id: 193905
date: 2/26/2009 6:56
refid: 09DUSHANBE231
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE103
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000231
SIPDIS
DIA PASS TO DHO2
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/26/2019
TAGS: MAS, MCAP, OVIP, PGOV, PREL, AF, TI
SUBJECT: USTRANSCOM MEETINGS WITH TAJIK OFFICIALS ON NORTHERN
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
REF: DUSHANBE 103
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Following up on General Petraeus’s Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) discussions with President Rahmon in
January (Ref A), Rear Admiral Mark Harnitchek, USTRANSCOM
Director of Strategy, Policy, and Logistics, met with
Tajikistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamrohon Zarifi,
Minister of Transportation and Communications Abdurahim Ashur,
Chief of the State Committee for National Security Khayridin
Abdurahimov, and Head of the Customs Service Gurez Zaripov on
February 20, 2009, to discuss using Tajikistan territory for the
transit of non-lethal cargo via commercial means to support
troops in Afghanistan. U.S.
Ambassador Tracey Jacobson attended
the first two meetings with RADM Harnitchek, and DCM Necia Quast
the second two. In all the
meetings, Tajik officials expressed
full support for the proposal and promised their cooperation.
They asked for the United States to consider building a second
bridge to Afghanistan at Kokul, and to develop other
transportation infrastructure and facilities. End summary.
2. (C) Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarifi expressed support for
the use of Tajikistan’s territory for the transit of cargo,
citing the common goal of stabilizing Afghanistan. He proposed
Kolkhozobad and Kulyob as primary nodes, pointing out their
proximity to the Afghan border, but acknowledged that neither
site currently had the necessary infrastructure to do
rail-to-road transloading. He
suggested that the United States
could assist in developing an intermodal terminal closer to the
border. The Ambassador emphasized
the importance of getting
cargo transit underway as soon as possible, suggesting use of
the existing facilities at Kurgan Teppe, before considering
other locations that would require substantial development.
Minister Zarifi agreed but reiterated keen interest in the
stability of Afghanistan and the importance of looking at
developing the other alternatives as well. With regard to
relations with Uzbekistan, he assured RADM Harnitchek that cargo
transit would not be a problem.
No final agreement was reached
at the meeting. Minister Zarifi
accepted a draft U.S.
diplomatic note, saying the MFA’s lawyers would look at it, and
promised a response on the type of agreement documentation they
required.
3. (C) After the meeting, a representative of MFA’s Americas
Desk advised that on February 23 there would be a meeting of the
relevant ministries on commercial transit of U.S. cargo. The
MFA representative cited a previous U.S. draft diplomatic note
and the Ambassador’s remarks indicating that this transit would
bring economic benefits to the country and asked for a more
detailed description of the benefits for the republic to report
to the government officials at the meeting. The Ambassador
responded that the United States was looking at commercial
shipments, using Tajikistan’s rail, road, and terminal
facilities. The U.S. government
would contract with commercial
shippers, who would pay customary fees related to shipping,
bringing revenues to commercial transit operators. This would be
an excellent business opportunity and a chance for Tajikistan to
demonstrate its ability to act as a transit country, which could
attract attention from other potential customers and investors.
4. (C) Minister of Transportation Ashur began his meeting with
the request for U.S. support in constructing a bridge at Kokul.
He discussed at some lengths the benefits for both Afghanistan
and Tajikistan of this connection.
The Ambassador indicated
that the request for the Kokul Bridge was being studied but that
no commitments had been made; she reiterated the need in the
meantime to see the existing bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj used to
full capacity. Turning
specifically to the NDN issue, Minister
Ashur, like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed
Kolkhozobad as an intermodal transit point, noting it is the
closest railway point to the Afghan border. He acknowledged,
however, that there was currently no truck terminal there, so
container transloading could not take place. Minister Ashur
reported that there were no serious issues in the relationship
DUSHANBE 00000231 002 OF 002
between the Uzbekistan and Tajikistan rail systems, indicating
that any small misunderstandings could be resolved at the
working level; he assured RADM Harnitchek that there would be no
problems with the transit of U.S. cargo.
Tajikistan railways
work within the framework of the Organization for Cooperation of
Railways.
5. (C) Chairman of the GKNB Abdrahimov, who oversees the Border
Guards, stated Tajikistan’s willingness to help in coalition
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and expressed gratitude for the
bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj. He added
that «the sooner we build a
second bridge at Kokul, the better» for additional transit
options. Like the Ministers in
the previous meetings, he
suggested using Kolkhozobad, citing its proximity to the Afghan
border. He reported that
operations would be ongoing at the
Nizhniy Pyanj Bridge on a 24-hour-a-day basis and that border
guard strength there would be plussed up. Finally, he passed to
the U.S. side a list of equipment they requested to facilitate
operations at the bridge facility, mostly relating to
computers/power needs such as UPS, surge protectors, and
generators.
6. (C) Head of Customs Service Zaripov emphasized Tajikistan’s
commitment to engagement and support for development of economic
ties with Afghanistan. He said
that the Customs Service was
ready to cooperate and negotiate on transit of cargo through
Tajikistan to assist coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Indicating that his tasking came directly from President Rahmon,
he assured RADM Harnitchek that there would be a smooth flow of
cargo without bureaucratic restraints.
7. (C) Comment: Cargo transit through Tajikistan clearly has
support from the highest levels of government. Each meeting was
attended by the minister or agency head who offered full support
from his organization. The
appearance of the GKNB Director
himself was unexpected-usually his deputy leads any meetings-and
indicates the importance attached to this issue. Although there
is much good political will and strong oral support from the
Tajikistan side on the transit issue, no formal agreement has
been reached yet. Each of the
meetings involved a
not-unexpected request for infrastructure development (all
mentioned Kolkhozobad and Kulyob) which may be proposed
explicitly as a quid pro quo for use of Tajik territory for the
cargo transit. End Comment.
8. (U) USTRANSCOM Admiral Harnitchek cleared this message.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 193971
date: 2/26/2009 11:52
refid: 09DUSHANBE233
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
09DUSHANBE103|09DUSHANBE115|09DUSHANBE154|09DUSHANBE231|09SECSTATE14097
header:
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DE RUEHDBU #0233/01 0571152
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0020
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0117
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000233
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/26/2019
TAGS: PREL, PARM, EAID, NATO, AF, PK, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN INITIAL INPUT TO AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN POLICY
REVIEW
REF: (A) SECSTATE 14097, (B) DUSHANBE 103, (C) DUSHANBE 115, (D)
DUSHANBE 154,
(E) DUSHANBE 231
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) PolEcon Chief delivered Ref A points to Khusrav Nosiri,
MFA Director for North America and Europe on February 20.
Nosiri had no substantive reply at the time. On February 26 MFA
North America Desk Officer Jamaluddin Ubaidulloev informed
PolEcon Chief that the MFA had sent the points to the
Presidential Administration for consideration, and that no reply
would be immediately forthcoming.
However, the Government of
Tajikistan would provide input before the April NATO summit, he
said.
2. (C) In recent meetings with General Petraeus and President
Rahmon (Ref B), separate meetings Ambassador held with Rahmon
and Foreign Minister Zarifi (Refs C and D), and meetings of
TRANSCOM Admiral Harnitchek with Zarifi (Ref E), Minister of
Transport Ashur, State Security Committee Chief Abdurahimov, and
Customs Service Chief Zaripov, the input from the Tajik side
regarding Afghanistan has been fairly consistent. Rahmon and
his ministers have emphasized the need to stabilize Afghanistan
in order for Central Asia to be secure, independent, and truly
sovereign. They have repeated
their willingness to help the
United States, including with commercial shipments that could,
as Rahmon said to General Petraeus, «potentially lead to more»
cooperation in the future. They
have also shown an increasing
willingness to accommodate joint military training, although
with caveats.
3. (C) Rahmon has emphasized that he is not averse to
cooperation with Afghanistan, saying that Pakistan, not
Afghanistan, is the «homeland of terrorism.» He and Zarifi have
said that the United States should do more infrastructure
development between Afghanistan and Central Asia, especially
building a new bridge across the Pyanzh, and building or
contributing to the Dosti Jhum hydroelectric dam project, which
could provide for agricultural needs in Afghanistan as well as
power. They have also pressed for
improvements to Tajikistan’s
rail and road infrastructure in connection with the Northern
Distribution Network.
4. (C) Rahmon and Zarifi also seek assistance for major projects
from other donors. They have said
the United States should
encourage the World Bank and other donors/investors to speed up
construction of the Roghun hydropower station, which could
produce excess power in the summer for sale sold to Afghanistan.
In a meeting on February 20,
Zarifi told Ambassador and
TRANSCOM Admiral Harnitchek that the Tajiks had presented a list
of proposed infrastructure projects to the European Union during
Rahmon’s recent visit to Brussels.
«We cannot stabilize
Afghanistan through military means alone; economic development
is necessary and that requires infrastructure» Zarifi said. The
Tajiks are proposing that allies build roads, railroads, dams
for both hydropower and irrigation, and electrical transmission
lines. Zarifi and Minister of
Transport Ashur have suggested
construction of an intermodal transit facility in Kholhozobod,
and have repeatedly raised a request for construction of a
bridge at Kokul (Ref B).
5. (C) Comment: The Tajiks clearly welcome the opportunity to
help more on Afghanistan.
However, in addition to their own
interest in improvments to regional security, they see their
cooperation as an instrument to gain support for infrastructure
projects. Most of these projects
would serve the additional
purpose of reducing Tajikistan’s dependence on Uzbekistan for
transport and power, a goal that would improve regional
stability and serve U.S. interests.
6. (C) Comment Continued: We should design our Afghan/Pakistan
policy with attention to the fact that these countries exist in
a broader region; that Afghanistan cannot be considered
separately from Central Asia, especially Tajikistan, given
transportation, linguistic, cultural and historical ties.
Tajikistan can be a help or a hindrance to our efforts — it
DUSHANBE 00000233 002 OF 002
depends on the effectiveness of our engagement, both in terms of
assistance and high-level political dialogue. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 193985
date: 2/26/2009 12:16
refid: 09DUSHANBE234
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE231
header:
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0119
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000234
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PARM, EAID, AF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — REQUEST APPROVAL TO SEND DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON
TRANSIT OF GOODS TO AFGHANISTAN
REF: DUSHANBE 231
1. (SBU) On February 20 Ambassador passed to Foreign Minister
Zarifi a draft diplomatic note on transit of goods to
Afghanistan (Reftel). On February
26 the MFA informed Embassy
that Zarifi had agreed to an exchange of dipnotes to authorize
transit of goods to Afghanistan as part of the Northern
Distribution Network, and requested that the embassy send the
draft text as an actual diplomatic note.
The MFA America’s
DeskOff said he believed the MFA could formally reply to our
dipnote in 3 working days.
2. (SBU) Following is the text of the draft note given to the
MFA. Post requests Department
authorization as soon as possible
to send this text as a diplomatic note to the MFA.
Begin Text:
Complimentary Opening… and has the honor to inform the
Ministry of the following.
The United States of America
requests the Republic of
Tajikistan’s consent by return diplomatic note for the regular
transit of non-lethal cargo through Tajikistan by commercial
means. This cargo would be
transported using Tajikistan’s rail
and road networks. The Government
of the United States is also
interested in exploring opportunities to purchase local goods to
support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
Complimentary Closing.
End Text.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 194322
date: 2/27/2009 13:00
refid: 09DUSHANBE241
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1502|08DUSHANBE1548
header:
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DE RUEHDBU #0241/01 0581300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0095
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0010
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0025
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0020
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0128
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000241
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ETRD, PGOV, ELAB, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S ECONOMY IN DIRE CONDITION, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SAY
REF: A: 08 DUSHANBE 1502, B: 08 DUSHANBE 1548
DUSHANBE 00000241 001.2 OF 003
1. (U) Summary: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are
predicting a very difficult year ahead for Tajikistan as a
result of the global financial crisis.
Economists at both
institutions say the situation is far worse than they had
predicted even a month ago. It is
expected that the major
impact on the Tajik economy will come from a steep drop in
remittances from Tajiks working abroad, especially in Russia.
Remittances, which equaled over half of Tajikistan’s GDP last
year, are a lifeline for this poor economy. But January figures
were 22% lower than the previous year, the first such drop in
six years of recordkeeping. The
IMF predicts GDP growth of 3%
this year, but cautions that this is «optimistic.» The EBRD
initially predicted 5%, but said the figure will be revised
downward. Economists at both
organizations said the economy
will likely get much worse before it gets better, and Tajikistan
may require significant support to avoid serious hardship. The
IMF mission here said the results of the IMF-mandated audit of
the Central Bank will be made public soon, and following this
they will recommend renewed a Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) for Tajikistan at the April meeting of the IMF’s
board. End summary.
IMF, EBRD Urge Support for Fragile Tajik Economy
2. (U) The IMF briefed the international donor community on the
health of Tajikistan’s economy on February 18. Over the course
of the previous two weeks, an IMF team lead by Mission Chief for
Tajikistan Axel Schimmelpfennig had been in Dushanbe to assess
the country’s macroeconomic conditions, meet with government
officials, and make recommendations about the future.
Schimmelpfennig announced that, based on the team’s findings,
they are recommending a resumption of assistance to Tajikistan
under the IMF’s low-interest lending program for low-income
countries, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
(IMF assistance to Tajikistan was suspended last year as a
result of National Bank misreporting about loans it had
underwritten to cotton sector financers.
IMF officials report
that the Bank has been meeting the loan repayments required for
resumption of assistance, and they are satisfied with
Tajikistan’s macroeconomic policy.)
Schimmelpfennig said his
team will recommend a PRGF in the amount of $120 million, with
much of the assistance front-loaded in order to help Tajikistan
cope with the financial crisis.
The proposal will be taken up
by the IMF’s board in Washington at the beginning of April.
3. (U) In a separate presentation two days later, the EBRD
unveiled its transition report for 2008, detailing economic
conditions and country performance in the Eurasian region. EBRD
Principal Economist Rika Ishii, based in London, was similarly
pessimistic about the state of the Tajik economy, saying that
the situation here is considerably worse than she had predicted
just a month ago. EBRD country
director Mathieu Le Blan said
that the Bank intends to make some 50 million Euros available to
Tajikistan this year in assistance.
What a Difference Two Months Make
4. (U) The majority of Axel Schimmelpfennig’s presentation was
devoted to a dour appraisal of Tajikistan’s economic climate
over the coming year. His tone
was markedly gloomier than it
was during his last visit two months ago (ref A). During that
visit he said Tajikistan was likely to be insulated from the
full brunt of the economic crisis due to the isolation of its
banking sector and the presumed resilience of remittance flows.
This time, however, he acknowledged that the crisis was already
having a very negative effect on the country, and there were few
domestic resources available to respond to it. He noted that
44% of domestic industries are not running at all right now due
to insufficient power.
5. (U) Schimmelpfennig said the IMF was now predicting GDP
growth of 3% for Tajikistan in 2009 — compared to its earlier
projection of 5-6% — «if all goes well.» But, he said, all was
not likely to go well, particularly given new projections that
Russia’s economy will contract by 1% over the coming year.
Given Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia as its primary source of
imports and remittances, negative growth in the Russian economy
will almost certainly have a significant impact here. EBRD’s
DUSHANBE 00000241 002.2 OF 003
Ishii said that the Russian Ministry of Finance had recently
released its own projection of a 2.2% contraction in the Russian
economy. In light of this, the
projection she had made at the
end of January that Tajikistan’s economy would grow by 5% this
year — based chiefly on the relatively mild winter — would
have to be significantly downwardly revised. She added
anecdotally that even over the course of the two days she had
spent in Tajikistan on this visit, it was clear that the
situation is much worse than she had imagined from London.
The Rose-Colored Glasses are Off on Remittances
6. (U) The major impact of the global financial crisis on the
Tajik economy will be felt through a decline in remittances.
Since 2003, when the IMF began collecting data, remittances
through the banking system have grown substantially year after
year, reaching $2.67 billion in 2008 — equivalent to 52% of
Tajikistan’s GDP, the highest percentage of any country in the
world. In January of this year,
however, for the first time in
six years remittances declined year-on-year, dropping 22% from
January 2008. The IMF forecasts
that remittances over the
course of 2009 will be 30% lower than 2008, but Schimmelpfennig
once again cautioned that even this figure may be optimistic,
given credible projections he has seen of a 50% drop. The EBRD
also predicts that remittances will decline steeply, but they
did not make a specific prediction.
7. (U) The IMF appears to have adopted a different paradigm
since its earlier briefing in December.
Even as the financial
crisis was gathering steam, IMF and World Bank officials were
predicting that remittances would prove resilient to economic
shocks. Some of their confidence
was based on economic
research, including work done by World Bank remittance expert
Dilip Ratha, arguing that remittances are very «supply
dependent» — i.e., that overseas guestworkers will do
everything possible to continue sending money back home,
including moving to a new location or country, accepting
lower-status or lower-paying work, or even cutting back on their
own expenditures on food and housing.
The new IMF and EBRD
projections appear to eschew this earlier logic, however.
8. (U) Ishii cautioned, however, that we should avoid drawing
conclusions from one month in isolation.
She noted that January
2008 remittance figures were particularly high as a result of
last winter’s food crisis, when overseas workers made efforts to
send home as much money as possible to help their families. She
said she has also heard reports that more people may be
hand-carrying remittances home rather than sending them through
banks, out of concern about the stability of the Tajik banking
sector. Both factors would result
in deflated January 2009
figures. A clearer picture would
emerge, she said, when data
from February and March are known.
Schimmelpfennig said that a
side effect of continued decline in remittances would be the
return of a significant amount of overseas workers. If this
happened, the country would have less money with which to feed
more mouths — a situation that had the potential to spiral
downward.
Somoni Expected to Slide South
9. (U) Both the EBRD and IMF experts said they expected the
Tajik somoni to continue to decline against the dollar. (Note:
In the last few months the somoni has dropped from 3.4 to as
much as 3.9 to the dollar. The
official rate is currently 3.8.
Since the currency floats freely, unofficial rates do not vary
much from the official rate, although they are usually a tenth
of a somoni higher. End
note.) Schimmelpfennig said that there
is almost nothing the National Bank of Tajikistan can do to halt
the slide of the somoni, given its relatively small reserves and
the sheer size of the macroeconomic forces it is up against.
Even if it had the ability to protect the currency, however, he
strongly advised the Bank to let the slide continue, acting only
to ensure that the decline was smooth.
While the decline hurt
imports, it nevertheless boosted domestic production. He was
reluctant to predict where the somoni would be trading at year’s
end, but said he would not be surprised if the «real effective
exchange rate» against a basket of world currencies would likely
drop by 10% or 20%.
10. (U) Schimmelpfennig said that as a result of worsening
DUSHANBE 00000241 003.2 OF 003
macroeconomic conditions and declining revenues, the external
financing gap for the country’s budget would be $135 million
this year. He was recommending
that the IMF contribute $51
million toward closing that gap, with other donors offering $74
million in direct budget support.
The IMF also predicts a 7%
drop in trade, which some donors thought was optimistic.
Bright Spots? Not Many
11. (U) Schimmelpfennig said that there are a few potential
bright spots in the Tajik economy.
One was that domestic
non-cotton agricultural production may receive a boost due to
plummeting world cotton prices and the increased cost of food
imports. A great deal of Tajik
food comes from Russia; while
the somoni has held relatively stable against the ruble, its
decline against other world currencies may make it more
difficult to purchase imports.
Schimmelpfennig said he has
already seen some limited evidence that government leaders
recognized the importance of diversifying the agricultural
sector, and this was an issue the IMF would follow up on. He
added that there has also been some positive inertia in the
domestic construction sector, even in Dushanbe, which appears
not to have slowed much due to the financial crisis. As the
crisis prolongs, however, this may change. (He expressed some
surprise that the construction of the Somoni Hotel, financed by
a Turkish firm, is continuing around the clock.) He added that
inflation was expected to come in at 12-13% in 2009,
Audit Results Expected Soon
11. (SBU) During a question-and-answer session after the IMF
presentation, Schimmelpfennig gave a status update on three
major audits commissioned in the wake of the misreporting
scandal. The audit of the
National Bank had been completed, and
he expected that its key findings would be published on the
bank’s website within the next month.
(Note: in an earlier
conversation IMF country director Luc Moers told Econoff that
the bank, which could use its own discretion in deciding what
findings were considered «key,» might choose not to make
negative conclusions public (ref B).
End note.) He said there
would be no surprises, although he added — to some raised
eyebrows in the room — that «the key for everyone will be to
take a little bit of a leap of faith in the authorities that
everything is on track.»
12. (SBU) The audit of the Barki Tajik has been completed and
should be published soon. The
audit of the Talco aluminum
company, the nation’s largest industry, has still not been
conducted. Three firms have
submitted bids. Under Tajik law
the country is obligated to select the lowest bid, which in this
case comes from the «mid-tier» London-based firm Moore
Stephens,
out of its Moscow office.
Schimmelpfennig admitted, however,
that he would be much more comfortable if the audit were
performed by Big-Four firm Ernst and Young, whose bid was
$150,000 higher. He appealed to
donors in the audience to
consider providing that funding.
(He had assurances from the
Tajik government that there would be no problem accepting Ernst
and Young provided the gap was met by a donor.)
13. (SBU) Comment: Earlier predictions by the IMF, echoed by
Tajik Goverment officials, that Tajikistan was shielded from the
global crisis have now gone by the board, and all eyes are on
the economic situation in Russia.
The next major economic
indicator to watch will be how many Tajiks return to Russia to
work later in the spring, and how much remittances pick up
during that time. Now that
Tajikistan has successfully
completed the Staff Monitoring Program demanded after the
misreporting scandal, which the IMF says has led to some
improvements in banking governance and Finance Ministry
oversight of state enterprises, the IMF is looking to move
forward with the PRGF; it will make a proposal to its board in
the first week of April. We would
withhold judgement on the
advisability of a PGRF until the Central Bank’s audit is posted.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 194481
date: 2/27/2009 21:37
refid: 09STATE18796
origin: Secretary of State
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE234
header:
VZCZCXRO5484
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHC #8796 0582152
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 272137Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 0141
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS STATE 018796
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AF, TI, EAID, PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT APPROVAL TO SEND DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON
TRANSIT OF GOODS TO AFGHANISTAN
REF: DUSHANBE 234
1. (SBU) In response to the
Embassy,s request for approval
dated 26 February (Reftel), the State Department hereby
authorizes the Embassy to send the below text as a diplomatic
note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of
Tajikistan.
Begin Text:
Complimentary Opening… and has the honor to inform the
Ministry of the following.
The United States requests
the Republic of
Tajikistan,s consent by return diplomatic note for the
transit of non-legal cargo through Tajikistan by commercial
means. This cargo would be
transported using Tajikistan,s
rail and road networks. The
Government of the United States
is also interested in exploring opportunities to purchase
local goods to support the International Security Assistance
Force and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
Complimentary Closing.
End Text.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 194666
date: 3/2/2009 12:09
refid: 09DUSHANBE242
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6636
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0242/01 0611209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 021209Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0098
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0028
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0013
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0131
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000242
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/2/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KJUS, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: AN INSIDE LOOK AT TAJIK LAW ENFORCEMENT
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: The Ministry of Interior’s investigation of an
embassy employee’s alleged involvement in a visa scam gave
EmbOffs an inside look at how Tajik law enforcement officers
conduct criminal investigations.
The embassy employee was
ultimately cleared of criminal liability, but the investigation
showed the major challenges facing Tajik law enforcement
institutions: the mindset that suspects are guilty until proven
innocent; poor administration that hampers the efficiency of
investigations; and the malign influence of the State Committee
on National Security. End
Summary.
EMBASSY EMPLOYEE ACCUSED
2. (C) In November 2008, a Tajik woman accused an embassy
employee in the Public Affairs Section (PAS) of running a visa
fraud ring. The woman originally
informed the Regional Security
Officer, who in early December 2008 notified the Ministry of
Interior of the allegations. The
embassy employee allegedly
offered to arrange visas to the United States and Canada in
return for several thousand dollars.
The victim said she handed
the money to an associate of the embassy employee in May 2008,
and she never received a visa.
Once the police began
investigating, 11 more victims came forward; investigators
estimated that the perpetrator collected about $60,000.
3. (C) The Regional Security Office was closely involved in the
investigation from the beginning, and in February 2009, the
embassy employee was exonerated of criminal liability. Police
investigators found that she was not in a position to influence
visa determinations, that she did not have contact with any of
the victims, and that she had no involvement in the crime. In
fact, they found that the person who originally claimed to be a
victim was in fact one of those perpetrating the crime. She had
simply used the embassy employee’s name to deflect attention
from herself.
BAD MANAGEMENT, INEFFICIENT INVESTIGATIONS
4. (C) It took police investigators over two months to exclude
the embassy employee as a suspect, despite the fact that only
one of the 12 victims had even mentioned her as being involved
in the scheme. The original lead
investigator interviewed the
embassy employee in mid-December 2008, in the presence of a
Diplomatic Security Special Agent and the Public Affairs
Officer. It was obvious that the
investigator assumed that the
embassy employee was guilty from the types of questions he asked
and from his tone. After the
interview, the investigator told
the DS agent, «Of course she’s involved — why else would someone
have accused her?»
5. (C) The case had three different lead investigators between
December 2008 and February 2009, and overall supervision of the
case moved between two different departments within the Ministry
of Interior. In late December
2008, a senior Ministry of
Interior administrator told the Regional Security Office that
the case would be reassigned because he was «not happy with the
lead investigator,» who held the mid-level rank of Major. A few
weeks later, the new lead investigator informed the Regional
Security Office that the case would be reassigned because «he
had too heavy a caseload.»
6. (C) It took investigators a long time to conduct basic
investigative steps, partly because of a management style that
has not changed much since the Soviet period. Criminal
investigators generally do not conduct field interviews,
participate in searches, or seek out leads. Investigators
manage the paperwork while different «operational» officers
follow up all investigative leads.
The result is that lead
investigators only have the information that others obtain for
them, and field officers are not privy to all the facts of the
case. They are therefore not
necessarily in a position to
recognize important evidence or clues.
DUSHANBE 00000242 002 OF 002
7. (C) Lack of resources also contributed to delays. Most of
the documents in the case file were hand-written. The lead
investigators generally typed up the victim statements
themselves, but only one of the three lead investigators had a
computer in his office. In one
case, the investigator was so
poor at typing that he conducted the interview by having the
witness type her own statement.
It took investigators more than
three weeks after the original complaint to obtain a search
warrant for their prime suspect’s house.
It took investigators
more than a month to request phone records of the victims and
suspect, despite the Ministry of Interior unit having unfettered
access to call records from all cellular providers in Tajikistan
(the law does not require warrants or requests from prosecutors).
AND OF COURSE, THERE’S THE KGB
8. (C) By mid-January, the police had concluded that the
original accuser was not credible, and that she was herself the
perpetrator. Her accusations
against the embassy employee were
uncorroborated, and she made statements that were inconsistent
with those of the other victims.
However, she had a connection
with the State Committee on National Security (GKNB): her
boyfriend’s sister, who works at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, is reportedly the mistress of a high-ranking GKNB
official.
9. (C) GKNB officers were involved from the earliest phases of
the investigation. An GKNB
officer was present in mid-December
when the embassy employee was questioned at the Ministry of
Interior. After the interview, he
ominously told the Regional
Security Office that «we have some information on your
employee.» The third lead
investigator told the Regional
Security Office in late January that the GKNB is «putting
pressure on us in this case.»
After the Ministry of Interior
closed the case against the embassy employee in February, an
investigator told the Regional Security Office that the file
would be sent to the GKNB.
FINALLY, A CONCLUSION…OR IS IT?
9. (C) Comment: It appears that the Ministry of Interior
investigators ultimately came to the right conclusion — that the
embassy employee was not involved in this crime. However, the
way in which the investigation progressed highlights the
problems with Tajik law enforcement.
Even if an investigator is
well-intentioned, the Ministry does not have the resources to
ensure that an investigation is carried out efficiently. The
poor management of this relatively routine case does not bode
well for investigations of more complicated crimes. Moreover,
the omnipresence of the GKNB is a fact of life in Tajikistan.
The fact that GKNB officers can interfere in any case they
choose creates problems for the normal criminal investigative
process. In this case, because of
the GKNB’s involvement the
embassy employee still does not know whether the matter is
closed. EmbOffs do not have the
kind of connections with the
GKNB that would allow monitoring of their investigation. The
GKNB may have «information» on the employee — or it may just
use
this incident as a convenient pretext to put pressure on a U.S.
Embassy employee. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 194676
date: 3/2/2009 12:52
refid: 09DUSHANBE245
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6689
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0245 0611252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021252Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0103
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0136
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0008
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0008
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0008
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0008
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0003
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000245
SIPDIS
ALMATY FOR USAID
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, ECON, EFIN, EAGR, TI
SUBJECT: FOOD DISTRIBUTION TENSE IN SOUTHERN TAJIKISTAN
1. Summary: USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA)provided Tajikistan with $3.35 million for emergency
winter food distribution for the most vulnerable in Tajikistan.
On February 26, visiting Assistance Coordinator Dan Rosenblum
visited Hiloli village in a Khatlon province in Southern
Tajikistan to see food being distributed by implementer Save the
Children. While rural areas are usually nearly empty of men,
many migrant workers were back from Russia and there was large
crowd of men at the distribution site. With sixty percent of
households receiving food, a scuffle broke out when some men
started demanding of local officials that the food be
distributed to all. End Summary.
2. With over three million dollars of funding from USAID’s OFDA,
the USG, through implementers Mercy Corps and Save the Children,
is distributing food to vulnerable families in some of the most
food insecure rural areas of Tajikistan. Flour, cooking oil and
lentils were procured in the region, and originally were to be
distributed in two tranches in December and February. Because of
transshipment delays in Uzbekistan, all the food was distributed
in February. Implementers worked with local governments to
identify the most vulnerable areas and the most vulnerable
households in those areas. Criteria for households included
those headed by women, headed by pensioners, with children under
two, the homeless, and the disabled without a source of regular
income or major assets.
3. On February 26, Dan Rosenblum, Assistance Coordinator for
Europe attended a food distribution in Hiloli village in the
Khurosan district of Khatlon province in southern Tajikistan.
Hiloli village is an area without irrigation that depends on
rain for agricultural production and drinking water. Because of
limited water supplies the villagers mainly make their living
from raising livestock and gathering firewood. Due to the
severity of last winter, when most livestock were either sold
for money for food or perished in the cold, and with wood stocks
similarly depleted, food and income was sharply curtailed in the
village. Of 198 households, 60% qualified as vulnerable and
eligible for food aid.
4. As with most rural areas nearly every family has had one or
members migrate to Russia for work and to send back money.
Usually when visiting such villages we see lots of women and
children and few older men. This time, however we arrived at the
site to find a large crowd of probably 200 men milling around.
As the few women present lined up to present their
identification for the food distribution, a scuffle broke out as
some men approached the local government officials present and
demanded that the available food be distributed equally among
all households, rather than food going only to those that met
the criteria. After several minutes of shouting, degenerating
into pushing and shoving, cooler heads prevailed and things
settled back down.
5. Although many migrant workers return during December-January
when construction in Russia slows, the villagers reported that
men had come back as early as September this year as they lost
their jobs. Most of the men who
had returned did not have jobs
to go back to in Russia come spring. When asked about their
plans most said they would look around at home for something to
do, and if nothing turned up would go back to Russia to try to
find work.
6. Comment: The food security
issues in Hiloli village
demonstrate the continued negative impact from last year’s harsh
winter. The large crowd of men
bore out reports that number of
migrants who returned this winter was higher than in previous
years and their early return almost certainly means the village
has gotten less remittance income in recent months. How many
stay and many return to Russia this spring will be a key test.
The confrontation for local officials is relatively unusual, but
shows the potential for increased tension as large numbers of
unemployed men find themselves at loose ends.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 194709
date: 3/2/2009 13:57
refid: 09DUSHANBE248
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6768
RR RUEHAST RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0248/01 0611357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021357Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0106
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0004
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0139
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000248
SIPDIS
AID/W FOR SCAA/FLYNN FULLER
ALMATY FOR USAID
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, KMPP, ASEC, EAID, APER, ABLD, TI
SUBJECT: MISSION RIGHTSIZING GOAL
1. Introduction and Summary: A recent review of the Mission
Strategic Plan provided a snapshot of what we achieved in the
last year and our top priorities looking ahead. This is the
fifth cable to provide a goal-by-goal look at what Embassy
Dushanbe is doing. For our rightsizing goal all agencies and
offices coordinate through the ICASS Budget Committee to provide
the management platform to support Mission staff carrying out
the work to achieve U.S. goals, to manage U.S. government-funded
projects and to oversee prudent use of taxpayer funds. End
introduction and summary.
Accomplishments
2. The Mission has high levels of local staff turnover, as
static local salaries cannot compete with other opportunities
available to skilled English-speaking staff. The Mission
successfully argued for an off-cycle salary review which
resulted in a 12.5% across the board increase, the first for
some years, in local staff compensation. The HR office prepared
information to allow a multiagency group to review our local
leave plan and is working with HR/OE bring it into compliance
with local labor law.
3. The winter of 2007/2008 was extremely difficult, with bitter
cold temperatures that cut off power and water supplies for
weeks at a time. The Mission had
to supply generator fuel and
water to all Embassy housing during these weeks, and the
Department contemplated drawing down Mission staff. Heroic
efforts by the team kept the embassy functioning and the staff
in country. For winter 2008/2009 the Mission undertook a
thorough winter planning effort. With OBO support, we obtained
extra temporary fuel storage for diesel, so that we could keep
generators and delivery trucks running in case of fuel
shortages. Although a warmer winter meant the severest hardships
did not come to pass, by mid-February post was managing lengthy
power outages each day.
4. Working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs we gathered
information on the government’s recently implemented VAT refund
process, submitted our first VAT refund request and got our
first refund. We installed water meters and got a written
agreement with the water company, validated by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to ensure that bills to the Embassy for water
reflect actual water use versus the previous method of estimated
usage based on the size of the intake pipes. This resulted in
significant cost savings. Construction was started on recreation
facilities next to the Chancery building.
5. The Mission has grown 250% in physical size and 500% in
direct hire staff in the last five years, but growth in the
ICASS staff has not kept pace. Post made a major push to get
three new positions, an HR/FM officer, an S/GSO and another IM
officer. Until these positions are created and filled, the
Ambassador has implemented a moratorium on new NSDD-38 positions
at the Mission. We got one of these positions and the new HR/FM
will arrive in March 2009. Post is short of ICASS local staff
and has been filling what are essentially full-time slots via a
labor contract. Post has gotten ICASS Council approval to create
direct hire positions to regularize this situation, and has a
plan to implement that change by the end of the fiscal year.
Priorities for the Coming Year
6. The electrical wiring in a large portion of our housing pool
does not meet U.S. safety standards. In the recent months we
have had two serious electrical fires in post housing. This
problem was a major issue noted by the OIG in our last
inspection. As people turn over,
Facilities Maintenance has
been upgrading the wiring of homes during make-readies. This is
a major job in each house and takes eight-twelve weeks, often
delaying our ability to have arriving staff move directly into
permanent quarters. There is only one contractor able to do this
work to the needed standard, and this contractor cannot handle
multiple houses simultaneously. This summer we will turn over or
add twenty houses, which can not all be upgraded in the short
window available. Establishing a plan to upgrade the electrical
wiring of houses is a top priority in the coming year.
7. Post is experiencing high and increasing turnover of skilled
local staff. We lost more than 25 people in 2008 and about 20
current FSNs have indicated plans to leave this year. Under our
local compensation plan, the highest paid FSN makes less than
$20,000 per year, with most of our key staff getting $14-16,000.
Skilled staff with good English can make much more in Russia or
elsewhere. Further the deteriorating living conditions in the
country, including long months with limited power, the
deteriorating quality of schooling for children, and the lack of
healthcare are strong incentives for people to leave. The pool
of applicants to refill these jobs is getting smaller and
DUSHANBE 00000248 002 OF 002
applicants have less experience and fewer skills. Getting a
further increase in local compensation will be important to
improving the stability of our local staff. In addition, we put
a high priority getting post specific ICASS training in Dushanbe
in FY 2010, in part because of high staff turnover.
8. Post hopes to make further progress on bringing on direct
hire management staff up to the level needed to support our
operations and assistance programs. Getting a senior GSO and an
additional IM position remain top priorities. Once we have
stopped using contract labor for core positions and we will
present a plan to bring our Facilities Maintenance local staff
into line with the amount of property post maintains. OBO is
helping by providing analysis of the standard staffing needed to
maintain and manage a compound and housing pool of our size.
Post will use this to create a plan for bringing the number of
staff in Facilities Maintenance up to the number needed to
properly manage post facilities.
9. Finally, post will be working OBO both to reconfigure our
existing space to meet our needs, and to move our warehouse and
motorpool from a condemned Soviet kindergarten several miles
away from the NEC onto the compound.
Key Challenges and Opportunities
———————————
10. Besides managing the ongoing turnover of local staff, in the
summer of 2009 we will face an unusually large turnover of
American staff, including virtually all of the management
section, except for one IM officer. As mentioned, the large
turnover coinciding with staffing gaps means that housing make
readies will be a challenge and the needed electrical upgrades
will need to be phased over time
11. GSO faces additional constraints trying to manage motorpool
and warehouse operations at a separate site. Post faces
exceptional logistical and transport difficulties, few local
sources for most supplies, and a lack of qualified local
contractors for many services and tasks. There are limited
international flights into and out of Dushanbe, often on smaller
planes with limited cargo space. Rail cargo often faces long
delays in transiting neighboring Uzbekistan, requiring a long
lead time for anything ordered. Likewise, pouch service faces
many serious delays.
12. In facing these challenges we are getting good support from
OBO and look forward to the team coming to chart a path forward.
In dealing with local utilities the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Diplomatic Services Office has been constructive. NEA/SCA/EX has
returned recoveries fund to us. This has been key to managing
our budget, and we look forward to continue support in this
area. NEA/SCA/EX has also helped in providing WAE coverage
during summer gaps in the management team, which has also been
important for us to meet our goals.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 194743
date: 3/2/2009 15:25
refid: 09LONDON544
origin: Embassy London
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09LONDON100
header:
VZCZCXRO6927
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLO #0544 0611525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021525Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1581
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
—————— header ends ———
