id: 149845
date: 4/15/2008 7:31
refid: 08DUSHANBE521
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
08DUSHANBE512|08DUSHANBE521
header:
VZCZCXRO7628
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0521/01 1060731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0132
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0070
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0105
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0078
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03
DUSHANBE 000521
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, ECON, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S CIVIL
SOCIETY AND BUSINESS LEADERS NEED RULE
OF LAW, NOT RULE OF THE
JUNGLE
REF: DUSHANBE 512
1. (U) Sensitive But
Unclassified — Not for Internet Distribution.
2. (SBU) Summary.
Tajikistan’s business advocates and civil leaders
cited corruption and the
lack of coherent laws and policies as the
greatest impediments to
business or reforming social institutions.
In separate open and
free-wheeling discussions with A/DAS Pamela
Spratlen April 1 about civil
society and the business climate, they
said that in Tajikistan
success or progress depended on personal
relationships with
influential officials, rather than institutions
and a reliable regulatory
framework. In a Soviet-style
contradiction, they shared
the sense that President Rahmon supported
them, but believed that
without rule of law, corrupt or ignorant
mid-level officials had too
much latitude to interfere with their
work. Civil society leaders noted the significant
role that
Russia’s media dominance
plays in undermining support for an open
civil society, especially
among young people. Business and civil
society leaders believe that
continued engagement on the issues from
foreign missions is a lever
that can get the GOTI to implement
necessary reforms. End summary.
«Blat» Thrives in
Absence of Policy
————————————
3. (SBU) The directors of
nine human rights and capacity building
organizations assessed the
operating environment for Tajikistan’s
civil society with Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary Pamela Spratlen
on April 1 at the
embassy. The overarching complaint was
that the
government had no policy
framework for managing civil society
activity; instead,
individual officials defined the terms of
engagement with
society. For the Soros Foundation this
meant
memoranda of understanding
with the ministries of health and
education inhibited rather
than facilitated public access to medical
professionals and
educators. The head of a capacity
building NGO
said mid-level officials
demanded that Soviet-style activity results
be published in national
newspapers. A women’s rights advocate
said
that because the president
appointed new ministers and advisors each
year, NGO leaders had to
build new relationships and re-justify
programs continually, which
prevented them from reaching program
goals.
NGO = Color Revolution
———————-
4. (SBU) The director of a
legal aid and human rights NGO said that
since the «political
upheaval» in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, the
government has scrutinized
human rights advocacy closely. She noted
that the public associations
law passed in 2007 required NGOs to
re-register with the
Ministry of Justice to monitor NGO activities
more closely, and that of
the 3,000 NGOs previously registered, only
1,600 subsequently
re-registered. (Note: The chairman of a
business
association said the number
was even lower, only 1,040 had
re-registered. End
note.) Some organizations lacked funding
to
continue, while others
operated without registration.
5. (SBU) Participants said
that the degree of government involvement
— whether interference or
cooperation — depended on the NGO’s
mission. A human rights defender said
«misunderstandings» were more
likely when organizations
shone a spotlight on issues such as
unlawful confiscation of
property or inconsistent enforcement of
laws. A lawyer for the American Bar
Association/Rule of Law
Initiative (ABA/ROLI) said
that the government refused even to
discuss its priorities for
reforming the criminal procedure code.
Qdiscuss its priorities for
reforming the criminal procedure code.
Nevertheless, she said her
organization had no difficulties
registering, although
articles maligning its activities sometimes
appeared in the Russian
media.
Good Czar, Bad Apparatchiks
—————————
6. (SBU) The NGO leaders
felt the government selectively supported
their efforts, at least in
principle. The director of a development
foundation said that the
trend was incremental but positive, and
that there was an
understanding «at the highest levels» of the need
for civil society. His organization prepared analyses on a
national
development program and a
code of conduct currently being discussed
by NGO, government, and
parliamentary representatives. He is
hopeful the government will
adopt both. The women’s rights advocate
said government officials
have quoted passages from a shadow report
on Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW)
prepared by her organization.
Tajik Youth — «We Don’t
Want No Civil Society»
———————————————
—
DUSHANBE 00000521 002 OF 003
7. (SBU) When asked whether
young people are interested in civil
society, an activist with 17
years experience in conflict resolution
said young people do not
understand their role in the country’s
future nor do they have an
interest in civil society, a concept
understood only by the elite
in Dushanbe and Khujand. Several
issues undermine civil
society development. First, he said
education is collapsing,
literacy is falling, TV and radio provide
no useful information to
citizens. Second, poverty is so severe
people can’t afford
newspapers. Third, there are few outlets
for
building institutional
change. The women’s rights advocate said
students who study abroad
find no open doors when they return; the
establishment is not
interested in their ideas or changing the
status quo. The best educated who do not work abroad end
up working
for international
organizations, many as lawyers.
8. (SBU) A major outside
source also depletes public support for
civil society
development. The director of an Internet
policy
initiative agreed that the
public had a negative impression of NGO
work, but it came not from
bad experiences with local groups, but
from negative reporting in
Russian media. He said that with young
people being interested in
business, NGOs should serve as bridge.
They could provide analyses
of market trends, employment
opportunities, and
recommended income levels.
Businesses Operate by Law of
Jungle, Not Rule of Law
———————————————
——-
9. (SBU) Business advocates
and private sector representatives
described a treacherous
business environment where survivors follow
the law of the jungle. The participants said that excessive
interest rates, an
incomprehensible tax code, and the lack of a
sound legal structure hinder
the growth of private enterprise in
Tajikistan. Just starting a business is difficult because
no
information about
registration procedures is available.
Banks offer
no short term credit, and
the interest rate on longer term loans is
18 to 40 percent. Those that manage to register have to deal
with
twenty different ministries
that issue decrees which they rarely
share with business
leaders. Businesses like the Orima
supermarket
chain that prevail despite
overwhelming odds are at risk of having
their leaders falsely
accused of crimes and/or being taken over by
rivals connected to powerful
officials (reftel).
10. (SBU) An expatriate on
the board of an investment bank said that
the most successful
international investors were the Chinese,
Russians or Kazakhstanis,
who knew how to «move through the gaps,»
that is, had the cash to pay
off the right people. He said there
was «no political
will» to improve the investment climate and no
transparency. The culture of corruption works both ways, he
noted;
government officials, who
clearly don’t understand that a rule-based
world exists outside their
experience, tried to bribe
representatives of rating
organizations Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s to get a higher
rating for the GOTI.
11. (SBU) Agribusinesses,
which account for 70 percent of small and
medium sized enterprises
(SME), are especially vulnerable because of
poor government regulation,
according to the chairman of the
beekeeper’s
association. The chairman charged that
the government
has never understood how to
regulate agriculture and simply copied
Russian and Kazakh laws
posted on the Internet. He said farmers
QRussian and Kazakh laws
posted on the Internet. He said farmers
can’t buy their own land and
are required to file onerous reports
about their crops and
harvests. He blamed the
«futurists,» the
agents who loan cotton
farmers cash to buy seeds, for the cotton
debt crisis. Echoing the «Good Czar» sentiments
voiced by civil
society, business leaders
said President Rahmon alone cared about
the plight of farmers,
because the president froze their debts and
ordered banks to loan
directly to them. Despite advocacy from
«dozens» of
international organizations, he said the «clan system»
of influence over business
still prevails; parliament refuses to act
on any recommendations about
adherence to international standards.
Tax ‘Em Dead
————
12. (SBU) One industry that
is booming is the mobile phone business,
in response to strong
demand. The chairman of the Mobile Phone
Operator’s Association said
«so far» his own business was
profitable. In 2007 he said cell phone companies paid $60
million
in taxes of their $200
million profit into government coffers.
However, the government is
using the profitable mobile sector to
prop up the state telecom
service. A few months ago, when the
mobile operators announced a
new system of payment, «calling party
pays,» the national
telecommunications company Tajiktelekom demanded
9.6% of all payments to the
mobile operators.
13. (SBU) An internet
service provider said that despite all the
obstacles, business was
nevertheless developing. He himself
managed
to accumulate savings to
start his own business without a loan.
The
DUSHANBE 00000521 003 OF 003
biggest problem in his
opinion was a lack of expertise in business
management. He said corruption was still a significant
problem
impeding progress and that
anti-corruption efforts had yielded no
results.
Comment
——-
14. (SBU) All participants,
who have benefited from foreign
assistance or are alumni of
USG programs, had a stake in persuading
a high-level American
official that the USG should continue its
support for civil society
and economic reform. They highlighted
corruption, incompetence and
their government’s impulse to monitor
and control as major
hindrances to their attempts to build
successful organizations and
make Tajikistan a more prosperous and
open society. Some noted Russia’s media dominance as a
factor that
negatively affects attitudes
toward civil society organizations.
Both business and civil
society leaders share the conviction that
continued engagement on the
issues from Western officials, embassies
and missions is a lever that
can bring essential expertise and get
the GOTI to implement
necessary reform. End Comment.
15. (U) A/DAS Spratlen
cleared this message.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 149847
date: 4/15/2008 7:33
refid: 08DUSHANBE522
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE522
header:
VZCZCXRO7631
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0522/01 1060733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150733Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0402
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0135
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0108
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0073
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0081
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 000522
SIPDIS
AIDAC
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DEPT ALSO PASS USAID
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EAGR, ECON,
PHUM, PREL, WFP, TI
SUBJECT: FEED THE PEOPLE; STARVE EXTREMISM: CONTINUING
NEEDS FOR
FOOD AID IN TAJIKISTAN
Ref: (a) April 10 MSP Senior Review for Embassy
Dushanbe;
(b) April 11
Spratlen-Jacobson e-mail; (c) Dushanbe 490; (d)
Dushanbe 219
1. Embassy Dushanbe appreciates the opportunity
for senior review
of its Mission
Strategic Plan via digital
video conference April 10 (ref A). The
robust attendance from representatives
of State and other agencies
clearly demonstrated a keen
level of interest in several of our most
pressing issues. In accordance with ref B e-mail, post offers
the
following synopsis of our
arguments for continuation of food
security programs in
Tajikistan as discussed during the meeting.
We
will send comments on
management staffing and corruption programming
separately.
2. Summary:
Tajikistan’s PL-480 Food For Peace program is
scheduled to end this
year. Post’s country team believes this
is a
critical mistake, which
could have immediate and severe humanitarian
consequences and a negative
long-term effect on Tajikistan’s
economic security and
political stability. Although Tajikistan
is
not yet a failed state (a
question that framed the MSP review), it
is clear that continuation
of the Food For Peace program could be
the single most important
intervention to address immediate
humanitarian concerns,
contribute to economic growth and democratic
development, and head off
the kinds of social stresses that will
lead to instability and
extremism. End summary.
3. High Impact Program: The PL-480 Food For Peace program provides
food to Tajikistan’s most
vulnerable people and communities. The
food aid is leveraged to
achieve developmental goals as well, and
has achieved a positive
impact on health, education, diversification
of agricultural, and local
economic growth. The program spurs local
food production and raises
farm income by aiding rural populations
in growing kitchen gardens
for household use, school gardens for
school lunches, preserving
food for the winter, establishing small
greenhouses, fruit and
vegetable canning operations. School
feeding
programs, have helped keep
children (especially rural girls) in
school and provide the most
vulnerable children with at least one,
nutritious hot meal a
day. The program contributes directly to
civil society development by
encouraging participatory decision
making in rural communities. In the context of a world food crisis,
Tajikistan’s heavy
dependence on imported food and falling farm
incomes, the Food For Peace
program is our most effective instrument
for providing short term
relief in the hardest hit rural communities
and contributes to medium
and long-term growth.
4. Going Hungry:
This winter’s food crisis (refs C and D) clearly
showed that Tajikistan, the
poorest of the former Soviet countries
and in fact one of the
poorest countries in the world, is unable to
meet the basic food needs of
its population. The climatic crisis
which occurred over the
coldest winter in 40 years exacerbated the
problem, but was not the
sole (or even main) cause. Skyrocketing
world food prices have hit
Tajikistan hard, as it is one of the
world’s most food insecure
countries, and at the end of a long
supply chain controlled by
sometimes hostile neighbors. As a
result, good nutrition has
become beyond the reach of agricultural
families already living on
the margin. As we have traveled around
the country delivering
humanitarian assistance, we have found that
Qthe country delivering
humanitarian assistance, we have found that
many families have sold
livestock and farm implements as coping
mechanisms to survive, and
have gone heavily into debt. This
portends a more acute drop
in farm income and domestic food supplies
during the coming year and a
more severe humanitarian emergency next
winter. We have also met several families that haven’t
had access
to food for days.
5. Losing our Partners: When the Food For Peace program ends, we
will not only lose the food
assistance itself, but the presence of
our implementing partners as
well. The NGO consortium implementing
the Food For Peace program
consists of three outstanding
organizations: Save the
Children, Mercy Corps, and CARE. Their
active presence in remote
areas of the country provide an early
warning system for upcoming
crises. Information gathered by this
consortium was critical to
the assessment of the winter emergency
and in designing a suitable
mechanism to deliver aid. The UN system
has limited capacity in
Tajikistan, and was not even able to gather
the basic data to describe
the emergency or issue an appeal, without
the help of our Food For
Peace partners. The WFP mission here is
chronically short of funds
and has plans to withdraw entirely by
2009. This is in stark contrast to neighboring
Afghanistan, where
the UN’s capacity to gather
data and respond to emergencies is much
more effective. The Tajik Government has even less capacity
than
the multilateral
organizations. Well after the spring
thaw had
begun, top officials told
donors that they still had no ability or
plan to collect data from
the remote areas of the country which had
DUSHANBE 00000522 002 OF 002
suffered during the
emergency. Indeed, the top officials
assigned
to interact with donor
governments were not even aware of the
existence of the sole
government-donor-implementer mechanism in
place which traditionally
responds to less complex spot emergencies
such as avalanches or
floods.
6. Social Strains: Falling farm incomes and failing communities
have produced visible social
strains in Tajikistan. Mass labor
migration (with estimates as
high as a million Tajik men seeking
employment mostly in Russia
and Kazakhstan) has left many rural
communities without working
age men. Migrant remittances are used
up almost entirely on basic
living necessities and contribute little
to investment. Various experts are concerned that the
migration may
contribute to public health
threats, such as HIV/AIDS transmission,
trafficking in narcotics and
people, and the spread of extremist
ideology. The communities left behind are showing some
alarming
indications. Education is faltering; drop out rates for
girls are
noticeably higher than for
boys in many communities — a sign of
economic necessity and
growing social conservatism. Recent
local
press articles have also
discussed suicide among women as a growing
phenomenon — an early
warning indicator more typical of the
Afghanistan under the
Taliban.
7. Strategic Concerns: Given Tajikistan’s strategic location — it
shares a long border with
Afghanistan, is a major transit route for
Afghan drugs, and a
recruiting/transit area for terrorist
organizations such as the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan — it is in
our interest to continue to
provide food assistance. To end this
vital program now will
contribute to a deteriorating humanitarian
situation on the border of a
war zone. We ask that our Washington
colleagues find a way to
extend the food assistance program in
Tajikistan.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 149881
date: 4/15/2008 11:24
refid: 08ASHGABAT472
origin: Embassy Ashgabat
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08ASHGABAT328
header:
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBI RUEHCI
RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHAH #0472/01 1061124
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P 151124Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0602
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND
CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
PRIORITY 0297
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
PRIORITY 3631
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
PRIORITY 1449
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA
LUMPUR PRIORITY 0102
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PRIORITY 1316
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
PRIORITY 1885
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
WASHDC PRIORITY
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000472
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE,
EUR/ERA, EEB, DRL
USAID/W FOR EE/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EAID,
EPET, KG, KZ, TI, TX, UZ, EU
SUBJECT: EC TROIKA IN TURKMENISTAN: THE HEADLINE WAS
ENERGY
REF: ASHGABAT 0328
Classified By: CDA Richard
E. Hoagland: 1.4(B), (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY:
The April 9-10 EU Troika-Central Asia
Ministerial added to
Turkmenistan’s international and
regional credentials. The media headline from the event was
Turkmenistan guarantees at
least 10 bcm/y natural gas for
Europe/Nabucco, although it
took a while for media
commentators to realize the
question was still open of how to
get the gas from
Turkmenistan’s borders to Europe.
Turkmenistan was unable to
sign the EU bilateral energy
memorandum of understanding
because it requested numerous
word changes late in the
game. The general impression of the
bilateral and plenary
sessions was Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
support regional approaches
to regional problems, Uzbekistan
was prickly and not in the
mood for regionalism, Turkmenistan
was guarded but tried to be
helpful, and Kazakhstan left a
bit of self-impression of
first among equals. The value of
the Troika ministerial was a
clear signal that the EC is
increasingly engaged in
Central Asia. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) The European Council held its annual
Troika meeting
with foreign ministers from
all five Central Asian countries
April 9-10 in Ashgabat,
Turkmenistan. On April 9, each of
the four members of the
«Troika» — EU Special Representative
for Central Asia Pierre
Morel, representing European Council
Secretary General Javier
Solana; European Commissioner for
SIPDIS
External Relations and
European Neighborhood Policy Benita
Ferraro-Waldner; Slovenian
Foreign Minister Dmitrij Rupel,
representing the current EU
Presidency; and French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner,
representing the next EU
Presidency — met separately
in a series of meetings with
Turkmenistan’s President
Berdimuhamedov and the foreign
ministers of each of the
Central Asian countries. There was
a plenary session April 10
in which each of the Central Asian
delegations delivered a
speech on a prepared topic.
3. (C) Ferrerro-Waldner on April 10 officially
opened Europa
House in Ashgabat that is
the precursor to a full EU
representation by 2010
(reftel). Europa House Coordinator
Emilio Valli said that the
idea to hold the Troika in a
Central Asian capital grew
out of the EU’s strategy for
Central Asia. The European Union wants to sign Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements
with all Central Asian countries,
including Turkmenistan. Once signed, the EU can begin to
focus on trade. However, none of the countries is especially
close to achieving the human
rights and other benchmarks
necessary for signing these
agreements. As a result, the EC
has developed a new
Development Cooperation Initiative (DCI),
which will replace the EU’s
TACIS program, to provide
broadbased cooperation
directed toward spurring reform. The
Troika meeting is one of the
vehicles through which the EU
coordinates that
cooperation.
ENERGY A PRIORITY ISSUE
4. (C) According to Valli, energy was a priority
issue for
the Troika’s discussions
with Turkmenistan. President
Berdimuhamedov guaranteed 10
bcm/y of natural gas for
Europe/Nabucco, and
eventually more when new sources are
exploited, but made clear
Europe would be responsible for
transporting it from
Turkmenistan’s border.
5. (C) The European Union and Turkmenistan have
been
preparing an energy
memorandum of understanding (MOU) which
was to have been signed at
the meeting that was more
hortatory than
obligatory. According to Valli,
Turkmenistan’s Deputy Prime
Minister for Oil and Gas
ASHGABAT 00000472 002 OF 003
Tachberdi Tagiyev had
visited Brussels on February 23 to
finalize the MOU’s
wording. The EC believed the MOU was on
track for signature until
the beginning of April, when
Turkmenistan submitted new,
non-substantive changes that,
nevertheless, will need to
be approved by each EU member.
TURKMENISTAN HUMAN RIGHTS
6. (C) The media reported, without going into
details, that
the Troika representatives
also discussed human rights, and
expanding cooperation in the
educational, science, and
counter-narcotics
sectors. Valli reported DCI is preparing
to sign, on April 15, an
agreement for a new multi-year
program with Turkmenistan’s
Institute for Democracy and Human
Rights that will focus on
drafting/revamping laws on human
rights institutions and
judicial and criminal laws.
BERDIMUHAMEDOV TO VISIT TO
PARIS
7. (U) During his primarily bilateral meeting
with
Berdimuhamedov, Kouchner
delivered an invitation from
President Sarkozy to visit
Paris in the second half of 2008,
once France becomes EU
President. Berdimuhamedov accepted.
8. (C) Normally French Ambassador Christian
Lechervy would
brief after such an event,
first his EU colleagues, then the
others separately, but he
departed Ashgabat with FM Kouchner
for Paris and is not
expected to return until late in the
week of April 14. In lieu of a detailed briefing, Embassy
Ashgabat obtained a hard
copy of the Council of Europe
informal brief for members
dated April 14. Below, we
summarize the over-all
conclusions and the bilateral sessions.
9. (C) OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
— First Troika meeting with
all Central Asian foreign
ministers present;
atmosphere was good; priority and concept
papers generally welcomed.
— Confirmed the importance
of differentiation among
countries and the need for
bilateral approaches.
— Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
agreed to enter into Human
Rights Dialogs with the EU;
Uzbekistan agreed to a Human
Rights Dialog in May or
June.
— Willingness to cooperate
with the EU on energy, but
countries ask for clear
projects from the EU for the
transport of natural gas.
10. (C) KAZAKHSTAN
— Gave details on the Way
to Europe program’s five
dimensions: technology transfer, institutional norms,
energy
dialog, human dimension, and
trade.
— Criticized the EU’s
formulation of country priorities and
distribution of assistance
funds among the five Central Asian
countries.
— Foreign Minister Tazhin
briefed on preparations for OSCE
Chairmanship, including
reform of law on political parties,
election law,
defamation/penal code, and media.
11. (C) KYRGYZSTAN BILATERAL
— Kyrgyzstan is looking for
opportunities to restore
national production
capacities (industrial and technological
park, agriculture,
engineering, information, light industry,
ASHGABAT 00000472 003 OF 003
and food processing);
proposed an EU-Kyrgyzstan plan until
2013 for this purpose.
— Agreed to initial Human
Rights Dialog starting in June
2008 at expert level, and
suggested a regional dialog.
— Water Academy Project
will be pursued with or without the
EU; water summit planned for
the end of 2008.
12. (C) TAJIKISTAN BILATERAL
— Presidential Economic
Adviser Davlatov named as national
coordinator for EU-Central
Asian strategy.
— Unlike some other
countries, Tajikistan emphasizes
regional cooperation,
especially on water, energy, border
security, narcotics control,
and demining. Foreign Minister
Zarifi offered Tajik
facilities for training Afghans.
— No objection to Human
Rights Dialog.
— Requested EU conduct
feasibility studies for seven
hydroelectric projects;
Ferrero-Waldner confirmed the EU’s
readiness.
— Made pitch to adapt, but
not limit, its OSCE mandate.
— Requested to host next EU
Troika-Central Asia meeting in
Dushanbe.
13. (C) TURKMENISTAN
— Ready to continue human
rights dialog, especially with
practical cooperation
projects.
— Willing to sell natural
gas to Europe, even though it will
not violate existing
contracts to non-EU partners; sells its
gas at its borders for world
prices; ready for PSAs in the
Caspian and service
contracts onshore.
— Ferrero-Waldner asked
Turkmenistan to consider
participation in a
high-level meeting on energy for the
development of the
Trans-Caspian Corridor and to appoint
sherpas to prepare this
meeting (NFI).
14. (C) UZBEKISTAN BILATERAL
— Denounced EU «double
standards» and insisted on respect
for each country’s
individuality since «there is no leading
country in the region.»
— Generally hesitated on
regional initiatives and insisted
on bilateral approaches for
education and rule-of-law
intiatives and water and
energy issues.
— Rupel, Morel, and
Ferrero-Waldner sent a strong message on
human rights, naming
individual cases; requested registration
of the new Human Rights
Watch representative.
— Uzbekistan confirmed ICRC
access to prisons; pointed out
EU weaknesses on human
rights, including «islamophobia.»
— Would consider an energy
MOU.
— Will not participate in
either the regional Water Academy
or the regional water summit
in Bishkek.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 149986
date: 4/16/2008 4:54
refid: 08DUSHANBE526
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE522
header:
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0526/01 1070454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160454Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0411
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL
AFB FL
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000526
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AIDAC
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND SCA/EX
DEPT PASS TO USAID
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, EAID, SNAR,
MASS, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: THE IMPACT OF NOT RIGHTSIZING EMBASSY
DUSHANBE’S
MANAGEMENT PLATFORM
Ref: (a) April 10 MSP Senior Review for Embassy
Dushanbe;
(b) April 11
Spratlen-Jacobson e-mail; (c) Dushanbe 522
1. Summary:
Embassy Dushanbe’s thoroughly inadequate management
staffing means we have had
to turn down important positions
requested by the Drug
Enforcement Agency, Office of Defense
Cooperation, and USAID. We understand the need for «triage»
in the
current budgetary
environment, but urge the Department to consider
this mission’s unique
history and current position as a front line
state in the battle against
terrorism and drugs, and provide
additional FTE for the
management section. End Summary.
How We Got Here
———————
2. As we noted in successive Mission Strategic
Plans, front channel
communications, and the
recent inspection report (ISP-I-08-17A),
Embassy Dushanbe’s American
staffing has tripled over the last few
years, without a concomitant
increase in management staffing.
Essentially, we have a
similar level of resources now, as a
mid-sized mission with a
robust foreign policy agenda located full
time in Tajikistan, as when
Embassy Dushanbe was co-located with
Embassy Almaty, and staffed
by 17 unaccompanied Americans. Four
years ago, the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative awarded positions to
other posts in the region to
right-size their management sections.
Embassy Dushanbe didn’t
benefit because at the time, it was
considered part of Embassy
Almaty.
3. Adequate American management staffing is
critical given the
enormous challenges related
to Tajikistan’s high level of
corruption, crumbling
infrastructure, bureaucratic inefficiencies,
and remote location at the
end of a long supply chain. Given these
challenges, we are unable to
support the existing mission community
adequately with the staffing
we now have, and thus have established
a moratorium on new
positions. This means that we have
turned down
NSDD-38 requests for
additional positions from DEA, Office of
Defense Cooperation, and
USAID. The inspectors acknowledged the
imbalance between management
and program staff and recognized the
necessity of the moratorium
saying, «The Ambassador has been
courageous in dealing with
this imbalance. She has declared a
moratorium on further
NSDD-38 decisions unless and until the
embassy’s management
capacities including staffing and space will
support further growth. Her position should be sustained.» The
inspection report called for
additional management staffing.
The Impact: Drug Enforcement Administration
———————————————
———
4. In 2006, the Drug Enforcement Agency decided
to move its
regional hub from Tashkent
to Dushanbe, based both on a worsening
relationship with Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan’s status as the majority
transshipment point for
Afghan poppy bound for Russian and European
markets. We initially approved positions for three
agents and one
administrative specialist,
but because the office must build
relationships with all five
countries in Central Asia, DEA requested
two additional agents. The workload, including the investment of
time necessary to build
relationships to the point where trust is
sufficient to allow real
exchange of information and joint
activities, demands
additional resources. Unfortunately, we
have
had to turn them down. We are missing a real opportunity to
develop the capacity of the
Central Asian transit countries to bring
down criminal networks and
stem the flow of narcotics and
Qdown criminal networks and
stem the flow of narcotics and
narco-profits, which fuel
corruption and provide funding to
terrorists.
The Impact: Office of
Defense Cooperation
——————————————
5. Tajikistan is Central Command’s third most
important country for
counter-narcotics work,
after Afghanistan and Pakistan. CENTCOM
is
funding important capacity
building work here, including the
renovation of border posts,
training facilities, and equipment. The
office is woefully
understaffed to handle the amount of CENTCOM
assistance — $15 million of
ongoing projects — and would like to
establish a position
(contract or long term TDY) to help manage its
contracting and
monitoring. We have had to turn down
this request,
with the end result that we
are not able to support CENTCOM’s
mandate to play a greater
role in fighting narcotics trafficking
(and related terrorist
financing) in a country bordering an active
war zone.
The Impact: USAID
————————
6. USAID has asked to move its regional education
advisor from
Almaty (where it doesn’t
have an education program) to Tajikistan,
where it does. Tajikistan is the most vulnerable country
(and worst
performer) in Europe and
Eurasia in relation to a number of
education indicators
including education spending, secondary and
tertiary enrollment,
vocational education and pre-school education.
For this reason, USAID’s
implementing partner has established its
regional headquarters here
in Dushanbe. Moving the USAID regional
education advisor to
Dushanbe would allow USAID to provide better
oversight of the regional
program and to better design and manage an
expanded education
assistance portfolio in Tajikistan.
Education,
in turn, is a powerful
weapon against the poverty and despair which
make people vulnerable to
recruitment by drug mafias or extremists.
However, we have had to turn
this position down.
The Impact — Language
Training
————————————-
7. We have also had to turn down requests for
two long term TDYs
for members of the Defense
community who had proposed to come to
Dushanbe for Persian
language training. Tajikistan is one of
only
three Persian-speaking
countries. In-country training for U.S.
Government personnel is not
possible in Iran and not practical in
Afghanistan given the
security concerns there. Tajikistan
would
make a prime training ground
for such immersion training and it is
no surprise that we are
beginning to receive such requests.
However, absent an increase
in management staffing, the embassy
cannot handle the additional
administrative burden imposed by
long-term language trainees.
Next Steps
————-
8. We had useful discussions with Dirk Richards
from M’s
rightsizing office during
his visit April 7; he supported our
request for additional
assistance on the management front. The
OIG
has also supported the
need. In his memo to the OIG, Assistant
Secretary Boucher listed
Embassy Dushanbe’s need for an increase in
SIPDIS
management staffing as the
Bureau’s top human resources priority.
Ideally, post requires a
second management officer (who would serve
as Deputy while
simultaneously supervising the financial management
and human resources units),
a Supervisory GSO, and another
Information Management
position. We would need to see progress
in
filling these management
positions before we could consider lifting
our staffing moratorium to
do the work we need to do in fighting
narcotics and terrorism and
promoting education. We look forward to
continuing to work with
Washington to address this critical need.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 150026
date: 4/16/2008 9:50
refid: 08DUSHANBE527
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
07BISHKEK833|08BISHKEK359
header:
VZCZCXRO9374
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0527 1070950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160950Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0413
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
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—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000527
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TI, KG
SUBJECT: TAJIK OFFICIAL SEES
NO CALL FOR ALARM IN
KYRGYZ-TAJIK WATER DISPUTES
REF: A. (A) BISHKEK 359
B. (B) 07 BISHKEK 833
1. (SBU) Summary: On April
15, PolOff met with Mirzosharif
Islomodinov, Isfara’s
parliamentary representative, to
discuss border issues raised
in reftels. Islomodinov did not
think that the conflicts
over water would amount to serious
tension between Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, and he was
confident that local
authorities could resolve their issues
peacefully. End summary.
2. (SBU) Islomodinov is
originally from Vorukh. He was the
Chairman of Isfara District
for 14 years, and he has also
served as the Deputy
Governor of Sughd and as Deputy Prime
Minister. He is currently a Deputy in the lower house
of
parliament, and he is the
Chairman of the Committee of
Energy, Industry, Building
and Communications. He is very
familiar with the issues
raised in reftel.
3. (SBU) Islomodinov
described Tajikistan’s relationship with
Kyrgyzstan as being
friendly. He pointed out that there were
only two border posts in
Isfara District, explaining that it
would be a waste to have any
more (the two posts exist
primarily to collect customs
duties from trucks hauling
commercial goods from China;
security is not an issue).
Islomodinov acknowledged
that Soviet era maps have created
questions about territory,
but that neither Bishkek nor
Dushanbe considered these
questions to be particularly
significant, saying that
«this is not a matter of dispute
between two friendly
countries.» He added that local
officials managed to resolve
the most recent flare up, and he
speculated that media reports
may have overblown the issue.
4. (SBU) Comment: While
Islomodinov is a member of
parliament, his comments
likely mirror the Tajik government’s
position on its border with
Kyrgyzstan. The Tajiks do not
see a major role for either
central government in this
dispute. While it is likely that there will be
additional
incidents in the future, the
Tajiks do not perceive this
situation as generating a
significant degree of tension or
animosity between Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. Based on our
discussions, we do not think
the Tajik authorities view water
issues with Kyrgyzstan with
the same degree of concern that
they have for water
conflicts with Uzbekistan. End comment.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 150449
date: 4/18/2008 16:25
refid: 08PARIS749
origin: Embassy Paris
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2036
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #0749/01 1091625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181625Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 2672
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN
POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
IMMEDIATE 0185
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA
IMMEDIATE 0043
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
IMMEDIATE 2278
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000749
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ZK, UZ,
TI, KZ, KG, TX, FR
SUBJECT: CENTRAL ASIA: A/DAS
SPRATLEN’S CONSULTATIONS WITH
THE GOF
Classified By: POLITICAL
MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (b) AND (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In April 4
meetings with French officials
responsible for Central
Asia, SCA A/DAS Pamela Spratlen was
briefed on GOF plans for
future engagement in the region,
including FM Kouchner’s
April 10-11 visits to Ashgabat and
Dushanbe as well as France’s
priorities for the region during
its July-December 2008 EU
Presidency. In this discussion of
U.S. and European interests
in the region, Spratlen and her
interlocutors agreed on the
importance of U.S./EU coordinated
action. Both the MFA and the PM’s office underlined
the
French intention to use the
EU’s Central Asia Strategy
framework adopted during the
German EU Presidency
(January-July 2007) as the
basis for its own EU Presidency
initiatives in the region as
well as for its bilateral
engagement with countries in
the region.
2. (C) GOF officials
explained France’s regional priorities
as broadly concentrated in
three key areas: security, energy,
and trafficking. France intends to work on several specific
projects in these areas,
including border security, human
rights, environmental
security, water management, trafficking
in persons, and
narco-trafficking. Spratlen obtained French
assurances on three key
issues: (1) maintaining pressure on
Kazakhstan to meet its
Madrid commitments; (2) staying
engaged, at a high level,
with Dushanbe on the OSCE’s
mandate; and (3) continuing
close U.S.- France and U.S.- EU
cooperation on our
assessment of Uzbekistan’s progress on
human rights. With all interlocutors, Spratlen laid out U.S
policy as helping the five
Central Asian states strengthen
their sovereignty and
independence by opening up their
societies and developing
trade and strategic partners in the
wider region, especially
Afghanistan and points south. END
SUMMARY
INTERLOCUTORS
————-
3. (SBU) SCA A/DAS Pamela
Spratlen met with the following
French officials on April 4
in Paris: Isabelle Dumont, FM
Kouchner’s Counselor for
Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus,
and the Balkans; Jacques
Faure, MFA A/S-equivalent for
Russia, Central Asia, the
Caucasus, and the Balkans;
Alexandre Vulic, MFA
DAS-equivalent for Russia, Central Asia,
and the Caucasus; Helene
Roos, MFA Desk officer for Central
Asia; and Emmanuel Mignot,
the PM’s Diplomatic Counselor for
Strategic Affairs (NATO,
non-proliferation), Russia, Central
Asia, and the Caucasus. Spratlen also met with Thomas
Gomart, Director of the
Russia/CIS program at the French
Institute for International
Relations (IFRI), a well known
French think-tank.
FRANCE’S COMEBACK IN CENTRAL
ASIA
———————————
4. (C) GOF officials told
Spratlen that France largely
disappeared from Central
Asia in the late 90s, but has made a
strategic decision to
reinforce its presence in the region as
part of the EU’s newly
adopted regional strategy. Several
symbolic and substantive
initiatives are part of France’s
return: PM Fillon’s visit to
Kazakhstan in February 2008;
President Nazerbayev’s
upcoming visit to France in June 2008;
President Bakiyev’s visit to
France in late 2008; FM
Kouchner’s visit to all five
Central Asian capitals in April
and May 2008 (the first such
visits in fifteen years); the
planned signing of a
France/Kazakhstan Strategic Framework
agreement; and Paris,
hosting of an EU/Central Asia
Ministerial Security Forum
in October 2008.
GOF’S REGIONAL AGENDA
———————
5. (C) France’s renewed
interest in the region and its
development initiatives all
correspond to the EU’s Central
Asia Strategy (adopted
during the German January-July 2007 EU
Presidency), French
officials told Spratlen. Central Asia
needs Europe, Mignot said,
noting that some countries in the
region are looking for
alternatives to Moscow. Europe needs
Central Asia, Mignot added,
not only because of its markets
and resources but also
because of its strategic location and
importance to success in
Afghanistan. French officials told
Spratlen that France intends
to focus on three key areas
during its EU Presidency:
energy, security, and trafficking.
PARIS 00000749 002 OF 003
As part of these broader
themes, the GOF intends to introduce
dialogue (and projects where
appropriate) which touch on
border security, energy
security, narco-trafficking,
trafficking in persons, the
threat of Islamic extremism in
Central Asia, a regional
approach to water management, human
rights, rule of law, and
democracy. Mignot added that the
GOF will encourage other
high level European officials to
visit the region in order
for them to better appreciate its
opportunities and
challenges. Spratlen praised France and
the EU’s positive engagement
in Central Asia, and provided an
extensive briefing on the
U.S.’ work in the region which
focuses on strengthening
sovereignty and independence by
encouraging open societies
and developing trade and strategic
partners in the wider
region, especially Afghanistan and
points south. U.S. policy, Spratlen emphasized, is largely
tied to human rights,
political progress, economic expansion
and diversification, and
institution and capacity building.
UZBEKISTAN
———-
6. (C) Discussion on
Uzbekistan focused largely on EU
sanctions which are
scheduled to be reconsidered April 28,
2008. Mignot noted that France had observed some
limited
progress in Uzbekistan on
human rights since President
Sarkozy sent President
Karimov a letter on the subject in
January 2008. French officials explained that they support
the continued suspension of
EU sanctions in order to allow
time for Uzbekistan to build
on its limited progress. In
particular, France is
concerned about the implementation of a
recent accord to begin
cooperation on judicial reform,
policing and law
enforcement. EU sanctions officially
expire
in October 2008 unless all
27 member states vote to reinstate
them. The GOF argued that a discussion in October
will be
more fruitful if Uzbekistan
has the additional six months to
demonstrate its
intentions. French officials noted that
there are several states
already against reinstating
sanctions in October
2008. If some EU members decide to
support a renewal of
sanctions in October, their arguments
will be stronger if they can
show that Tashkent did not take
sufficient advantage of the
EU’s year-long suspension in
order to make progress.
7. (C) Vulic told Spratlen
that with the exception of Sweden,
the Netherlands, and
Ireland, all other 24 member states
currently supported this
strategy. France plans to engage
with Sweden, the Netherlands,
and Ireland, none of whom are
represented in
Tashkent. All French officials expressed
a
great deal of interest in
U.S. Congressional sanctions on
Uzbekistan, which Spratlen
explained in detail. Spratlen
also urged France to
consider how it can use the upcoming EU
discussions to pressure
Tashkent to allow ICRC further
critical access to
prisoners. Tashkent’s progress on human
rights has been extremely
limited, Spratlen argued, and the
international community must
stay attentive to possible
negative developments.
8. (C) Faure and Vulic both
inquired about the U.S.’ analysis
of the Islamic radical
threat to Uzbekistan and the countries
in the region, particularly
from Hizb ut-Tahir. France is
concerned that the group’s
activities signal a heightened
threat of terrorism. Spratlen noted that Washington is aware
of EU interest in the
subject, including EU envoy Pierre
Morel’s concerns. The State Department intends to host a
conference on Islam in
Central Asia next spring and Spratlen
agreed to share conclusions
with the French, if possible.
Spratlen added that Islam is
a very complex issue in the
region and that Hizb
ut-Tahir is only one of many
organizations that warrant
attention.
KAZAKHSTAN
———-
9. (C) PM Fillon’s visit to
Astana in February 2008 marked
renewed French interest in a
country that French officials
described to Spratlen as a
«model and leader for the region.»
President Nazerbayev intends to visit France
in June 2008,
while Sarkozy has agreed to
return the state visit in the
first half of 2009. Mignot told Spratlen that France will
soon sign a Strategic
Framework Agreement with Astana — a
move that should form the
basis for broader economic and
security cooperation. Several French officials emphasized
France’s excellent relations
with Kazakhstan, and noted that
France has offered to train
Kazakh diplomats and journalists
PARIS 00000749 003 OF 003
in the run up to Astana’s
assumption of the 2010
Chairman-in-Office (CiO)
position at the OSCE in Vienna.
Spratlen stressed that
although Kazakhstan has made some
progress on human rights and
democracy — and more economic
gains than other Central
Asian states — it is critical to
keep pressure on Nazerbayev
to live up to the commitments he
made at the Madrid OSCE
Summit. Dumont and Vulic assured
Spratlen that France will
maintain pressure on Kazakhstan to
live up to those commitments
and will continue offering
assistance to help Astana
succeed. Mignot added that France
also intends to double the
number of Kazakh students given
the opportunity to study in
French universities. Vulic noted
that France has proposed its
own candidate to head the OSCE
mission in Kazakhstan, and
would appreciate U.S. support.
TURKMENISTAN
————
10. (C) French MFA officials
told Spratlen that the EU is
assessing its potential for
assistance to Turkmenistan.
France, Vulic said, is the
only Western country to host a
cultural center in
Turkmenistan, but quickly added that this
was of limited
advantage. FM Kouchner planned to
present
France’s interest in
providing assistance on rule of law,
water management, and
governance to Turkmenistan during his
April 10 visit to
Ashgabat. France is also considering the
possibility of Trans-Caspian
projects, but is cautious due to
the opaque nature of energy
deals between Moscow and
Ashgabat. Overall, French officials assessed no
substantive
changes in Turkmenistan, but
noted that Ashgabat’s desire to
have contact with the
outside world was in and of itself a
fundamental change in the
regime’s position thereby providing
the EU with an opportunity
for positive engagement. Spratlen
said that the U.S. sees the
current opening — since
Turkmenbashi’s death — as
an opportunity to work with
Ashgabat in making
democratic and economic advances.
Fifteen
months in, Spratlen said, it
is clear that this is a
long-term project requiring
a great deal of patience.
TAJIKISTAN
———-
11. (C) Spratlen told French
officials that the OSCE’s work
in Tajikistan is essential
to the co
