Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 62310
date: 4/29/2006 9:31
refid: 06DUSHANBE801
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8910
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0801/01 1190931
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 290931Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7375
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8593
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1508
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0016
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1584
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1594
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1566
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1563
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1517
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1521
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1393
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1339
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1554
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1591
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1123
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0031
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0910
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000801
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR HOAGLAND
NEW DELHI, KATHMANDU, ALMATY PLEASE PASS TO BOUCHER PARTY
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, SNAR, KDEM, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENE-SETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER AND
NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR MILLARD
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Richard and Elisabeth,
we are very grateful you are
visiting Tajikistan. As you have
quickly learned, Central Asia
is not the easiest place for the United States to do business,
especially since Russia has declared these countries its sphere
of influence and is taking all sorts of measures, both overt and
covert, to enforce this view. Of
the five states in the region,
Tajikistan has emerged from the chaos of its civil war in the
1990s and is now one of the two most stable of the five. We
firmly believe your visit will advance U.S. goals and
objectives. This scene-setter is
geared to your full schedule
we have proposed for May 8.
2. (U) This is not necessarily a
traditional scene-setter. We
know you read our reporting. Your
staffs have fully briefed you
for this visit. What we want to
do is give you insight and
background for the key meetings and events, so that you can make
the very best use of them to advance the President’s and
Secretary’s foreign policy for this region.
SIPDIS
PRESIDENT RAHMONOV
3. (C) Your most important
meeting for the bilateral
relationship will be with President Rahmonov. You should know
up-front it is likely to be long because he likes to expound at
length when he gets wound up — sometimes at considerable length!
This is not just the Soviet/Asian
custom. It’s how he really
is. He generally starts reading
his prepared talking points,
and may appear disinterested. But
he quickly gets bored and
then, pushing his briefing book aside, speaks from the heart.
Though he may sound a bit vehement when he gets on a roll, he is
always worth listening to, because he wears his heart on his
sleeve, and frequently speaks surprisingly frankly. He may
archly refute what you have to say that he doesn’t like to hear,
for example on elections, should you bring that up. But, to
give him credit, you can be sure he will take your message on
board, and, likely as not, will implement at least a portion of
what you suggest.
4. (C) He is likely to want to
focus on the importance of
Afghanistan to regional stability — he has been a stalwart
supporter of President Karzai and his government — and he will
certainly bring up hydropower and other regional infrastructure
issues. The proposed Dasti Zhum
dam and hydroelectric station
on the river between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is one of his
favorites. He will have just
returned from a state visit to
Kazakhstan, and you may want to probe him on that. As a grace
note, you might want to salute his «open-door» foreign policy,
and what we believe are his sincere attempts, sometimes against
Russian odds, to protect Tajikistan’s sovereignty and
independence. Although he really
doesn’t understand us, he is
not at anti-American.
5. (SBU) Rahmonov will have a
number of advisers with him at
the table — at a minimum Foreign Minister Nazarov and Foreign
Policy Adviser Rahmatulloyev. But
they will not speak unless he
consults with them on some obscure detail or another. This will
most definitely be a one-man show on their side.
DUSHANBE 00000801 002.2 OF 004
6. (SBU) Your probable separate
meeting with Foreign Minister
Nazarov, before seeing the President, will essentially be a
courtesy call. You will want to
summarize your key messages, so
that Nazarov can then quickly brief Rahmonov, but you may want
to use this meeting to touch briefly on any second-tier issues
you might have.
7. (SBU) After your meeting with
Rahmonov, Tajik and Russian
journalists, along with other international stringers, will be
staked out. There is simply no
way around this. It is standard
practice here, and a must-do. Our
superb public affairs FSN
will manage the journalists (with my guidance), and you can call
a halt whenever you like. At a
minimum, I’d suggest three or
four fairly quick Qs and As. This
will be the key opportunity
for you to communicate major messages, and will get broader
coverage than any other press conference we could set up. You
also need to know that the President’s press service will have
prepared, in advance of your meeting, their press release that
gives their spin. It will not be
dishonest, but it will not
fully reflect the reality of your meeting. That’s OK — we can
live with that, as we have frequently done in the past. It is
not ill-intentioned. It’s likely
just a hold-over from «central
planning.»
BORDER SECURITY AND COUNTER-NARCOTICS ASSISTANCE
8. (C) Our various
military-to-military relationships
implemented by our Department of Defense colleagues have been
tended assiduously, and are growing in gratifying and sometimes
surprisingly positive ways. But
now is not the time to trumpet
those tender, new relationships.
The unasked and unanswered
question about an American military facility in Tajikistan hangs
over any high-level meeting. We
would rather focus on our
increasingly well-established border protection and
counter-narcotics efforts.
Whether or not you actually observe
a controlled drug-burn (which would also be a media op, although
we understand you may not have time for this), your (we hope)
joint meeting with Drug Control Agency (DCA) Chairman General
Rustam Nazarov and Tajik Border Guard (TBG) Chairman General
Saidamur Zuhurov, will be a very important part of your visit,
because it will send the message throughout the region that we
are deadly serious in supporting Tajikistan on these issues.
Both generals, in our view, are true Tajik patriots, as clean
and honest as they come here, and enormously dedicated and
health-wreckingly hard working. A
bit of honest hyperbole
praising them would not be inappropriate.
9. (SBU) The U.S. government has
long supported the DCA, for
the most part quietly through UNODC, and the relationship
continues to expand in more direct and special ways. The DCA is
widely considered to nearly meet international standards.
Tajikistan interdicts more narcotics than the other Central
Asian republics together. Our
assistance relationship with the
TBG is barely 18 months old, but it is, so far, a true success
story. President Rahmonov has
quite regularly embarrassed
General Zuhurov in cabinet meetings by pointing him out as the
model for working with the United States, and by haranguing the
other ministers «to get with the program.»
10. (C) Both these relationships
— border control and
counter-narcotics — are the foundation for a stronger and more
productive relationship in all other areas of our bilateral
DUSHANBE 00000801 003.2 OF 004
relationship. Because we have
proven we are reliable partners
in these areas, President Rahmonov is, we feel, a bit more
willing to trust us on the enormously more difficult issues like
political reform. Although never
yet in public, President
Rahmonov and his inner circle have increasingly praised the
United States for it’s «objective understanding» of the
complex
reality in Tajikistan and how to do business here. They are
quietly grateful for Washington’s increasing attention.
11. (C) An interesting
footnote: before 9/11, General Zuhurov,
when he was first Minister of Security and then Deputy Prime
Minister for Security Affairs, was the Tajik point-man for
funneling U.S. assistance to the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan. He still keeps a
photo of Ahmad Shah Masood on the
bookshelves in his private office.
U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR ELECTIONS
12. (C) We intend to put together
for you an event at the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) that would
include political party representatives, respectable and
progressive Tajik journalists, members of civil society
promoting fair elections, and, we hope, some Tajik government
officials. This would not be a
head-bangingly boring
talking-heads event. We will
prevent that. You would control
it. You know from Embassy
Dushanbe’s reporting that IFES has a
remarkable initiative underway, supported by DRL, with
progressive Tajik government officials, including some very
highly placed, who are committed to improving the conduct of the
November presidential election.
USAID has also funded $280,000
for election support by National Democratic Institute.
Nevertheless, despite their commitment, they are a bit leery
that they can ever do enough to satisfy the international (i.e.,
Western) community.
13. (SBU) Your message, we
suggest, should be that building
democracy is a long and incremental process. We can and will be
patient, but we likewise expect incremental progress. There is
always something to criticize in the conduct of elections —
after all, the OSCE did not give the U.S. 2004 Presidential
Election an absolutely clean bill of health! We would never
recommend you pull any punches, but this will be an opportunity
for a forward-looking, upbeat message about the presidential
election.
STUDENTS AND EDUCATION
14. (U) We sincerely applaud your
commitment to education as a
fundamental for building a brighter future. Our intention, if
there is time, is for you to have a brief round-table with
English-speaking students, probably at the American Corner.
15. (SBU) We caution you may hear
some negative platitudes
about U.S. foreign policy. This
is not necessarily because
various entities have gotten to the students and planted
questions. It’s not because they
are knee-jerk anti-American.
It really is because the information space in Tajikistan is
almost totally dominated by Russia — and I know you are well
aware of the multiple twisted versions of reality Russia has
been promulgating. If this event
occurs, we see it as an
opportunity, not as a confrontational challenge. It is vitally
important to know that Tajiks are very open to new ideas, and
eagerly accept divergent views.
DUSHANBE 00000801 004 OF 004
THE 800-POUND BEAR
16. (C) While Iran and China are
active in Tajikistan, Russia
is the 800-pound bear. We know
you are fully apprised of the
increasingly negative, domineering role the Kremlin is
attempting to impose on Central Asia, and not the least in
Tajikistan. Maybe especially in
Tajikistan. President Putin
threw down the gauntlet during his state visit to Dushanbe in
October 2004 and all but declared, through economic
accommodations and probably pie-in-the-sky promises of
multi-billion-dollar investment in infrastructure, that
Tajikistan is Russia’s, and that the «little Tajik brother»
needs to get with the program.
Much of this new «druzhba
narodov» (Soviet-style «friendship of the peoples»), is
supposed
to be implemented through controversial RusAl oligarch Oleg
Deripaska.
17. (C) Even though Tajikistan
was always the most remote and
poorest of the Republics of the Soviet Union, Russia’s 201st
Motorized Rifle Division, now the 201st Russian Military Base,
has been here since 1945. The
201st totally mobilized to
Afghanistan during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. It is now
rather a shadow of its former self, but it still projects itself
as a formidable player and nearly sole guarantor of stability
and security in Tajikistan. A lot
of this is hortatory. Russia
does not measure up to its rhetoric.
When the Russian Border
Force withdrew from the Tajik-Afghan border in 2005, it
proclaimed it was leaving everything intact and passing the full
infrastructure on to the Tajiks.
In fact, the departing
Russians stole what they could, including the urinals and
kitchen sinks, and destroyed much of the rest.
18. (C) We know for a fact that
Rahmonov is increasingly
exasperated with the Russians.
However, if he is feeling
relatively discreet, you will not hear this directly from him.
Although many Tajik officials are pro-Russia and nostalgic for
the Soviet past, Rahmonov also has increasingly included in his
circle more modern, internationally savvy, sometimes purely
technocratic progressives. He
orchestrates the chaos as if he
were directing Stockhausen rather than the niceties of
neo-classical Stravinskiy.
19. (C) In the end, this is why,
despite all the headline bad
news, we still continue to believe Rahmonov, at heart, is a
reformer, even if this is slow in practice. That is why your
visit is truly important. It is a
signal opportunity not to rag
on him, but to encourage him further in the right direction. We
trust your light touch with tough messages.
20. (U) We very much look forward
to your visit to advance U.S.
foreign policy in Tajikistan, and, thus, in Greater Central
Asia.
21. (U) Minimize considered.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 62483
date: 5/2/2006 11:33
refid: 06DUSHANBE802
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE326|06DUSHANBE668|06DUSHANBE711|06DUSHANBE748
header:
VZCZCXRO0613
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0802/01 1221133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 021133Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7379
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8597
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1588
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1598
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1570
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1567
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1521
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1512
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1525
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0914
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0046
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1127
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000802
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ENRG, ECON, EAID, AF, TI
SUBJECT: NEW ENERGY MINISTER, SAME ENERGY POLICY
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0711 B) DUSHANBE 0326 C) DUSHANBE 0668 D) DUSHANBE 0748
DUSHANBE 00000802 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In his third day on the job, Energy Minister
Yorov reported Tajikistan’s energy policy would continue to
focus on attracting foreign investment for key infrastructure
projects. He cited the reforms of
the past five years, notably
in improved fee collection, as evidence that Tajikistan is
slowly, but solidly, getting its energy house in order. He
listened closely to recommendations on how Tajikistan and
Afghanistan could generate real international interest in one of
the most ambitious hydropower projects, Dasti Zhum. Yorov is a
technocrat, with many years in the government, but his
experience and leadership may result in a more efficient,
responsive Energy Ministry, ready to work with international
financial institutions and Western investors to realize
Tajikistan’s hydropower potential.
END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) In an hour-long meeting
April 28 with PolOff, Yorov
listed the upcoming hydropower projects-Sangtuda I and II,
Rogun-that promised to make Tajikistan a regional electricity
exporter by 2008. He noted that
RusAl had already committed
invest around $50 million in roads and other infrastructure
improvements in anticipation of construction of Rogun. Yorov
noted with satisfaction how the Ministry of Energy and State
electricity utility Barqi Tojik had improved fee collection from
40% in 1998 to almost 95%
(NOTE: Per reftel C, other sources
indicate that collection rates are less successful, and often
state run enterprises fail to pay.
END NOTE.)
3. (SBU) Yorov, flanked by his
new First Deputy Minister
Mukhiddinov, seemed genuinely perplexed when asked what was
preventing the MoE from signing a memorandum of understanding
with American company AES. The
MOU would establish a joint
venture to construct 220 kV lines from Geran substation in the
south to the Afghan border, allowing Tajikistan to export its
summer surplus electricity.
Existing high voltage lines do not
allow Tajikistan to export electricity, due to Uzbekistan’s
unwillingness to allow transit to Russia and Kazakhstan. Head
of the Office of Energy Policy Abdurashid Gulov asserted that
they had given AES feedback on the initial MOU and were waiting
for AES; he then suggested that the anticipated April 19 signing
in Washington (on the margins of the World Bank/IMF meetings)
could not have taken place because the Tajik delegation, headed
by the National Bank Chairman Alimardonov, was not authorized to
sign such energy agreements. «You need to push AES,» said
Gulov.
Yorov suggested AES send him a
cover letter and new MOU
spelling out the terms.
4. (SBU) Yorov initially
confused the AES joint venture MOU
with AES participation in the upcoming May trilateral energy
meeting in Islamabad. He noted
there were no anticipated
deliverables for the May 8-9 between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and
Pakistan, but the meeting would be an opportunity to discuss
implementation of recently signed agreements between the three
countries. Other participants
will include the World Bank, AES,
and Russian energy company RAO UES, likely represented by its
head Anatoly Chubais. Yorov
confirmed that in addition to a
trilateral agreement on energy sales, the Tajiks and Afghans had
signed a bilateral agreement in December 2005. (NOTE: A
«Cooperation Agreement» to implement the terms of the MOU was
supposed to be signed in January but remains unsigned. END
NOTE.)
5. (SBU) The energy officials
expressed great interest in
PolOff’s April 17 visit to the Dasti Zhum site (reftel D). They
nodded and took notes as she explained how experts from Embassy
Kabul had found the site very promising, but the Tajik and
Afghan governments would both need to demonstrate real
cooperation, through effective bilateral working groups, before
international investors and donors would even begin to look
seriously at the proposed $3.5 billion project.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: The introductory meeting indicated that
Yorov’s appointment does not signify any radical change in
Tajikistan’s energy policy. In
fact, it may indicate that
President Rahmonov is trying to bring the Ministry more in line
with national goals and under stricter guidance from the
DUSHANBE 00000802 002.2 OF 002
Presidency. However, the
transition may be bumpy. Some sources
note the outgoing team did very little to prepare the new
administration and the few holdovers-notably Gulov-are notorious
for sitting on information and decisions for months. The
Embassy will work to engage the minister and his top officials;
the June Istanbul Power conference will provide an excellent
opportunity to prove the United States is a serious partner.
END COMMENT.
ARMBRUSTER
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 62628
date: 5/3/2006 11:22
refid: 06DUSHANBE817
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE798|06DUSHANBE804
header:
VZCZCXRO2160
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0817 1231122
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031122Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7396
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1595
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8622
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000817
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: NDI: PROTEST SUBMITTED
TO MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0798 B) DUSHANBE
0804
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) Post submitted the
following diplomatic note to the
MFA May 3 lodging a formal protest against the treatment of NDI:
BEGIN TEXT:
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Tajikistan and has the honor to inform the Ministry that the
Embassy protests strongly against the continued attacks by the
Ministry of Security and its relevant agencies and their allies
against the National Democratic Institute (NDI) office and its
employees in Dushanbe. The recent
use of classic intimidation
and entrapment against NDI’s former Acting Director is a
bewildering action against a highly respected U.S. organization
that works openly and honestly in over 100 countries around the
world. It is especially
regrettable that this action occurred
during a presidential election year when official Washington is
focusing close attention on Tajikistan.
This kind of activity
will harm the other successful aspects of our bilateral
relationship and seriously tarnish Tajikistan’s reputation as an
emerging democracy.
The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of
this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Tajikistan the assurances of its highest
consideration.
The Embassy of the United States of America
Dushanbe, May 3, 2006
END TEXT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 62656
date: 5/3/2006 13:25
refid: 06DUSHANBE827
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE789
header:
VZCZCXRO2366
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0827/01 1231325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 031325Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7407
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1516
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1524
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1569
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1590
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1572
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1343
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1600
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1129
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0916
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1558
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8633
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000827
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ECON, EAID, SOCI, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S MOST ISLAMIC REGION FEELS MOST NEGLECTED
REF: DUSHANBE 0789
DUSHANBE 00000827 001.2 OF 002
1. SUMMARY: Rasht Valley, one of Tajikistan’s most
isolated
and devoutly Islamic districts, feels left behind. The economic
boom evident elsewhere in Tajikistan has yet to reach this
agricultural area. NGO and civil
society leaders observe that
while international organizations are active, more donor dollars
go to towards Dushanbe, and Sughd and Khatlon provinces. Most
farmers grow potatoes. A few
organizations are working to
diversify the monoculture, but due to poor roads, high transport
costs and a lack of food processing facilities, even more
diversified crops would have limited economic impact. The
center of opposition during the 1992-1997 civil war, Rasht has
few powerful patrons in Dushanbe.
The residents of Garm,
Tojikibod, and Jirgatol districts represent Tajikistan’s most
observant Muslims, although local authorities and religious
leaders are quick to underline that the religious beliefs do not
conflict with support for President Rahmonov, and all residents
prefer peace over the years of conflict. Due to high
unemployment, the majority of men have left, most as migrant
workers in Russia, leaving women to struggle with farms and
homes. END SUMMARY.
2. During an April 24-26 visit to
Garm and Tojikibod, PolOff
met government officials and NGO leaders, and visited a U.S.
food aid distribution program (reftel).
A 5 = hour bone-jarring
drive on cratered roads leads to the town of Garm, where a
single main street shows very little sign of entrepreneurship or
economic activity. Abandoned
half-finished buildings dotted the
route in the Rasht Valley, further evidence that reconstruction
funds had not been put into infrastructure. Two mobile phone
companies serve Garm, although their signals were only active a
few hours in the morning and evening, and never at the same
time. None of the imported Mercedes, BMW and Prado Land Cruisers
common on the streets of Dushanbe, Khujand and Kulob graced
Garm’s main drag, where a new branch of Orien Bank stood out as
the one new addition. Residents
gestured to the prominent
Western Union sign and noted the bank mainly transfers money
from migrants abroad. (NOTE: With national interest rates at
34%, it was unlikely any of the Rasht valley residents would
look to a bank for credit. END
NOTE.)
3. Even with spectacular
mountains and scenery, few tourists
make their way to the region; and if they reached Garm, there
would be no place to stay aside from two NGO-run guesthouses,
and the local government «hotel,» which has no indoor toilet.
In preparation for President Rahmonov’s June 27 visit to
commemorate «Unity Day» marking the end of the civil war, the
local government had ordered a number of cosmetic improvements,
including painting fences, rehabilitating the main tea house,
and filling some of the thousands of pot holes.
4. Rasht is isolated and could
grow even more so. Not only
does the road deter all but the most committed travelers,
language and economic disparity separate the valley from the
more global-looking parts of Tajikistan.
Tajiki is the spoken
and written language-no signs were visible in Russian, and while
most interlocutors responded to PolOff’s Russian greetings in
proper Russian, they quickly switched into Tajiki, with a nod to
the interpreter.
AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL, BUT SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS
5. Despite an optimal
microclimate to raise fruits and
vegetables, Rasht has failed to maximize its agricultural
potential, due to the potato monoculture, a lack of food
processing facilities, and poor transportation options. Aga
Khan Foundation’s Mountain Society Development Support Program
(MSDSP), German Agro Action and Canada’s SIDA have implemented
programs for seed improvement and diversification, but effects
are limited. MSDPS also has pilot
projects for a small oil
processing facility that employs two women, and domestic food
preservation and canning, but its director noted the valley
truly needs food processing facilities, where farmers could
bring their fruits and vegetables.
Other NGO workers and
DUSHANBE 00000827 002.2 OF 002
farmers echoed this wish over two days-food processing
facilities would provide much-needed jobs and offer a way to get
Rasht’s high quality produce to a wider market than simply to
the local consumers it currently supplies.
MIGRATIONS RATES AMONG THE HIGHEST
6. The overall lack of jobs has
led almost all men over age 17
to leave the valley, in some communities up to 70% of the male
population. Residents admitted
that many families use
microcredit loans available from various projects to purchase
plane tickets for laborers. The
director of the Garm technical
college expressed concern that many of the young men spoke no
Russian and were ill-prepared for the hard-scrabble life as an
illegal immigrant. He sought
funding for a resource center to
better educate workers about their rights before they leave.
The newly-arrived OCSE field office director candidly admitted
that while OSCE headquarters in Dushanbe was enthusiastic about
a «business development center» further down the valley in Obi
Garm, he thought the priority should be addressing the needs of
thousands of young migrant men, and their families left behind.
CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS SOCIETY ACTIVE
7. U.S. and other donor funding
have helped local NGOs to
address some of the problems of poverty, migration, education
and agriculture, and taught their leaders how to advocate for
their community, but there was a sense of envy at the April 25
roundtable discussion, that other regions of Tajikistan enjoy
more benefits from donors and the central government. The NGO
representatives, and local government leaders, expressed
appreciation for the work being done, but noted ruefully that
many needs go unaddressed.
8. Rasht’s citizens are among
Tajikistan’s most active Muslims.
Since the civil war ended, mosque
attendance has steadily grown
and now the Friday mosques pull in thousands of worshippers for
weekly prayer. Women all wear
traditional dresses and head
coverings. A local Embassy
staffer reported that in his
friends’ village a few kilometers south of Garm, every family
was preparing to give $1000 each to construct a new mosque.
«Not a school,» he noted. «They are too
religious!» American
Councils representatives were in Garm at the same time,
recruiting for a Community Connections professional exchange
program for Tajik religious leaders.
They observed that many of
the religious leaders they were trying to interest in the
exchange programs were reluctant to speak about politics or the
civil war and focused instead on peace and stability.
PROGESS POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY WITH SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT
9. The news in Rasht is not all
bad: Should construction on
Rogun hydropower station begin, the project would create
hundreds of jobs. (Although one
local NGO representative
skeptically noted, «They’ve had festivals and feasts twice to
herald the construction of Rogun, and still haven’t gotten any
further.») The Asian
Development Bank has committed to
rehabilitating the road through the Rasht Valley to the Kyrgyz
border. The multi-million dollar
project would also create
jobs, and make the valley a major transit route between
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. NGO
leaders thought the economy was better than two years ago and
would continue to improve.
10. COMMENT: Real economic development depends on
investment
that is nowhere in sight. No
Tajik businesses plan to build any
of the much-desired food processing facilities. Corruption and
a lack of legal protection make domestic investments
unattractive for Tajiks, and foreign investors have yet to show
any interest. The labor migration
saps Rasht valley of manpower
and talent, as young men opt for low-paying jobs in Russia
instead of education. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 62870
date: 5/4/2006 16:49
refid: 06DUSHANBE834
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE541
header:
VZCZCXRO4398
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0834/01 1241649
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041649Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7418
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1596
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1603
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1575
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1572
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1527
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1529
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1519
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1400
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1346
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1561
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1132
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1597
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0919
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8644
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000834
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL/IRF, S/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S RELIGIOUS LEADERS REACT TO DRAFT LAW ON
RELIGION
REF: DUSHANBE 0541
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
Not for public Internet.
2. (U) SUMMARY: In a series of meetings with PolOff April
12-25, religious leaders unanimously expressed grave concerns
with the State Committee on Religious Affairs’ (SCRA) new draft
law on religion. Most are
optimistic the draft law will not
pass this year, if at all.
Christian organizations have united
and sent a letter to President Rahmonov and SCRA Chairman
Murudullo Davlatov delineating specific concerns with the draft
law that would limit their freedom-of-religion rights. Islamic
organizations have not responded publicly to the draft law. END
SUMMARY.
CHRISTIAN GROUPS WRITE TO PRESIDENT
3. (SBU) On April 20, 34
Christian organizations sent a letter
to President Rahmonov and SCRA Chairman Davlatov. The letters
to President Rahmonov stressed the concern that implementing the
new law will discredit Tajikistan in the international community
and violate the Tajik Constitution and international agreements
Tajikistan has signed. Attached
to the letter are a
point-by-point analysis drafted by the Christian organizations,
and a legal analysis by the Republic Bureau on Human Rights and
Observation of Legitimacy.
4. (SBU) The analyses point out
the restrictive nature of the
law, which would prohibit many religious groups to worship
(reftel). The overarching concern
raised by the Christian
organizations is the vague nature of the law and further
questions it raises. The
organizations’ analysis also points
out the first line of the draft states, «[Republic of
Tajikistan] acknowledges a special role of Islam in social and
spiritual life of people of Tajikistan~.» Although most have
interpreted the restrictive articles in the draft law to mean
greater restrictions on Islam in an attempt by the government to
curb extremism and Islam’s growing popularity, the non-Islamic
organizations fear this line means Islam would be given priority
over other religions. They want
to revise the phrase to reflect
equality of all religions in a secular state.
DEALING WITH DAVLATOV
5. (SBU) The non-Islamic
organizations submitted their analysis
to SCRA Chairman Davlatov as well and requested additional
meetings to discuss the draft law.
Organizations point out that
Davlatov has been a fickle person to meet with and did not take
them seriously in past meetings.
They complain that he likes to
drone on in meetings about irrelevant issues and does not seek
their true opinion. The only
concern Davlatov wanted to hear
was how the religious organizations defined certain words such
as «association.»
(COMMENT: Although the
organizations
dismissed the importance of Davlatov’s questions, a word’s
definition is crucial, and ambiguities in the law could give the
government leeway to widely interpret the law. END COMMENT.)
6. (SBU) Davlatov’s comments in
the press dismissed the
non-Islamic organizations’ critique of the draft law saying that
the organizations could not justify their claims that the new
draft law violates articles of the Tajik constitution. When
pressed on details of the draft law, Davlatov remarked that
there is no need to discuss the law on a public level.
7. (SBU) The majority of
religious leaders noted that up to
this point they have enjoyed relative freedom to worship and
engage in religious activities.
They all cite good
relationships with the previous chairmen of the SCRA. Many
DUSHANBE 00000834 002 OF 003
also specifically pointed out that Davlatov is difficult to
engage with and is a staunch secularist.
8. (SBU) Since Davlatov’s term
began in 2005, registration has
become more difficult. Although
the SCRA never outright denies
registration, it sometimes cites technical application errors to
delay registration, an increasingly common Soviet-style tactic.
Some organizations understand from government sources that more
organizations will be registered after the new draft law passes.
9. (SBU) One organization alleged
the SCRA sometimes refused to
approve printing of spiritual literature and delayed the
importation of copies of the New Testament. (COMMENT:
The
restriction of religious texts imports could be a result of
bureaucratic red tape or corrupt practices in attempts to get
bribes, rather than a concerted effort to limit freedom of
religion. Humanitarian assistance
has been similarly delayed.
As the government increasingly cracks down on corruption,
corrupt working level officials seem to be more desperately
brazen. END COMMENT.)
ISLAMIC GROUPS SILENT ON DRAFT LAW
10. (SBU) Although the minority
religious leaders PolOff met
with all received a copy of the draft law, many Islamic leaders
did not. When PolOff visited a
local Friday mosque, the elders
and leaders of the mosque told PolOff they had not seen the
draft. After receiving a copy
from PolOff, they expressed great
surprise and disdain at the new draft law. Many local imams
received copies of the draft law through informal connections,
rather than directly from the government. The Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) Deputy Chairman, who is
also a member of Lower House of Parliament, also received a copy
from the Embassy. (COMMENT: This shows the government has
selectively distributed the draft, and may have made a concerted
effort not to spread too widely to the Islamic community. END
COMMENT.)
11. (SBU) The Imam of the Central Mosque in Dushanbe claimed he
had not read or seen the draft law.
He initially praised the
government and said they have not had any problems with the
government, but after PolOff pointed out some details of the
draft law, the Imam said he hopes the draft law will not pass.
Embassy sources tell PolOff that the Council of Ulamo, which
directs the Central Mosque, has indeed received a copy of the
draft law and are also dissatisfied with it, but have not come
out publicly against the draft.
Although it is supposed to be
an independent board of Islamic elders, the Council of Ulamo is
heavily influenced by the government.
12. (SBU) Although speaking out
against the draft law would be
difficult, Council members told Embassy sources, they do not
favor the law. One main reason is
because the state has taken
control of managing the hajj. The
profits government officials
reap from bribes and registration fees from the hajj means that
the Council of Ulamo would benefit less from the hajj.
13. (SBU) Even the head of the
Russian Orthodox Church agreed
that the hajj should be managed by religious organizations and
not the government. Although he
does not feel the Russian
Orthodox Church would be affected by the new law, as many of the
articles are in fact targeted againt Islam, he understands the
new law would negatively impact the Islamic community. However,
he cautioned that religious groups should not protest too much
and anger the government. Leaders
of Christian groups have
attempted to contact Islamic leaders, but sensed a lack of
interest on their part on cooperating as an ad hoc coalition.
DUSHANBE 00000834 003 OF 003
14. (SBU) COMMENT: Given the Council of Ulamo’s relationship
with the government, it is unlikely Islamic groups will unite in
a coalition with Christian organizations to make public
statements questioning the government.
Nevertheless, a number
of organizations are being proactive to voice their concerns to
the government. In the middle of
May, the OSCE in Dushanbe will
hold a roundtable to discuss the draft law and present its
analysis of the draft. This will
alert the government that the
international community is watching closely. At this time, we
judge it unlikely that, with all this attention, the draft law
will pass as is. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 62880
date: 5/4/2006 17:47
refid: 06DUSHANBE835
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE326|06DUSHANBE327|06DUSHANBE748|06DUSHANBE802
header:
VZCZCXRO4434
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0835/01 1241747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041747Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7421
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0089
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0048
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1599
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1578
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1575
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1530
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1532
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1522
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1403
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1349
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1564
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1135
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1600
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0922
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8647
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000835
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/P, EB
PLEASE PASS TO TDA
MANILA FOR ADB AMB. SPELTZ
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ENRG, AF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK DEPUTY PM OUTLINES VISION FOR HYDROPOWER SECTOR
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0326 B) DUSHANBE 0327 C) DUSHANBE 0748 D) DUSHANBE 0802
DUSHANBE 00000835 001.2 OF 003
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Although the Chinese have made the Tajiks an
offer too good to refuse on a South-North transmission line
project, according to Deputy Prime Minister Asadullo Ghulomov,
many energy projects remain for U.S. and other investors. AES’s
proposed project to build 220 kV transmission lines to the
Afghan border remains on track, but the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) has yet to finalize the funding — which appears to be the
key sticking point. Ghulomov
prefers that Tajik presentations
at the June Istanbul conference focus on mid-sized generation
and transmission projects and not rehabilitation of existing
facilities that will bring only small increases in output.
Dasti Zhum represents the first of three significant hydropower
projects he says will «tame the River Pyanzh» and bring energy
security to future generations in the region. He hinted that
the United States could take the lead on regional transmission
projects. END SUMMARY
3. (SBU) An exceptionally animated
Ghulomov spent more than 75
minutes May 5 explaining his vision for Tajikistan’s hydropower
sector. He confirmed press
reports that the Chinese would
finance and construct South-North (Dushanbe-Khujand) high
voltage lines, offering 95% financing through a 20-year loan
with a seven-year grace period. A
second high-voltage line
between Lolazor and Obi Mazor, west of Dushanbe, was included in
the package. Ghulomov noted the
Chinese deal was part of a
regional $900 million assistance package through the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.
Reluctant to call it absolutely
final, he reported the Chinese and Tajiks would sign the
agreement on June 15, and noted that while they welcomed any
investment in that project, no other donors or investors came
close to matching the Chinese terms.
AES ON TRACK
4. (SBU) Financing was the last
hurdle delaying the
government’s signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with
AES to construct 220 kV transmission lines, but Ghulomov
dismissed this as a technicality. «Signing an MOU, an agreement
or a contract, what does it matter?
We’ve agreed to do it and
are waiting for the ADB or another donor to figure out the
funding. » (NOTE: AES has been waiting for the Tajiks to sign an
MOU that would establish a joint venture to build the lines.
END NOTE.) Ghulomov looks
forward to meeting the AES CEO when
he visits Dushanbe at the end of May.
He also proposed AES
consider medium sized-generation projects.
TDA ISTANBUL CONFERENCE
5. (SBU) Ghulomov accepted the
invitation to the U.S.-sponsored
«Energy Without Borders» conference in June in Istanbul, but
observed the presentations the Trade and Development Agency
requested did not entirely match Tajikistan’s energy priorities.
Ghulomov saw no point
inpresenting the South-North transmission
lines project days before they would sign the agreement with the
Chinese. According to Ghulomov,
the Kairakkum rehabilitation
project would only bring a net gain of 12 MW to Tajikistan’s
energy supply. He stated that
rehabilitation projects were a
low priority.
6. (SBU) Instead, Ghulomov
proposed that after his overview
presentation, Energy Minister Yurov could outline projects in
DUSHANBE 00000835 002.2 OF 003
the upper Vakhsh, including Enurskaya hydropower station and
Garmskaya hydropower station, a 400 MW project. (NOTE: This is
the first time anyone in the Tajik government suggested
developing the upper Vakhsh river.
Most talk focuses on Rogun
and below, and Enurskaya does not appear in any of the previous
Ministry of Energy materials. END NOTE.)
Ghulomov suggested
state-run electric utility Barqi Tojik’s presentation focus on
high voltage lines, namely Rogun-Sangtuda to the Afghan border.
REGIONAL TRANSMISSION LINES NEEDED
7. (SBU) Changing topics,
Ghulomov explained that new
transmission lines to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan would help
Dushanbe break its dependence on Uzbekistan to transmit power to
northern Tajikistan, but noted it was a sensitive topic and not
yet a matter for public discussion.
He drew a map to show how a
transmission line from Kazakhstan to Datka, Kyrgyzstan, to
Khujand could supply Tajikistan’s Sughd region with 6.5 billion
kilowatts per hour per year.
8. (SBU) This power transmission
would supply reliable
electricity to Sughd, freeing Tajikistan to export electricity
from its southern grid. Currently
the Sughd electricity grid is
connected to the southern grid through 1500 km of 500KV
transmission line running through Uzbekistan. They would save
money on transit fees, he noted.
«And we would prevent
Uzbekistan from controlling us!» he added with a smile. He
commented on how a 220KV power transmission line exists between
Konibodom, Tajikistan, and Batken, Kyrgyzstan, but 22 km of this
line runs through Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan finds various reasons
to interrupt power transmission.
«We have good relations with
the Kyrgyz and the Kazakhs, but we need a catalyst to start this
(high voltage transmission line) project,» he commented.
However, he suggested several times that the United States could
play a regional role in establishing a transmission network.
DASTI ZHUM
9. (SBU) Ghulomov was pleased
that his trip with PolOff to the
Dasti Zhum site April 17 had made such an impression on the
visiting advisors from Embassy Kabul (reftel C). The 4000 MW
Dasti Zhum was the first of three large projects. Hydropower
stations at Roshan (3,000 MW) and Granite Gates (2,100 MW) would
also help tame River Pyanzh, he said.
PolOff emphasized that to
attract donors, Tajikistan and Afghanistan would need to take
some concrete steps to prove their cooperation before anyone
would consider funding even a feasibility study.
10. (SBU) Ghulomov could offer no
clarification on the status
of agreements between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. «The
Cooperative Agreement has been signed,» he argued. When posed
the question whether there were any outstanding agreements that
need to be signed before Tajikistan could export electricity
south, he paused and noted that a seven-member Afghan delegation
led by the deputy minister of power would be in Dushanbe May
21-22 to discuss further cooperation in the power transmission
and electricity issues.
(COMMENT: We are concerned that
Tajikistan and Afghanistan left on their own, without
international advisers present, will not necessarily do the
right things to move forward. We
suggest Embassy Kabul consider
the possibility of adding U.S. advisers to this Afghan
delegation. We will help on the
Tajik side to the fullest
extent possible. END COMMENT.)
11. (SBU) COMMENT: Ghulomov was unusually expansive, and kept
an Avian Flu assessment team from the WHO, UNICEF, FAO, and
World Bank waiting 45 minutes while he carefully explained his
vision to us. He seemed
enthusiastic about the Istanbul
DUSHANBE 00000835 003.2 OF 003
conference, but wanted to be sure the requested presentations
were in line with what Tajikistan needed and wanted to do.
Fortunately, he did not push mega-project Dasti Zhum as a topic
for Istanbul, but understood the need for concrete projects that
would attract U.S. investors and suppliers. He ran out of time
before talking about the goals of the Islamabad regional energy
meeting May 8-9, or the latest on RAO UES and Sangtuda, but
promised to meet again at the end of the month. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 62935
date: 5/5/2006 9:34
refid: 06DUSHANBE836
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE781|06DUSHANBE804|06DUSHANBE817
header:
VZCZCXRO5053
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0836/01 1250934
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050934Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7424
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1602
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1609
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1581
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1578
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1533
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1535
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1525
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1406
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1352
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1567
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1603
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1138
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0925
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8650
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000836
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, EAID, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: NDI IN
WASHINGTON WANTS SHOWDOWN MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT RAHMONOV
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0817 B) DUSHANBE 0804 C) DUSHANBE 0781
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) National Democratic
Institute (NDI) President Ken
Wallach and the Ambassador spoke by telephone May 5. Wallach
thanked the Ambassador and Embassy Dushanbe for continuous
support and advocacy for NDI.
