id: 89121
date: 12/12/2006 12:37
refid: 06DUSHANBE2205
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE2171|06DUSHANBE2201
header:
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0735
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002205
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, EAIR, ENRG, EAID, ETRD, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S NEW CABINET INCLINED TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND REFORM
REF: A) DUSHANBE 2171 B) DUSHANBE 2201
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Tajik and foreign observers agree
Tajikistan’s
economy and infrastructure need a total overhaul. President
Rahmonov’s November 30 governmental restructuring and early
December cabinet appointments to economic positions suggest he
understands that he needs a competent set of advisors to improve
Tajikistan’s business environment and attract foreign
investment. He appointed some
experienced, reform-minded
officials to head the Ministries of Economic Development,
Agriculture, and Transportation and Communications. He also
established new independent entities, such as the Customs
Service, Tax Committee, and Agency to Fight Corruption, that
could implement administrative reforms to help small businesses
and spur economic growth.
2. (C) U.S.-funded programs in business and
agriculture will
likely continue at the same pace or flourish under the new
cabinet. With a few exceptions,
the new ministers’ record of
support for U.S. economic development and assistance priorities
suggest we could have a fruitful relationship on economic
cooperation, if the new ministers are given the authority to
implement much needed but painful reforms.
3. (C) One exception to the
progressive trend is Rahmonov’s
choice for Minister of Energy and Industry — a personal
favorite of the president with a bad reputation for corruption.
However, energy policy will continue to rest largely in the
hands of Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov.
Although Rahmonov’s
new economic team consists more of loyal allies from his home
region of Kulob than Tajikistan’s brightest economic minds, the
restructuring indicates Rahmonov recognizes fiscal
responsibility and sound economic policy are the only way to
bring Tajikistan forward. We will
need a few months to see
whether the new government structure ushers in reform and
growth, or simply provides a different way for the top echelon
to line their pockets. END
SUMMARY.
4. (U) This cable on economic and social
institutions is one
of four cables examining the impact of Tajikistan’s restructured
government and President Rahmonov’s new cabinet on U.S bilateral
and regional priorities (Ref A).
The other reports look at
bilateral and regional security issues (Ref B), democracy and
human rights, and the bigger picture of Tajikistan’s future.
THE GOOD NEWS
5. (C) Rahmonov did little to bring new blood into
his
administration after winning a second seven year-term as
president November 6, but he did shift some reform-minded
officials to new positions:
— Minister of Economic Development and Trade Guljomon Boboyev:
The former Minister of State Revenues and Taxes now heads a new
ministry, focused on Economic Trade and Development.
— Minister of Agriculture and Environmental Protection
Abdurahim Qodirov: As chairman
of Zafarabod district in Sughd
region, Qodirov dramatically overhauled the cotton and
agricultural sectors, improved irrigation systems and expanded
entrepreneurship and trade. He
has been open and supportive of
collaboration with donors. He
will likely support current USAID
projects in agribusiness, land reform and crop diversification.
— Minister of Transportation and Communication Abdurahim
Ashurov: Ashurov retains control
of his former Ministry of
Transportation, but takes on Communications and Civil Aviation
(which one of his staff members described to us as «a real
mess»). The outgoing
Minister of Communication Said Zuvaidov
had allowed more private sector investment, but was closely
linked to several Chinese telecoms doing business in Tajikistan.
He likely profited greatly from
his telecom connections and
some suggested he «got greedy.» Zuvaidov was also behind
government efforts to create a single information gateway to
control information flow. Ashurov
has thirty years of
experience in transportation and roads and is known as a
DUSHANBE 00002205 002 OF 003
workaholic with a loyal and talented staff. He has been very
supportive of the U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj.
— Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Masaid Hamidov: Former
minister, Abdukohir Nazirov, an excellent partner particularly
on cross border issues with Afghanistan, now heads the northern
Sughd region, but his replacement comes with a good technical
background and reputation. Before
his last posting as First
Deputy Mayor in Dushanbe, Hamidov previously served as First
Deputy Minister of Land Reclamation and supported the
USAID-funded Water Users Associations Support Program.
— Governor of Sughd Region Abdukohir Nazirov: As former
Minister of Land Reclamation and Water, Nazirov was instrumental
in working with post on a number of issues, including Water
Users Associations and Memoranda of Understanding with the
Afghan government on water management agreements. The outgoing
governor, Kasim Kasimov, while reform-minded, frustrated many
northern Tajiks with his bureaucratic style. Post’s political
assistant, who was in Khujand when the appointment was made,
reported that businessmen and NGOs in Sughd are delighted that
someone as «clean» as Nazirov would take the helm. For U.S.
projects in the north, this may improve cooperation.
— Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamrokhon Zaripov: Well known to
Washington circles, the former Tajik Ambassador to the U.S. is
rumored to run things much stricter at the MFA than outgoing FM
Talbak Nazarov, based on what Zaripov experienced during his
tenure in Washington. We hear
rumors that MFA employees are
jockeying to remain in their posts or move up.
THE BAD NEWS
6. (C) Minister of Energy and Industry Sherali
Gulov: Formerly
the head of the highly lucrative Committee on Investments and
State Property, Gulov is thought to be smart, but incredibly
corrupt. Now as head of the
newly-consolidated ministry, Gulov
replaces two ministers who worked well with the Embassy: former
Energy Minister Abdullo Yerov and former Industry Minister Zaid
Saidov. Because Deputy Prime
Minister Ghulomov retains true
control over Tajikistan’s energy policy, we anticipate U.S.
engagement on energy and electricity policies will remain the
same, although we may encounter more difficulties on a working
level with the new ministry.
THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS
7. (C) Tax Committee and Customs Service: Rahmonov’s
restructuring broke up the Ministry of State Revenues and Taxes
into a Tax Committee and Customs Service that report directly to
the central government. Hakim
Soliev, the former Minister of
Economy and Trade, will head the Tax Committee, and Gurez
Zaripov, the former Deputy Minister of State Revenues and Taxes,
will lead the Customs Service.
Tojikstandart, the agency that
creates and defines all industrial standards, is now also an
independent body, removed from the Ministry of Economy.
8. (C) The restructuring created
independent bodies which may
be able to implement reform faster, but it also removed a layer
of oversight from highly lucrative and corrupt agencies, and
streamlined the flow of revenue straight to the top.
Tojikstandart in particular has been historically a difficult
agency, creating many barriers to trade and imports and
demanding additional payments and bribes from companies trying
to comply with Tajikistan’s arcane industrial standards
regulations. Its independence
could be bad sign for
Tajikistan’s accession to the WTO.
9. (C) Minister of Health Rano
Abdurahmonova replaces
Nusratullo Faizulloev. The only
female cabinet member,
Abdurahmonova has served as a deputy health minister but
transferred to head the Health and Women’s Affairs Department of
the Presidential Administration after supposedly falling out
with Faizulloev. Faizulloev
actively supported U.S.-funded
health projects, and was available on a variety of issues,
including water sanitation and avian influenza. Abdurahmonova
has a mixed reputation-it is unclear whether we will enjoy the
same access and open relationship with her.
NO GAIN, NO LOSS
10. (C) Other top officials remain in place:
DUSHANBE 00002205 003 OF 003
— Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov will continue to serve as a
figurehead of government.
— First Deputy Prime Minister Asadullo Ghulomov retains his
portfolio over energy, construction and investment. Ghulomov
knows how to talk the regional energy talk, but his lack of
support for government commitments on electricity cost recovery,
particularly at the small Pamir-I project, indicate he is most
interested in building big hydropower stations and less
interested in getting Tajikistan’s messy state electricity
utility in order.
— «Barqi Tojik» Chairman Sharikhon Samiev remains at the helm
of the Tajik state-owned electrical utility. Rumored to be
President Rahmonov’s driver’s sister’s husband, Samiev was
previously the Chairman of Dushanbe district and brought little
formal training or energy experience when he assumed the
position in April 2006. Barqi
Tojik claims it has a 90 percent
cost recovery rate (which we sincerely doubt). The increased
electricity shortages in Dushanbe, and the blackouts throughout
most of the country, suggest that much more needs to be done to
regulate Tajikistan’s electricity sector.
— Minister of Finance Safarali Najmuddinov. With economic
policy decisions largely made at the National Bank or the
Presidential Administration, Najmiuddinov has not played a large
role in the overall economic strategy.
He will assuredly
continue to press the U.S. for debt relief. Najmuddinov has
also formally requested U.S. technical assistance.
— National Bank Chairman Murotali Alimardonov: A chief rival
to First Brother-in-law Hasan Saidulloev, (who was rumored to be
lobbying to fill the chairman’s seat), Alimardonov is deeply
involved in the cotton sector.
Like Saidulloev, Alimardonov
owns or controls a number of futures companies
— Minister of Education
Abdujabbor Rahmonov: While generally
supportive of certain U.S. funded projects, he did nothing to
prevent his ministry from shutting down the successful ABA CEELI
civil education «Street Law» project in October 2005. He has
also been reluctant to allow our implementing partners to use
university campuses to recruit for exchange students or host
U.S.-sponsored speakers.
—State Advisor on Economic Affairs Matlubhon Davlatov: The
former head of the State Property Committee retains his position
in the Presidential Administration.
—State Advisor on International Affairs Erkin Rahmatulloyev:
This close contact of the Embassy retains his position in the
Presidential Administration.
11. (C) COMMENT: Unlike in the security sector, where hardline
neo-Soviets have consolidated their control, Rahmonov’s
appointments in the economic sector suggest he intends to
continue on a slow path to reform with trusted loyalists
implementing the changes. USAID
and other U.S. programs to
improve the business and regulatory environment stand a good
chance of succeeding with this team.
Our health and education
programs should stay on track, regardless of the ministers’
inclinations, but only with the necessary funding levels.
Several health and education initiatives will likely be cut due
to U.S. budget constraints.
12. (C) As long as Deputy Prime
Minister Ghulomov retains
ultimate authority over energy policy, Tajikistan will support
U.S. regional energy integration policies. On a working level,
U.S. and other companies looking to enter the Tajik market will
have to deal with Minister of Energy and Industry Gulov, who may
prove more problematic and less transparent than the previous
ministers. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 89122
date: 12/12/2006 12:38
refid: 06DUSHANBE2206
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0738
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 002206
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: IRPT MEMBER CONVICTED, FREEDOM OF SPEECH VIOLATED
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
A city court convicted Mukhtorjon Shodiev, an
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) member, December
6 of inciting violence and calling for an overthrow of the
government in remarks he gave in front a small, private
audience. He was sentenced to
nine months in prison. Evidence
points to a politically-motivated trial aimed at curbing IRPT
activity in the Khujand area. The
IRPT will help Shodiev launch
his appeal. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) The Khujand City Court sentenced Mukhtorjon
Shodiev to
nine months in prison for allegedly calling others to jihad with
intent to incite violence.
However, IRPT contacts argue the
actual facts do not indicate jihad was Shodiev’s goal. The
controversial words in Shodiev’s remarks, documented in his
indictment, were: «Let all
people be Mujahiddin of Islam and
let there be peace in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia and
Chechnya.» Shodiev and six
other IRPT members assembled in
April for a private, informal picnic retreat in the mountains.
One among the party was Anton Evsin, an ethnic Russian who
secretly recorded Shodiev’s remarks using a mobile telephone.
SIPDIS
Ministry of Security officials «found» the recording on
Evsin’s
phone in June and used it as evidence to arrest Shodiev. Evsin
is presently in Russia.
3. (C) In private, the judge presiding over the
case,
Absuvosit Ashurov, confided to Embassy sources that he does not
believe Shodiev’s words amount to Islamic extremism, and openly
said he believes Shodiev is not guilty.
Religious scholars and
linguists also advised Ashurov that Shodiev’s words were not a
call for violence or illegal activity.
Ashurov added that he
did not believe Shodiev intended to propagate violence because
the words were spoken in front of a small, private audience.
Despite Ashurov’s personal opinion and the scholars’
conclusions, Ashurov convicted Shodiev and sentenced him to nine
months in prison. Because Shodiev
was arrested in June, he has
already served almost six months that will count toward his
sentence.
4. (C) Members of the Khujand IRPT chapter also
determined the
case was politically motivated. The chapter is active, with
Shodiev being an especially involved member, and enjoys a
following by young people. Due to
insufficient evidence and
thanks to the persistent work of Shodiev’s defense lawyer, the
trial was stopped twice. However,
as the trial wore on, the
lawyer became increasingly silent during proceedings. IRPT
members suspect the lawyer faced pressure from government
officials.
5. (C) COMMENT:
Shodiev’s arrest and imprisonment is a bad
sign that the Tajik government only marginally tolerates the
existence of the Islamic Party of Tajikistan. Although sources
would not indicate who might be behind the arrest, the tactics
used are a classic Soviet trap and likely encouraged by the
security services and the government to quiet IRPT activity.
The government views the IPRT as a threat, particularly in the
northern Sughd region, closely linked to the populous Ferghana
Valley. Government officials
openly talk about their concerted
effort to curb religious extremism, but this is frequently a
pretext to suppress IRPT political activity. This particular
arrest violates freedom of speech as well as freedom of religion
nominally protected by the Tajik Constitution. This is not the
first, and most likely will not be the last, IPRT arrest. END
COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 89310
date: 12/13/2006 12:57
refid: 06DUSHANBE2210
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE2210
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002210
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: DUSHANBE’S MAYOR STRIKES AGAIN, AS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TRY
TO GRAB PRIVATE PROPERTY
CLASSIFIED BY: TJACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
Dushanbe’s Mayor Ubaidulloyev, known for his
autonomy in governing Tajikistan’s capital, has his eye on a
building owned by the Grace Sun Min Church and wants to turn the
building into a school. However,
his motives appear suspect, in
light of his past attempts to take the church to court in an
attempt to privatize the building and then sell it. This case
illustrates a broader pattern of abuse of power with government
officials seizing land from private citizens without
compensation. Although some
corrupt government officials select
their targets indiscriminately, several examples of land and
property disputes have targeted religious organizations. END
SUMMARY.
THE MAYOR VS. THE CHURCH-ROUND TWO
2. (C) In an attempted property grab, Dushanbe’s
Mayor
Ubaidulloyev plans to seize the Grace Sun Min Church’s building.
Grace Sun Min is a Christian
church run by American citizen Yun
Seop Choi. Vladimir Kim, a church
member, claims he has copies
of documents with handwritten notes from Ubaidulloyev
instructing the Tajik Supreme Economic Court and the General
Prosecutor’s Office to find any way to get the Grace Sun Min’s
building back in the city’s control.
At this point, no legal
case has been filed. However, Kim
feels it is only a matter of
time before Ubaidulloyev moves his plans forward.
3. (C) Ubaidulloyev’s desire to take the Grace Sun
Min
Church’s building dates back to 2001.
The building in dispute
was legally purchased by the church in 1996 from the city
council. The city tried to take the building back, forcing a
court trial. Kim believes that in
2001, Ubaidulloyev had
intended to seize the building and then grant it to a relative
or friend who would privatize it and sell it for profit. During
the trial, which Embassy officers observed, the Grace Sun Min
Church proved its legal ownership and retained the building.
Under Tajik law, the statute of limitations to appeal the case
has passed.
4. (SBU) In February of this year, Ubaidulloyev
himself
visited the church and surveyed the building, a highly
out-of-character move for the aloof Mayor. He said he would
like to turn the building into a school, reasoning that schools
are overcrowded in Dushanbe and thousands of children need space
for education. (NOTE: This is indeed true, Dushanbe’s schools
are overcrowded and children have to go to school in shifts to
accommodate everyone. END NOTE.) No restitution was offered to
the church at the time. Shortly
after the mayor’s visit,
officials from the General Prosecutor’s Office arrived, pointed
out that the church did not obtain the proper permits to
renovate the building’s roof, and demanded a fine.
5. (C) Fearing another trial and harassment from the
mayor’s
office, the church is considering renovating the building into a
private school. Kim said that the
church has been advised that
by doing this, it can maintain ownership and control of the
building and take away the mayor’s current pretext for seizing
the building.
NOT THE FIRST TIME, SEVERAL PAST EXAMPLES
6. (U) The Grace Sun Min Church is not the only
religious
organization in town entangled in property disputes. The
highest profile example, Dushanbe’s only synagogue, has been
partially torn down and may eventually be completely destroyed
to accommodate the government’s plans for a green zone around
the new presidential palace.
Other businesses, private homes,
two mosques and a psychiatric hospital in the area have already
been razed. Ubaidulloyev has a
history of property and permit
disputes, most notably when he forced the popular restaurant La
Grande Dame to tear down its facade, claiming the owner did not
have the proper authorization to renovate. The mayor’s office
has also demanded the British Embassy raze its outer wall to
increase the setback from the street by several feet.
7. (C) Operation Mercy, formerly known as CADA, also
faced
DUSHANBE 00002210 002 OF 002
property issues when the former Minister of Industry wanted to
build on private property adjacent to the Christian NGO’s
office. The two sides were able
to reach a mutual agreement.
More than one year ago, the organization faced a more hostile
confrontation when a relative of former Prime Minister Hayoev, a
co-owner of the HIMA cotton futures company, wanted to buy a
house owned by CADA. The buyer
was prepared to pay over market
value for the house; however, due to a lack of proper
documentation on the buyer’s part, CADA was not willing to sell
it. The buyer then threatened to
have city officials devalue
CADA’s house well below market value if it refused to sell.
Fortunately, CADA was able to use its government connections to
resolve the issue and never did sell to Hayoev’s relative.
8. (SBU) Dushanbe’s Baptist Church in the past year
had a
children’s camp in Varzob District outside of Dushanbe
confiscated by the government.
The government’s rationale was
that the camp was located too close to the presidential dacha.
The Baptist Church’s pastor believes that a government official
has his eye on the camp and the property will eventually be
privatized for the benefit of the official. The land seizures
in Varzob District also affect several residents who have lived
in the area for over forty years.
Residents are distraught over
the forced relocation. The
families were turned out when the
General Prosecutor’s Office decided it wanted to build a dacha
in the area. Although the
community has repeatedly appealed to
the government, it has not received a response.
9. (C) COMMENT: Even if the government is not deliberately
targeting religious institutions to seize property, it blatantly
disregards private property rights.
Authorities usually fail to
provide proper compensation for displaced owners and do not
actively engage in discussions with them. Officials feel free
to take whichever property they desire; the result makes
normally complacent Tajik citizens extremely angry at the
government’s corruption and abuse of power. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 89309
date: 12/13/2006 12:57
refid: 06DUSHANBE2209
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
06DUSHANBE2171|06DUSHANBE2201|06DUSHANBE2205|06DUSHANBE2209|06DUSHANBE542
header:
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RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0742
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002209
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, EAID, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S NEW CABINET: NO GOOD NEWS FOR U.S. DEMOCRACY
PROGRAMS
REF: A) DUSHANBE 2171 B) DUSHANBE 2201 C) DUSHANBE 2205 D) DUSHANBE 542
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT:
Nothing about President’s
Rahmonov’s new cabinet suggests that democracy and human rights
programs will now operate more freely.
After months of Tajik
officials counseling us to «wait until after the November 6
election» to push for registration of the National Democratic
Institute, licensing of Internews’ community radio stations, or
resolution of a personnel case against Mercy Corps, the new
Minister of Justice and the old hands in charge of radio and
television, religious affairs, and elections seem inclined to
maintain the status quo-or worse, tighten their control over
NGOs. The November 30
governmental restructuring and subsequent
cabinet appointments will not improve the overall climate for
civil society.
2. (C) Despite official lip
service about the importance of
democracy, the Tajik government still suspects that democracy
and human rights programs secretly intend to foment a «color
revolution,» a fear fed and shared by Russia and neighboring
Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan. Our public
diplomacy efforts will need to be ramped up to counter
continuing «black» propaganda aimed at discrediting Western
organizations and programs.
3. (C) Political parties should
not expect any more operating
space, and the government will certainly continue its efforts to
squash any sort of genuine political opposition. The small
number of U.S. programs promoting free media and press will
likely continue; however, the Tajik press knows well the limits
of speech expected by the Rahmonov administration and does not
push the envelope. Given
Rahmonov’s enthusiasm for English
language training, we anticipate the government will continue to
support educational and professional exchanges, although it may
scrutinize participants for «controversial» programs like
religion-themed exchanges, as has happened in the past. END
SUMMARY.
4. (U) This cable on democracy
and human rights is one of four
cables examining the impact of Tajikistan’s restructured
government and President Rahmonov’s new cabinet on U.S bilateral
and regional priorities (Ref A).
The other reports look at
bilateral and regional security issues (Ref B), economic
development and growth (Ref C), and the bigger picture of
Tajikistan’s future (septel).
NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE, OLD PRACTICES
5. (C) Incoming Minister of
Justice Bahtier Huderoev does not
bring the fresh air we had hoped for in the ministry that
oversees registration of all international and local
non-government organizations and associations. The former head
of the Presidential Administration’s Constitutional Guarantees
Department takes over from the very rigid former Minister
Halifabob Hamidov. Hamidov was
rumored to tightly control every
aspect of the ministry, but U.S.-funded organizations like
Eurasia Foundation and Pragma predict that Huderoev will be no
more flexible. Huderoev will
likely not give his deputy
ministers more freedom and authority than his predecessor. We
will approach him about registering National Democratic
Institute, but anticipate the same resistance put up by his
predecessor — and the same background pressure from the
security services.
6. (C) At stake is the
registration status of all NGOs,
including the U.S.-funded Internews and National Democratic
Institute, as well as a draft law on organizations which
threatens to consolidate Ministry of Justice control over NGOs.
Mercy Corps has also had problems with the previous Minister of
Justice and has an outstanding personnel case filed by the
Justice Ministry. We have not
traditionally enjoyed a good
partnership with this ministry, so our efforts to work for legal
and administrative reform will likely remain labored and slow.
7. (C) Also at stake is a
controversial draft Law on
Associations, known as «the NGO law.» After heated objections
to the control it would give to the Ministry of Justice to
DUSHANBE 00002209 002 OF 002
register and monitor all associations, including local and
international NGOs, the government postponed its discussion
until after the November 6 presidential election. Given how
Rahmonov has taken his cues from Moscow on NGO activity, the
parliament may be asked to pass the law in early 2007.
8. (C) Although the court system
and Prosecutor General’s
office are independent bodies, the Ministry of Justice still
exerts influence over both, and we must wait to see what tact
Huderoev takes with regards to the justice system. Because the
Prosecutor General Bobojon Bobokhonov retained his position,
U.S.-funded trainings and programs with his office should not be
affected.
SAME OLD, SAME OLD
9. (C) President Rahmonov chose
to retain several committee
heads with a history of blocking U.S. programs and exchanges:
— Chairman of Committee for Television and Radio Asadullo
Rahmonov has been a long time opponent of Internews’ U.S.-funded
community radio project. Under
his continued watch, the six
radio stations applying for licenses will likely spin their
wheels, without direct intervention from another more powerful
ministry.
— The Committee on Religious Affairs has been subsumed under
the Ministry of Culture, but Murodullo Davlatov remains its
head. Most recently, he tried to
stop a number of Muslim
leaders from visiting the states on a U.S-funded Community
Connections program. However,
oversight from the Minister of
Culture could mean he will have less authority to control or
veto U.S. programs that involved Muslim outreach. Davlatov is
the author of a controversial law on religion that was tabled
until after the election (Ref D).
If passed, the law, which
fails to meet many international standards, would essentially
outlaw home religious instruction and curtail the construction
of many new Friday mosques in small communities. We have heard
that objections from government officials stalled its passage.
However, without continued international pressure to reform the
law, the government may be inclined to quietly pass it into
effect.
—The new Minister of Culture, Mirzoshorukh Asrorov, previously
worked as the head of the department of culture in the Dushanbe
Mayor’s office. (NOTE: A few
others from Mayor Ubaidulloyev’s
staff have managed to get higher ranking positions, including
Mehriniso Nasirova, who now heads the Committee on Women Affairs
and Family. END NOTE.) The
Minister of Culture could have a
great influence on cultural heritage sites, exchanges, including
the religious ones, as well as architecture and construction.
— Chairman of the Central Committee for Elections and Referenda
(CCER) Mirzoali Boltuyev has also not been replaced. Boltuyev
was a reluctant partner to donors and NGOs, although his deputy
Dodojonov worked closely with U.S.-funded NGOs and donors to
push through a series of decrees implementing international
election standards. Boltuyev is
rumored to have serious alcohol
problems since his wife’s death and frequently seemed out of it
in meetings or conferences. With
a great sense of satisfaction
at conducting a «clean» presidential election and no national
elections on the horizon until 2010, the government and the CCER
will feel little pressure to continue implementing important
election reforms.
10. (C) In the restructuring, the
government has quietly
abolished the Social Protection Fund.
All companies and
organizations with employees were obligated to pay into this
fund, which played a role similar to the United States’ Social
Security. Over the past year, we
have worked hard to ensure
that our implementing partners complied with the law and paid
into this fund for their local employees. No press has reported
on this issue and the effects are unclear.
11. (C) The new Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes
is a step in the right direction, as corruption is rampant and
seeps into civil society as well as economic programs. Most
western observers agree that the agency was created as «window
dressing» for western consumption; its head has not been named,
and it remains unclear whether it will have any real authority.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 89524
date: 12/14/2006 13:50
refid: 06DUSHANBE2219
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE2171|06DUSHANBE2201|06DUSHANBE2205|06DUSHANBE2209
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 002219
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ECON, EAID, ENRG, SNAR, KDEM, TI, AF
SUBJECT: TRADING PLACES: TAJIKISTAN’S NEW CABINET OF OLD HANDS WILL
NOT CHANGE OVERALL DIRECTION
REF: A) DUSHANBE 2171 B) DUSHANBE 2201 C) DUSHANBE 2205 D) DUSHANBE 2209
DUSHANBE 00002219 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: With a few
exceptions, Tajik President
Rahmonov’s post-election appointments simply shuffled loyalists
and favorites into different positions, further concentrating
power in the hands of those from his home region of Kulob.
Instead of naming new, younger officials or educated technocrats
to help guide Tajikistan’s economic and social development,
Rahmonov continued to reward his relatives and close allies.
With the dismissal of the ministers of Emergency Situations,
Industry and Labor, Rahmonov removed the last opposition cabinet
members designated under the 1997 power sharing agreement that
helped end the Tajik Civil War.
2. (C) After a presidential
election victory November 6,
orchestrated in large part to please international audiences,
Rahmonov will maintain his chosen course, balancing regional
pressures and cooperating with the United States where we have
shared priorities or where the U.S. can provide significant
financial assistance. Economic
and social reforms will continue
at the same glacial pace, but no substantive progress on
democracy or human rights can be expected. Strong historical
and economic connections will keep Rahmonov in Moscow’s orbit.
Tajikistan is a poor country that cannot afford to act on
principle alone. Its foreign and domestic policies may be driven
by those players who offer the most help. If the United States
wants to remain engaged and relevant during Rahmonov’s next
term, we will need financial support to back up intensified
diplomatic relations. END SUMMARY
3. (SBU) This cable concludes a
series of four reports on how
the November 30 government restructuring and early December
cabinet appointments impact U.S. interests in Tajikistan and the
region (reftels).
REGIONALISM RISING
4. (SBU) Some advisors told us
before the election that
Rahmonov should bring in new specialists to invigorate his
administration, but Rahmonov instead reassigned cabinet
positions to trusted relatives and allies, mainly from his home
town, Dangara, and his home region, Kulob. Kulobis now dominate
the cabinet and Presidential Administration, and control the
most powerful ministries-Interior, Defense, Security, and Energy
and Industry.
5. (C) This regionalism means
government decisions may
increasingly be made to protect clan interests first, and
national interests second. This
course could start to
exacerbate regional tensions that have been dormant since the
civil war; although we have seen no signs of this so far. More
concretely it also disadvantages educated specialists from other
regions from advancing within the government, further
contributing to Tajikistan’s diminishing human resources and
human capacity. Unfortunately,
the poor performance of many
presidential favorites from Dangara and Kulob has done nothing
to dissuade the small intelligentsia in Dushanbe and Khujand of
the Kulobis’ reputation as badly educated and incompetent
villagers.
6. (SBU) In the Kulob club:
— Sherali Gulov, Minister of Energy and Industry: Rahmonov’s
son-in-law’s father.
— Hairriddin Abdurahimov, Chairman, Committee on National
Security, Rahmonov’s nephew.
— Davlatali Saidov, Chairman, Committee on Youth, Sport and
Tourism, Rahmonov’s nephew.
— Matlubhon Davlatov, State Economic Advisor to President,
Rahmonov’s cousin and neighbor.
— Sherali Khairulloev, Minister of Defense, Rahmonov’s distant
relative, from Dangara.
DUSHANBE 00002219 002.2 OF 003
— Mamadnazar Solehov, Minister of Interior, from Dangara.
— Amirsho Miraliev, Chief, Presidential Administration,
Rahmonov’s Dangara classmate
— Asadullo Ghulomov, Deputy Prime Minister, longtime Rahmonov
family friend, from Vose, next to Kulob
— Safarali Najmuddinov, Minister of Finance, from Dangara
— Hasan Sadulloev, Chairman, Orien Bank and Ismoili Somoni
holding company, arguably Tajikistan’s most powerful business
man, and Rahmonov’s brother-in-law
— Sharifhon Samiev, Head of Barqi Tojik state electricity
utility, Rahmonov’s neighbor from Dangara (also rumored to be
the husband of Rahmonov’s driver’s sister.)
THE NET RESULT
7. (C) Rahmonov’s new
administration — old wine in new bottles
— will likely have the following effects in the short- and
medium-term:
—Tajikistan will continue to look to Moscow first: Rahmonov’s
loyal advisors trust Russia, or at least understand how Moscow
operates and thinks. Russia
remains Tajikistan’s top trading
partner and foreign investor.
Russian advisors exerted a strong
influence on Abdurahimov as Minister of Security. President
Rahmonov will not try to distance himself from a country where
up to one million Tajiks work each year, supplying up to
one-half of Tajikistan’s $3 billion GDP.
—Tajikistan’s human capacity will continue to decline. The
crumbling and corrupt education system results in meaningless
degrees and technically incompetent professionals and workers.
Foreign companies and donors trying to open businesses or
projects lament the poor quality of the Tajik work force, but
the education system is not equipped to produce qualified labor.
Exchange programs to the United
States, India, China and Europe
provide a small number of smart young Tajiks with their only
opportunity for quality education.
— Border security, counterterrorism and counternarcotics
cooperation will remain on track as long as donor money flows.
Tajikistan shares international concerns about drugs and
terrorists, but needs help developing institutional and
operational capacity to effectively monitor its border and train
and equip its armed forces. These
security concerns may
outweigh Abdurahimov’s distrust of the United States, but may
also cause Tajikistan to look for additional partners in border
activities. Our goal of
dismantling and prosecuting drug
trafficking and organized crime syndicates may find less support
from this cabinet. It is suspected, although difficult to prove,
that many Kulobis have ties to drug trafficking. With clan
loyalty rewarded by Rahmonov himself, it is unlikely anyone will
have the authority to go after the top traffickers.
— No real free speech, no real free media, no real political
opposition. After the November 6
presidential election,
international attention will be much less focused on the state
of democracy in Tajikistan and we expect Rahmonov will feel
little pressure to continue democratic reforms or allow
opposition political parties to organize or express themselves.
The government is poised to pass strict laws on associations
(modeled on the Russian NGO law) and religion, and may make it
harder for certain U.S.-funded NGOs to register. The already
timid Tajik press will probably not provoke Rahmonov or his
administration by criticizing his actions or policies.
— Infrastructure investment will buy influence. Examples
abound: China’s $639 million low interest loans for transmission
lines, roads and a tunnel; Russia’s support for hydropower
stations at Sangtuda-I and Roghun; Iran’s construction of the
Anzob Tunnel and Sangtuda-II; our $37 million bridge at Nizhniy
Pyanj, and even India’s modest $12 million rehabilitation of the
Varzob hydropower station all give certain countries a louder
voice that commands the Tajik government’s attention.
Assistance for economic and social reform, health, and education
are not as alluring as mega-projects; hence the EU and European
countries’ relatively limited influence despite average annual
assistance of $50 million over the past few years.
DUSHANBE 00002219 003.2 OF 003
— Regional economic integration will focus on northern routes
to Kazakhstan and Russia, at least for the short term.
Electricity trade aside, the Tajiks have not developed the road
network or products to trade with South Asia when the bridge
opens at Nizhniy Pyanj in 2007 connecting Tajikistan and
Afghanistan. A lack of English
language capacity among Tajik
officials also means they cannot easily communicate with their
South Asian neighbors. Russian
language skills are also
declining among the younger post-Soviet generation of Tajiks,
ensuring the majority of the migrant workers in Russia will be
stuck with menial jobs.
NEXT STEPS FOR THE UNITED STATES
8. (C) Our common fight against
terror and narcotics should
continue as planned, but we must consider how to engage a
government that does not always understand or agree with our
goals of democracy and economic reform.
The following steps are
not new ideas but initiatives we know will have traction with a
government entrenched in its ways.
— Increased visits and diplomatic engagement: Visits from
high-level U.S. officials get a lot of mileage. Some of most
irksome bilateral issues — NGO registration, anti-corruption and
investment climate issues — get the most attention when raised
by a visitor. In a place where
personal relationships matter,
we can engage more often at a higher level.
— Joint programs with Afghanistan:
To encourage Tajikistan to
think more about trading south, we need to provide opportunities
for Tajikistan and Afghanistan to develop together. Energy,
security, water, health, education, agriculture, customs reform,
trade, and tourism are all sectors where Tajikistan and
Afghanistan can work together. We
will provide a list of
project ideas septel.
— Increased exchanges: High school, university, graduate and
professional exchanges all help open the minds of Tajiks who
otherwise have almost no exposure to Western media or ways of
thinking.
— Peace Corps: No institution is
better tailored to provide
technical assistance and public diplomacy than Peace Corps. The
volunteer model is ideally suited to Tajikistan, where our best
access remains at the community level, where personal
relationships mean everything, and where the extremely young
population has no alternate access to outside ideas short of
migrating to Russia. Given the
paucity of English language
instruction and the need for small business development in
Tajikistan, and the U.S. policy goal of training more Americans
as Persian (Farsi, Dari, Tajiki) speakers, it is time to start a
program in Tajikistan.JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 89627
date: 12/15/2006 6:52
refid: 06NEWDELHI8365
origin: Embassy New Delhi
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 008365
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2026
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KISL, EPET, ELTN, TX, KZ, TI, KG,
UZ, IN
SUBJECT: PIPELINES, EDUCATION AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA:
P/DAS MANN AND J/S BHAGWATI
Classified By: POLCOUNS Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a Dec. 13 meeting, Joint Secretary
(Eurasia) Jaimini Bhagwati expressed concerns to P/DAS Steven
Mann about whether Turkmenistan could live up to its
obligations in a proposed
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas
pipeline. Citing the Indo-Pak
relationship and pricing as
concerns, Bhagwati nevertheless said India is interested in
both TAPI and the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas
pipeline. He described Tajikistan
and Kazakhstan as
relatively stable, but Kyrgyzstan as plagued by a lack of
resources, Uzbekistan as difficult to do business with, and
Turkmenistan as complicated due to its dictatorial leader.
Mann asked Bhagwati for greater cooperation on energy and on
developing educational opportunities in Central Asia, and
urged the GOI to use its influence in tempering
Turkmenistan’s worst instincts.
END SUMMARY.
—————————————
CENTRAL ASIA THROUGH THE EYES OF INDIA
—————————————
2. (C) Joint Secretary (Eurasia)
Jaimini Bhagwati briefed
P/DAS Mann on the GOI’s view of the current political and
developmental landscape of Central Asia in a December 13
meeting. President Rahmonov of
Tajikistan is relatively
young at age 55, he said, and India expects he will remain
fully in control of the country for some time. Though he
received 76% of the vote, there is not much to speak of in
terms of opposition to the government, remarked Bhagwati,
adding that although Rahmonov promised to make changes in his
government after the election, only the foreign minister has
been replaced at this point.
«Tajikistan is a poor country,
and Rahmonov must figure out how to improve the quality of
life for his people,» said Bhagwati, noting that the country
is reasonably stable. Rahmonov
doesn’t want to «push things
too far,» but instead ensures that clans and tribes are
allowed to have their say, therefore providing a «safety
valve» and semblance of plurality without relinquishing
control, opined Bhagwati.
3. (C) Kyrgyzstan is less stable,
and poorer than
Tajikistan, indicated Bhagwati.
The government doesn’t want
to push things to a breaking point, nor does it want
wide-spread bloodshed, he conjectured, adding that the
country needs to figure out what to do with its economy.
«They have neither personnel, nor natural resources,» noted
Bhagwati, «and their $450 or so per capita will not likely
rise in the short, or even medium, term.» An increasing
number of Islamic women wear the hijab in Kyrgyzstan and
growing numbers of people observing the Ramadan fast,
Bhagwati reported. Expressing
concern, he said, «I worry
that such outward manifestations are linked to a mindset to
become more fundamentalist.»
Bhagwati indicated that this is
an issue of development, pointing out that life is harsh in
NEW DELHI 00008365 002 OF 004
this country, especially in winter, and that people may be
influenced by fundamentalists to believe that Islamic
conservatism is a way out of the «morass.»
4. (C) Turning to Uzbekistan,
Bhagwati remarked, with 25
million people, it is more populous than Tajikistan and
served as a cultural and transport hub in the Soviet era.
Its people were known for their skills and still have high
degree of expertise, but they are losing it, he noted. The
country doesn’t have good relations with anyone around them,
acknowledged Bhagwati, despite some interdependence with
Tajikistan on electricity and trade.
Bhagwati contended that
the Russians are worried about dissent in Uzbekistan being
put down too firmly. He warned
that cotton crops, an Uzbek
staple, are not viable because they ruin the soil and fields
have to remain fallow for several years.
They have oil, gas
and even gold, he said, but questioned whether or not the
Uzbeks can exploit it commercially.
Uzbekistan has the
highest potential for human resource development, asserted
Bhagwati, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan trailing behind.
Uzbekistan’s President Karimov, at 66 years old, does not
look healthy, observed Bhagwati, adding that Karimov’s
daughter Gulnra is likely being groomed to take over for him.
Bhagwati opined that the Uzbeks,
with their stream of
ever-changing ministers, are bad-faith bargainers, and
indicated that it would be difficult to do business with
them.
5. (C) Calling Turkmenistan an
«extremely strange country,»
Bhagwati observed that it is better off than most of its
neighbors in terms of resources, but doubted it was more
stable. Its dictatorial
leadership doesn’t lend itself to
stability, nor does it lead to development, he theorized.
Bhagwati underlined that the stability of Central Asia as a
whole is a real problem for India, given the relative
proximity of the region. «It
is only a two hour and ten
minute flight from Tashkent to New Delhi,» he emphasized,
adding that there are many points within India that are
further apart than the capitals of Central Asia are from New
Delhi. Because of Pakistan, there
are no surface linkages,
he added, «therefore
