id: 238371
date: 12/7/2009 9:17
refid: 09SKOPJE589
origin: Embassy Skopje
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9160
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHSQ #0589/01 3410917
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 070917Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 8732
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0574
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
SKOPJE 000589
SIPDIS
FOR G/TIP, EUR/PGI, EUR/SCE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM,
PBTS, SMIG, SOCI, ELAB, TI, KS, SR,
GR, MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: NEW TIP
COMBATING AND PREVENTION
ACTIVITIES
SKOPJE 00000589 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary: Macedonia
has continued to refine its
victim protection and TIP
prevention activities and is
attending to the
shortcomings identified in its established
TIP infrastructure. Partnering with the international
community, the government
has begun expansive training
projects focused on the
continued dissemination of the
nation’s Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and addressing
the nation’s changing TIP
atmosphere. The government has
also extended its efforts to
root out corruption where it
increases Macedonia’s
vulnerability to human trafficking, and
has continued to assume more
direct financial responsibility
for TIP victim
protection. Macedonia has broadened its
efforts to improve TIP
awareness and high-ranking Macedonian
officials have continued to
demonstrate their commitment to
fighting TIP through
domestic and international engagement.
In June, a TIP NGO, working
with GoM support, received a
major international award
for its work. (End Summary)
———————————————
————
Building Capacity and
Strengthening Victim Identification
———————————————
————
2. (SBU) The success
Macedonia has achieved in eliminating
traditional forms of
trafficking in recent years has allowed
the government to focus on
programs that maximize TIP
awareness and victim
identification capabilities, as well as
to re-focus some energy on
uncovering the more discreet
victim profiles and more
subtle forms of trafficking that
have emerged as a result of
that success. One important goal
for Macedonia this year is
to increase national capacities to
expose and eradicate
potential labor trafficking crimes. To
address this, the Ministry
of Labor and OSCE have begun a
series of four three-day
workshops focused on training more
than 120 labor
inspectors. The trainings are designed
to
help the inspectors identify
the less obvious indicators of
labor trafficking and
educate them on appropriate procedures
for investigating and
reporting those crimes through the
National Referral Mechanism
(NRM). The OSCE reported that
the new Director of the
State Labor Inspectorate has shown
enthusiasm for these
trainings and has been an advocate for
the participation and
education of the labor inspectors.
3. (SBU) In a separate
project, utilizing Macedonia’s EU
Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA) funds, the IOM
and the Ministry of Interior
have begun a five week intensive
training aimed at improving
the understanding and consistent
implementation of the SOPs
in victim identification by
front-line law enforcement
officials. Eight two-day seminars
will be conducted to train
250 local police and border police
throughout the country. The
trainings will include a special
focus on identifying the
new, more discreet victim profile
and adapting police methods
to the changing modus operandi of
traffickers that have
emerged due to Macedonia’s vigorous
crackdown on human
trafficking over the past three years.
Those trainings will be
followed by a specialized training
for prosecutors, members of
the Ministry of Interior’s
Anti-Human Trafficking Unit,
and the office of the NRM to
ensure proper and efficient
coordination between local
authorities and central
government authorities. These
trainings specifically
address recommendations from the
international community that
Macedonia seek to more
thoroughly implement the
SOPs at regional levels.
——————-
Fighting Corruption
——————-
4. (SBU) Due to the rise in
human smuggling cases transiting
through Macedonia in the
last couple of years, law
enforcement officials have
increased their efforts to root
out any corruption that
makes Macedonia more vulnerable to
organized international
human smuggling and trafficking
networks. On July 1, 13 people in Macedonia, including
one
senior MOI police officer,
were arrested and charged with
human smuggling for the
smuggling of Asian migrants from
Serbia, through Macedonia,
to Greece. Operation «Kanis»
(as
the case has been dubbed)
was coordinated in cooperation with
Serbian officials through
the SECI center.
5. (SBU) Separately,
beginning on August 25, the Organized
Crime Unit began arresting
border police and customs officers
in operation
«Boomerang» for allegedly taking and/or
soliciting bribes at border
entry points. To date, 92
officers have been arrested
and an additional 52 officers are
still being
investigated. There is no evidence
connecting
these bribes to smuggling or
TIP crimes, but Macedonian
authorities consider
«Boomerang» a significant win in
securing the borders against
vulnerabilities to international
SKOPJE 00000589 002.2 OF 002
smuggling and trafficking
crimes.
———————————————
—
Government Funding of TIP
Combating Activities
———————————————
—
6. (SBU) For the first time,
the new National Action Plan
(NAP) for combating
trafficking, formally adopted by the
government earlier this
year, included detailed funding
responsibilities. Previously the NAP only detailed
Macedonia,s specific TIP
combating goals and objectives but
did not define specific
funding sources to achieve those
goals. Therefore, where ambiguity existed, the
ministries
tended to pass the buck and
some activities went unfunded.
Now, every one of the goals
and objectives in the NAP
includes a funding directive
that defines which ministries
are responsible for funding
that specific activity. This
change will make budget
allocations easier and compel
ministerial accountability
for TIP combating
responsibilities. This year the GoM also completed the
process of taking over full
financial responsibility for the
office of the NRM. (Note: The NRM was previously working
within the Ministry of Labor
and Social Policy but its
employees and activities
were mostly funded by the OSCE. End
Note) In addition, the government has finally
settled on an
appropriate building for the
new government-run shelter for
domestic victims of
trafficking and— in conjunction with the
two NGOs that will run the
shelter— is developing plans to
get the shelter fully
operational. The government’s Agency
of Youth and Sports also granted
the NGO OpenGate direct
government funding to
continue TIP prevention lectures to
youth around the country.
——————————————
On-going Efforts to Elevate
TIP Awareness
——————————————
7. (U) Seeking to address
client demand for trafficking
victims, the National
Anti-Trafficking Commission (NC) has
translated the IOM’s
«Buy Responsibly» demand reduction
awareness campaign into
Macedonian and will be broadcasting
the campaign over the state
television network. On October
18, EU Anti-trafficking day,
the National Commission
distributed anti-trafficking
flyers and brochures in Skopje’s
two largest shopping
centers. The NC is in the process of
organizing nationwide TIP
awareness campaigns and prevention
activities for its annual
National Anti-Trafficking week,
which will be held again in
December.
—————————
International Coordination
—————————
8. (SBU) In addition to the
domestic awareness activities
conducted on EU
Anti-Trafficking day, the Macedonian
Ministers of Interior and
Justice attended a TIP conference
in Brussels. Both delivered speeches on the continued
importance of combating
trafficking throughout Europe.
Through a post nomination,
the Minister of the Interior and
Director of the NGO OpenGate
have been selected to attend the
State Department’s «The
Courage to Lead: Women World Leader’s
Summit» in Geneva,
Switzerland in December for their efforts
and success in fighting TIP
in Macedonia. In September,
senior officials from the
National Anti-trafficking
Commission had an extensive
meeting with the Deputy Minister
of Justice and Deputy
General Prosecutor of Tajikistan on
best practices for combating
TIP. The Tajik officials sought
advice from Macedonia on
ways they could implement effective
anti-TIP programs in their
own country.
———————————————
Macedonian NGO Wins Major
International Award
———————————————
9. (U) In June, the
Macedonian TIP NGO OpenGate received the
2009 ERSTE Foundation Award
for Social Integration for their
Child Trafficking Prevention
Campaign. OpenGate’s project
included visits to almost 50
schools in the highest risk
areas of Macedonia, reaching
approximately 3000 students from
ages 11-18 and more than 60
teachers to educate them on the
threats of human
trafficking. The NGO’s project was
awarded
first prize out of 1,300
projects from eight different
countries. The prize included a 40,000 EURO award for
future
project funding.
NAVRATIL
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 238820
date: 12/9/2009 11:03
refid: 09DUSHANBE1394
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 09STATE97228
header:
VZCZCXRO1289
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI
RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1394/01 3431103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091103Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
1013
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON
DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2180
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07
DUSHANBE 001394
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BUHLER),
SCT, EEB
JUSTICE FOR (DUCOT AND
NEWCOMBE), AFMLS, OIA, OPDAT
TREASURY FOR FINCEN
DEFENSE FOR OSD/P
DEPT OF JUSTICE FOR ICITAP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCRM, EFIN, KTFN,
SNAR, KJUS, PGOV, PREL, RF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:
2009-2010 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
STRATEGY REPORT, PART 1
REF: STATE 097228
DUSHANBE 00001394 001.2 OF 007
I. Summary
1. (U) Other than
geographically limited and small-scale hashish
cultivation, Tajikistan is
not a producer of illicit narcotics.
It is a major transit
country. Significant amounts of
opium/heroin are trafficked
north from the 1344-km Tajik-Afghan
border along the established
land-based routes and then onward
through Central Asia to
Russia. There is some evidence of
trafficking in Afghan
opiates to and through China, but the
United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Dushanbe
reports that the vast bulk
of Afghan opiates transiting
Tajikistan are consumed
within the Russian Federation. The
Tajik Drug Control Agency is
operating an INL-funded Drug
Liaison Office in Taloqan,
northern Afghanistan, which has been
instrumental in several
significant drug seizures. Internally,
Tajikistan’s law enforcement
and security services coordinate
some investigative and
enforcement activities with each other,
but the coordination is
inconsistent and of undetermined
effectiveness.
2. (U) The Government of
Tajikistan implements counternarcotics
activities. In the past, Tajikistan’s seizures of Afghan
opiates have exceeded all
other Central Asian states combined.
In the first nine months of
2009, Tajikistan’s seizures remained
high, compared to its
Central Asian neighbors, but the amount
decreased. Tajik law enforcement makes arrests and
seizures in
mid- to low-level cases and
Tajik cities are generally free of
drug-related street
crimes. The Tajik enforcement
authorities,
however, apparently are
unwilling to target major traffickers.
Tajikistan is a party to the
1988 United Nations Drug Convention
and the United Nations
Convention against Corruption.
II Status of the Country
3. (U) Geography and
economics make Tajikistan an attractive
transit route for illegal
narcotics. The Pyanj River, which
becomes the Amu Darya after
joining with the Vakhsh, forms most
of Tajikistan’s 1344 km
border with Afghanistan. It is thinly
guarded and difficult to
patrol. Traffickers can easily cross
the border at numerous
points without inspection.
4. (U) Tajikistan’s
legitimate economic opportunities are
limited. The recent economic and financial crisis has
hit
Tajikistan hard. Before the crisis, about one million Tajiks
worked outside Tajikistan,
many in construction in Russia.
Since the crisis, some have
returned home and are largely
jobless. Remittances have fallen 34 percent from 2008
levels.
5. (U) Even in normal
economic times, Tajikistan’s economic
growth possibilities are
limited by aging infrastructure and
power shortages and
complicated by the fact that its major
export routes transit
neighboring Uzbekistan, an unfriendly and
uncooperative neighbor. The U.S.-built bridge at Nijniy Pyanj
provides a new route for
trade through Afghanistan, but the
level of legitimate commerce
so far generated does not
contribute significantly to
Tajikistan’s economy.
III Country Actions against
Drugs.
Policy Initiatives
DUSHANBE 00001394 002.2 OF 007
6. (U) The government has
made significant legal reforms, but
for the most part these
reforms are not directly related to
narcotics trafficking. On December 3, Tajik President Emomali
Rahmon signed into law a new
Criminal Procedure Code. The new
Criminal Procedure Code
contains significant changes designed to
improve the fairness, and
effectiveness of the criminal justice
system. It will transfer the power of issuing arrest,
search
and wiretapping warrants
from prosecutors to the judiciary. If
the President signs the law
as expected, the Criminal Procedure
Code will take effect April
1, 2010.
7. (U) The first Tajik
Ombudsman was appointed by President
Rahmon in May 2009. The Ombudsman is charged with conducting an
independent review of claims
against government officials and
agencies. The Ombudsman is a well regarded official who
enjoys
close contacts with the
President. His ability to address
systemic issues has not yet
been tested. The institution will
be comprised of
political-economical, socioeconomic-cultural and
administrative departments
and will employ 17 specialists and 15
administrative staff. The Tajik Government provided the
Ombudsman with a building in
good condition and allocated about
$80,000 for its 2009
operation.
8. (U) President Rahmon
established a National Legislative
Center in March of
2009. The goal of the Center is to
eliminate
contradictions in laws,
improve the quality of new laws, and
bring Tajik legislation into
compliance with international
treaties signed by
Tajikistan. President Rahmon appointed
Mahmad Zabirovich Rahimov,
Member of Parliament, as the Director
of the National Legislative
Center. During the Soviet era, Mr.
Rahimov was the Head of the
Department of Commercial Law at the
National University. INL Dushanbe has developed a Justice
Sector project to assist
training lawyers who will work in the
Center.
Law Enforcement Efforts
9. (U) The data below, provided by the Tajik
Drug Control
Agency, shows the narcotics
seizures by the Tajik law
enforcement and security
services during the first 9 months of
2009 compared with the same
period of 2008:
Ministry of Internal
Affairs:
Heroin (kg) 2008:
751 2009: 402
Opium (kg) 2008:
411 2009: 272
Cannabis (kg) 2008:
821 2009: 1236
Total MVD (kg) 2008: 1983 2009: 1910
Drug Control Agency:
Heroin (kg) 2008:
307 2009: 303
Opium (kg) 2008:
487 2009: 143
Cannabis (kg) 2008:
358 2009: 299
Total DCA (kg) 2008: 1152 2009: 745
Border Guards:
DUSHANBE 00001394 003.2 OF 007
Heroin (kg) 2008:
111 2009: 138
Opium (kg) 2008:
241 2009: 207
Cannabis (kg) 2008:
649 2009: 552
Total BG (kg) 2008: 1001 2009: 897
Committee for National
Security:
Heroin (kg) 2008: 200 2009:
19
Opium (kg) 2008: 468 2009:
21
Cannabis (kg) 2008: 121 2009: 134
Total KNB (kg) 2008: 789 2009: 174
Customs Service
Heroin (kg) 2008: 81 2009: 100
Opium (kg) 2008: 01 2009: 9
Cannabis (kg) 2008: 09 2009: 4
Total CS (kg) 2008: 90 2009: 113
Total:
Heroin (kg) 2008: 1450 2009:
962
Opium (kg) 2008: 1607 2009:
652
Cannabis (kg) 2008: 1958 2009: 2225
Total (kg)- 2008: 5015 2009: 3839
10. (U) In the first nine
months of this year, the DCA seized
over 744 kilos of illicit
drugs. The DCA participated in four
joint operations with the
Border Guards. These operations were
successful in seizing 76
kilos of illicit narcotics, to include
eleven kilos of heroin,
twelve kilos of raw opium and 53 kilos
of cannabis. The DCA
instituted 110 criminal proceedings.
11. (U) The Border Guards
are the first line of defense against
contraband trafficking along
the Tajik-Afghan border. They
seized 897 kilos of drugs
during the first nine months of 2009,
which is a 10.4 percent
decrease over the same period of last
year. They destroyed over a million wild hemp
plants. In the
first nine months of 2009,
the border guards have registered 199
illegal border crossings,
have arrested 7 drug dealers which
included leaders of large
transnational drug groups. Also, the
border guards detained 831
persons presenting fraudulent travel
documents, and recovered 46
firearms, including 26 submachine
guns, 13 carbines, 1
machine-gun, and more than 1600 rounds of
ammunition.
Corruption
12. (U) Corruption is
endemic. Salaries of civil servants,
including law enforcement
officers, are abysmally low. Under
these circumstances, many
civil servants look to increase income
by charging for services
that should be free, or accepting or
demanding money to overlook
violations of the law. Although
DUSHANBE 00001394 004.2 OF 007
there are institutions to
investigate corruption, there are no
measures in place to change
the conditions that give rise to
corruption.
13. (U) Over the first nine
months of 2009, the State Financial
Control and Anti Corruption
Agency has detected 677
corruption-related
crimes. Criminal proceedings have been
instituted against more than
122 employees of the public
management system, law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, the
Counternarcotics Agency, the
Ministry of Defense, land
management and architecture
bodies. These officials are charged
with bribery, abuse of
office and embezzlement of state funds.
Several of these cases have
been tried and convictions obtained.
14. (U) The State Financial Control and Anti
Corruption Agency
conducted 892 inspections at
state-run economic entities and
other federally funded
organizations. Overall, 666 officials
and managers have been
implicated in wrongdoing, and
disciplinary and
administrative actions have been imposed upon
them, including 28
dismissals. Additionally, inspections of
the
activities of 69 private
companies revealed tax evasion cases,
totaling more than 11.8
million Somoni.
Agreements and Treaties
15. (U) Tajikistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention,
the 1961 UN Single
Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol,
and the 1972 UN Convention
on Psychotropic Substances.
Tajikistan is also a party
to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized
Crime and its protocols against migrant
smuggling and trafficking in
persons.
Cultivation/Production
16. (U) In a recent address to the donor
community, DCA Head
General Rustam Nazarov
stated that small-scale hashish
cultivation was taking place
in the Khatlon region of
Tajikistan. However, this problem is insignificant when
compared to the opiates
flowing north from Afghanistan.
Drug Flow/Transit
17. (U) The latest UNODC estimates indicate that
about fifty
tons of narcotics are
smuggled into — and out of — Tajikistan
each year. Domestic production is small, and domestic
use is
insignificant compared to
the transit volume. Most smuggled
narcotics continue on
through Central Asia and into Russia,
where it is consumed.
18. (U) The quantity of Afghan opiates crossing
into
Tajikistan, transiting
through the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region (GBAO) and
entering western China remains
undetermined. DCA officials in Khorogh claim that the
Mobile
Patrols in the area are
deterring large scale smuggling. Lack
of verifiable intelligence
and actual seizures in that region
make it difficult to assess
the extent of this problem. We are
addressing this by
supporting DCA enforcement activities in this
region (see paragraph 26).
DUSHANBE 00001394 005.2 OF 007
19. (U) The amount of precursor chemicals used in
Afghan heroin
production coming from both
western China to Afghanistan and via
rail from the Russian
Federation is unknown. While the U.S.
and
other donors assist Tajik
authorities in addressing both of
these precursor routes,
successful interdiction has been very
minimal. Existing trade agreements allow sealed rail
containers
to move uninspected from
Russia to Afghanistan. Since there had
been no precursor seizures
it is difficult to determine the
exact extent of the problem.
The GBAO region is of particular
concern due to minimal
police presence in the region and
deficient customs
inspections at the Kulma pass. DCA
Mobile
Interdiction Teams are not
set up to inspect cargo trucks for
mismarked/illegal cargo,
particularly since narcotics sniffing
dogs are not trained to
detain precursor chemicals. Ultimately,
Tajik customs officials are
going to be the key to obtaining
seizures of precursors.
Domestic Programs/Demand
Reduction
20. (U) The U.S. Embassy conducts drug demand
reduction
projects to complement other
U.S. counternarcotics initiatives.
The projects target high
school students to promote a healthy
and drug-free lifestyle and
are popular and well received. In
October 2009 the U.S.
Embassy International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Office jointly
with the Bodybuilding and Fitness
Federation of Tajikistan
organized the Body Building
Championship dedicated to
drug demand reduction and promoting a
healthy lifestyle among
young people in Tajikistan.
21. (U) The Drug Control Agency continued to
expand and develop
initiatives to increase drug
awareness, primarily among school
children. In June 2009 the Drug Control Agency held
drug demand
reduction events in five
summer camps in the Varzob district.
The DCA also held similar
events in all regions of the country.
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives
and Programs.
Bilateral Cooperation
22. (U) On May 5, 2009, the U.S. Embassy signed
the Amendment
to the Letter of Agreement
on cooperation on narcotics control
and law enforcement issues
dated January 27, 2003. This
amendment provides
$9,426,000 in additional assistance for
narcotics control, law
enforcement, and justice sector reform.
With this assistance, the
International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement program has
provided more than $37 million in
assistance to support
Tajikistan’s security, rule of law and
counter narcotics efforts
since 1992.
23. (U) The U.S. Embassy INL Office in Dushanbe
signed a
co-financing agreement for $1,600,000 with the Asian
Development Bank for the
reconstruction of the Kulma and
Kizil-Art border crossing
posts. This reconstruction will
provide better living and
working conditions to the Border
Guards, Customs Service and
other agencies working at these
posts. This is expected to lead to improved border
control.
This joint project funds the
construction of better facilities
than either the United
States or the Bank could fund separately.
24. (U) The bilateral relationship in
counter-narcotics and law
enforcement is sound but the
U.S. Embassy continues to press for
more direct operational and
investigative cooperation.
Cooperation in justice
sector reform is continuing and has led
DUSHANBE 00001394 006.2 OF 007
to progress in prosecutorial
development and international law
projects.
25. (U) The International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Office
in the U.S. Embassy in
Tajikistan is headed by a full-time
International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement officer. She is
assisted by a Police
Advisor, a Supervisory Program Manager, a
Rule of Law Program Manager,
Program Managers for Border
Security and Policing
including Community Policing (1207), and a
Construction Engineer. The ICITAP Senior Law Enforcement
Advisor departed Post in
April 2009 and a new Law Enforcement
Advisor is to arrive at Post
early next year.
26. (U) In supporting the many programs directly
implemented by
INL, the U.S. Embassy uses
the UNODC as an implementer in
supporting the Drug Control
Agency; the International
Organization for Migration
for implementation of Trafficking in
Persons programs; the
American Bar Association to implement rule
of law programs; and local
non-governmental organizations for
implementation of justice
programs. The INL section also
implements programs
directly.
27. (U) The INL Office provides financial support
to the Drug
Control Agency Mobile Team
in GBAO. The INL staff will
provide technical advice and
will monitor the implementation of
the project. The goal of the project is to expand
professional,
technical and infrastructure
capacity of the DCA to detect,
investigate, interdict and
report the illegal movement of
narcotics, including
pre-cursor chemicals, in the GBAO region of
Tajikistan.
28. (U) Effective narcotics interdiction requires
cross-border
cooperation and information
sharing. Since 2007, the Drug
Control Agency implemented
an INL-funded pilot project with the
U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to create an office
in the Taloqan, northern
Afghanistan. The DEA Dushanbe Office
is responsible for providing
operational support in reference to
monitoring/ supervising
operational case development, and
confidential source
recruitment and management. UNODC, our
implementing agency,
provides support to the Taloqan office for
administrative managements
like payment of salaries, building
operating expenses,
provision of equipment, vehicle expenses,
and provision of expert
training in intelligence-led policing.
INL staff will provide
technical advice and will monitor the
implementation of the
project.
29. (U) The U.S. Embassy’s Border and Law
Enforcement Working
Group (BLEWG) coordinates
all USG assistance on counternarcotics
and border assistance. Donor countries and organizations
coordinate assistance
through the monthly meeting of the Border
International Group
(BIG). The U.S. is renovating the
Ministry
of Internal Affairs Academy,
and an embedded U.S. advisor, a
retired NYPD officer,
provides information and assistance
concerning curriculum
development and teaching methodology.
30. (U) The U.S. Embassy created the biweekly
Development
Assistance Working Group
(DAWG), which addresses all aspects of
USG assistance in Tajikistan
not covered by the BLEWG. As a
major implementer of USG
assistance programs INL is a member of
the DAWG.
Road Ahead
DUSHANBE 00001394 007.2 OF 007
31. (U) The U.S. Embassy INL Office works to
improve the
justice sector to ensure
individuals who commit crimes are
prosecuted and convicted in
a manner consistent with
international human rights
standards; provide access to justice
for the poor, underserved,
and disadvantaged; support the
development and unification
of the defense bar; combat extremism
in the legal training of
religious leaders; improve the criminal
code and its implementation;
combat crimes of trafficking, money
laundering and corruption;
and strive to reduce illegal drug
demand.
32. (U) INL closely
coordinates its programs within the Embassy,
the Government of
Tajikistan, and the international community
including the European
Union, the United Nations, and the
Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe. The
long-term elements include
building and renovating border posts
along the Afghan border;
installing communications and
counter-narcotics
interdiction equipment; and improving the
infrastructure, curricula,
and methodology of the law
enforcement training
academies.
33. (U) Program sustainability is an overarching
concern and
consideration. USG assistance in Tajikistan cannot be seen
as
open ended. However, it is unlikely that the Government
of
Tajikistan will take on the
costs of sustaining follow-on to INL
programs in the near
future. Upcoming assistance projects
proposals must be developed
with this fact in mind.
V. Statistical Tables
32. Drug Crop Cultivation:
N/A
VI. Chemical Control
Precursors
33. (U) No statistics on
2009 seizures of precursor chemicals
were provided. There was one seizure reported in 2008.
34. The point of contact for the INCSR report in
the U.S.
Embassy Dushanbe is Anne
Carson, INL Officer, email:
[email protected] .
End report.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 239025
date: 12/10/2009 10:27
refid: 09DUSHANBE1398
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination:
08DUSHANBE591|09STATE86558
header:
VZCZCXRO2370
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1398 3441027
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 101027Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 1022
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 2190
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001398
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
AND S/GC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PTER,
KDRG, TI
SUBJECT: ACCESS TO FORMER
GUANTANAMO DETAINEE RAHMIDDIN SHARIPOV (ISN
076)
REF: (A) STATE 86558 (B)
2008 DUSHANBE 591
CLASSIFIED BY: NECIA L.
QUAST, Charge’ d Affairs, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Per Reftel A request,
on December 9, 2009, emboff visited
Rahmiddin Sharipov in the
Ministry of Justice pre-trial
detention facility in
Dushanbe where he is now held. The
meeting took place in an
office of the administration of the
detention facility, with two
officers of the facility present.
2. (C) In response to
emboff’s questions, Sharipov said he
received the same treatment
as other prisoners, did not have
health problems, and was
able to pray and otherwise practice his
religion while in
prison. He said he did not experience
abuse
from prison authorities or
other prisoners. Sharipov said he
was able to communicate with
his family by mail. His parents
visited him once a year; the
infrequency of their visits was due
to distance and expense of
travel, as they lived in Isfara in
northern Tajikistan, he
said. Sharipov asked whether he could
serve his sentence at a
prison closer to his family. In
response to emboff’s
question, he said his parents and other
family members experienced
no problems with or pressure from
authorities in connection
with Sharipov’s detention at
Guantanamo Bay, or his
conviction by Tajik authorities for
illegal border crossing and
for service with the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan.
3. (C) Embassy conveyed
reftel request to visit Sharipov to the
Government of Tajikistan in
August, 2009. According to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the lengthy delay in visiting
Sharipov was because
authorities moved him from a regular
prison, where he was serving
a 17 year sentence, to pre-trial
detention after having
committed a crime while in prison. The
process of obtaining
approvals to visit Sharipov in pre-trial
detention was lengthy and
confusing for all concerned.
4. (C) Emboff asked Sharipov
what had happened in prison that
had caused his return to
pre-trial detention. He replied that
he had tried to escape from
prison, because he «did not agree»
with his earlier conviction
for illegal border crossing and for
having served with the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
5. (C) Comment: Sharipov did
not bear any visible marks of
abuse, appeared to be in
good health, and was animated during
the meeting. He said his current imprisonment was
«illegal»
because he had done nothing
wrong in the first place, and he
wished to be in contact with
an American lawyer he had known at
Guantanamo named
«Matthew O’Hara.» He said he
was «deceived»
into going to Afghanistan,
believing it was some sort of
military service in
Tajikistan, traveled to Tavildara (in
central Tajikistan) and from
there went by helicopter to
Afghanistan in January
2001. He spent some time in Mazar e
Sharif, where Abdul Rashid
Dostum’s forces captured him and
«sold» him to
American forces. Sharipov declined to
say who had
helped him move to
Afghanistan. As in his meeting last year
with emboff (Reftel B),
Sharipov asked that his five years of
detention at Guantanamo
count in his current 17 year sentence in
Tajikistan. He did not exhibit fear of his captors in
emboff’s
presence, was open with his
complaints, but casually agreed that
his actual conditions of
confinement were reasonable in the
context of Tajikistan and no
different from those of other
prisoners. He referred to his detention at Guantanamo as
«a
sanatorium.» End Comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 239259
date: 12/11/2009 4:09
refid: 09DUSHANBE1410
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 09STATE118797
header:
VZCZCXRO3228
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1410 3450409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110409Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
1024
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2212
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001410
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, KBCT, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN
RESPONSE: 2010 NTE CHAPTER ON THE ARAB LEAGUE
TRADE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL
REF: STATE 118797
1. (U) The Arab League Trade
Boycott of Israel does not appear
to have any impact on U.S.
firms or products in Tajikistan
(reftel). Very few U.S. products are on the market in
Tajikistan, but this is due
to the distance and small size of
the market. The government of Tajikistan has not made any
public calls to support the
Arab League trade boycott of Israel.
On the contrary the government has made
efforts to court
Israeli investment, although
to post’s knowledge there are not
yet any major business ties
between the two countries.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 239629
date: 12/14/2009 7:08
refid: 09USOSCE276
origin: Mission USOSCE
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE1364
header:
VZCZCXRO4968
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0276/01 3480708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140708Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 6757
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0103
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO
OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR
SECURITY IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
PRIORITY 0140
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
PRIORITY 0352
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
PRIORITY 0080
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 USOSCE 000276
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KG, KZ,
TI, LH
SUBJECT: DAS KROL MEETS WITH
TAJIK AND KYRGYZ FOREIGN
MINISTERS AND LITHUANIAN POL
DIRECTOR IN ATHENS
REF: DUSHANBE 1364
USOSCE 00000276 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge
d’Affaires Carol S. Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).
SUMMARY
————
1. (C) In a series of
meetings on the margins of the OSCE
Ministerial Council in
Athens on December 1, SCA DAS George
Krol met with the Foreign
Ministers of Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan as well as the
Political Director from the
Lithuanian MFA ahead of
Lithuania’s 2011 Chairmanship of the
OSCE. Tajik FM largely complained about Uzbek
behavior in
withdrawing from the power
grid while the Kyrgyz FM pushed
for the Bishkek Initiative
to play a role in addressing
Afghanistan issues. The Lithuanian Political Director
offered insights into
dealing with Kazakhstan as it embarks
on its Chairmanship of the
OSCE. End summary.
MEETING WITH TAJIK FOREIGN
MINISTER
————————————
2. (C) At the outset, Tajik
Foreign Minister Hamrohon Zarifi
raised Uzbekistan’s
withdrawal from the Central Asia Power
grid, which he said
Uzbekistan did before winter as a
calculated political
move. He said no one, including
President Karimov, knows
about the large number of
electro-transmission lines
in Tajikistan and at this rate,
Tajikistan would be
completely using its own power stations
by May. «We will suffer this winter, and the
summer will
also be bad.» Zarifi said that Tajikistan informed
Turkmenistan about limits to
the summer water flow, but that
«no one will be able to
convince President Karimov, it is not
logical.» He said the Tajik President was tired of
trying to
explain things to Karimov and
asked the U.S. to speak to the
Uzbeks about the ‘real
situation.’
3. (C) DAS Krol told Zarifi
he discussed Uzbekistan leaving
the power grid with both
Uzbeks and Turkmen on a recent visit
to the region. He said Uzbek officials told him the
situation «had been
developing» and Uzbekistan felt it had to
remove itself from the
electrical grid because it was
damaging their system (Ref
A). DAS Krol said Uzbek officials
claimed the situation was
not permanent and there would be
developments to resolve
it. He also told Zarifi that Turkmen
President Berdimukhamidov
was sympathetic but realized the
situation depended on
Turkmenistan’s relationship with
Uzbekistan. Krol said the U.S. would have further talks
with
Uzbekistan’s senior
leadership on the matter.
4. (C) DAS Krol told Zarifi
the U.S. looked forward to
developing bilateral
consultations with Tajikistan and added
that in the first part of
next year, the U.S. may try to
bring a delegation to
Dushanbe; he stressed, however, that
there would need to be a
clear agenda ahead of time. On
upcoming elections, Krol
said he hoped the government
welcomed the participation
of election observers.
5. (C) Zarifi asked for the
U.S. to fully engage in supplying
goods under the ‘new
agreement’ and said Tajikistan will have
more capacity to assist, in
terms of infrastructure, from
their airport, in the
transmission of non-military goods to
Afghanistan. He also asked for help in eliminating
anti-personnel mines on the
border with Uzbekistan, which he
said Uzbekistan did not want
to recognize. Zarifi said
Tajikistan would like to
construct a new bridge for which it
needs serious support in
constructing a transmission line
through Afghanistan to
Pakistan. He added that Tajikistan
also needed help with its
minorities — as all their schools
had closed.
MEETING WITH KYRGYZ FOREIGN
MINISTER
————————————
6. (C) In his meeting with
Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek
Sarbaev, the FM repeatedly
emphasized Kyrgyz concerns that
the U.S. was preparing to
exit Afghanistan within the next
three to five years. He said it was essential to put stable
and peaceful Afghan
structures in place before a departure or
the U.S. would leave behind
an unruly, lawless state. He
said President Obama’s plan
to increase troop strength in
Afghanistan was the correct
decision, but also noted that
solving the Afghan problem
was not only a question of having
military forces in place.
THE BISHKEK INITIATIVE
———————-
7. (C) Sarbaev stressed the Bishkek Initiative as a
powerful
USOSCE 00000276 002.2 OF 002
tool towards that end and
said there were Taliban groups
watching the initiative’s
progress, groups that were
interested in coming to the
table for dialogue. DAS Krol
asked Sarbaev whether he had
discussed the Bishkek Initiative
with either the Uzbeks or
Kazakhs in light of their thoughts
on discussions about
Afghanistan. Sarbaev replied that the
Bishkek Initiative was not
in competition with other
proposals. However, he noted that the Uzbek stance on
bilateral talks (vice
multilateral) was not a good approach.
On the other hand, he felt
that the Kazakh chairmanship of
the OSCE next year would
help make Afghanistan one of the key
OSCE issues in 2010.
8. (C) Asked about Chinese
opinion on Afghanistan, Sarbaev
said the Chinese were being
cagey while they study the
proposals at hand. In his opinion, China will inevitably
become involved — economic
interests in the areas are too
large for them not to do
so. He said small indications of
such future Chinese
involvement were already becoming evident
through articles in Chinese
press, and beyond.
MEETING WITH LITHUANIAN POLITICAL
DIRECTOR
——————————————
9. (C) In DAS Krol’s meeting
with Lithuanian MFA Political
Director Eitvydas Bajarunas
and Ambassador at Large Rytis
Paulauskas, the conversation
largely focused on best ways for
Lithuania to work with and
manage Kazakhstan in the EU Troika
in the next two years. Calling Foreign Minister Saudabayev a
«night and day»
difference from former Kazakhstani Foreign
Minister Tazhin, Bajarunas
said the new state of affairs was
«quite depressing.» In contrast to Saudabayev, Bajarunas
said Tazhin was open minded,
open to suggestion, would not
hesitate to accept our
ideas, and was accepting of the Human
Dimension. He said Tazhin was also open to the OSCE
working
in Afghanistan, but he
feared Saudabayev was less so.
10. (C) Bajarunas said the
first real test of the Kazakhstani
chairmanship would be seen
in Kazakhstan’s reaction to the
approaching elections in
Ukraine. The second test will be
the Geneva Talks and
preserving the OSCE’s role in the
discussions. Bajarunas said we will need to press
Kazakhstan
to be more creative on
Georgia. On OSCE involvement in
Afghanistan, Bajarunas said
Lithuania would be quite
enthusiastic if Kazakhstan
were to do something; especially
to combat the major drug
trafficking coming out of Central
Asia.
11. (C) Paulauskas said
Lithuanian was looking for the best
method of working with the
Kazakhstanis in the OSCE Troika
and developed an
understanding that Kazakhstan reacted badly
to anyone «trying to
teach them.» While Kazakhstan very
much
wants to be (and wants to
appear to be) independent of the
Russian Federation,
Bajarunas pointed out that the
Kazakhstani Ambassador to
the OSCE told him how much better
he understood the Corfu Process
after receiving a briefing
from Russian diplomats. He also said there was concern that
Kazakhstan may use its year
as Chair to try to downsize some
of the OSCE missions in
Central Asia; therefore, we will need
continued engagement by the
big powers, he said.
12. (C) In closing,
Bajarunas said the Lithuanians «want to
continue to share their
knowledge about Kazakhstan,» but
added that because Lithuania
is not well positioned in
Central Asia, the GOL would
greatly appreciate U.S. briefings
in Vienna on the situation
in Central Asia. DAS Krol assured
of our willingness to do so
and said Lithuanian Embassy
officials in Washington were
also welcomed to visit SCA.
FULLER
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 239930
date: 12/15/2009 12:17
refid: 09DUSHANBE1427
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
09DUSHANBE1016|09DUSHANBE1211
header:
VZCZCXRO6415
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1427/01 3491217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151217Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
1036
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB FL
RUZFMXI/CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL
CELL SCOTT AFB IL
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2238
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001427
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DS/IP/SCA,
DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA, S/CT
CENTCOM FOR J5, SOCCENT J3,
SOCCENT CEG
DIA FOR DHO-2
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: JIHAD DECLARED
AGAINST OMON
REF: A: DUSHANBE 1016; B:
DUSHANBE 1211
CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth
Gross, Ambassador, Exec, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: OMON (Militia Special Purpose Detachment)
Commander Colonel
Makhmadshoev Khurshed believes that the IMU
declared a jihad against
OMON in retaliation for the killing of
suspected IMU
militants. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) During a recent
meeting with the RSO, Colonel Khurshed
described a series of
reprisal attacks by the IMU that started
after OMON first engaged
suspected IMU militants in the
Tavildara region during the
May to August time frame. Colonel
Khurshed formed his theory
that the IMU declared a jihad against
OMON after a failed
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack
against OMON personnel in
the northern city of Khujand. On
November 8, a low-order IED
detonation occurred under an OMON
vehicle. The explosive train of the IED was initiated
by a
radio receiver and
electrical blasting cap. The blasting
cap
detonated but failed to
initiate the main charge. According to
a post-blast investigation,
the electrical blasting cap somehow
fell out of the bucket
containing the main charge. The main
charge was two kg of
ammonium nitrate mixed with aluminum powder
and diesel fuel.
3. (C) A timeline of events
in this alleged tit-for-tat chain of
attacks is as follows:
— May to August 2009: OMON is dispatched to the Tavildara
region of Tajikistan to
conduct direct action operations against
suspected IMU militants that
allegedly infiltrated into
Tajikistan from
Afghanistan. OMON snipers reportedly
killed 12
IMU militants.
— September (exact day
unknown): OMON kills a suspected IMU
bomb maker in Afghono
village (outskirts of Dushanbe).
Investigators find hand
written instructions (allegedly from
Afghanistan) describing how
to build an IED at the bomb maker’s
residence, in addition to
material and information regarding
military explosive devices,
electrical schematics, powdered
charcoal, an AK-47, 7.62 mm
ammunition, hand grenades, and
money.
— September 18: Alleged IMU militants assassinate the Police
Chief in Isfara, in northern
Tajikistan.
— October 18: Tajik police (including members of the OMON
detachment) raid a house in
Isfara allegedly housing IMU
militants responsible for
the assassination of the Isfara police
chief. They kill four suspected IMU militants. One OMON
officer is wounded in the
arm.
4. (C) Comment: It is difficult to establish that the IMU
declared jihad against OMON
or that the IMU intends to
specifically target OMON, as
the Colonel believes. Post
routinely receives reports
of IMU activity and host nation
police action against IMU
militants in Tajikistan from OMON and
other sources. Attempts to corroborate these reports are
rarely
successful. The RSO requested to see the alleged IED that
was
found in Khujand. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (OMON’s
parent organization) denied
the request on the basis that the
IED was still in Khujand, a
12-hour drive from Dushanbe. The
Ministry provided photos of
the IED, but they were of such poor
quality as to not be useful
in identifying any of the IED
components.
5. (C) Comment
Continued: The Tajik government
regularly pins
responsibility for such
incidents on a «foreign» enemy, the IMU,
rather than admit that
homegrown grievances may play a role.
These incidents could be
related to the IMU, or could be the
DUSHANBE 00001427 002 OF 002
results of local grievances
or criminal disputes. End Comment.
6. (U) The point of contact
for this and all security related
information at Post is
Regional Security Officer Erik Olerud.
GROSS
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
&nb
