id: 151464
date: 4/27/2008 9:56
refid: 08KHARTOUM645
origin: Embassy Khartoum
classification: SECRET
destination: 08STATE44358
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKH #0645 1180956
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 270956Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0663
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000645
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI AMBASSADOR CLINT WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2018
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PTER, KDRG, TI, SU
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF THREE DETAINEES TO SUDAN
REF: A. A) STATE 44358
B. B) 07 STATE 152279
C. C) 07 KHARTOUM 1783
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) CDA Fernandez briefed MFA
Under-Secretary Mutriff
Siddiq on April 27 of the contents of reftel A. RAO briefed
Sudanese Intelligence (NISS) at the same time. DLO has
provided flight information to appropriate MOD authorities
and to MFA in a diplomatic note (without specifying the
nature of the cargo).
2. (S) Siddiq, a former intelligence officer, confirmed that
the same level of humane treatment, security and access
assurances previously provided by the GOS with respect to
earlier GTMO transferees, will apply to this latest group as
previously was negotiated with the Embassy and confirmed more
recently with visiting State/DOD team. He agreed that this
information should be treated in a sensitive and confidential
manner prior to the completion of the transfer but added that
leaks could come from the lawyers retained by some of these
detainees, as has sometimes happened in the past.
3. (S) Siddiq confirmed the permission for the refueling of
the plane after landing in Sudan and transferring the
detainees to Sudanese custody and control.
FERNANDEZ
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 151501
date: 4/28/2008 6:38
refid: 08DUSHANBE591
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE390|08STATE18705
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0591/01 1190638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 280638Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0446
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0116
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0143
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000591
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND S/WCI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PTER, KJUS, KDRG, TI
SUBJECT: POLOFF GAINS ACCESS TO TAJIK PRISONS, VISITS
GUANTANAMO RETURNEES
REF: A. A) STATE 18705
B. B) DUSHANBE 390
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
1. (C) Summary: On April 24, PolOff visited Sobit Vakhidov
and Rahmiddin Sharopov, both returnees from Guantanamo now
held in Tajik prison, pursuant to a 2006 agreement between
the United States and Tajikistan.
There were numerous
bureaucratic complications in gaining access to them, and we
were only able to get a general impression of their treatment
in Tajik prison colonies.
However, we were also able to get
some information about the country’s penal system, to which
few internationals have had access in recent years. End
summary.
Getting Past the Bureaucracy
2. (SBU) Despite the presence of an agreement specifically
giving U.S. officials access to Guantanamo returnees, the
Tajik bureaucracy presented a formidable challenge. Tajik
authorities have generally refused internationals access to
prison facilities; they continue to refuse to allow the
International Committee for the Red Cross to carry out prison
inspections. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs took more than
six weeks to coordinate the arrangements with the Ministry of
Justice, which runs the prison system.
We originally sent
our request by diplomatic note on March 6. We had several
meetings with prison officials who did not appear to have the
instructions that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
told us they had sent. We
repeatedly contacted our Ministry
of Foreign Affairs counterparts to inform them of what their
Ministry of Justice colleagues told us.
Just as we started
to think that the authorities intended to deny us access, we
got a green light for our visit.
High Security ) But Not Maximum Security
4. (SBU) We were escorted by Col. Hudamon Muborakqadamov, who
gave us details of the circumstances under which Vakhidov and
Sharopov are being held. (We are
using the prisoners’ names
as spelled on their prison uniform.
Several variations exist
due to inconsistent transliterations.
The names used in
post’s Ref B interim response were SHARIPOV and VOHIDOV.)
Both prisoners had been convicted by Tajik courts for
terrorism related offenses (articles 335 and 401 of the Tajik
Criminal Code ) supporting mercenaries and unlawful border
crossing) shortly after returning from Guantanamo, and both
had been sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment. Both are
being held in high security penal colonies ) Vakhidov in
Dushanbe, and Sharopov in Vahdat.
We were given access only
to the administrative buildings of the penal colonies; we
were not permitted to view the rest of the prison grounds,
including the areas where the prisoners were being held.
5. (SBU) Prison officials told us that each of the penal
colonies houses more than 1000 inmates, all convicted of
serious crimes. Prisoners are
housed in barracks which
contain approximately 50 beds.
The areas around the beds are
considered the prisoners’ «individual spaces» where they are
allowed to keep personal articles.
Prisoners are required to
adhere to schedules prepared by the prison authorities; meals
are served at 6am, 1pm, and 6pm, and there are 6 roll calls
during the day (when prisoners must stand beside their beds).
Lights-out is from 10pm to
6am. (Note: While the colonies
where the GITMO returnees are kept have stringent security
regimes, they are not the most restrictive in the prison
system; maximum security prisons are reserved for
Qsystem; maximum security prisons are reserved for
particularly violent criminals, such as those with multiple
murder convictions. Prisoners in
these maximum security
prisons are kept in cells, not barracks, and cannot freely
walk about the prison grounds.
End note.)
6. (SBU) Each of the colonies has a library and a prayer
room.
Prisoners can use the library during their free time, and
they are permitted to worship in accordance with their faith.
(There are some Orthodox
prisoners, but most are Muslim.)
Prisoners may speak to imams, and they are permitted to keep
Korans in their «individual spaces.» The prison colonies
have work programs, and prisoners can earn credits that they
can use to purchase items at prison-run stores. There are no
general restrictions on prisoner to prisoner communication,
and prisoners are permitted visitors pending approval by the
authorities.
E
At Last We Meet
7. (C) We met Vakhidov and Sharopov in the offices of the
prison colonies’ directors, and Col. Muborakqadamov and the
prison colony director sat in during each meeting. Guards
brought each prisoner into the office, showed him to a chair
in the middle of the room, and then left and closed the door
behind them. The prisoners wore
simple black pants and
shirts, and they were not handcuffed or restrained in any
way. There were no particular
security precautions taken
during the interviews, although guards remained posted
outside the office. Neither
prisoner had any visible
indication that he had been mistreated.
PolOff spoke in
English, and PolAssistant translated into Tajiki.
8. (C) Vakhidov’s demeanor was sullen.
He spent most of the
interview staring at the floor; he never looked directly at
the prison officials or at EmbOffs.
He corroborated the
general conditions that Muborakqadamov had described for us,
but said that he was «not allowed to go to the mosque.» He
said that his father had visited twice, and that he was
allowed to speak to his father without the presence of prison
officials. He was allowed to
accept packages from his father
containing food. He said that he
had had some stomach
problems, and that he received medicine from his father. He
had also visited the prison doctor.
9. (C) Sharopov was more animated; he looked at EmbOffs when
speaking to them. His beard had
been shaved, as prison rules
prohibit facial hair. He said
that he had participated in a
work detail ) he and a group of other prisoners were taken
to a nearby factory to perform some repair work. He has had
one visitor ) a brother in law ) but has otherwise had no
contact with family members.
Sharopov said that his lawyer
had asked that his 5 years in Guantanamo count against his
sentence in Tajikistan. He said
the court denied the motion,
as there was no official confirmation from the U.S.
Government about his detention.
He asked that EmbOffs pass
on this information to the relevant officials.
As An Added Bonus, Some Information on the Penal System
10. (C) While traveling to and from the prisons, we took the
opportunity to engage Muborakqadamov in a discussion of Tajik
prisons. Muborakqadamov described
a system that has not
changed markedly from the Soviet period; the main goal of
prison guards is to «rehabilitate and correct» aberrant
behavior. He said that the system
has lost specialists who
had been trained at academies in Russia and Kazakhstan, and
that the overall quality of prison officials was very low.
Prison guards have a meager salary, have dangerous jobs, and
are not trained well enough to run the system like it had
been run under the Soviets.
Muborakqadamov himself has been
in the prison service for 35 years, and he regrets the loss
of professional exchanges that prison officials enjoyed
before Tajikistan’s independence.
He was very curious about
prison systems in the United States, and he suggested an
exchange program.
11. (C) Comment: Given the fact
that we had limited access
to the prison facilities, and that we conducted interviews in
the presence of prison officials, we cannot draw any
definitive conclusions about the prisoners’ detentions.
Neither prisoner exhibited signs of mistreatment, and their
accounts of prison conditions generally corroborated the
information given to us by Col. Muborakqadamov. The
prisoners had obviously gotten used to a strict regime
Qprisoners had obviously gotten used to a strict regime
imposed by prison officials.
(When they sat down in our
meetings, they both voluntarily put their hands behind their
chairs, although they were not restrained.) EmbOffs got the
impression that they were both holding back at least some
information because of the presence of prison officials.
Vakhidov was not particularly communicative, and he seemed
resigned to the fact that he would be spending a long time in
jail. Sharopov was thinking of
how to make his prison stay
shorter, and what he could do when he got out. PolOff
detected in his mannerisms a sense of bitterness and
hostility, although he alluded to the fact that conditions in
Guantanamo were better than those in Tajikistan.
12. (C) Comment continued: As has been our experience in
other settings, Muborakqadamov’s openness and cooperation was
a stark contrast to higher level officials’ obstructions.
The director of the penal system, General Izatullo Sharipov,
is regarded in the international community as being
uncooperative and corrupt. We
suspect that Muborakqadamov
has accurately characterized the overall professional
capacity of prison officials as deteriorating. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 151523
date: 4/28/2008 9:09
refid: 08BEIJING1643
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07BEIJING6233|07BEIJING7329|07BEIJING7330
header:
VZCZCXRO9501
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1643/01 1190909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 280909Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6938
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0369
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0062
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1332
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6691
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0618
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1169
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001643
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2033
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, KIRF, TI, PK, KG, AF, KZ, CH
SUBJECT: HIZB UT-TAHRIR, MUSLIM MISSIONARIES AND ISLAMIC
RESURGENCE IN WESTERN CHINA
REF: A. 2007 BEIJING 7329
B. 2007 BEIJING 7330
C. OSC/FBIS CPP20080404136002
D. 2007 BEIJING 6233
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).
Summary
——-
1. (C) Counterterrorism experts at the Ministry of State
Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR) described to PolOffs on April
15 an ongoing Islamic «resurgence» in western China,
encouraged by rising wealth among Chinese Muslims and
increasing contacts with foreign Muslims through foreign
missionary work, Hajj travel and study abroad. The spread of
the Wahhabist Salafiyya movement among western China’s Hui
Muslims has so far not conflicted with Chinese Government
interests, but local, more mainstream Muslims of the Qadim
and Ikhwan sects generally oppose the movement. The spread
of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, a fundamentalist group known in
Mandarin as «Yi Zha Bu Te» or «Yisilan Jiefang Dang»
which
promotes the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, generally
remains confined to Xinjiang, according to CICIR experts. An
Urumqi-based academic told PolOffs that Xinjiang authorities
have not figured out how to control the spread of Hizb
ut-Tahrir, which targets well-educated Muslims and whose
propaganda is available at street stalls and bookstores in
Uighur neighborhoods of Urumqi.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is «really
giving the Government a headache,» he added, surmising that
the movement’s «ideological strength» is too strong. End
Summary.
Scholars: Islamic Rebirth, Increasing Foreign Contact
——————————————— ———
2. (C) Counterterrorism expert Fang Jinying (strictly
protect) at the Ministry of State Security-sponsored think
tank China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
(CICIR) described to PolOffs what she views as an Islamic
revival in western China. She
feels the revival is part of a
global trend which swept across other Muslim regions of the
world three decades ago, but is just now reaching China after
being thwarted by the strict prohibitions on religion during
the Cultural Revolution. She
added that the religious
resurgence is not limited to Islam; participation in
Christianity and Buddhism is also currently on the rise.
3. (C) According to Fang, the influx of Muslim missionaries
and rise in foreign contact as a result of China’s increased
openness to the outside world and globalization have
contributed to this rebirth.
Missionaries from Jamaat
Tablighi, an international Islamic missionary organization
founded in India in 1926, have recently been traveling to
predominantly Hui Muslim areas of western China, such as
Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai to revive religious fervor, said
Fang. Fang and her colleague, Xu
Feibiao (strictly protect),
said missionaries focus their efforts on personal
relationships, engaging people in mosques and Muslim
neighborhoods. A common approach
is to organize and attend
studies or discussion groups after mosque services. Xu also
noted that Internet access to international Islamic websites,
as well as the increased interaction with foreign Muslims of
all kinds, have strengthened Islam in China.
4. (C) Fang highlighted rising wealth stemming from economic
development in Muslim communities as another factor in the
resurgence of Islamic beliefs in China (ref A). Economic
development has given more Muslims opportunities to travel
abroad, whether through work, study in Muslim countries
(increasingly common) or the Hajj pilgrimage. Consequently,
there are more and more opportunities for establishing
personal and institutional relationships with foreign Muslims
(ref B). Fang pointed to the
spread of the Wahhabist
Salafiyya movement in western China as an example of
increasing foreign influence, in this case as a result of
students and pilgrims returning from Saudi Arabia.
5. (C) Though Xu told PolOffs that the rising prevalence of
Salafiyyas in western China is opposed by Hui Muslim
followers of the more common Qadim and Ikhwan denominations,
Fang said the Central Government has not attempted to
BEIJING 00001643 002 OF 002
restrict the Salafiyya movement.
She observed that the
movement is an «evolution of customs» resulting from growing
interaction with the outside world and subsequent social
changes. So far, Fang said,
Salafiyya activities have not
violated any laws. However, she
admitted her concern that
the increasing religiosity among Chinese Muslims could
ultimately cause conflict between rival Chinese Muslim sects.
Experts Still in the Dark on Hizb ut-Tahrir
——————————————-
6. (C) Unlike Salafiyya, Fang says the tenets of Hizb
ut-Tahrir, a group which she claims is spreading in Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Region, conflict with Chinese law. For
example, she told PolOffs that the group’s intention to
establish an Islamic Caliphate constitutes a plan to
overthrow the state. Fang, who is
currently researching Hizb
ut-Tahrir’s structure and activities both in China and abroad
for a book on international extremism, said that the movement
is primarily intellectual and targets university-educated
Muslims. Xu said that «open
source materials» show that many
Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Xinjiang have «good jobs,» such as
university professorships. Fang
said that, in other
countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir recruiters first target society’s
«elite,» including government officials and law enforcement
officers. Second, they seek
followers from university
students and professors, before finally turning toward the
«middle class.»
7. (C) Uighur Sufis have also served as ripe recruits, in
part because the original founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir was a
Sufi, Fang claimed. She added
that Internet access and the
fact that there are many ethnic Uighurs in Central Asian
countries, where Hizb ut-Tahrir has a significant following,
make it more difficult to control the influx of radical
influences. Asked what measures
the Central Government is
taking to halt the spread of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Fang replied
that «this is why we are researching the topic.»
XUAR Claims Hizb ut-Tahrir-led Protests, Experts Uninformed
——————————————— —————
8. (C) State-controlled media reported that three «illegal
demonstration activities organized by Hizb ut-Tahrir» took
place on March 23 in the southern Xinjiang city of Hotan
(also known as «Khotan» or «Hetian») (ref C). The article
claimed that Hizb ut-Tahrir also distributed «reactionary
leaflets and posters» in Urumqi and Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous
Prefecture (west of Kasghar), as well as in Hotan, in an
attempt to «instigate» such demonstrations. When asked about
the report, CICIR’s Fang told PolOffs that they know no
details about the demonstrations, and that they need to go do
an on-site evaluation themselves.
If the protests were
indeed organized by Hizb ut-Tahrir, Fang said, such a
demonstration would be «a first» for their operations in
China. (NOTE: Foreign media
report that frustration over an
alleged ban on headscarves worn by Muslim women and
indignation over the death in custody of a wealthy Uighur
businessman sparked the Hotan demonstrations.)
Urumqi-based Academic: A «Headache» for the Government
——————————————— ———
9. (C) Mulati Heiniyati (strictly protect), an ethnic Kazakh
scholar in the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences (XJASS)
Institute of Religions, told PolOffs that Xinjiang
authorities have not figured out how to control the spread of
Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hizb ut-Tahrir is
«really giving the
Government a headache,» he added, surmising that the
movement’s «ideological strength» may be too strong for the
Central Government to stop.
Heiniyati agreed that this
segment of society threatens social stability and may offer
fertile ground for groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir to take root.
(NOTE: XJASS counterterrorism expert Ma Pinyan (strictly
protect) told PolOff in August 2007 that Hizb ut-Tahrir
specifically targets unemployed university graduates among
other disaffected groups (ref D).)
PICCUTA
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 151565
date: 4/28/2008 13:43
refid: 08DUSHANBE592
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 08STATE43804
header:
O 281343Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0449
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY ASTANA
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 000592
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP, SCA, EUR, ISN, NEA, AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2018
TAGS: PARM, PREL, KNNP, TI
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON UPDATED SCHEDULE OF FLIGHT
OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN FROM DPRK TO SYRIA
REF: STATE 43804
Classified By: DCM Tom Hushek; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (S) PolOff delivered the non-paper on the Air Koryo
charter flight as instructed to the Tajik Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Ministry officials
informed us on April 28 that
they had sent the information on the flight to the State
Committee for National Security, which is the responsible
institution for responding to this matter. Tajik Foreign
Ministry officials have indicated in response to previous
demarches on this subject that Tajikistan would uphold UNSC
resolutions and accede to our requests.
2. (U) Dushanbe point of contact for follow-up information is
Greg Naarden, [email protected].
JACOBSON
NNNN
End Cable Text
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 151676
date: 4/29/2008 9:44
refid: 08BEIJING1661
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0496
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1661/01 1200944
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 290944Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6962
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0371
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0064
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1334
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6693
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0620
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1171
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001661
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2033
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, KIRF, TI, PK, KG, AF, KZ
SUBJECT: XINJIANG: LACK OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
DISCRIMINATION EXACERBATES ETHNIC TENSIONS
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).
Summary
——-
1. (C) Job discrimination continues to fuel ethnic tension in
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), according to
academics and Beijing-based Uighurs.
Well-known Xinjiang
scholar Yang Shengmin (strictly protect) of Beijing’s Central
University for Nationalities also acknowledged that
unemployment, which results from «complicated economic
factors,» is a source of ethnic tension. However, Li Sheng
(strictly protect), a top Xinjiang expert at the State
Council-affiliated Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued
that the Uighurs’ poor work ethic and inferiority to Han in
the classroom are partly to blame for high unemployment. In
addition to joblessness, Xinjiang authorities are also
dealing with inflation, disgruntlement over the Government’s
management of religious affairs and protests, allegedly
instigated by Muslim radicals, all as the Olympics draw near.
End Summary.
2006 Study in Xinjiang Shows Gap in Employment
——————————————— —
2. (C) From 2003 to 2006, the employment rate among recent
university graduates in Xinjiang was 70 percent, roughly the
national average, according to a study published in September
2006 by the Xinjiang Institute of Education Journal.
However, during the same period, the employment rate for
ethnic minority recent graduates in Xinjiang was a dismal 20
percent, while it was 94 percent for ethnic Han (the Chinese
majority ethnicity) graduates.
The study’s authors blame the
unemployment problem on a lack of employment opportunities
offered by mid- to large-sized state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), a focus among ethnic minority graduates on finding
work in «developed, urban centers» instead of in
underdeveloped border areas, inadequate employment
information for graduates, and insufficient Mandarin skills
among ethnic minority job-seekers.
This particular report
proposes an eight-step solution to the predicament, including
development of tourism and manufacturing of cultural products
(i.e. industries that typically rely heavily on minority
employees), improvement of preferential hiring policies for
ethnic minorities, incentives for private sector hiring,
incentives for minority graduates to go work in rural and
borderland areas and improved Mandarin language training.
Xinjiang Scholars Call Uighur Unemployment a «Big Problem»
——————————————— ————-
3. (C) Adil Zhumaturdu (strictly protect) an ethnic Kyrgyz
scholar from southern Xinjiang’s Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous
Prefecture who now works at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences’ (CASS) Institute for Ethnic Literature Studies,
told PolOffs that unemployment among Uighur university
graduates is «a big problem.»
Adil stressed that language is
a major factor. Chinese companies
want to hire people who
are completely fluent in both written and spoken Mandarin.
Furthermore, Adil said the problem is not limited to the
private sector; government departments also prefer native
Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese applicants. Adil noted that
one effort to address this problem is the «bilingual
education» policy, which decrees that Mandarin be used in
Uighur-language primary and secondary schools (ref A).
Xinjiang scholar Yang Shengmin (strictly protect) of
Beijing’s Central University for Nationalities acknowledged
that unemployment has become a source of ethnic tension,
though he said the Government is not to blame given the «very
complicated» economic factors at work.
4. (C) Mulati Heiniyati (strictly protect), an ethnic Kazakh
scholar in the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences (XJASS)
Institute of Religions, expressed shock at how many young,
university-educated Uighurs are working in restaurants
because they cannot find other job opportunities. Heiniyati
lamented that many well-educated Uighurs are relegated to
low-paying, unskilled work.
Heiniyati said the resulting
disgruntlement could threaten social stability and may offer
fertile ground in which Islamic radical groups like Hizb
ut-Tahrir could take root (refs B, C).
Uighur Workers Lack «Quality»
BEIJING 00001661 002 OF 003
——————————
5. (C) Li Sheng, Director of the Borderland Studies and
History Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS), told PolOffs that market reforms and
preferential education policies are actually hurting
employment prospects for Uighur university graduates. Li,
who lived in Urumqi for over forty years, pointed out that
the university entrance examination requirement is 100 points
lower for Uighur students than for Han.
For example, if a
Han high school student must score 600 out of 750 on the
college entrance exam in order to gain university acceptance,
his Uighur classmate may only need to break 500. Li bluntly
asserted that as a result of the low bar set for Uighur
students, Han students at Xinjiang universities, who had to
meet higher admissions standards to enter college, are
generally of «higher quality» than their Uighur classmates.
Companies and businesses in China’s «marketized» economy must
respond to «market demands» by hiring the highest quality
workers, «most» of whom are Han,
Li said.
6. (C) Li said the XUAR Government has made efforts to
require government departments and state-owned companies to
hire more ethnic minorities, but the market is now the
dominant generator of jobs in Xinjiang.
Li told PolOffs that
Uighurs, whether blue or white collar, simply do not have a
good reputation with employers.
He mentioned the case of a
Han brick kiln owner in Yutian, a Taklamakan oasis town east
of Hotan, who exclusively hires Han from Sichuan Province.
The kiln owner pays to send them home for a one-month
vacation every year and proclaims the kiln is still more
productive than it would be if he hired local Uighurs to work
year-round. Li also told PolOffs
about a Xinjiang
supermarket owner, who idealistically hired a half Uighur,
half Han staff. After a period of
time, Li recounted, the
supermarket owner found that the Han workers were so much
superior that he replaced all the Uighur staff with Han.
7. (C) Such attitudes among Han are common, our contacts say.
An Amcit who regularly runs
teaching workshops in Xinjiang
repeated to PolOffs a Han colleague’s comment which is
representative of Han attitudes towards Uighurs. The Uighurs
are «uninterested in development,» the colleague told our
Amcit contact, and «lack appreciation for government
investment in southern Xinjiang.»
«Look at them,» she
continued, «It’s like they want to be poor forever.»
Meanwhile, Uighur Frustration Continues
—————————————
8. (C) Parhat (strictly protect), a Uighur native of Kashgar
who plays in a rock band in Beijing, spoke to PolOff of
mounting frustration among Uighur college graduates over
unsatisfactory job opportunities.
Parhat is a doctor by
trade and speaks both fluent English and Mandarin Chinese yet
was only able to find work in a small clinic in a small
village outside of Kashgar.
Uighur doctors are relegated to
the least desirable jobs in the remotest areas, he said. The
experience caused Parhat to move to Beijing to seek work as a
musician. According to Parhat,
his former classmates and
friends continue to face similar challenges back in Kashgar
and Urumqi. One of his classmates
from the medical college
recently took a job as a policeman, after unsuccessfully
searching for a job in medicine.
Separately, a young Uighur
named Hasan (strictly protect), a recent graduate from
Kashgar Teacher’s College, told PolOff he likewise moved to
Beijing to work as a waiter because of the lack of
opportunities in Xinjiang.
Unemployment Not the Only Problem
———————————
9. (C) XJASS scholar of Islam and XUAR People’s Political
Consultative Conference (PPCC) member Ahmadjan Hasan
(strictly protect) told PolOff that inflation was the hottest
topic at the January 2008 PPCC meeting.
According to Hasan,
the price of mutton in southern Xinjiang has almost doubled
in the past year. Hasan reported
that many Uighur imams are
frustrated with government management of religious affairs
and that many rules and policies imposed on Uighur Muslims
violate China’s own constitution.
For example, even though
the constitution protects «normal religious activities» and
BEIJING 00001661 003 OF 003
forbids «discrimination against citizens who believe in
religion,» Hasan said local imams complain tht many Muslims
working in the Government are not allowed to worship at the
mosque. State-run media also
recently reported protests in
he southern Xinjiang city of Hotan (ref B). Reorts blamed
the unrest on Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic fundamentalist group
that contacts say is growing within the Uighur population
(ref C).
PICCUTA
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 152491
date: 5/6/2008 3:09
refid: 08DUSHANBE634
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5985
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0634/01 1270309
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060309Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0464
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0147
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0081
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0119
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0089
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000634
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IIP/NEA-SCA MBRYANT
ALSO FOR SCA/PPD JKAMP, ECA/A/S/A ECLEMENT, AND SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ECON, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — WHY AMERICAN CORNERS MATTER
1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified — Not for Internet Distribution.
2. (SBU) Summary. Despite widespread academic corruption and
crumbling infrastructure, Tajik students and instructors are
striving to achieve, as Public Affairs Officer and visiting
Information Resources Officer learned during a trip to Qurghon-Teppa
and Khorog April 23-25 to scout locations for new American Corners.
The Corners would build on local initiative and provide much needed
English language activities and educational advising to facilitate
connections between Tajiks and Americans. Academics and NGO leaders
enthusiastically welcomed the proposed addition to local resources.
Local officials in Khorog lauded «good intentions,» but made
it
plain that any American Corner would need their consent. The new
Corners will considerably widen the horizon of exchanges and
opportunities for Tajikistan’s deserving and hard working academics.
End summary.
3. (SBU) Tajikistan is facing a crisis in education as the
population continues to rise and the government expends few
resources to renovate Soviet era educational infrastructure.
Academic corruption here undermines incentive for professors or
students to achieve. University
administrators dismiss students
from classes in the fall to pick cotton for a couple dollars a day,
an illegal but tacitly accepted practice. Teachers are underpaid
and accept bribes from students who pay to stay out of the cotton
fields or to obtain good grades.
Nevertheless, those willing to
work hard to advance honestly are striving to learn English to
qualify for admission to universities abroad. By providing an
English language platform and educational advising, our Corners fill
a gap left by inadequate local facilities and thus stand as an
alternative to corruption. To
meet the demand for these services,
Dushanbe’s Public Affairs Officer and SCA’s visiting Information
Resource Officer traveled to Qurghon-Teppa and Khorog April 23-25 to
scout locations for two new Corners.
4. (SBU) In Khorog, a beautiful but isolated city of 28,000 on the
Afghan border which serves as the capital of the Gorno-Badakhshan
Autonomous Region, we found strong traditions of education and
self-reliance, confirming the city would be an ideal location for a
new American Corner. Moreover,
the study of English is widespread,
due to the excellent education offered by the University of Central
Asia (UCA) and the Aga Khan Lycee, where English is a primary
language of instruction. The
Community Education Center, a
non-governmental organization which supports itself by offering
low-fee English language and computer training, would be a natural
partner.
5. (SBU) We met a Khorog State University professor who participated
in a Junior Faculty Development program in Kentucky last year. This
summer, in a program funded by the University of Kentucky, she will
return with two of her fellow professors to write a grammar and
lexicon of the Pamiri language, Shugni. While this success story
started with a USG exchange, an American Corner with educational
advising could connect more Tajik academics to American colleagues,
beyond the limited number of official USG exchanges.
6. (SBU) The prospect of a growing «American» presence in
Khorog
provoked a Soviet like reflex from the regional authorities. After
our enthusiastic reception at the Aga Khan funded University of
Qour enthusiastic reception at the Aga Khan funded University of
Central Asia, the hukumat (i.e., regional government offices)
summoned us to a meeting to remind us of who was in charge. The
governor/mayor and the vice rector of the government run Khorog
State University said an American Corner to support education was
«a
good intention,» but would go nowhere without their explicit
consent. They reminded us again
the next day during the Information
Resources Officer’s informal briefing on United States government
with a couple dozen Khorog State English students. Members of the
local State Committee for National Security (successor to the KGB,
but still known by that acronym) called the Public Affairs Section
assistant and threatened to (but did not) interrupt the talk because
we did not request permission in advance.
7. (SBU) Qurghon-Teppa is likewise an excellent host city for a
Corner, being Tajikistan’s third largest city with a population of
about 80,000, home of Qurghon-Teppa State University, and only a
hour’s drive from Dushanbe in all four seasons. A committee of
seven faculty and administrators from the university met us in a
show of strong approval. However,
some of the good will had strings
attached. The rector tried to
sell us an «American Center» that
would fit perfectly in his daughter’s three-story house. When we
explained the difference between a «corner» and a
«center,» he said
the university had no space. A
professor who was afraid we would be
dissuaded by this gambit took us aside and told us to ignore the
rector, and said the university had plenty of space.
DUSHANBE 00000634 002 OF 002
8. (SBU) A more likely partner would be the non-governmental
organization SWORDE-Teppa (Sustainable World Development within the
Environment), which offers free English courses to the community,
educational activities for youth, and public health programs to
eradicate malaria. In 2007
SWORDE-Teppe signed a three-year
rent-free lease agreement with the local authorities for a spacious
two-story kindergarten which the NGO renovated with $75,000 in
British government funding. When
asked whether the Government of
Tajikistan was likely to reclaim the property at the end of the
three-year term, the director considered that unlikely because the
organization was well established as a community center for Tajik
citizens, particularly youth.
9. (U) To improve the management of existing and future Corners, the
Public Affairs Section will introduce a strategic shift in the
Corners’ mission. We will hire
coordinators who answer to us
instead of local university administrators, who do not always share
our vision. In response to the
great demand from patrons, we will
also add educational advising services and greatly expand the
contacts among the Tajik and American academic communities. Last
year our existing Corners logged an impressive 18,000 visitors.
When Khorog and Qurghon-Teppa come on board and the administrative
changes are in place, we will have considerably widened the horizon
of exchanges and opportunities for Tajikistan’s deserving and hard
working academics.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 152759
date: 5/7/2008 12:41
refid: 08DUSHANBE649
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE515|08DUSHANBE550
header:
VZCZCXRO7367
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0649/01 1281241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071241Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0477
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0151
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0123
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0085
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0093
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000649
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, EFIN, ECON, PREL, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — FOOD INSECURITY LIKELY TO WORSEN
REF: (A) Dushanbe 550
(B) Dushanbe 515
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Alanna Shaikh, EUR/ACE Central Asia Country
Assistance Coordinator, visited Tajikistan from April 24 to May 1 to
assess humanitarian assistance needs.
She confirmed that food
security problems persist (reftel A) and that they will worsen in
the coming year without intervention by the international community.
In meetings with international
organizations, NGOs, and government
officials, she learned that Tajikistan has made little progress
recovering from the past winter.
Overseas remittances have kept
many families afloat, and small and medium private enterprises
remain subject to an unstable economic environment. Tajiks continue
to become increasingly frustrated with President Rahmon’s
government, and they are increasingly willing to voice criticism.
End Summary.
Food Shortages Will Get Worse
——————————
2. (U) Shaikh met with representatives from the World Food Program,
the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, Winrock
International, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, CARE, and the
Ministry of Health. She also
visited beneficiaries of EUR/ACE
funding. There was strong
consensus among the NGOs that major food
security problems exist throughout the country. The World Food
Program found that 27% of Tajiks are malnourished, and another 27%
are in jeopardy of falling into the same category. They estimate
that most Tajiks spend between 70 and 80 percent of their income on
food. According to CARE,
Tajikistan’s malnourishment stunting rate
(low height-for-age) rivals that of sub-Saharan Africa.
3. (U) The outlook for the future is dim. The NGOs and
international organizations point to declining production from
harvests, continued government emphasis on cotton production, poor
irrigation infrastructure, rising food and fuel prices, and
decreased real remittances as reasons to expect the situation to
deteriorate well into 2009.
Despite assurances by government
officials to the contrary, our interlocutors generally agreed that
Tajikistan is not prepared for the next crisis. The government has
passed some laws that address longer term solutions, but there have
been no real changes to the country’s dysfunctional and inefficient
agricultural sector. For now,
impoverished farmers need immediate
access to inputs (e.g. seeds and fertilizer) to plant food crops for
the late fall harvest. Since the
government does not have the
resources or ability to support the farmers, the international
community must step in to provide assistance.
Private Sector and Remittances Keep the Country on a Tight Rope
——————————————-
4. (U) Small and medium scale private businesses and remittances
from Tajiks working abroad have kept the Tajik economy from
collapsing. The international
community’s microfinance programs
have dispersed more than a billion dollars in loans since
independence, and have helped build trust in the banking system.
Any positive developments, however, are offset by the deteriorating
business climate. A European Bank
for Reconstruction and
Development representative pointed to the dubious prosecution of
Maruf Orifov, the owner of the Orima supermarket chain (reftel B) as
being disastrous for investor confidence. While Tajiks living in
Qbeing disastrous for investor confidence. While Tajiks living in
Russia sent home an estimated $1.6 billion in 2007, increased
inflation reduced the real value of their remittances. Disruptions
to the flow of remittances could reduce the country’s GDP by up to
20%.
Full of Sound and Fury
———————-
5. (SBU) Our interlocutors confirmed our observations that the
declining economic situation is having a significant impact on
public opinion. Newspapers have
printed more direct criticism of
government officials than in the past.
Tajiks in both rural and
urban settings have become been more willing to openly express their
dissatisfaction with the government.
The recent suggestion by
Dushanbe’s Mayor that Tajiks donate 50% of their May and June
salaries to help finance a hydroelectric dam project highlights the
degree to which government officials have lost touch with public
sentiment.
Signifying Something?
———————
6. (SBU) Comment: In his April 25 address to the joint session of
parliament, President Rahmon recognized that lack of food security
DUSHANBE 00000649 002 OF 002
was a problem. He played the
«civil war card» by reminding people
of what happens when the country is not unified. The fear of
igniting tension keeps Tajiks from openly advocating for change, and
allows the government to continue dysfunctional policies.
Tajikistan’s worsening food security situation will test the
conventional wisdom. Without
substantial and immediate assistance
from the international community, Tajikistan’s worsening food
shortage could lead to political instability. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 152760
date: 5/7/2008 12:41
refid: 08DUSHANBE650
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE515|08DUSHANBE550
header:
VZCZCXRO7370
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0650/01 1281241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071241Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0479
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0153
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0125
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0087
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0095
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000650
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, EFIN, ECON, PREL, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — FOOD INSECURITY LIKELY TO WORSEN
REF: (A) Dushanbe 550
(B) Dushanbe 515
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Alanna Shaikh, EUR/ACE Central Asia Country
Assistance Coordinator, visited Tajikistan from April 24 to May 1 to
assess humanitarian assistance needs.
She confirmed that food
security problems persist (reftel A) and that they will worsen in
the coming year without intervention by the international community.
In meetings with international
organizations, NGOs, and government
officials, she learned that Tajikistan has made little progress
recovering from the past winter.
Overseas remittances have kept
many families afloat, and small and medium private enterprises
remain subject to an unstable economic environment. Tajiks continue
to become increasingly frustrated with President Rahmon’s
government, and they are increasingly willing to voice criticism.
End Summary.
Food Shortages Will Get Worse
——————————
2. (U) Shaikh met with representatives from the World Food Program,
the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank, Winrock
International, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, CARE, and the
Ministry of Health. She also
visited beneficiaries of EUR/ACE
funding. There was strong
consensus among the NGOs that major food
security problems exist throughout the country. The World Food
Program found that 27% of Tajiks are malnourished, and another 27%
are in jeopardy of falling into the same category. They estimate
that most Tajiks spend between 70 and 80 percent of their income on
food. According to CARE,
Tajikistan’s malnourishment stunting rate
(low height-for-age) rivals that of sub-Saharan Africa.
3. (U) The outlook for the future is dim. The NGOs and
international organizations point to declining production from
harvests, continued government emphasis on cotton production, poor
irrigation infrastructure, rising food and fuel prices, and
decreased real remittances as reasons to expect the situation to
deteriorate well into 2009.
Despite assurances by government
officials to the contrary, our interlocutors generally agreed that
Tajikistan is not prepared for the next crisis. The government has
passed some laws that address longer term solutions, but there have
been no real changes to the country’s dysfunctional and inefficient
agricultural sector. For now,
impoverished farmers need immediate
access to inputs (e.g. seeds and fertilizer) to plant food crops for
the late fall harvest. Since the
government does not have the
resources or ability to support the farmers, the international
community must step in to provide assistance.
Private Sector and Remittances Keep the Country on a Tight Rope
——————————————-
4. (U) Small and medium scale private businesses and remittances
from Tajiks working abroad have kept the Tajik economy from
collapsing. The international
community’s microfinance programs
have dispersed more than a billion dollars in loans since
independence, and have helped build trust in the banking system.
Any positive developments, however, are offset by the deteriorating
business climate. A European Bank
for Reconstruction and
Development representative pointed to the dubious prosecution of
Maruf Orifov, the owner of the Orima supermarket chain (reftel B) as
being disastrous for investor confidence. While Tajiks living in
Qbeing disastrous for investor confidence. While Tajiks living in
Russia sent home an estimated $1.6 billion in 2007, increased
inflation reduced the real value of their remittances. Disruptions
to the flow of remittances could reduce the country’s GDP by up to
20%.
Full of Sound and Fury
———————-
5. (SBU) Our interlocutors confirmed our observations that the
declining economic situation is having a significant impact on
public opinion. Newspapers have
printed more direct criticism of
government officials than in the past.
Tajiks in both rural and
urban settings have become been more willing to openly express their
dissatisfaction with the government.
The recent suggestion by
Dushanbe’s Mayor that Tajiks donate 50% of their May and June
salaries to help finance a hydroelectric dam project highlights the
degree to which government officials have lost touch with public
sentiment.
Signifying Something?
———————
6. (SBU) Comment: In his April 25 address to the joint session of
parliament, President Rahmon recognized that lack of food security
DUSHANBE 00000650 002 OF 002
was a problem. He played the
«civil war card» by reminding people
of what happens when the country is not unified. The fear of
igniting tension keeps Tajiks from openly advocating for change, and
allows the government to continue dysfunctional policies.
Tajikistan’s worsening food security situation will test the
conventional wisdom. Without
substantial and immediate assistance
from the international community, Tajikistan’s worsening food
shortage could lead to political instability. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 152879
date: 5/8/2008 7:14
refid: 08DUSHANBE654
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0654/01 1290714
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 080714Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0485
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0155
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0097
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0127
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0089
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0078
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0010
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000654
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — KHOROG’S QUIET DISCONTENTS
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Jacobson; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: During an April 24-25 visit to Khorog, the
capital of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of
Tajikistan encompassing the Pamir mountains, conversations
with civil society, political figures, and administrators
showed a region with severe economic difficulties, resentment
of the central government, an
