Выпуск-54

id: 109590
date: 5/24/2007 12:25
refid: 07DUSHANBE762
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07STATE54097
header:
VZCZCXRO5380
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0762 1441225
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 241225Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0309
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2095
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2126
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2100
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2006
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000762
 
SIPDIS
 
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ECIN, EFIN, ECPS, EINV, ETRD, EAID, KG, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKS SUPPORT FIBER OPTICS CONFERENCE, BUT WANT «EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES» FOR STATE OPERATOR
 
REF: STATE   00054097
 
1.  (SBU) Tajikistan supports the
idea of a U.S.-organized
conference on regional fiber optic projects (reftel), but
Minister of Transportation and Communications Adburahim Ashurov
expressed greater interest in more international assistance to
support the state-owned operator Tojiktelecom.  Ashurov
encouraged the development of a regional fiber optics network to
create additional opportunities for Tajikistan as a transit
country and asked for an official letter laying out the project.
 
2.  (SBU)  In a May 21 meeting with EmbOffs, Ashurov
asked for
more technical assistance and training for telecom specialists
at Tojiktelecom.  Ashurov wants to
protect the national company
by providing it with international assistance and possible
infrastructure investment.  He
noted that although Tojiktelecom
owns all the existing landlines and telecom infrastructure in
Tajikistan, a lack of financial resources and lack of market
transparency make the company uncompetitive on the local market.
 Ashurov and Tojiktelecom head
Rahmonali Hasanov criticized the
13 mobile phone operators for «filling their pockets and
cheating clients» with confusing tariff plans, while failing to
expand to rural areas.  Ashurov
argued that the government, not
the private operators should be setting tariffs.
 
3.  (SBU)  Ashurov acknowledged that in his first sixth
months
heading the communications ministry, he has sought out
specialists to work on regulatory issues, but the sector still
does not have the proper regulation or enough technical experts.
 (Note: As the former Minister of
Transportation, he was
appointed head of the combined ministry in December 2006.  End
note.)  He appreciated his staff’s
inclusion in an April U.S.
Trade and Development Agency forum on regulation in Almaty, and
promised that an outstanding letter requesting technical
assistance was still in the works, but he wanted to expand the
scope of the request beyond regulation to all aspects of
telecom.
 
4.  (SBU)  Leading telecom companies in Tajikistan
support the
fiber optics but have told EmbOffs that there are technical and
policy issues to be resolved first. 
Chinese companies have
already been actively engaged with Bablion and Tojiktelecom on
ways to link Tajikistan to the rest of the world without relying
on routes through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
 
5.  (SBU)  Comment: 
Bringing Tajikistan fully on board with a
regional fiber optic project will require a great deal of
education and technical assistance, both to the government and
private operators.  Ashurov and
other Tajik officials will have
to overcome their instincts to protect the uncompetitive
state-owned Tojiktelecom and instead learn to promote private
operators — who in fact pay more tax revenues to the government
than any other industry.  End
Comment.
 
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 109704
date: 5/25/2007 3:10
refid: 07DUSHANBE764
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07Dushanbe262
header:
VZCZCXRO6194
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0764 1450310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250310Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0310
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2096
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2127
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2101
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0008
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2008
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000764
 
SIPDIS
 
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK NGO LAW NOT AS BAD AS IT COULD HAVE BEEN~BUT STILL NOT
GREAT
 
REF: Dushanbe 262
 
1.  (SBU) Tajikistan finally has
an official new law on
non-governmental organizations. After multiple drafts, months of
negotiations and parliamentary discussions, diplomatic
interventions and civil society hand-wringing, President Rahmon
signed the Law on Public Associations May 12.  However, the
final version was not considered official -or available to the
public — until published in a state-run Tajik language
newspaper May 19.  The official
Russian version has not yet been
released.
 
2.  (SBU) The new law took into
consideration a number of
concerns post and other donors had actively raised with the
government:
 
— It eliminated the proposed requirement that international
NGOs such as Mercy Corps, CARE, Internews, and other long-time
U.S. implementing partners, register with both the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice.  Given that
administrative red tape is a favorite Tajik government tactic to
stall or unofficially to deny organizations the ability to
operate, this leaves the bureaucratic hurdles some organizations
will face the same as before.
 
— The parliament removed a proposed requirement that any
organization manager be a Tajik citizen, which would have
effectively eliminated expat leadership from the bigger
organizations.  There are fewer
restrictions on the rights of
foreign citizens to participate in public association.
 
— The final version no longer gives the government unlimited
access to all NGO training programs and internal meetings, but
still allows authorities access to «mass events» (undefined).
 
— The «registering authority,» in most cases the Ministry of
Justice, cannot suspend the activities of an NGO without a court
order, and investigations of violations should be conducted
through the prosecutors’ offices.
 
— The final version also eliminated a «territorial»
requirement
in the draft that in some cases would have meant that an
organization would need to register in each individual district.
 
3.  (SBU)  However, some remaining provisions still
raise
concerns:
 
— A broad range of grounds for denying registration to a public
association, which would allow bureaucrats and security services
to refuse registration without much explanation.
 
— For international NGOs, all full-time staff — international
and local — must be accredited with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs after the organization is registered.  Given the
Ministry’s lack of organization, this adds yet another
administrative requirement for our implementing partners.
 
— Unregistered organizations are not allowed to conduct any
activities until they have been fully registered.  This would
affect National Democratic Institute, which has been operating
without registration for its entire tenure in Tajikistan.
 
4.  (SBU) Under the new law, all
public associations and
non-governmental organizations must re-register with the
Ministry of Justice, free of charge, by January 2008.  Muatar
Kahdirova, of the International Center for Non-Profit Law noted
that the new law took into account many of the comments conveyed
to the parliament by her organization and others.  However, she
anticipated that some of the wording would leave international
NGOs open to greater scrutiny by the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Interior.
 
5.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Although local organizations did little to
advocate for themselves, Post worked very hard to make the Tajik
government understand the ramifications of the restrictive draft
law for international groups.  We
are pleased the government
incorporated a number of suggestions into the final version, but
the NGO saga is far from over. 
The overall operating
environment has not changed; nor have many of the ministries
making life hard for our implementing partners.  We anticipate
we will need to continue to engage the government on the
importance of non-governmental organizations for strengthening
civil society and promoting economic stability.  END COMMENT.
 
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110147
date: 5/30/2007 10:38
refid: 07DUSHANBE776
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9746
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0776/01 1501038
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301038Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0327
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2026
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000776
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
DEPT FOR SCA HILLMEYER AND BRENNIG
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING FOR TAJIK LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
 
 
1. This is an action cable.  See
paragraph 4.
 
2. Post has been asked to conduct a human rights review for the
following participants from various Tajik law enforcement
agencies appointed to attend «Precursor control in Central
Asia»
and «Regional Cooperation in Precursor Control between
Afghanistan and Neighboring countries» training courses
organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC).  UNODC plans to conduct
the trainings in Dushanbe on
11-15 June 2007 with the participation of French partners.
 
 
A.  LAST NAME:  Zamirov
FIRST NAME:  Farmonbek
DOB:  08.12.1951
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Operational officer of the mobile department
AGENCY:  Drug Control Agency
 
B.  LAST NAME:  Habibulaev
FIRST NAME: Timur
DOB:  16.09.1980
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Operational officer of the operational investigation
department
AGENCY:  Drug Control Agency
 
C.  LAST NAME:  Huseynova
FIRST NAME:  Mijgona
DOB:  23.04.1982
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Inspector of the department of the drug and precursor
control
AGENCY:  Drug Control Agency
 
D.  LAST NAME:  Djaborov
FIRST NAME:  Furkatjon
DOB:  16.02.1983
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION:  Senior inspector of the
department against customs
infringements
AGENCY: Customs Service
 
E.  LAST NAME:  Gayurov
FIRST NAME:  Anomudin
DOB:  05.02.1959
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Customs Service
 
F.  LAST NAME:  Rizaev
FIRST NAME:  Dilshod
DOB:  07.09.1983
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Inspector of the regional Customs department for
Tursunzade
AGENCY:  Customs Service
 
G.  LAST NAME: Kosymov
FIRST NAME:  Iskandar
DOB:  13.07.1959
POB: Tajikistan
POSITION: Operational officer of the drug control department
AGENCY:  Ministry of Interior
 
H.  LAST NAME: Zukhurov
FIRST NAME:  Shamsiddin
DOB: 10.02.1975
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Senior operational officer of the drug control
department
AGENCY:  Ministry of Interior
 
I.  LAST NAME:  Karaev
FIRST NAME: Abduvahob
DOB:  21.04.1966
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Officer of the State Border Guards department
AGENCY:  State Committee on
National Security
 
J.  LAST NAME:  Gafurov
FIRST NAME:  Davron
DOB:  23.01.1976
POB:  Tajikistan
POSITION: Officer of the State Border Guards department
AGENCY:  State Committee on
National Security
 
 
3. Post has no credible information of gross violations of human
rights by any of the listed participants.
 
4. Action requested:  Post kindly
requests that Department check
the names against its databases and inform Post if no derogatory
 
DUSHANBE 00000776  002 OF 002
 
 
information was found.  Point of
contact at Post is INL Officer
Ranjeet Singh at [email protected].
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110169
date: 5/30/2007 12:12
refid: 07DUSHANBE778
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07DUSHANBE778
header:
VZCZCXRO9861
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0778/01 1501212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 301212Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0329
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2102
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2129
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0009
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 0004
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0007
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2029
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000778
 
SIPDIS
 
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ENRG, EAID, TI, AF
SUBJECT: IN TAJIKISTAN, A LUMP OF COAL IS NOT SUCH A BAD THING
 
REF: Dushanbe 637
 
DUSHANBE 00000778  001.2 OF 002
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Nothing would
please the Tajik government
more than big lumps of coal in their stockings this Christmas,
preferably from a U.S.-financed mine that fuels a thermal power
station.   At a May 29 roundtable
meeting on «Integrated
Development of Coal and Power Projects and Reconstruction of
Thermal Power Plants for Coal Fuel» sponsored by the Tajik
Ministry of Energy and Industry, investors, donors and the
government signed a declaration to study Tajikistan’s coal
reserves, with an end goal of year-round electricity production
for domestic use and export.  The
United States agreed to
consider reassigning Trade and Development Agency grant money
already allocated to Tajikistan for a coal-related feasibility
study, should the Ministry submit a sensible proposal that
supports our regional energy goals. 
END SUMMARY.
 
2.  (SBU) At the day-long meeting,
the Ministry had a focused
agenda and concrete answers to donor questions about feasibility
and goals.  After opening remarks
by Minister of Energy Sherali
Gulov, Deputy Prime Minister Asadullo Ghulomov included in his
own comments specific references to a May 28 meeting with SCA
Senior Advisor Bob Deutsch (septel), noting that Tajikistan was
ready to comply with all international standards on power
purchase agreements.  «We
commit ourselves to upgrading Tajik
law in those areas where we do not meet international norms.»
Deputy Minister of Energy Pulod Mukhiddinov outlined
Tajikistan’s coal potential, notably deposits at Fon Yaghnob,
Nazar Aylok and Ziddi, and the possibility of converting
gas-powered thermal stations in Dushanbe and Yavan to
coal-fueled.  All noted that
despite rich hydropower potential,
coal-powered electricity would help meet the demand during
Tajikistan’s winter months, when most of the country sits in the
dark, and help meet year-round export commitments.
 
3.  (SBU) Prospective investors
made presentations about their
interest and experience in the coal sector.  Presenters included
the U.S. firm AES, Russia’s RAO UES, three Kazakh firms, (one
having already invested $1 million in a Tajik coal field), a
British consultant, and Chinese equipment manufacturers.  Among
the conference’s 80 participants were local representatives from
the major international financial institutions — World Bank,
Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, International Finance Corporation, Islamic
Development Bank, Eurasian Development Bank — plus
Washington-based World Bank Energy advisor Raghu Sharma.
 
4.  (SBU) At the end of the
meeting, which finished a remarkable
five hours ahead of schedule, 
Sharma and Ghulomov facilitated a
discussion of the next steps to developing the coal sector and
finalized a «conclusions» declaration, which outlined
participants’ intent and narrowed the focus to the Fon Yaghnob
deposit and possible rehabilitation of the Dushanbe and Yavan
stations.  The declaration
included commitments to uphold
environmental and safety standards and create a «shell
company»
based on an Indian model that would obtain the necessary
clearance and conduct the feasibility studies, and then be
transferred to the private investor selected to develop the
project.
 
5.  (SBU) Ghulomov repeated a
previous appeal to the U.S.
government to reallocate TDA grant money to a coal feasibility
study; based on Deutsch’s earlier meetings with Ghulomov,
Pol/Econ chief agreed that this would be possible if there were
a concrete proposal that supported U.S. regional electricity
goals, including developing an electricity source that could
provide Afghanistan with year-round power.
 
6. (SBU) In a likely effort to demonstrate strong government
commitment to the project, the Tajiks trotted out other economic
heavy hitters, including the chairman of the Tajik Aluminum
Company, the head of Tajik State Savings Bank, the deputy of
Orien Bank (Tajikistan’s largest commercial financial
institution), the Minister of Economic Development, the
Presidential Advisor on Energy (and former Minister of Energy),
and most of the Ministry of Energy and Industry.
 
7.  (SBU) Comment: The concrete
goals and presentations of this
meeting contrasted sharply with the April roundtable for
consultants on a regional electricity trade project (reftel)
where Tajik officials remained in the realm of the theoretical,
making the pitch for any and all generation projects.  Ghulomov,
who missed the last meeting due to medical treatment, was active
 
DUSHANBE 00000778  002.2 OF 002
 
 
and engaged in the discussion, and seemed to have taken
Deutsch’s comments about international standard agreements to
heart.  He assured investors and
donors that Tajikistan was
ready to move forward quickly to ensure that thermal-generated
electricity could be part of the regional electricity trade.  We
hope he means it.  End Comment.
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110444
date: 6/1/2007 5:31
refid: 07DUSHANBE783
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07DUSHANBE783
header:
VZCZCXRO2133
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0783/01 1520531
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 010531Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0335
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2099
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2104
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2132
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0011
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 0006
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 0009
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2039
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000783
 
SIPDIS
 
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ENRG, EAID, TI, AF
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN MUST COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS TO SUCCEED
IN ENERGY TRADE
 
DUSHANBE 00000783  001.2 OF 002
 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary. Tajikistan needs to take steps to
sign and
abide by international standard agreements if it wants to
develop its electricity sector through exports to Afghanistan
and beyond.  In a series of
meetings with top energy and
economic officials May 28, Senior Advisor for Regional Economic
Integration Robert Deutsch and Senior Advisor for Afghan Private
Investment Ed Smith delivered a clear message to the Tajik
government: Tajikistan cannot do business as usual, with
bureaucratic hurdles and fuzzy legal agreements, if it wants to
attract private investment or international financing.
 
2.  (SBU)  Deutsch reiterated U.S. support for
Tajikistan’s
energy sector and interest in the development of Tajikistan’s
coal sector in order to provide year-round electricity for
domestic use and export.  He noted
that U.S. Trade and
Development Agency grant money already given to Tajikistan for a
regional project could be transferred to study coal development,
if the Tajik government presented a clear and sensible plan.  At
a May 29 meeting for investors and donors on coal (septel), the
message had clearly sunk in, when Tajikistan’s Energy Czar,
Deputy Prime Minister Asadullo Ghulomov, repeatedly pledged
Tajikistan would meet all international standards in the energy
sector. End Summary.
 
3.  (SBU)  In meetings with Presidential Advisor for
Economic
Policy Matlubkhon Davlatov, Minister of Energy and Industry
Sherali Gulov, Deputy Prime Minister Asadullo Ghulomov, and
Minister of Transportation and Communications Abdurahim Ashurov,
Deutsch briefed the Tajik officials on the May 22-23
Multi-Country Working Group meeting in Jeddah concerning
regional energy trade.  The Jeddah
meeting set out key issues to
ensure that the working group made progress towards trading 1000
megawatts of electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to
Afghanistan and Pakistan — a project know as «Central Asia
South Asia (CASA) 1000.»  One
critical step will be
demonstrating commitment to a higher standard of transparency
and contracting by signing a solid power purchase agreement
between Tajikistan and Afghanistan for their bilateral
electricity trade to enable ABD financing for the
interconnection.  (Note:  The Afghans have proposed a standard
power purchase agreement, to which the Tajiks had responded that
they preferred to continue previous month-to-month arrangements
that were governed by memoranda of understanding and Tajik law.
End Note.)  Deutsch’s message to
the Tajik officials centered on
the following points:
 
—  A USTDA grant from June 2006,
intended to study transmission
networks to Afghanistan, could be used instead to study the
feasibility of coal, provided the Tajiks had a comprehensive
plan of action.
 
— The United States could support Tajikistan’s energy sector in
several other ways: Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) would be available for insurance and financing if U.S.
companies participated in the project. 
Export-Import Bank of
the United States (EXIM) is closed to Tajikistan but could
potentially support a third party purchaser, like Pakistan.
 
— Although Tajikistan had successfully sold power to
Afghanistan on a monthly basis under the framework of a simple
memorandum of understanding, international financiers and
investors require a more definitive agreement on supply and
export prices that includes a mechanism for neutral dispute
resolution.  Tajikistan must be
prepared to sign specific,
binding agreements that go beyond Tajik law and adhere to
international standards.
 
— Providing electricity to Afghanistan is a U.S. policy
priority, but the United States will not invest in mega-projects
like the proposed 4000 megawatt hydropower station at
Dhasti-Jhum.  The Tajik government
will need to take many
smaller steps to establish a market and build investor
confidence in such projects over the coming years.
 
4.  (SBU)  Presidential Advisor Matlubkhon Davlatov
called
energy a development priority and noted it was a regional, not
just a national issue.  In
response to Deutsch and Smith’s
nine-hour journey on bad roads (at times, off-road) to a coal
field in northern Tajikistan the day before, Davlatov observed
that Tajikistan would still need to develop its road and rail
infrastructure to use coal efficiently. 
He promised to follow
 
DUSHANBE 00000783  002.2 OF 002
 
 
through on a draft power purchase agreement that Afghanistan had
sent to Tajikistan, and ensure that the Tajik side accepted the
standard international terms for selling electricity.
 
5.  (SBU)  Deutsch also raised Canargo, a U.S. firm
trying to
sign an agreement with the Tajik government for gas exploration.
 When Davlatov suggested that the
Tajik government would sign
the production sharing agreement after Canargo had done its
exploration, Deutsch reminded him that Western investors want
the terms in advance of the risks and investment.   Davlatov
said that Tajikistan would adhere to international business
norms, and when Tajik law did not match international standards,
they would change their laws.
 
Minister of Energy and Industry
——————————————
 
6.  (SBU)  Minister of Energy and Industry Gulov thanked
Deutsch
for his support for Tajikistan’s coal sector and noted that a
U.S.-funded feasibility study would go a long way to ensure a
year-round supply of electricity for domestic use and export.
Like Davlatov, he also asked for U.S. assistance in developing
more generation capacity, particularly a hydropower station at
Dhasti-Jhum.  Gulov also pledged
to clear up a
«misunderstanding» on the draft power purchase agreement with
Afghanistan, and ensure that it included international dispute
resolution and a long term-commitment to supply power at
established rates.
 
Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov
———————————————
 
7.  (SBU)  As Tajikistan’s key official for energy and
industrial policy, Ghulomov assured Deutsch that Tajikistan
would meet all international standards to ensure the regional
electricity project was successful. 
Because the electricity
supply situation could change in 2008, when Sangtuda-I comes on
line, Ghulomov said he was reluctant to commit Tajikistan now to
an agreement with Afghanistan, but understood that for
international financing, they would fulfill the expected legal
obligations.  He observed that
even if Tajikistan had the 1000
megawatts to export now, Afghanistan did not yet have a
distribution network to take the power. 
«The Afghans have
colossal work ahead of them.»
 
8.  (SBU)  Moving beyond the CASA 1000 project, Ghulomov
pitched
key points in Tajikistan’s energy dreams, including the need for
a second high voltage line to Pakistan that would carry
electricity produced at new generation projects, like
Dhasti-Jhum.  He noted that the
May 29 coal conference would be
an important step in developing year-round electricity and that
Tajikistan needed more help in the coal sector.
 
Minister of Transportation and Communication
——————————————— ——————-
 
9.  (SBU)  Minister Ashurov repeated comments from the
other
three officials thanking the United States for the bridge at
Nizhniy Pyanj.  Calling it a
significant step in linking Central
and South Asia, he looked forward to the proposed August
opening.  He welcomed the opportunity
for Tajikistan to
participate in a fiber optic project to link the Central Asian
republics directly to global fiber optic networks, and he
promised that his telecommunications experts would provide full
information on Tajikistan’s infrastructure and plans for further
discussion of regional fiber optic interconnections.
 
10.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  
Deutsch’s visit was a timely reminder to
Tajik officials that although the United States strongly
supports Tajikistan’s energy sector development, Soviet-style
business practices will not help them build regional electricity
networks or attract financing and investment.  Whether his
message sticks will only become clear if Tajikistan actually
signs the mountain of paperwork necessary for a successful power
purchase agreement.  The pleas for
U.S. development of power
stations, specifically Dhasti-Jhum, were expected, and also
demonstrate that our emphasis on attracting private investment
through a more attractive business climate hasn’t yet hit its
target.  The August bridge opening
will be another opportunity
to reinforce that message.  END
COMMENT.
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110446
date: 6/1/2007 5:58
refid: 07DUSHANBE785
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
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—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000785
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
STATE FOR EUR/ACE
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN TAJIKISTAN:  NO
OVERSIGHT COULD LEAD TO NO PERFORMANCE
 
REF: (A) KRYSTEL-HUSHEK E-MAIL 5-30-2007
 
1.  Summary:  Embassy Dushanbe strongly opposes granting
National Endowment for Democracy funds in Tajikistan to the
«Center of Democratic Transformation» to open a Women’s
Leadership School, as included in the June 2007 list of project
proposal (ref A).  This local
non-governmental organization has
a history of non-performance and hostility toward Embassy
officers; and post recently had to terminate a Democracy
Commission grant because of non-performance and lack of results.
 End Summary
 
2.  The Center of Democratic
Transformation received a Democracy
Commission grant in August 2006 to strengthen Tajikistan’s
multi-party political system through the creation of a website
for political parties and organization of discussion roundtables
in northern Tajikistan.  After
months of inactivity,
particularly in the critical period leading to Tajikistan’s
presidential election in November 2006, the grant was terminated
in May 2007.
 
3.  When the embassy began
exercising oversight on how the funds
were used, organization representatives began accusing the
embassy of «spying,» and threatened to «tell the
world» about
embassy corruption.  The Center
for Democratic Transformation
failed to create a functional website and falsified the
attendance lists for the few seminars conducted.  As a result of
the non-performance, the embassy refused to pay the final grant
funds.  When EmbOffs flew from
Dushanbe to visit the
organization’s office in early May for a pre-arranged meeting,
the office was padlocked and the staff refused to communicate
further with EmbOffs.  During the
extensive e-mail and phone
communications with the organization’s director, Fatemah
Ahmedova, we learned she resides in England, and her brother
Akhmed Kadirov nominally runs activities in Khojand.
 
4.  ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy Dushanbe requests confirmation that
this project will not/not receive NED funding.
 
5.  Comment.  Our own experience with the Center for
Democratic
Transformation is instructive for Washington-based organizations
who try to fund projects in Tajikistan without an in-country
presence or direct oversight. 
Post has previously raised these
concerns about National Endowment for Democracy funded grants.
In general, NED too seldom consults with the Embassy and has
provided very little information on the activities and results
of its grants here.  The versions
of the proposals which we do
see are typically written with generalized language and contain
no detailed breakdowns of budgets or proposed activities.  With
these limitations and in a country permeated by corruption, the
Embassy on its own can do very little to ensure accountability
for taxpayers’ dollars.  The
Embassy strongly supports NED’s
goal of promoting democratic reform, which is also a top mission
priority.  However, we recommend
NED consider how to exercise
more oversight and work more closely with the Embassy in order
to ensure its programs actually promote progress toward this
goal.   End Comment.
 
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110526
date: 6/1/2007 13:11
refid: 07DUSHANBE786
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1434|06DUSHANBE1977|07DUSHANBE703
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—————— header ends —————-
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000786
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/1/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ENRG, EAID, TI, AF, IR
SUBJECT: PERSIAN POWER: TAJIKISTAN’S DEVELOPING TIES WITH IRAN
 
REF: A) 06 DUSHANBE 1434, B) DUSHANBE 703, C) 06 DUSHANBE 1977
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
 
 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Tajikistan has characterized its ties with
Iran as purely economic, but growing political, military and
diplomatic relations indicate that more than investment and
trade is bringing the two countries closer together.  In the
last eighteen months, Tajik President Rahmon and Iranian
President Ahmadinejad have made trips to each other’s capitals
and signed a raft of agreements and declarations ranging from
education, science and culture to inter-parliamentary and
defense cooperation.
 
2.  (C) Rahmon’s public rhetoric
has always emphasized the
shared linguistic and cultural bonds, but his private rhetoric
lately has begun to include an element of political apology for
his neighbor and cultural kin. 
Iranian assistance has also
trickled into impoverished rural areas, building schools and
mosques in places where the government has provided little
development.  Secular Tajiks may
not be comfortable with Iranian
religious dictatorship, and parts of Rahmon’s government still
resent the quiet support Iran gave to the Islamic-oriented
opposition in the Tajik civil war ten years ago.   But although
friendship with a country that supports religion-based
insurrections in neighboring states is a dangerous game for
Tajikistan, neither Rahmon nor Tajikistan can afford to say no
to infrastructure development and investment.  In the short run,
both countries stand to gain from closer relations:  Tajikistan
needs the money, and Iran needs the friend.  END SUMMARY.
 
Persian Shuttle Diplomacy
 
———————————-
 
3.  (C) President Rahmon’s May
7-10 visit to Iran was the latest
in a series of meetings for the Persian-speaking leaders.  In
January 2006, Rahmon went to Tehran, and in July 2006,
Ahmadinejad and Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Dushanbe
for a tripartite meeting. 
Although the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs characterized the May trip as a «working level visit»
on
ongoing investments (ref b), the Iranian news agencies used the
opportunity to report that Tajikistan would «support Iran’s
call» to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.  Rahmon called on
the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei and proposed a Tajik-Iranian business forum, as well as
a regional railroad project linking Tajikistan, Afghanistan and
Iran.  While the visit broke
little new ground, it further
cemented a relationship expanding into many spheres.
 
Economics
 
——————
 
4.  (C) Tajikistan increasingly
looks to Iran for economic
assistance, both as a trading partner and as an investor in key
infrastructure projects. 
According to official statistics, in
2006, Tajikistan imported more than $34 million from Iran,
mainly eggs, cooking oils, chocolate, other consumer goods and
aluminum oxide, while it exported $76 million, primarily cotton
and aluminum.
 
5.  (C) In May, Iran announced
intentions to invest in a Tajik
vehicle production facility for Samand cars and construct a
cement plant with a million ton capacity.  In addition, the
Tajik aluminum company Talco will invest in several of Iran’s
seaports, providing Talco new outlets to the world market.
Talco Chairman Sherali Kabirov told PolEcon Chief with great
pride that his company intended to invest $66 million to rebuild
a coke refinery in Iran — Tajikistan’s first ever foreign
investment.  An Iranian company
has begun construction of
Dushanbe’s tallest building, a 27-story «Tower of Peace»
(reftel
C).
 
6.  (C) Iran is financing and
building the Anzob tunnel ($39
million, and from all accounts an engineering disaster months
behind schedule); the 220 megawatt hydropower station
Sangtuda-II ($220 million, and two years behind construction),
and a tunnel at Chormazak ($55 million). 
The Tajik government
 
DUSHANBE 00000786  002 OF 004
 
 
touts its «open door policy» as a guiding principle and
welcomes
all investors, but Iran, along with China and Russia, has been
one of the few countries to sink major resources into
Tajikistan’s risky business environment.
 
Politics
 
———-
 
7.  (C) In response to every U.S.
demarche regarding Iran’s
violation of U.N. resolutions and Iran’s nuclear program,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs interlocutors are quick to tell
EmbOffs that Tajikistan opposes all forms of nuclear development
in the region.  However, they are
equally quick to point out
that Tajikistan will not openly oppose Iran on the issue, for
fear of losing the much-needed infrastructure investment.  A
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official recently admitted to EmbOff
that Tajikistan could not object to Iran joining the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, should Iran pursue membership.
 
8.  (C) However, during the May 23
visit of NATO Special
Representative for Central Asia Robert Simmons, Rahmon made what
Simmons characterized as «almost an apology» for Iran’s
civilian
nuclear program and offered an explanation for Ahmadinejad’s
approach to the United Nations.
 
9.  (C) Tajik officials across
various ministries have proposed
Tajikistan as a natural go-between for Iran and the United
States to solve problems.  Since
his re-election in November,
Rahmon has been busy traveling around the Muslim world, not just
to Iran, to project an image of Tajikistan as a regional player
and to seek financing for infrastructure projects.  Iran views
Tajikistan as a little brother in the relationship and would
likely dismiss an intermediary role for Tajikistan in dealing
with the United States or the United Nations on its nuclear
program.  In turn, many Tajiks in
the government still remember
Iran’s assistance to the opposition during the Civil War and
fear any sort of religious resurgence in Tajikistan, which may
limit the degree of engagement with Iran on political issues.
 
Education and Culture
 
——————————-
 
10.  (C) Both Iran and Tajikistan
have played up the linguistic
and cultural ties between their countries despite the fact that
Iran is primarily Shia and Tajikistan Sunni.  Iran has increased
its engagement in Tajikistan’s educational sphere, planning an
educational complex, providing up to 100 university slots for
Tajik students to study in Iran, and offering Persian-language
textbooks in Arabic and Cyrillic scripts.  (Note: Persian-Farsi,
written with Arabic script, and Persian-Tajiki, written with
Cyrillic, are mutually intelligible. 
End Note.)  Due to the
different alphabets, Tajik students and workers still turn more
to Russia than Iran, but this could shift if Iran increases the
number of scholarships and offers more instruction in Farsi in
Dushanbe.  Many Tajiki language
publications are consciously
incorporating more Farsi and Arabic words.
 
11.  (C) Iran maintains a cultural
center in Dushanbe as well as
a private secondary school that a few Tajik elites attend.  Iran
is an important source of linguistically understandable pop
culture as well.  A hugely popular
Swedish-based Iranian pop
star triggered a highly unusual public demonstration by
disappointed youths when he postponed his concert last year.
Iranian music and television are available through satellite
television, and Iranian hits are all over Tajikistan’s airwaves.
 
Defense
 
————
 
12.  (C) The Tajiks and Iranians
have danced around military
cooperation, but activities and assistance have yet to produce
any significant partnership.  In
general, the Iranians are
disappointed in the level of military cooperation and tend to
dismiss the Tajiks’ characterization of their military relations
as cooperation.  The
Russian-influenced Tajik Ministry of
Defense remains wary of the influence of political Islam and
therefore reluctant to fully engage the Iranian military.
 
13.  (C) An Iranian Ministry of
Defense delegation visited
 
DUSHANBE 00000786  003 OF 004
 
 
Tajikistan April 29-May 2 and although the two sides signed a
document, the visit was more political than substantive in
nature.  In addition to a dose of
anti-U.S. rhetoric, the
Iranians offered minor technical assistance including uniforms,
small arms ammunition and radio repair. 
Press reports mentioned
that Iran has provided «over 6 million dollars» in military
assistance to Tajikistan over the last 10 years.  This is a drop
in the bucket compared to what other interested parties,
including Russia, China and the United States, provide.
 
14.  (C) The delegation cancelled
a meeting with Tajik Foreign
Minister Zarifi, a former Ambassador to the United States at the
last minute, raising some speculation as to the real level of
cooperation and goal of the mission. 
The Iranian defense
minister may have considered Zarifi too associated with the
United States and therefore unworthy of meeting with the Iranian
defense delegation.  On the whole,
the visit indicated an
Iranian preoccupation with U.S intentions in Tajikistan and
further abroad.
 
Religion and grassroots development
 
——————————————— ——
 
15.  (C) Much to the discomfort of
Tajikistan’s secular
post-Soviet cadre, Iran has quietly been making an impact in
rural areas, by donating money for mosques and schools.  The
mosques are able to offer some short-term assistance for
families needing food or assistance when the men are in Russia
working.  We have anecdotal
evidence that Iran funnels the money
through local Islamic Renaissance Party chapters, which then use
the money to build mosques and some schools.  Despite growing
government efforts to control the construction and activities of
these mosques in rural areas, more and more they are serving as
community centers and providing social services.
 
16.  (C) Nevertheless, recent
Presidential moves banning the
wearing of Iranian-style headscarves in schools and government
offices provide evidence that secularism is still an important
government policy.  The
combination of heightened fears of
religious extremism, government and local attitudes towards
Islamic missionaries and Iran’s overtures in the mid-late 1990s
would make Tajikistan a difficult environment for Iranian
religious influence to take root.
 
 What does this all mean?
 
———————————-
 
17.  (C) The trajectory appears to
be upwards for Tajikistan and
Iran.  The relationship is likely
growing beyond the economic,
which could mean a stronger Iranian influence on President
Rahmon, particularly if Iran tried to leverage its substantial
investments for political support on the world stage.  Adding
Iran’s well known anti-American rhetoric to the already dominant
Russian propaganda means that the U.S. message could have a more
limited impact.  The Tajik
government is unlikely to embrace, or
welcome, Iran’s religious policy, but may try to ignore that
aspect of Iran (as it sometimes does with U.S. messages on
democracy and civil society) by concentrating on other areas of
cooperation.
 
18.  (C) Economically, the United
States cannot compete with
Iran’s infrastructure investment, but we can use feasibility
studies to define projects that might attract U.S. or other
foreign investors.  We will
continue to encourage a better
business climate through assistance programs that aim for
long-term stability and transparency for small and medium
enterprises.
 
19.  (C) Culturally, the growing
influence of Iran makes
bringing the Peace Corps to Tajikistan all the more essential.
A volunteer teaching English in the same town as an
Iranian-supported mosque would at the very least give Tajik
citizens with limited access to outside media some exposure to
our culture and values, while providing a desperately needed
(and frequently requested) service.
 
20.  (C) Politically, we will
repeat our message to the Tajiks
that supporting a country in flagrant contravention of UN
resolutions and international opinion is a bad move, despite the
economic incentives.  President
Rahmon is a pragmatist, who
 
DUSHANBE 00000786  004 OF 004
 
 
carefully weighs his options but seems susceptible to strong
rhetoric and international diplomacy. 
A high-level visit to
Tajikistan in August for the opening of the U.S.-funded bridge
at Nizhniy Pyanj, just weeks before the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Summit where Iran could make a play for full
membership, will provide the ideal opportunity to open a
dialogue with Rahmon on Iran.
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110714
date: 6/4/2007 10:55
refid: 07DUSHANBE790
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE623
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2056
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000790
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/4/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES’ LITERATURE SEIZED, MEMBER INTERROGATED
 
REF: DUSHANBE 623
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
 
 
 
1.  (C) Tajikistan’s Jehovah’s
Witnesses face increased pressure
from the Tajik government and fear their recent problems may
signal the government’s move to shut down the religious group
entirely (reftel).  On April 26,
State Committee on National
Security officials prohibited customs authorities from releasing
a container from Germany with over three tons of religious
materials including books, brochures, and DVDs. Jehovah’s
Witnesses Valeri Dudayev and James Hwang painted a grim picture
of recent activities to PolOff May 31.
 
2.  (C)  On April 26, State Committee on National
Security
officials called in two Jehovah’s Witnesses, Suhrob Ibraghimov
and Vladimir Aderhayev, for five hours of questioning.
Afterwards Ibraghimov told Jehovah’s Witnesses that during the
interrogation, officials delivered a strong punch to his upper
body.  They accused him of working
for the United States and
Germany and ordered him to change his religion.  Ibraghimov is
ethnic Uzbek and Aderhayev is ethnic Ossetian; both are
Tajikistan nationals.
 
3.  (C)  Two Jehovah’s Witnesses lawyers from the
Almaty chapter
met with the State Committee on National Security May 10.  When
they requested a meeting with the Chairman or Deputy Chairman,
officials declined, saying that the high officials will never
meet with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
The officials demanded a
list of countries assisting Jehovah’s Witnesses, a list of
members, bank account statements and other documents.  The
Committee members said that they plan on burning all the
imported materials and would inform the Jehovah’s Witnesses when
they have done so.  To date,
Jehovah’s Witnesses believe the
materials have not yet been destroyed.
 
4.  (SBU)  On May 10 and 24 Jehovah’s Witnesses filed
official
letters with the Ministry of Security and Tajik Customs asking
for an explanation for the confiscation of materials.   The
group insisted that it had filed all the necessary documents and
obtained receipts for all fees paid to customs authorities.
Jehovah’s Witnesses had been permitted to import religious
literature for 14 years with only minor problems.  In May 2006
local police stopped a Jehovah’s Witnesses truck full of
religious materials but released it within three hours.
 
5.  (C)  Tajikistan’s local Jehovah’s Witnesses
chapter is
considering appealing the problem to its United States chapter
as well as other countries. 
Because a German company supplied
the literature, Dudayev said that Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany
have informed the German government. 
PolOff suggested that
Jehovah’s Witnesses also inform other international
organizations and diplomatic missions in Dushanbe who are
regular champions of religious freedom. 
For now, the group is
waiting for an official response to its May letters to the
government, although they realize a response may never come.  In
the meantime, another shipment, sent from Germany before these
problems surfaced is en route.
 
6.  (C)  COMMENT: 
The State Committee on National Security did
not explain why they confiscated the religious materials or
questioned the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
This particular Jehovah’s
Witnesses case is the latest in a string of recent
interrogations by security officials of members of Christian
groups with some connection to foreigners.  Intimidation and
harassment is the tactic of choice to discourage Christian
groups from proselytizing. 
Although past cases involved
intimidation, the physical abuse of Ibraghimov is the first
report we have heard of violence. 
Post will continue to raise
these specific incidents as a negative trends toward restriction
of religious freedom, and will send a diplomatic note to the
government officially registering our concern. END COMMENT.
 
JACOBSON
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
 
 
id: 110895
date: 6/5/2007 10:18
refid: 07DUSHANBE796
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07DUSHANBE622|07DUSHANBE796
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2065
 
—————— header ends —————-
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000796
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KWMN, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN:  FEMALE
STUDENT CHALLENGES BAN ON HIJAB IN
UNPRECEDENTED CASE
 
REF: DUSHANBE 622
 
DUSHANBE 00000796  001.2 OF 002
 
 
1.  SUMMARY:  In an unprecedented case, a young female
university student, Davlatmoh Ismailova, is suing the Tajik
Institute of Languages and the Ministry of Education for
expelling her for wearing a hijab to school.  This is the first
time a student has brought a case against a university and the
Ministry of Education, and the first court case disputing the
ban on hijabs (reftel).  On May
31, the courageous young woman
told PolOff her story and what motivated her to take on the
Tajik government.  END SUMMARY.
 
2.  On May 2 the Sino District
courthouse received Ismailova’s
case petitioning for the Institute of Languages and Ministry of
Education to readmit her into the university with her hijab.
However, the judicial system postponed the case and redirected
it to the Shomansur District Court where the Ministry of
Education is located.   On May 16,
the rescheduled court date,