id: 91176
date: 12/28/2006 21:43
refid: 06STATE203832
origin: Secretary of State
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5999
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHC #3832 3622147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 282143Z DEC 06
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 6550
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 7356
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 203832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
PLEASE PASS TO IRPO DUBAI AND AMEMBASSY ASTANA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2016
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, KDEM, AW, AF, AJ, AMB, FR, GG, GM, IR, IT, KZ, TI,
TU, UK, UZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN IRAN
Classified By: Classified by: DRL A/S Barry F. Lowenkron,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. This is an action request.
Please see para 5.
SUMMARY
——-
2. (C) This cable informs addressee posts that grantees from
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and the
Bureau of Near East Asian Affairs (NEA) may be operating in
their countries, alone or in cooperation with local NGOs, and
requests posts, support in assisting those grantees with
their crucial work on Iran, if approached. Posts may contact
NEA or DRL (para 5) for region-specific information or to
confirm the names of organizations working on these programs.
END SUMMARY.
BACKGROUND
———-
3. (C) Consistent with her objectives for Transformational
Diplomacy, the Secretary has approved an outreach plan to the
Iranian people as one of the Department,s highest foreign
policy priorities. DRL obligated
$3 million in FY05 and has
committed and will soon obligate $4.15 million in FY06. NEA,
via the Middle East Peace Initiative (MEPI), will obligate
$27 million in FY06 in support of grantee projects that will:
(1) foster democratic forces and promote civil society, (2)
promote respect for human rights, and (3) provide the Iranian
people with access to unbiased information.
4. (C) Given the regime,s continuing opposition to democracy
promotion in Iran, many grantees must operate from third
countries. Because of the
sensitive nature of our Iran
grantees, work, the Department protects their names;
however, NEA and DRL can confirm the names of specific groups
to posts, should questions arise about their bona fides (see
para 6).
ACTION REQUEST: ASSISTANCE TO IRAN GRANTEES
——————————————-
5. (C) Action: If the Department,s Iran grantees approach
U.S. missions abroad to inform them of their activities or of
the activities of locally based sub-grantees, the Department
asks that posts contact the Office of Iranian Affairs
(NEA/IR) (POC Rob McInturff: [email protected], tel.
202-647-2520, blackberry 202-701-3980) or the Department of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL/NESCA) (POC: Suzanne
Yountchi: [email protected], tel. 202-647-1423) to
confirm the status of the grants and request further
instructions. The Department
encourages posts to assist Iran
grantees with limited administrative requests, such as
submitting reports to Washington or confirming the status of
DRL or NEA funds, but asks that posts contact Washington for
additional guidance before assisting with any non-routine
tasks.
6. (C) Posts who would like more region-specific information
about Department-sponsored Iran programs should contact the
Office of Iranian Affairs (NEA/IR) for more information. The
Department thanks posts in advance for their cooperation with
this critical initiative.
RICE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 91619
date: 1/5/2007 12:15
refid: 07DUSHANBE34
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE2019
header:
VZCZCXRO0449
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0034/01 0051215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 051215Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9354
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1890
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1924
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1876
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1150
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0890
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000034
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA — FEIGENBAUM AND SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/5/2017
TAGS: PREL, EAID, EINV, ENRG, PGOV, OVIP, TI
SUBJECT: ENERGETIC FOREIGN MINISTER FULL OF IDEAS — PUSHING
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
REF: (A) 2006 DUSHANBE 2200; (B) 2006 DUSHANBE 2229; (C) 2006 DUSHANBE
2095; (D) 2006 DUSHANBE 2019
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary:
Tajik Foreign Minister Zaripov visited the
Embassy January 4 to sign the condolence book for President Ford
and ended up canceling his follow-on appointments to discuss a
number of issues with the Ambassador.
Zaripov asked the
Embassy’s assistance to accelerate and expand U.S. private
sector investment in Tajikistan’s hydropower sector. The
Minister also emphasized his pet project: achieving full
Millennium Challenge status for Tajikistan (ref B). Zaripov
outlined his plans for reorganizing the Foreign Ministry and
pushed for a quick decision on agrement for his replacement as
Ambassador to Washington (ref A).
Post will report septel on
Zaripov’s ambitious and positive ideas to maximize coverage of
the opening of the U.S. constructed bridge linking Tajikistan
and Afghanistan, possibly in August.
End summary.
Agrement for the new Tajik Ambassador
==============================
2. (C) Zaripov pressed us on a decision regarding
agrement
for Abdujabbor Shirinov as Tajikistan’s next ambassador to
Washington (ref A). Zaripov
explained that President Rahmonov
himself is anxious to see the appointment go forward quickly.
While Shirinov’s appointment to Washington is pending, Rahmonov
is holding off on appointing a chief of the newly created Agency
to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes.
Shirinov, who led the
former Financial Control Board, would be a leading candidate to
run that agency if his ambassadorship falls through. The
Ambassador explained that we forwarded all the agrement papers
immediately to the State Department, but since the nomination
happened just before the holiday season, the process was moving
slowly. Embassy requests an
update from Protocol on the likely
timing of a response to the Tajik request for agrement.
Energizing the Hydropower Sector
========================
3. (C) Zaripov noted that President Rahmonov met
with
Pakistani Prime Minster Shaukat Aziz while they were both in
Ashgabat for President Niyazov’s funeral. According to Zaripov,
Shaukat Aziz promised to visit Dushanbe before March. (Note:
The Pakistani Ambassador here has told us Islamabad has not
decided on dates for a visit. End
note.) During the
Rahmonov-Aziz meeting, the two leaders focused on hydropower and
the eventual transmission of Tajik power through Afghanistan to
Pakistan. The two leaders decided
between themselves,
apparently without the benefit of technical experts, that the
proposed 500 kV transmission line should be increased to 750 kV
and be extended from Pakistan to India.
Zaripov encouraged the
Embassy to pressure the American firm AES to step up its
activities in Tajikistan.
Tajikistan wants AES to build the
transmission line (bigger than the 500 kV line discussed
previously) and «at least one generation station» as
well. The
Ambassador explained that the U.S. Government is in touch with
AES but cannot drive its decisions.
The timetable set at the
October energy conference in Dushanbe (ref D) aims for
completion of technical and commercial feasibility studies by
June. After the studies are
completed, AES may decide to invest
in a transmission line project, but construction of a hydropower
station is a longer term goal and will depend in large part on
the investment climate in Tajikistan.
Millennium Challenge — Fighting Corruption
================================
4. (C) Zaripov reiterated his desire (ref B) to
achieve full
Millennium Challenge status for Tajikistan. He joked that he
would gladly trade registration of the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) (a frequent Embassy request) for Millennium
Challenge status, but quickly explained that both issues are
related to democratic reform. The
Ambassador emphasized that
DUSHANBE 00000034 002 OF 003
achieving Millennium Challenge status will require significant
efforts in fighting corruption.
To establish his own
anti-corruption credentials, Zaripov explained that while
serving as Ambassador for almost ten years, he has been the
highest paid Tajik official, and yet upon returning to Dushanbe
he can afford only a one-bedroom apartment. How do his fellow
countrymen afford such luxurious homes, he wondered, pointing to
some newly constructed mansions visible from the Ambassador’s
window. Zaripov assured the
Ambassador that President Rahmonov
was very serious on fighting corruption as evidenced by the
creation of the new Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic
Crimes and many public and private statements. The Ambassador
said more action and actual results will be needed, and Zaripov
outlined the president’s consideration of a change in the
Customs structure. The new
Customs chief has promised the
president that he will increase official customs revenues this
year by $35 million if given sufficient authority to tackle
corruption problems. The
Ambassador agreed that the Embassy
will resend Tajikistan’s Millennium Challenge scorecard (ref C)
to the Ministry and follow up with working level meetings to
design an action plan for Tajikistan to eventually meet the
Millennium Challenge criteria.
Restructuring the Ministry
==================
5. (C) Zaripov explained that his reorganization
plans would
require approval by the president and the parliament. (Note:
the latter is a legal nicety; such questions, including
decisions requiring expenditures of resources, are typically in
the hands of the presidency. End
note.) The Minister’s plans
include doubling the size of the Tajik diplomatic corps, from
110 foreign service officers to 220.
This will allow him to
create separate offices, for example, for the Americas, Western
Europe, and Eastern Europe.
Currently all three important
regions are served by a small two-person section — competent
but overstretched. Zaripov is
also seeking approval for plans
to build a new Foreign Ministry building with conference space
and other amenities absent from the current location, which is
shared with the Parliament. The
building is still in the design
phase, but Zaripov is zeroing in on a site near the new
presidential palace. The Minister
also reported he plans to
organize a foreign missions office «similar to the State
Department’s set-up» to provide a full range of services for the
embassies resident in Dushanbe.
Expanding on the plans,
however, he described a unit more akin to the old Soviet «Dip
Corps Directorate» (UpDK) which tightly controlled where
diplomats could live, shop, and recreate.
COMMENT
=========
6. (C) Tajik authorities only half believe us when
we explain
that the U.S. Government cannot direct private investment toward
Tajikistan. We regularly
emphasize that only an improvement in
the investment climate and tackling the corruption problems will
spur significant increases in U.S. investment and business.
However, the counter-example of large-scale Chinese and Iranian
investment with no apparent conditionality undermines our
argument. Russian investors are
somewhere in between: Kremlin
politics exert an influence, but commercial viability is still a
key concern.
7. (C) We welcome Zaripov’s personal quest to
achieve
Millennium Challenge status — the first time any Tajik official
has appeared serious about the possibility. It is unclear
whether Zaripov understands the significant requirements for
improved governance and doubtful he will have the stamina or
clout to see through all the necessary reforms. But progress
along the way could have real payoffs in terms of improving
democratic reform, fighting corruption, and improving the
business climate.
8. (C) Underneath Zaripov’s smooth style, polished
by years as
the Ambassador to Vienna and Washington, we occasionally glimpse
his old KGB training. Perhaps
Zaripov sees his proposal for a
foreign missions office serving the functions of the Soviet-era
«Dip Corps Directorate» (UpDK) — including close oversight of
DUSHANBE 00000034 003 OF 003
foreign diplomats — as a means to take that function away from
the State Committee on National Security. More likely it is
simply a case of old-think, in which problems are resolved by
exerting more control. Our
initial impressions of Zaripov as
minister, however, are largely positive.
He is certainly more
energetic and proactive than his predecessor had been during
recent years; yet his ministry must still compete with other
influential ministries including security. Cooperating with
Zaripov on his more progressive agenda, such as pursuit of the
Millennium Challenge goals and encouraging investment, may open
up some opportunities for real reform.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 91878
date: 1/9/2007 12:23
refid: 07DUSHANBE43
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2900
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0043/01 0091223
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 091223Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9363
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1879
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0917
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000043
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ECA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/9/2032
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EINV, ETRD, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK BANKING DINNER TURNS INTO SERIOUS TALK TO RESOLVE
COMMERICAL DISPUTE
REF: 06 DUSHANBE 2243
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary:
In Tajikistan, singing and dancing alongside
the President’s brother-in-law while discussing business earns
the United States diplomatic goodwill.
At a private dinner
January 8 to talk about banking supervision and economic reform,
President Rahmonov’s brother-in-law Hasan Sadulloev and the
deputy director of the Tajik state Aluminum company (TadAZ),
Sherali Kabirov pressed the Ambassador with their side of the
Gerald Metals dispute, emphasizing the strides Tajikistan had
made in improving the investment climate. The Ambassador
underscored the need for TadAZ to communicate directly with
Gerald Metals and encouraged a resolution similar to the one
made with Norwegian Aluminum giant Norsk Hydro (reftel) in
December. Sadulloev and his
companions stressed the need for
education assistance, particularly in English, and welcomed the
establishment of an American Chamber of Commerce in Dushanbe as
an important step to attract foreign investment. They thanked
the Ambassador for the opportunity «to sit at the same table and
talk about real issues» and applauded Embassy participation in
the evening’s traditional dance and music program.
2. (C) Comment: Face time and personal rapport
matter a great
deal in Tajikistan; the dinner provided an important opportunity
to bond with a key member of Rahmonov’s inner circle, and some
of the most forward-leaning economic officials. Underlining the
importance of developing «personal relationships,» the Tajik
hosts lauded Assistant Secretary Boucher’s attendance at the
December 24 funeral of Turkmen President Niyazov and his meeting
with President Rahmonov. They
noted with disappointment that
European countries failed to send a representative to
Turkmenistan. The United States
cannot compete with China or
Russian in terms of investment, but we can remain solidly
engaged with Tajikistan through personal interaction at all
levels, including high-level visitors from Washington. Should
Sadulloev participate in the Department’s Interanational
Visitors Program on banking as hoped— he has promised to inform
us of his schedule within the week— we ask that Washington give
special attention to this influential visitor.
3. (C) Norsk Hydro’s success may provide a model for
Gerald
Metals to resolve its dispute with TadAZ, but only if Gerald
Metals recognizes that it will need to put in the effort to
establish a less confrontational working relationship. Post
will meet with TadAZ to flesh out concrete steps to bring the
two sides closer together. End
Summary and Comment.
4. (C) Sadulloev’s invitation
came in response to the
Ambassador’s request to discuss his participation in a Banking
Supervision International Visitors program. As the head of
Tajikistan’s largest commercial bank, Orionbank, Sadulloev’s
influence extends beyond his status as «First Brother-in-Law»
—
husband of President Rahmonov’s younger sister. Other guests
included Mahmadamin Mahmadaminov, head of the Tajik State
Savings bank Amonatbank, Sherali
Kabirov, Deputy Director of
TadAZ, and TadAZ lawyer (and former USAID commercial law project
officer) Akbar Muratov. (Comment:
Sadulloev and Kabirov are
close friends, but Kabirov’s presence, along with the TadAZ
legal advisor, immediately suggested that the dinner
conversation would be about more than banking. End Comment.)
DOWN TO BUSINESS: TADAZ
5. (C) The discussion quickly
turned to TadAZ’s recent
settlement with Norsk Hydro over a $150 million dispute.
Kabirov noted that TadAZ is repaying Norsk with aluminum out of
its current profits, and is also suing the London-based trading
company Ansol to try to recover some of the lost funds.
6. (C) Kabirov asked if he could
brief the Ambassador on the
state of affairs with Gerald Metals.
«I know Gerald Metals has
said a lot of bad things about us in Washington, but the money
they lost didn’t end up in TadAZ’s pockets.» Gerald Metals
signed an agreement with previous TadAZ management and Ansol
that Kabirov claims was never valid because it failed to go
through an interagency approval process. (Note: One of the major
DUSHANBE 00000043 002 OF 002
sticking points between Gerald Metals and the Tajik government
has been that the government must honor all contracts signed by
state-owned enterprises. End Note.)
7. (C) Kabirov noted that Gerald
Metals has lost every hearing
and appeal to date, in Tajikistan and London, and predicted the
upcoming January 18 hearing in Moscow would be no different. He
stated clearly that TadAZ was open to negotiating with Gerald
Metals, and finding a solution similar to that with Norsk Hydro.
Would a phone call with Gerald
Metals start the negotiation
process? Kabirov wrinkled his nose. «It’s too hard to
communicate on the phone — and they’ve never bothered to come
out here.» In contrast, he noted that Norsk Hydro visited
Dushanbe several times. Sadulloev
suggested that during the
banking international visitor program in February, he or
Mahmadaminov could meet with Gerald Metals and invite them to
Dushanbe, «to sit at the table, like we are now,» he proposed.
8. (C) Kabirov boasted to PolOff
about TadAZ’s significant
accomplishments in 2006.
«Not just the Norsk deal,» he said.
The aluminum plant registered record production, upped salaries
by 40%, paid their electricity bills and introduced
international standards of bookkeeping and accounting. «We are
working towards becoming a real international company,» he said
with pride. (Note: Kabirov came
on board as deputy director in
2004, after the previous director absconded. End Note.)
WELCOME, AMCHAM!
9. (C) Sadulloev and the others called the establishment of an
American Chamber of Commerce an important sign for international
investors that Tajikistan was open for business. They brushed
off concerns that the Tajik Chamber of Trade and Industry may
feel threatened by the American Chamber of Commerce and pose
bureaucratic hurdles. «The Tajik Chamber belongs to the old
Soviet economic system,» said Sadulloev. He agreed the
«American Chamber of Commerce» was a brand name that would
help
draw investors to Dushanbe.
«The Tajik Chamber will not oppose
this,» assured Mahmadaminov.
EDUCATION AND ENGLISH
10. (C) President Rahmonov placed
great importance on educating
the next generation of Tajiks, reported Sadulloev. Kabirov
believes that English, not Russian, is much more important for
Tajik students, and lamented the lack of good English language
opportunities in Tajikistan. He
praised Kazakhstan for
providing thousands of scholarships to Western universities, but
noted that the Tajik budget could not support that effort and
relied on other countries to help with exchanges.
BUSINESS CLIMATE
11. (C) The only other guests (in
a restaurant rumored to be a
Sadulloev favorite for its singers and dancers) were a party of
Chinese energy experts, hosted by Sharifhon Samiev, head of
Barqi Tojik, the state-owned electrical utility. Sadulloev
reported that in addition to the 120 MW Yavan hydropower station
project expected to be announced during Rahmonov’s January 15-21
visit to China, the Chinese were considering building another
four hydropower stations.
12. (C) The Ambassador emphasized
that the United States could
not directly finance infrastructure projects, like the Chinese,
but instead tried to attract private investment by helping
countries reform their business and investment climates.
Sadulloev and the others agreed that corruption and excessive
bureaucracy still made Western investors nervous.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 91879
date: 1/9/2007 12:26
refid: 07DUSHANBE44
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE34
header:
VZCZCXRO2906
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0044/01 0091226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 091226Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9365
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1929
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1967
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0919
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000044
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA FEIGENBAUMAND DEUTSCH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/9/2017
TAGS: PREL, EAID, MASS, KPAO, TI, AF
SUBJECT: TAJIK FOREIGN MINISTER PITCHES HIGH PROFILE BRIDGE OPENING
REF: DUSHANBE 34
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Summary: In a January 4 meeting with the Ambassador
(reftel), Tajik Foreign Minister Zaripov proposed a high profile
opening for the United States Government funded bridge linking
Tajikistan and Afghanistan across the Pyanj river. The Embassy
fully supports a strong public diplomacy package for the bridge
opening, estimated for August 2007, and requests Department
action to line up high-level attendees from both the
Administration and Congress.
Additional public diplomacy and
security coordination will be required with Embassies Kabul and
Islamabad to maximize the regional impact of the opening. The
bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj is the largest United States Government
funded infrastructure project in Tajikistan (one of the largest
Army Corps of Engineers projects in the world) and will serve as
a physical and symbolic link between Central Asia and South Asia
through Afghanistan. See action
request in para 6. End
summary.
Opening Day
===========
2. (SBU) Foreign Minister Zaripov
asked the Ambassador to
confirm that the USG-funded bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj, linking
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, would open as planned in summer
2007. Referring to the most
recent reports from our engineering
team at the bridge site, the Ambassador reported that the bridge
completion has already slipped from the June target date due to
repeated delays in delivery of cement from the state-owned Tajik
cement factory. Even since the
latest «resolution» of the
cement issue, the contractors have received approximately only
two-thirds of the required deliveries.
The Ambassador suggested
August would be a safe target for an opening ceremony provided
Tajikistan keeps to its cement delivery commitments, and noted
that Washington officials tend to travel more in August as well.
Zaripov promised to do what he
could to facilitate the bridge
project, including pushing for on-time cement deliveries.
Zaripov agreed that both sides should aim for the bridge opening
in August.
Playing to the Crowd
===============
3. (C) Zaripov’s proposal for the bridge opening
includes
attendance by both President Rahmonov and President Karzai. The
twosome had attended the project’s groundbreaking ceremony in
2005, and Zaripov noted that Karzai’s New Year greeting to
Rahmonov mentioned the bridge opening this summer. Zaripov
asked what U.S. officials would attend and suggested including
members of Congress. Tied to the
ribbon cutting ceremony,
Zaripov envisions launching a convoy of ten or more commercial
trucks loaded with Tajik export goods and accompanied by
international media. The convoy
would cross the bridge to
Afghanistan, travel through Kunduz, the Salang Tunnel, Kabul,
and Kandahar and proceed through Baluchistan to either Karachi
or Gwadar on the Pakistani coast.
This trip of 3000 kilometers
to an Indian Ocean port is dramatically less than the 7000
kilometers trade goods currently have to travel to the Baltic
Sea. Accompanying the convoy
would be representatives of
international media, covering the stories of the bridge opening,
Afghanistan’s new roads, and regional integration in general.
4. (C) Even before we could raise the issue, Zaripov
recognized the difficulties posed by security conditions in
southern Afghanistan. He asked
that the United States or the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) «guarantee» the
security of the convoy, describing his vision of helicopter and
troop escorts. We acknowledged
the potential security issues
and offered to raise these issues with Washington and our
embassies in Kabul and Islamabad.
5. (C) Comment:
Zaripov evidently learned a lot about public
relations during his time as Ambassador in Washington. He
understands that the bridge opening represents a tremendous
opportunity to highlight Tajikistan’s role in the region and its
relevance to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and greater Central
Asia. His ideas about publicizing
the opening of the bridge
DUSHANBE 00000044 002 OF 002
strike us as being right on target.
The bridge opening provides
an unparalleled opportunity to demonstrate in concrete terms the
benefits of regional integration between Central and South Asia.
We understand the most difficult
part of these arrangements
will be security for a commercial and media convoy through
southern Afghanistan and Baluchistan.
Although road security
conditions in August are difficult to predict at present, a
preliminary assessment would help move plans forward. End
Comment.
6. (C) Action Request: Post recommends the Department begin
work now to identify appropriate high-level administration
official(s) and member(s) of Congress to participate in an
August event. We would also need
assistance attracting
appropriate international media to the opening events and
coordinating a multi-day convoy from Tajikistan, through
Afghanistan and Pakistan to the coast.
Embassy Kabul’s
assistance will be required both to accommodate President
Karzai’s participation as well as to make appropriate security
arrangements with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan National
Army for the proposed convoy.
Embassy Islamabad and ConGen
Karachi would also be involved.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 91885
date: 1/9/2007 13:10
refid: 07DUSHANBE45
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE1846|07DUSHANBE45
header:
VZCZCXRO3014
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0045/01 0091310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091310Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9367
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0921
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0114
RUEAUSA/AMEMBASSY NETHERLANDS PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1931
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1969
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1955
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000045
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EINV, EFIN, EAID, PGOV, TIUZ
SUBJECT: IT’S ONLY NATURAL — TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN AGREE ON GAS
TRADE
REF: 06 DUSHANBE 1846
DUSHANBE 00000045 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) Summary. On December 27, 2006, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan reached lopsided agreements on trade of natural gas
and electricity. While the
electricity swapping arrangement
favoring Uzbekistan will continue, the new natural gas agreement
nearly doubles the price of gas paid by Tajikistan. Unable to
measure consumer use and collect payments, Tajik Gas is
installing gas meters around the country. Many Tajiks receive
only two hours of gas a day, and in outlying regions have
received none in over a month.
The government intends to
partially subsidize increased energy costs in 2007, but poor
Tajiks await a frosty year. End
summary.
———————————
If This is the Good News~
———————————
2. (U) On December 27, 2006,
Uzbekistan agreed to deliver 600
million kilowatt-hours of electricity from January to March to
Tajikistan. In payment,
Tajikistan will supply 900 million
kilowatt-hours next summer to Uzbekistan. In effect, Uzbekistan
receives $0.015 per kilowatt-hour, while Tajikistan receives
$0.010 per kilowatt-hour for its electricity, the same rates as
in 2006. With its hydropower
plants producing surplus energy
during the summer and deficits in the winter, and absent
transmission lines to Afghanistan, Tajikistan has no alternative
to selling its electricity at a lesser price to Uzbekistan.
——————
The Bad News
——————
3. (SBU) On the same day, the
Uzbek state gas company,
Uztransgaz, agreed to supply 700 million cubic meters of natural
gas to Tajikistan at $100 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2007, a $45
increase over the previous year.
This price increase mirrors
new Uzbek agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. According
to First Deputy Director of Tajik Gas Shavkat Shoimov, Tajik Gas
plans on charging end consumers $130-$140 per 1,000 cubic
meters. This price increase will
hit Tajik consumers hard. If
poor consumers in rural areas are unable to pay their increased
bills, Tajik Gas might cut them off from the already-minimal
flow. Response to the increase
has been muted, as Tajik
consumers in rural areas have yet to hear about the new prices.
4. (SBU) Shoimov told EmbOffs
January 4 that the price increase
will make it even more difficult for Tajik Gas to collect on
bills. In 2006, the overall
collection rate in Tajikistan was
70%, while the rate in Dushanbe was 50%, due to the difficulty
in shutting off power to individuals within blocs of non-payers
in the capital. Outside the
capital, Tajik Gas takes a blanket
approach and simply cuts off gas to entire rural districts for
non-payment, leaving large portions of the country without gas
but improving Tajik Gas’s collection rate.
5. (SBU) Tajikistan’s major
industrial natural gas consumers
previously received generous pricing and will face hefty rate
hikes, perhaps paying the same rate as other consumers,
according to Shoimov. The
Dushanbe Power Heating Station, the
Tajik aluminum plant (TadAZ), VATZ Chemical Plant, and Tajik
Cement in Dushanbe, all rely heavily on gas for their
operations. The VATZ plant near
Kurgan-tube is the largest user
of natural gas in Tajikistan, creating fertilizer for domestic
use and export (reftel). With
input costs as much as doubling,
the company will struggle to compete with foreign competitors
that receive natural gas more cheaply, including a
soon-to-be-completed fertilizer plant in Turkmenistan.
————————-
The Forecast: Sunny but Cold
————————-
6. (U) The World Bank’s Energy
Loss Reduction Project is
providing $1.5 million to help reduce the commercial losses in
the gas system and improve the financial viability of the
utility. The project will supply
and install gas meters, revamp
the financial and billing systems, and help establish an
industry-standard gas agreement with Uzbekistan. Tajik Gas is
seeking additional loan funds from the World Bank to computerize
its aging gas distribution network.
The company has finished
installing gas meters covering 70% of Tajik territory, and plans
on completing nationwide installation by June 2007.
DUSHANBE 00000045 002.2 OF 002
7. (SBU) Until Tajik Gas improves
its collection rate, it will
continue to struggle with its finances.
In 2006, Tajik Gas
received 620 million cubic meters of gas, paying for 90% of it.
In September 2006, Uztransgaz cut off natural gas to Tajikistan
due to $4.5 million payment arrears.
According to Shoimov,
Tajik Gas took out a $1.5 million loan from Orien Bank at 20%
interest to pay their debt in part to the Uzbeks, but has yet to
begin repayment to the bank.
(Note: Orien Bank is owned by the
«First Brother-in-Law» of President Rahmonov, Hasan Sadulloev.
This helps explain why a state-owned utility would borrow from a
private bank at such an exorbitant rate.
End note.) In 2006,
the Tajik government subsidized vulnerable populations with a 10
million Somoni subsidy ($3.4 million), and the 2007 budget
includes increased energy subsidies.
However, with the massive
rate increases, it is likely that rural Tajiks will remain
gasless.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 93078
date: 1/19/2007 7:33
refid: 07DUSHANBE121
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2370
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0121/01 0190733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190733Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9457
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1920
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1935
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1977
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1957
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1029
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000121
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
EMBASSY TASHKENT FOR JOHN BALLARD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: A TRUE TRAVEL STORY FROM HELL
DUSHANBE 00000121 001.2 OF 003
1. SUMMARY: With 67 returning Kazakh hajjis and nearly
one
hundred tired and hungry expats on board, Turkish Airlines
flight 1344 bound for Dushanbe, Tajikistan, could not land for
nearly two days due to fog, rain and snow, uncooperative Central
Asian governments, indecisive Turkish Airlines representatives
and aggressive passengers. On
January 11, after the plane
failed its first attempt to land at Dushanbe airport at six in
the morning due to poor visibility, the flight diverted to
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Unlucky
Dushanbe PolOff describes a
travel disaster that could only occur in Central Asia. END
SUMMARY.
2. A commercial plane flew
between Dushanbe and Tashkent for
the first time since 1994 — the last regularly scheduled flight
between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
Turkish Airlines flight 1344
bound for Dushanbe attempted to land three times at Dushanbe
airport, but failed due to heavy fog.
Many other incoming
flights to Dushanbe were directed to smaller local airports
where Tajik and Russian pilots were brave enough to attempt
landing in heavy fog on poor runways.
The Turkish Airlines
pilot chose to rely on his multi-million dollar equipment to
tell him that he could not see well enough to land that day and
diverted instead to Tashkent — not once but three times. By
the time the plane returned to Tashkent airport after the last
attempt, it was eight in the evening and Uzbek authorities
refused to allow passengers to disembark to the transit lounge.
Passengers had endured the plane for nearly twenty hours with
only a brief break in the Tashkent transit lounge earlier in the
day. Most had been en route for
more than twenty hours,
including one passenger who began traveling from San Francisco
two days earlier.
ANGRY KAZAKHS OR HAJJI HIJACKERS?
3. After failing for the third
time to land in Dushanbe and
returning to Tashkent for refueling, a group of Kazakhs
returning from hajj demanded that the flight be redirected to
Almaty, having already missed their connecting flight in
Dushanbe (COMMENT: Who connects through Dushanbe? Fire my
travel agent! END COMMENT). Turkish Airlines representatives,
eager to accommodate passengers, entered into a negotiation with
the Kazakhs. The Hajjis persuaded
Turkish Air reps that flying
to Almaty would allow passengers to easily obtain visas, spend
the night in a hotel, and catch connecting flights to Dushanbe.
After succeeding to get Uzbek authorities to allow the plane to
change its flight plan and fly over Uzbek airspace into
Kazakhstan, the plan failed when Kazakhstan refused entry for
the plane.
4. Unlike earlier in the day,
Uzbek airport authorities refused
to allow passengers off the plane onto the slightly more
comfortable concrete floor of the Soviet-era transit lounge.
Even passengers holding valid Uzbek visas were not allowed to
exit the transit lounge. Past
midnight, flight attendants
announced that whatever food was left would be rationed, women
and children first. Passengers
raised their eyebrows, then
raised their blood sugar level by breaking out and sharing
stashes of chocolate, beef jerky, and bottles of wine.
5. When the pilot announced on
the intercom that the plane,
having no other alternative and with the Uzbeks pressuring it to
leave the airport, would return to Istanbul, the angry Kazakhs
rushed towards the cockpit. A
blue-eyed woman covered in an
abaya led the charge and demanded to return to Almaty.
Passengers allegedly heard some verbal threats including forcing
the pilot to change course towards Almaty in mid-air. Turkish
Airlines employees had clearly lost control of the situation and
many passengers genuinely feared a dangerous situation brewing.
Earlier in the flight, several hajjis proselytized fellow
passengers and chastised them for drinking wine, causing many to
be unnerved. Several passengers
later called the U.S. Embassy
in Dushanbe, insisting the Kazakhs be arrested for «hijacking»
the plane. The argument with the
Kazakhs continued, despite the
fact that their own government refused the plane landing rights.
They even woke the Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the
problem, but the attempts were futile.
6. At three o’clock in the
morning, passengers were allowed
into the transit lounge where they slept on the floor and in
chairs, with the promise that more news would be forthcoming at
five o’clock, almost 24 hours after they should have landed in
Dushanbe. Five o’clock became
eight o’clock. Without clear
DUSHANBE 00000121 002.2 OF 003
information from Turkish Airlines, the rumor mill churned at
full blast and travelers became desperate. A group of about ten
American citizens, including Dushanbe PolOff, gathered to
discuss a united strategy.
Knowing full well the Uzbek
government was unlikely to grant visas to Americans, the group
decided to advocate for a last attempt to land in Dushanbe or
return to Istanbul, with or without the Kazakhs. After PolOff’s
negotiations with the Turkish Airlines representative, Turkish
Airlines decided to proceed to Dushanbe in one last landing
attempt. If that attempt should
fail, the plane would then head
back to Istanbul where passengers would receive food, lodging
and a flight back to Dushanbe.
7. Not so fast. The Kazakh problem remained. The Kazakh
embassy was able to provide the Kazakhs land transportation back
to Almaty and other cities, however, the Kazakh passengers would
not depart without their baggage from the plane. Uzbek airport
authorities did not have permission to remove baggage not marked
with Tashkent as its final destination.
Local embassies
pressured the authorities into making an exception and allow the
baggage off so the other passengers could continue.
8. Embassies in Tashkent made
valiant efforts to the assist
their citizens, including the U.S. Embassy which provided
constant support and information.
However, due to the Uzbek
government’s hostile attitude and inflexibility, some embassy
representatives, including from the American Embassy, were not
even permitted in the transit lounge.
YOU WILL FLY US SOMEWHERE!
9. At one o’clock in the
afternoon, after successfully
negotiating with airport authorities to unload the Kazakh
baggage, Turkish Airlines announced it would begin to board
passengers for a two o’clock departure.
Passengers hurried as
the plane only had a one hour time frame at three o’clock with
adequate landing visibility. At
this point, a British travel
writer leading a group of European Union citizens restrained the
Turkish Air representative and prevented him from preparing for
departure. They demanded he sign
a yellow piece of notebook
paper with nothing but the names and passport numbers of all the
EU passengers on it. They wanted
assurance that Turkish Air
would provide meals, lodging and a return flight for all
passengers, but the paper had no words to that effect.
10. Knowing the document would
have no legal bearing, PolOff
and other Americans urged the Europeans to back down, follow the
plan and allow Turkish Airlines to do its job. Many Europeans
had bought into a rumor that Turkish Airlines was conspiring to
secretly fly the passengers straight back to Istanbul, where
SIPDIS
they would strand the passengers and abandon all responsibility.
The Europeans wanted to land
later in the evening when they
thought the weather might have cleared.
If it hadn’t, they
hoped to return to Uzbekistan, where they assumed they would be
able to receive visas on a Friday evening. (COMMENT: Fat
chance! They would have probably ended another night in the
transit terminal. For many
Americans with no hope at a visa and
families with children who did not want to suffer another night
in the transit lounge, this was not a viable option. END
COMMENT.) The issue soon took on
an EU versus America
undertone, and after several minutes of heated debate in a scrum
and two o’clock in the afternoon drawing near, PolOff freed the
sweat-drenched Turkish Airlines representative to get the flight
moving.
11. During the flight back to
Dushanbe, the entire plane, sans
the Kazakhs, was silent and tense.
After circling Dushanbe for
a few minutes, the plane descended and successfully landed in
Dushanbe with passengers cheering with gratitude and immense
relief. The plane made the
one-hour time frame with eight
minutes to spare, almost 16 hours after it was originally
scheduled to land. Shortly after
wheels down, heavy snowfall
hit Dushanbe.
12. COMMENT: The majority of foreigners traveling in and
out
of Tajikistan often opt for the twice a week Turkish Airlines
flight, a comfortable plane that doesn’t serve hardboiled eggs
and neon green sodas. However,
even Turkish Airlines cannot
thrive in a region whose governments impose political and
bureaucratic barriers and are inflexible to accommodating
emergency situations. The Turkish
Airlines representative in
Uzbekistan confided to PolOff that he found working in Central
DUSHANBE 00000121 003.2 OF 003
Asia to be extremely difficult and was looking forward to
leaving. Clearly this is not the
first time he has had to deal
with difficult airport authorities.
Scaring away western and
private companies, particularly those that provide transport
links, only impedes economic development in the region. END
COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 93140
date: 1/19/2007 12:10
refid: 07DUSHANBE124
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07STATE6178303
header:
VZCZCXRO2654
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0124/01 0191210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191210Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9465
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1923
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1895
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1829
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1153
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1037
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1980
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1938
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1773
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0116
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1960
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1572
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1591
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1881
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0116
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 DUSHANBE 000124
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GEHRENBECK), EB/IFD/OIA (HATCHER), EUR/ACE, DEPT FOR
USTR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EINV, EFIN, ETRD, ELAB, KTDB, OPIC, USTR, TI
SUBJECT: 2007 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT FOR TAJIKISTAN
REF: STATE 06 178303
DUSHANBE 00000124 001.2 OF 010
1. (U) Following is our submission per the referenced telegram
for the 2007 Investment Climate Statement for Tajikistan.
———-
BEGIN TEXT
———-
2006 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT — TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan presents selected opportunities for savvy investors
who are willing to put in significant research and effort into
market development activities.
Tajikistan lagged behind other
Soviet republics economically and remains the poorest of the
former Soviet republics and one of the poorest countries in the
world. The Tajik government has
shown interest in attracting
foreign investment but seems unsure of how to implement much
needed economic reforms, including the incorporation of the
country’s considerable gray economy and sizeable remittances.
The Tajik government has committed to addressing Tajikistan’s
internal and external isolation, but progress is slow. In
addition, corruption and rent-seeking in Tajikistan is still
high. Until Tajikistan addresses
internal infrastructure
impediments to investment, the system will not attract or
support significant growth in Foreign Direct Investment.
Openness to Foreign Investment
————————————
Although the Government of Tajikistan is hungry for foreign
investments, through 2004 it was only able to attract on average
$27 million per annum. President
Rahmonov has made numerous
public and private statements, calling for foreign investment,
particularly in the hydropower sector.
However, his
administration has yet to fully implement key reforms and
regulations to create an attractive business climate. The Tajik
Government still burdens the private sector with unnecessary
costs and creates substantial uncertainty and risk through
non-transparent practices and unjustified barriers to
competition.
Major opportunities for investment exist in the hydropower, food
processing, construction, and consumer goods sectors.
To accelerate flow of foreign investments the Government of
Tajikistan adopted a Law on Foreign Investments in 1992.
Although this law establishes the general investment conditions,
it has many gaps and contradicts other legislative acts.
According to existing legislation, foreign investments can be
made through acquisitions, mergers, and takeovers by:
— Owning a share in existing
companies, either jointly with
other Tajik companies or Tajik citizens;
— Creating fully
foreign-owned companies under the laws of
Tajikistan;
— Acquiring assets,
including shares and other securities;
— Acquiring the right for
use of land and other mineral
resources, as well as exercising other property rights either
independently or in shared with other Tajik companies and
citizens of Tajikistan;
— Concluding agreements with
legal entities and citizens of
Tajikistan providing for other forms of foreign investment
activity;
The judicial system recognizes sanctity of contracts; however
contract enforcement is poor, due in part to general inadequate
legal awareness and a non-independent court system. While
Tajikistan is party to a number of arbitration agreements and
conventions, it does not have its own internationally recognized
arbitration system. The courts do
not always respect or uphold
international arbitration rulings.
The Tajik Government’s Economic Development Strategy for
2005-2015 emphasizes economic and industrial growth. The
Strategy has no discriminatory effects on foreign-owned
DUSHANBE 00000124 002.2 OF 010
investors. According to the Civil
Code (Article 1) there are no
legal discriminations against foreign companies and foreign
entities. Practically all
international agreements of
Tajikistan have a provision for most favored nations regime
(climate).
Foreign investors can acquire up to 50-year land-use rights,
although all land belongs to the state.
There are no legal
limitations for foreign investors to buy shares on the local
stock exchange. The law on
foreign investments guarantees
foreign investors’ right to buy shares on the local market,
according to the procedures set forth by the Ministry of
Finance. Foreign investors’
activity on the stock exchange is
regulated by the Law on Security and Exchanges which in turn
refers to the Law on Foreign Investments. The foreign
investments law has no articles that regulate professional
activity of foreign investors on stock exchange.
In December 2006, the Government of Tajikistan created a new
Committee on Investments and State Property. Top officials
claim this will be dedicated to attracting foreign investment,
but as of January 2007, no decisions regarding the committee’s
authority have been made.
There are no established criteria to screen investment
proposals. Instead of working
with delegated investment
promotion agency, a potential investor has to go through a
lengthy screening process by all concerned government agencies.
In practice, a proposed statement of foreign investments
forwarded to the Government of Tajikistan is circulated among
the relevant government offices and ministries with instruction
to review and express their formal no-objection statement. If a
certain ministry of the government objects to the proposed
investment activity statement it forwards an official note to
the attention of the Government.
The criteria for scre
