Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 237307
date: 12/1/2009 6:04
refid: 09DUSHANBE1336
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3630
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHDBU #1336/01 3350604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010604Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0957
INFO RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY 0034
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0021
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUCNEXC/EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/USCG HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0094
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0098
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2056
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001336
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC YWONG, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN ALONG, SCA/RA JMCCLELLAN
CBP/INA FOR SBAKER, GRISING
DHS/ICE FOR AMEFFERD
DOE/NNSA FOR JNOBLE, BPENTOLA
DOC FOR DCREED
USCG SHABTEMICHAEL
FRANKFURT PLEASE PASS TO ICE ATTACHE
BERLIN PLEASE PASS TO CBP ATTACHE
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO ICE ATTACHE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC, MNUC, PARM, PREL, KSTC, KNNP, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: EXBS: TAJIKISTAN ADVISOR MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE — NOVEMBER
2009
DUSHANBE 00001336 001.2 OF 003
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS
A. On November 2, 2009, Zebo Khasanova began employment as the
EXBS Program Management Assistant.
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS DURING REPORTING PERIOD
1. Site Assessments
a) On November 5 the EXBS
Advisor, Lead EXBS Program Management
Assistant and the EXBS Program Management Assistant visited the
construction site of the Nuclear Radiation Safety Agency (NRSA)
laboratory. The EXBS funded
construction of the calibration
laboratory is moving forward and is on schedule to be completed
in late January or early February.
b) On November 4 the EXBS
Advisor, Lead EXBS Program Management
Assistant and the EXBS Program Management Assistant visited the
construction site of the GOTI Customs Academy. The EXBS Team
was accompanied by a computer programmer from the Embassy
Dushanbe Information Systems Center.
The two computer
classrooms were assessed, proposed computer equipment was
examined, and approval was given to purchase multi-media
equipment. The contractor
presented samples of classroom
furniture that was not acceptable to the EXBS Office and did not
meet the requirements of the contract.
The contractor was
advised that the classroom furniture had to be constructed to
withstand constant use by training participants.
c) On November 24 the EXBS
Advisor, Lead EXBS Program
Management Assistant and the EXBS Program Management Assistant
visited the construction site of the GOTI Customs Academy. All
major construction has been completed.
The contractor presented
samples of stronger classroom furniture and audio-visual
equipment. All the samples were
approved by the EXBS Office.
The furniture will have to be specially manufactured and the
computer equipment will be purchased from outside Tajikistan and
will require a delay in the completion date of the project. The
contractor applied in writing to extend the completion date for
30 days and it was approved by RPSO.
2. Meetings
a) During the week of November 16
the Lead EXBS Program
Management Assistant and the EXBS Program Management Assistant
attended the EXBS LES Workshop in Frankfurt, Germany. The Lead
EXBS Program Management Assistant gave a presentation on
Internal Controls used in the EXBS Dushanbe Office. She also
received an award from the Director of Export Control
DUSHANBE 00001336 002.2 OF 003
Cooperation.
b) On November 19 members of Post
Border Law Enforcement
Working Group (BLEWG) briefed the Russian Ambassador and members
of his staff on border security assistance programs. The EXBS
Advisor provided an overview of the EXBS border security program
in Tajikistan. It was agreed that
the Russian Embassy would do
a similar briefing in the future.
c) On November 19 the Ambassador
hosted an INL/DEA/EXBS law
enforcement reception at his residence.
The reception was
attended by the EXBS Advisor.
GOTI law enforcement officials
associated with the three programs attended.
d) On November 20 the EXBS
Advisor met with the Chief Technical
Advisor for UNDP. He has
temporarily been tasked to represent
the EU in matters relating to nonproliferation in Tajikistan.
He advised that the EU wants to have a larger presence in
nonproliferation programs in Tajikistan.
e) On November 20 the Lead EXBS
Program Management Assistant
and the EXBS Program Management Assistant met with
representatives from RPSO in Frankfurt, Germany to discuss two
ongoing EXBS funded construction projects and three future
projects.
B. TRAINING CONDUCTED DURING
REPORTING PERIOD
1. During the week of November 9
the Department of Defense,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducted a course on
Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The course was attended by 32 GOTI Customs, Drug Control Agency,
Police and Prosecutor officials.
C. EQUIPMENT DELIVERED DURING
REPORTING PERIOD
1. NONE
D. IMMINENT TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT
STATUS UPDATE
1. Training
a) None
DUSHANBE 00001336 003.2 OF 003
2. Equipment
a) None
E. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EXPORT CONTROLS,
NONPROLIFERATION, OR RELATED BORDER SECURITY
None
III. RED FLAG ISSUES
A. None
POC for this report is Robert Granico, EXBS Advisor,
[email protected] , phone 992
37
229-2804; EXBS Program Assistant Dilorom Ganieva,
[email protected] , phone 992
37
229-2805.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 237831
date: 12/3/2009 11:26
refid: 09DUSHANBE1348
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE1215
header:
VZCZCXRO6284
PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1348/01 3371126
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031126Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0980
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0324
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0117
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0003
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0002
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2079
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001348
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, ENRG, TI
SUBJECT: RAHMON LAMBASTS UZBEK ENERGY GRID WITHDRAWAL, ASKS FOR DONOR
HELP
REF: DUSHANBE 1215
DUSHANBE 00001348 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Summary: President
Rahmon convened a surprise meeting
of international donors in Dushanbe on November 20 to discuss
the energy situation and request assistance in the face of an
economic crisis compounded by Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the
regional energy system. He
lambasted Uzbekistan’s conduct on
numerous fronts, ranging from energy policy to its meddling in
Tajikistan’s civil war, and urged the international community to
exert pressure on Tashkent. He
criticized donors for being soft
on Uzbekistan. Rahmon repeated
earlier threats to hoard water
instead of letting it flow to Uzbekistan. He said Tajikistan
would raise the dam at Roghun ahead of schedule to hold water
back for winter use downstream at the Nurek hydropower station,
and the Qairaqqum hydropower station in the north would use its
water to generate electricity in the winter, rather than saving
it for agricultural use in Uzbekistan during the spring and
summer. Rahmon detailed ongoing
and planned energy projects,
including new transmission lines and hydroelectric stations that
he said were necessary to achieve energy independence. Despite
Rahmon’s stern words, it is not clear that Tajikistan has much
room for maneuver. Nor is the
situation all that much worse
than usual, given that Uzbekistan limits power to Tajikistan
each winter anyway. End summary.
THE BAD NEWS …
2. (SBU) On November 20, the government called donors, including
USAID Country Director, to a hastily-convened meeting at the
Presidential Dacha in Dushanbe.
President Rahmon began the
meeting by discussing the global economic crisis and its impact
on Tajikistan. Falling aluminum
and cotton prices have reduced
exports by 35%, with a 10% decrease in overall production,
worsened by the energy crisis.
Remittances from Tajiks working
abroad are also down 35% in the first 9 months of 2009, and
budget fulfillment is 95% of targets.
(Comment: According to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), exports have declined by
only 23%. Since government
figures generally use world prices
in calculating aluminum exports, even though Tajikistan exports
its aluminum at a fixed price under a tolling arrangement, the
statistics are not necessarily reliable.
Nor is there a direct
correlation between decreased aluminum exports and economic
difficulties, since profits from aluminum production largely
flow to offshore accounts controlled by the country’s elite.
End comment.)
… AND SOME GOOD NEWS
3. (SBU) There was some good news, Rahmon said. The country had
recently built over 150 small hydropower stations, with 50 more
coming on line this year. The
South-North 500 kilovolt (kV)
energy transmission line linking Dushanbe and Khujand was
completed just a few days ago, providing greater energy
independence for Tajikistan’s north, which had largely depended
on electricity imports from Uzbekistan.
Rahmon noted the
completion, with Russian investment, of Sangtuda-1 earlier this
year, and said the first of Sangtuda-2’s two turbines, built
with Iranian investment, will come online next year. Most
experts believe Sangtuda-2 will not be ready before 2012.
Rahmon said the energy situation was better this year than last.
Rationing started in November
rather than December, and the
regions are getting 7 hours this year, rather than just two
hours as in previous years.
(Embassy note: Rationing started
in September in 2008.)
REPEATS THREAT TO HOLD WATER BACK FROM UZBEKISTAN
4. (SBU) Despite such efforts, however, Uzbekistan’s decision to
leave the Central Asian Unified Energy System would force
Tajikistan to take drastic measures.
Although the energy
situation was slightly better this year, the system was
operating without a backup.
Rahmon said Tajikistan would
accelerate construction of the massive Roghun hydropower
station, investing $150 million by the end of this year and the
same amount in 2010. (Rahmon had
earlier announced that 2009
expenditures would total $122 million.)
Tajikistan needed about
$500 million over four years to complete Roghun. Rahmon
provided more detail about Tajikistan’s plans to hold back water
to generate electricity, thus reducing the volume of water to
downstream Uzbekistan. Initially
this threat appeared to be an
empty one, since Tajikistan already holds back as much water as
DUSHANBE 00001348 002.2 OF 004
possible on an annual basis to refill its hydroelectric
reservoirs (reftel). But Rahmon
specified that Tajikistan
planned to build the dam at Roghun to a height of 30 meters
between now and August 2010, even before Roghun’s turbines were
ready, to hold more water back for downstream use at Nurek.
Tajikistan would continue to raise the Roghun dam every year,
which would allow for more generation at Nurek, and would export
excess power to Afghanistan along a new 220 kV line.
5. (SBU) Rahmon said Tajikistan would hold water back in the
Qairaqqum reservoir in the north, on the Syr Darya River, which
would have a much more serious impact on Uzbekistan’s
agriculture. Uzbekistan relies on
spring and summer outflow
from the Syr Darya to irrigate crops in three of its districts.
Rahmon said instead of letting water accumulate in Qairaqqum
during the winter months for use in spring and summer both to
generate hydropower and to irrigate crops, Tajikistan would
generate power all winter long, leaving little for the
agricultural season.
SCREED AGAINST UZBEKISTAN WIDENS
6. (SBU) Rahmon spent most of the meeting delivering a tirade
against Uzbekistan’s perfidy, with donors coming under attack as
well. He charged that the timing
of Uzbekistan’s decision was
calculated to inflict maximal damage on Tajikistan’s economy, to
bring the country to heel as an «obedient slave.» He cited the
many times Uzbekistan had shut off natural gas to Tajikistan
over the past 18 years, and the gratuitous blocking of cargo and
air and rail links. Fertilizers,
for example, had only been
available via Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan. (Note: In
fact most of Tajikistan’s imports come via rail through
Uzbekistan. Fertilizer smuggled
from Uzbekistan is available on
the Tajik market, according to Embassy contacts. End note.)
7. (SBU) Rahmon said Uzbekistan forced Tajikistan to waste half
its hydropower production, since Tashkent made it difficult for
Tajikistan to export its excess summer generation from Nurek via
Uzbek transmission lines. This
year, Tajikistan produced 2
billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of surplus power at Nurek, half of
which was lost because Uzbekistan refused to allow onward power
distribution, and the remainder of which was sold to Uzbekistan
at rock-bottom prices for lack of another market. Rahmon was
angry as well at Tashkent’s refusal to allow winter energy from
Turkmenistan to transit the Uzbek grid to Tajikistan. Going
further back, Rahmon criticized Uzbekistan’s role in the civil
war, complained about its land mines along the Tajik border, and
blamed Uzbekistan for destroying the Aral Sea.
DONORS COME IN FOR DRUBBING TOO
8. (SBU) Rahmon then rounded on donors, criticizing them for
strengthening Uzbekistan’s hand vis-a-vis Tajikistan and failing
to take Uzbekistan to task on child labor and land mine issues.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) came in for particular
criticism. Rahmon alleged that
the Japanese and Koreans lobbied
the ADB to provide loans to Uzbekistan — for example, $180
million for a railroad link to Afghanistan — while the Bank
withdrew support for the CASA 1000 project to build an electric
transmission line linking Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. (Comment: Sources
at the ADB have told us the
project was not economically viable.
Another source, however,
has suggested they may have been influenced, at least in part,
by a desire to avoid upsetting Karimov.
End comment.) ADB
assistance helped Uzbekistan preserve the railway monopoly into
and out of Tajikistan that it has enjoyed since Soviet days, so
that Tajikistan must use the Uzbek city of Termez even to ship
cargo by rail to neighboring Afghanistan. Rahmon bitterly
criticized the ADB’s decision to host its annual international
meeting in Tashkent in the spring of 2010, charging that it gave
inappropriate political support to the regime.
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
9. (SBU) Rahmon said he was sending letters to the presidents of
all donor organizations and representations requesting
assistance and criticizing Uzbekistan’s destructive activities.
He sought donor support for several specific projects. Among
them were three critical power lines: a 220 kV lines from
Khujand via Penjakent to Ayni, another 220 kV line from
DUSHANBE 00001348 003.2 OF 004
Qairaqqum to Asht, and, in the south, a 500 kV line from
Sangtuda-1 to Dushanbe, helping to protect the capital and
Tajikistan’s sole large industry, the Talco aluminum plant at
Tursonzoda. Rahmon said the 220
kV line to Afghanistan was
urgently needed before May 2010, so Tajikistan could export
excess summer power directly. (Note: According to ADB
representatives, it will not likely be completed before December
2010. End note.) He cited as well the geopolitical importance
of completing the CASA 1000 line to supply power to Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
10. (SBU) Rahmon also requested support for various hydropower
projects. He said Tajikistan
needed 2,000 megawatts (MW) of
additional capacity to satisfy domestic needs. Projects
underway included the 220 MW Sangtuda-2; Roghun, which is
expected to generate 3,600 MW; a 270 MW thermal plant in
Dushanbe to be built with Chinese assistance; the 160 MW
Zaravshan hydropower station, which would have no reservoir and
hence no downstream impact, but which Uzbekistan objected to
anyway; modernization of the Qairaqqum hydropower station; a 400
MW station near Isfara; and two 500 MW stations in Nurobad,
above the Roghun site. Some $500
million is also needed for
reconstruction at Nurek, which had been in operation for 36
years, 15 years beyond its expected useful life. The Zaravshan
project has had a feasibility study conducted by the German
Technical Assistance Agency (GTZ) and could be ready in
two-and-a-half years. The
Qairaqqum modernization was under
consideration at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), although Rahmon would rather they invested
in Zaravshan. More immediately,
Dushanbe needs some 40,000 tons
of fuel to start its thermal plant.
He mentioned a joint
electricity and gas pipeline between Tajikistan, Afghanistan,
and Turkmenistan, for which some $40 million is needed. In
response to donor concerns about transparency, Rahmon said he
was «for reform,» although he was not specific. He noted the
$30-40 million debt owed by the Ministry of Water Resources to
Barqi Tojik, resulting in the latter’s inability to pay for
Sangtuda-1 power generation.
DONORS DETAIL SUPPORT
11. (SBU) Donors noted plans underway to assist Tajikistan. The
ADB said its energy team would visit the following week, while
the World Bank would send its regional director and energy team
the week of December 7, during which they would request a
meeting with the President. The
World Bank announced it would
help buy the fuel to start Dushanbe’s thermal plant. If
additional funds are available, the World Bank would consider
more funding to expand electrical metering. The Bank was
continuing its environmental and social assessments of Roghun
and CASA 1000. The EBRD said it
did not have concessional loans
available for infrastructure, but with EU, Swiss, and Japanese
help it was supporting an energy efficiency effort, refurbishing
existing hydro plants, and seeking support for additional small
and medium hydro projects, while developing the legal framework
governing those operations.
COMMENT: TAJIKISTAN HOLDS FEW CARDS
12. (SBU) The fact that Rahmon personally called in donors to
discuss the power issue is evidence of just how rattled he and
his government are by Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the energy
grid. The question remains,
however: what can Tajikistan do?
Threats to hold back water from Uzbekistan may be more Kabuki
theater than realistic options: to the extent water is held
back, it cannot be used to generate much-needed power in
Tajikistan. Although plans to
raise the dam at Roghun ahead of
schedule may have some impact on downstream users, only at
Qairaqqum, which generates a mere 126 MW at peak capacity, does
Tajikistan have the ability to really interfere with Uzbek
agriculture.
13. (SBU) Rahmon’s plea for power lines to protect Talco brings
us to another elephant in the room: a major threat to
Tajikistan’s energy security is the aluminum plant, which
consumes the lion’s share of Tajikistan’s electricity at highly
subsidized rates, while most of the population sits in the dark.
It is financially non-transparent
and returns little of its
revenue to Tajikistan’s budget.
Rahmon was, in effect, pleading
with donors to subsidize his personal wealth, at the expense of
DUSHANBE 00001348 004.2 OF 004
the people of Tajikistan. Any
assistance to Tajikistan to
resolve its energy shortages must address Talco’s consumption
and financial structure. Meanwhile,
despite the heightened
rhetoric, the situation is not significantly worse than in
previous years, since Uzbekistan routinely withheld power
exports to Tajikistan during much of the winter, and blocked the
transit of power from Turkmenistan as well. With full
reservoirs after a rainy summer, Tajikistan may not be much
worse off than last year. End
comment.
ATTENDEES AT THE MEETING
14. (U) Government representatives at the meeting included
Matlubhon Davlatov, Presidential Advisor on Economic Affairs;
Farrukh Hamraliev, Minister of Economic Development and Trade;
and Pulod Muhiddinov, First Deputy Minister of Energy and
Industry. Donor representatives
included the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UK Department
for International Development (DFID), the European Union, the
German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Swiss Agency
for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and USAID.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 237837
date: 12/3/2009 11:50
refid: 09DUSHANBE1349
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09STATE122637
header:
VZCZCXRO6307
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1349 3371150
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031150Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0984
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2083
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001349
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, UNGA, UN, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — DECEMBER VOTE ON «DEFAMATION OF
RELIGIONS»
REF: STATE 122637
1. (U) On December 3, poloff delivered reftel demarche and
non-paper on defamation of religions resolution to Idibek
Kalandarov, Deputy Chief of the Tajik Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Office of International Organizations. Kalandarov said
he would advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on USG views on
the resolution, but offered no further substantive reply.
2. (U) Post will forward any substantive response from
Tajikistan to this demarche.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 237842
date: 12/3/2009 12:03
refid: 09DUSHANBE1350
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 09DUSHANBE1263|09DUSHANBE1319
header:
VZCZCXRO6325
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1350/01 3371203
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031203Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0985
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2084
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001350
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KTIP, KCRM, KWMN, PGOV, SMIG, TI
SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT: COMBATTING TIP ON A HALF TANK OF GAS
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1319; B)
DUSHANBE 1263
DUSHANBE 00001350 001.2 OF 005
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a November 30 — December 1 visit, G/TIP
Tajikistan desk officer Megan Hall and emboffs met government
officials and representatives of NGOs and IOs to discuss
Tajikistan’s progress in addressing trafficking in persons and
forced labor during the cotton harvest.
Government officials
outlined numerous Tajik initiatives to Combat TIP, but funding
for the initiatives is limited.
Tajik Consuls, the Ministry of
Health, and the Ministry of Interior have directly assisted TIP
victims and investigated cases, but their capacity is limited by
chronic funding shortages and high staff turnover. After the
President’s decree banning employment of child labor in the
cotton harvest, schools remained open through the picking
season, unlike in previous years.
However, NGOs report that
there have been cases of teachers forcing children to pick
cotton. Local officials have also
directed government
employees, including doctors and teachers, to work in the fields
during harvest. Government
officials underscored Tajikistan’s
commitment to combat TIP and highlighted the President’s public
order to end child labor, but denied that any forced labor
problem exists in the country.
END SUMMARY
TIP VICTIMS: THERE AND BACK AGAIN
2. (SBU) Russia, and to a lesser degree Kazakhstan, continue to
be the primary destinations for Tajik labor migrants, although
the government is seeking additional labor agreements with
potential destination countries, including Saudi Arabia,
according to IOM Country Director Zeinal Hajiyev. Hajiyev
predicted that these efforts to diversify would be largely
unsuccessful as Tajik migrants are not well placed to compete
for foreign jobs outside the Russian sphere due to lack of
education and language skills.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Dubai and
the Gulf States remain destinations for Tajik women trafficked
for sexual exploitation. Tajik
consuls abroad, particularly in
Dubai, have worked with IOM to identify TIP victims and
facilitate repatriation, although a lack of funding and
resources limit the ability of Tajik overseas missions to assist
victims. (The GOTI expects the
Consulate in Dubai to fund its
own operations based on its income from visa fees.) When Tajik
Consuls repatriates TIP victims, IOM pays for the ticket.
3. (SBU) Staff of an IOM-managed, INL-funded shelter for TIP
victims told Hall that they have a productive relationship with
the Tajik Consul in Dubai, who contacts them to arrange
assistance in Dushanbe when repatriating a victim. (These
victims often come to the Consul’s attention through raids
conducted by the Dubai police).
However, shelter staff report
that the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) immediately
investigates victims at the airport upon their return to
Tajikistan. Because victims first
learn of the shelter from the
GKNB, many get the impression that it is affiliated with the
security services and refuse assistance.
According to ILO
specialist Firuz Sattarov, many victims also believe if they
stay in the shelter, they will acquire a public stigma as
prostitutes. The shelter assisted
21 victims in 2009 but
currently houses no trafficking victims.
Shelter staff want to
meet victims on the airport tarmac to provide guidance before
they encounter security officials.
Ideally, victims would first
move into the shelter before any interview with officials takes
place and have the option to refuse the interview entirely. INL
is seeking to extend funding of the shelter until August 2010.
USAID plans to begin a competitive bid process to identify and
fund an implementing partner to run the shelter after INL
funding expires.
4. (SBU) IOM received no reports of abuse of TIP victims by
security officials in 2009.
Hajiyev noted that one victim
residing at the shelter was called by the GKNB for an interview
in the middle of the night. IOM
intervened and the GKNB agreed
to interview the victim during the day.
Hajiev noted that the
GKNB conducts investigations for many types of criminal cases at
night. Lack of sensitivity in
working with TIP victims remains
a problem. Many lower-level
security officials continue to view
TIP victims as prostitutes, despite numerous training sessions
by IOs, NGOs, and the GOTI. OSCE
TIP officer Graziella Piga
reports that when government officials were asked during a
training session how they identify a TIP victim, one Police
Academy Instructor responded, «She wears mascara, high heels,
and a short skirt.»
5. (SBU) In addition to Consuls, the Ministry of Health and an
IOM-funded TIP-hotline Victims refer victims to the shelter.
DUSHANBE 00001350 002.2 OF 005
However, according to Piga, the «national hotline» consists of
the regular office cell phone of one IOM-staffer and the general
phone number of the police.
Although the OSCE sponsored the
travel of senior government officials to study referral
mechanisms in Serbia and Macedonia, Inter-Ministerial Commission
Secretary Adham Abdulloyev told Piga that there is no need for a
new referral system as the current system functions well.
Shelter Staff said the Inter-Ministerial Commission advised them
on victims’ legal cases, but has not provided the shelter with
monetary or in-kind assistance.
6. (SBU) Hajiyev noted that the Tajik Migration service has
several offices in Russia, but added that many migrants consider
it a police structure rather than a victim-assistance mechanism
because it is under the MVD. He
said that it was not clear who
was the government’s «main player» on TIP. Although the
Inter-Agency Commission was mandated to manage anti-TIP
activities, the GKNB regularly acted on its own without
coordinating with the MVD; the MVD asked IOM to intervene with
the GKNB to request that it refer more cases to the MVD for
investigation. Hajiyev also
expressed appreciation for the
INL-funded TIP training courses IOM provided from June to July
2009. (NOTE: Seven sessions,
totaling 200 Tajiks, focused on
practical steps for law enforcement personnel. Attendees
included 84 Ministry of Interior representatives, 20 judges, 38
prosecutors and 11 law students.)
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS TIP UNIT: OUT OF GAS
——————————————— —-
7. (SBU) The MVD’s Anti-TIP division is led by Colonel Alikhon
Mulloyev and staffed with 14 officers, with affiliates in all 4
regions of the country. Mulloyev
underlined that trafficking in
persons is a major concern to Tajikistan, along with drug and
weapons trafficking. The Unit
opened four cases under criminal
article 130.1, Trafficking in Persons, in 2009. (Tajikistan
prosecutes most TIP-related crimes under other statues,
including 130.2, «false recruitment». The GOTI reports 22
prosecutions of TIP-related cases in the first half of 2009).
Mulloyev recognized the sensitivities of working with TIP
victims, adding that he would like to hire additional female
officers to assist victims of sexual exploitation.
8. (SBU) The Unit is limited, however, by poor provision of
funding and resources. Mulloyev
said that the Unit appreciated
the training provided by the USG, but that with one government
car assigned for all 14 officers in the country, it was very
difficult for the Unit to investigate cases. The Unit’s weekly
fuel allotment for this vehicle is 20 liters of petrol, enough
to fill half a tank. The allotment
per operation to pay
informers is 10-50 somoni (2-12 dollars). For any field
investigation, officers must pay transportation costs out of
pocket. There is no computer in
Mulloyev’s office. Another
challenge is high staff turnover.
Only four Unit officers have
been on the job more than two years.
Mulloyev asked if the
Embassy could write a diplomatic note asking the Ministry of
Interior to appoint more experienced officers to the Unit and
keep them there.
COTTON: SCHOOL REMAINS OPEN, BUT CASES OF FORCED LABOR CONTINUE
——————————————— ——————
9. (SBU) G/TIP officer met with representatives of three NGOs,
the Bureau for Human Rights (BHR), Center for Human Rights
(CHR), and Imran, to discuss trafficking and forced labor in the
2009 cotton harvest. All three
monitored the use of child and
forced labor in the harvest and will release reports in early
2010. President Rahmon banned the
use of child labor in an
April, 2009 decree, and denounced the practice in his national
address. «We didn’t think
there would be cases of child labor
because of the President’s decree,» according to BHR Director
Nargis Zokirova, «but children are still being taken out to the
fields. They just do it on the
weekend.» Unlike in years past,
local officials have not closed schools during the harvest.
While child labor is still employed in many areas, it occurs
outside of school hours.
DUSHANBE 00001350 003.2 OF 005
10. (SBU) Monitors reported several cases of coercion by school
officials. In the Khatlon region,
a teacher told children that
if they did not participate in the cotton harvest, they should
bring in a few kilograms of cotton as their contribution,
according to Zokirova. «Not
every family can afford to buy
cotton, so the children had to go out and pick it.» Teachers in
the small town of Pakhtabad, near the Uzbek border, told
students that the President ordered them to pick cotton at the
end of the season. They
threatened some children with expulsion
if they did not comply. Zokirova
said that local administrators
involved in the cotton business are likely acting to protect
their cotton investments. Since
many adult men are in Russia,
they continue to illegally conscript child labor and government
employees.
11. (SBU) Imran representatives concurred that the practice of
forced labor still occurs, because «local officials don’t get
the message that they are not supposed to compel people. They
didn’t gather enough cotton in time, so now they compel
everyone.» As the government
continues to set region-specific
quotas for cotton cultivation, these officials resort to forced
labor to meet their targets.
Imran staff suggested that it is
easy to compel Tajiks to pick cotton, even when there is no
direct threat, because they recall the repercussions for refusal
in years past. Individuals forced
to pick cotton do not
complain to the government or NGOs because of the widely held
notion that the work is indeed mandatory. CHR confirmed that
local officials have deployed state employees, including doctors
and teachers, to harvest cotton for 10-15 day periods. NGOs
called for the government to prosecute officials in such cases
to set a precedent that forced/child labor will not be
tolerated. Although authorities
prosecuted three teachers for
employing child labor during the 2008 harvest, these cases
received little media attention.
12. (SBU) On a positive note, the government’s 2008 «Freedom to
Farm» decree, which called for allowing farmers to plant any
crop they wished, may have contributed to the estimated 20% drop
in land used for cotton production in 2009. Overall, the use of
forced child labor is down from past years due to the official
ban. IOM’s request to monitor the
2009 cotton harvest and
verify implementation of President Rahmon’s ban on employment of
forced child labor finally received government approval in
mid-November, according to IOM Country Director Hajiyev, but
this approval at the tail end of the season was too late for IOM
to deploy a monitoring mission.
IOM will try to reach an
agreement with the Tajik government to begin monitoring next
year from the start of the harvest.
INL will coordinate with
IOM to discuss possible USG funding of this initiative.
TIP COMMISSION: LET’S TALK ABOUT TIP, BUT NO FORCED LABOR HERE
——————————————— ——————
13. (SBU) In a 45 minute introductory statement, Adham
Abdulloyev, secretary of the TIP commission and member of the
President’s apparatus, told Hall that President Rahmon made TIP
a top priority, and outlined Tajikistan’s efforts to combat TIP,
most of them rhetorical.
Tajikistan has ratified over 20
conventions regarding TIP and labor issues, created the
22-member Inter-Agency Commission, facilitated TIP training of
12 Afghans by NGO «Imran» at Tajik National University (TNU),
is
creating a course on TIP at TNU (with support from IOM and INL),
facilitated training of 220 officials in 2009 (conducted by IOM,
OSCE, and NGOs), issued a 37-page report on the government’s
anti-TIP efforts, and is establishing a new database to compile
statistics on TIP cases.
14. (SBU) Hall advised Abdulloyev that G/TIP is closely
following developments in three areas: government complicity in
trafficking, level of victim-access to assistance, and the use
of forced labor in the cotton harvest.
On government
complicity, Abdulloyev said that «our President is seriously
addressing the issue. If such a
case occurs, the offender is
immediately punished. A special
body overseas the activities of
government employees. So far this
year there has not been such
a case, but once reported, such cases will be thoroughly
investigated.»
15. (SBU) On victim access to assistance, Abdulloyev noted that
there are currently USG-funded, IOM-managed, shelters in
DUSHANBE 00001350 004.2 OF 005
Dushanbe and Khujand. The Tajik
government hopes to build
additional shelters «when the economic situation
improves.» The
Ministry of Health established eight support rooms to provide
medical and psychological support for victims of TIP and
domestic violence. Abdulloyev
said that the Commission will
include statistics on victims assisted by the Ministry of Health
in its next report.
16. (SBU) On forced labor during the cotton harvest, Abdulloyev
reiterated the President’s ban and the Ministry of Education’s
decree banning the practice. He
said that the President has
directly relayed the order to local officials via phone. He
admitted that officials used forced child labor until «two or
three years ago», but not this year and said that there is «no
problem» with the IOM monitoring the harvest in 2010. Poloff
noted that there continue to be reports of forced child and
adult labor, despite the President’s ban. Abdulloyev said that
all labor in the cotton fields is voluntary as «in eastern
countries there are traditions for the whole community to come
together. If someone is forced or
threatened with
administrative punishment, these cases will be prosecuted, but
we haven’t heard of such cases.»
He said that additional
information on the fall harvest would be included in the 2009
report and declared «we are in favor of open and direct
communication (with the USG).»
17. (SBU) In a separate meeting with the members of the TIP
Commission, including first Deputy Foreign Minister Yuldashev
(Reftel A) and Deputies of the Ministry of Justice, GKNB, and
MVD, Hall raised the same
concerns of government complicity,
victims access, and forced labor.
Commission members said that
there have been no cases of official involvement in trafficking
in 2009. Yuldashev said that
Tajik media would have reported
such cases and claimed that «our government agencies don’t hide
anything.» (NOTE: In the Russian language newspaper «Business
and Politics», there have been reports of forced adult labor in
Khatlon and Sughd). He concluded,
«I must say that complicity
of government officials has not been detected… Maybe because
of poor performance of our law agencies and maybe because it
actually didn’t happen.»
18. (C) Yuldashev declared that forced labor did not occur in
the cotton sector because «we didn’t pick any cotton this year.
What is 253,000 tons? In the Soviet
days, we picked one
million! This year we didn’t
force anyone because there was no
cotton to pick, but if someone wanted to voluntarily participate
they could do it for good money.»
Yuldashev concluded that the
problem was not forced labor in the cotton sector, but not
enough cotton grown. «We
must grow cotton. It is our wealth.
If we could produce one million tons of cotton again, everyone
would have work and there would be no trafficking in persons.
Some people my age think that someone is against Tajik cotton,
maybe a competitor.» GKNB
and MVD Deputy Ministers said that
there were no cases of local officials forcing individuals to
pick cotton. Yuldashev declared
that «forced labor is not a
problem in Tajikistan» and directed his staff to re-circulate
the Ministry of Education’s directive on child labor to local
officials. He said that the
reports of forced adult labor in
Sughd and Khatlon was «bad information.» None of the Commission
members, including Yuldashev, were aware of the IOM’s proposal
to monitor the 2010 harvest, or the government’s apparent
approval of the monitoring.
19. (SBU) On assistance to TIP victims, Yuldashev said «the
government would work with this category of victims according to
our financial ability. We don’t
hide the phenomena of
trafficking of our women or pretend that everything is fine.
Security officials ensure that when victims return they are not
re-victimized» (apparently referring to allegations made in 2007
by three victims who claimed to have been assaulted by GKNB
officers). Yuldashev repeated the
government’s commitment to
combat TIP and engage the USG on TIP initiatives. Hall
expressed appreciation for the GOTI’s actions to combat TIP, but
reminded Yuldashev that the USG is interested in real
implementation of Tajikistan’s anti-TIP policies, including
identification of victims and vigorous prosecution of both
traffickers and officials employing forced labor.
20. (SBU) COMMENT: High-level
GOTI officials consistently
respond positively to engagement by the Embassy, particularly
INL, on anti-trafficking projects and consistently argue that,
given Tajikistan’s budgetary difficulties, the government has
exerted considerable political will towards combating TIP. At
DUSHANBE 00001350 005.2 OF 005
the working level, government efforts are often hamstrung by the
insensitivity of security officials, lack of resolve to
prosecute officials, and a lack of funds. High-level officials
do not consider forced labor during the cotton harvest a TIP
issue, but the government has made an effort to reduce the use
of forced child labor through public decrees, though it is clear
that some local officials continue to pressure children and
adults to pick cotton. The
denials by members of the TIP
Commission that such practices occur underlines the need to
encourage the government to allow the IOM to monitor the 2010
harvest from the start of the season.
A more complete picture
of forced labor during the 2009 harvest will be available after
NGOs release their monitoring reports. END COMMENT
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 238023
date: 12/4/2009 6:32
refid: 09DUSHANBE1362
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 09DUSHANBE1263|09DUSHANBE1319
header:
VZCZCXRO7289
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1362/01 3380632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040632Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0992
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2111
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001362
(CORRECTED COPY)
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KTIP, KCRM, KWMN, PGOV, SMIG, TI
SUBJECT: G/TIP VISIT: COMBATTING TIP ON A HALF TANK OF GAS
REF: A: DUSHANBE 1319; B: DUSHANBE 1263
DUSHANBE 00001362 001.2 OF 005
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During a November 30 — December 1 visit, G/TIP
Tajikistan desk officer Megan Hall and emboffs met government
officials and representatives of NGOs and IOs to discuss
Tajikistan’s progress in addressing trafficking in persons and
forced labor during the cotton harvest.
Government officials
outlined numerous Tajik initiatives to Combat TIP, but funding
for the initiatives is limited.
Tajik Consuls, the Ministry of
Health, and the Ministry of Interior have directly assisted TIP
victims and investigated cases, but their capacity is limited by
chronic funding shortages and high staff turnover. After the
President’s decree banning employment of child labor in the
cotton harvest, schools remained open through the picking
season, unlike in previous years.
However, NGOs report that
there have been cases of teachers forcing children to pick
cotton. Local officials have also
directed government
employees, including doctors and teachers, to work in the fields
during harvest. Government
officials underscored Tajikistan’s
commitment to combat TIP and highlighted the President’s public
order to end child labor, but denied that any forced labor
problem exists in the country.
END SUMMARY
TIP VICTIMS: THERE AND BACK AGAIN
2. (SBU) Russia, and to a lesser degree Kazakhstan, continue to
be the primary destinations for Tajik labor migrants, although
the government is seeking additional labor agreements with
potential destination countries, including Saudi Arabia,
according to IOM Country Director Zeinal Hajiyev. Hajiyev
predicted that these efforts to diversify would be largely
unsuccessful as Tajik migrants are not well placed to compete
for foreign jobs outside the Russian sphere due to lack of
education and language skills.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Dubai and
the Gulf States remain destinations for Tajik women trafficked
for sexual exploitation. Tajik
consuls abroad, particularly in
Dubai, have worked with IOM to identify TIP victims and
facilitate repatriation, although a lack of funding and
resources limit the ability of Tajik overseas missions to assist
victims. (The GOTI expects the
Consulate in Dubai to fund its
own operations based on its income from visa fees.) When Tajik
Consuls repatriates TIP victims, IOM pays for the ticket.
3. (SBU) Staff of an IOM-managed, INL-funded shelter for TIP
victims told Hall that they have a productive relationship with
the Tajik Consul in Dubai, who contacts them to arrange
assistance in Dushanbe when repatriating a victim. (These
victims often come to the Consul’s attention through raids
conducted by the Dubai police).
However, shelter staff report
that the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) immediately
investigates victims at the airport upon their return to
Tajikistan. Because victims first
learn of the shelter from the
GKNB, many get the impression that it is affiliated with the
security services and refuse assistance.
According to ILO
specialist Firuz Sattarov, many victims also believe if they
stay in the shelter, they will acquire a public stigma as
prostitutes. The shelter assisted
21 victims in 2009 but
currently houses no trafficking victims.
Shelter staff want to
meet victims on the airport tarmac to provide guidance before
they encounter security officials.
Ideally, victims would first
move into the shelter before any interview with officials takes
place and have the option to refuse the interview entirely. INL
is seeking to extend funding of the shelter until August 2010.
USAID plans to begin a competitive bid process to identify and
fund an implementing partner to run the shelter after INL
funding expires.
4. (SBU) IOM received no reports of abuse of TIP victims by
security officials in 2009.
Hajiyev noted that one victim
residing at the shelter was called by the GKNB for an interview
in the middle of the night. IOM
intervened and the GKNB agreed
to interview the victim during the day.
Hajiev noted that the
GKNB conducts investigations for many types of criminal cases at
night. Lack of sensitivity in
working with TIP victims remains
a problem. Many lower-level
security officials continue to view
TIP victims as prostitutes, despite numerous training sessions
by IOs, NGOs, and the GOTI. OSCE
TIP officer Graziella Piga
reports that when government officials were asked during a
training session how they identify a TIP victim, one Police
Academy Instructor responded, «She wears mascara, high heels,
and a short skirt.»
5. (SBU) In addition to Consuls, the Ministry of Health and an
DUSHANBE 00001362 002.2 OF 005
IOM-funded TIP-hotline Victims refer victims to the shelter.
However, according to Piga, the «national hotline» consists of
the regular office cell phone of one IOM-staffer and the general
phone number of the police.
Although the OSCE sponsored the
travel of senior government officials to study referral
mechanisms in Serbia and Macedonia, Inter-Ministerial Commission
Secretary Adham Abdulloyev told Piga that there is no need for a
new referral system as the current system functions well.
Shelter Staff said the Inter-Ministerial Commission advised them
on victims’ legal cases, but has not provided the shelter with
monetary or in-kind assistance.
6. (SBU) Hajiyev noted that the Tajik Migration service has
several offices in Russia, but added that many migrants consider
it a police structure rather than a victim-assistance mechanism
because it is under the MVD. He
said that it was not clear who
was the government’s «main player» on TIP. Although the
Inter-Agency Commission was mandated to manage anti-TIP
activities, the GKNB regularly acted on its own without
coordinating with the MVD; the MVD asked IOM to intervene with
the GKNB to request that it refer more cases to the MVD for
investigation. Hajiyev also
expressed appreciation for the
INL-funded TIP training courses IOM provided from June to July
2009. (NOTE: Seven sessions,
totaling 200 Tajiks, focused on
practical steps for law enforcement personnel. Attendees
included 84 Ministry of Interior representatives, 20 judges, 38
prosecutors and 11 law students.)
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS TIP UNIT: OUT OF GAS
——————————————— —-
7. (SBU) The MVD’s Anti-TIP division is led by Colonel Alikhon
Mulloyev and staffed with 14 officers, with affiliates in all 4
regions of the country. Mulloyev
underlined that trafficking in
persons is a major concern to Tajikistan, along with drug and
weapons trafficking. The Unit
opened four cases under criminal
article 130.1, Trafficking in Persons, in 2009. (Tajikistan
prosecutes most TIP-related crimes under other statues,
including 130.2, «false recruitment». The GOTI reports 22
prosecutions of TIP-related cases in the first half of 2009).
Mulloyev recognized the sensitivities of working with TIP
victims, adding that he would like to hire additional female
officers to assist victims of sexual exploitation.
8. (SBU) The Unit is limited, however, by poor provision of
funding and resources. Mulloyev
said that the Unit appreciated
the training provided by the USG, but that with one government
car assigned for all 14 officers in the country, it was very
difficult for the Unit to investigate cases. The Unit’s weekly
fuel allotment for this vehicle is 20 liters of petrol, enough
to fill half a tank. The
allotment per operation to pay
informers is 10-50 somoni (2-12 dollars). For any field
investigation, officers must pay transportation costs out of
pocket. There is no computer in
Mulloyev’s office. Another
challenge is high staff turnover.
Only four Unit officers have
been on the job more than two years.
Mulloyev asked if the
Embassy could write a diplomatic note asking the Ministry of
Interior to appoint more experienced officers to the Unit and
keep them there.
COTTON: SCHOOL REMAINS OPEN, BUT CASES OF FORCED LABOR CONTINUE
——————————————— ——————
9. (SBU) G/TIP officer met with representatives of three NGOs,
the Bureau for Human Rights (BHR), Center for Human Rights
(CHR), and Imran, to discuss trafficking and forced labor in the
2009 cotton harvest. All three
monitored the use of child and
forced labor in the harvest and will release reports in early
2010. President Rahmon banned the
use of child labor in an
April, 2009 decree, and denounced the practice in his national
address. «We didn’t think
there would be cases of child labor
