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id: 141193
date: 2/13/2008 12:21
refid: 08DUSHANBE228
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE185
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000228
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DEPT PASS USTR
USDOC FOR ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2013
TAGS: EINV, ETRD, PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: TIFA 2008 — TAJIKS WON’T PLAY, UNLESS IT’S THEIR
SANDBOX
REF: DUSHANBE 185
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Jacobson; reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: The Government of Tajikistan threatened to
not participate in the 2008 Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) conference, and in regional consultations
with the EU Troika, unless one of these two meetings is held
in Dushanbe. End Summary.
2. (C) In his first meeting with DCM, the new Director for
European and American Affairs, Husrav Nosiri, used the
occasion to deliver two sternly worded demarches — one
complaining about «a very serious security incident» and the
other threatening to refrain from participating in the
Central Asian Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)
meeting this coming summer. For
the second demarche, Nosiri
invited the new European Commission representative too,
making this a trilateral demarche, and linking the TIFA
decision to the upcoming EU Troika consultations with Central
Asian governments, slated for Ashgabat this spring. In both
cases, Nosiri read from a prepared Russian language text and
declined to pass us anything in writing.
TIFA 2008 and EU Troika
———————
3. (C) Nosiri stated that the Tajik embassies in Washington
and Brussels had reported that the USG and EU intended to
hold their respective meetings (TIFA and the Troika-Central
Asia) in Ashgabat rather than in Dushanbe, and that the
Government of Tajikistan was «disappointed» by these apparent
decisions. If the USG and EU did
not reconsider their
decisions and agree to hold at least one of the two meetings
in Dushanbe, then Tajikistan would refuse to participate in
either meeting, and «reserved its right to cease its
participation in these mechanisms.»
4. (C) Reading from his prepared
script, Nosiri said that
the simultaneous decisions by Washington and Brussels
indicated to Dushanbe that our countries were more interested
in Turkmenistan’s natural resources than honoring their
commitments. The
«commitments» Nosiri was referring to in
the case of TIFA date from the last TIFA meeting in
Washington, where Tajik Economics Minister Bobozoda offered
to host the summer 2008 meeting in Dushanbe. At that time,
TIFA members thanked Tajikistan for its offer and the Tajik
Government considered this a done deal. In the case of the
EU Troika meeting, Nosiri claimed that Tajik Foreign Minister
Zarifi was the first to propose the idea of having the
ministerial-level Troika meet collectively with Central Asian
counterparts in Central Asia itself.
The Foreign Minister
was reportedly shocked to hear that «his idea» resulted in
another high profile meeting for Ashgabat.
4. (C) The DCM explained that the decision where to host the
TIFA is not Washington’s decision to make alone. He asked
Nosiri whether Dushanbe had been in touch with Ashgabat about
this dispute; Nosiri acknowledged that Tajikistan has not
discussed its TIFA invitation with any of its neighbors. The
DCM explained that international interest in Turkmenistan has
increased recently, not because of its natural resources, but
because of a perceived opening toward democracy. The trend
line in Tajikistan, on the other hand, is toward less space
for civil society, as shown, for example, by the latest
rejection of National Democratic Institute’s application for
registration. Nosiri reiterated
that the Foreign Minister
Qregistration. Nosiri reiterated
that the Foreign Minister
expects a response directly from Washington (and from
Brussels).
«A Very Serious Security Incident»
—————————
5. (SBU) Nosiri also read a
prepared demarche concerning an
incident two weeks ago in which Americans participating in
the popular running club, the Hash House Harriers, were
briefly stopped by security officials while setting a trail
in front of the Ministry of Interior and State Committee for
National Security headquarters buildings. Nosiri explained
that Tajik security officials were deeply concerned by the
«unusual and unacceptable» behavior involving placing
shredded paper and chalk marks «around the perimeter of
sensitive government installations.» The DCM explained that
the running club included participants from many countries
including Tajikistan, was a popular pastime all over the
world, and had been active in Dushanbe for years. He agreed
to pass word to the club not to set the trail again in front
of these ministries. Nosiri
seemed satisfied with the
informal agreement but never cracked a smile at the
description of the eccentric running club.
Comment — Settling the TIFA Question
—————————-
6. (C) TIFA will only really
produce results when the
Central Asians themselves use it as a venue to discuss issues
and find solutions. With that in
mind, Embassy believes the
Central Asian members themselves should decide who will host
the next TIFA conference. The
United States should avoid
anointing one or another host, but the Department could play
a positive role in resolving the current dispute by helping
the two governments reach a joint decision. For example, SCA
Acting DAS Pamela Spratlen might consider inviting Tajik
Ambassador Shirinov and his Turkmen colleague to discuss the
TIFA venue. The ultimatum
presented by Nosiri no doubt comes
straight from Foreign Minister Zarifi who sees his reputation
on the line. His similarly
petulant reaction to the
announcement that U.S. energy company AES was suspending its
operations in Tajikistan and his failure to attract other
U.S. or foreign investors may indicate he’s feeling pressure
to produce in order to keep his job.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 141664
date: 2/15/2008 14:02
refid: 08DUSHANBE240
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08STATE14284
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000240
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2013
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DEFENDING THE
U.S. KOSOVO POSITION IN THE OSCE
REF: STATE 14284
Classified By: Tom Hushek, DCM; reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) PolOff delivered the demarche on defending the U.S.
Kosovo position in the OSCE to Muzafar Huseinov, the acting
Head of Department for International Organizations at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to his deputy, Jamshed
Khamidov. Huseinov said that
Tajikistan was aware of
Serbia,s intention to invoke the Berlin Mechanism after
Kosovo declares independence, and he will inform his
superiors of our position.
2. (SBU) Neither Huseinov nor Khamidov was prepared to give
an indication of what Tajikistan,s position might be, either
on recognizing Kosovo,s independence or on their reaction to
invoking the Berlin Mechanism.
3. (C) We anticipate that
Tajikistan will side with the
Russian Federation on Kosovo issues.
4. (U) Dushanbe point of contact for follow-up information is
Greg Naarden, [email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 141930
date: 2/19/2008 11:38
refid: 08DUSHANBE245
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
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RR RUEHWEB
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0077
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0037
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0030
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000245
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: EAID, PREL, IR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK-IRANIAN FRATERNAL RELATIONS RECONFIRMED
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Jacobson; reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Summary: President Rahmon visited Iran unexpectedly
February 9-10. He returned with
promises of some fuel oil to
help Dushanbe in the ongoing winter power shortage, and
«agreements» for Iran to consider undertaking more
hydropower, power transmission, and tunnel improvement work.
The visit seemed aimed at showing the President doing
something about the power crisis.
Commentary here also
suggested that the visit was in response to a recent visit by
Uzbek President Karimov to Moscow, but we doubt that was
Rahmon’s main motive. In return,
Iran got Tajik endorsement
of its desire to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
End Summary.
2. (SBU) President Rahmon flew to Iran on Feb 9. The hasty
nature of this trip was apparent from the erroneous rumor the
embassy heard the day before from a senior member of the
President’s political party, that Mr. Rahmon planned to fly
to Uzbekistan to plead for energy assistance from Karimov.
The President wanted to make a good impression on his Iranian
hosts, so took the Boeing 737-800 belonging to the new and
ostensibly private airline, Somon Air.
This took
Tajikistan’s «first private airline» out of commercial
service for two days. Somon Air
is controlled by the
President’s brother-in-law.
3. (SBU) Officially, President Rahmon traveled to Tehran to
participate in President Ahmadinejad’s celebration on the
anniversary of the Iranian revolution.
During the visit,
Rahmon and his hosts produced several assurances of increased
cooperation, including that Iran would speed up construction
of the Sangtuda-2 hydropower station, might fund the
construction of another hydropower station, and might give
additional funding to complete the Anzob tunnel north of
Dushanbe, which is being built by an Iranian company.
Reportedly the two sides concluded Memorandums of
Understanding on defense cooperation, and the Iranian side
said it would consider improving some cargo handling
facilities at Bandar Abbas related to the export of Tajik
Aluminum. There was talk that
Iran would fund the
construction of a 500 kilowatt power line from eastern Iran
to Afghanistan and on to Tajikistan, and construction of two
cement factories in Tajikistan.
But the only concrete
measure to come from this visit was Iran donating several
railroad tank cars full of fuel oil for Dushanbe’s
thermoelectric plant, which is the city’s main source of
electricity now that Nurek reservoir has reached its minimal
level and is supplying only a small amount of electricity to
the Tajik Aluminum Company.
4. (SBU) More interesting than the agreements on economic
cooperation were statements from the Tajik side after the
visit that Iran could become a full member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) «gradually.» President Rahmon
said he would advocate with other SCO members for Iran’s
eventual transition from observer status to full membership.
As the host of the next SCO summit, Rahmon may be in a
position to act on his promise.
(Note: Previously the Tajik
Government had supported membership for Iran «in principle,»
but assured us in the same breath that it wouldn’t happen
since the SCO had no mechanism for expansion. End note.)
The Tajik President also made polite noises about Iran’s
right to develop civilian nuclear power, and the need to ban
nuclear weapons from the region.
5. (C) The Foreign Ministry Americas and Europe Director had
little to say about the visit when we asked him on February
11, noting only the fuel oil donation and agreements to
consider more cooperation. Two
opposition politicians we
spoke with both concurred with views expressed in the media,
that the visit was a counterbalance to Uzbek President
Karimov’s perceived growing relationship with Russia.
Rahmatullo Valiev, Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Party of
Tajikistan (Iskanderov faction, anti-government) added that
Tajik relations were deteriorating with almost every country
except Kazakhstan, and that President Rahmon was grasping for
any friendship he could find.
«Other countries just don’t
want to work with this government, primarily because they
cannot trust them,» he said.
He specifically included Russia
among those who don’t want to deal with Rahmon’s government.
Rahmatillo Zoirov, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party,
said he doubted that Tajikistan’s evolving relationship with
Iran «would amount to anything substantial.» He thought
Tajikistan might get some short-term benefits in the energy
sector, but ideological differences between the secular Tajik
government and the Iranian regime would prevent anything
deeper than that.
6. (C) Comment — Talk is Cheap: The press and some contacts
here have speculated that the President’s visit to Iran was
staged as a counterpunch to a recent visit to Moscow by Uzbek
President Karimov. We doubt that
was the main motive,
although it could certainly be part of President Rahmon’s
thinking. Rahmon was probably
responding to advice from the
World Bank that he must get out and lobby his friends for
more aid during the current economic crisis. Regardless of
results, the visit makes it look like the President is doing
something useful for his country.
This visit looks similar
to other aid-seeking visits abroad by President Rahmon, where
many agreements are reached but little actually results. So
Iran may have bought some more friendship, and an endorsement
for its desire to join the SCO, at a pretty low price — some
tank cars of fuel oil.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 142263
date: 2/21/2008 5:35
refid: 08DUSHANBE266
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08STATE16319
header:
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0063
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000266
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2009
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON U.S.
DECISION TO RECOGNIZE KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE
REF: STATE 016319
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) PolOff delivered latest
demarche (reftel) to Husrav
Nosiri, the Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of
American and European Affairs. He
said that Tajikistan did
not yet have a position on Kosovo independence, but the
Government of Tajikistan was «discussing the issue seriously.»
2. (C) PolOff reiterated the offer for the Ambassador to
discuss the Kosovo issue with Foreign Minister Zarifi
personally, as expressed in our diplomatic note. Nosiri said
he would pass the information on to the Foreign Minister.
3. (U) Dushanbe point of contact for follow-up action is Greg
Naarden, [email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 142298
date: 2/21/2008 8:51
refid: 08ASHGABAT259
origin: Embassy Ashgabat
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08ASHGABAT199
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS ASHGABAT 000259
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
USAID/W FOR EE/AA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, SOCI, TI, TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN PROVIDES
MORE HUMANITARIAN AID, THIS
TIME TO TAJIKISTAN
REF: ASHGABAT 0199
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:
Following on its decision to send aid to
Afghanistan (reftel), Turkmenistan donated fuel as
humanitarian assistanceto Tajikistan on February 13, publicly
demonstrating the strong bilateral ties it shares with its
neighbor, but also making its mark as a responsible regional
player. Turkmenistan has also
brought its electricity
deliveries to Tajikistan up to previously-agreed levels, now
that historic low winter temperatures in Turkmenistan have
eased. END SUMMARY.
3. (U) On February 13, Turkmen state television news
reported President Berdimuhamedov had issued a decree to
donate 500 tons of diesel fuel to Tajikistan. A News Central
Asia Internet report estimated the value of the fuel at about
$385,000, based on the fuel’s retail value in China. The
fuel arrived in Tajikistan on February 18. Berdimuhamedov
announced the donation after meeting with Tajikistan’s
Minister of Energy Sherali Gulov, who was in Ashgabat for a
Turkmen-Tajik economic commission session.
4. (U) Turkmenistan’s government has stepped up its
relationship with Tajikistan since former President Niyazov’s
death, and appears to be increasingly sympathetic to
Tajikistan’s economic and energy woes.
According to
Tajikistan’s press, Turkmenistan has forgiven some $13
million of Tajik debt since 2005.
According to the same
source, the Tajiks still owe about $23 million, described as
inter-bank debts, as well as electricity- and
agriculture-related debts.
5. (U) Turkmenistan has also been supplying
Tajikistan with
a significant portion of its electricity needs since November
2007. During the coldest periods
of the winter, deliveries
of electricity dropped from about 6 kilowatt hours to about 3
kilowatt hours per day because of Turkmenistan’s climbing
domestic demand, but as of February 19, daily delivery had
reached 7.5 kilowatt hours.
6. (SBU) COMMENT:
Given the positive press created by
Turkmenistan’s delivery of a large caravan of humanitarian
aid to Afghanistan in early February (reftel), Berdimuhamedov
may view a donation of aid to Tajikistan as another
opportunity to demonstrate publicly Turkmenistan’s potential
as a regional leader. But the
relationship between
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan is genuinely good — President
Rahmon was one of the first regional leaders to stretch out a
hand of friendship to Berdimuhamedov, attending both former
President Niyazov’s funeral and President Berdimuhamedov’s
inauguration. With back-to-back
aid to both Afghanistan and
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan is positioning itself as a
responsible regional player. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 142376
date: 2/21/2008 13:38
refid: 08DUSHANBE269
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE210
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DE RUEHDBU #0269/01 0521338
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RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC 0007
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0033
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0082
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000269
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ETRD, EAIR, TI
SUBJECT: SOMON AIR — «PRIVATE» IN NAME ONLY.
Reftel: Dushanbe 210
1. (SBU) Summary: On February 6 EmbOff experienced the pleasure of
flying Tajikistan’s «first private airline,» Somon Air, aboard
its
wet-leased Turkish Pegasus Airlines Boeing 737-800. Minor
intercultural hiccups aside, the flight was normal, and an
improvement on the standards of state-owned Tajik Air. However,
Somon Air so far functions only as an extension of state-owned Tajik
Air; it has not begun to operate as an independent airline, and does
not compete with Tajik Air. End
Summary.
Whose Plane is This?
———————
2. (SBU) EmbOff explicitly requested to travel on Tajik Air —
nicknamed «Tragic Air» — as the best of the meager options for
the
route through Moscow. Emboff’s
earlier experiences with Russia
based Domodedovo Airlines included late flights, surly staff, lost
luggage, and getting hit in the head by falling suitcases.
3. (SBU) After purchasing the ticket and checking in for Tajik Air
flight 631, EmbOff was surprised when the airport shuttle pulled up
to Somon Air’s Boeing 737-800.
Curious, but well into pack
mentality, EmbOff followed the rest of the passengers onto the
plane. There was no explanation
as to why a «private» airline was
flying a route of the Tajik national airline. The Turkish cabin
crew spoke neither Russian nor Tajik, and at first EmbOff wasn’t
even sure he was on the right flight.
4. (SBU) Flights from Dushanbe to Moscow are usually full, and this
flight was no exception. Most of
the Tajik passengers were labor
migrants from the provincial regions of Tajikistan, and many seemed
to be first time flyers. After
watching a cabin attendant, in
English, try in vain to explain to Tajiks sitting in an emergency
exit row that they needed to place their carry-on baggage in the
overhead compartments instead of in the aisle, EmbOff realized that
all but one of the attendants could not speak Russian or Tajik. The
emergency instructions and exit signs were all in Turkish, and the
cabin crew all wore Pegasus Airlines uniforms. EmbOff helped
explain to the Tajiks sitting in the emergency aisle that they
needed to stow their bags for takeoff and landing. He then sat back
and watched in amusement as the Turkish attendants futilely ran up
and down the aisles trying to make the mostly Tajik passengers
switch off their mobile telephones.
5. (SBU) The airplane itself seemed to be in decent shape, obviously
used, a little worn around the edges, but on the whole a marked
improvement on flying an old Tupolev 154. EmbOff opened the
seat-back pocket in front of him.
Surprised that he was able to
open it with all of the old chewing gum and assorted other sticky
substances in there, EmbOff flopped back into his seat,
understanding now why no in-flight magazines were provided. After a
delay of about 30 minutes, the airplane took off for Moscow.
Moscow Welcomes Tajiks With Open Arms and Drug Dogs
——————————————— ——
6. (SBU) Apparently all Tajik flights are subject to extensive
security scrutiny upon arrival in Moscow. Somon Air passengers
waited for over an hour in the baggage claim area in Domodedovo
Airport (after a near on-time arrival) before a baggage carousel was
even announced. An airport
employee told EmbOff that «the dogs»
needed time to go over every bag.
During this extended wait, EmbOff
also noted that immigration officials corralled arriving passengers
Qalso noted that immigration officials corralled arriving passengers
who appeared Central Asian after they had passed passport control
and before they entered the baggage claim area. These officials
examined the Tajiks’ passports and sent selected passengers to the
immigration counter.
7. (SBU) Somon Air also flew the route of Tajik Air flight 632 back
to Dushanbe on February 18, leaving about an hour behind schedule
without any explanation to the waiting passengers. Upon boarding,
EmbOff found that the flight was empty, and happily stretched out in
his own row. The flight to
Dushanbe was uneventful and again
arrived nearly on time.
Reminiscent of the language problems on the
flight to Moscow, the cabin crew seemed not to be fully briefed for
their mission. When the Turkish
crew came through with «dinner» and
EmbOff asked what was being served, in English, the flight attendant
rolled her eyes, shrugged, and said, «I don’t know.» It turned out
to be the usual airline food, some sort of stewed meat with rice and
green peas, which tasted just like any other reheated airline
dinner. When EmbOff asked for a
blanket for his wife who was
traveling with him, the lone Tajik attendant curtly told him that
blankets were for business class passengers only — at which point it
DUSHANBE 00000269 002 OF 002
was EmbOff’s turn to roll his eyes.
Comment — Tourist Hopes Dashed
——————————
8. (SBU) The disorientation Somon Air’s Turkish crew are suffering
is not the only start-up difficulty of this airline. Moscow is so
far the only route it flies, and it does this as a Tajik Air flight.
In reftel we theorized that Somon
might replace Tajik Air’s
monopoly with its own, given its presidential connections (Somon is
controlled by the President’s brother-in-law). So far, it’s not
clear to us what is actually happening, but it’s certainly not
commercial competition. The other
flights Somon Air claims on its
website — to Almaty, Urumqi, Dubai, and Istanbul — don’t yet exist.
Besides flying for Tajik Air its other role is, so far, to be a
presidential travel convenience.
President Rahmon has used Somon’s
only aircraft for his official travel at least once already, and
since the airplane is newer and better than anything else around
here, he’ll likely continue this practice. We don’t know when Somon
Air will emerge as an independently functioning airline, nor how it
benefits, if at all, from its current role as a contractor to Tajik
Air; but it seems so far to be «private» in name, not in
function.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 142563
date: 2/22/2008 12:06
refid: 08BEIJING658
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08BEIJING581
header:
VZCZCXRO4703
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0658/01 0531206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221206Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5290
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000658
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2033
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, OREP, CASC, KOLY, KG, AF, KZ, UZ, CH, TI,
TU, GM, PK
SUBJECT: XINJIANG: NEWSPAPER REPORTS ON TERRORIST SHOOTOUT
IN URUMQI; MEDIA, SCHOLARS EMPHASIZE OLYMPIC THREAT
REF: A. OCS/FBIS CPP20080219480001
B. OCS/FBIS CPP20080214710001
C. BEIJING 581
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
Summary
——-
1. (C) The Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a newspaper run by
the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper, reported in two
articles, published on February 18 and 20 respectively, that
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) police raided a
«violent terrorist cell (tuanhuo)» on the evening of January
27 in Urumqi’s «biggest residential development,» killing two
«terrorists» and arresting fifteen more who have confessed to
their crimes (ref A). The article
claimed the group had
received guidance (zhishi) from foreign terrorist
organizations and were conspiring to carry out «acts of
violent terrorism.» Ministry
of Public Security (MPS)
officials in Beijing on February 19 confirmed basic details
of the raid, but would not give information on possible
threats made by this specific group to the Olympic Games.
Media quoted Beijing- and Urumqi-based scholars who took the
raid as an opportunity to stress the terrorist threat to the
upcoming Olympics, with Beijing-based counterterrorism expert
Li Wei stating that «East Turkestan» terrorist organizations
have «on different occasions openly threatened to use
violence and murder (baoli biji shouduan) to interfere with
and ruin the Beijing Olympics.»
End summary.
CCP Media: Police-Terrorists Shootout in Urumqi
——————————————— —
2. (SBU) The Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a newspaper run
by the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper, reported in
two articles, published on February 18 and 20 respectively,
that Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) police raided a
«violent terrorist cell» on the evening of January 27 in
Urumqi’s «biggest residential development,» killing two
«terrorists» and arresting fifteen more (ref A). Although
«several» police suffered wounds, none were killed in the
«well-conceived,» «smooth» operation. Terrorists had rented
an apartment in Xinfu Huayuan development (xiaoqu) of
Tianshan District, which they were using to «assemble
explosives» and «carry out training.» Police found at the
site a number of guns, home-made (zizhi) explosives, «violent
terrorist activity equipment» and religious extremist
propaganda. They had received
guidance (zhishi) from foreign
terrorist organizations and were conspiring to carry out
«acts of violent terrorism.»
The terrorists have already
confessed to their crimes. The
February 20 article quotes
XUAR Party Secretary (and Politburo member) Wang Lequan
stating in a «recent» interview with «Hong Kong
media» that
«right now, we take out (dadiao) ten to twenty violent
terrorist cells (tuanhuo) each year.»
Global Times Refutes HK Sing Tao Jih Pao Report
——————————————— —
3. (SBU) The February 20 Global Times article also quoted an
unnamed Xinjiang official as «resolutely refuting» a February
14 report in Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Jih Pao newspaper on a
similar incident (ref B). The
Sing Tao article reported that
eighteen «terrorists» and two police officers were killed
during a raid, and claimed that «several hundred» police were
involved in surrounding the apartment.
The reported location
of the raid was the same, but Sing Tao claimed that the raid
took place on February 4, just before the «terrorists» could
carry out an attack the following day on the eleventh
anniversary of the Yining («Ghulja» in Uighur) incident of
1997 (see note below). The
February 20 Global Times report
included Sing Tao’s report of a planned February 5 attack in
Urumqi, but made no mention of the Yining incident. The
Global Times article also described the anger of local
residents at the fact that the Xinfu Huayuan development
police station had allowed a «nest of terror» to set up
«right under their (own) eyelids,» just 300 meters from the
station, adding that one official at the local police station
is rumored to have been fired.
However, both reports
emphasized the continued stability of, and local citizens’
confidence in, Xinjiang’s overall security situation.
4. (C) NOTE: On February 5, 1997, Chinese security forces
brutally suppressed Uighur demonstrations against
restrictions on social gatherings of young Muslims in Yining
City, Yili Prefecture. PolOffs
visiting Yining on the tenth
anniversary of the crackdown witnessed a number of
BEIJING 00000658 002 OF 003
approximately six-to-eight member security force teams
patrolling through the streets at night, armed with tear gas
guns. Additionally, one Han taxi
driver told PolOffs to be
careful because the «Uighurs might riot.» End Note.
5. (SBU) The official Xinhua News Agency, the China Daily and
other popular online news portals such as Sina.com, Sohu.com
and QQ.com all carried news of the incident on February 18,
but the story received minimal attention in Xinjiang local
online media. While
www.xjnews.com and the Urumqi Evening
News website carried the Global Times story, as of the
afternoon of February 22, Poloff found no reporting of the
raid on two major Xinjiang online news sites,
www.tianshannet.com and www.xjdaily.com.
MPS Tells LegAtt: «Read the Newspaper»
—————————————
6. (C) The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) confirmed to the
Embassy Beijing Legal Attache on February 19 that the raid
took place and that two «terrorists» were killed, fifteen
arrested, and no police lost their lives. Pressed for more
details, MPS officials simply told LegAtt to «read the
newspaper,» likely referring to the February 19 Global Times
article. MPS made clear that the
Sing Tao report of February
14 was «completely inaccurate.» PolOff spoke with a XUAR
Public Security Bureau Propaganda Department official on
February 19 who refused to discuss the raid on the grounds
that he did not have MPS approval to do so.
7. (SBU) Asked about the incident at the February 19 regular
MFA press briefing, spokesman Liu Jianchao said he had seen
reports of the incident and that China’s position on
terrorism is firm and «in line» with that of the
international community (ref C).
Media, Scholars Hype Threat to Olympics
—————————————
8. (C) Both Global Times articles quoted Li Wei,
counterterrorism expert from the Ministry of State
Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR), stating, «This incident
reminds us that ensuring the security for the Olympics is not
just limited to Beijing, and that in some areas where
terrorist activities have occurred, attention must be
increased.» The February 20
article quotes Li Wei more
extensively. Li warns that
«East Turkestan» terrorist
organizations have «on different occasions openly threatened
to use violence and murder (baoli biji shouduan) to interfere
with and ruin the Beijing Olympics.» Li also points out that
other organizations and groups might commit violent acts
during «the year of the Beijing Olympics.»
9. (SBU) Despite Li’s assertion that foreign terrorist
organizations have recently decreased support for violent
acts of terrorism within China’s borders as a means of
garnering «moral and political support from Western
countries,» he warns that these groups are still actively
preparing and training and almost always have foreign links.
For these reasons, Li stresses that China’s counterterrorism
responsibility this year is «formidable,» and reminds the
masses to prepare themselves to prevent and deal with a
variety of «sudden disturbances» (tufa shijian).
10. (SBU) The February 20 Global Times article also reports
an interview with Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences
counterterrorism expert Pan Zhiqiang, who similarly takes the
topic of the Urumqi shootout as an opportunity to discuss
threats to Olympic security. Pan
is quoted saying that the
Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX
Olympiad (BOCOG) must strengthen counterterrorism work. Pan
adds that Xinjiang must also continue to carry out
counterterrorism efforts on a «great scale» in order to
«vigorously purge» the home front of «terrorists.»
11. (C) MPS officials told LegAtt February 19 that they
perceive groups like the one targeted in the recent raid as a
threat to the Olympic Games. When
LegAtt asked if this
specific group had made threats regarding the Olympics, the
official gave no information.
XJ Secretary Wang on XJ terrorism
———————————
12. (SBU) State-controlled news portal Sina.com carried a
February 20 China News Online (Zhongguo Xinwen Wang) report,
which includes extensive excerpts from a «recent» Phoenix
Television interview with XUAR Party Secretary Wang Lequan,
BEIJING 00000658 003 OF 003
in which Wang discussed the history of terrorism in Xinjiang,
measures taken to combat the problem and even his detailed
assessment of United States-based Uighur activist Rebiya
Kadeer. (Note: The article does
not include a reference to
security forces’ uncovering ten to twenty terrorist cells per
year, as highlighted by the Global Times.)
13. (C) Wang describes the Government’s account of the Yining
incident, which he alleges was organized by the «East
Turkestan Liberation Organization» (ETLO, also abbreviated
using its Uighur language initials as SHAT), and says there
were over 250 cases of «violent acts of terrorism» carried
out in Xinjiang by «East Turkestan» forces in the 1990s. The
report also quotes Wang telling the journalist that he was
the «first name» on an assassination list of the «East
Turkestan Islamic Opposition Party» in the late-1990s.
RANDT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 142998
date: 2/26/2008 9:02
refid: 08BEIJING682
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7177
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0682/01 0570902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 260902Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5326
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000682
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2028
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ENRG, EDEV, PINR, PBTS, TI, CH
SUBJECT: PRC-TAJIKISTAN: CHINA DISPLACING RUSSIA, NO BORDER
ISSUES REMAIN, SAYS TAJIKISTAN EMBASSY (C-RE8-00054)
BEIJING 00000682 001.2 OF 002
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
CANCEL BEIJING 682. THIS CABLE WILL BE RESENT UNDER NEW
MRN/MCN
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
BEIJING 00000682 002.2 OF 002
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
CANCEL BEIJING 682. THIS CABLE WILL BE RESENT UNDER NEW
MRN/MCN
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
RANDT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 143039
date: 2/26/2008 12:09
refid: 08BEIJING687
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7396
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0687/01 0571209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261209Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5335
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000687
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O.12985: 02/26/2028
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ENRG, EDEV, PINR, PBTS, TI, CH
SUBJECT: PRC-Tajikistan: China Displacing Russia, No
Outstanding Border Issues Remain, Says Tajikistan
Embassy (C-RE8-00054)
Classified by Political Minister Counselor Aubrey
Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary: According to a
diplomat at the
Tajikistan Embassy, Tajikistan increasingly tilts
toward China, which it regards as the best hope in the
region for a patron, supplanting Russia’s historical
role. PRC-funded economic
development projects
(primarily infrastructure investment) further
commercial links and win over ordinary citizens, who
suffer from an energy crisis and chronic
underdevelopment. Chinese
«soft power» and security-
related training for Tajikistan officials also
contribute to better ties. The
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) fails to provide a framework for
increasing regional economic activity, given its
continuing focus on political and security matters.
The SCO’s lack of economic focus disappoints
Tajikistan and contrasts with growing bilateral
economic ties with China. A 2002
agreement with China
ending the border dispute was comprehensive, and no
outstanding border issues remain, the diplomat
claimed. End Summary.
Russia Losing Influence to China
———————————
2. (C) Tajikistan Embassy Political Minister Counselor
Likoev Mahmadali told PolOff February 15 that in the
last few years China has shown a strong and growing
interest in fostering Tajikistan’s economic
development, in contrast to Russia’s almost exclusive
focus on security in relations with the smaller
countries of Central Asia.
Mahmadali indicated
Russia’s approach appears self-serving to many in
Tajikistan, who believe Russia takes for granted its
historical ties with the country.
China’s focus on
highly visible economic activity with smaller
neighbors addresses the problems that ordinary
Tajikistan citizens face. The
Chinese strategy,
Mahmadali said, has effectively ensured cooperation on
security and increased China’s long-term influence
among ordinary citizens and leaders.
Infrastructure Investment
————————-
3. (C) Chinese infrastructure development projects in
Tajikistan include highways, hydroelectric power and
electricity transmission lines, for which private
investment plays an important part.
Mahmadali
indicated that because this private investment is the
result of official prodding from Beijing, Tajikistan
regards it as a form of foreign assistance. In
addition to upgrading Tajikistan’s domestic power
transmission system, Chinese investors plan a project
to connect the Tajikistan power grid to Afghanistan,
according to Mahmadali. Also,
China completed a road
in 2006 that connects Dushanbe to Xinjiang through the
Pamir Mountains, which not only develops the economy
but facilitates other Chinese projects in Tajikistan.
«Soft Power» and Humanitarian Assistance
—————————————-
4. (C) China’s global «soft power» enterprise is
manifested in Tajikistan through growing cultural and
educational programs, law enforcement cooperation and
scientific exchanges, Mahmadali said.
China provided
a USD 4-million grant to the Tajikistan counter-
narcotics agency in Dushanbe, and has brought law
enforcement officials to Beijing for counter-terrorism
training. China also offered
humanitarian aid during
Tajikistan’s recent energy crisis, specifically by
repairing roads between the two countries, a pledge
made despite China’s own snowstorm crisis. China so
far has not made good on this pledge, Mahmadali said,
lauding U.S. assistance as the first on the scene and
well-targeted to meet the needs of victims. He stated
that one reason for the slow Chinese response is that
Chinese assistance to Tajikistan is generally long-
term in nature and not geared toward emergency
response.
SCO Focus All Political/Security
———————————
5. (C) Mahmadali said that Tajikistan’s participation
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is
essential to its efforts to cultivate relations with
BEIJING 00000687 002 OF 002
6. (C) Mahmadali said that PRC-Tajikistan relations
improved after the 2002 agreement to settle a long-
standing territorial dispute. He
volunteered that the
agreement has been successfully implemented and no
outstanding territorial claims remain on either side.
Bio Note
———
7. (C) Mahmadali is an experienced diplomat but a
newcomer to China. He spent his
early career in the
Soviet Foreign Ministry as an Arabist, including a
tour at the Soviet embassy in Baghdad, where he claims
to have interpreted for visiting Soviet officials in
their meetings with Saddam Hussein.
His current tour
was preceded by an assignment as a Political Counselor
at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Secretariat
in Beijing.
RANDT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 143851
date: 3/3/2008 6:52
refid: 08DUSHANBE338
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08Reftel:State16737
header:
VZCZCXYZ5568
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0338 0630652
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030652Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0271
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC 0009
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0045
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0068
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0035
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0091
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000338
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/RA — LEO GALLAGHER, AND EEB/IFD/OMA — ANDREW
SNOW, RICHARD FIGUEROA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PREL TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — REPORT ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
Reftel: State 16737
1. Following is post’s response to reftel tasking. Begin Text:
Transparency and accountability of government fiscal actions is poor
in Tajikistan, and although the government has made efforts to
improve this state of affairs since independence in 1991, progress
is inconsistent. The Tajik
economy is largely built on commodity
production (aluminum and cotton), with a high level of state
ownership in key industries.
International assistance has been a
key component in developing respect for and implementation of
principles of transparency and accountability and the necessary
frameworks for their implementation, but the impact of these efforts
has been uneven, with the most success occurring at the local level
and in certain ministries in Dushanbe.
Tajikistan has misreported its finances to the IMF repeatedly over
the past several years. In the
latest misreporting incident, in
2007 the Central Bank made incorrect assurances to the IMF that it
had not made sovereign guarantees for private bank loans to fund
investment in the unprofitable cotton sector. The beneficiaries of
these guarantees are unknown. The
President in response replaced
the Central Bank Chairman and his deputies (moving some to other
government posts) and agreed to make several reforms, inviting a
staff monitoring program and audit of the Central Bank. The IMF
will wait to see concrete results before instituting the new loan
program Tajikistan has requested.
The national budget is not published in whole, although it is
possible to obtain parts of it in very general form. Information on
large parts of the budget, government debt, off-budget operations,
tax revenue projections, and other major items is inaccurate or
absent. Parliament is politically
and institutionally very weak; it
does not exercise effective oversight of the budget, neither
seriously examining and debating government budget plans, nor
effectively overseeing budget execution.
The details of revenue
from the Government’s major source of income, the Tajik Aluminum
Company, are closely held by the President, and details of
Presidential spending are also hidden.
The national budget included
large unexplained «other expenses.»
There are a variety of programs supported by the World Bank, the
United States, and other donors to help Tajikistan improve fiscal
planning, accountability and controls.
These programs are focused
on improving strategic planning processes, budget execution, and
smoothing fiscal relations between different part of the government
at the local and national levels.
These programs have improved the
capacity of the Ministry of Finance and other government
departments. The banking sector
also improved, thanks to U.S.
assistance. However, these
efforts will likely continue to be
challenging, given the inconsistency of committment to and
understanding of fiscal reform at the top levels of government.
Tajikistan has cooperated with the IMF to allow the IMF to report on
the country’s compliance with standards and codes of fiscal
transparency. The last IMF report
on this subject for Tajikistan,
from January 2007, is posted on the IMF website.
End Text.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 144478
date: 3/6/2008 3:13
refid: 08DUSHANBE375
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08STATE9475
header:
VZCZCXYZ3610
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0375 0660313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060313Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0283
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0049
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000375
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EB/TPP/IPE AND SCA/CEN
PASS USTR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN, ETTC, ECON, ETRD, PGOV, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — SPECIAL 301 REVIEW
REF: STATE 9475
1. SUMMARY: Post recommends that Tajikistan remain on the Special
301 Watch List. Tajikistan has
taken some steps over the past year
to improve protection of intellectual property, but much work
remains to be done. End Summary.
2. Advances in the past year included:
— passage of a Law on Geographical Indications, and a Law on Trade
Marks and Service Marks.
According to the Deputy Director of the
National Patent Information Center at the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade, this law has several articles which comply
with TRIPS requirements.
— In October President Rahmon signed a Government Resolution to
establish a Commission on coordination of the activities against
violations of intellectual property rights in Tajikistan. The
Commission had not become active as of February 2008.
— In early 2008 the Tajik MFA sent a diplomatic note to the United
Nations confirming Tajikistan’s ratification of the Rome Convention
(1961). The Tajik Parliament had
approved this decision in 2006.
— In February 2008 the Government began interministerial
deliberations on joining the Agreement on Author’s Rights (the
«Internet» Agreement of 1996) which is a part of the Berne
Convention.
3. However, in 2007 Tajikistan did not make any changes in the
Criminal Code to make penalties for IPR violations more severe, to
provide greater investigative powers for police in IPR-related
cases, or to permit confiscation and destruction of equipment used
to produce pirated material. The
government did not amend the
Customs Code to provide «ex-officio» authority to customs
officials
to suspend the release of suspected infringing materials at the
border. Lack of technical
expertise and resources prevents the
Customs Committee from creating a data base of all registered
entities who seek protection at the border based on intellectual
property rights. Tajikistan did
not adhere to the Geneva phonograms
convention, despite assurances in early 2007 that it would do so.
There were few reported seizures of pirated DVDs and CDs. In these
cases the shops selling the pirated goods were back in business
within a short time. There were
no known convictions for IPR
violations, although the Ministry of Interior assured the embassy
that criminal cases were in process.
4. U.S. assistance is supporting Tajikistan’s defense of
intellectual property. The USAID
«Regional Trade Liberalization and
Customs Project» assists Tajikistan in its efforts to join the
World
Trade Organization, an important part of which is bringing its IPR
rules and regulations into
