id: 201110
date: 4/7/2009 9:48
refid: 09DUSHANBE419
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1349
RR RUEHDBU RUEHDE
DE RUEHDBU #0419 0970948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070948Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0043
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0016
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0073
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0008
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0006
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0372
RUEABND/DEA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000419
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEA HQ PASS TO: OC/NEWTON-BELL, OE/TRAPP, A/OC/HARRIGAN
OCX/WILLIAMS, OEX/MASUMOTO, A/OGE/SCHRETTNER, OGA/RYAN,
OGPA/STATEN, NTRE/UPP, NIRE/LEHRER
NI/BORDER, NTRE/UPP/KREGOR, FOE/HAFF,
NIWF/MANZI, SOD/OSE/LENARTOWICZ/QUINN
GAITHER/EDAHL/JASSO
OSOC/HAMLET/MILIONE/JASSO/OEMLER/
EDDINGTON/DIEDERICH
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: GFUI-09-9322/TAJIKISTAN/DEA DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE JOINT
COUNTER NARCOTIC INVESTIGATION WITH THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR THE
REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
REF: DEA DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE CABEL 000409; R 0205-7Z APR 09
1. (SBU) ON 04/03/09, ACTING COUNTRY ATTACHE FOR THE DEA
DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE (DCO), MICHAEL W. BROWN AND SPECIAL
AGENT (S/A) WILLIAM T. GUSTAFSON MET WITH THE MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR (MOI) FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN, COL. MANSUR
BUHORIEV. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE CURRENT
DEVELOPMENT OF NARCOTIC INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED BY THE MOI AND
SUPPORTED BY THE DCO.
2. (SBU) COL. BUHORIEV, WORKING THROUGH THE MOI HAS ESTABLISHED
A NUMBER OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (CS) WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO
ASSIST THE MOI WITH THE INITIATION OF UNDERCOVER BUY/BUST
OPERATIONS TARGETING SPECIFIC TRAFFICKING CELLS OPERATING ALONG
TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER AND WITH IN THE CITY LIMITS OF DUSHANBE.
3. (SBU) REF: A) (SBU) COL. BUHORIEV STATED THAT ON OR ABOUT
MARCH 30, 2009, THE MOI INITIATED AN UNDERCOVER OPERATION USING
AN MOI CS TO PENETRATE A TAJIK-AFGHAN TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION
WHICH WAS PLANNING TO TRANSPORT APPROXIMATELY 1 KILOGRAMS OF
HEROIN AND 40 KILOGRAMS OF OPIUM TO DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN. DURING
THE PAST WEEK, THE CS WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION WHICH
ESTABLISHED WHEN THE ORGANIZATION WOULD BE TRANSPORTING THE DRUG
CONSIGNMENT TO DUSHANBE FOR STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION.
4. (SBU) ON 04/03/09, THE CS PROVIDED INFORMATION TO THE MOI
WHICH IDENTIFIED A TRAFFICKING ASSOCIATE OF THE ORGANIZATION
IDENTIFIED AS BURHON HUSAINOVICH SODIKOV. THE INFORMATION
FURTHER STATED THAT SODIKOV WOULD BE TRANSPORTING APPROXIMATELY
ONE KILOGRAM OF HEROIN TO A PREARRANGED LOCATION NEAR DUSHANBE.
BASED ON THE ABOVE MENTIONED INFORMATION, THE MOI WAS ABLE TO
ESTABLISH SURVEILLANCE ON SODIKOV AND LATER ARREST HIM. AT THE
TIME OF SODIKOV’S ARREST, HE HAD APPROXIMATELY 986 GRAMS OF
EXPORT QUALITY HEROIN IN HIS POSSESSION. ACCORDING TO THE MOI,
SODIKOV IS PROVIDING A LIMITED AMOUNT OF COOPERATION.
5. (SBU) COL. BUHORIEV STATED THAT THE CS WOULD SOON HAVE
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY THE LOCATION OF
APPROXIMATELY 40 KILOGRAMS OF OPIUM AND ONE KILOGRAM OF HEROIN.
THE MOI IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION WHICH WOULD FULLY IDENTIFY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE
ABOVE MENTIONED TAJIK TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION. THE
INVESTIGATION IS ON-GOING.
6. (U) THIS CABLE WAS PREPARED IN LIEU OF A DEA-6; REFERENCE THE
DEA MANUAL SECTION 6242.11. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CONTENT
OF THIS CABLE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ACTING COUNTRY ATTACHI
MICHAEL W. BROWN AT 992-37-229-2807.
INDEXING SECTION:
1. SODIKOV, BURHON, HUSAINOVICH
NADDIS: NEGATIVE; DESCRIBED
AS A TAJIKI MALE NATIONAL; ON 04/03/09, SODIKOV WAS ARRESTED BY
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN FOR
POSSESSING APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOGRAM OF HEROIN. ACCORDING TO
SOURCE INFORMATION, SODIKOV IS ASSOCIATED WITH A CURRENTLY
IDENTIFIED TAJIK TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 201424
date: 4/8/2009 13:37
refid: 09DUSHANBE423
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE983
header:
VZCZCXRO2568
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDBU #0423/01 0981337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081337Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0210
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0379
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000423
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: IS TAJIKISTAN’S ISLAMIC PARTY AT A CROSSROADS?
REF: 08 DUSHANBE 983
DUSHANBE 00000423 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Tajikistan’s new religion law puts Tajikistan’s
Islamic Revival Party in a difficult position. The party’s
inability to influence either the legislative process or the
government’s religious policy, calls into question its reason
for being. The party’s silence on
major issues challenges its
relevance. While the party ranks
continue to grow, some wonder
whether party members will start questioning the party’s
leadership. End summary.
2. (C) The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan remains the
largest opposition party, and it is the only opposition party
that has representatives in Tajikistan’s parliament (two members
of the lower house). However,
recent events have challenged the
party’s claims to relevance. The
party was unable to prevent
passage of a restrictive religion law, and it has been unable to
influence government officials implementing the country’s
religious policy. Party leaders
have been quiet on electoral
reform, and were relatively passive in raising allegations of
fraud in a recent by-election in Dushanbe. For the second
straight year, party leaders did not exploit government missteps
during winter crises to boost the party’s image or position.
THE RELIGION ISSUE
3. (C) In 2008, Islamic Revival Party Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri,
as one of the party’s two parliamentary deputies, introduced his
own version of the religion law, as a counter-measure to the
government’s controversial version (which was ultimately
adopted). Kabiri said at the time
that his version of the law
was never submitted for discussion by the relevant parliamentary
committee; parliament was dominated by President Rahmon’s
supporters, and the deputies were pressured into considering
only the government’s version. On
March 5, when parliament
passed the government’s version — with little or no debate —
Kabiri was in Bishkek on a business trip.
4. (C) PolAssistant witnessed an exchange about this sequence of
events between Kabiri and Davlat Usmon, a former Deputy Chairman
of the party, at a social gathering on March 30. Usmon told
Kabiri that «it is high time for the party to be more active.»
Usmon criticized Kabiri for not cutting his business trip short
and returning for the vote, at least as a symbolic act. Usmon
reminded Kabiri that Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, one of the few
independent deputies in the upper house, cut short his trip to
Libya to add his voice in protest to the law. Kabiri responded
to Usmon by explaining that he had tried to work with the
Chairman of the lower house on the legislation without success,
and that his presence would not have prevented the law’s
passage.
5. (C) In a private conversation, Kabiri said a public
discussion of the law could do nothing more than «complicate
social tranquility,» and that if there were social disturbances,
the Islamic Revival Party would get the blame. He did not see
any way to change the government’s religious policy, and he
thought it would be better for the party to position itself
between the government and the religious community, to try to
«soften or release tension between the two.»
6. (C) During a March 31 conversation with PolOff, Abdullo
Rahnamo, a respected analyst at the Strategic Research Center
who was on the same trip in Libya with Turajonzoda when the
latter flew home to vote against the law, commented that the
passage of the religion law challenged the fundamental reason
for the party to exist. The
essential purpose of the party is
to represent the religious community; «if the party cannot
protect the religious community, what does the party stand for?»
THE ELECTION ISSUE
7. (C) The religion law is not the only major issue facing the
DUSHANBE 00000423 002.2 OF 003
party. Parliamentary elections
are set to take place in early
2010, and if a recent by-election for a parliamentary seat
representing one of Tajikistan’s largest constituencies is any
indication, the future is not bright for a free and fair
process. In early February, the
government claimed that a
member of President Rahmon’s party received 91% of the vote to
the Islamic Revival Party candidate’s 7%, and that turnout was
70%. International observers from
the OSCE and the EU reported
numerous irregularities, and estimated that turnout was closer
to 10-15%. Just after the
by-election, Hikmatullo Saifullozoda,
the Islamic Revival Party’s spokesman, and Muhammadali Hait, the
party’s Deputy Chairman, held a press conference, claiming
victory, complaining about the irregularities, and vowing to
challenge the announced results in court. A local court
rejected the party’s claims, and the party has filed an appeal.
8. (C) In early March, PolOff hosted a lunch for Sughd regional
Islamic Revival Party representatives during a trip to Isfara.
The representatives were concerned about the by-election
results, and asked the U.S. Embassy to «tell the government to
pass a new election law» because they had no ability to do it
themselves. In responding, PolOff
noted that the party had the
potential to take a proactive role in advocating for electoral
changes, as it has two parliamentary representatives, a
newspaper and public relations department, and a growing (and
significant) support base. One of
the representatives argued
that Kabiri’s plan was to grow the party ranks so that it could
compete in the 2015 elections.
PolOff said that the party
representatives’ comments were reminiscent of the government
line on reform — we need the international community to do it
for us, and we are working for the future. At that point, the
representatives turned their attention to Naimjon Samiev, the
party’s Regional Chairman, who had been silent during this
exchange. The representatives
started to ask probing questions
about what the party leadership was doing about the issues we
raised.
THE WINTER CRISIS ISSUE
9. (C) In past years, the Islamic Revival Party has not
exploited government missteps that contributed to chronic winter
crises, which have included blackouts across the country and
severe shortages of food. Post
asked Kabiri about the party’s
tactics in 2008, and reported in reftel that Kabiri was hesitant
to criticize the government during the crisis because it would
not have helped the situation. A
reporter from the weekly
independent newspaper Farazh asked Kabiri a similar question in
early 2009; Kabiri responded broadly and generally, saying that
if the government did not improve its performance next year, the
party would respond.
IS THE PARTY RELEVANT?
10. (C) Comment: We have witnessed at least two instances in
which Islamic Revival Party members have questioned their
leadership about a relatively passive approach to major issues
affecting them. Davlat Usmon may
not be the only person to
question the party’s response to the religion law’s passage.
During our lunch in Isfara, it appeared that Sughd party members
were questioning their leadership as well. Kabiri’s comments
about this year’s winter crisis add to the observations in
reftel about the course he has chartered for his party. His
refusal to capitalize on government failures during the winter
seem to be at odds with his role as the leader of Tajikistan’s
main opposition party. President
Rahmon has been fairly
ruthless in coopting, or even crushing, political challengers.
Kabiri is clearly reluctant to directly challenge him unless and
until he feels that his party is in a stronger position,
although, according to Kabiri, the party has a huge following
throughout the country. Kabiri is
still unwilling to take risks
by taking a strong stand on major issues.
11. (C) Comment continued: The question is, how long will that
growing group of followers remain patient? The passage of the
religion law may bring this question to a head. In not taking a
strong vocal stand prior to the law’s passage, the party has
opened itself up to questions about its relevance. Some party
DUSHANBE 00000423 003.2 OF 003
officials have recognized the need to do something.
Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, the party’s other parliamentary
representative, took the government to task for passing the law
in a recent article in the party’s newspaper. Other party
members have been reluctant to discuss the issue, however. The
conventional wisdom has been that the Islamic Revival Party has
been the beneficiary of a growing religious population that is
increasingly frustrated with the government. Will the party
remain the political voice of religious Tajiks? End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 201795
date: 4/10/2009 5:19
refid: 09DUSHANBE429
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4965
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0429/01 1000519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 100519Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0218
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0387
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0044
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0074
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0044
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000429
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/10/2019
TAGS: EAID, ECON, EINV, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR A/S BOUCHER’S APRIL 20-21 VISIT
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe welcomes the upcoming visit of A/S
Boucher. Following is an overview
of the key issues we face in
Tajikistan.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
——————-
2. (C) Tajikistan has been hit hard by the global recession.
Remittances, which in 2008 were equivalent to half of the
country’s GDP, have fallen by 30%, primarily because of the
downturn in Russia’s economy.
Tajikistan’s GDP is also falling
because of declining global prices for Tajikistan’s main
exports, aluminum and cotton.
This winter was easier for
Tajikistan than last year’s, but only because of warmer weather.
Dissatisfaction with the state of
the country has affected
President Rahmon’s popularity, though he retains considerable
support. It is unlikely that parliamentary elections in 2010
will produce any political change.
The government has started
implementing a new religion law, which has been heavily
criticized locally and internationally.
The only significant
positive development has come in foreign policy: the last few
months have seen steps toward rapprochement in Tajikistan’s
strained relations with Uzbekistan.
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RAHMON
——————————
3. (C) President Rahmon is likely to raise the following points:
— Afghanistan/Pakistan: President Rahmon will want an update on
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and he will want
the latest information on U.S. and allied efforts. The
Government of Tajikistan continues to view Afghan-based
narcotics trafficking and Islamic extremism as serious threats,
and is reluctant to cooperate seriously with Afghanistan in any
field. There have been a few
bright spots, including a
committment to joint training for Tajik and Afghan border guards
at a U.S.-funded facility in Khorog and acceptance of 30 Afghan
military at the Tajik Ministry of Defense academy last fall.
— Northern Distribution Network: Tajikistan answered our
request for transit rights within a week, and Rahmon may ask for
transit to begin immediately. He
will press for U.S. funding to
build another bridge to Afghanistan at Kokul, near Kulyab.
However, the existing bridge is still used at only 15% to 20% of
its capacity, in large part because the Tajik government has not
devoted enough manpower to operating it around the clock and
because of bureaucratic difficulties for Afghans in obtaining
Tajik visas. Rahmon may repeat
the request he made to General
Petraeus for air transport of munitions purchased from Ukraine;
USTRANSCOM says it cannot support this request due to the great
expense, but has identified funds to answer a $200k Tajik
request for computer equipment at the Nizhny Pyanj crossing.
— Investment: Rahmon probably will ask for USG financing for
hydroelectric dams to reduce Tajikistan’s chronic power
shortages and to supply Afghanistan.
You can expect him to
repeat his request for U.S. support for a massive hydropower
project at Dosti-jhum (on the Pyanj river, between Tajikistan
and Afghanistan), which he will describe in terms of its
potential benefits for Afghanistan.
He may seek involvement in
the construction of a power transmission line linking
Afghanistan with Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan that the Asian
Development Bank had to pull out of because of a decline in
available funds in the wake of the worldwide recession. Rahmon
and his ministers continue to view foreign investment through
the prism of their Soviet experience, and make such requests for
direct state investment without addressing the need for reform
DUSHANBE 00000429 002 OF 003
that might bring in private investors.
— Uzbekistan: Tajik-Uzbek relations continue to be marked by
mutual suspicion and recrimination.
However, there has recently
been a slight thaw. In February a
Tajik-Uzbek intergovernmental
commission met for the first time in several years, reportedly
making progress on resolving some border issues. There has been
talk of renewing air service between Tashkent and Dushanbe,
which has been suspended since Soviet times.
KEY GOALS FOR YOUR VISIT
————————
4. (C) You should raise the following subjects:
— Northern Distribution Network: Thank Tajikistan for its rapid
agreement to transit of cargo to Afghanistan. You should
encourage the rapprochement with Uzbekistan, which should make
extending the Northern Distribution Network to Tajikistan less
problematic.
— Afghanistan/Pakistan: Update President Rahmon on the Obama
administration’s strategy.
— Political Reform: Tajikistan is backsliding on democracy and
civil society development. The
Government has resisted
reforming its electoral infrastructure, although this issue has
been a matter of discussion for years.
OSCE/ODIHR issued
reports highlighting shortcomings in Tajikistan’s electoral
processes in 2005 and 2006; political parties, supported by
USAID and IFES, made recommendations for changes to the
electoral infrastructure in 2008.
It is unclear, however,
whether there will be new legislation in the near future, and
whether a new law will have any substantial changes. A recent
by-election in Dushanbe was a bad omen for the 2010
parliamentary elections, as it involved accusations of ballot
stuffing and other problems. The
lack of reforms continues to
disenfranchise the Tajik public.
— Religion: The new religion law violates Tajikistan’s
international obligations and its own constitution, and has been
heavily criticized locally and abroad.
Rahmon may justify the
law to prevent or control extremism; he may call criticism of
the law «unwarranted interference» in his country’s domestic
affairs. Nevertheless, his
government’s restrictive religious
policy and the new law furthers his government’s isolation from
the religious community. Full implementation of the law could
have negative repercussions.
— Economic Development: The country’s declining economic
indicators have raised questions about its long term stability.
Significant reforms in the agricultural sector are not in the
offing; the business environment is poor, and the lack of
reforms continues to deter investment.
— U.S. Investment: The recent establishment of the American
Chamber of Commerce is a good start, but there is still only one
U.S. company with significant investment interests. And even
that company, Comsup, has been
pressured by the government to
sell its production to one local middleman at a low price rather
than on the world market. This
pressure hinders the company’s
ability to secure the financing it needs to expand its
investment.
DUSHANBE 00000429 003 OF 003
CONCLUSION
———-
5. (C) Tajikistan is in a precarious position. The country’s
weak economy is becoming weaker and its unpopular government is
becoming less popular. Policies
aimed at strengthening the
government’s hand are actually weakening its position with the
public. Tajiks remain disengaged
from the political process
because they know the outcome of elections is predetermined.
Religious extremism is not a problem now, but harsh government
restrictions may change this. The
situation in Afghanistan
requires a regional solution, but it remains unclear how
committed President Rahmon is to substantially engaging.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 201865
date: 4/10/2009 13:12
refid: 09DUSHANBE449
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE1381
header:
VZCZCXRO5370
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0449 1001312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101312Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0221
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0409
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000449
SIPDIS
SCA/CEN (HUSHEK)
INL/AAE (BUHLER)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, EAID, KCRM, KJUS, TI
SUBJECT: KARATE AGAINST DRUGS-PERFORMANCE IN KULYAB
REF: 08 DUSHANBE 1381
1. (SBU) Summary: INL Dushanbe officers participated
in a drug demand reduction performance in the southern
city of Kulab conducted February 17 by members of the
Tajikistan Karate-do Federation.
The karate experts led
by the Federation’s head coach, Bahrom Khomidov, engaged
high school students in a spirited, interactive performance
promoting a healthy and drug-free lifestyle. End summary.
2. (U) Background: INL teamed up with the Karate-do
Federation of Tajikistan last October sponsoring a
kick-off tournament with prizes for karate champions
and an essay competition for high school students on
the dangers of drugs (reftel).
The essay winners
received a free English language course or karate
lessons. Following the
tournament, INL enlisted the
support of the karate champions and Federation
leadership to travel to 30 schools around Tajikistan
to teach about the dangers of drug use and show athlete
s as positive role models. End background.
3. (U) On February 17, INL Dushanbe team traveled to
Kulyab, in the south of Tajikistan, to monitor the final
outreach performance of the project.
The performance
took place in secondary school # 9, a 1970’s era structure
that was in good repair although it lacked heat and
electricity as did most of the town.
More than one hundred
teenagers, teachers, and staff comprised the audience.
The local representative of the Ministry of Education
joined us for the event and proved to be an active participant.
4. (U) Head karate-do coach, Bahrom Khamidov, briefed the
students about different types of drugs and how drug use can
damage their health. He actively
reached out to the audience,
offering kids ample opportunity to speak and express their
opinion. He used «Films of
your life» an interactive game/
presentation model which INL Dushanbe modified to appeal to
Tajik youth. The model creates
interaction between the
audience and the presenter and students are offered a chance
to publicly imagine their futures in both healthy and d
rug-addicted lives at age 20, 40, and 60. Focusing on the
dangers to the family, the most critical support network in
a country which provides next to no social services, Khamidov
used dramatic examples of the danger of students’ drug use.
He encouraged students to openly discuss the possibility of
losing beloved family members or even complete family
destruction. It was notable how
seriously the students
regarded the negative impact of drug use on their lives.
One young man hypothesized that a life of drug use would
cause him to lose his future family and (more importantly)
he said his wife’s next husband would have no regard for another
man’s children.
5. (U) After the emphasis on the
dangers of drugs, Khamidov
turned to the karate team to demonstrate to the audience the
possibilities for a person leading a drug-free life style,
participating in sports, becoming strong and self confident,
and living a successful life — an alternative to drug addiction.
Four members of the karate team gave a brief demonstration of
their
sport, with the mock combat definitely catching the attention of
the audience.
6. (U) At the end of event the most active student participants
were invited to the stage to receive presents handed by INL and
Ministry of Education representatives.
Bahrom Khamidov called
on the students to pass on the information they received during
this performance to their friends, relatives, and neighbors in
order to build a better society for a better future for
themselves
and Tajikistan.
7. (SBU) Comment: INL Dushanbe
believes that engaging the group
most susceptible to illegal narcotics to drug demand reduction
projects will be most fruitful.
To identify target schools for
the presentations we drew from data collected during USAID’s
demand reduction project which resulted in considerable cost
savings.
In the next phase of the project, we are planning to use «Youth
Power
Centers» previously founded
by USAID and which provide
teenagers
alternate activities in place of drug use. The Ministry of
Education,
not the most cooperative ministry
in the government, was a
solid
partner in this project, even helping the Federation
representatives
hone the message for maximum
impact. End comment
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 201870
date: 4/10/2009 13:34
refid: 09DUSHANBE458
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5410
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0458 1001334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101334Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0222
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0418
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0009
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0009
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0010
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0009
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0011
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000458
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR LILIENFELD
STATE PASS TO OPIC AND EXIM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, EINV, BEXP, PREL, ENRG, KIPR, TI
SUBJECT: WHITHER TIFA? RETHINKING OUR DIALOGUE WITH TAJIKISTAN
1. (SBU) Given the new administration, the broad review of our
engagement in this region, and the upcoming visit of Deputy
Assistant Trade Representative Claudio Lilienfeld, this is a
good opportunity to take a fresh look at the most effective way
to engage in a meaningful trade and investment dialogue with
Tajikistan. As work gets underway
to plan this year’s Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) meeting, we propose
setting aside the old model and trying a new approach.
Bilateral Engagement
2. (SBU) The Mission recommends moving from the current regional
event involving all five Central Asian republics to a bilateral
discussion that focuses specifically on Tajikistan and its
issues. Though the five former Soviet central Asian states are
neighbors and share history, they have evolved in different
directions economically and can not really be addressed in
unison on most economic issues. Some are WTO members, some are
not; some have relatively open trade regimes, others do not;
they have different levels of wealth, different levels of
government capacity, different levels of trade and investment
with the West. Trying to discuss key issues with them
simultaneously inevitably leaves some of them on the sidelines
of any conversation. Prickly relationships among them also
undermine productive discussion in group settings. We have
noticed, in particular, that representatives from one country
are reluctant to engage in substantive discussions with us under
the gaze of those they see as potential rivals. This is true
even in the areas where countries have substantial interests in
common. Lumping these countries
together is an increasingly
artificial construct for many issues.
Thus we recommend that we
shift our dialogue on trade and investment issues with
Tajikistan from a regional format to a bilateral format that can
address issues that are directly relevant to Tajikistan.
A Focused Agenda
3. (SBU) The Mission recommends that the agenda for this
discussion be carefully tailored to a limited set of issues
where we judge there are some realistic prospects for making
progress with direct engagement.
Even where there is real
political will, the Tajik government has a limited capacity to
implement meaningful reform.
Presenting a broad agenda tends to
overwhelm the fairly small cadre with the ability to effect any
change. The end results are
polite exchanges, a few
pleasantries, while the long list of actual items discussed is
promptly set aside until next year.
4. (SBU) Direct U.S. business interests in Tajikistan are very
limited. Even when Tajik
companies express interest in working
with U.S. companies, the U.S. side often decides the deals are
too small and Tajikistan too remote to make it worth bothering.
The main U.S. economic interest here is improving the overall
business environment to strengthen the Tajik economy and
stability. There are perhaps six
to eight areas where there is
some slow progress or potential for progress including tax
reform, budget processes, agriculture reform, the energy sector,
microfinance, and business regulation.
We would recommend that
each year we review these areas, and then choose no more than
three, which have the best potential for bilateral engagement
and positive action, to address with the government of
Tajikistan.
5. (SBU) The Mission would then seek the highest level official
we could get from State, Commerce or USTR to lead the dialogue,
in order to engage high-level interlocutors on the Tajik side.
We would propose some specific steps we would like to see
Tajikistan take in these three areas, and match that with offers
of specific support for these steps, mainly through USAID
programs. The Mission judges that
this approach would be less
demanding on our resources than the current format and more
likely to achieve real results.
6. (SBU) The Mission recognizes that the TIFA process has a
history behind it, and that for many Washington agencies
addressing the five central Asia states together has advantages.
We believe that, at least for
Tajikistan, the current process
has reached a point where it simply does not work, and is in
danger of degenerating into a purely pro forma exercise. To
reinvigorate TIFA with a strong trade and investment dialogue,
we need to look to a new format.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 202364
date: 4/15/2009 9:19
refid: 09DUSHANBE466
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09STATE31102
header:
VZCZCXRO0160
OO RUEHSR
DE RUEHDBU #0466 1050919
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 150919Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0228
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0428
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000466
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/A REOTT, EUR/RPM COPE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2019
TAGS: PREL, NATO, MOPS, MARR, AF, TI
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON AFGHANISTAN CONTRIBUTIONS DELIVERED
REF: 09 STATE 31102
CLASSIFIED BY: NECIA QUAST, DCM, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)
1. (C) On April 6, PolOff delivered reftel demarche to Husrav
Noziri, the Head of the Americas and Europe Division of
Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Noziri could not
provide specific feedback on reftel requests, but he forwarded
them to the individuals. It is
unclear how and when the
authorities will respond; the Government of Tajikistan continues
to view Afghan-based narcotics trafficking and Islamic extremism
as serious threats, but is reluctant to cooperate seriously with
Afghanistan in any field.
Nevertheless, there have been some
developments.
2. (C) Bridge: The Tajiks have taken some steps toward
facilitating increased use of the Nizhny Pyanj bridge, but they
have still not devoted enough manpower to operate it around the
clock. Authorities claim that
traffic is up to 150 to 200
trucks a day crossing in either direction, but this is
unverified and not consistent with Emboffs’ observations during
visits to the facilities. Even if
true, it is also well below
the 1,000 vehicle per day capacity.
The inspection facilities
on the Tajik end of the bridge are almost complete; the
Government took legal possession of them last August, and
recently connected them to the power grid.
3. (C) Border Training Initiatives: It remains unclear when the
OSCE-sponsored Border Management Staff College will begin
operations. Training is expected
to start at the U.S.-sponsored
border guard training facility in Khorog in June 2009 at the
earliest.
4. (C) Agriculture and Water Experts: We know of no ongoing
efforts to provide agriculture or water experts in coordination
with the Afghan government.
Nosiri told poloff on April 13 that
the Government of Tajikistan had this request under
consideration.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 202369
date: 4/15/2009 9:36
refid: 09DUSHANBE467
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0180
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0467/01 1050936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 150936Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0229
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0429
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0077
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0047
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0047
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000467
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/15/2019
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ECON, RU, TI
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS LOOK BETTER ON PAPER
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: According to the Russian embassy, Russia plans
and implements its assistance to Tajikistan in a basic manner
that is politically driven, does not take account of development
needs, and relies excessively on the Tajik government for
distribution. Russian diplomats
share our frustration with
Tajik officialdom’s pervasive corruption and sense of
entitlement to unconditional aid.
End Summary.
2. (C) On 20 March, Poloff and USAID representatives met with
Russian Embassy First Secretary Alexander Averin to discuss
possible coordination between the embassies to better implement
humanitarian aid efforts in Tajikistan.
Averin expressed
interest in pursuing coordination, noting the difficult and
problematic political environment in Tajikistan. Averin cited
corruption, lack of oversight, overlapping efforts, and
unrealistic expectations by the Tajik Government as examples of
the problems Russian assistance efforts face. Averin agreed on
the need for continued consultations with the U.S. Embassy
regarding cooperation, and expressed interest in the U.S. model
of contracting non-governmental organizations to do the leg work
of the USG’s aid programs.
3. (SBU) Russian Federation aid to Tajikistan is, in terms of
planning and implementation, still in its infancy. Averin said
that, no matter what the particular program was, the Russian
planning model was simply to throw money where the Embassy, or
more often Moscow, felt it was needed.
The same was true for
their food assistance programs, though aid deliveries were
usually negotiated at meetings in Moscow. Recent Russian
deliveries of food aid to Tajikistan were left to be distributed
via the Government of Tajikistan, which had little capacity to
do so. Averin acknowledged this
process had problems, and
listened with interest to USAID representative’s description of
the USG model that contracts local and international
non-governmental organizations to track and distribute aid
supplies. He commented that
«it sounds expensive.»
4. (SBU) Averin complained about the corruption rife in the
Tajik government and the need to monitor the distribution of
assistance as well as account for where and to whom distribution
took place. Averin was unfamiliar
with many of the
international aid community’s activities in Tajikistan, asking
about the roles of multilateral assistance planning groups that
meet regularly in Dushanbe, but also noting that coordination
helped donor countries to ensure that foreign aid was reaching
its intended recipients. [Note:
the Russian Charges d’Affaires
regularly attends the Principles’ Group meeting in Dushanbe
which discusses relief and aid programs, coordinating activities
of embassies in Tajikistan, indicating a possible disconnect
within the Russian Embassy].
Averin mentioned a Russian embassy
requirement to gather data on donor activities for reporting to
Moscow, which indicated both a strong interest in understanding
USG and other donors’ motives and activities. Averin said there
was very little in the way of Russian social development
programs in Tajikistan. The
Russian government focused its
assistance more towards commercial infrastructure that suited
the needs of Russian businesses interested in currying favor
with the Tajik government, rather than stimulating local
economic development.
5. (C) Averin expressed some frustration with the expectations
of the Tajikistani Government. He
cited the Sangtuda I
hydroelectric station, possible future hydropower stations, and
projects such as a Russian-built business center and the new
Hyatt Regency as examples of Tajik expectations that Russia
would contribute to projects in Tajikistan while getting nothing
in return. Interestingly, he also
cited the presence of the 201
Motorized Rifle Division in this context, saying the Tajiks
expected it to remain permanently while it had come to
Tajikistan only to assist with stability and support the central
government here when President Rahmon’s government was at its
weakest, following the Civil War.
6. (C) Comment: We are encouraged by Averin’s expression of
interest in continuing a dialogue on coordination of
humanitarian efforts, and see this meeting as a chance to open
doors with the Russian Embassy as well as, possibly, help
alleviate their reflexive suspicion of all U.S. activities in
DUSHANBE 00000467 002 OF 002
Central Asia. Clearly, Russian
assistance efforts are plagued
with problems of planning and implementation. Averin’s comments
on dealing with the Tajik government may reflect growing Russian
frustration with Tajikistan’s manipulations of its traditional
foreign friends. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 202378
date: 4/15/2009 10:26
refid: 09DUSHANBE474
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0212
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0474/01 1051026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151026Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0231
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0437
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0079
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000474
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
ASHGABAT PASS BOUCHER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, ECON, PREL, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: UPDATE ON POWER PROJECTS
DUSHANBE 00000474 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) Summary: The power situation in Tajikistan has eased
since the winter crunch. Water
levels at the Nurek hydropower
station remain low, although this spring’s abundant rains may
help. The fourth and final
generator of Russian-built
Sangtuda-1 is expected to go online in mid-May. Iranian-built
Sangtuda-2 is not expected to be completed until the 2010 or
2011. The government’s priority
remains the enormous Roghun
project, although no firm schedule for completion is in sight.
There are several plans to build new transmission plans to link
Tajikistan with regional energy partners. The largest of these
may be endangered by reduced donor funding due to the financial
crisis. End summary.
Nurek
——
2. (U) The Nurek hydropower station continues to be the mainstay
of Tajikistan’s domestic energy production, accounting for
three-quarters of the country’s 4,700 Megawatt (MW) capacity.
Due to last year’s drought, for the first time in Nurek’s
37-year history its reservoir did not fill to capacity, which
meant less energy for the lean winter months. While this
spring’s rainy weather has been a good omen for both agriculture
and energy, the Nurek reservoir has so far risen only 1.2 meters
over its low point and is almost 53 meters below full. The
major project this year for Nurek is a $54.77 million upgrade,
financed by the Asian Development Bank, of the station’s aging
electrical switch yard, which is located on subsiding ground.
Sangtuda-1
———-
3. (U) The Sangtuda-1 hydropower station, financed and built by
Russian energy giant RAO UES, is scheduled for completion on May
15, when Presidents Rahmon and Medvedev will attend an official
opening ceremony. Already, three
of the station’s four
generators are operating. Once
the fourth is completed,
Sangtuda-1 is expected to generate 670 MW of electricity. Last
winter, the partially-completed Sangtuda-1 was able to pick up
some of the slack from underperforming Nurek. Russia retains a
75% share in the power station.
4. (U) On March 27, Sangtuda-1 became the subject of some
controversy when workers declared a one-day strike to demand
four months of back wages.
Managers at Sangtuda said they could
not pay the wages because Tajikistan’s state-held power company
Barqi Tojik had yet to pay a $10 million debt to the power
station. A week later Barqi Tojik
announced that it was paying
2 million somoni ($520,000) to Sangtuda, part of which was to be
used to pay worker salaries.
Sangtuda-2
———-
5. (U) The Sangtuda-2 hydropower station, located 25 kilometers
from Sangtuda-1, is being built by the Iranian firm Sangob, with
major financing from the Iranian government. It was initially
slated to be online by 2011, but Tajik authorities have asked
the Iranians to complete it a year earlier. Construction on the
station, which will contain two generators, began in February
2006. The estimated cost of
constructing Sangtuda-2 is $220
million, including a $180 million preferential loan from Iran
(ten years at 5% annual interest) and $40 million in Tajik
government financing. As of March
2009 about $90 million had
been spent on construction.
Roghun
——
6. (U) Tajikistan’s largest energy project under construction
remains the Roghun hydropower station, situated upstream from
Nurek, which is expected to generate 3,600 MW, almost doubling
the country’s current capacity.
Roghun is under the supervision
of the Presidential Administration rather than the Ministry of
Energy and Industry. The project
was launched in the 1970s, but
lay idle for many years due to lack of financing and civil
strife. Construction restarted
last year, and the government
expects to begin raising the dam in late 2009. It has earmarked
$150 million for the project this year.
The first two
generating units of the station are supposed to begin operations
in three or four years, theoretically providing revenue to pay
for further construction of the dam.
7. (U) Uzbekistan has strongly opposed construction of Roghun,
saying it will reduce downstream water supplies; Tajikistan
presses ahead with the project regardless. The World Bank is
funding a feasibility study of Roghun which will take into
account the water needs of downstream countries. Recently the
DUSHANBE 00000474 002.2 OF 002
UNDP representative in Dushanbe, and the EU’s Special
Representative for Central Asia have called for more attention
to small and medium hydropower projects, saying Roghun is too
expensive, too large, and too controversial to be built any time
soon, and Tajikistan needs more practical ways to escape its
chronic energy crisis.
Transmission Lines
——————
8. (U) Key to Tajikistan’s energy future is not just increasing
its generation capacity, but augmenting its ability to offset
seasonal energy imbalances by trading power with neighboring
countries. In November 2007 the
Central Asia/South Asia
Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM) agreement was signed to
implement a $500 million power transmission line connecting
Central Asia with South Asia. In
its first stage, the so-called
CASA-1000 project would transfer around 1,300 MW of electricity
from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
CASAREM, the secretariat of which is based in Kabul, was
supposed to receive 40% of its funding from the World Bank, 40%
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and 20% from the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB). In
February of 2009, however, the ADB
notified the Tajik Government that it was suspending its
contribution to the project due to a decline in available
funding brought on by the world financial crisis. The World
Bank and the IDB have not yet revealed their plans. The ADB
says it is ready to resume negotiations on CASA-1000, provided
that the Tajik government is prepared to discuss prioritizing
the project with the other partners — Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Kyrgyzstan.
9. (U) There are other, smaller transmission projects in the
works. In August 2008, under the
Power Purchase Agreement
signed between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, electricity will be
transmitted from Sangtuda-1 to Pul-e Khumri in Afghanistan, via
a 220 kV line. The ADB is funding
construction of this project
with a $50 million loan.
Construction of the 120-kilometer line
is supposed to start this autumn and finish in spring 2010. In
addition, the Iranian government is funding a feasibility study
for a 500 kV line from Sangtuda to Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif,
Herat, and Meshhed.
10. (SBU) Comment: Tajikistan is still a considerable distance
from solving its chronic seasonal energy shortages. The
government remains fixated on big-ticket construction programs,
particularly the extravagant Roghun project. In fact, however,
Tajikistan may be better served by focusing on expanding its
regional energy trading. In that
way, it can use its already
appreciable summer power surplus to trade for much needed
electricity in the winter. End
comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 202380
date: 4/15/2009 10:30
refid: 09DUSHANBE475
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE458
header:
VZCZCXRO0219
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0475/01 1051030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151030Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0233
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0439
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0049
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0081
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000475
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
COMMERCE FOR DAUSTR LILIENFELD
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ETRD, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR DAUSTR CLAUDIO LILIENFELD’S APRIL
21-22 VISIT
REF: DUSHANBE 458
DUSHANBE 00000475 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe welcomes the upcoming visit of Deputy
Assistant United States Trade Representative Claudio Lilienfeld.
Following is an overview of key
economic and trade issues in
Tajikistan.
Overview
———
2. (SBU) The poorest former Soviet republic, Tajikistan is
critically important to our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and
the region. The country faces
serious challenges, however: the
legacy of its civil war, poverty, isolation, massive labor
migration, corruption, lack of government capacity, poor
infrastructure, and low levels of investment, to name just a
few. Furthermore, the global
financial crisis has hit the
country hard, resulting in a devalued national currency,
declining remittances from Tajiks working abroad, and lower
prices for Tajikistan’s main exports, aluminum and cotton.
Economic Snapshot
——————
3. (SBU) U.S. trade with Tajikistan remains minimal, due to
several factors: the small size of the Tajik market, its
distance from seaports and the United States, a general lack of
transparency in business affairs, and government corruption and
inefficiency. Despite this,
Tajikistan has economic potential
in a number of areas. On the
production side, it possesses a
wealth of relatively unexploited mineral deposits, a sizeable
agricultural sector, and hydrocarbon resources, particularly gas
and coal. On the market side, due
precisely to the difficulties
noted above, few firms are actively engaged in selling western
products here. Despite
Tajikistan’s poverty, there is a real
demand for such products. For
Tajikistan to develop as an
active trading partner for the United States and other
countries, however, significant strides must be taken to ensure
a more transparent business climate.
4. (SBU) Tajikistan’s top leaders view foreign investment
through the prism of their Soviet experience, and tend to favor
large state-led investment projects.
While acknowledging the
need to attract private investment, the government has done
little to stem the corruption and bureaucratic barriers that
make Tajikistan an inhospitable environment for business. To
some extent the government has not confronted these problems
since it has been able to attract state-led investment from
China, Iran, and Russia, among others, to develop its road and
energy infrastructure, while leaving much of the population to
survive on remittances from Tajiks working in Russia. With the
contraction of foreign investment as a result of the global
financial crisis and the decline of t
