id: 204043
date: 4/24/2009 14:53
refid: 09DUSHANBE508
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8479
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #0508/01 1141453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 241453Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0256
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0504
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0021
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000508
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/24/2019
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: ZARIFI BLOWS A GASKET OVER AUDIT OF NATIONAL BANK AND U.S.
NON-SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND LOAN, WANTS TO REVIEW THE
RELATIONSHIP
DUSHANBE 00000508 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Staffdel Helwig met with Foreign Minister Zarifi
on April 24, to discuss elections, trafficking in persons,
freedom of religion, economic reform, Afghanistan, and the work
of the OSCE in the region. Zarifi
made comments virtually
identical to those he made to A/S Boucher on these issues on
April 20. However, when the
International Monetary Fund audit
of the National Bank came up he angrily and at length denounced
the United States vote against the Fund’s new Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility loan to Tajikistan at the April 21
International Monetary Fund board meeting, dismissed the audit
findings as mere rumor, and called the Ambassador for a further
meeting on April 27 to review bilateral relations. His comments
made clear that he had not read the audit summary and did not
understand the importance of the issues involved, but also that
we have the Tajik government’s attention on this issue. End
Summary.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, ELECTIONS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
2. (C) U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
advisors Janice Helwig and Shelley Han raised electoral reform
before the 2010 elections, trafficking in persons, the law on
religion, and economic reforms with Zarifi. On election, Zarifi
said the 2010 elections would be better than previous elections,
but would not meet international standards. Tajikistan would
work with the OSCE and the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems on electoral procedures, but Zarifi did not
believe that the legislation required any amendments. On
trafficking in persons, Zarifi emphasized President Rahmon’s
public decrees not to tolerate child labor in the cotton
industry, although admitting that implementation was faulty.
Ambassador explained the difficulties in our assistance
relationship with Tajikistan that would arise if Tajikistan were
downgraded to Tier 3 for trafficking in persons, and urged that
there be more efforts to investigate and prosecute involvement
in trafficking, including officials who forced children to work
in the cotton harvest. Zarifi
said Tajik Embassies were working
to prevent the trafficking of Tajiks to the Middle East and
Russia, and he and Ambassador agreed that the Tajik Consul
General in Dubai was particularly energetic and effective in
this area. On religion, Zarifi
said that Tajikistan needed to
stop extremism by developing a strong mainstream religious
movement, as the country lacked the strong security forces
needed to do the job. He believed
the majority of Tajik
citizens supported the new law on religion.
NATIONAL BANK AUDIT — OUCH
3. (C) Turning to economic reform, Han asked Zarifi what the
government planned to do in response to the results of the
International Monetary Fund-ordered audit of the National Bank.
Zarifi said that the United States’ vote against immediate
approval of the International Monetary Fund loan to Tajikistan
was an unfriendly act. He
dismissed the contents of the audit
as «rumors» and said Deputy Prime Minister Alimardon (who, as
National Bank Chairman had authored the diversion of hundreds of
millions) should enjoy the presumption of innocence until an
investigation and legal process had taken place. He asserted
that the United States had the wrong information, noting that
all other International Monetary Fund board members had voted
for the loan. He repeated
President Rahmon’s argument that the
figure of $800 million misused was impossible in a country with
a national budget of only $1.2 billion.
4. (C) Zarifi emphasized that because of the global economic
crisis Tajikistan needed serious financial assistance, because
Tajikistan did not have oil or gas like its neighbors and was
desperately poor. The people of
Tajikistan would not tolerate
difficult conditions forever.
«Three winters of deprivation»
was possible to tolerate, but after a fourth they might rise up
and get rid of their government, he said. «Rhetoric» about
democracy didn’t matter in the face of serious matters like
stability in Central Asia, he continued.
He dismissed the issue
of corruption, saying it existed in every country.
DUSHANBE 00000508 002.2 OF 003
5. (C) Ambassador pointed out to Zarifi that the U.S. statement
at the International Monetary Fund board meeting expressed
concern about governance at the National Bank of Tajikistan and
in the highest levels of the Tajik government, and called for
stronger conditions to be established before further
International Monetary Fund lending to Tajikistan. It did not
rule out further lending. She
noted that the National Bank
Chairman was now Deputy Prime Minister, calling into question
the government’s commitment to transparency and accountability.
She also pointed out that the «rumors» Zarifi referred to were
the findings and observations of a leading international
auditing firm, and included details of corruption and
obstruction of the audit process that could not be ignored. She
added that all the donors were concerned that the Government of
Tajikistan had said nothing about the audit results (including
in the President’s annual address to the parliament on April 15)
and had apparently had no reaction to it, and suggested that
Zarifi actually read the audit summary before their meeting on
April 27.
6. (C) Zarifi said the Prosecutor General had ordered an
investigation into the results of the audit, but it would take
some time to complete. He
repeated several times that Alimardon
could be punished if found guilty of a crime. But he also
emphasized that the Government of Tajikistan could use foreign
assistance funding for whatever purposes it deemed necessary,
and this was not a crime, simply the result of the government
setting its own priorities.
Ambassador asked if that meant that
the government might use the just-approved International
Monetary Fund $116 million loan package for any purpose other
than those approved in the loan program.
Zarifi said yes, the
Tajik government could and would do this. He then appeared to
reconsider, and said no, the government would follow the
program’s conditions.
7. (C) Zarifi spoke about the «game» played by Russia and the
United States for influence in Central Asia, saying the U.S.
vote against International Monetary Fund assistance to
Tajikistan would push the Tajiks back to the Russians. He said
the United States was in danger of losing Tajikistan through
mistakes like this, just as it had lost Kyrgyzstan. He
complained at length about the lack of progress on a feasibility
study for the Rogun dam project, saying that if the western
countries and World Bank dithered for much longer Tajikistan
would be forced to accept Russian offers of bilateral financing
for the project under Russian ownership.
This was a bad option,
as it would give Russia complete control in Central Asia — they
could even control downstream countries using control over their
irrigation water. However,
Tajikistan would have no other
choice if it was to survive.
Ambassador replied that the United
States was playing no game in Central Asia, and wanted
Tajikistan to deal with corruption and economic reform issues
for its own sake.
AFGHANISTAN SHOULD GROW COTTON
8. (C) Zarifi said the situation in northern Afghanistan had
improved, but there were serious problems of corruption in the
assistance process for Afghanistan.
He recounted allegations he
had heard while visiting Mazar e Sharif recently that U.S. and
other assistance was largely stolen, but said he would not
prejudge such «rumors,» unlike the way the United States had
treated Tajikistan. He praised
the Nizhniy Pyanj bridge for
helping to greatly increase regional trade, and said Tajikistan
supported President Karzai, whom they credited with making
possible elections, better education, and reconciliation in
Afghanistan. Tajikistan opposed
any negotiations with the
Taleban, as they could never be trusted.
The countries of the
regional needed to establish a regional infrastructure of
cooperation to ensure the stabilization of Afghanistan, for the
time when foreign troops went home.
The narcotics problem would
not go away purely through law enforcement means, but needed
economic measures to switch the population to other crops. If
the Dostijum dam were built, it would allow irrigation of 1.5
million hectares in Afghanistan, enabling farmers to switch from
opium poppy to cotton.
DUSHANBE 00000508 003.2 OF 003
RUSSIA AND THE OSCE
9. (C) Zarifi said that Russia and the west were trying to use
the OSCE to cross purposes.
Russian was focused on regional
control, as always, while the west had introduced new ideas of
security built on the basis of strong civil society. Small
countries in the middle had to find ways to survive between the
United States and Russia, and this was a real game for
influence. Tajikistan needed the
support of the west to resist
Russian pressure to agree to Russian control of Rogun. The
United States’ policy of «playing no (great) game» in Central
Asia was impossible, because Russia insisted on playing and the
small countries had to survive and feed their people.
COMMENT
10. (C) Zarifi was in anger mode, and said to expect a long
conversation on April 27 about the bilateral relationship in
general. His comments about the
audit of the National Bank
showed clearly that he had not actually read the audit summary,
and we doubt President Rahmon has either. A/S Boucher’s
comments to the press, and the U.S. vote against the
International Monetary Fund loan to Tajikistan got the Tajik
leadership’s attention, and perhaps this will inspire the
Foreign Minister and the President to read the audit and
seriously consider its import for their relations with the donor
community. Understanding the
audit and finding the will to take
action based on it is another story; don’t hold your breath.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 204254
date: 4/27/2009 12:42
refid: 09DUSHANBE509
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9771
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #0509/01 1171242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 271242Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0259
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0507
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0024
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0033
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000509
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2019
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS TELL BOUCHER THERE IS LITTLE HOPE
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM
DUSHANBE 00000509 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Three leaders of
opposition political parties
told South and Central Asia Assistant Secretary Boucher they had
little hope for the development of democratic government in
Tajikistan, then tried to blame this on lack of support from the
United States Government. They
offered no plans to change the
situation themselves. End
Summary.
2. (C) Boucher met with Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan
Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri, General Secretary of the Democratic
Party of Tajikistan Rahmatullo Valiev, and Chairman of the
Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan Rahmatillo Zoyirov at the
Embassy on April 21.
COMPLAINTS AND DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
3. (C) All three party leaders delivered prepared remarks to
Boucher, somewhat defeating the intended informal and private
atmosphere of the event. All
complained that they had
previously enjoyed warm relations with the United States Embassy
and had received support from the United States Government, but
in recent years this relationship had ceased. They also
criticized the international community for what they perceived
as rhetorical support for Rahmon.
Valiev commented that the
results of the National Bank audit showed that aid money only
fed corruption. He complained
that the United States and other
countries paid much attention to Afghanistan when, he claimed,
there was less political freedom in Tajikistan. He added that
Boucher should have met with the political party heads before
meeting President Rahmon, so they could convey their concerns
prior to his official meetings.
4. (C) Zoyirov expected no breakthroughs toward democracy,
saying the government had lied for the past ten years by
claiming it intended to reform the election law. He favors
legal and peaceful actions to change the government, but it is
now harder to restrain Tajiks from illegal and violent action,
he said, and a revolutionary situation is taking root as
Rahmon’s control is slipping. He
asked whether the United
States Government had any position on the political problems in
Tajikistan.
DREAM OVER
5. (C) Kabiri of the Islamic Revival Party agreed with
everything Zoyirov said, and adding that while political parties
in Tajikistan need assistance, they no longer have any «romantic
illusions» about strong outsider support. The five Central
Asian republics have convinced the United States that secular
authoritarian governments are the only option to support,
because there is no alternative save radical Islamist
governments. No one in the region
believes in the possibility
of moderate leaders, leaving the field to extreme secularists
and extreme Islamists, both of whom are growing in influence.
Tajik youth see no prospects for change through elections, so
seek extremist solutions.
6. (C) Boucher replied to these concerns by emphasizing that he
raised electoral reform and corruption with the President, and
that the embassy is supporting democracy through its advocacy
and cooperation with the OSCE, and USAID programs. Noting that
the United States Government does not give money directly to the
Government of Tajikistan, he said that elections are a chance
for us all to push for issues of common interest. He asked what
the parties are doing themselves to improve the conduct of
elections and expand their influence.
Only Kabiri offered an
answer, saying the Islamic Revival Party is ready to place
monitors in every polling station.
But he wondered whether
doing so would be a waste of money, if the results are fixed
anyway. He said government
rhetoric is unhelpful, as President
Rahmon in his recent annual address to the nation called on
political parties to put «national interests» above the
interests of the parties or «foreign bosses.» He predicted that
the only change likely in Tajikistan is a narrowing of political
DUSHANBE 00000509 002.2 OF 002
space under increased government pressure. Kabiri wishs for the
return of the National Democratic Institute to Tajikistan, to
strengthen independent political parties.
COMMENT: FOLD EARLY AND FOLD OFTEN
7. (C) The only politician present from a party with seats in
parliament, Kabiri, was not forward leaning about changing
election laws or practices, seeming to accept defeat in advance,
despite his party’s possession of two parliamentary seats and
claims to tens of thousands of members.
His performance did not
dispel our impression of him as an inactive party leader. His
colleagues were equally negative, and represent organizations
with a few thousand members at best and little hope of ever
coming back into parliament. None
elaborated on ways their
parties might take advantage of the current situation to
strengthen their positions.
8. (C) Comment Continued: Perhaps
more interesting were the
circumstances of the two invitees who did not attend this
meeting: Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda,
former Deputy Prime Minister,
current member of the upper house of parliament, former top
religious official, and an opposition figure in the civil war,
told Embassy he could not attend because he did not wish to
invite an increase in the already heavy pressure he and his
family were feeling from the government due to his denunciations
of the new law on religion (septel describes Foreign Minister
Zarifi’s allegations that Turajonzoda was scheming to establish
an Islamic state). Turajonzoda is
reputedly wealthy, and the
Government may know how to hurt him, as it could hurt allegedly
wealthy Muhiddin Kabiri. The
other no-show was Shodi Shabdolov,
whose Communist Party has three seats in parliament, and 3-4
other independent members of parliament voting with them.
Shabdolov has in recent months taken vocal stands against some
government policies, suggesting the Communist Party is becoming
more active. But at the last
minute he told the embassy by
telephone that he had forgotten about the meeting with Boucher,
and could not drive over in time.
End Comment.
9. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 204256
date: 4/27/2009 12:50
refid: 09DUSHANBE510
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9777
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0510/01 1171250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 271250Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0261
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0509
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0092
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0049
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0059
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0035
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000510
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR LILIENFELD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2019
TAGS: ETRD, ECON, PREL, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: DEPUTY ASST US TRADE REP FINDS TAJIK GOVT MORE INTERESTED IN
HANDOUTS THAN HAND UP
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Deputy Assistant United States Trade
Representative for South and Central Asia Claudio Lilienfeld
visited Dushanbe April 21-22 to review U.S.-Tajik trade
relations and the status of the U.S.-Central Asian Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).
Matlubkhon Davlatov, the
President’s economic policy advisor, appeared relatively unaware
of TIFA; he was far more fixated on the impending International
Monetary Fund (IMF) vote on a new $116 million loan to
Tajikistan. Deputy Minister of
Economic Development and Trade
Larisa Kislyakova was well-versed in TIFA and appeared
interested in giving the TIFA process more substance. DAUSTR
Lilienfeld told both that the U.S. was exploring a three-pronged
strategy: enhancing the multi-country
TIFA agreement,
developing further bilateral ties, and using TIFA to engage with
Afghanistan. He stressed the
importance the United States
places on further economic reform in Tajikistan. End summary.
Davlatov: Fixated on the IMF Decision
2. (C) Matlubkhon Davlatov, State Advisor to President Rahmon on
Economic Affairs (and Rahmon’s uncle) began his meeting with
DAUSTR Lilienfeld by mentioning that the IMF was due to decide
within the next few hours whether to provide renewed economic
assistance to Tajikistan. (The
IMF had suspended assistance and
demanded repayment of $47 million in loans after the National
Bank of Tajikistan admitted deliberately misreporting its
balance sheet to the IMF. A
subsequent audit of the Bank by
Ernst & Young revealed numerous additional problems.) Davlatov
said he had been combing through the internet for signs of the
U.S. position on new IMF assistance, but he had seen no
indication of what Washington was thinking. He raised his
eyebrows suggestively at us but did not wait for any comment.
(Note: The IMF voted to approve the $116 million Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility for Tajikistan. End note.)
Tajiks Counting on Assistance with Financial Crisis
3. (SBU) Noting that the United States «has always helped us
with our needs,» Davlatov thanked us for our ongoing assistance
to the Republic of Tajikistan, mentioning specifically tens of
millions of dollars provided by USAID and the construction of
the bridge to Afghanistan at Nizhniy Pyanj. He highlighted as
well the recent collaboration on the Northern Distribution
Network bringing supplies to Afghanistan. He then ruefully
noted the expense and difficulty in guarding the 1,400km border
after the Russian departure in 2005, suggesting that any
additional help the United States provided would be appreciated.
4. (SBU) Davlatov spent the better portion of the meeting
providing an overview of Tajikistan’s current economic
condition. He acknowledged
difficulties stemming from the
financial crisis, particularly the steep drop in prices for
major Tajik exports cotton and aluminum, as well as the decline
in remittances from compatriots working in Russia. He rattled
off some statistics: GDP growth, 8.0% last year, had slowed to
3.2%. Remittances had dropped by
over 30%. Some 40,000 guest
workers had returned home. The
decline in remittances had
slowed inflation, however, from 3.4% to 1.2%, comparing the
first three months of 2009 with the same period in 2008.
Davlatov said the government had created 110,000 new jobs last
year to help returning migrants, mostly in the agricultural
sector, and intended to create an additional 180,000 jobs this
year. (Note: These numbers appear
almost impossibly high. To
the extent they are accurate, it should be noted that
agricultural jobs are among the least remunerative in
Tajikistan. Many farmers are in
fact forced to work essentially
for free. End note.)
5. (SBU) Despite government efforts, the budget would come up
$200 million short due to the crisis.
Davlatov said that
international organizations were looking to fill the gap: the
DUSHANBE 00000510 002 OF 003
Asian Development Bank would spend $40 million, the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development had pledged 34 million
euros, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank were
looking at $20 million each, and the IMF was considering
spending $70 million this year.
«If We Still Need Money, We’ll just Turn to China»
6. (C) Almost any discussion with a Tajik government official
about international investment includes a mention of China, and
Davlatov was no exception. If,
after reviewing the plans of the
international financial organizations, «we still need money,
we’ll just turn to China.»
He noted that Kazakhstan «went to
China and got $10 billion,» and Tajikistan could do the same.
China is already funding two major projects here, the «New Silk
Road» highway from Dushanbe through Kyrgyzstan to the Chinese
border and the 500 kV North-South electric transmission line,
costing some $600 million. With
international political
interest so high in Tajikistan, he said, the country was in a
difficult position. «China
is pushing, Russia is pushing, and
the United States is pushing. We
need to choose our path
carefully.»
U.S. TIFA Strategy
7. (U) DAUSTR Lilienfeld, thanking Davlatov for his overview,
noted that one of his principal goals for this visit was to
inform Central Asian governments about the U.S. interest in
strengthening the TIFA between the United States and the five
Central Asian countries. He noted
that the Trade
Representative’s Office was exploring a three-pronged strategy:
(1) adding more substance to the multi-country agreement, and
engaging more frequently at the working level to follow up on
specifics; (2) creating a more robust bilateral dialog to
consider issues of mutual concern; and (3) using TIFA to engage
more with Afghanistan. DAUSTR
Lilienfeld noted that, with a new
team in the White House, and new leadership at USTR, all policy
approaches and existing mechanisms (e.g., TIFAs) were subject to
review and likely would focus more sharply on seeking results.
8. (SBU) Responding to the discussion about China’s large,
state-led investment programs, Lilienfeld stated that Western
foreign investment is led by the private sector, not the
government. The United States was
thus interested in seeing
that essential business environment reforms were carried through
in Tajikistan. At the moment
there is only one U.S. firm with
major investments in Tajikistan, the antimony-mining firm Comsup
Commodities, and it is having difficulties with interference
from the government. (Note:
Comsup has been pressured,
primarily by the Prime Minister’s office, to sell pre-processed
antimony to a local buyer. The
Embassy has been supporting
Comsup’s right to make its own business decisions. End note.)
Lilienfeld noted that other firms are watching the Comsup case
with concern.
9. (SBU) Davlatov responded primarily to the Afghanistan issue,
noting that President Rahmon had recently told the Parliament of
the European Union that Tajikistan played a stabilizing role in
Central Asia, and that it could do the same for Afghanistan. He
said that Tajikistan was already bearing a considerable burden.
He registered Lilienfeld’s expression of concern about Comsup,
but sought to minimize the issue as «simply the result of a
misunderstanding. We are
resolving it.»
Tajik Agreement that TIFA Needs more Teetha
10. (SBU) DAUSTR Lilienfeld met next with Deputy Minister for
DUSHANBE 00000510 003 OF 003
Economic Development and Trade Larisa Kislyakova. Kislyakova
was instrumental in arranging the TIFA meetings in Dushanbe last
year, and, according to some accounts, may be the only person in
the Tajik Government who is fully versed in the issue. She
agreed completely with DAUSTR Lilienfeld’s desire to bolster the
TIFA process, but she could not say the same for other
countries. Of the five Central
Asian states, she said only
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were fully committed to the process.
Uzbekistan in particular had played an unconstructive role.
Despite talk of reducing trade barriers, Tashkent instead had
been erecting them. Since nearly
all of Tajikistan’s
commodities must pass through Uzbekistan, this had a seriously
negative effect. For TIFA to
become more meaningful, Uzbekistan
and other countries must honor their commitments. She said
that, as an honest broker, the United States could play a major
role in ensuring that this happened.
Otherwise TIFA was just a
talk shop.
11. (U) Kislyakova agreed with the emphasis on Afghanistan,
saying that the two countries had a lot to gain from economic
cooperation. Already border trade
had become a significant
factor in the economy at four border crossings. The possibility
for increased trade might prove particularly beneficial to
women, who may find employment in the sector.
12 (C) Comment: The positive comments from Davlatov and
Kislyakova about Tajik-Afghan cooperation are unfortunately
probably just ear candy for their western visitors. Tajiks are
generally more focused on containing than cooperating with their
southern neighbor. (While this
tends to stymie efforts at
increasing trade, it at least means that we have relatively
meaningful law enforcement and border security cooperation.)
Davlatov’s concern about the IMF results, however, suggests an
opportunity to advocate for real business climate improvements
by insisting that assistance — whether bilateral or multilateral
— or attention (e.g., greater bilateral engagement on trade
investment) be made conditional on concrete reforms. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 204269
date: 4/27/2009 13:28
refid: 09DUSHANBE514
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE310|09DUSHANBE48|09DUSHANBE508
header:
VZCZCXRO9813
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #0514/01 1171328
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 271328Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0003
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0518
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000514
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/27/2019
TAGS: PREL, EFIN, ASEC, CVIS, PHUM, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: MIFFED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND VOTE, TAJIK FOREIGN
MINISTER VENTS
REF: A) DUSHANBE 508 B) DUSHANBE
310 C) DUSHANBE 48
DUSHANBE 00000514 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: With the Tajik
government highly annoyed that
the United States dared to oppose a new IMF loan, Foreign
Minister Zarifi called in the Ambassador April 27, accompanied
by the DCM and RSO. In a departure from normal practice, Zarifi,
who is comfortable in both Russian and English, insisted on
conducting the meeting in Tajik with interpretation.
Accompanied by a supporting phalanx of staff, he complained not
just about the IMF vote, but a long list of grievances,
including the U.S. Human Rights Report, U.S. comments on the
Religious Freedom Law, the use of «green zone» security
territory surrounding the Embassy, Embassy hiring practices and
visa issuance, and finally an alleged failure to inform MFA
about A/S Boucher’s press conference April 21. The tenor of the
conversation suggested that the Embassy should deal exclusively
with the MFA in all our work, and not use information from
ordinary citizens, civil society, or opposition parties in
reporting and assessment. Zarifi contended that no third party
had any right to take action based on the special audit report
of the national bank.
The Ambassador told Zarifi that of course donors would consider
the audit report, which should be an impetus to undertake
serious economic reform. She
welcomed the Minister raising the
human rights report as chance to elevate the dialogue on this
issue, but noted that we are obliged not only to prepare the
report annually, but also to include information from a variety
of sources outside government, including civil society and
opposition groups. On the Embassy
perimeter zone, she secured
agreement to delay any immediate action until the June visit of
an OBO planning team (ref B and septel).
Finally, she laid out
the internal controls in our hiring and visa review procedures
in detail. The IMF vote was the
main substantive issue, but it
also provided Zarifi a pretext to demand what he has long wanted
— more control over who we hire, how we work, and what we
report back to Washington. End
Summary.
Unfriendly Gestures
2. (C) As predicted in reftel A, Foreign Minister Zarifi
convoked the Ambassador to a meeting to discuss «bilateral
relations,» in an apparent fit of pique that the United States
had dared to oppose a new IMF loan (which was nonetheless
approved 23-1 on April 21.)
Accompanied by the Head of
Diplomatic services, two staff from the North America Desk, the
head of MFA Consular Affairs and the MFA press office as well as
an interpreter, Zarifi set an unusually formal tone by
conducting the meeting in Tajik with interpretation.
Recognizing that the recently released executive summary of the
Ernst & Young Special Audit probably played a factor in our
opposition Zarifi claimed that it was not legitimate to use the
report as the basis for any kind of decision, and again
criticized A/S Boucher’s mention of the missing money during his
meeting with the President on April 20. He read the audit’s
disclaimer in full (in Russian) which noted that because so much
information was withheld from the auditors or destroyed the
numbers therein could not be certified as accurate. Zarifi
claimed that the audit therefore could not be considered
evidence of any wrongdoing. The
Ambassador said that if the
audit did not provide proof that anything was stolen,
nonetheless it showed that over $500 million was not properly
accounted for, and donors would take that information into
consideration in designing future programs for Tajikistan. She
offered the Minister the U.S. Treasury statement on its
opposition to the loan, but he refused saying he was not
interested. He called the no vote an «unfriendly gesture.» The
Ambassador noted because the United States is a major donor to
the IMF and other international financial institutions, we have
an obligation to ensure that U.S. taxpayers’ funds reach the
people who need them and are not diverted for some other
purpose. She noted that the
United States wants to work with
Tajikistan to help its development, including in the energy
sector, and that we would continue projects to help improve
agriculture and the business environment. We are willing to
help facilitate a dialogue with neighbors if that would be
useful. But she also noted that
improving the management of
Tajik’s national resources and economic practices were
prerequisites for real economic growth, and over the long term,
real Tajik sovereignty.
Tajikistan will not be able to overcome
its reliance on donor funding until it undertakes serious
reform, and the audit should be an impetus.
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Human Rights and Religious Freedom
3. (SBU) After the obligatory diplomatic language about the
importance of our bilateral relationship and the Minister’s
satisfaction with the work of the embassy, Zarifi launched into
a complaint about the U.S. human rights report, calling it
inaccurate and biased and an interference in internal affairs.
He said Tajikistan discussed these issues with international
organizations but did not recognize it as a valid topic for the
bilateral relationship. He complained that Embassy staff had
discussed the religion law with Tajik citizens and opposition
parties and said if we had concerns we should address them to
the government and more specifically to the MFA, and not engage
in a «provocative» dialogue with individuals outside of
government. He suggested that the United States look to its own
problems with human rights, for example Guantanamo and the war
in Iraq. The Ambassador noted we
were mandated by law to
compile the report using the widest variety of sources, both in
and outside the government. The
more information the government
gives us the better the report would be.
She noted that human
rights in the United States is a broad and constant topic both
inside and outside the country, but only through listening to
constructive criticism could we hope to make improvements to our
policies. She also noted that in our discussions on the election
law and religion law, we have not made bilateral recommendations
but supported recommendations of international organizations
like the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and
United Nations.
Green Zone
4. (SBU) Zarifi raised the Embassy’s control over the 20 meter
perimeter around its compound, known as the «Green Zone,»
saying
that we had no right to this property, had not paid for it, and
needed to remove the guard booths and perimeter fence on this
property. The Ambassador handed
over the diplomatic
correspondence on the issue dating back to 2002. The first was a
diplomatic note from the United States saying that before
entering the lease for Embassy property we requested written
agreement that the Embassy would be allowed to control for
security purposes a 20 meter perimeter zone. She also offered
the MFA’s reply noting receipt of our diplomatic note and
forwarding a letter from the City administration granting the
United States control of that territory.
The Minister claimed
that the City administration letter was not valid and that only
the MFA could approve an agreement with a foreign mission. The
Ambassador pointed out that since the MFA sent us the City’s
letter under the cover of a diplomatic note, we had relied on it
as approved by MFA. Zarifi maintained his claim that it was not
valid, but agreed to the Ambassador’s request, that in view in
the recent increase in surveillance of the Embassy, we could
wait until a visiting OBO team came in June to discuss the
matter before any current structures were removed. The
Ambassador also pointed out the Embassy does not use the
territory or guard booths, which are rather used by Tajik
security staff protecting the Embassy. In view of this the RSO
will inform the State Committee for National Security that the
current structures might soon be removed. By septel we will be
requesting DS and OBO assistance in maintaining embassy
security.
Embassy Functions
5. (C) Zarifi claimed that the hiring of staff at the U.S.
Embassy was controlled by a corrupt regional mafia who hired
their friends and relatives. He
further claimed that local
consular staff arranged visas in exchange for bribes and
consulate gave visas to criminals or people escaping child
support payments or court cases. The Ambassador acknowledged
that she was aware of the rumors about a «hiring mafia» but in
fact all hiring was done by Americans with controls in place to
ensure local staff could not influence the process. She also
described internal controls in the visa process. She noted that
there are groups in Tajikistan who tell applicants they can help
them get a visa for a fee, so we have a robust public diplomacy
effort including media and universities to explain that no one
needs to deal with a middleman to get a visa. The Ambassador
noted that we had requested the government to share information
on criminals and terrorists so we could include them in the
database and avoid inadvertently issuing visas to such people.
DUSHANBE 00000514 003.2 OF 003
She said that the embassy wanted to take Tajik government
information into consideration when making visa decisions — real
information on court rulings, arrests, etc., would be welcome.
However, we cannot refuse a visa based solely on a call from
someone inside or outside the government that is not backed up
by documentation. She suggested
that the MFA adopt a policy
along the lines of the State Department’s practice of refusing
passports to parents in arrears on their child support. (Note:
Last year, Zarifi raised one on one with the Ambassador the case
of the son of a friend, who had left his first wife and
«immigrated illegally to the United States to avoid paying child
support.» The parents wanted
him returned to Tajikistan.
Ambassador explained that the individual had a valid marriage
according to Tajik law, and also had a valid immigrant visa, and
that the embassy could not revoke a visa or deport a legal
immigrant on the basis of an oral request). Zarifi asked that
the Embassy provide a list of local employees to the Ministry.
The Ambassador agreed to provide a list, but noted that we
already requested the Ministry to provide a background check on
anyone before we hired them (which led the surprised Minister to
check with his staff for confirmation).
6. (C) Comment: The IMF vote was
the main substantive issue,
but it also provided Zarifi a pretext to demand what he has long
wanted — more control over who we hire, how we work, and what
we report back to Washington. We
suspect there is also a
financial incentive — we have heard from the head of diplomatic
services that if the MFA can get information that leads to the
collection of unpaid taxes (from local employees and landlords,
for instance),or rental fees (for example, for the perimeter
around the Embassy) then the MFA gets to keep a cut. The
Ambassador will be briefing the European Missions about our IMF
vote and the Tajik response on April 28.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 204562
date: 4/29/2009 4:52
refid: 09TASHKENT601
origin: Embassy Tashkent
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08TASHKENT1163
header:
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RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNT #0601/01 1190440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290452Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0821
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0051
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0070
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0248
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0241
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000601
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, SNAR, KCRM, PHUM, KCOR, ASEC, TI, UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NARCOTICS
SEIZURES NOW REGULARLY HIGHLIGHTED IN
STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA
REF: 08 TASHKENT 1163
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED — PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
1. (SBU) Summary: This is the
first of planned regular updates
about narcotics seizures publicized in the Uzbek state-controlled
mass media. Emboffs have noted a
substantial increase recently in
the number of articles and television news reports highlighting
narcotics-related arrests and seizures.
While the National Center
for Drug Control has always provided the Embassy with its official
statistics for inclusion in the annual International Narcotics
Control and Strategy Report (INCSR) Volume 1, the reports in the
media provide some interesting context about individual narcotics
seizures. A recurrent theme in
the reports is to reinforce the
Government of Uzbekistan’s complaints that Afghan drugs enter the
country via Tajikistan, and there are liberal references to «Tajik
accomplices» who tempt Uzbeks into perpetrating drug crimes.
Another common denominator is the reference to arrests involving
Surkhandarya residents, the strategic southernmost province that
shares a rugged border with Tajikistan, a well-defended river
border with Afghanistan, and a desert border with Turkmenistan.
While Uzbekistan seems genuinely alarmed by the flow of
Afghan-origin narcotics, it has been reluctant to accept an Embassy
proposal to establish a Counternarcotics Section under the
direction of accredited DEA Agents.
End summary.
Drug Seizures Now Common in the Press
——————————————— ——
2. (U) The Embassy counted more than 50 narcotics-related articles
in the press clips during the first quarter of 2009, which includes
some BBC Monitoring-produced reports or summaries of national
television broadcasts. Not long
ago Uzbekistan refused to
acknowledge that narcotics use or trafficking was a serious problem
but, consistent with frank conversations with high-level visitors
over the past year about the surge in narcotics emanating north
from Afghanistan, public reports about arrests now appear several
times per week. This report
summarizes publicly reported
information from January — March, 2009, and we will continue to
track and regularly report narcotic seizures.
Reports Focus on Trafficking Via the Tajik Border
——————————————— —————
3. (U) On January 17, Uzbek Television First Channel aired a
26-minute segment on drug trafficking, noting «of late, Uzbek law
enforcement agencies have been uncovering frequent attempts to
smuggle drugs from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan.» It went on to
describe a bust at the Tashkent Airport by the National Security
Service (NSS) in conjunction with Customs officers of a criminal
group from the Uzbek border town of Bekobod which shuttled drugs to
Moscow. Women were typically used
as mules, it reported, because
they are not searched as thoroughly.
A Tajik national was
reportedly behind the scheme and recruited Uzbeks looking for easy
money in tough financial times.
«It is known that Tajik drug
dealers are attempting to set up a permanent drug transit route via
our country and regularly use it,» the anchor lamented, adding that
«the worst thing is that they still keep involving our fellow
countrymen living in border areas in this job and pursuing their
goals using their services.»
4. (U) Press reported on January 17 that two brothers were
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convicted of selling 16.7 grams of heroin in the Denov District of
Surkhandarya Province.
5. (U) Uzbek Television First Channel aired a story on January 20
about a 22-kilo heroin seizure in southeastern Uzbekistan (probably
Surkhandarya). It noted the drugs
«belonged to a Tajik national»
but were seized from two Surkhandarya residents and that the
narcotics «were smuggled
through the back roads from neighboring
Tajikistan.»
6. (U) The newspaper Tashkent Mahalla reported on January 21 that a
«dangerous organized criminal group» of 18 people (including
11
women) in Khorezm Province was convicted of drug crimes. It
reportedly had operated since 2002 and sold heroin around
Uzbekistan as well as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Five
ringleaders — all relatives — were sentenced to prison terms of
13-18 years.
7. (U) The Ministry of Internal Affairs newspaper Na Postu reported
on January 24 that 500 grams of narcotics was discovered in a
baby’s diaper during a search on a bus from Tashkent to Nukus. The
offenders were from Urgut in Samarkand Province.
8. (U) On February 3 the Uzbek Television First Channel broadcast
that another resident of Urgut was arrested in Bukhara at one of
many routine traffic checkpoints after three packages of heroin
were found in the car’s heating system totaling over 1.5 kilograms.
The suspect admitted he «received the drugs from a Tajik
citizen»
and was instructed to deliver the drugs to a contact in the Urgench
bazaar. Another Nexia automobile
was stopped in Navoiy, where
sniffer dogs uncovered 2.5 kg of opium on the driver and another 2
kilos in luggage. This driver
also confessed that «Tajik citizens
handed it over to him.»
9. (U) On February 7 the same channel aired another narcotics
seizure report, this time involving an Afghan citizen who was
arrested with 10 kilograms of opium on the southern border. The
Balkh resident apparently tried to smuggle the drugs across the
river, which has been heavily guarded since Soviet times. The NSS,
Border Guards, and Customs conducted the operation on January 29 at
11PM.
10. (U) On February 8 the Uzbek Television First Channel reported
that a Nexia sedan was stopped at the Chandir checkpoint in the
Romitan District of Bukhara Province by NSS and MVD officers. A
search revealed that 9.5 kilograms of heroin was stashed in bags on
the underside of the car, along with 200 grams of opium. A
Tashkent Province man was driving, and reported «the drugs were
hidden by a Tajik accomplice.»
This shipment was also apparently
bound for Urgench in the country’s northwest.
11. (U) Surkhandarya TV reported on February 13 that an Afghan
national crossed the river border near Termez in a boat on the
night of January 29 in possession of 19 kilos of opium.
12. (U) On February 15 the Uzbek Television First Channel reported
a 23-kg seizure on February 9 in the town of Denov, Surkhandarya
Province. First officers arrested
three locals attempting to sell
350 grams of heroin, which in turn led them to another man and a
bigger seizure. Again, officials
«established that the drugs had
TASHKENT 00000601 003 OF 005
been smuggled from Tajikistan into our country.» Authorities also
confiscated 2 kilos of hashish and plastic capsules designed for
ingesting drugs in the stomach.
(Note: This also highlights that
Uzbek investigators are trying to build on small finds and go after
the supplier. End note.)
13. (U) On February 18 the Uzbek Television First Channel again
aired a drug trafficking story with a heavy anti-Tajik message,
with the commentator stating «our country is fighting to terminate
drug trafficking, especially transit routes for Tajik heroin.
Unfortunately, there are still cases where fellow compatriots
become involved in drug trafficking by dancing to the Tajik drug
dealers’ tune, motivated by greed.»
It went on to describe that on
February 10, a Bekobod resident was arrested with 1 kilo of heroin
and had been working with a Tajik accomplice. It again mentioned
«increasingly intensive activities of criminal groups in
neighboring Tajikistan.»
Another example was given of a Tajik
national who was caught with nearly a kilogram of heroin in a
cellophane bag. The story
proceeded to shame a teacher in
Sariosiyo District of Surhandarya who was also found with a kilo of
heroin of Tajik origin. Finally,
the report mentioned a third-time
offending female was caught trying to sell 3.5 kilos of heroin in
Denov after smuggling it from Tajikistan.
14. (U) The regional paper «Namangan Diyonat» reported on
February
19 that police had uncovered 15 cases of drug trafficking in
January alone in Namangan, including 1.5 kilos of marijuana.
15. (U) The Russian Internet news agency Regnum reported on
February 24 that a retired colonel from the Kyrgyz security
services was arrested for smuggling and selling large quantities of
drugs in Namangan Province, Uzbekistan.
The NSS linked him after
initially arresting a local man with 225 grams of hashish, who
identified the former officer as a supplier. He was subsequently
arrested on his next visit to the country.
16. (U) On February 25 another instance was reported of an Afghan
trying to illegally cross into Uzbekistan with 25 kilos of opium in
a sack near the Amu Darya River.
The man confessed that financial
difficulties compelled him to get involved in drug trafficking.
17. (U) The Uzbek television show «Axborot» News reported on
February 26 about 14 arrests in a raid in the Yangiyol District of
Tashkent Province on February 1
18. (U) The small regional paper «Termez Oqshomi» reported on
February 16 that an Afghan national was sentenced to 19 years in
prison for smuggling 27 kilos of opium into Uzbekistan in two sacks
while in possession of an AK-47 assault rifle.
19. (U) On March 3 a large 107-kilo heroin seizure was made in
Russia that had been transported on a train originating in Kokand,
Uzbekistan, according to Interfax.
20. (U) The newspaper «Tashkent Huquq» on March 5 reported
that a
27-year old Uzbek Customs officer from Surkhandarya Province was
sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug trafficking. He was
arrested by the NSS with 715 grams of heroin; subsequent checks of
his home revealed four white plastic sacks buried in the yard
containing 139 kilos of opium. He
was formerly an inspector at the
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Galaba Customs checkpoint, which is a strategic railhead in the
country’s far south where train tracks from Afghanistan and
Tajikistan converge. It is an
encouraging sign that the Uzbek
Government is willing to prosecute corrupt officials after its 2008
adoption of the UN Convention Against Corruption. (Note:&nbs
