id: 164123
date: 7/30/2008 10:45
refid: 08DUSHANBE996
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08SECSTATE76596
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0996 2121045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301045Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0850
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF
TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0126
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0069
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000996
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, T, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP, EFIN, PARM, IR,
TI
SUBJECT: DESIGNTION OF
IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS
UNDER E.O. 13382
REF: SECSTATE 76596
1. (SBU)
On July 28th, Post delivered ref demarche
regarding the designation of
additional Iranian entities and
individuals under E.O. 13382
to the Europe and Americas Desk
at the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Post will submit
any substantive response
separately.
2. Point of contact for this issue is Wil von
Zagorski,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 164136
date: 7/30/2008 12:18
refid: 08DUSHANBE997
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 08SECSTATE77238
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0997 2121218
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301218Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
0851
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 000997
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI AND
SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2018
TAGS: KDRG, PHUM, PINR,
PTER, TI
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF TAJIK
GTMO DETAINEE JUMMA JAN
REF: SECSTATE 77238
Classified By: Ambassador
Tracy A. Jacobson, Reasons 2.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) On July 29, 2008
PolEcon Chief delivered reftel
demarche to Khusrav Nosiri,
Head of the Department of
European and North American
Affairs at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. PolEcon Chief specified that the date range
for the transfer would be
September 10-16, per email
communication with S/WCI
subsequent to the transmission of
reftel. Nosiri foresaw no problem with that date
range, and
said he would circulate in
the Government reftel’s requests
for assurances on humane
treatment and speedy USG access to
returnees. Nosiri requested the Embassy contact him
after
August 1 for a more
substantive response to reftel requests.
2. (S) PolEcon Chief thanked
Nosiri for Tajikistan’s
cooperation in allowing
Embassy access to previous GTMO
returnees earlier this year,
and asked if the response time
on future requests could be
shortened to five working days,
per reftel. Nosiri said the quickest possible response
time
by the Tajik Government to a
U.S. request for access to a
GTMO returnee would be two
weeks. He explained that this
simply reflected the speed
of official communications between
the concerned departments of
the Government of Tajikistan,
and was a best-case response
time.
3. (U) Dushanbe Point of
Contact for this matter is PolEcon
Chief Matt Purl,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 164138
date: 7/30/2008 12:29
refid: 08DUSHANBE998
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE875
header:
VZCZCXRO9357
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI
RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #0998 2121229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301229Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0852
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION
USOSCE VIENNA AU
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0143
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL
ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0127
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000998
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
(DONNELLY), INL/AAE (BUHLER), DEFENSE FOR KLUG
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, PREL, CH,
KG, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK FINANCED ROAD
CONSTRUCTION CREATES BORDER
CROSSING OPPORTUNITIES
REF: Dushanbe 875
1. Summary: Ministry of Transportation and Asian
Development Bank
officials agree that the
re-built A-372 road in the north-central
Vaksh/Surkhob/Kizilsu valley
between Dushanbe and the Karamik border
crossing with Kyrgyzstan
will attract freight haulers currently
using the trans-Pamir route
from China through Murghab. The
projected freight
redirection provides rationale for international
donors to allocate funds for
limited scale border crossing
improvements. Tajik transportation officials assert that
freight
traffic could begin using
A-372 as early as next year, although the
ADB is not so confident,
claiming that it will not be viable as a
heavy truck route until
construction completion in 2013. With a
modest $2.5 million budget,
in the coming years ADB plans to
construct six Tajik customs
posts and renovate ten more around the
country. The construction of customs facilities
presents an
opportunity for ADB to team
up with ongoing INL, OSCE, and EU border
security programs. End summary.
Building, Building, Building
into the Future
———————————————
2. Following a June familiarization trip to the
Pamir region border
sites (reftel) Emboffs,
OSCE’s border advisor, and the chief
technical advisor for the
European Union’s Border Management Central
Asia project met with the
Ministry of Transportation’s road building
executive director Nizom
Hakimov, Chief Engineer Yuri Yuldashev, and
ADB project specialist
Ruslan Sadykov to collect data necessary to
properly allocate border and
customs assistance requested for the
Murghab area of
Gorno-Bakakhshan. The officials told us
that the
firm «Chinese
Road» is building the ADB-financed A-372 road from
Tajikistan to China through
Kyrgyzstan with an expected completion
date of 2013.
Kulma-Murghab — A Road to be
Less Traveled?
——————————————-
3. Hakimov and Yuldashev
claimed that Chinese trucks could begin
using the more direct A-372
route from Kashgar to Dushanbe in 2009
and save two days travel
time, reduce the distance by 479
kilometers, and eliminate
the transfer of cargo at Khorog. When we
met separately with Sadykov
he disagreed, maintaining that the last
121-kilometer segment of
A-372 would be impassable for large Chinese
trucks until 2013. Ministry of Transportation and ADB officials
concurred, however, that
when completed A-372 will carry about 80
percent of China-Tajikistan
trade and 70 percent of
China-Afghanistan trade.
4. What is most important
for border security and customs
improvement programs for
international donors, Sadykov reconfirmed
the ADB’s 2005 estimate that
the trade volume through Kulma to
Khorog is likely to decrease
dramatically once A-372 via Karamik is
fully operational. International donors immediately recognized
that
the reduced freight transit
estimate significantly undercuts Customs
Service requests for
substantial assistance to upgrade Kulma and
Kizilart border crossing
points.
ADB Plans Customs Upgrades
—————————
5. Sadykov stated that ADB has $2.5 million to
support
rehabilitation and new
construction for custom facilities in 16
border crossing points. He said the plans were to build six new
border customs facilities
and to renovate 10 others. He
acknowledged that the
funding was insufficient to make a significant
Qacknowledged that the
funding was insufficient to make a significant
impact and the number of
posts would have to be reduced. He
agreed
to closely coordinate with
international donors on the ADB’s plans
to improve customs
facilities.
6. Comment: Before making firm funding
allocations, INL officer
plans to assess highway
A-372 and the Karamik crossing in September,
but initial analysis
suggests that international donors should cast
a careful eye on large
requests for assistance to the Customs
Service in the Murghab
area. The Border Guards’ request for
assistance is more warranted
given the reputation of the Pamir
Highway as a corridor for
transit of drugs, arms and illegal
immigration and migration
but the funding level will be carefully
calibrated. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 164502
date: 8/1/2008 11:17
refid: 08DUSHANBE1022
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08STATE76596
header:
VZCZCXRO1154
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1022 2141117
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011117Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0864
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0198
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0231
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0154
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0070
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0133
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001022
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, T, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP, EFIN, PARM, IR
SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF
IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS
UNDER E.O. 13382
REF: STATE 76596
1. (SBU)
On July 28th, Post delivered ref demarche
regarding the designation of
additional Iranian entities and
individuals under E.O. 13382
to the Europe and Americas Desk
at the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Post will submit
any substantive response
separately.
2. (U) Point of contact for this issue is Wil
Von Zagorski,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 164815
date: 8/5/2008 3:37
refid: 08DUSHANBE1027
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08SECSTATE76596
header:
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1027 2180337
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050337Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0869
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF
TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0135
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0072
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001027
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, T, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP, EFIN, PARM, IR,
TI
SUBJECT: DESIGNTION OF
IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS
UNDER E.O. 13382
REF: SECSTATE 76596
1. (SBU)
On July 28th, Post delivered ref demarche
regarding the designation of
additional Iranian entities and
individuals under E.O. 13382
to the Europe and Americas Desk
at the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Post will submit
any substantive response
separately.
2. (U) Point of contact for this issue is Wil
von Zagorski,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 165863
date: 8/13/2008 9:42
refid: 08DUSHANBE1067
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
08DUSHANBE1053|08DUSHANBE940
header:
VZCZCXRO9376
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1067 2260942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130942Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0913
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001067
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP, KDEM, PHUM,
KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY FACES
ADDITIONAL
LAWSUIT OVER SLOPPY HUMAN
RESOURCES PRACTICES
REF: (A) 08 DUSHANBE 1053
(B) 08 DUSHANBE 940
1. (SBU) Summary: On August
12, CAO met with Sayfiddin
Dostiev (pen name Sayofi
Mizrob), a former RFE/RL employee
who said he has filed a
lawsuit accusing RFE/RL of
violating Tajik labor law.
After a follow-up conversation
with RFE/RL Tajik Service
Director Rod Shahidi, CAO
confirmed that, contrary to
Shahidi’s prior
representations, RFE/RL
continues to violate local labor
laws. The organization’s human resources errors
leave
RFE/RL vulnerable to censure
by the Tajik government, and
threaten its operations in
Tajikistan. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Dostiev, who had
worked as a freelancer for RFE/RL
since 1995, said that RFE/RL
presented him with a new
employment contract in April
2008 that did not comply with
the local labor code,
particularly in relation to overtime
work and annual leave. He
was also upset that the contact
included a three-month
probation period, even though he had
been an RFE/RL freelancer
for 13 years.
3. (SBU) Dostiev did not
sign the contract, and he said he
brought the discrepancies to
RFE/RL’s attention in April.
In a June 23 e-mail to
Dostiev (which Dostiev showed to
CAO), Shahidi wrote that
«I assumed that by taking your
vacation pay….you have
accepted the employment contract.»
Shahidi, however, admitted
that he continued to pay Dostiev
as a freelancer, despite his
prior e-mail indicating that a
new employment contract had
come into effect, creating a
legal issue around Dostiev’s
employment status. Dostiev
said that Shahidi told him
to «sign the contract or don’t
sign it, but you will work
under this contract.»
4. (SBU) In a phone
conversation, Shahidi confirmed to CAO
that several RFE/RL
employees are currently working under
non-compliant contracts,
despite the fact that he had
earlier told EmbOffs that
RFE/RL had resolved such issues
(reftel A). He said that a revised contract is being
translated from English, and
has not yet been presented to
RFE/RL’s employees.
5. (SBU) Dostiev resigned on
July 10 and held a press
conference criticizing
RFE/RL for negative reporting and
labor code violations
(reftel B). He said that he filed a
lawsuit against the
organization on August 10, but he
refused to show CAO a copy
of the lawsuit. He also would
not allow CAO to make a copy
of his employment contract,
saying the prosecutor told
him that «official documents»
must not be
distributed. CAO repeatedly asked why he
had
continued to work for RFE/RL
for such a long time if he was
so dissatisfied with the
working conditions. He replied
that he was very busy
nursing a sick uncle.
6. (SBU) Comment: Dostiev
does not have a good reputation
in Tajikistan, and there are
many questions about his
motives. He seems to be manipulating certain aspects
of
the case by exaggerating
claims that his human rights were
violated. The timing of his
actions is suspicious. Despite
these questions, RFE/RL has
opened itself up to scrutiny by
failing to get its
administrative house in order. Dostiev
has given the Tajik
authorities a basis upon which to
disrupt RFE/RL’s operations,
and Shahidi appears to have
weakened his position and
taken contradictory — and
possibly unlawful —
stances. Post has warned Shahidi that
he and RFE/RL management
must take control of every aspect
of the station’s operations
to ensure no further
complications arise that
could result in RFE/RL’s closure
in Tajikistan (reftel
A). We hope that Shahidi has taken
this message to heart. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 166353
date: 8/18/2008 3:07
refid: 08DUSHANBE1075
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2600
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1075/01 2310307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180307Z AUG 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0916
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0206
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0240
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0159
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC 0037
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 001075
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EAID, EINV,
PGOV, PREL, USTR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
PRESIDENT RAHMON LAUNCHES INVESTMENT COUNCIL
1. (U) This message is
sensitive but unclassified. Please
protect
accordingly.
2. (SBU) Summary: President
Rahmon chaired the first ever meeting of
the Investment Council on
July 31. While much of the meeting was
dedicated to preliminary
organizational matters, the President
expounded on several topics
— not necessarily related to improving
the investment
environment. However, for this new body
to represent
something more than
window-dressing, it must tackle real issues that
result in positive change to
the business environment. Only then
will Tajikistan begin to
attract the foreign investment the Tajiks
say they desire, and
stimulate private sector development. End
Summary.
3. (U) The Investment
Council, an initiative of the European Bank
for Reconstruction and
Development, includes USAID, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Tethys Petroleum, the
National Association of
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises,
President Rahmon, Prime
Minister Akil Akilov, Chairman of the State
Committee on Investments
Farrukh Hamraliev, and Mufarah Muhabbatov,
General Director of a local
souvenir producer. USAID served as the
representative of bilateral
donors (and based on its current
Business Environment
Improvement Project implemented through
Pragma), while the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
represented multilateral
donors.
BE VERY VERY NICE TO THE
PRESIDENT
4. (SBU) Although the launch
of the Investment Council was more than
a year in the making, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development gave just three
days advance notice of the first
meeting, leaving little time
to gather the Donor Coordination
Council to discuss
approaches and messages to the Government of
Tajikistan from the donor
community. On July 29 several non-Tajik
Government members of the
Council held an advance meeting to discuss
procedures and agenda of the
first Investment Council meeting.
Djoomart Otorbaev, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development Senior Adviser on
Investment Climate for Enterprises led
this preliminary
meeting. Mr. Otorbaev, the former Deputy
Prime
Minister in Kyrgyzstan, has
spearheaded this effort in several
countries in addition to
Tajikistan. Mr. Otorbaev told the other
members of the Investment
Council present that they must create a
congenial, open atmosphere
to keep the President engaged. They were
advised not to raise any
politically sensitive or controversial
topics. The President’s opening and closing speeches
were already
prepared, and Council
members might have three minutes to say
something.
5. (SBU) Mr. Otorbaev
suggested the USAID representative tell the
President how pleased the
donors were to work with him on improving
the business environment and
investment opportunities in Tajikistan.
When the USAID representatives suggested it
would be more useful to
raise issues such as the tax
code or the rule of law, Mr. Otorbaev
responded that it would
probably be four to five years before those
subjects could start to be
addressed. The focus was to be on small
realistic actions aimed at
achieving some results quickly.
… CAUSE HE’S FEELING VERY
TIRED
6. (SBU) President Rahmon,
appearing tired and somewhat disengaged,
began the Investment Council
meeting with introductory remarks on
the need to increase
business representatives in the country.
The
representative of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Qrepresentative of the
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Masaru Honma,
Director for Central Asia, as well as the
Chairman of the State
Committee on Investments made brief remarks on
the investment climate and
the utility of the Investment Council.
Honma expressed his hope
that the Investment Council would be a
forum for a frank exchange
of views, and approved of the recent
Government decision to
institute a two-year moratorium on
inspections of small and
medium-sized enterprises. Hamraliev
stated
that political and
macroeconomic stability has been achieved and
that the private sector
would be the engine for economic growth.
He
continued that the economy
in Tajikistan was open and would continue
to become more integrated
with the international business community,
particularly through WTO
accession. While the investment climate
was improving and the number
of investors was increasing, it still
was not enough.
DAMN FOREIGNERS!
7. (SBU) For the first hour,
Rahmon appeared to want to just get the
meeting over with. However, he eventually came alive, finally
speaking for over an hour,
jumping from one topic to another.
Rahmon complained about the
lack of investment in the cotton sector
and that the Government had
to step up with 120 million somoni
(approximately $40M) for
cotton farmers. He also complained about
DUSHANBE 00001075 002 OF 002
what he considered
conflicting messages the international financial
institutions sent the
country, which he said had caused confusion.
He railed against
Uzbekistan, saying they «closed the door this
year, not even allowing
humanitarian aid in.» Rahmon said
«Tajikistan is one of
the most backward countries, and other similar
countries have received debt
forgiveness» (He did not mention the
latest IMF misreporting
scandal, under which Tajikistan became the
first country known to have
received IMF debt relief under false
pretenses). Rahmon added that «I don’t trust
journalists, and the
internet less so. Most journalists work for intelligence
services.»
8. (SBU) Rahmon raised the
case of an international company
registered in Tajikistan and
doing business in Isfara, which was
caught trafficking
narcotics. «Tajikistan has a lot of
cheaters and
criminals coming. We must take action against them, but then
others
say that Tajikistan is not
favorable to business.» Rahmon also
talked about tax evaders and
how Tajikistan needed to protect
itself. On corruption, he admitted it was a problem
particularly
among local officials, but
then tried to rationalize it away by
saying that corruption was a
problem throughout the world. He
finished with comments on
how Tajikistan could help with
Afghanistan’s recovery and
development, especially in the areas of
energy and border
trade. He contrasted these prospects
with
Uzbekistan’s obstruction of
development in Tajikistan, saying that
Tajikistan needed
transportation alternatives that avoided
Uzbekistan.
9. (SBU) Comment: Despite
the President’s demonstration of his
suspicion of foreign
involvement in Tajikistan, the Investment
Council needs to move
quickly beyond pleasantries and deal with
pressing issues that hinder
private sector development and foreign
investment. If the Investment Council can achieve some
initial
successes that lead to
positive reactions and commentary from
business and donor leaders,
it may gain the legitimacy and momentum
that will allow it to tackle
other obstacles. However, if the
Investment Council fails to
press an agenda of real economic reform,
it may lose Rahmon’s
interest and die a quiet death. With the
agenda for the next
quarterly meeting focused on improving the
regulatory environment, the
Investment Council could achieve gains
in simplifying the
registration of legal entities, such as by
promotion of «one
stop» business licensing. End
Comment.
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 166687
date: 8/20/2008 11:29
refid: 08DUSHANBE1083
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE1772|08DUSHANBE851
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1083/01 2331129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201129Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0927
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
0019
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0141
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001083
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: A BAD
MOON RISING?
REF: A. (A) 08 DUSHANBE 851
B. (B) 07 DUSHANBE 1772
Classified By: Ambassador
Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.
1. (C) Summary: A prominent
politician and a political
analyst do not foresee
significant political changes in
Tajikistan in the next few
years. President Rahmon is a
clever politician who has
learned to resolve conflicts
between factions and
prevented serious challenges to his
rule. However, he has charted an unstable future
for his
country through economic
mismanagement and a short-sighted
religious policy. End summary.
2. (SBU) On August 11,
PolOff met with Hoji Akbar
Turajonzoda, a Senator in
Tajikistan’s upper house of
parliament (Majlisi Milli),
who has no party affiliation. In
the early 1990s, he was the
country’s senior religious
figure, or Qozi Kalon. (This
position has evolved into the
Head of the Council of
Ulamo). He won a seat in Tajikistan’s
parliament in 1995, and in
1998 President Rahmon appointed
him First Deputy Prime
Minister. Rahmon removed him from
this position in 2005, but
appointed him to the Majlisi
Milli. His father, Eshoni Turajon, was one of the
country’s
most respected religious
leaders during the Soviet period;
his brother, Nuriddin, has
carried on this tradition as the
imam-hatib of the largest
mosque in Vahdat.
3. (SBU) On August 19,
PolOff and a visiting staff delegation
from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee met with Rashid
Ghani Abdullo, a political
analyst. Abdullo worked in the
Academy of Sciences’
Institute of Oriental Studies, and he
was one of the Embassy’s
first employees in 1992. He studied
in the United States on a
Fulbright scholarship, and he
worked for the UN
peacekeeping mission until it closed in
2007. He now works for the Institute for War and
Peace
Reporting, an international
NGO based in the United Kingdom.
SMOOTH OPERATOR
3. (C) Neither Turajonzoda
nor Abdullo see the possibility of
significant political change
in the coming years. Despite
the country’s immense
economic hardships, Rahmon has proven
to be an agile political
operator. He has learned how to
resolve conflicts between
political factions, and he has
prevented anyone emerging to
seriously challenge his hold on
power. When conflicts arise, such as in Khorog
(reftel A),
he is patient, waits for
factions to show themselves, and
then negotiates with
them. Turajonzoda predicted there would
be political stability for
«at least the next four or five
years.» Abdullo said this period would be even
longer:
«Rahmon is a young man
by Central Asian standards ) he is
only 55.»
4. (C) President Rahmon
surrounded himself with those who do
not have presidential
ambitions. Rahmon dismissed
Turajonzoda in 2005 because
he had become very popular;
Rahmon appointed him to
parliament when he was able to
convince Rahmon that he had
no intention of running for
president in 2006. Rahmon was content to keep the current
Prime Minister, Oqil Oqilov,
in his position — despite the
fact that he has reached
retirement age ) because he does
not have his eyes on the
presidency. Rahmon did not have to
worry about attacks from the
opposition. The strongest
opposition party, the
Islamic Revival Party, did not attack
his Achilles heels ) a bad
economy and recurring winter
crises.
MONEY FOR NOTHING
5. (C) Abdullo said all of
Tajikistan’s senior economic
officials and advisors were
Soviet-era thinkers who could not
manage a transition to a
modern economy. He contrasted
Tajikistan with Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where
QTajikistan with Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where
younger officials had been
brought in to introduce new ideas
and methods to the
economy. Rahmon, however, was reluctant
to bring in new blood; it
was hard to find a pragmatic
business-minded figure who
had no political ambitions. An
important indicator would be
the office of the Prime
Minister: if Oqilov’s
successor was a young business person,
there is potential for
change. If the successor was another
Soviet-style apparatchik,
serious economic reform was
unlikely.
LOSING MY RELIGION
6. (C) Turajonzoda termed
the government’s religious policy
«short-sighted.» About four years ago, Deputy Minister of
Culture Murodali Davlatov
consulted Turajonzoda about trying
to establish Rahmon as
Tajikistan’s religious leader; at the
time, Turajonzoda compared
Rahmon to King Henry VIII. While
Tajikistan has not
established its equivalent of the Anglican
Church, Rahmon has attempted
to subtly position himself as a
spiritual as well as
political leader, and has included in
his speeches the concept
that «religion must serve the
government.» Tajiks view President Rahmon’s references to
religious authority with
skepticism, however. Davlatov, a
key figure on religious
issues, hurt the government’s
credibility because of his
«reputation as an atheist,» and
because of his corrupt
practices (reftel B). After almost
fifty officials complained
about him at a government meeting,
Rahmon removed him from the
Ministry and made him the head of
a new Center for Islamic
Studies.
7. (C) The official
religious hierarchy in Tajikistan
differed greatly from the
actual religious hierarchy. The
actual religious hierarchy
was composed of imams who think
independently of the
government. The official religious
hierarchy ) such as members
of the Council of Ulamo ) was a
means for the government to
control religious life, which
Turajonzoda believes to be
an impossible goal. It was of
great concern that a
generation of religious Tajiks is
growing up without a solid
understanding of what it actually
means to be Muslim.
8. (C) Comment: In general
terms, the comments of Turajonzoda
and Abdullo are
reasonable. Rahmon’s desire to crush
potential rivals could
explain why presidential brother in
law Hasan Asadullozoda has
taken on a lower profile than in
the past. The observation that resolving unrest in
Khorog is
evidence that Rahmon can still
effectively handle political
conflicts differs from our
conclusion in reftel A. Their
belief that there will be no
significant political changes in
the near future runs counter
to those who cite an
increasingly disaffected
public and the prospect of another
winter crisis as factors
that could affect the continued
stability of the
regime. However, it is true that Rahmon
has
no serious rivals and it is
difficult to envision change in
the current environment. Without more government attention
to the longer term
challenges that Tajikistan is facing,
however, future stability
looks ever more tenuous. End
comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 166954
date: 8/22/2008 7:09
refid: 08DUSHANBE1094
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08SECSTATE89769
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1094 2350709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220709Z AUG 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 0935
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
IMMEDIATE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
IMMEDIATE 0208
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
IMMEDIATE 0242
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
IMMEDIATE 0161
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001094
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS: MARR, PREL, GG, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: RUSSIA
— GEORGIA CONFLICT DEMARCHE
DELIVERED
REF: SECSTATE 89769
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey
A. Jacobson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On August 21 Pol/Econ
Chief delivered reftel demarche
to Husrav Nosiri, MFA
Director for North America and European
Affairs (Assistant Secretary
equivalent). Nosiri accepted
the demarche with the comment
that Tajikistan was unlikely to
take any public stance on
the conflict between Georgia and
Russia. «We are in a difficult position» he
said, as the
conflict involved competing
principles of territorial
integrity and national
self-determination. Nosiri could not
say whether Tajikistan would
convey any of our concerns to
Russia in private, but did
offer that he did not believe the
conflict would have any
significant impact on either
Tajik-Russian or Tajik-United
States relations.
2. (C) Comment: We expect
Tajikistan to remain silent about
the Georgian-Russian
conflict, as it has nothing to gain from
taking a stand on this
matter. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167302
date: 8/25/2008 22:18
refid: 08STATE91372
origin: Secretary of State
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #1372 2382223
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 252218Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
PRIORITY 2864
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS STATE 091372
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID.ECON, UN, TX, KG,
TI, KZ, UZ
SUBJECT: DAS KROL REQUESTS
MEETINGS WITH UN OFFICIALS IN
NEW YORK
1. (U) George Krol, Deputy
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau
of South and Central Asian
Affairs responsible for Central
Asia, requests mission’s
assistance in arranging a one — day
program in New York during
the week of September 8 primarily
to meet with relevant UN and
mission officials to discuss
Central Asian affairs. In
particular, DAS Krol would
appreciate USUN arranging an
appointment with UN Under
Secretary General for
Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe to
discuss the looming food,
energy, and financial crisis in
Central Asia and what steps
the UN may be considering to deal
with it. DAS Krol has held extensive discussions on
the
subject in the region and
has chaired interagency meetings
devoted to focusing USG
efforts to address the matter. DAS
Krol would appreciate
meetings with other UN officials the
mission might consider
relevant, as well as with mission
elements that deal with
Central Asian issues. DAS Krol is
open to meeting with Central
Asian missions to the UN, if
mission deems such meetings
appropriate and useful.
2. (U) DAS Krol will have just returned from a
visit to
Turkmenistan and would be
prepared to travel to New York as
soon as September 9. DAS Krol would intend to take the train
up and back for the one day
and is in no need of
accommodation
assistance. While in New York, DAS Krol
would
also like to obtain UNGA
credentials in case his
participation would be
required at any bilaterals with
Central Asians during the
UNGA.
3. (U) DAS Krol should be known to U/S Pascoe as
they worked
together when Krol was in
the S/NIS office.
4. (U) DAS Krol’s biography follows:
Krol was appointed Deputy
Assistant Secretary in the South
and Central Asian Affairs
Bureau in April 2008. Prior to
this appointment, he taught
on the faculty of the National
War College. His last foreign assignment was as Ambassador
to Belarus 2003-2006. Krol served as Political Minister
Counselor in Moscow,
Director of Russian Affairs, Special
Assistant at large for the
New Independent States and had
previous foreign postings in
Minsk, Kiev, Saint Petersburg,
New Delhi, and Warsaw.
5. (U) Please provide name and contact for
control officer.
State POC for Ambassador
Krol’s visit is Turkmenistan Desk
Officer Rick Snelsire, tel.
202-647-9031.
RICE
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167317
date: 8/26/2008 3:59
refid: 08DUSHANBE1098
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1098/01 2390359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260359Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0939
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0143
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0081
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
0042
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL
AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001098
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/SCA,
DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA FOR BENKER,
DS/ICI/CIL FOR ROBRAHN, SCA,
INL FOR BUHLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2033
TAGS: ASEC, PINR, TI
SUBJECT: MEET THE NEW TAJIK
SPETZNAZ
Classified By: RSO SETH
GREEN FOR REASONS 1.4(c,d)
1. (C) On
August 20, RSO met with Major General Abdurauf
YUSUPOV, First Deputy
Minister of Interior and Lieutenant
Colonel Dilshod ISLOMOV,
Commander of the new Special Forces
Battalion
(«SpetzNaz») for the Ministry of Interior. The
purpose of the meeting was
to be introduced to the SpetzNaz
Commander, receive a
briefing on the unit, and to better
understand the specific
requests for assistance made by the
Ministry.
2. (C)
The Ministry of Interior created a new Special
Forces Battalion
(«SpetzNaz»), which replaced the former
Quick Reaction Force
(«SOBR») that was disbanded earlier in
the year. The unit is in its infancy, receiving weapons
the
day before the RSO’s
visit. Their facility previously
belonged to another Ministry
of Interior unit, but had been
abandoned for a few
years. They are in the process of
renovating their office
space and have very little equipment.
A. Mission: SpetzNaz will be responsible for
crowd control
and mass disorder
operations, maintaining order during
natural disasters or other
crisis, reinforcing checkpoints
and aiding traffic police
during high threat situations,
detaining high threat
criminals, and perimeter security
during counter-terrorism /
high threat operations by OMON.
B. Table of Organization: There are 180 officers serving in
SpetzNaz on a contract
basis. 150 will be operational and 30
are staff. The «all-officer-corps» unit has
three Companies
led by Deputy Commanders: A
Chief of Staff leading the staff
corps, a Chief of Logistics
leading a logistics and support
company, and a Chief of
Operations leading the operational
company. Each company has two platoons, with the
Operational
groups being the
largest. Within the operational company,
they also plan a sapper team
and canine unit.
C. Candidate Requirements: Each candidate must
be 170
centimeters or taller, pass
a physical fitness test, pass a
psychological and medical
examination, graduate from
university level study,
obtain an officer’s commission, and
pass a board of examination
led by the First Deputy Minister
of Interior. After this,
each candidate has a three month
probation period on the team
for the Commander to assess
whether they will be
retained. The Regional Security Officer
observed the officers in
formation receiving their morning
briefing. All were young, mid-twenties to early
thirties,
and fit.
D. Weapons Systems: The team received Kalishnikov rifles
(both 5.45 and 7.62) and
Makarov pistols (9mm). They also
have 6 Draganof sniper
rifles, 4 Kalishnikov light machine
rifles (RPKs), and 2
Kalishnikov automatic machine guns
(PKs). They do not have their own shooting range,
but expect
to use the Academy’s range
near the Interior Forces compound.
They had stocks of 7.62 ammunition, but at the
time did not
have any 9mm or 5.45
ammunition. (RSO NOTE: This is
consistent with Tajik
Government wide shortages. END NOTE.)
E. Protective Equipment and Less-than-Lethal: The team has
50 plastic helmets for riot
control operations with Styrofoam
padding, 60 riot control
shields made from weak plexiglass,
50 PR-24 style batons, 2
Armored personnel carriers, and 50
body armor carriers with
small steel plates that likely
protect against stabbings,
but are not ballistic resistant.
protect against stabbings,
but are not ballistic resistant.
3. (SBU)
The Commander of the new unit, Colonel ISLOMOV,
immediately spoke about the
training he received in 2003 in
Louisiana through the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance program while
he served in the Ministry’s
Internal Forces. He even pulled
out the Crisis Response Team
course book from his cabinet )
the only training manual he
had. He expressed his
appreciation for the
training he received, and stated that he
has passed along his
knowledge to over 300 interior forces
soldiers. He asked for the United States to assist him
in
building a basic training
program for the new SpetzNaz unit,
and for any assistance in
developing standard operating
procedures for his
program. The Commander agreed to meet
with the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance needs assessment team in
early September to discuss
their training needs.
4. (C)
COMMENT: The openness of the
Ministry and full
disclosure reveals both
their need for American assistance,
and their appreciation with
Embassy’s concerns regarding
«mission creep»
between this new unit and the Militia
Detachment for Special
Purposes (OMON) team, which has been
well supported by the United
States for the past six years.
Aside from SpetzNaz’s sapper
and canine units, which don’t
appear to support the
disclosed mission, this unit does not
appear to duplicate
assignments already supported by other
Ministry teams trained or
funded by the United States.
5. (C)
This unit was created by the Minister, and has
become General YUSUPOV’s pet
project. After last winter and
the series of peaceful
protests this past year, the Ministry
understands they are on
borrowed time before protests could
turn violent. Many in Tajikistan still point to riots in
1992 as the catalyst for the
Civil War, ignoring the social
problems behind them. The Government of Tajikistan is
looking for options to stay
in power. The riot in 2006
following the no-show of
Iranian-born rocker Arash
demonstrated that the
Ministry of Interior had no capacity to
address basic crowd
control. If the Government perceives a
protest as being a threat,
and has no training, human rights
orientation, or
less-than-lethal option, they are likely to
follow the Uzbekistan
example as an effective tactic to put
down anti-government
protests.
6. (C)
General YUSUPOV commented that having an all officer
corps in SpetzNaz allowed
him to screen candidates to ensure
they would help de-escalate
situations rather than enflame
them. As this is a new unit, the timing and
openness of the
Ministry provides the United
States with a unique opportunity
to influence the training,
standard operating procedures,
infuse western-style
policing, less-than-lethal protective
equipment, and human rights
training. Abdicating this
opportunity leaves the team
with either Uzbek-style crowd
control (ex. Andijon 2006),
or an inept response opening the
potential for further
instability. Post will be pursuing
training and other
engagement opportunities in the near
future. END COMMENT.
7. (U)
The point of contact for this and all security
related matters at Post is
Regional Security Officer Seth
Green.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167318
date: 8/26/2008 4:17
refid: 08DUSHANBE1099
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8406
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR
RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDBU #1099/01 2390417
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260417Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0941
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
PRIORITY 0150
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
PRIORITY 0209
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
PRIORITY 0243
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
PRIORITY 0162
RUEHUR/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
PRIORITY 0005
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
0145
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
PRIORITY
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001099
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ECON,
EINV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: FARCE DE TRIOMPHE —
DUSHANBE CHANNELS PARIS AS IT
PREPARES FOR THE SHANGHAI
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION SUMMIT
Classified By: Ambassador
Tracey A. Jacobson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: As with last
year’s CIS summit, the Tajik
Government is using the
occasion of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) summit to
show off a city with new
monuments, smooth and
painted grand avenues, park
restorations, elaborate and
luxurious hospitality, and
numerous cultural
entertainment programs. The summit
preparations create a facade
meant to impress officials from
China, Russia, Iran, and
India, countries which to varying
degrees donate to
Tajikistan’s economic development.
Summit
preparations and associated
construction are enormously
expensive, organized in a
manner to hide that expense from
public scrutiny, and of
doubtful benefit to Tajikistan. End
Summary.
2. (U) Dushanbe hosts the
2008 Summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization on
August 28. Heads of State or
Government of China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Afghanistan,
Iran, and Mongolia will attend,
along the Foreign Minister
of India and a Minister (exactly
who is TBD) from
Pakistan. Thousands of staffers and
myriad
camp followers will come
with them.
DIPLOMATIE — KARIMOV OUI,
IRAN NON…
3. (C) Well before official
word came from Tashkent that
President Karimov would in
fact attend the summit, an Uzbek
political officer denied the
reports circulating that he
would boycott. The officer said tensions between Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan were
overrated, and the two countries shared
too much in common through
culture and trade. A Kazakh
Political Officer also
assured us that Karimov would attend,
despite the rhetoric in the
media and official chatter
claiming the opposite.
4. (C) Political officers at
the embassies of several SCO
member states agreed that
Iran was unlikely to gain
membership in the
organization, at least for now.
Admitting
Iran would require the
consensus of all member states.
Diplomats of the Chinese,
Uzbek, and Kazakh embassies in
Dushanbe commented that
there was little support in their
governments for Iran’s SCO
membership bid, but none could
flatly rule it out. The Afghan DCM vehemently objected to
Iranian membership, saying
it would both hurt the security
and economic potential of
the SCO and it would de-legitimize
the organization.
ET LE BRIEFING… NON.
5. (C) The diplomatic corps,
collectively and individually,
pressed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to provide an
official readout on the
results of the state visit by China
and the other head-of-state
visits happening in association
with the summit. This looks unlikely. The MFA is generally
uninformative about any
non-bilateral matter, and the
Director of North American
and European Affairs commented to
emboff that a post-summit
briefing for diplomats was unlikely
because «we don’t do
that.»
CHAMPS ELYSEES
6. (C) Dushanbe has seen
accelerated construction projects,
park overhauls, painting of
city streets, and a myriad of
other face-lifts. The government is rushing to complete the
$300 million dollar
presidential «Palace of the Nation» along
with the central city park
in front of it (yes, Tajikistan
Qwith the central city park
in front of it (yes, Tajikistan
fans, that’s about ten
percent of the country’s GDP for that
palace). Resurfacing and painting of the main roads,
hanging
of hundreds of signs and
posters, and sprucing up of the
city’s garden strips and
flower beds are all in full swing.
The Government has
commandeered hundreds of actors, singers,
dancers, and schoolchildren
since early July for daily
rehearsals of a gala concert
on the eve of the summit. They
receive no pay. The rehearsals last up to six hours, in the
100 degree sun.
INSPECTOR CLOUSEAU COMES
CALLING
7. (C) Embassy local staff
reported that security officers
began going door-to-door in
central Dushanbe a few weeks ago,
DUSHANBE 00001099 002 OF 003
questioning residents along
the main avenues and advising
them not to hang up laundry
on balconies during the summit.
A new development was that
security officers also visited
outlying neighborhoods of
the city, asking residents to
report any suspicious or
unknown persons, and not to allow
strangers to take up
residence in their homes in the lead-up
to the summit. At Pugus, the village north of Dushanbe where
President Rahmon has built a
massive and ornate Dacha
spanning the Varzob River,
residents have been expelled for
security reasons until the
summit is over. In line with past
practice, Tajikistan has
closed its land borders with all
neighboring states in
preparation for the summit.
8. (C) The police presence
in Dushanbe has visibly increased
during the last month, with
groups of officers up to five or
ten strong standing in
clusters near critical intersections
or in front of government
buildings. More upscale Mercedes
police cars are on the
road. Starting August 26 they will
block the roads in the city
center for several hours a day.
9. (C) All of this is to
ensure order and protect the leading
figures of a summit crowd
that completely overwhelms
Dushanbe’s capacity to house
visitors. The Government
expects about 5,000 summit
visitors: 600 official Russians,
300 Chinese, 100 Kazakhs,
hundreds of journalists, and
cultural performance groups
from all the countries
participating. The government has forced the Hyatt, not
ready for business until
late this year, to house Russian
delegates despite being
without furniture and paint still
wet. According to a manager at the Hyatt, the
hotel is
spending $350,000 to rush
cheap furniture in to be used for
the duration of the Summit;
it will then be discarded. No
hotel rooms of any quality
are available, and low-end workers
summer camp
«resorts» far from the city have been taken over
to house the 5,000 odd
official visitors. Embassy staff
found that a popular Chinese
restaurant is closed for the
week, because it is so busy
catering to Chinese summiteers.
10. (C) Organizing
hospitality has been done in Tajik
government fashion; with
lofty goals and little planning. As
in past summits, each
ministry is assigned a country to take
care of. For example, the Ministry of Energy must
feed,
house and entertain the 100
person official Iranian
delegation. Ministries receive no extra funding for this
non-core mission, so must
take money away from their real
activities (or, as we have
observed, entertaining on behalf
of the President IS their
real activity). As with the
extortion of costly support
from private businesses, this
organizational model hides
the costs of the summit, avoiding
unpleasant questions later
on of whether it was worth it — or
not.
COMMENT: NON-SEQUITUR
11. (C) Senior government
contacts have complained to us that
since we bring no private
investors to build their grand
hydropower schemes, they are
«forced» to spend money on
massive prestige projects to
impress visiting Chinese and
Russian officials who will
then, presumably, send state-led
investment to
Tajikistan. We question the logic (and
Qinvestment to
Tajikistan. We question the logic (and
arithmetic) behind this
approach. Forcing businesses to
support the summit for no
compensation is certainly bad for
the investment climate that
officials claim the summit will
benefit. Also illogical, the Palace of the Nation
alone
costs as much as China’s
huge road improvement project
between Dushanbe and
Khujand, and it is only the largest of
numerous presidential
palaces around the country. The
Chinese are funding the road
for their own commercial and
strategic reasons. Tajikistan’s dream mega-project, the
Rogun dam, will cost
billions of dollars, but has languished
undone because of disputes
between Russia and Tajikistan over
post-completion
ownership. Fancy hospitality and new
palaces
have not solved this
problem, nor are they likely to resolve
the personal enmity between
Karimov and Rahmon, which blocks
regional trade and
hydropower development. But as power
rationing spreads to
Dushanbe this fall, with its attendant
disruptions of water
supplies, many businesses, schools, and
hospitals, the gaudy
illuminated Palace of the Nation and its
surrounding park will remind
Tajiks of the pride their
President takes in his
country. As Foreign Minister Zarifi
said to Ambassador in
January, in response to her question
DUSHANBE 00