id: 89856
date:
12/18/2006 5:07
refid:
06DUSHANBE2222
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
06STATE175925
header:
VZCZCXRO7284
RR
RUEHDBU
DE
RUEHDBU #2222/01 3520507
ZNR UUUUU
ZZH
R 180507Z
DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9243
INFO
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0759
——————
header ends —————-
UNCLAS
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002222
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR
SCA/CEN
E.O.
12958: N/A
TAGS:
ASEC, EFIN, KCRM, KPAO, PTER, KHLS, AEMR
SUBJECT:
TAJIKISTAN: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
REF:
STATE 175925
1. (SBU)
Per ref request, Post provides Tajikistan’s 2006
country
report on terrorism.
2. (SBU)
Sharing a 1,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan,
Tajikistan
is well aware of the negative effects of
state-sponsored
terrorism and offered its limited resources to
assist
the United States almost unconditionally.
Following the
deployment
of U.S. troops to Afghanistan, Tajikistan allowed its
territory
and air space to be used for counterterrorist actions.
The Tajik Government’s main impediment to
counterterrorism
performance
remains its lack of resources. The fact
that
Tajikistan
remains the poorest of all the former Soviet
republics,
and per GDP the ninth poorest country in the world,
puts
these funding issues into context. There
were no terrorist
acts
committed against U.S. citizens in Tajikistan during 2006.
3.
(SBU) While Tajikistan is not known to
harbor any terrorist
groups,
some analysts believe that extremists transit Tajikistan
to and
from Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the
1,400 kilometer
Tajik-Afghan
border is porous, the border guards are slowly
working
to control it. The U.S. Government spent
over $5.8
million
in 2006 to train and equip the Tajik Border Guards in
order to
increase their border-patrolling capabilities; these
programs
were implemented through International
Narcotics and
Law
Enforcement (INL), Export, Customs and Border Security
Assistance
(EXBS) Office, and the Office of Defense Cooperation
(ODC). These border fortifications and related
capacity-building
assistance will help stem the flow of
potential
terrorists attempting to cross the border and allow
Tajikistan
to better monitor its own borders.
4. (SBU) Within the framework of the war on
terrorism,
Tajikistan
prohibited extremist-oriented activities and closely
monitored
terrorist groups like the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
(IMU) and extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).
HT, an
extremist political movement advocating the establishment
of a
theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslim
world. The Government of Tajikistan believes HT is also active
in
Tajikistan, particularly in the northern part of the country,
which is
a part of the Fergana Valley.. In May
2006, a small
group of
armed bandits attacked Tajik and Kyrgyz border posts.
The
fighters killed and seized several weapons, including 17
Kalashnikov
assault rifles, a PK light machine-gun and 3,000
rounds of
ammunition. The date of the attack
coincided with the
one-year
anniversary of the Andijan uprising in Uzbekistan,
which led
authorities to believe that the IMU was responsible
for these
attacks. Kyrgyz security services killed
four
militants
during the attack and arrested one other.
Tajik
authorities
later convicted seven IMU members for their
participation
in the attacks.
5. (SBU) While the United States has no evidence
that HT has
committed
acts of international terrorism, the group’s radical
anti-American
and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts
of
violence against the United States and its allies. In 2005,
approximately
74 members of HT were arrested and 44 HT activists
arrested
the previous year were convicted and sentenced to
prison
terms of three to 20 years. A recent
press report stated
that
Tajik authorities have arrested 56 alleged HT members this
year in
Tajikistan. While the final statistics
are not yet
available,
the Tajik legal system has convicted at least 32 of
these
suspects (nineteen men and thirteen women).
6. (SBU) The Tajik government does not keep a
list of declared
terrorist
organizations.
7. (SBU)
Tajikistan participated in the counterterrorist
activities
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the
Commonwealth
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the CIS
Counterterrorist
Center.
8. (SBU)
Analysts also believe that the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
(IMU) also operates in Tajikistan.
Recent press
reports
indicate that Tajik authorities arrested 30 suspect IMU
members
in Tajikistan in 2006; figures are not available
regarding
how many of them have been convicted.
There is also
an
ongoing trial of 11 alleged IMU members in Dushanbe, who are
accused
of organizing January and June 2005 terrorist bombings
in
Dushanbe, both of which occurred outside the Ministry of
Emergency
Situations. One of the defendants is a
member of the
Islamic
Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the
officially-recognized
Islamic opposition party. Tajik
authorities
also arrested five additional alleged IMU members in
Isfara;
during a search of their house, police claim that they
found 80
kilograms of ammoniac nitrate and four kilograms of
aluminum
powder.
9. (SBU) Post’s point of contact for this report
is Political
Officer
James Ricker, [email protected], phone 992-37-229-2507,
DUSHANBE
00002222 002 OF 002
IVG
752-2507.
JACOBSON
SIGNATURE
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 89863
date:
12/18/2006 6:43
refid:
06DUSHANBE2223
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7345
RR RUEHLN
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE
RUEHDBU #2223/01 3520643
ZNR UUUUU
ZZH
R 180643Z
DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9245
INFO
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA
WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA
WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0761
——————
header ends —————-
UNCLAS
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002223
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR
SCA/CEN AND INL
E.O.
12958: N/A
TAGS:
PREL, SNAR, MASS, TI
SUBJECT:
INITIAL MEETING WITH NEW TAJIK BORDER GUARDS CHIEF
DUSHANBE
00002223 001.2 OF 002
1. (U)
SUMMARY: The newly appointed head of the Tajik Border
Forces
within the State Committee on National Security,
General-Major
(US 1-star equivalent) Mirzoev, invited
representatives
from the U.S. Embassy and other donor countries
and
implementing agencies to an introductory meeting. General
Mirzoev
welcomed the attendees, whom Mirzoev identified as the
primary
sources of external support to the Border Guard. He
told the
gathered representatives he hoped for their continued
cooperation
and said he planned to meet soon with each partner
individually. The meeting was short and business-like with
minimum
pleasantries and none of the usual vodka toasts. END
SUMMARY
2. (U)
General Mirzoev asked the attendees to introduce
themselves
and briefly comment on their assistance efforts.
Sergey
Bozhko of the UN Office of Drug Control described UNODC’s
INL-funded
border control projects. Mahmoud Naderi,
country
officer
for the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
discussed
the expansion of the Border Guards training center,
improvements
in passport automation and controls at the
international
airport, and collection of immigration information
in an
analytical center — all projects funded by INL.
He also
made a
pitch to do another border management project at the
Kulma
Pass. Peter Isaacs, Project Manager for
UNDP border
management
programs in Tajikistan (BOMCA), funded by the
European
Union, spoke about coordinating efforts to prevent
duplication
by the donors and emphasized Border Guards’
responsibility
for management of the Inter-Ministerial Council
on Border
Management. General Mirzoev confirmed
the Border
Guard
would continue to chair the Council.
Chinese Defense
Attache
Senior Colonel Lee Djyoon said he has enjoyed a good
relationship
with Mirzoev at the Ministry of Defense and that he
looks
forward to continuing to work together. Embassy Dushanbe
was
represented by Defense Attache, ODC, INL, and EXBS who
described
to the General and the group the U.S. Embassy’s
programs
in support of the Border Guard and other Tajik
government
entities. The Russian Border Guard
advisors, who
typically
participate in all donor coordination meetings in
Dushanbe,
were not present.
3. (U)
General Mirzoev acknowledged the wide-ranging assistance
received
from the donors and said the Border Guards’ central
purpose
was to ensure the security of Tajikistan’s borders and
safety of
people in Tajikistan and the region.
Mirzoev said the
absorption
of the Border Guard into the Ministry of Security was
done to
«put the management structure in order» and to
strengthen
controls on the border, but explained that the
internal
structure of the Border Guard Forces would not be
changed. The State Committee on National Security will
provide
assistance
in resolving certain problems on the border, he said,
but the
tasks of the Border Guard Forces remains the same:
combating
drug trafficking, terrorism, contraband of all kinds
including
illegal weapons and WMD, and illegal immigration.
4. (U)
General Mirzoev said that he was on his third day of
inspecting
the Border Guard Forces and that he is aware of many
unmet
needs at the border where assistance is still required.
The
outposts lack computers and other equipment for conducting
border
control operations. Life among the
soldiers is still
tough,
although much has been done to improve the daily living
conditions. Mirzoev described the government’s effort to
bring
the
border guard facilities up to proper standards, and
commented
that even developed countries with more established
border
services are having trouble managing their borders. He
characterized
the Tajik Border Guard as young, referring to the
fact that
until 2005 the Russian Federation was responsible for
protecting
Tajikistan’s borders. He called for continued
assistance
and pledged to demonstrate to partners that the
Border
Guards can achieve real results.
5. (U)
Responding to questions from the group, Mirzoev confirmed
that
donors would still be able to communicate directly with the
Border
Guards through official letters, diplomatic notes and
named
himself as the primary interlocutor. On
the question of
corruption,
Mirzoev provided the routine response that the
Government
of Tajikistan was committed to battling corruption
everywhere
and that he would wage war against corruption within
the
Border Forces. He broke from his
businesslike demeanor to
relate
that «his deputy had been tempted to take out an AK-47
DUSHANBE
00002223 002.2 OF 002
and sort
out the problems himself.» Mirzoev
closed by saying he
looked
forward to meeting each of the partners individually to
discuss
assistance projects.
6. (SBU)
COMMENT: Mirzoev presented himself as
professional and
disciplined,
focusing on business and keeping pleasantries to a
minimum. At least at this introductory meeting,
Mirzoev decided
to forego
some of signs of Tajik hospitality such as vodka
toasts or
even handshakes as he left the meeting.
However, he
softened
the edges a bit by including Colonel Tojibaev, our
long-standing
and trusted contact in the Border Guards
international
relations department. His facilitation
of the
meeting
put the group at ease. Tojibaev said
he will be
staying
on with the Border Guards in the same capacity, at least
for the
time being — a sign Mirzoev understands the need to
cultivate
relations with the donors. We and the
other resident
donors
will certainly continue the dialogue with the newly
reorganized
border guards. Our next big test of the
relationship
will be our planned JCET training of the Border
Guards
special forces planned for January-February.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90074
date:
12/19/2006 11:32
refid:
06DUSHANBE2225
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8664
PP
RUEHDBU
DE
RUEHDBU #2225/01 3531132
ZNY CCCCC
ZZH
P R
191132Z DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9247
INFO
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS
COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA
WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY
ISLAMABAD 1948
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY
NEW DELHI 1939
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0764
——————
header ends —————-
C O N F I
D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002225
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O.
12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS:
PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG, EFIN, TI
SUBJECT:
ANOTHER DAM CABLE FROM TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED
BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe,
State.
REASON:
1.4 (d)
1. (U)
Boom!! After four hours of waiting for Tajik President
Rahmonov
and Russian energy utility RAO UES head Anatoli Chubais
to arrive
by car, when thick fog prevented helicopter travel,
observers
witnessed a single explosion block the mighty Vaksh
River at
Sangtuda. The river was diverted through
two tunnels
to a
point 500 meters further down the bank, enabling RAO UES to
begin
constructing a dam and a 670 megawatt hydropower station.
The first
of three turbines is expected to go online in March
2008
although press reports indicate that Rahmonov asked, and
Chubais
agreed, to speed up construction and start production by
the end
of 2007. The December 15 event was only
the second
river
diversion in Tajikistan’s history; in 1966, the Vaksh was
first
blocked to build the Nurek dam and a 3200 MW power
station,
still Tajikistan’s largest.
2. (C)
Hundreds of schoolchildren danced along the roads
leading
to two pavilions for spectators of the largely bilateral
event,
with Tajik and Russian leaders the only official guests
and no
diplomatic or donor representatives in sight.
The RAO
UES
Sangtuda General Director Vasily Cherneshenko invited the
SIPDIS
Ambassador
to attend the event as a private observer, and gave
her a
quick tour of the construction site.
Supervising the
bulldozers
frantically moving boulders away from the diversion
tunnels
was Deputy Prime Minister Asadullo Ghulomov, dressed in
mud boots
and a hard hat. «I’m a real construction worker
again!»
he laughed to the Ambassador. Looking
less at home
among the
heavy machinery and mud was the new Minister of Energy
and
Industry Sherali Gulov, wearing a suit and dress shoes.
3. (C)
While killing time, Cherneshenko took the Ambassador to
see the
Sangtuda-II site, the 220 MW hydropower station 15
kilometers
downstream to be constructed with Iranian funding.
He
observed that although Russia and Iran had agreed to finance
and build
the Sangtuda stations at the same time, the Iranians
were
trying to «outsmart» the Tajiks, and vice versa, which had
led the
Sangtuda-II project to stall, while Sangtuda-I
progressed
as scheduled.
4. (U) The actual demolition took place shortly
after
Rahmonov’s
motorcade rolled in from Dushanbe.
Rahmonov made
public
remarks about the need to develop other hydropower
stations
along the Vaksh, and stated that he asked RAO UES to
intensify
work so that the first Sangtuda-I unit would generate
electricity
in December 2007, four months earlier than planned.
5. (U) In an unusual turn of events, Tajikistan
did not
experience
the nationwide blackout authorities had warned of
weeks in
advance. Officials feared that if the
diversion
tunnels
did not regulate the flow of water right away, they
would
have to turn off the water upstream at Nurek, and had
publicly
announced a three-day power cut after the diversion.
However,
central Dushanbe remained electrified through the
weekend.
(NOTE: Most rural parts of Tajikistan have been
entirely
without power since mid-November END NOTE.)
AS GOES
SANGTUDA~?
6. (C) Sangtuda-I has become a test case for
Tajikistan’s
hydropower
sector, with developers, donor and investors waiting
to see
how the Tajik government handles the construction and
financing
of the project. Unlike the hotly
contested Roghun
project,
Sangtuda-I has remained on track, even as RAO UES
appeals
to the World Bank and other international financial
institutions
for funding.
7. (C)
«Great progress!» Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov
described
Sangtuda-I to the Ambassador December 13-ironically,
in a
meeting requested to discuss how cement diverted to
Sangtuda-I
may potentially delay construction of the U.S. funded
bridge at
Nizhniy Pyanj. Government sources had
reported that
Ghulomov
personally ordered all cement produced by Tajikistan’s
single
cement factory be sent to Sangtuda-I to finish lining the
water
diversion tunnels.
8. (C)
Ghulomov acknowledged that he made all decisions
concerning
cement, but brushed off the idea that a lack of
cement
could hinder future construction of hydropower stations,
and
suggested that some of the cement was being siphoned for
sale in
Afghanistan. Plans by a Czech company to
build an
additional
cement plant in southern Tajikistan remain in the
preliminary
stages.
9. (C) COMMENT: It’s not every day one sees a
major river bed
DUSHANBE
00002225 002 OF 002
dry up in
a few hours. The success of the
diversion should buoy
the
spirits of the already confident Tajik government about its
hydropower
future. But in order to convince
international
investors
that Tajikistan’s energy sector is a safe bet, the
Tajik
government will need Sangtuda-I to stay on track. Given
Ghulomov’s
micromanagement of cement deliveries, we can assume
that
Tajikistan’s top officials will do everything in their
power to
see the project succeed. However, this
kind of effort
and
attention does nothing to make the investment climate
better,
and only reinforces the bad habits of Tajiks who rely on
personal
relationships, not functioning systems, to get anything
done.
10. (C)
The lack of a power outage in Dushanbe, despite
repeated
warnings, also demonstrates that the government does
not fully
know its own technical capacity in the energy sector.
Lights in
the capital provided little cheer or confidence in the
government
in the many parts of Tajikistan that will remain in
the dark
until spring. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90097
date:
12/19/2006 12:52
refid:
06DUSHANBE2226
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8774
RR RUEHLN
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE
RUEHDBU #2226 3531252
ZNR UUUUU
ZZH
R 191252Z
DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9249
INFO
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA
WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY
ISLAMABAD 1950
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY
NEW DELHI 1941
RUCNCIS/CIS
COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY
KABUL 1914
RUEHVEN/USMISSION
USOSCE 1865
RUCNDT/USMISSION
USUN NEW YORK 1391
RUEHBS/USEU
BRUSSELS 1142
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0766
——————
header ends —————-
UNCLAS
DUSHANBE 002226
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR
SCA/CEN, DRL/SEA
E.O.
12958: N/A
TAGS:
PHUM, KPAO, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT:
HUMAN RIGHTS DAY EVENTS IN TAJIKISTAN
1. SUMMARY:
Embassy Dushanbe commemorated International Human
Rights
Day/Week with a variety of events: having students paint
a mural
on the Embassy walls, showing a Human Rights related
movie
followed by a discussion group, and hosting a number of
public
speaking events focused on the theme «Defending the
Defenders.» END SUMMARY
2. Embassy Dushanbe teamed with 15 local design
students to
create
and paint a mural outside the Embassy commemorating Human
Rights
Day. The Ambassador opened up the event
with brief
remarks
on the meaning of the day, and then the design students
went to
work. This mural is the first of a
series of paintings
planned
around the Embassy compound to mark such events as Earth
Day and
Women’s Day.
3. PAO, PolOff and DCM spoke at three different
local
universities
about the importance of Human Rights Day, the UN
Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the current status of
freedom
in Tajikistan. Between 25 and 50
students showed up for
each
event, with the students asking a variety of perceptive
questions
on topics from media self-censorship in Tajikistan to
the
U.S.’s role in the war in Iraq. The
appetite for Embassy
speakers
was apparent when rectors, teachers and students all
asked for
increased officer visits for roundtables
and the
chance to
speak English with a native speaker. PAO
also led a
roundtable
on human rights at the Embassy-sponsored weekly
English
Language conversation club.
4. Keeping with the «Defending the
Defenders» theme, Saturday
culminated
with a screening of «Hotel Rwanda» and discussion
about
genocide. Approximately 50 locals and
expats, including
students
and NGO workers attended the event. The
program opened
with an
American citizen NGO director with experience in Rwanda
providing
background facts about the genocide and
ended up with
him
leading a lively discussion after the movie.
5. The Embassy also distributed the Fact Sheet
on U.S. Human
Rights
Initiatives and the Secretary’s December 14 remarks.
6. COMMENT:
The discussions with students and locals showed
that
Tajiks are aware of the human rights problems in their
country
and desire change. Many of the students
with whom we
met
recognized the problem of self-censorship in the Tajik
media,
and rely instead on information from the Internet to
shape
their opinions. All sought more
opportunities to meet
with
Americans and other foreigners in order to increase their
exposure
to the outside world. This younger
generation of
Tajiks
has little direct memory of the civil war and does not
unquestioningly
credit the government or President Rahmonov with
maintaining
stability. As they comes of age, they
may begin
demanding
greater changes from their government with respect to
issues
such as corruption and freedom of speech.
This week’s
human
rights focused meetings remind us once again that
Tajikistan
would benefit greatly from increased exchange
opportunities. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90099
date:
12/19/2006 12:57
refid:
06DUSHANBE2227
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8778
PP
RUEHDBU
DE
RUEHDBU #2227 3531257
ZNY CCCCC
ZZH
P 191257Z
DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9250
INFO
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0767
——————
header ends —————-
C O N F I
D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 002227
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT
FOR SCA/CEN, S/CT (FRED VOGEL) AND CA (ALCY
FRELICK)
E.O.
12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS:
PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, CVIS, ASEC, KHLS, KVPR
SUBJECT:
TAJIKISTAN NOT YET AN APPROPRIATE TERRORIST-RELATED DATA
SHARING
PARTNER
REF: 06
STATE 190832
CLASSIFIED
BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe,
STATE.
REASON:
1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Post is engaged in informal information
sharing with
Tajik
Government law enforcement and security service entities.
However,
the limited biometric and biographic information in
Tajik
travel documents, as well as their elementary and
improperly
used immigration and security databases, make the
systematic
collection of terrorist-related data unreliable
(reftel).
2. (SBU) Immigration Databases: Despite a recent USG-funded
IOM
project to supply computers to several main Tajik points of
entry
(including Dushanbe International Airport), many Tajik
border
and immigration officials do not use the automated
system,
sticking to paper logs and longhand databases.
Limited
training,
power brownouts (particularly on the Uzbek and Afghan
border),
and reluctance to use the new equipment all contribute
to
partial and improper use of the computer databases that are
available. The databases are not connected to each other
or to
a central
server.
3. (SBU) Watchlist and Information Sharing: The computer
database
uses a very general name-based Watchlist, consisting
only of
information from the immigration department of the
Ministry
of Interior. Even Tajik officials admit
the Watchlist
is
incomplete and rarely updated. Since the
system is seldom
used to
screen for names, there is no evidence to demonstrate
that even
a properly documented name hit will be found and
matched
to a person crossing the border. Though
the Ministry of
Interior
(other than the immigration and registration
department)
and Ministry of Security keep additional databases,
we
understand this information is not shared directly with the
border
authorities as part of a general Watchlist system.
Specific
lookouts are disseminated by longhand note and word of
mouth, or
by dispatching special officers to a border point for
a
specific operation. Tajik authorities
cooperate with their
neighbors
(Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, China, and Kyrgyzstan) on a
case-by-case
basis but do not routinely share their databases or
Watchlists.
4. (SBU) Biometrics: The Tajik passport, machine readable but
of very
poor quality, does not contain additional biometric
features. The passport readers currently at place in
Dushanbe
Airport
and at several border posts do not have the ability to
machine
read Tajik passports — only better quality international
machine
readable passports.
5. (C) Identifying Appropriate Partners: Due to the above
information,
Tajikistan would make a very poor data sharing
partner. Though the Tajik border authorities want to
upgrade
their
Watchlist capabilities, internal and external systematic
data
sharing, and passport quality, scant resources prevent this
from
happening. The OSCE is currently
considering a border
security
assistance project for Tajikistan which might include
working
with the Tajik Government to improve immigration data
collection
and sharing.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90273
date:
12/20/2006 11:07
refid:
06DUSHANBE2228
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
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——————
header ends —————-
UNCLAS
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002228
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR
SCA/CEN, ECA/PE/V/N/E
E.O.
12958: N/A
TAGS:
PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KPOA, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT:
HOW WE CAN HELP THE TAJIK ELECTION COMMISSION PREPARE FOR
2010
1. (U) This is an Action cable. See Paragraphs 5
and 9.
2. (U)
Without the pressure of an upcoming election and with
the
international spotlight shining elsewhere, we have an
unusual
opportunity to engage Tajikistan’s Central Commission
for
Elections and Referenda. The CCER would
like to maintain
the
momentum of the technical assistance, poll worker and voter
education
they received prior to the November 6 presidential
election,
but will need help doing so. The United
States could
further
our democracy goals by arranging an International
Visitor
exchange program for commission members, giving them
long-term
experience and exposure to western election procedures
and
encouraging them to continue their reforms.
We can also
send
high-level visitors, for example to an upcoming March
conference,
to convey the message that democracy is about more
than
elections.
3. (U) A
little over one month after the presidential
election,
the CCER is already planning for future elections.
Although
the next nation-wide elections will be for parliament
in 2010,
two districts in Tajikistan will hold local elections
for chairmen
in February 2007. Deputy Commisstion
Chairman
Muhibulloh
Dodojonov thanked Poloff December 11 for Embassy and
U.S.
government support leading up to the presidential election
and
discussed the CCER’s future strategies.
4. (U)
Dodojonov admitted that he was not completely satisfied
with the
recent election process; however, noted that
procedurally
the election was an improvement from the 2005
parliamentary
election. He pointed out the OSCE
preliminary
election
report’s main concerns were political issues, not
technical
problems. However, Dodojonov also
understood that the
CCER is
in the position to change some elections regulations
that will
also resolve certain political problems, for example,
by giving
candidates more media access. He hoped
there will be
some
legislative changes to the Tajik constitution before the
next
election. International organizations
criticized the
constitutional
requirement that all presidential candidates
acquire
signatures from five percent of the electorate in order
to
formally run, a requirement considered too high. The CCER is
noting
all criticisms and will attempt to address them.
5. (U) In March 2007, the CCER in conjunction
with the Center
for
Strategic Studies, Tajikistan’s premier think-tank, will
host an
international conference to discuss the presidential
election
results. The organizers will invite
international
experts
to comment. Dodojonov invited the United
States to
suggest
and send speakers to the conference.
ACTION REQUEST:
This
presents another unique opportunity for the Department to
send
Tajikistan a strong message emphasizing our support for
their
democratic reforms by sending an official visitor, perhaps
a Deputy
Assistant Secretary from SCA or DRL, to speak at the
conference. Alternately, the Department could propose or
fund
an
outside speaker for this conference.
6. (U) In addition, by March, the CCER will have
drafted a
comprehensive
plan proposing legislative changes and practical
reforms
needed prior to the next election. The
commission aims
to use
the plan in order to solicit donor support.
Concurrently,
the CCER is working with the local NGO «Bureau on
Human
Rights and Rule of Law» to draft requests for funding on
election
reform projects. The CCER also aims to
compile a
textbook
that will serve as an election go-to guide.
7. (U) Dodojonov recognized that Tajik election
officials need
to be
better trained on how to conduct democratically sound and
transparent
elections. He requested the United
States send CCER
officials
to the United States, Canada or Europe to observe
elections
within the next year so that upon returning to
Tajikistan,
they have time to prepare and implement changes for
the 2010
parliamentary election.
8. (SBU) COMMENT: Dodojonov is the behind-the-scenes brains of
the
CCER. The commission’s chairman Mirzoali
Boltuyev is
increasingly
serving as a figurehead. Undoubtedly,
Dodojonov’s
good
working relationships with international organizations and
NGOs has
taught him that in order to make real democratic and
election
reforms in Tajikistan, the CCER needs to start early.
END
COMMENT.
9. (U)
ACTION REQUEST: To take
advantage of this unique
DUSHANBE
00002228 002 OF 002
opportunity
to strengthen democratic process without the
pressure
of an election looming, post requests funding for five
additional
slots for FY 2007 International Visitor programs, as
a single
country or regional program, to continue training
election
officials. This could be an opportunity
for Tajik and
Afghan
officials to participate in a Farsi-language exchange
together. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90282
date:
12/20/2006 12:06
refid:
06DUSHANBE2229
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9867
RR
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DE
RUEHDBU #2229/01 3541206
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WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0770
——————
header ends —————-
C O N F I
D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002229
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR
SCA/CEN
E.O.
12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS:
PREL, PGOV, EAID, ENRG, TI
SUBJECT:
AMBASSADOR’S FIRST MEETING WITH NEW TAJIK FOREIGN MINISTER
CLASSIFIED
BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe,
STATE.
REASON:
1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary:
The Ambassador met December 20 with Hamrakhon
Zaripov
in his new capacity as Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister.
Zaripov
agreed to «coordinate with relevant ministries and the
president»
on responses to the Ambassador’s requests for forward
movement
on registration and visas for National Democratic
Institute
(NDI) staff and registration of U.S-funded community
radio
stations. When the Ambassador raised the
need to improve
Tajikistan’s
business climate, Zaripov called for more U.S.
investment
in hydropower, used China as an example of how
investment
should flow into Tajikistan, and railed against U.S.
company
Gerald Metals whom he said avoided official channels and
did
business with criminal elements. Zaripov
promised help in
establishing
an American Chamber of Commerce, getting a meeting
with
Security Minister Abdurahimov, and moving along the Boulder
Cyber
Cafe project. He seconded the
Ambassador’s enthusiasm for
establishing
a Peace Corps program here. In a
surprise move, he
pitched
Tajikistan becoming a Millennium Challenge recipient — a
subject
in which the previous foreign minister and government
appeared
to have little interest. End Summary
2. (C) The new Foreign Minister agreed to meet
the Ambassador
first
thing in the morning on December 20, a day before the
Ambassador
is scheduled to depart for the holidays.
The Embassy
had
requested the meeting as soon as we learned of the
appointment
of the former Ambassador to the United States as the
new
Foreign Minister. The Tajik Parliament
only confirmed the
new
Cabinet appointments on December 16, and the Foreign
Minister
did not want to appear overly eager to meet with us
until the
formalities were concluded. Zaripov
noted that
already
the Russian press has been playing up his American
connections. He has just passed to President Rahmonov a
collection
of 70 recent articles from the Russian internet on
this
theme.
OLD
ANSWERS TO OLD PROBLEMS
3. (C) NDI:
The Ambassador raised the issue of registration of
the
National Democratic Institute (NDI) and obtaining visitor
visas for
NDI board members Sam Gejdensen and Laura Jewett, and
obtaining
a work-authorization visa for NDI’s newly identified
American
citizen director for Dushanbe. NDI had
followed the
Ministry’s
advice and waited to push on the registration and
visa
issues until after the election and inauguration of the new
government,
but is eager to move ahead. Zaripov said
while he
was fully
briefed on the NDI issues as Ambassador to the United
States,
in his new capacity as Foreign Minister he would have to
consult
with other government ministries before providing a
response. He promised to get us a reply in
approximately one
week.
4. (C) Internews: In the context of free press, the Ambassador
raised
the stalled registration and licensing of six community
radio
stations developed by U.S.-funded NGO Internews. Zaripov
acknowledged
the need in theory to expand independent media, but
he viewed
that as a luxury for Tajikistan.
«How can journalists
worry
about reporting when they have no heat or electricity?»
The same
principle applies to political parties, NGOs and
others,
he insisted. He described his recent visit to his home
village
to see his mother who has had no electricity or heat for
weeks. Like other residents of rural Tajikistan, she
is forced
to burn
garbage to heat a single room.
«Tajikistan’s first
priority
must be to develop its hydroelectric resources.
This
will help
journalists, NGOs and everyone else.»
Note: Our
question
about Internews probably caught Zaripov off guard, and
in future
meetings we hope to walk back his attitude about
dealing
with media and democracy issues only AFTER economic
development
has taken place.
BUSINESS
CLIMATE
5. (C) The Ambassador took advantage of
Zaripov’s abrupt change
of
subject, including his pitch to the United States to fund
construction
of the mega-hydroelectric station at Dasti-zhum, to
DUSHANBE
00002229 002 OF 003
raise the
issue of business environment. American
businesses
need
confidence that contracts will be honored and that profits
can be
made before they will invest in business in Tajikistan.
The
unresolved case of Gerald Metals which lost over $20 million
in a deal
with Tajikistan’s TadAZ aluminum factory will scare
away
potential investors. An energy company
such as AES will
need to
see whether it can make a profit from a smaller
investment,
such as the proposed transmission line to
Afghanistan,
before it would participate in a large commercial
consortium
to build Dasti-zhum. Unlike the Chinese
government,
the U.S.
government cannot instruct U.S. firms where to invest;
Tajikistan
will have to attract investments by ensuring a
suitable
business climate.
6. (C) Gerald Metals: Zaripov became agitated a the mention of
Gerald
Metals, and recounted his version of the deal gone bad.
Gerald
Metals had refused then Ambassador Zaripov’s advice to
work
through official GOTI channels and instead struck a deal
directly
with the then-director of TadAZ who is now known to be
a
criminal. Gerald Metals is paying the
price for being greedy
and
hoping to get windfall profits, three times the norm, at
Tajikistan’s
expense. Zaripov offered some Soviet-era
advice
that all
U.S. companies should get the blessings of both the
Tajik
Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in Dushanbe
before
launching business dealings here. As a
counterexample to
Gerald
Metals, he pointed to the huge investments by the
Chinese,
all brokered through official channels.
Zaripov
mentioned
that a deal was almost struck with Gerald Metals in
May,
whereby Gerald would make future purchases of aluminum at a
slight
discount, eventually recouping its original $20 million
down
payment to TadAZ. Zaripov said that both
parties were
happy
with the deal, but a World Bank advisor deemed the
discount
mechanism violated anti-corruption principles (Zaripov
used the
Russian word «doping»), and derailed the deal.
7. (C) AmCham:
Zaripov promised his assistance in convincing
officials
at the Tajik Chamber of Commerce that a newly
established
American Chamber would not compete with the
state-run
body. The Embassy is sponsoring the
Eurasia
Foundation
Central Asia’s efforts to get an AmCham up and
running. Zaripov would like to see more American
businesses
coming
directly to Tajikistan rather than working through
middlemen. As an example he noted most Tajik aluminum
reaches
the
United States via Holland. (Note: He
seemed to forget we
just
finished discussing Gerald Metals — the one U.S. firm which
tried to
make a direct deal with Tajikistan.)
FORWARD
MARCH
8. (C) Peace Corps: The Ambassador did not have
a hard sell
with
Zaripov when it came to the benefits of establishing a
Peace
Corps program in Tajikistan. He
understood the enormous
benefits
of English language training and immediately offered to
generate
a new formal expression of interest on behalf of the
Government
of Tajikistan to update the letter sent by President
Rahmonov
four years ago.
9. (C) Boulder Cyber Cafe: Zaripov was familiar with the long
saga
concerning the city of Boulder’s efforts to build a
state-of-the-art
cyber cafe in Dushanbe. The project is
part of
the
sister city relationship between Boulder and Dushanbe.
(Dushanbe
has already bequeathed Boulder with a Tajik Tea
House.) After he recounted the long delays — many of
them
caused by
the City of Boulder, according to Zaripov — he
promised
ot help move things along with the Dushanbe city
government.
10. (C)
Millennium Challenge: At the end of the
meeting,
Zaripov
surprised us with an issue of his own.
He would like to
see
Tajikistan fully qualify for Millennium Challenge
assistance. Zaripov said he understands there will be
challenges
along the way, but feels the time is right, given the
demonstrated
«success of the recent election process.»
Zaripov’s
overly positive characterization of the November 6
presidential
election is based on his experience in Washington
where his
embassy oversaw the polling place for resident Tajik
citizens. He boasted that in the United States,
President
Rahmonov
received more than 90% of the votes cast (44 Tajiks
voted) —
significantly more than in Tajikistan itself.
He
DUSHANBE
00002229 003 OF 003
pointed
out that the Washington polling station met the highest
international
standards, and there were no restrictions on press
or
information in the United States.
Zaripov is no doubt aware
the OSCE
and other international observers did not give the
Tajik
election such high remarks, but he seems committed to
using the
election as a platform to help move his country
forward. The Embassy will encourage Zaripov’s interest
by
briefing
his MFA staff in detail on Tajikistan’s Millennium
Challenge
scorecard and examining next steps.
COMMENT
11. (C)
Several of Zaripov’s responses struck us as «old
school»: his advice that all business proceed through
government-to-government
channels, his stance that development
of
independent radio stations should take a back seat to
hydropower
development, and his blind faith that if the USG
simply
decided to build Dasti-zhum, regional peace and
prosperity
would follow. However, he promised to
help on a
number of
fronts. Although he gave no assurances,
Zaripov’s
offer to
coordinate a government-cleared response on NDI is at
least
more straight forward than his predecessor’s standard
reply:
«That’s a decision for the government, not for the
Foreign
Ministry.» And importantly,
Zaripov is the first Tajik
official
who has ever expressed interest in pursuing Millennium
Challenge
status. The Embassy will pursue
Zaripov’s interest by
re-reviewing
Tajikistan’s Millennium Challenge scorecard with
staff at
the ministry and helping the MFA craft a full program
of
reforms which could lead to eventual membership. It will be
a longer
road than Zaripov probably expects, but one worth
pursuing. Zaripov was generally receptive the
Ambassador’s
message
that with the start of a new presidential term and
formation
of a new government, Tajikistan has an opportunity to
demonstrate
to Washington and the world which way the country is
headed. Washington will be looking for signals. For example,
will
Tajikistan accept or reject the proposed NGO law, which
falls
short of international standards? Will
the government
register
NDI? The Tajik government’s actions will
help
determine
the approach Washington takes on such issues as the
Millennium
Challenge program.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90686
date:
12/22/2006 9:59
refid:
06DUSHANBE2243
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
06DUSHANBE1545
header:
VZCZCXRO5056
PP
RUEHDBU
DE
RUEHDBU #2243 3560959
ZNY CCCCC
ZZH
P R
220959Z DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9268
INFO
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA
WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA
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RUEHML/AMEMBASSY
MANILA 0110
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY
OSLO 0002
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 0786
——————
header ends —————-
C O N F I
D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 002243
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O.
12958: DECL: 12/22/2016
TAGS:
PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG, EINV, ETRD, TI, NO
SUBJECT:
A MINOR MIRACLE? TAJIK SETTLEMENT WITH
NORSK HYDRO COULD BE
MAJOR
VICTORY FOR POTENTIAL INVESTORS
REF:
DUSHANBE 1545
CLASSIFIED
BY: Tom Hushek, CdA, U.S. Embassy, Dushanbe, State.
REASON:
1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C)
With the December 20 signing of a cooperation agreement
between
Norwegian aluminum giant Norsk Hydro and Tajikistan’s
state-owned
aluminum factory TadAZ, Tajikistan resolved one of
its
stickiest investment cases. Moscow-based
Norwegian
Ambassador
Oyvind Nordsletten called on Ambassador Jacobson and
confirmed
the Tajik government had accepted a recent London
Court of
International Arbitration ruling in favor of Norsk
Hydro. Under the new commercial agreement, the
Norwegian
company
will provide raw alumina to TadAZ, and receive 200,000
tons of
aluminum each year for the next four years, roughly half
of
TadAZ’s annual 425,000 tons current production.
Norsk Hydro
will also
provide technical assistance to improve the plant’s
efficiency
and lessen its environmental impact.
Nordsletten
said that
if initial improvements go well, Norsk Hydro was
prepared
to increase the plant’s capacity to 600,000 tons
annually.
2. (C)
Despite a record $150 million political risk insurance
settlement
from Chubb, Norsk Hydro has been quietly working to
find a
settlement that would allow continued trade with
Tajikistan
after a 2004 dispute. With the blessings
of the
World
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development,
also present at the signing, TadAZ will begin
repaying
its debt in January 2007. Nordsletten
said he did not
know the
exact details of how Norsk Hydro would pay back Chubb,
or
whether Chubb would again start issuing political risk
insurance
for Tajikistan, but said there was «general
satisfaction»
among all parties and a great deal of optimism
about the
future.
3. (C)
Nordsletten indicated that Norsk Hydro was already
considering
investing in Tajikistan’s hydro-energy sector, and
mentioned
the 3600 megawatt power station Rogun as a possible
project,
with potential long term plans for a second aluminum
smelter. «In 1905, Norway was one of the poorest
countries in
Europe. We developed our hydropower and were able to
create a
thriving
economy,» Nordsletten said. He saw
similarities
between
the two mountainous countries, and reported he was
pushing
Oslo to issue an invitation to Tajik President Rahmonov
for a
state visit.
WHAT
ABOUT RUSAL?
4. (C)
During the meeting with Norsk Hydro executives,
Nordsletten
said President Rahmonov sharply criticized Russian
aluminum
giant RusAl for its tactics over the Rogun hydropower
station
and aluminum. Nordsletten acknowledged
that Norsk Hydro
may present
a threat to RusAl, particularly since Norsk Hydro is
now the
world’s third largest aluminum company, but felt
confident
that Norsk Hydro’s transparent dealings would make it
a more
attractive partner for Tajikistan.
5. (C)
COMMENT: At the risk of seeming
overly optimistic,
this
could represent a significant shift in Tajikistan’s
investment
climate and geopolitical alliances.
Several
multimillion
dollar cases against TadAZ have marked Tajikistan
as a bad
investment risk, and this settlement suggests the Tajik
government
understands a) that it takes more than lip service to
attract
foreign companies and b) that they must honor their
obligations
and contracts. Norsk Hydro’s approach of
a
constructive
resolution through arbitration appears to have
proven
more successful that the U.S. company Gerald Metals’
tactic of
pressuring and threatening the Tajik government.
6. (C) Norsk Hydro could give Tajikistan an
alternative to
RusAl on
key infrastructure projects. RusAl’s
development of
Rogun and
a second aluminum smelter was one of the key
deliverables
during Russian President Putin’s October 2004 visit
to
Tajikistan. However, in recent months,
the Tajiks and RusAl
have
engaged in a war of the words over the projects (reftel),
and Tajik
government officials, including President Rahmonov,
have
openly stated they will develop the project on their own.
Norsk
Hydro may present Rahmonov with a new partner, and one who
does not
assume the domineering big brother role that has so
rankled
Tajik officials. END COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 90753
date:
12/22/2006 14:36
refid:
06DUSHANBE2247
origin:
Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5061
PP RUEHLN
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE
RUEHDBU #2247/01 3561436
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ZZH
P R
221436Z DEC 06
FM
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9272
RUCPDOC/USDOC
WASHDC PRIORITY 0108
INFO
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1145
RUEAIIA/CIA
WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS
COLLECTIVE
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BEIJING 1885
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY
MANILA 0111
——————
header ends —————-
UNCLAS
SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 002247
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR
SCA/CEN;
AMEMBASSY
ANKARA FOR AGCOUNSELOR
E.O.
12958: N/A
TAGS:
EAGR, ECON, EAID, ELAB, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT:
THE FUTURE OF TAJIK COTTON — ANYTHING BUT LIGHT AND FLUFFY
REF: A:
DUSHANBE 1667; B: DUSHANBE 1740; C: DUSHANBE 1749
DUSHANBE
00002247 001.4 OF 005
1. (U) Summary:
Despite the ailing cotton sector’s debt-ridden
farms and
declining harvest, cotton remains Tajikistan’s most
important
export and biggest crop. International
donors have
joined
forces, backing major projects to reinvigorate the
sector. The Government of Tajikistan, the National
Bank of
Tajikistan,
lending companies and international financial
institutions
are actively seeking cotton sector and land reform,
united by
an independent commission on cotton reform.
The World
Bank and
Asian Development Bank December 13 sent a draft «Road
Map»
to the government to resolve the cotton debt through a
series of
reforms and technical assistance. U.S.
assistance
efforts
complement the Road Map by focusing more broadly on the
agricultural
sector: promoting land reform will help build a
viable
land market, and developing the non-cotton agricultural
sector
will boost farmers’ freedom to grow alternative products.
While national attention is on cotton, the
massive influx of
income
from foreign remittances to rural areas has softened the
crisis by
making the rural economy less dependent on cotton.
End
Summary.
Cotton
Production
—————————
2. (U) Intense informal government pressure on
farmers to
increase
output has failed to increase Tajik cotton production.
