id: 190338
date: 2/4/2009 11:36
refid: 09SQCTION02OF02DUSHANBE143
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2595
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0143/02 0351136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041136Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1449
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0418
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SQCTION 02 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000143
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA and PA/PR/FPCW
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KPAO, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — FEB 11 HEARING ON RFE/RL TAX BILL
the tax committee had informed the station in a letter that the
August tax audit was ordered by the security services.
9. (SBU) Comment: So far, RFE/RL has not been harassed in Tajikistan
as it has been in neighboring countries, but the events related to
the station has been obscured by a lot of «smoke.» At the point
when the station itself and its local Tajik bureau chief were up for
re-accreditation last summer, the Government granted it. If the
government wanted to shut the station down, that would have been the
time to do so. As for what
provoked the lawsuits from former
employees last summer, a Tajik reporter points to Orion Bank
chairman Hasan Asadullozoda, who allegedly took revenge against the
station for reporting (inaccurately) he had been shot dead by the
president’s son last spring.
10. (SBU) Comment continued. Regarding RFE/RL contributor Abdumumin
Sherhonov, the reporter who was beaten up in Kulyab in January, both
he and RFE/RL’s Tajik bureau chief told emboff that the fight was
personal and not related to Sherhonov’s reporting. (Ref B) Finally,
the head of the tax committee who signed the letter threatening to
confiscate equipment retired a day or two after the letter was sent
and thus is no longer accountable for any consequences. It is
possible the threat was a clumsy, desperate attempt by unscrupulous
officials to see whether they would end up with easy cash in their
pockets. Emboff will be at the
February 11 hearing, which may
reveal more of the government’s motives.
End Comment.
Jacobson
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 190337
date: 2/4/2009 11:36
refid: 09DUSHANBE143
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1246|09DUSHANBE44
header:
VZCZCXRO2596
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0143/01 0351136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041136Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1448
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0417
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000143
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA and PA/PR/FPCW
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KPAO, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — FEB 11 HEARING ON RFE/RL TAX BILL
Ref: A) 08 Dushanbe 1246 B) Dushanbe 44
1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified — Not for Internet Distribution.
2. (SBU) Summary: On February 11 the Economic Court in Dushanbe will
hold a hearing regarding $110,000 in unpaid taxes that Tajikistan’s
tax committee alleges are owed by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s
(RFE/RL) Tajikistan bureau.
Although the committee had threatened
to seize the station’s bank assets and operating equipment if the
fine were not paid by January 30, as of February 2, no one had
carried out the threat. The
Ambassador told RFE/RL President Jeff
Gedmin January 23 that the embassy is ready to raise the issue with
the MFA if necessary to ask for a transparent and early court
action. RFE/RL local lawyers
believe the charge has no merit, and
RFE/RL management plans to appeal if the judge rules against the
local bureau. End summary.
RFE/RL TO HAVE ITS DAY IN COURT
——————————-
3. (SBU) On February 11 the Economic Court in Dushanbe will hold a
hearing regarding $110,000 in unpaid taxes that Tajikistan’s tax
committee alleges are owed by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s
(RFE/RL) Tajikistan bureau. In a
conversation January 28 with Abbas
Djavadi, RFE/RL’s Associate Director of Broadcasting, Djavadi told
PAO that RFE/RL’s lawyers believe the charge has no merit, but if
the judge ruled against RFE/RL, the station would appeal.
4. (SBU) The tax committee sent a letter to the station dated
January 20 threatening to seize the station’s bank assets and
operating equipment if the fine were not paid by January 30. When
PAO phoned Tajik bureau chief Mirzonabi Kholiqzoda February 2 to
ascertain the court date, he said that no one had carried out the
threat. RFE/RL’s legal counsel
advised that threatening to penalize
the station before the court decision is against Tajik law and may
explain why the tax authority did not act on its threat.
5. (SBU) In a telephone conversation January 23 with RFE/RL
President Jeff Gedmin, the Ambassador said the embassy was ready to
raise the issue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ask for a
transparent and early court action, if and when RFE/RL thought that
higher level intervention might be helpful. The Ambassador noted
that RFE/RL might have to pay the fine, because hiring practices for
part time reporters at the local station had not been in compliance
with Tajik labor law.
AUDIT TRAIL LEADS TO CONTROVERSIAL FREELANCE CONTRACTS
——————————————— ———
6. (SBU) In email and telephone correspondence with emboff, RFE/RL
managers said that a tax inspector assessed the fine on August 29,
2008, after an audit of the station’s books going back three years.
During that time the station employed some reporters under freelance
contracts. RFE/RL representatives
said that the freelancers were
responsible for paying their own taxes, which was explicitly stated
in their contracts and confirmed by a local law firm that reviewed
the Tajik bureau’s legal and taxation compliance in 2006. RFE/RL
reps said that the tax inspector in August still charged the station
for $110,000 in taxes not paid by the freelance reporters.
Moreover, because the amount exceeded 100,000 Tajik somoni
($29,000), the case triggered a review from the Tajik
anti-corruption agency, and that entity has threatened three current
or former RFE/RL employees with fines and even prison sentences for
their alleged complicity in the station’s failure to pay the taxes.
7. (SBU) After lawsuits filed in July by former reporters about
Q7. (SBU) After lawsuits filed in July by former reporters about
unfair benefits for part time employees (see reftel), the station
concluded contracts in compliance with the local labor code. The
last of the plaintiffs, former reporter Sayofi Mizrob (Saifuddin
Dostiev), had demanded $145,000 for being underpaid for 12 years,
but settled for $1,500 on October 31.
IS THE GOVERNMENT TRYING TO SHUT DOWN RFE/RL OR NOT?
——————————————— ——-
8. (SBU) RFE/RL representatives believe the case is part of a
pattern of harassment because the government does not want RFE/RL
publicizing the problems facing Tajik society, including government
corruption. RFE/RL president Jeff
Gedmin told the Ambassador that
that the government was trying to accomplish through legal maneuvers
«what it could not do directly for optical reasons — shut us
down.»
Sojida Djakhfarova, acting director of RFE/RL’s Tajik service, told
emboff on February 3 about a «two or three hour meeting» she
had
with Foreign Minister Zamrahon Zarifi in Dushanbe in November. She
said he was very familiar with RFE/RL’s website and complained about
the stories posted there. When
she defended the station’s
dedication to reporting news, she said he told her he had spent time
in the United States and understood the necessity for free media and
assured her the tax audit «was not political.» She told emboff that
***********************
* Missing Section 002 *
***********************
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 190482
date: 2/4/2009 23:30
refid: 09STATE10430
origin: Secretary of State
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE66
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #0430 0352341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 042330Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0000
INFO DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 010430
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: ASEC, CVIS, KLIG, KVIS, TI
SUBJECT: ARCHIVAL IMMUNITY WAIVER IN RESPONSE TO TAJIK MVD
REQUEST FOR ARCHIVES AND COMMUNCATIONS FROM AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE
REF: A. 09 DUSHANBE 0066
Classified By: SCA/CEN Tom Hushek for reasons 1.4(c) and (d)
1. (C) On January 4, 7, and 9,
Post has received three
official written requests for documentation and information
from the Tajik Ministry of Interior related to a criminal
investigation into a criminal case violating the Tajik law
«swindling». (reftel)
According to the documents received
from the Government of Tajikistan a locally employed Embassy
staff member from the Public Diplomacy section, Maya
Vahobova, has been accused of selling promises of visa
support along with a second Tajik national, Shakhzoda Mirova.
2. (U) Post is authorized to transmitthe following points to
the Government of Tajikistan by whatever means are deemed
most appropriate.
3. (C rel GOTI) Under Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, the archives of the Embassy are
inviolable at any time and wherever they shall be.
— The United States hereby expressly waives its archival
inviolability for the limited purpose of providing the
following information to the Tajik Ministry of the Interior
in relation to its criminal investigation of Maya Vahobova
and Shakhzoda Mirova for an alleged violation of Tajik law
«swindling» and for no other purpose.
— The following questions were posed by the Tajik Ministry
of Interior. Below each question is Post’s answer.
A. Please inform the Ministry
whether Muyassara Kahorovna
Vahobova is employed by the U.S. Embassy in the Republic of
Tajikistan. If yes, beginning when, in what role/job, and
what are her functional responsibilities. Also, please
advise the Ministry if she has the responsibility to prepare
documents for the issuance of U.S. visas.
ANSWER: Muyassara Kahorovna VAHOBOVA is currently employed by
the U.S. Embassy in the Republic of Tajikistan. She is the
Cultural Assistant. The cultural
assistant reports to the
Cultural Affairs Officer and is the mission’s sole local
employee who handles cultural and exchange activities. The
incumbent plans, develops, and administers nationwide
education and cultural programs designed to help Tajik
citizens better understand U.S. culture, values, and
policies. The cultural assistant
is granted broad discretion
in recommending and organizing receptions, exhibitions,
artist performances, arts training, and visits by U.S.
cultural envoys to promote US policies and values. She
manages the logistics and implementation of these events. The
cultural assistant assists in the management of visits by
Tajik citizens to the United States as part of cultural,
educational, and professional exchange programs. She helps
identify applicants for these programs, and a team of USG
citizens selects the participants.
The cu
ltural assistant then works directly with the participants to
collect biographic data and arranges travel, leads or
participates in pre-departure orientations, and return
briefings. She also prepares
reports for State liaison
offices in Washington.
About 5 percent of the cultural assistant’s time is spent
helping applicants fill out the standard online visa forms,
mostly for the International Visitor program. The mandatory
English language visa form DS-156 can ONLY be completed
online and Maya helps those who do not speak English or who
lack Internet access or even electricity, and sometimes their
dependents who accompany them on the program. The applicants
fill in the paper copies of the form, often in Russian, then
give Maya the form to put the data enter into the English
online form. Maya enters the
information using her own
computer, prints out the resulting document with the bar
code, and gives the applicant the form, which the applicant
takes to the consular section during the interview. She is
the liaison to the consular section, which sets the visa
interview appointment. She does not
conduct visa interviews
or have any interaction with the actual visa application
process. She does not issue visas
nor have any influence
over the issuance of visas. The
Consul reports that he has
never been approached by Maya with any inappropriate
questions regarding the visa process.
B. Who works with Vahobova in
her section and in the
office? Which office telephone number and mobile phone number
does she use? What are the other office telephone numbers in
her area? And who has access to her phone and the other
office telephones?
ANSWER: The Public Diplomacy section of the Embassy is led by
Jacqueline McKennan and her deputy Anne Benjaminson. Both are
American diplomats accredited to the Republic of Tajikistan.
There are currently two other citizens of Tajikistan that
work in the Public Diplomacy office. Abdumalik Kadirov is a
Cultural Affairs Assistant working alongside Maya Vahobova.
Nigina Alieva is an Information Assistant and works with the
mass media.
Maya Vahobova’s office number is 229-2312. Her cell phone
number is 90-700-7060. Anyone in the Public Diplomacy section
could, theoretically, have access to any of the office
telephones in the section. The other extension numbers for
the section are: 2351, 2313, 2315, 2314, 2318.
C. Which Embassy employee uses
the telephone numbers
229-23-00 and 229-23-12. Who has right to use these
telephones? Is it possible to make outgoing call from these
numbers.
ANSWER: 229-2300 is the general number for the
ConsularAffairs section. Nobody in the Public Diplomacy
section would have access to that number. It does not connect
to numbers outside the Consular section. There is an
automated answer and reply system that allows callers to get
routine answers in multiple languages to Consular services.
Nobody uses that number directly to call outside the Embassy.
229-2312 is a telephone number in
the Public Diplomacy
section and belongs to Maya Vahobova. Anyone in the Public
Diplomacy section could, theoretically, have access to this
number.
D. Did Vahobova speak at any
universities or similar
institutions in Dushanbe on behalf of U.S. Government
programs from July up to present time? If yes when, with
which program, and in which institutions?
ANSWER: In September, Maya and Anne Benjaminson attended the
International Education Fair in Khujand attended by hundreds
of academics, students. Many
educational institutions, NGOs,
and foreign missions set up information booths and made
presentations about international study programs.
On the following dates Maya accompanied U.S. Embassy
personnel who delivered lectures about quoted topics approved
by the Ministry of Education: Nov 12 Anne Benjaminson,
Pedagogical institute, «Education in the U.S.» Nov 14 DCM
Necia Quast, Technological University of Tajikistan,
«American Agriculture.» Nov 20 — Anne Benjaminson —
Tajik-Russian Slavonic University ) presentation on the
Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant program and
other exchange programs. Jan 7 ) RSO Seth Green,
Technological University of Tajikistan, «The U.S.
Constitution.»
E. What documents are necessary
to apply for an American
visa?
ANSWER: The following United States Government forms are
necessary to apply for a visa: Forms DS-156 (visa
application), DS-157 (for men aged 16-45) and DS-158 (for
students). In addition, applicants must present 1 photo, a
valid foreign passport and the Consular fee of 131 USD.
F. The order of addressing,
obtaining and extension of USA
visa.
ANSWER: The process of receiving a visa is 1) Make an
advanced appointment online. 2) Submit the forms, photo, ID,
and fee on the day of the appointment. 3) Participate in a
visa interview with an American Consul. 4) Submit electronic
fingerprints at the time of the interview. 5) Visa wait time
is typically one day after the interview.
No visa extensions are available. Each time the applicant
must go through the above process and pay a new fee each
time.
G. Is there a citizen of the
Republic of Tajikistan by the
name «Muyasara» and «Maysara» approximately 40-45
years old
employed by the Embassy of the United States of America in
the Republic of Tajikistan with the exception of VAHOBOVA
Muyassara Kahorovna?
ANSWER: There are no other Embassy employees named «Muyasara»
and «Maysara», regardless of age.
H. In the course of the
Embassy’s preliminary
investigation, the Embassy’s local security employee, Yusuf
Kholov, used a photo spread to ascertain whether Mirova could
identify Vahobova. The Ministry requests a copy of the photos
used for the investigative file and evidence.
I. Which Embassy employees use
telephone numbers 229-20-00
and 229-23-14? Who uses these
telephone numbers? Is this
possible to make outgoing call from these numbers?
ANSWER: 229-2000 is the general Embassy switchboard number.
Any and all phone extensions in the Embassy will show this
number for outgoing calls and this number is widely and
publicly distributed as the Embassy’s general number. While
nobody individually has the 229-2000 number, all outgoing
calls from the Embassy would show this number.
229-2314 is a number in the Public Diplomacy section. The
desk the phone is on is currently vacant. Anyone in the
Public Diplomacy section could, theoretically, have access to
this number.
J. On December 2, 2008, please
provide the Ministry
information about when Vahobova and Kholov arrived and
departed the Embassy.
ANSWER: Yusuf Kholov arrived at the Embassy on December 2,
2008 at 0705 and departed the Embassy at 1746 hours. Maya
Vahobova arrived at the Embassy on December 2, 2008 at 0807
and departed the Embassy at 1659 hours.
K. According to phone records
of incoming and outgoing
calls from cellular phone of Mirova (tel: 93-520-00-88) she
repeatedly called to the following phone numbers of the U.S.
Embassy. Please provide us with the information regarding who
from the Embassy spoke on the phone with Mirova? What was the
subject of their conversation and whether phone conversations
were recorded? If yes, please provide investigation with the
mentioned conversation to add it to criminal case.
i. 229-23-00: 11-12-2008 at
11:08: duration of call 36
seconds
ii. 229-23-00: 11-12-2008 at
11:30: duration of call 25
seconds
iii. 229-20-00: 11-18-2008 at
8:34: duration of call 1
minute 36 seconds
iv. 229-23-00: 11-20-2008 at
15:16: duration of call 6
seconds
v. 229-23-00: 12-02-2008 at
17:11: duration of call 1
minute 43 seconds
vi. 229-20-00: 12-02-2008 at
17:14: duration of call 4
minutes 22 seconds
vii. 229-23-00: 12-02-2008 at
22:22: duration of call 1
minute 43 seconds
viii. 229-23-00: 12-02-2008 at 22:30: duration of call 1
minute 30 seconds
ix. 229-23-00: 12-02-2008 at
22:33: duration of call 45
seconds
ANSWER: Calls to the number 229-2300 were sent to an
automated message service. There are numerous automated
messages and options to acquire various information related
to Consular services such as American passport renewal,
non-immigrant visa services, birth and death notifications,
and other services commonly provided by Consular sections
around the world. As this is not a number that a live person
answers, there was not likely any conversation ) especially
with the short duration of the calls. The number 229-2300
does not have an operator assigned and cannot transfer calls
to other extensions.
Calls to the number 229-2000 go to the main operator. The
operator received dozens of calls per day and does not
register or log whom they transfer calls to. A check of
Embassy records shows that 570-0088 did in fact dial the
Embassy number at 08:35. After 26 seconds, the call was
transferred to the Consular section (extension 2308) to local
employee Natasha Pilipenko. The call lasted 1 minute exactly
and was transferred to extension 2302, belonging to local
employee Tahmina Dekhoti. The call lasted 29 seconds and was
disconnected. Dekhoti indicated that she did not in fact
speak with Mirova from that number, but rather it was Sadbarg
Ganieva calling from Mirova’s cell phone. According to
Takhmina, Ganieva had called many times before but Embassy
records indicate that other numbers were used. She said that
her son and several other student aged people paid between
3500 and 4500 USD to Maya through someone named Shakhzoda.
According to Ganieva, Maya promised to assist with an F-1
student visa if they pay her and eventually disappeared.
According to Takhmina, Ganieva made implicit threats of
physical harm to her ) and indicated that she had &high
level connections8 at the Tajik State Committee for National
Security. During the call in
question, she also mentioned
that she had already spoken with both Maya Vakhobova and
Yusuf Kholov and was aware that the Embassy had filed a case
with the Ministry of Interior. Sadbarg Ganieva is the head of
the local UNESCO office, and an employee of the Tajik
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RSO
learned during the
investigation that Sadbarg Ganieva’s son is the boyfriend of
Mirova.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 190521
date: 2/5/2009 8:57
refid: 09DUSHANBE144
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1256|08DUSHANBE1388
header:
VZCZCXRO3504
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0144 0360857
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050857Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1450
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0419
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000144
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR G/TIP HALL, DRL/ILCSR HAILEY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, EAGR, ELAB, TI
SUBJECT: COTTON FORCED LABOR PROSECUTIONS IN THE SOUTH
REF: (A) 08 Dushanbe 1256
(B) 08 Dushanbe 1388
1. (U) Summary: Prosecutors in Tajikistan’s Khatlon Region have
begun pursuing charges against officials for forcing students to
participate in the cotton harvest.
These are the first such cases
filed in Tajikistan, and demonstrate that at least some officials
are prepared to uphold the law.
End summary.
2. (SBU) Nosirjon Mamurzoda, a stringer for Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty in Khatlon has filed several stories on cases against local
officials who forced students to participate in the 2008 cotton
harvest in Khatlon. He has spoken
to victims about the conditions
to which they were subjected during the harvest, and he has
maintained contacts in the prosecutors’ offices which are pursuing
the actions. According to
Mamurzoda, prosecutors have filed cases
in Sarband, Shahritus, and Kubodiyon.
3. (SBU) In Sarband, a local prosecutor found that students from a
vocational school were forced to pick cotton in October. School
officials organized the students’ transport to the cotton field in
Jami, and the director of the school expelled 30 students who
refused to participate. The
prosecutor filed administrative (not
criminal) charges in November or December, asking that the teachers
be reprimanded. Of the 30
expelled students 21 were allowed to
return; the remaining 9 were drafted into military service.
Mamurzoda had heard that 10 teachers at the school were reprimanded
by Ministry of Education officials; he was unsure of the punishment.
The director of the school was
not punished.
4. (SBU) Both cases in Shahrtus and Kubodiyon are criminal cases in
which prosecutors are investigating the culpability of local
officials in injuries suffered by 5 children forced to work in the
cotton fields. Mamurzoda was
unsure of whether the injuries were
caused while the children were being transported to the fields or
while the children were actually working in the fields. The
injuries were severe enough to require hospitalization. While the
details of the criminal investigations are sketchy, Mamurzoda said
there was enough information to prove that officials in both towns
organized and supervised school children between the ages of 14 and
17 working in the cotton fields, in violation of the Law on
Education. The accused in
Shahritus is the Deputy Chairman of the
town’s government; in Kubodiyon. The accused is the head of the
Department of Education.
5. (SBU) Comment: These cases are the first (and only) cases lodged
against Tajik officials in relation to forced labor and child labor
in the cotton sector (see refs A and B).
Mamurzoda attributed this
effort to hold officials accountable to the regional prosecutor,
Foziljon Akhunov. While the cases
are positive step toward
addressing an important human rights concern, they do not represent
a national-level effort. That’s
the necessary next step which
embassy is pushing for. End
comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 190726
date: 2/6/2009 7:04
refid: 09DUSHANBE146
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE121|09DUSHANBE125|09DUSHANBE4|09DUSHANBE46
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0146/01 0370704
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060704Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1452
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0421
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0227
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0300
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0304
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000146
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PREL, RU, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK-RUSSIAN RELATIONS COOL, ONLY TO WARM AGAIN
REF: A. (A) DUSHANBE 125
B. (B) DUSHANBE 121
C. (C) DUSHANBE 046
D. (D) DUSHANBE 004
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Tajik-Russian relations seem to have hit a
rough patch, mainly over perceived Russian support for
Uzbekistan in Tajik-Uzbek water sharing disagreements.
Resentments over mistreatment of Tajiks working in Russia and
lack of work opportunities there has added to tensions.
President Rahmon vacillated about whether to attend the CSTO
meeting in Moscow in early February, and finally decided to
go. This, and his warm welcome to
the U.S. interest in
northern supply routes to Afghanistan may partially have been
motivated by a desire to show Russia that he has other
friends. End Summary.
2. (C) On February 1 the government announced that Rahmon
had, at the last minute, cancelled his trip to Moscow to
participate in summits of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)
and to meet with President Medvedev.
He later reinstated it.
Rahmon also cancelled then
reinstated a subsequent trip to
the Baltics, blaming both cancellations on the precarious
energy situation in Tajikistan (ref B).
3. (C) While undoubtedly true, that explanation only touched
the surface. Dushanbe has been
engaged in a war of words
with Moscow over a number of different issues during the past
two months, culminating in Tajikistan’s angry reaction to a
Medvedev statement in Tashkent, perceived as supporting
Uzbekistan’s position in a longstanding dispute over Central
Asian water rights (ref A).
Medvedev said on January 23 that
hydropower projects in the region had to take into account
the interests of all users of transboundary rivers.
Tajikistan claims that the rivers in which it has numerous
ongoing and prospective hydropower plants are completely
internal, while Uzbekistan’s position, which has received
support from international organizations, is that
Tajikistan’s rivers are part of transboundary water systems
that require international approval before being altered.
The dispute has ratcheted up this winter as Tashkent has —
with little explanation — blocked transit of Turkmen
electricity, with Dushanbe countering by threatening to hold
water back in the spring in order to replenish its reservoirs.
4. (C) Even before Medvedev’s statement, relations between
Dushanbe and Moscow were troubled.
In December the murder of
a Tajik migrant worker in Russia generated an outpouring of
popular anger in Tajikistan, including protests in front of
the Russian Embassy. The Russian
Embassy, although it issued
a statement regretting the loss of life, also responded by
issuing an unusual public diplomatic note to the Tajik
government complaining about the reporting of the Tajik media
(ref D). In another twist on
diplomatic relations, Tajik
media in late January reported a rumor that the Government of
Tajikistan had rejected the proposed new Russian Ambassador,
because he was considered too low-ranking.
5. (C) Underlying this public back-and-forth has been the
steadily increasing fear that the worsening world financial
crisis may have profound affects on the prosperity of both
countries. Russia’s decision to
halve the official quota on
CIS guest workers in December ) although its actual effects
QCIS guest workers in December ) although its actual effects
remain debatable ) has increased worries in Tajikistan about
declining remittances that are crucial to their economy (ref
C). Tajikistan’s remittances, as
a percentage of its GDP,
are the highest in the world.
6. (C) The possible cancellation of the President’s trip to
Moscow received a tremendous amount of bated-breath media
coverage in Tajikistan and farther afield. Part of the issue
was that reliable information about the President’s
intentions were hard to come by ) in all likelihood
reflecting uncertainty in the presidential administration
itself. News reports emerged
every few minutes announcing
that the trip was either back on or back off. Regardless of
its position on the trip, almost every article accentuated
the dramatic nature of a presidential cancellation, noting
that Rahmon had never once failed to attend a CSTO summit.
7. (C) In the end, Rahmon went to Moscow. He and Medvedev
must have made nice; on February 5 the presidential
administration announced that Rahmon would return to Moscow
this month for a working visit, and later in the year for a
state visit.
8. (C) Tajikistan’s difficulties with Russia may be
responsible for its particularly warm reception of new
linkages with other countries, including both the United
States and Iran. Tajik media have
reported on various local
experts, including some affiliated with the government,
reacting very favorably to NATO’s proposed Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) to supply troops in Afghanistan
and saying Tajikistan was eager to host foreign military
bases as a way to help stabilize Afghanistan and break the
country’s economic dependence on Russia.
Even here, however,
Tajikistan cannot act without its troublesome neighbor, since
the freight lines that lead into the country pass through
Uzbekistan.
9. (C) Rahmon also has very publicly welcomed economic
cooperation with Tehran, voicing his approval for the
creation of a Persian bloc including Iran, Tajikistan, and
Afghanistan. Among other
proposals, the thinking includes
the development of transportation networks that bypass
Uzbekistan, including an already begin railway linking Iran
with the western Afghan city of Herat.
Additional plans
include the development of the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas
to serve as an outlet for Tajik exports, particularly
aluminum. Soon after Medvedev’s
unwelcome comments in
Tashkent Rahmon spoke with President Ahmadinejad, and
Dushanbe is now hosting the Iranian trade minister.
10. (C) Regardless of the severity of the row between
Tajikistan and Russia, it is a bigger deal in Dushanbe than
it is in Moscow. Dushanbe can
hardly go its own way ) it
relies on Russia for everything, from imports to remittances
to military security. The global
economic crisis and the
expanding U.S. operation in Afghanistan, and the possibility
of the closure of the U.S. air base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan,
have changed this relationship somewhat, and the Tajik
leadership will try to play these changes to Tajikistan’s
financial advantage. But while
Tajikistan wants to show
Russia that it has other friends, the overwhelming weight of
interests continues to bind Dushanbe to Moscow. The quick
reconciliation during Rahmon’s just-concluded visit to Moscow
showed this clearly. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 190728
date: 2/6/2009 7:10
refid: 09DUSHANBE147
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE1582|08DUSHANBE169|09DUSHANBE130
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0147/01 0370710
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060710Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1454
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0423
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0302
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0229
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0306
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000147
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN GOVERNMENT SHUFFLE — STRIKE A BLOW FOR
MORE OF THE SAME
REF: A. (A) 2008 DUSHANBE 1582
B. (B) DUSHANBE 130
C. (C) 2008 DUSHANBE 169
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: In the annual Tajik government reshuffle,
President Rahmon replaced the heads of major state
enterprises and a variety of district heads and deputy
ministers. Like last year’s
reshuffle, government changes
were mainly at the district and deputy minister level. The
only cabinet level change this year was also the move with
the greatest potential significance, the appointment of a
northerner as Minister of Interior.
Despite years of rumors
about their impending retirements, the Prime Minister and
Defense Minister remained in their jobs.
There has been no
general change of Ministers since late 2006. End summary.
————————-
State Industries Punished
————————-
2. (C) In December President Rahmon fired the Director of
Tajik Air, Hokimsho Tilloev who, senior presidential economic
advisers told us, opposed and slowed Tajik Air’s breakup into
separate air and ground services companies (ref A). He left
for a wealthy retirement. His
successor was Alimurod
Mahmadaliev, previously of the state anti-corruption agency.
In the mid-January reshuffle, Rahmon fired the heads of the
state electricity monopoly, Barki Tojik, the state gas
monopoly, and the state-owned cement and chemicals companies.
His stated reasons for removing
them were poor management
practices and their failure to adequately prepare for the
winter.
3. (C) On January 30 Rahmon replaced the Minister of
Interior. He selected a
northerner as the new Minister,
Abdurahim Qahhorov, previously the regional Ministry of
Interior head in Sugdh Oblast (ref B).
This was the first
northerner Rahmon had appointed to a «power» ministry (i.e. a
security service). (Note: Embassy
political specialist
recalls that in 1992, prior to becoming President, Rahmon
told the U.S. DCM that if he succeeded in becoming leader of
Tajikistan, he would never allow a northerner to control a
security-related ministry.)
4. (C) Rahmon also issued his usual public warnings to
various senior officials that they needed to shape up, or
ship out. President Rahmon has
previously used such warnings
as a means of deflecting responsibility for the country’s
problems, and showing that he is trying to promote change
(ref C). One of the officials so
warned was the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, who was told to improve his
performance in the next six months, or lose his job. The
exact basis for the criticism was unclear, but it doesn’t say
much for judicial independence.
————————
Corruption Not Punished
————————
5. (C) One notable change was the dismissal of the State Tax
Committee Chairman. His
replacement, Nusratullo Davlatov,
was previously First Deputy Chairman of the Committee.
Davlatov is likely to bring to the Chairmanship a strong
understanding of tax fraud issues; he is the French Embassy’s
landlord, and French embassy staff told us Davlatov falsified
his own tax returns, claiming he received only $500 per month
from the French, when in fact they pay him $5,000.
6. (C) Comment: Despite mismanagement of last winter’s power
shortage, and a repeat of power shortages this year, Rahmon
Qshortage, and a repeat of power shortages this year, Rahmon
has chosen to limit major changes to the heads of some of the
state enterprises. Blaming and
punishing the gas and
electricity chiefs for mismanagement seems an obvious step to
deflect blame from the President for the power and gas
cutoffs in Tajikistan. But the
emphasis on accountability
for state enterprises undermines the legitimacy of political
leaders below the President. Like
the long-serving and loyal
— but harmless — Prime Minister, the cabinet ministers are
made to seem largely irrelevant to the country’s future. In
government, only the President matters.
It is, however,
difficult for Rahmon to replace ministers; the heads of
ministries and other senior officials represent business
clans with their hands on control of imports of key goods
such as gas and wheat, cotton production, or control of
retail centers around the country.
Cutting them off from
political power could upset too many other hidden interests.
7. (C) Comment continued: However, the appointment of a
northerner to a power ministry may signify Rahmon’s growing
unease with rivals within his own ranks, and a need to
broaden his political base. It
may also signal an effort by
Rahmon to curry favor in northern Tajikistan, which has been
hardest hit by winter power shortages.
Whatever the larger
political meaning, it was a move to shake up (and possibly
clean up) the Interior Ministry, which had signal failures
last year in the Rasht Valley and in Khorog. New Minister
Qahhorov promptly fired two deputy ministers and the head of
the organized crime unit. End
comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 190800
date: 2/6/2009 12:10
refid: 09DUSHANBE154
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE146
header:
VZCZCXRO4822
PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #0154/01 0371210
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061210Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1461
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000154
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PREL, RS, TI
SUBJECT: RAHMON INVITES AMBASSADOR TO «SEND A SIGNAL»
REF: DUSHANBE 146
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C)Summary: For the first time
during her two-and-a-half
year tour, Rahmon invited Ambassador for a one-on-one
meeting. He briefed Ambassador
on:
— the argument with Russia over President Medvedev,s
statement in Tashkent on water management,
— his recent visit to Moscow and Russian «horse trading» in
the region aimed at increasing Russian economic and military
influence, and
—his willingness to fully support transit of commercial
goods through Tajikistan to Afghanistan.
He hinted that commercial transit could lead to other
opportunities, «considering complications at Manas.» He
asked that we influence the World Bank to speed up its
feasibility study for development of the Roghun hydropower
plant, that we accelerate our own feasibility study for
development of coal at Yagnob, and that we seriously consider
the Tajik proposal for an additional br1XQqP\zLv}with Russia over
Medvedev,s comments in Tashkent.
Rahmon had called Medvedev
during his visit to the Uzbek capital to ask his help in
influencing the Uzbeks to allow the transit of Turkmen
electricity to Tajikistan.
«Instead he did the opposite )
calling for all hydropower projects to be developed only with
the consent of the affected neighbors.» Rahmon handed
Ambassador a copy of the transcript of the Karimov-Medvedev
press conference of January 23, in which he claimed Medvedev
was trying to frighten everyone with the possibility of war
over water between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. (Note:
the
actual transcript refers to deciding questions about
hydropower through economic and political means, «not to
mention more dangerous directions or means of solving
disagreements.») Based on
Medvedev,s press conference,
Rahmon initially decided to cancel his planned meetings in
Moscow, «but they continually approached me through various
channels so in the end I went ) but for my own purposes.»
He said Medvedev pushed him to sign an agreement giving
Russia 75% of the shares in Roghun «so they could control
everything.» Rahmon
declined. He described a EURASEC
meeting in which Russia demonstrated its intention «to
accelerate the process of increasing its military and
economic influence in Central Asia, including trading with
Bakiev on Manas.» Rahmon
claims he strongly criticized
Russian policy, noting that it had led to decreQWT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 191190
date: 2/10/2009 3:50
refid: 09DUSHANBE156
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6837
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0156 0410350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100350Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1464
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0308
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000156
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (LONG)
INL/AAE (BUHLER)
JUSTICE (DUCOT AND NEWCOMBE)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, KJUS, KCRM, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM PROGRAM GRANT AWARD
1. Summary: Post requests INL Washington approve and sign a grant
for $33,435 to the NGO Child Rights Center to implement a portion of
the mission’s overall justice reform program. The International
Narcotics and Law office Dushanbe solicited proposals for grants to
reform the Justice Sector. The
embassy’s Development Assistance
Working Group chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission examined and
approved the project proposal «Legal Support to Children in
Conflict
with the Law and in Closed Institutions» submitted by Child Rights
Center. End summary.
2. NGO Child Rights Center will
implement an assistance project to
raise the legal awareness of specialized groups of children and
their families, protection and promotion of child rights, and
professional support for and improvements to the state juvenile
correctional and detention facilities.
3. Children in conflict with the
law are particularly vulnerable to
violations of their rights. None
of the administrative detention
centres or prisons provide effective programs of rehabilitation.
Institutional staffs are poorly trained, motivated, and monitored,
leaving the children vulnerable to abuse. There is limited support
for children when they return to the community increasing their
chances of family breakdown, homelessness, unemployment, and
recidivism.
4. While the provision of legal assistance cannot overcome all the
current problems in the system, it would provide fundamental due
process, see that the child’s rights are recognized, and that the
child is represented and supported.
5. Fiscal data for the project:
1911-X1022.0005-00-0289-0289625003-2721-4121- IN41TJ25 (FY 2006).
Post requests that INL Washington approve and sign the grant of
$33,435 submitted through the INL Purchase Authorization system.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 191258
date: 2/10/2009 10:35
refid: 09DUSHANBE157
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE121|09DUSHANBE154|09DUSHANBE21
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0157/01 0411035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101035Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1465
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0426
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0309
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000157
SIPDIS
STATE DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: ENRG, PGOV, ECON, PREL, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: ENERGY SITUATION WORSENS IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: A. DUSHANBE 21
B. DUSHANBE 121
C. DUSHANBE 154
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Sanat Rahimov, the new chair of the national
electricity company Barqi Tojik, dismissed as ridiculous the
notion that Tajikistan either could or should hold back water
in the spring to replenish its hydroelectric reservoirs. He
said Tajikistan must «live within its energy means» and not
rely on its neighbors. He had
made no efforts to contact his
Uzbek counterparts since he was appointed 15 days ago. He
said the Nurek Hydroelectric Station should have enough
capacity to generate electricity through March 20, while
World Bank experts say there is only enough water to last
through February 20. Meanwhile,
the energy situation is
becoming more precarious in Tajikistan.
Most parts of the
capital receive energy 15 hours per day; areas outside of the
capital receive only a few hours, if any. Consumption at the
Talco aluminum plant has declined by 20%, though this likely
owes more to the sagging world aluminum market than to
altruistic concerns about limiting usage. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Econoff met with Sanat Rahimov on February 5. He
began by explaining how the Central Asian energy grid, built
during the Soviet era, was explicitly designed to balance
agricultural and industrial needs as well as regionally
varying seasonal surpluses and deficits by distributing
electricity throughout the region.
He boasted the system was
agile enough to avoid the kinds of blackouts that had plagued
the United States in years past (evidently referring to the
major east coast power outage of 2003 and earlier west coast
blackouts in the late 1990s). Yet
the one constant refrain
during the meeting was that Tajikistan must now live within
its energy means and not rely at all on its neighbors. «We
generate 17 billion kilowatt-hours per year. We must live on
17 billion per year. That’s all
there is to it.»
Tajikistan Will NOT Hold Back Water in Spring
3. (C) Rahimov dismissed as ridiculous the notion, voiced by
several people in the Tajik government, including Foreign
Minister Zarifi, that Tajikistan might have to hold on to
water in the spring and summer to replenish its reservoirs.
«Whoever said that, and I don’t know who it is, clearly has
no understanding of power.»
He said if Tajikistan held back
water it would not be able to generate power or feed its
agriculture. On the contrary, he
said, it was in
Tajikistan’s interests to let the water flow to the fullest
extent possible. He allowed that
those saying otherwise
might be «playing political games.»
4. (SBU) Rahimov noted, however, that the situation at the
Kairakum Hydroelectric Station, on the Syr Darya River,
differs from Nurek. While the
Vakhsh River feeding Nurek
receives a relatively steady flow of water during the summer
season from glacial melt, the Syr Darya is fed by snowmelt
and volumes decline considerably over the course of the
summer. Because of the energy
crisis, the Kairakum Station
is currently in power generation mode, letting water flow out
of the reservoir across the turbines, when it should be in
agriculture mode, accumulating water for later use during the
growing season. As a result, the
river leading out of the
reservoir could conceivably run dry later in the year. He
said that Tajik authorities have informed their Uzbek
counterparts of this concern.
Qcounterparts of this concern.
Unrealistic Expectations of Power Use
5. (C) Rahimov directly contradicted nearly unanimous
reporting that the Nurek Hydroelectric Station, which
supplies over three-quarters of Tajikistan’s electricity,
will run out of generation capacity in mid-February. Rahimov
said Nurek had sufficient water in its reservoir to last
until March 20 before reaching the «dead point,» where the
water level is too low to power the turbines. World Bank
experts, however, put that moment exactly a month earlier.
When asked how he could square this difference, Rahimov said
the issue needed to be thought of in terms of consumption,
not production. «We must
work tirelessly, 24 hours a day, to
change our consumption habits.»
He drew an analogy: an
Englishman, asked how his country had such perfect lawns,
responded that it must be carefully seeded, fertilized and
watered. «Do this for three
hundred years, and you will have
a perfect lawn.» He said
that Tajikistan must adopt the same
slow and steady approach to adjusting its consumption. When
asked how this long-ra
nging strategy was going to help in winter 2009, Rahimov
vaguely acknowledged that there might have to be further
rationing.
6. (SBU) According to Sodyk Khaitov, an energy specialist
with the World Bank, Nurek can conceivably continue to
generate power at water levels three or four meters below the
«dead point.» Because
of silt buildup along the reservoir’s
floor, however, the dam would be running a significant risk
of a «hydraulic shock» caused by a foreign object entering
the turbines. Khaitov added that
power rationing had been
having a significant effect on consumption. Without
rationing Nurek was consuming as much as 60 cm a day from its
reservoir; it now draws off between 20 and 30 cm. The
country as a whole was using 62 GWh of electricity before the
rationing, while it now uses closer to 30 GWh.
Ignores Uzbeks
7. (C) Unlike other officials in recent days, Rahimov refused
to criticize Uzbekistan for Tajikistan’s precarious energy
situation, even though he expressed bafflement about Uzbek
intentions. He declared, almost
boastingly, that he had been
in office for 15 days and had not once bothered trying to
contact his Uzbek counterparts.
When asked to speculate why
Tashkent would refuse to transmit Turkmen energy to
Tajikistan, Rahimov said he had no idea (refs A and B). He
did say, however, that the excuse occasionally given by
Uzbekistan, that the line between Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
needed repairs, was patently ridiculous.
The repairs the
Uzbeks described, he said, «are a matter of a few hours.
They’ve given some kind of excuse that they are having
logistical difficulties getting repairs done. We’ve offered
to send specialists, but they ignore us.»
Talco Cuts Consumption
8. (SBU) According to some reports, as much as 50% of
Tajikistan’s domestically produced power is consumed by the
Talco aluminum plant. The company
announced in December that
it would reduce its consumption by 10% in response to the
energy crisis. President Rahmon
then ordered Talco to cut
its consumption by 35% in January, according to a press
report. Khaitov said Talco had in
fact cut its usage by
about 20%, from 20 Gigawatts to 16 GW; he said he expected
Talco to further reduce its consumption by another Gigawatt
or two, but that the process must be gradual in order not to
damage the equipment. He
acknowledged, though, that Talco’s