Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 248322
date: 2/11/2010 10:27
refid: 10DUSHANBE171
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000171
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EFIN, ECON, SOCI, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF ROGHUN CAMPAIGN ON U.S. ASSISTANCE GOALS
REF: A. A: 09 DUSHANBE 1364 B: 09
DUSHANBE 1443 C: DUSHANBE 52
B. D: 09 DUSHANBE 1113 E: DUSHANBE 67 F: DUSHANBE 103
DUSHANBE 00000171 001.2 OF 003
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O 12958: N/A
TAGS: SUBJECT:
REFS:
1. (SBU) Summary: The Tajik
government stresses electricity
shortfalls as a serious threat to living standards and economic
growth, and rightly so, but refuses to confront key causes of
the shortfall, or to pursue to the most effective solutions.
Instead, it insists that building mega-hydro-project Roghun dam
is the top priority. The Tajik
government’s campaign to force
people to contribute to building the dam is undermining U.S.
assistance goals. It is
increasing and legitimizing corruption.
It violates citizens’ rights and
further weakens the rule of
law. It is exacerbating poverty
and household vulnerability and
diverting resources from health and education. It is making a
bad business climate worse and reducing confidence in the banks.
Government revenues and
expenditures are even less transparent.
This negative impact on U.S.
goals across the board raises
serious concerns, and we may need to re-examine some of our
assistance in light of these effects.
End Summary.
Power Shortages, For Some
2. (SBU) It is no secret the Soviet-designed power and water
systems in Central Asia put Tajikistan in a difficult position,
with power surpluses in summer and power shortages in winter.
Prickly relations with neighboring Uzbekistan limit seasonal
power-sharing, and the Tajiks ration power each winter, making
most modern business and industry impossible in most of the
country (ref A). This lowers
living standards and limits
economic growth. Much of the
problem would be ameliorated if
the large quasi-state-owned Talco aluminum plant, which consumes
at least 40% of Tajikistan’s power, were shut down or at least
if its energy fees and revenue structure were revaluated. Not
only does the plant consume power that could be used by homes,
schools, business and industry, it pays a below-cost price for
power, keeping the state power company Barqi Tojik broke and
unable to maintain the system or to reinvest in new production.
Despite its low tariffs, Talco still owes several million
dollars in back fees. The
government emphasizes that Talco is
an importance to the country’s GDP and the national budget as
aluminum is Tajikistan’s biggest export.
However, the profits
Talco earns off subsidized power go mainly offshore to a small
elite. Talco’s official revenues
are not a major contributor to
the budget. The government also could look to other projects
that are on the table or under development, most with foreign
financing, that could provide energy fairly quickly, but all of
these require an economic price be paid for the power produced.
Instead, the government has staked everything on the wholly
Tajik-owned, government-controlled Roghun hydroelectric project,
which even in the best case would take many years to complete.
Dams Before People
3. (SBU) Despite some of the lowest spending as a percentage of
GDP for health and education in the world, the government each
year has increased budget funds to build Roghun. In the current
IMF program, the government undertook to maintain social
spending despite shortfalls, and to hold Roghun spending below
$140 million. In November, with
tensions high as Uzbekistan
announced plans to pull out of the Central Asian grid, President
Rahmon enlisted the nation to build Roghun, calling on all
citizens «with the means to do so» to buy Roghun shares to
finance construction. The
campaign struck a chord, and many
people expressed a genuine desire to contribute. In January,
when shares went on sale, however, it quickly became clear the
DUSHANBE 00000171 002.2 OF 003
campaign was voluntary in only the loosest sense. Many people,
especially government employees, soon found that contributions
were mandatory and a failure to contribute carried severe
consequences (Refs B and C). As
the campaign continues, it is
undermining many goals of U.S. assistance.
Feeding, Legitimizing Corruption at the Expense of Rule of Law
4. (SBU) Government employees have been at the sharp end of the
campaign, expected to contribute several months’ salary or even
the equivalent of their annual salaries.
More disturbingly,
judging by the targets given some employees in corruption-prone
sectors, the government clearly expects them to exploit their
positions. Government employees
are tasked with «encouraging»
citizen to contribute. To pay for
their Roghun contributions,
employees are increasing their demands for bribes, demanding
funds from those down the supervisory chain, and refusing to
provide government services to those who do not contribute to
the campaign. People report being
unable to buy plane tickets,
register cars, enter or leave the country, keep a market stall
or even stay open as a business without making a contribution.
According to one unverified but credible rumor, Customs officers
have been given a daily quota.
Corruption is not just accepted
or expected, but demanded. The
average person now doesn’t just
pay a bribe to get services, he must buy a share of Roghun or
lose a job, have a business closed, or be denied crucial
government services. A Roghun tax
is added to the price of
goods and services explicitly or implicitly, but the amounts
paid by whom and for what are fuzzy.
Already weak due process
is becoming weaker. Few dare
object to Roghun extortion for
fear of being tarred as unpatriotic or other consequences.
Blood from Stones
5. (SBU) The nearly $200 million raised so far is about 3% of
GDP. Much of it can’t be spent
right away and will finance
imports, which means the money has been withdrawn from the
economy. It is reducing household
income and domestic demand
and increasing household debt. In
an economy under pressure
from the global financial crisis, with remittances down a third,
the government’s pro-cyclical action exacerbates the slowdown in
economic growth and increases poverty — exactly opposite the
intent of U.S. and international assistance. After two tough
years, the Tajik population is vulnerable to even small income
shocks. The fall in remittances
affected many households, and
the government last year pleaded with donors to fill the gap to
prevent a devastating decline into poverty. On the whole donors
complied, but the size of the Roghun campaign almost exactly
wipes out the donor contributions meant to support the social
sector and the poorest. Some
households reportedly are taking
on debt to buy Roghun shares, making households more vulnerable
and reducing funds for consumption and productive activity.
With teachers, doctors, and other medical staff among those
having salaries withheld for Roghun, de facto social sector
spending has been affected.
Further, Health Ministry staff has
appealed to USAID and other donors for more assistance because
Roghun contributions are reducing peoples’ ability to pay for
healthcare. Students must pay to
sit exams, get grades, and
other education documents.
The Business Climate Gets Worse
6. (SBU) Though the government took steps to improve its «Doing
Business» ranking last year (ref D), the Roghun campaign
reversed the progress. Businesses
of all kinds have faced the
hard sell. Foreign companies,
barred by law from buying shares,
have been told their licenses and other necessary documents
depend on local employees contributing generously. Many
companies say Roghun contributions will wipe out their
investable funds and limit current operations. Small shops and
marketers have been threatened with closure and in some cases
closed for failure to contribute enough.
People are seeking
loans from microcredit organizations to buy Roghun shares.
Rumors are rampant that a cut ranging from 3-25% is being
DUSHANBE 00000171 003.2 OF 003
deducted from remittances and electronic fund transfers (EFTs).
While the government has denied it, Embassy vendors are becoming
increasingly reluctant to accept EFTs.
True or not, people
believe it, undermining already shaky confidence in the banks.
Murkier Still
7. (SBU) The Roghun campaign is making opaque government
finances even murkier. While the
government now is reporting
the amount raised through the Roghun campaign, it is not clear
from where or whom most of the money is coming. The funds go to
an off-budget account at a bank controlled by a presidential
brother-in-law with some transferred to the Ministry of Finance
and the National Bank, but details are scant. Some unknown
portion of the money raised has come from government funds —
withheld from government salaries, appropriated by government
employees to cover their contributions, or diverted from
government revenue. Roghun joins
Talco and Barqi Tojik as
another government entity that lots of government money will
flow to, from, and through without real accountability.
Meanwhile, the value of the Roghun shares and rights of the
shareholders are utterly undefined.
Taking Steps
8. (SBU) Donors have raised some of these concerns to the
government in a letter from the Donors Coordinating Committee to
the Prime Minister. The IMF knows
our concerns and the current
Mission is looking at how the campaign is impacting poverty and
growth (Refs E and F). One of the
IMF questions to us was
whether bilateral donors are concerned enough about the impact
of the Roghun campaign to reevaluate any bilateral assistance.
Donors have trodden carefully on the Roghun issue, not wanting
to provoke an unproductive, nationalism-fueled accusation that
they are obstructing Tajikistan’s interests.
How We Should Respond
9. (SBU) Comment: It is already
difficult in Tajikistan to make
progress toward many of our goals. A government campaign that
directly undermines key goals raises serious issues for some of
our programs. Our steps to
improve the business climate or
strengthen the banking sector are being overwhelmed by negative
government action. In health and
education, we are perilously
close to a situation where the government sees these as
responsibilities that it can foist on to donors while it diverts
government money to projects in which officials have a financial
interest. Our insistence that the
government improve financial
transparency as a condition of assistance is becoming ever more
hollow as increased opacity bears no consequences. We should
raise our concerns about the impact of the Roghun campaign on
U.S. assistance goals directly with the government; seek an end
to the current campaign, and concrete steps to ameliorate some
of damage, including steps to improve transparency. We should
push the government to commit to restructure Barqi Tojik to be
transparent, commercial, and recover costs. This is essential to
the energy sector and we can provide concrete assistance if they
agree. If the government does not respond reasonably to our
concerns, we should consider visibly halting some program as a
direct response to specific concerns we have about the impact of
Roghun on our goals. We need to
demonstrate to the government,
and to the public, that there are limits to what we will accept.
While we face the potential
accusation of undermining
Tajikistan by lack of genuflection to Roghun as the savior of
national sovereignty, if we allow Roghun to become a sacred crow
that justifies any and all government behavior, we head down a
much more dangerous path. We
should not neglect the role of
Talco in Tajikistan’s electricity issues, as it lays at the
heart of the problem, the solutions, and the motivations for
government action. End comment.
QUAST
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id: 248564
date: 2/12/2010 10:10
refid: 10DUSHANBE172
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 000172
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR S/RAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/12/2020
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, EAID, ECON, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SRAP HOLBROOKE
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia Quast, Charge d’ Affaires, EXEC, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: U.S. interests in Tajikistan are a stable state
on Afghanistan’s northern border, support for our military
efforts in Afghanistan, and for Tajikistan to be a stabilizing
influence and contributor to economic development in the region.
Tajikistan gives unrestricted
over flight rights, and quickly
agreed to NDN ground transit. In
the medium term, it could play
a more active role in regional development, because of its huge
hydropower potential, relative (to Afghanistan) stability, and
religiously moderate population.
But to do so Tajikistan must
overcome multiple political and economic problems which stymie
its own development: poverty, bad relations with Uzbekistan,
intense corruption, Soviet-era economic structures and planning,
an undemocratic political system, chronic food insecurity, and
dependence on migrant labor in Russia.
2. (C) U.S. assistance has shown mixed results in the
development sphere. Recent steps
to improve the business
climate have been offset by the government’s campaign to force
its citizens to contribute to the construction of the Roghun
hydroelectric dam. The government
is not willing to reform its
political process. Our security
cooperation shows some promise.
Regardless of our efforts, there
is a limit to what Tajikistan
can offer: it produces very little, is poor, and its government
has minimal capacity. The Tajiks
have some unrealistic ideas
about what we can offer them — mainly large infrastructure
projects including questionable power plants, tunnels to
Pakistan, and bridges to nowhere.
There is some truth to the
quip that Tajikistan’s real contribution to our efforts in
Afghanistan is to be stable, and to allow unfettered over flight
and transit to our forces — which the Tajiks have done
unfailingly. We try to promote
Tajik polices which will ensure
continued stability. End summary.
A DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOOD
3. (C) Some of Tajikistan’s difficulties are geographic.
Chronic problems with Uzbekistan, fueled by personal animosity
between the presidents of each country, has stymied Tajikistan’s
trade, energy self-sufficiency, and economic development.
Afghan instability is a malign influence: traffic in drugs
undermines rule of law in Tajikistan, Tajiks fear the spread of
extremist ideas from Afghanistan, and militants in Afghanistan
can threaten Tajik security across the long, porous border.
Russian interference looms large in the Tajik consciousness.
The Russians control one major hydropower dam in Tajikistan, a
source of disagreements between the two countries. The Tajiks
seek alternative partners, including the United States, China,
and Iran, to balance Russian influence.
China is a major
infrastructure donor, with over $1 billion in low-interest loans
to Tajikistan to build roads and power line projects. Iran
funds tunnel and hydropower projects, but displays of Persian
solidarity do not mask deep suspicions between the
hard-drinking, Soviet-reared, Sunni elite in Dushanbe and
religiously conservative Shiites in Tehran.
4. (C) The Tajik government presses us for greater benefits in
return for support on Afghanistan.
The Tajiks think Uzbekistan
is keeping all NDN-related business for itself; they want more
traffic to transit Tajikistan, more infrastructure to support
that traffic, and the United States to purchase Tajik goods for
forces in Afghanistan. We
currently purchase small amounts of
Tajik bottled water for ISAF.
They have indicated they would be
happy for the U.S. establish an air base in Tajikistan. They
see U.S. involvement in the region as a bulwark against Afghan
instability, and as a cash cow they want a piece of.
FEAR OF INTERNAL RIVALS, MILITANTS, AND RUSSIA
5. (C) The Tajik civil war ended in 1997 with a power sharing
arrangement between President Rahmon’s government and the
leaders of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Since the end of
the war, Rahmon gradually has reneged on this deal and forced
DUSHANBE 00000172 002 OF 005
nearly all oppositionists out of government — some are in
prison, some left the country, and others died mysteriously. In
May 2009 an armed group led by a former UTO figure, Mullah
Abdullo Rahimov, returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan,
reportedly with several foreign fighters. Tajik security forces
neutralized this group without outside assistance. They have
told us U.S. training enabled their security forces to win, and
they are eager for more training.
6. (C) Russian-Tajik relations have deteriorated. Tajik
officials believe the Russians supported Mullah Abdullo’s group,
to signal Tajikistan that they need Russian protection. The two
governments could not agree on the terms of Russian involvement
in the Roghun Dam, and they have other differences. In October
2009 the President downgraded the formal status of the Russian
language in Tajikistan. His
government broached charging Russia
rent for its military bases in Tajikistan. In 2009 the
Russian-controlled Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric plant cut production
when the government of Tajikistan’s failed to pay its bills on
time.
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
7. (C) Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics.
It is more mountainous than
Afghanistan, with earthquakes,
floods, droughts, locusts and extreme weather. Parts of the
country are often cut off by snow and avalanches. External
links pass through obstructive Uzbekistan, unstable Afghanistan,
or over the rough, remote Pamir passes to western China. Its
only industrial products are aluminum and hydroelectricity. The
Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco) accounts for most of Tajikistan’s
exports. Though it is technically
state-owned, most of its
revenues end up in a secretive offshore company controlled by
the President, and the state budget sees little of the income.
Talco consumes up to half of Tajikistan’s electricity,
contributing to major seasonal shortages and suffering.
8. (C) President Rahmon’s response to Tajikistan’s chronic
energy insecurity was in late 2009 to launch a massive campaign
to fund and build the Roghun Hydroelectric Plant. Roghun would
be the highest dam in the world, and double Tajikistan’s
electricity generation capacity.
The government’s fundraising
efforts, however, have drawn serious concern from international
donors. Individuals and
organizations across all walks of life
have been coerced into buying shares in the project. Many
people have been told they will lose their jobs unless they
contribute an amount equal to many months’ salary. While the
government claims all share sales are voluntary, there is ample
evidence that officials are forcing the population to cough up
funds. Apart from the human
rights question, donors are
concerned that the nearly $200 million in funds raised so far
will not be accounted for and spent transparently. Considering
Talco’s share of electricity consumption, the Roghun campaign
looks like a means to ensure Talco’s continued profitability.
9. (C) Tajikistan’s economy suffers from the global recession
through major drops in exports, imports, and remittances from a
million Tajiks working in Russia.
The money they sent home was
equal to over 50% of GDP in 2008, and literally keeps rural
communities alive. Remittances
dropped 34% in 2009. The
greatest obstacle to improving the economy is resistance to
reform. From the President down
to the policeman on the street,
government is characterized by cronyism and corruption. Rahmon
and his family control the country’s major businesses, including
the largest bank, and they play hardball to protect their
business interests, no matter the cost to the economy writ
large. As one foreign ambassador
summed up, President Rahmon
prefers to control 90% of a ten-dollar pie rather than 30% of a
hundred-dollar pie.
ELECTIONS ARE COMING, BUT DEMOCRACY ISN’T
DUSHANBE 00000172 003 OF 005
10. (C) The government has limited opposition party operations
and rejected electoral law reforms for the February 28, 2010
parliamentary elections. The
Embassy does not expect the
elections to be free and fair.
There has been almost no
coverage of opposition political parties by state media, and
most of the population is unaware of the purpose of the
elections. Parliamentary
opposition is weak — only 15 of the
62 members are not in the ruling party, and some of these are
independent in name only. The
most prominent opposition party,
the Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), has two seats in
the outgoing parliament. IRPT
leadership has supported the
government on most issues and downplays the importance of Islam
in the party’s platform.
Parliament acts as a rubber stamp.
11. (SBU) In 2009 Parliament passed a restrictive new law on
religion, curbing the activities of religious groups, Islamic or
otherwise. Our advice that this
could radicalize many believers
has fallen on deaf ears. Last
year, the government arrested
dozens of individuals, accusing them of membership in the banned
«Salafiya» movement, but it has no evidence that there is an
organized Salafiya movement. It
also arrested 92 members of the
Muslim fundamentalist missionary group, Jamaati Tabligh. Most
mainstream Muslim religious leaders view the Tabligh members as
harmless missionaries and have called for their release.
12. (SBU) Independent media is reeling after government
officials recently filed lawsuits against five newspapers for
reporting on public government reports and statements in open
court which were critical of judges and government ministries.
The newspapers will be forced to close if the lawsuits succeed.
We and European partners have protested the lawsuits.
DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH DONORS
13. (SBU) In 2007 Tajikistan’s National Bank admitted it had
hidden a billion dollars in loans and guarantees to
politically-connected cotton investors (of which $600 million
was never repaid), violating its IMF program. The IMF demanded
early repayment of some debt, an audit of the National Bank, and
other reforms before renewing assistance. In May 2009 the IMF
voted to lend a further $116 million to Tajikistan to help it
through the next three years; the U.S. was the only IMF member
to vote against this, which infuriated the Tajik government.
The IMF has so far disbursed $40 million. A team from
Washington was recently in Dushanbe to assess government
progress, establish new benchmarks for the next tranche of
funds, and assess the impact of Roghun fundraising. The team’s
assessment should be available soon.
Donors are concerned that
the campaign to finance Roghun is exacerbating severe poverty,
and violates the terms of the IMF’s assistance. It raises
questions about the government’s frequent appeals to donors for
financial aid and its willingness to enact economic reforms as a
condition of that aid. Donors
have expressed their concerns
formally to the government and await a response. Donors are
pushing regional energy market integration and the construction
of power lines that will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell
surplus summer electricity output to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
A 220 kW line from Tajikistan to Afghanistan is under
construction with Asian Development Bank financing, and will be
finished in late 2010. The larger
CASA-1000 power line project
to link to Afghanistan and Pakistan has been delayed by
financing problems.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
14. (U) U.S. assistance to Tajikistan will grow significantly to
$45.3 million in FY 2010, from $27.8 million in FY 2009. The
new money will go to agriculture, trade, and private sector
initiatives to compensate for the loss of the much-needed food
security programs. Until FY 2008
Tajikistan had a multi-year
DUSHANBE 00000172 004 OF 005
food aid program that had significant results reducing food
insecurity in some of Tajikistan’s most at-risk regions,
followed by similar single-year programs in FY 2009 and 2010. A
new Food Security Initiative is in development, but it remains
unclear whether Tajikistan will receive any of those funds. New
programs also will address chronic energy shortages by building
a regional energy market and helping the Central Asian states
address water and power issues.
Tajikistan was awarded $9.9
million in FY 2008 1207 funds to address stability issues. The
major threats to stability arise from the Tajikistan’s poverty
— the World Bank estimates over 60% of the population lives
below the poverty line — and the government’s demonstrated
inability to respond to emergencies.
The 1207 project works in
50 isolated communities in the Rasht and Fergana valleys, and
along the Afghan frontier. Health
and education deficiencies
are so acute they imperil our progress in other areas. Our
programs work to improve health policies, systems and services,
teacher training, education finance, national curriculum,
student assessment, and school governance.
SECURITY COOPERATION
15. (C) Security Cooperation remains a strong point in our
relationship with Tajikistan. The
Ministry of Defense
volunteered last year for the first time to host CENTCOM’s
Exercise Regional Cooperation, including Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, which concluded August 10. CENTCOM
and the Tajik Armed Forces held Consultative Staff Talks in May
and established the FY 2010 Security Cooperation Plan, which
reflects Tajikistan’s increased interest in demining and
participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
The U.S. Army Humanitarian Demining Research and Development
Office will provide Tajikistan a mechanical demining machine for
field evaluation in FY 2010 with a planned FMF purchase in FY
2011. Tajikistan reconfirmed its
commitment to deploy a
company-sized peacekeeping unit in 2011.
Training begins this
month with a National Policy White Paper Workshop that will help
shape development in the Ministry of Defense and their Mobile
Forces. A General Staff level
workshop and actual unit training
will take place next year.
16. (C) The Nizhny Pyanj Bridge and Point of Entry facilities
have improved the links between Tajikistan and Afghanistan
significantly. Though the bridge
is not being used to its
fullest capacity, traffic is much heavier than the old ferry
system, and continues to grow.
Counts vary between 40 and 200
containers and transport trucks per day.
CENTCOM 2010funding at
this facility will improve lighting, fences, and cameras, and
parking areas. Tajikistan is
eager to see us make greater use
of our agreement on transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan
through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and hopes for
economic benefits to Tajikistan from this agreement. So far we
have low rate truck traffic from Manas through Tajikistan to
Bagram. Defense Logistics Agency
is arranging to buy bottled
water from a Tajik producer for forces in Afghanistan. The
Tajiks are looking for any way to circumvent Uzbekistan’s
stranglehold on their trade.
US SOF ENGAGEMENT
17. (S) The U.S. Embassy plans to continue to build the capacity
and capability of select Tajikistan security forces, in support
of CENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter
Narcotics (JIACG-CN), and U.S. government strategic themes,
goals and objectives for Tajikistan.
Once SOCCENT forces have
done an assessment and started organizing these groups into
special units, the main goal is to sustain an increase in
capabilities by U.S. Special Forces Joint Combined Exercise and
Training (JCET) and Counter-narcotic training (CNT) missions.
NARCOTICS
DUSHANBE 00000172 005 OF 005
18. (C) Tajikistan is a major transit route for Afghan heroin
going to Russia and Europe.
According to UN Office of Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) estimates, 40 tons of Afghan opiates enter Russia
each year via Tajikistan. Less
than 5% is seized before
reaching Russia. Capabilities of
Tajik law enforcement agencies
are severely limited. Corruption
is a major problem. Law
enforcement agencies are reluctant to target well-connected
traffickers, but are effective
against low- and mid-level
traffickers. The Drug Control Agency (DCA) is a ten-year-old,
400-officer agency developed through a UNODC project. Many
countries are donors, but an INL-funded salary supplement
program provides the primary funding.
DCA’s liaison officers in
Taloquan in northern Afghanistan were key to seizures totaling
over 100 kilos of heroin in the last four months. U.S Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents work with DCA to deepen
operations.
19. (SBU) Until 2005, the Russians guarded the Tajik/Afghan
border; after the Russians departed, the outposts were broken
down lean-tos, unfit for human habitation. The Tajik Border
Guard force is staffed largely by conscripts who are poorly
trained, poorly paid, underequipped and often under-fed. INL
rebuilt border posts, giving the Border Guards suitable and safe
places to live, creating conditions for successful border patrol
operations. Each new outpost
costs about $500,000 and houses
more than 100 guards. The
outposts use low-maintenance
energy-efficient prefab construction and alternative energy,
including solar, wind and micro-hydro power. We are planning a
pilot project of joint Tajik/Afghan border guard training in
Khorog. If successful, it will be
part of the regular training
of guards assigned to the Afghan/Tajik border. We are exploring
offering a popular Emergency First Responder course to a joint
class of Tajik and Afghan border guards.
INL has rebuilt the
Tajik Border Guard academy. A
U.S. Border Patrol team plans to
visit to discuss and demonstrate patrolling techniques at the
Academy and in the field; this might lead to an exchange of
instructors.
20. (C) CENTCOM’s Counter Narcotics program is making strong
contributions to Tajikistan’s security.
This year, $16.9
million in funding, recently approved in the Supplemental Bill,
will support construction of an interagency National Training
Center, infrastructure at the Nizhny Pyanj Point of Entry, and
communications equipment. The
Training Center will be a
multi-use facility for all ministries and serve as a venue for
SOCCENT’s bi-annual Counter Narco-Terrorism training. A recent
end-use monitoring visit demonstrated the Tajiks are using
previously provided communications equipment and maintaining the
equipment. This year, we will
begin establishing an interagency
communications architecture at Nizhny Pyanj and the adjoining
district. This will allow five
government agencies to
communicate using a compatible system.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
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date: 2/16/2010 13:41
refid: 10DUSHANBE173
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination:
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RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 000173
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR S/RAP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2020
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, EAID, ECON, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY — TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SRAP
HOLBROOKE
CLASSIFIED BY: NECIA QUAST, CDA, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: U.S. interests in Tajikistan are a stable state
on Afghanistan’s northern border, support for our military
efforts in Afghanistan, and for Tajikistan to be a stabilizing
influence and contributor to economic development in the region.
Tajikistan gives unrestricted
over flight rights, and quickly
agreed to NDN ground transit. In
the medium term, it could play
a more active role in regional development, because of its huge
hydropower potential, relative (to Afghanistan) stability, and
religiously moderate population.
But to do so Tajikistan must
overcome multiple political and economic problems which stymie
its own development: poverty, bad relations with Uzbekistan,
intense corruption, Soviet-era economic structures and planning,
an undemocratic political system, chronic food insecurity, and
dependence on migrant labor in Russia.
2. (C) U.S. assistance has shown mixed results in the
development sphere. Recent steps
to improve the business
climate have been offset by the government’s campaign to force
its citizens to contribute to the construction of the Roghun
hydroelectric dam. The government
is not willing to reform its
political process. Our security
cooperation shows some promise.
Regardless of our efforts, there
is a limit to what Tajikistan
can offer: it produces very little, is poor, and its government
has minimal capacity. The Tajiks
have some unrealistic ideas
about what we can offer them — mainly large infrastructure
projects including questionable power plants, tunnels to
Pakistan, and bridges to nowhere.
There is some truth to the
quip that Tajikistan’s real contribution to our efforts in
Afghanistan is to be stable, and to allow unfettered over flight
and transit to our forces — which the Tajiks have done
unfailingly. We try to promote
Tajik polices which will ensure
continued stability. End summary.
A DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOOD
3. (C) Some of Tajikistan’s difficulties are geographic.
Chronic problems with Uzbekistan, fueled by personal animosity
between the presidents of each country, has stymied Tajikistan’s
trade, energy self-sufficiency, and economic development.
Afghan instability is a malign influence: traffic in drugs
undermines rule of law in Tajikistan, Tajiks fear the spread of
extremist ideas from Afghanistan, and militants in Afghanistan
can threaten Tajik security across the long, porous border.
Russian interference looms large in the Tajik consciousness.
The Russians control one major hydropower dam in Tajikistan, a
source of disagreements between the two countries. The Tajiks
seek alternative partners, including the United States, China,
and Iran, to balance Russian influence.
China is a major
infrastructure donor, with over $1 billion in low-interest loans
to Tajikistan to build roads and power line projects. Iran
funds tunnel and hydropower projects, but displays of Persian
solidarity do not mask deep suspicions between the
hard-drinking, Soviet-reared, Sunni elite in Dushanbe and
religiously conservative Shiites in Tehran.
4. (C) The Tajik government presses us for greater benefits in
return for support on Afghanistan.
The Tajiks think Uzbekistan
is keeping all NDN-related business for itself; they want more
traffic to transit Tajikistan, more infrastructure to support
that traffic, and the United States to purchase Tajik goods for
forces in Afghanistan. We
currently purchase small amounts of
Tajik bottled water for ISAF.
They have indicated they would be
happy for the U.S. establish an air base in Tajikistan. They
see U.S. involvement in the region as a bulwark against Afghan
instability, and as a cash cow they want a piece of.
FEAR OF INTERNAL RIVALS, MILITANTS, AND RUSSIA
5. (C) The Tajik civil war ended in 1997 with a power sharing
arrangement between President Rahmon’s government and the
leaders of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Since the end of
DUSHANBE 00000173 002 OF 005
the war, Rahmon gradually has reneged on this deal and forced
nearly all oppositionists out of government — some are in
prison, some left the country, and others died mysteriously. In
May 2009 an armed group led by a former UTO figure, Mullah
Abdullo Rahimov, returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan,
reportedly with several foreign fighters. Tajik security forces
neutralized this group without outside assistance. They have
told us U.S. training enabled their security forces to win, and
they are eager for more training.
6. (C) Russian-Tajik relations have deteriorated. Tajik
officials believe the Russians supported Mullah Abdullo’s group,
to signal Tajikistan that they need Russian protection. The two
governments could not agree on the terms of Russian involvement
in the Roghun Dam, and they have other differences. In October
2009 the President downgraded the formal status of the Russian
language in Tajikistan. His
government broached charging Russia
rent for its military bases in Tajikistan. In 2009 the
Russian-controlled Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric plant cut production
when the government of Tajikistan’s failed to pay its bills on
time.
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
7. (C) Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics.
It is more mountainous than
Afghanistan, with earthquakes,
floods, droughts, locusts and extreme weather. Parts of the
country are often cut off by snow and avalanches. External
links pass through obstructive Uzbekistan, unstable Afghanistan,
or over the rough, remote Pamir passes to western China. Its
only industrial products are aluminum and hydroelectricity. The
Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco) accounts for most of Tajikistan’s
exports. Though it is technically
state-owned, most of its
revenues end up in a secretive offshore company controlled by
the President, and the state budget sees little of the income.
Talco consumes up to half of Tajikistan’s electricity,
contributing to major seasonal shortages and suffering.
8. (C) President Rahmon’s response to Tajikistan’s chronic
energy insecurity was in late 2009 to launch a massive campaign
to fund and build the Roghun Hydroelectric Plant. Roghun would
be the highest dam in the world, and double Tajikistan’s
electricity generation capacity.
The government’s fundraising
efforts, however, have drawn serious concern from international
donors. Individuals and
organizations across all walks of life
have been coerced into buying shares in the project. Many
people have been told they will lose their jobs unless they
contribute an amount equal to many months’ salary. While the
government claims all share sales are voluntary, there is ample
evidence that officials are forcing the population to cough up
funds. Apart from the human
rights question, donors are
concerned that the nearly $200 million in funds raised so far
will not be accounted for and spent transparently. Considering
Talco’s share of electricity consumption, the Roghun campaign
looks like a means to ensure Talco’s continued profitability.
9. (C) Tajikistan’s economy suffers from the global recession
through major drops in exports, imports, and remittances from a
million Tajiks working in Russia.
The money they sent home was
equal to over 50% of GDP in 2008, and literally keeps rural
communities alive. Remittances
dropped 34% in 2009. The
greatest obstacle to improving the economy is resistance to
reform. From the President down
to the policeman on the street,
government is characterized by cronyism and corruption. Rahmon
and his family control the country’s major businesses, including
the largest bank, and they play hardball to protect their
business interests, no matter the cost to the economy writ
large. As one foreign ambassador
summed up, President Rahmon
prefers to control 90% of a ten-dollar pie rather than 30% of a
hundred-dollar pie.
DUSHANBE 00000173 003 OF 005
ELECTIONS ARE COMING, BUT DEMOCRACY ISN’T
10. (C) The government has limited opposition party operations
and rejected electoral law reforms for the February 28, 2010
parliamentary elections. The
Embassy does not expect the
elections to be free and fair.
There has been almost no
coverage of opposition political parties by state media, and
most of the population is unaware of the purpose of the
elections. Parliamentary
opposition is weak — only 15 of the
62 members are not in the ruling party, and some of these are
independent in name only. The
most prominent opposition party,
the Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), has two seats in
the outgoing parliament. IRPT
leadership has supported the
government on most issues and downplays the importance of Islam
in the party’s platform.
Parliament acts as a rubber stamp.
11. (SBU) In 2009 Parliament passed a restrictive new law on
religion, curbing the activities of religious groups, Islamic or
otherwise. Our advice that this
could radicalize many believers
has fallen on deaf ears. Last
year, the government arrested
dozens of individuals, accusing them of membership in the banned
«Salafiya» movement, but it has no evidence that there is an
organized Salafiya movement. It
also arrested 92 members of the
Muslim fundamentalist missionary group, Jamaati Tabligh. Most
mainstream Muslim religious leaders view the Tabligh members as
harmless missionaries and have called for their release.
12. (SBU) Independent media is reeling after government
officials recently filed lawsuits against five newspapers for
reporting on public government reports and statements in open
court which were critical of judges and government ministries.
The newspapers will be forced to close if the lawsuits succeed.
We and European partners have protested the lawsuits.
DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH DONORS
13. (SBU) In 2007 Tajikistan’s National Bank admitted it had
hidden a billion dollars in loans and guarantees to
politically-connected cotton investors (of which $600 million
was never repaid), violating its IMF program. The IMF demanded
early repayment of some debt, an audit of the National Bank, and
other reforms before renewing assistance. In May 2009 the IMF
voted to lend a further $116 million to Tajikistan to help it
through the next three years; the U.S. was the only IMF member
to vote against this, which infuriated the Tajik government.
The IMF has so far disbursed $40 million. A team from
Washington was recently in Dushanbe to assess government
progress, establish new benchmarks for the next tranche of
funds, and assess the impact of Roghun fundraising. The team’s
assessment should be available soon.
Donors are concerned that
the campaign to finance Roghun is exacerbating severe poverty,
and violates the terms of the IMF’s assistance. It raises
questions about the government’s frequent appeals to donors for
financial aid and its willingness to enact economic reforms as a
condition of that aid. Donors
have expressed their concerns
formally to the government and await a response. Donors are
pushing regional energy market integration and the construction
of power lines that will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell
surplus summer electricity output to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
A 220 kW line from Tajikistan to Afghanistan is under
construction with Asian Development Bank financing, and will be
finished in late 2010. The larger
CASA-1000 power line project
to link to Afghanistan and Pakistan has been delayed by
financing problems.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
14. (U) U.S. assistance to Tajikistan will grow significantly to
$45.3 million in FY 2010, from $27.8 million in FY 2009. The
DUSHANBE 00000173 004 OF 005
new money will go to agriculture, trade, and private sector
initiatives to compensate for the loss of the much-needed food
security programs. Until FY 2008
Tajikistan had a multi-year
food aid program that had significant results reducing food
insecurity in some of Tajikistan’s most at-risk regions,
followed by similar single-year programs in FY 2009 and 2010. A
new Food Security Initiative is in development, but it remains
unclear whether Tajikistan will receive any of those funds. New
programs also will address chronic energy shortages by building
a regional energy market and helping the Central Asian states
address water and power issues.
Tajikistan was awarded $9.9
million in FY 2008 1207 funds to address stability issues. The
major threats to stability arise from the Tajikistan’s poverty
— the World Bank estimates over 60% of the population lives
below the poverty line — and the government’s demonstrated
inability to respond to emergencies.
The 1207 project works in
50 isolated communities in the Rasht and Fergana valleys, and
along the Afghan frontier. Health
and education deficiencies
are so acute they imperil our progress in other areas. Our
programs work to improve health policies, systems and services,
teacher training, education finance, national curriculum,
student assessment, and school governance.
SECURITY COOPERATION
15. (C) Security Cooperation remains a strong point in our
relationship with Tajikistan. The
Ministry of Defense
volunteered last year for the first time to host CENTCOM’s
Exercise Regional Cooperation, including Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, which concluded August 10. CENTCOM
and the Tajik Armed Forces held Consultative Staff Talks in May
and established the FY 2010 Security Cooperation Plan, which
reflects Tajikistan’s increased interest in demining and
participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
The U.S. Army Humanitarian Demining Research and Development
Office will provide Tajikistan a mechanical demining machine for
field evaluation in FY 2010 with a planned FMF purchase in FY
2011. Tajikistan reconfirmed its
commitment to deploy a
company-sized peacekeeping unit in 2011.
Training begins this
month with a National Policy White Paper Workshop that will help
shape development in the Ministry of Defense and their Mobile
Forces. A General Staff level
workshop and actual unit training
will take place next year.
16. (C) The Nizhny Pyanj Bridge and Point of Entry facilities
have improved the links between Tajikistan and Afghanistan
significantly. Though the bridge
is not being used to its
fullest capacity, traffic is much heavier than the old ferry
system, and continues to grow.
Counts vary between 40 and 200
containers and transport trucks per day.
CENTCOM 2010funding at
this facility will improve lighting, fences, and cameras, and
parking areas. Tajikistan is
eager to see us make greater use
of our agreement on transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan
through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and hopes for
economic benefits to Tajikistan from this agreement. So far we
have low rate truck traffic from Manas through Tajikistan to
Bagram. Defense Logistics Agency
is arranging to buy bottled
water from a Tajik producer for forces in Afghanistan. The
Tajiks are looking for any way to circumvent Uzbekistan’s
stranglehold on their trade.
US SOF ENGAGEMENT
17. (S) The U.S. Embassy plans to continue to build the capacity
and capability of select Tajikistan security forces, in support
of CENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter
Narcotics (JIACG-CN), and U.S. government strategic themes,
goals and objectives for Tajikistan.
Once SOCCENT forces have
done an assessment and started organizing these groups into
special units, the main goal is to sustain an increase in
capabilities by U.S. Special Forces Joint Combined Exercise and
Training (JCET) and Counter-narcotic training (CNT) missions.
DUSHANBE 00000173 005 OF 005
NARCOTICS
18. (C) Tajikistan is a major transit route for Afghan heroin
going to Russia and Europe.
According to UN Office of Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) estimates, 40 tons of Afghan opiates enter Russia
each year via Tajikistan. Less
than 5% is seized before
reaching Russia. Capabilities of
Tajik law enforcement agencies
are severely limited. Corruption
is a major problem. Law
enforcement agencies are reluctant to target well-connected
traffickers, but are effective
against low- and mid-level
traffickers. The Drug Control Agency (DCA) is a ten-year-old,
400-officer agency developed through a UNODC project. Many
countries are donors, but an INL-funded salary supplement
program provides the primary funding.
DCA’s liaison officers in
Taloquan in northern Afghanistan were key to seizures totaling
over 100 kilos of heroin in the last four months. U.S Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents work with DCA to deepen
operations.
19. (SBU) Until 2005, the Russians guarded the Tajik/Afghan
border; after the Russians departed, the outposts were broken
down lean-tos, unfit for human habitation. The Tajik Border
Guard force is staffed largely by conscripts who are poorly
trained, poorly paid, underequipped and often under-fed. INL
rebuilt border posts, giving the Border Guards suitable and safe
places to live, creating conditions for successful border patrol
operations. Each new outpost
costs about $500,000 and houses
more than 100 guards. The
outposts use low-maintenance
energy-efficient prefab construction and alternative energy,
including solar, wind and micro-hydro power. We are planning a
pilot project of joint Tajik/Afghan border guard training in
Khorog. If successful, it will be
part of the regular training
of guards assigned to the Afghan/Tajik border. We are exploring
offering a popular Emergency First Responder course to a joint
class of Tajik and Afghan border guards.
INL has rebuilt the
Tajik Border Guard academy. A
U.S. Border Patrol team plans to
visit to discuss and demonstrate patrolling techniques at the
Academy and in the field; this might lead to an exchange of
instructors.
20. (C) CENTCOM’s Counter Narcotics program is making strong
contributions to Tajikistan’s security.
This year, $16.9
million in funding, recently approved in the Supplemental Bill,
will support construction of an interagency National Training
Center, infrastructure at the Nizhny Pyanj Point of Entry, and
communications equipment. The
Training Center will be a
multi-use facility for all ministries and serve as a venue for
SOCCENT’s bi-annual Counter Narco-Terrorism training. A recent
end-use monitoring visit demonstrated the Tajiks are using
previously provided communications equipment and maintaining the
e
