id: 71984
date: 7/20/2006 8:56
refid: 06DUSHANBE1362
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001362
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, DRL, S/P
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S NEW MEDIA COALITION NOT ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT
1. (SBU) Three prominent media associations formed the
new
Partnership for Democracy in June, a media coalition group
designed to address misunderstandings among journalistic bodies
and foster improved relations between mass media and the
government. However, despite the
group’s good intentions, it
appears it is subject to considerable government influence.
2. (SBU) The three organizations in the coalition are
the
National Association of Independent Mass Media in Tajikistan
(NANSMIT), the Tajik Association of Independent Electronic Media
(TAIEM), and the Media Alliance of Tajikistan (MAT). The
Chairman of TAIEM, Muso Asozoda is also the Head of
Administration for the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan,
President Rahmonov’s political party.
Even NANSMIT, the
self-proclaimed darling of the international community, and MAT
are not truly independent organizations.
Embassy sources say
that even though these organizations may ideally want to reform
media conditions in the country, all three have connections
within the government and are soft on government criticism, when
they publish opposing views at all.
3. (SBU) According to press reports, the group’s
three-pronged
strategy includes each organization taking the lead on one of
three goals: reform media
legislation, establish a state body
to regulate relations between the media and government, and set
up a body to regulate journalistic ethics and relations within
the media community. However,
during EmbOffs’ meeting July 18
with NANSMIT Chairman Nuriddin Karshiboev, he stressed strong
government cooperation more so than in public reports. For
instance, he described the organization’s first two goals as
reforming media legislation and introducing a new law on mass
media so that media groups can better cooperate with the
government, and establishing a new council to include the
government and mass media which would strengthen cooperation
between the two. Nowhere in
Partnership for Democracy’s written
goals does it stress the need for a more free and independent
media or legislation reform for transparent government
regulations. The group also plans
to offer membership to the
Tajik Union of Journalists, a well-known government-directed
body.
4. (SBU) COMMENT:
Although the organization is still in its
early stages and its true intentions cannot yet be judged, all
signs point to Partnership for Democracy as another pre-election
government ploy. This coalition
allows the government to more
closely and succinctly work with all mass media organizations in
the country and silence opposition voices. It would be easier
for the government to hide behind a seemingly independent
organization to control media activities than directly pressure
the media with a heavy hand. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72295
date: 7/24/2006 8:48
refid: 06DUSHANBE1420
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001420
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, E, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL, S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/24/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PROP, ECON, EINV, ENRG, MARR, KDEM, IR,
AF, CH, RS, TI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT RAHMONOV
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, Exective Office,
Dept. of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) During the Ambassador’s
90-minute one-on-one farewell
call with President Rahmonov July 19, the President spoke
without notes, because, we learned later, he had not expected a
working meeting. President
Foreign Policy Adviser Erkin
Rahmatulloyev told us, «Generally, ambassadors come to say a
protocol good-bye, shake hands, and wonder what gift they’ll
get. But, on the other hand, none
of the others work like you
do. Except maybe [Russian
Ambassador Ramazan] Adbulatipov, but
he usually comes to give us orders.»
2. (C) The Ambassador
— thanked the President for his productive partnership and
reviewed the key accomplishments of the last three years,
including major assistance for the Tajik Border Guards, the
Pyanzh Bridge under construction, a new U.S. Embassy completed
and occupied, and a major U.S. company involved in Tajikistan’s
hydro-electric sector.
— reviewed the investment climate and advocated for U.S.
businesses facing problems (Gerald Metals and Comsup);
— advocated for a November presidential election that would
meet international standards, and suggested registering and
licensing new independent radio and television stations before
the election, including Asia-Plus TV;
— explored the possibility of greater access by the U.S.
military to support the war against terrorism in Afghanistan; and
— asked for Rahmonov’s vision for Tajikistan five years from
now.
3. (C) Rahmonov thanked the
Ambassador for the work he has done
during his tenure, noting it has left an «indelible mark» on
Tajikistan, and, especially on the bilateral relationship. He
said, «You know that anyone who matters reads and discusses
every word you publish.» Rahmonov thanked President Bush for the
new attention and respect shown Tajikistan in the past three
years.
MILITARY COOPERATION
4. (C) Regarding increased access
by U.S. and coalition forces
to Tajik military facilities, Rahmonov said he would repeat what
he told Secretary of Defense Rumsfled on July 10: «Tajikistan
will do whatever is in its power to support the war against
DUSHANBE 00001420 002 OF 005
extremism and terrorism.
But,» he noted, «this is not 2001. If
you had taken Kulob Airfield then, you would have it now. Don’t
ever forget that the success of Manas depends on our blanket
clearance for your use of our air space.
Today, we are in a
‘spiderweb’ of new international commitments and cannot make
unilateral decisions that violate those commitments.» (COMMENT:
The means Russia has largely
achieved control of it’s sphere of
influence, unless we can think of creative ways out of this box.
END COMMENT.)
5. (C) Rahmonov said he is
extremely grateful for U.S. military
assistance, notably for the National Guard, and especially for
the Tajik Border Guards — «They’re young and need all the help
they can get. Even so, I intend
to decrease the number of
Russian advisers. If they were
truly helping, that would be
fine. But I’ll tell you frankly I
don’t like what they are
doing.»
6. (C) Musing about the U.S.
presence in the region, Rahmonov
said, «You lost Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan. I simply do not
understand your internal bureaucracy.
If Karimov was annoyed
with you and your presence was imperiled, why didn’t you just
offer him a few major ‘economic projects’?» (COMMENT: This
unscripted advice offers insight into how business is done in
this part of the world: you can
buy your way out of any
problems. END COMMENT.)
RUSSIA
7. (C) Rahmonov lamented, «Every single thing
we do without
permission irritates Russia.»
He said he’s especially
exasperated by the continuing anti-Tajikistan Russian-media
propaganda campaign that seems to be geared to portraying
Tajikistan as a feckless narco-state harboring terrorists. He
added that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are also involved in this
disinformation campaign about Tajikistan. (COMMENT:
This is
the first we’ve heard Rahmonov complain about Kazakhstan on this
issue. He may have in mind the
web site that
posts Russian disinformation and is reportedly Kazakhstan-based.
END COMMENT.)
8. (C) Rahmonov said the frequent meetings between
Russian
President Putin and the other CIS presidents are coming to seem
like the old Soviet Politburo. He
said, «I remind them at every
meeting the Politburo is gone.
It’s a new world.» He
repeated
heatedly, «It’s a new world,» then added, «but
complicated.
Putin thinks he’s the new General Secretary. That’s why we need
reliable partners like the United States, but we don’t have oil
and gas. To reduce Moscow’s power
over us, we need strong
economic and social development.
That’s why we need your help.
If we become stronger, we become more independent. We do not
want to be a ‘toy’ in anyone’s hands.
You tell us your views
very clearly, but you don’t force or threaten us. And for that
I am grateful.
9. (C) About the new U.S. Embassy, Rahmonov said,
«You are the
first to build a substantial, new embassy. Never underestimate
DUSHANBE 00001420 003 OF 005
the importance of symbols. It
means a lot to us. Russia simply
took a ‘dolgostroi’ [an abandoned Soviet construction project]
and finished it, but it’s already falling apart.
FOREIGN POLICY
10. (C) The President reaffirmed, at length, his
«open-door»
foreign policy and his desire for multiple strong partners. «We
will not let Russia and China intimidate us.» He expressed
gratitude for Washington’s «objective and accurate
understanding» of and growing respect for Tajikistan.
11. (C) In an aside, Rahmonov said he gets annoyed
with
European officials who call on him and «don’t even know what
country they’re in but tell us we must be like them. But we try
to take their views into consideration because we need multiple
European partners.»
INTERNAL POLICY
12. «You can’t force change,» Rahmonov said, «but you can
help
us achieve it.» He
elaborated that he wants greatly accelerated
economic development, an end to roads and especially railrods
that only go north, solutions for social problems and further
poverty reduction, less corruption, less labor migration, and a
strong democratic civil society so that people feel they are
part of the government. «But
we must go slowly. Foreign
governments and their NGOs don’t understand they cannot
replicate their own experiences here.
It’s essential to
understand the culture and respect the traditions of the people.
The fundamental mistake of the
USSR was it didn’t respect the
traditions of its peoples.
Forcing change can lead to mistakes
and serious consequences.»
He paused and then added, «But we do
respect your views and try to take them into consideration.» We
want to be a respected and exemplary country in a civilized
world. The United States is
essential in the region.»
13. Rahmonov declined to be drawn
out on the November
presidential election. «It’s
too early. But if Rahmonov wins,»
he added using the third person, «Tajikistan’s foreign policy
will not change in any dramatic way.»
U.S. INVESTMENT AND WESTERN BUSINESS INTERESTS
14. The Ambassador explained that
international legal cases
involving TadAz, as a result of the upheaval there in the second
half of 2004, are still causing concern for Western investors,
and will continue to inhibit major investment until the cases
are resolved. The Ambassador once
again brought up the U.S.
company Gerald Metals, and elaborated on the U.S. political risk
re-insurer, Chubb, which had to pay out $125 million to Norsk
Hydro because of the TadAz mess.
The Ambassador said, «Whoever
was mucking around at TadAz has seriously harmed Tajikistan’s
DUSHANBE 00001420 004 OF 005
interests, especially because political risk insurers for major
investment are a very small club, and the TadAz mess is globally
known.» The President nodded
but had no reply.
15. The Ambassador noted that
Dushanbe Mayor Mahmadsaid
Obaidulloyev is in the process of destroying the one and only
European-class restaurant in Dushanbe, La Grande Dame, that was
previously a favorite of Western diplomats, businessmen, and
potential investors. He told
Rahmonov, «This may seem minor to
you, but it is totally crazy.
Small things like this can have a
disproportionate impact on potential investors. They’ll see it
as an example of chaotic risk, because the restaurant’s owner,
an Australian citizen, had all the proper permission for her
investment and the construction of her business.» Rahmonov
scowled, turned red, and banged the arm of his chair with his
fist, which was what we hoped would be the impact on him.
(COMMENT: Rahmonov has to walk a
very fine line with the
Moscow-supported wildly corrupt mayor of Dushanbe, but it never
hurts to get Ramonov’s dander up against Obaidulloyev. END
COMMENT.)
HYDRO-POWER
16. (C) Rahmonov advocated again
that the United States take a
larger role in Tajikistan’s hydro-energy sector. He said, «We
are sincerely grateful for what you did to get AES here, but we
want more U.S. active investment and involvement.» He focused
on the proposed Dasht-i-Zhum dam and hydro-electric station on
the Pyanzh River between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. «This is
as strategic for Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the region as the
Pyanzh Bridge. Like the bridge,
it could be oxygen for the
region. Maybe the United States
can’t fund the entire project,
but I would like you to use your moral and economic power to
take the lead in the international community to get this built.
It is essential.»
COMMENT
17. (C) We believe Rahmonov believes in his vision for
Tajikistan that includes a strong, democratic civil society.
But what he means and what we mean by those words are not
necessarily yet fully congruent.
His constant emphasis on the
need to respect the culture and traditions of the country is not
wholly just a blow-you-off excuse for his vested-interest
go-slow approach on these issues.
Tajikistan is in a very tough
geographical and ideological neighborhood. Internally, he still
has many political enemies, like Obaidulloyev. And, certainly,
Rahmonov is a product of his place and time. But he is a shrewd
and increasingly sophisticated player who sort of gets what we
say. We need continually to
nudge, but not try to shove, him in
the right direction.
18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Rahmonov was pleasant,
complimentary, relaxed, and confident.
He sported a new light
gray summer suit from his personal tailor at Brioni who flies in
from Italy about every six months. We are pleased he allowed 90
minutes for the meeting, especially if he had been expecting
DUSHANBE 00001420 005 OF 005
only 10-15 minutes. This is a
busy time for him. Besides the
normal flow of business, the election is looming, July 21-22 he
was in Moscow for the informal CIS «Summer Horse Race Summit,»
and July 25-27 Iran’s President Amadinejad will be in Dushanbe.
Rahmonov told us he expects the Chinese Prime Minister for an
official visit September 15. END COMMENT.
19. Kabul minimized considered.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72468
date: 7/25/2006 11:08
refid: 06DUSHANBE1423
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001423
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, MARR, KDEM, IR, RS, TI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S FAREWELL CALL ON TAJIK FM TALBAK NAZAROV
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
In his July 17 official farewell call on
Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov, the Ambassador summed up
the progress in the U.S.-Tajik relationship over the past three
years, including increased border
assistance, a new U.S.
Embassy and U.S. involvement in hydropower and infrastructure
projects. The Ambassador noted
the business climate still
needed further and consistent reform to attract foreign
investors, and several high-level cases involving U.S. firms
must be resolved before more American investors would come. The
Ambassador recommended that the Tajik authorities begin
registering and licensing independent television and radio
stations before the November presidential elections to
demonstrate a commitment to a freer media. He suggested
increased military cooperation was still possible without
specifically establishing a U.S. base, through logistics
support, refueling and search and rescue operations. Nazarov
indicated this was possible, «with the proper mechanism,»
which
would likely involve direct U.S.-Russian agreement. Nazarov
agreed that the bilateral relationship was very strong.
Tajikistan was constantly balancing its foreign policy with
bigger countries and its neighbors, and partnership with the
United States played an important role in Tajikistan’s
«open-door» foreign policy.
END SUMMARY.
IRAN
2. (C) Minus the usual MFA notetaker, Nazarov sat
down and
chatted for almost 45 minutes about the state of the bilateral
relationship and regional issues.
Addressing first the
Ambassador’s final question about Iranian President
Ahmadinejad’s July 25-27 visit, Nazarov noted the meetings would
not be political. «We don’t plan or desire that!» he stressed.
Under agreements signed with former President Khatami, Iran took
the lead on several infrastructure projects in Tajikistan,
including the strategic Anzob Tunnel and Sangtuda-II hydropower
station. Ahmadinejad is coming
specifically for the official
opening of the tunnel.
Unfortunately, almost no progress has
been made on Sangtuda-II.» It’s unclear whose fault that is,»
said Nazarov. «Maybe ours? Maybe the Russians?» referring to
the
neighboring RAO UES project Sangtuda-I.
«We had hoped these
projects would be finished before Khatami left office,» remarked
Nazarov.
3. (C) According to Nazarov, the
Tajiks have «no special love»
for the current Iranian administration.
Many Tajiks,
particularly in the government, remember Iranian support for the
opposition forces and their role in starting the Tajik Civil War
in the early 1990s, and the resulting «catastrophic effects.»
«Perhaps that (infrastructure support) is compensation for the
enormous damage,» he mused.
He added, however, that Tajikistan
has to pay close attention to domestic public opinion, and a
good number of the Tajik intelligentsia have a warm and benign
view of Iran based on common cultural and linguistic links.
Nazarov characterized Iran’s ideology-driven foreign policy as
«near sighted,» but noted that Tajikistan must be careful
«not
to quarrel» with Tehran.
(NOTE: MFA Americas department Head
Ismatulloh Nasreddinov pulled PolOff aside at a reception June
26 to emphasize that the Iranian visit was bilateral only, and
no international issue would be raised. «Tajikistan is on record
as opposing nuclear weapons,» he said,» but we cannot and will
not bring this up during the visit. That was a condition to
DUSHANBE 00001423 002 OF 003
having the visit.»
Presumably, he meant an Iranian condition.
END NOTE.)
4. (C) Nazarov confirmed that Afghan President Hamid
Karzai
will visit Dushanbe July 26, in part because he cancelled his
participation in the January Afghan-Tajik-Iranian trilateral
meeting in Tehran. However,
Nazarov noted that while Karzai’s
visit was «compensation» for missing the January meeting,
there
were no plans to sign any trilateral agreements, and no joint
statements would be made. Nazarov
also noted that Tajikistan
owes Afghanistan an official bilateral visit to Dushanbe but
this currently pending visit is not official.
THE DOOR MUST STAY OPEN
5. (C) President Rahmonov’s «open door»
foreign policy has
proven successful, Nazarov concurred, as Tajikistan has tried to
establish partnerships with the «leading countries» and its
neighbors. «We don’t want to
feel the embrace of just one
country,» he said. «We must continue to balance our
interests.»
He agreed with the Ambassador’s assessment that only Tajikistan
and Kazakhstan have successfully forged fairly balanced working
relationships with the major powers, like Russia, the United
States and China, as well as with neighbors. In response to a
question, Nazarov suggested Rahmonov would likely change key
cabinet members after the November presidential election.
U.S.-TAJIK RELATIONS: MATURE AND PRINCIPLED
6. (C) The United States and Tajikistan both want
normal
cooperation and a strong partnership, suggested Nazarov, and
thus they resolve issues based on this principle. He agreed
that the bilateral relationship was mature and they must find a
mechanism to maintain the balance.
7. (C) Regarding Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent
request, Nazarov
said, «Our arms were short.
We have commitments to the regional
organizations (especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
Commonwealth Strategic Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian
Economic Community). Could we
allow ourselves to by ostracized
in those regional fora?» He
reminded the Ambassador that in
2001, Tajikistan was very interested in coalition troops
establishing a military presence at Kulyob airfield, but the
United States did not take up the offer.
RUSSIA
8. (C) He agreed that it was essential to find a way
for the
Russians to be helpful to resolve problems in Afghanistan. Thus
far, Russia has not been participating, but «looking at the
situation while on the black list.»
If Russia felt like it had
more responsibility for regional security in Afghanistan,
Nazarov suggested, it might cooperate more. However, for
further U.S. and coalition military use of Tajik facilities, a
«mechanism» must be found, primarily between the United States
and Russia. Nazarov said he’d
heard nothing of rumors that the
Russians and Indians were negotiating an agreement over the use
of the Ayni Airbase.
THANKS
9. (C) In parting, the Foreign Minister complimented
the
Ambassador on being a «working ambassador» who had done much
to
solidify and strengthen the bilateral relationship by focusing
on the «big issues» and not getting caught up with minor
problems. He said, «We
respect you could tell us hard things,
but always with balance and objectivity and a focus on what’s
truly important.»
10. (C) COMMENT:
Nazarov, who has been foreign minister for
over 10 years, has several times asked to retire, but President
DUSHANBE 00001423 003 OF 003
Rahmonov has refused to let him.
After the November election,
he may press his case one more time.
If he is replaced, we hope
it is someone with his balance and vision. Under his
leadership, the foreign ministry has emerged as perhaps the most
liberal, and balances, when it can, the old-guard impulses of
the ministry of security.
11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: We are intrigued by Nazarov’s
musing that an enhanced U.S. and coalition military presence in
Tajikistan is not impossible if the right «mechanism» is
found.
In our search for a positive partnership with Russia, this might
be worth exploring. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72469
date: 7/25/2006 11:09
refid: 06DUSHANBE1424
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001424
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK INDUSTRY MINISTER WANTS U.S. JOINT VENTURE TO FLY
SOLO
REF: HILLMEYER — HOAGLAND EMAIL 6 JULY 2006
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
1. (SBU) An antimony mining joint venture with New
Jersey-based COMSUP has been so successful, according to
Minister of Industry Zaid Saidov, the Tajik government would
prefer the U.S. firm own one hundred percent of the operation,
rather than 49%. In a July 18
meeting with PolOff, Saidov
explained the Government of Tajikistan’s recent proposal to sell
its shares in Anzobskigok, a mining enterprise was not an
attempt to pressure COMSUP, but instead a way for COMSUP to keep
control of the operation in the face of privatization.
2. (SBU) Should COMSUP elect not to purchase the
controlling
interest in the joint venture, the shares would go up for
auction in January as part of the state privatization plan.
(NOTE: Under the official privatization plan, most state-owned
enterprises should be privatized in January 2007. In addition
to Anzobskigok, the state-owned companies slated to privatize
include the electric utility Barqi Tojik, Tokjikgas, Tajik
Airlines, and Tajikistan’s biggest producer, the aluminum
company TadAZ. However, recent
press reporting suggests TadAZ
has been taken off the block. END
NOTE.)
3. (SBU) Rather than sell the shares in Anzobskigok to
an
untested foreign investor, the Ministry of Industry would prefer
to see COMSUP take ownership of the entire company. Saidov
reported that a number of different companies already expressed
interest in Anzobskigok, including Kazakh and Chinese firms, for
more than double the $3 million it proposed to COMSUP.
Anzobskigok anticipates extracting up to 750,000 tons of ore to
produce 250,000 tons of antimony concentrate by the end of 2006.
4. (SBU) Said indicated the proposal reflected the
Tajik
government’s limitations on investing in its own enterprises.
If COMSUP were the sole owner, there would be no limitations on
what it put into Anzobskigok.
(NOTE: COMSUP has already
invested $4 million in the Tajik venture. END NOTE.) «We want
to attract foreign investment,» said Saidov. «This is in both
of our interests.» The
government would like to see an ore
production facility in Tajikistan, rather than shipping the
concentrate to Kyrgyzstan or China for processing, but cannot
afford to match any new investments. Currently, the antimony
concentrate exported for production contains gold and silver
that never end up profiting Tajikistan.
5. (SBU) COMSUP’s contracts and documents establishing
the
Anzobskigok joint venture are all legal, confirmed Saidov;
should COMSUP choose not to purchase majority shares, the
contract would still be honored.
When the joint venture was
established, foreign companies were required to have a Tajik
partner. Now, under a new law on
foreign investment, foreign
investors can own one hundred percent of their operations.
6. (C) COMMENT:
Saidov seemed to be operating under good
faith when he suggested the Tajik government was so pleased with
COMSUP, it would rather see them take full control of the
operation than have another investor take part. If this
proposal truly is part of the privatization plan, it represents
a sensible first offer to a company that could lose much should
another investor take 51%.
DUSHANBE 00001424 002 OF 002
7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: However, given the example of
Gerald Metals, where the Tajik government refused to honor
agreements signed under one director of a state company after he
was removed from his post, COMSUP is smart to be concerned about
the proposal. It is also unclear
whether there are really
foreign investors interested, or whether the Ministry of
Industry is trying to pressure COMUSP to take on more than they
want in Anzobskigok. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72470
date: 7/25/2006 11:10
refid: 06DUSHANBE1425
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classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001425
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/25/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: NDI NOT GETTING THE ANSWERS THEY WANT FROM TAJIK GOVERNMENT
REF: Dushanbe 804
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (c)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
In meetings with Foreign Minister Talbak
Nazarov and Deputy Minister of Justice Sharipova, National
Democratic Institute (NDI) representatives pressed the Tajik
government to register the organization and issue a visa for an
American staff member to manage the Dushanbe office. In both
meetings July 17, NDI Director Laura Jewett and NDI board member
(and retired Connecticut Congressman) Sam Gejdenson heard
elusive responses and received no clear indication that NDI was
welcome to operate in Tajikistan.
With NDI activities
effectively frozen since April and with no new assurances on
registration or a visa for American staff, Gejdenson and Jewett
are cobbling together a plan to keep the door open. Even this
scaled back presence will require significant continued support
from the Embassy. END SUMMARY.
FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTS BIDING TIME
2. (C) Foreign Minister Nazarov
suggested that NDI wait to
attempt to register with the Ministry of Justice until after a
new law on public associations and non governmental
organizations was enacted, possibly at the end of the year.
Acknowledging that it is indeed illegal to function without
registration, he referred to the unofficial arrangement brokered
by the Embassy which allowed NDI to conduct its trainings of
political parties even while it remained unregistered. Now,
however, it is impossible to return to the unofficial status
quo. Nazarov confided that in
government meetings on NDI, he
had been the lone voice advocating allowing the organization to
work in Tajikistan while its status remained unresolved.
3. (C) Gejdenson emphasized that NDI was a
transparent
organization whose aim was to help Tajikistan create a «free and
open society,» and quoted Jefferson, stating the price of
freedom was vigilance. He
explained that NDI wanted to bring «a
technical person» to lead the office through the registration
process, but that individual would need a visa. Nazarov
made
no pledge the MFA would issue a visa, even when Jewett repeated
the request later.
4. (C) Nazarov noted the April incident, where
Acting NDI
director Nurul Rakhembekov, a Kazakh national, was caught in a
sex scandal and quickly deported (reftel), was «very unpleasant»
for the Tajik government, particularly since it took place a
week before President Rahmonov’s state visit to Kazakhstan.
(COMMENT: Nazarov was most likely
speaking from the Foreign
Ministry’s perspective. We are
certain that the Ministry of
Security set up the episode. END
COMMENT.)
5. (C) Jewett reported the Ministry of Security had
repeatedly
questioned NDI’s local staff, and they were concerned about the
physical security of their employees.
Nazarov promised to
speak to the Minister of Security and assured the NDI
representatives that no harm would come to their local staff.
6. (C) Nazarov alluded to the events in Andijon and
Kyrgyzstan, saying «Tajikistan is still living through the
effects.» Gejdenson asked
whether Russia tried to dictate its
terms to Tajikistan. «We balance our relations,» replied the
foreign minister diplomatically.
NO FURTHER ADVICE FROM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
7. (C) Gejdenson opened the
conversation with First Deputy
Minister Ghulchera Sharipova by stating, «I want to register NDI
DUSHANBE 00001425 002 OF 003
under the old law and then again under the new law. There is no
reason not to register this transparent organization. Madeline
Albright will be calling the foreign minister to request a visa
for an American director to come and manage the office.» He
suggested the new NGO law would be restrictive and modeled on a
similar Russian law, and then stated, «It’s not good for you if
NDI leaves this country.»
8. (C) Sharipova carefully avoided giving any
specific
explanation by stating, «You’ll need to talk to my colleagues
about that. I do not deal with
registration issues. » (NOTE:
As First Deputy Minister, Sharipova can and has involved herself
in NGO issues and is well briefed on the registration problems.
END NOTE.) She noted that NDI was
refused registration because
it «presented its documents» incorrectly, and no new
registrations would be granted until after the new law was
passed. When? «I cannot
speak for parliament,» she said.
When
pressed for more specific advice, she demurred. «I do not know
anything about this case.»
She seemed surprised to hear Nazarov
had recommended that NDI wait until the end of the year to try
to reregister. Taking another
tack, she remarked, «(The
U.S.-funded NGO) ABA Ceeli had problems registering, but they
worked closely with the Ministry and resolved the issue.»
NO FURTHER MEETINGS
9. (C) Despite repeated requests, the Embassy was
unable to
arrange meetings with the Presidential Administration and the
Ministry of Security. The
Presidential Administration told an
Embassy staff member, «(Presidential Advisor Erkin)
Rakmatulloyev has spoken with the Ambassador on this issue and
there is nothing new to say.»
Sharipova’s colleague, Deputy
Minister of Justice Mengliev, would not consider a meeting until
permission came from the MFA, which more than 48 hours later had
failed to pass the diplomatic note to the Ministry of Justice.
10. (C) Since the departure of NDI Acting Director
Nurul
Rakhembekov in April, NDI has ceased all training programs, even
with the president’s ruling political party. Several staff
members have quit, including the interpreter. The lack of
registration makes it impossible for NDI to do something as
simple as issue a Letter of Invitation for technical trainers,
or register visitors, such as Jewett and Gejdenson, who had to
be registered as «tourists» visiting local staff.
FINDING A WAY FORWARD
11. (C) The NDI delegation came
to Dushanbe with plans to
obtain a work visa for an American staff member and move forward
on registration. Jewett admitted,
«We came up with nothing.»
Gejdenson and Jewett were reluctant to give up, however, finding
inspiration in their remaining local staff’s commitment to the
program despite fear of harassment from Tajik authorities. They
also spoke with beneficiaries of NDI training, including
officials of President Rahmonov’s own party, whose appreciation
for NDI’s work, Gejdenson believes, was genuine.
12. (C) Gejdenson and Jewett
considered seriously whether this
was enough to keep NDI’s doors open in Tajikistan. Gejdenson
ruled out total closure of the office, uncertain they would
manage to get back in after the elections and after the adoption
of the new NGO law. More
seriously, he was afraid of setting a
precedent by letting a host government squeeze out NDI.
Gejdenson and Jewett did, however, seriously consider the
possibility of formally and publicly suspending NDI activities.
The Ambassador explained the potential benefits of such a move,
which would give NDI the upper hand in determining its own fate
and obtain some benefit from what is already a de facto
suspension. Hours before leaving
Dushanbe, Gejdenson and Jewett
still were not sure how far down this path they would go.
13. (C) In the meantime, NDI
plans to continue to seek a visa
for an American citizen director.
Gejdenson is confident he can
get former Secretary Albright to write a letter to FM Nazarov
requesting a visa, and equally confident he can find «an
DUSHANBE 00001425 003 OF 003
American of some heft»such as former congressman Tom Andrews to
volunteer to come to Dushanbe as a temporary director until
after the Tajik elections, adoption of the new NGO law, and
eventual registration of NDI. NDI
is well aware of the problem
of sending an American to work here on a Tajik tourist visa and
will seek proper status for him.
The Embassy advised NDI that
absent full registration, a work visa is highly unlikely.
However, if the visa would be forthcoming, the interim American
director would focus on pursuing NDI’s registration and
implementing a scaled-down program of activities, avoiding
activities that might trigger backlash from government
authorities before the elections.
Gejdenson admitted that the
purpose of such activities would be to keep the door open until
a full NDI program could resume.
14. (C) COMMENT: The case of NDI makes the Tajiks very
uncomfortable, and the government has found it easier to refuse
to discuss the issue than to give a clear «no.» Gejdenson and
Jewett appear understandably frustrated by the vague responses,
yet eager to persevere. They are
clearly still sorting out
their options, including suspending or scaling back activities.
Despite previous pledges to the Ambassador, nothing suggests the
Tajik government will actually issue a visa for an American
office director to manage the office.
Without registration and
strong management, NDI will continue to have a presence in
Tajikistan in name only. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72799
date: 7/27/2006 13:11
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001434
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG, TI, AF, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN AND AFHGAN PRESIDENTS’ VISIT TO DUSHANBE BRINGS NO
SURPRISES, JUST PERSIAN BROTHERLY LOVE
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1420 B)
STATE 19436
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s July 25-26
visit to Dushanbe confirmed the close linguistic and cultural
ties between Tajikistan and Iran; the multiple agreements signed
further strengthened the bonds forged during Tajik President
Rahmonov’s January visit to Tehran.
When Afghan President Hamid
Karzai joined the party July 26, the three leaders reaffirmed
their common cultural ties and agreed to meet annually as a part
of an Intergovernmental Coordination Council. Aside from paying
enthusiastic lip service to the construction of a hydropower
mega-project at Dhosti-jhum on the Afghan-Tajik border, the
visit produced little more than autographed agreements that may
or may not be implemented. Tajik
counterparts, understanding
the optics of welcoming an official Iranian delegation while
nuclear issues and support for Hezbollah go unresolved, tried to
downplay the political aspects of the meeting and highlighted
the economic points. END SUMMARY.
IRAN
2. (SBU) Ahmadinejad arrived from Turkmenistan July 25
to an
immediate meeting with President Rahmonov and top advisors. In
addition to a joint declaration on the development of bilateral
relations, Tajik television reported that during the bilateral
meetings, the Tajiks and Iranians signed five agreements
relating to cooperation in:
—Justice;
—Labor and social protection;
—Tourism 2006-2009;
—Establishment of free economic and trade zones;
—Preferred tariffs on imports and exports.
3. (C) Ahmadinejad also attended the inaugural
ceremony for
the Anzob tunnel, a $40 million project financed by the Iranians
linking northern and southern Tajikistan. (NOTE:
Despite the
ribbon cutting, the tunnel still requires several months more
work before it is open to the public. The project is rumored to
be rife with embezzlement and corruption on both the Tajik and
Iranian sides. END NOTE.)
4. (U) Ahmadinejad made only brief remarks to the
press the
first day of the visit, saving his comments and vitriol for the
press conference that followed the tri-lateral meeting. After a
well-publicized telephone conversation with Russian President
Putin during his sojourn in Dushanbe, Ahmadinejad told the press
only that they discussed «international issues,» including the
situation in Lebanon.
5. (C) Ahmadinejad’s arrival did not include the
usual
high-level diplomats reserved for a visiting head of state. The
German, French and British Embassies sent lower-ranking
diplomats to his airport reception in place of their
Ambassadors, although Tajik protocol introduced all diplomats on
the tarmac as «Ambassador.»
6. (C) According to the British DCM and French
Ambassador, a
week prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit, the German, French and
British Embassies in Dushanbe received instructions to deliver a
joint demarche to FM Nazarov concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
Nazarov acknowledged that Iran has a right to develop nuclear
energy, but agreed that Iran should refrain from any military
nuclear program and should cooperate with the appropriate
international bodies. Nazarov
promised to pass the European
message to President Rahmonov, a commitment he apparently kept
as evidenced by press accounts which noted that Rahmonov and
exchanged views on Iran’s nuclear program and Rahmonov urged
DUSHANBE 00001434 002 OF 003
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
7. (C) COMMENT:
Interestingly, when the subject came up in
Ambassador Hoagland’s farewell call on Rahmonov (Ref A) prior to
the EU demarche, the president indicated he did not intend to
raise such a contentious issue and would keep the upcoming
bilateral with strictly focused
on cultural, commercial and
assistance matters. The EU
demarche, perhaps with some credit
due to our own message on the P5+1 incentive package (Ref B)
delivered just prior to Ahmadinejad’s visit, appears to have
nudged Rahmonov to overcome his instinct to avoid politicized
issues during the visit. END
COMMENT.
ENTER AFGHANISTAN
8. (C) Afghan President Hamid Karzai joined the duo
July 26 to
attend the first trilateral summit of the three countries.
(NOTE: The summit was meant to take place in Tehran in January,
but Karzai, after consultation with the United States, backed
out, citing «domestic issues.» END NOTE.) The three leaders
signed several memoranda in Dushanbe on economic cooperation and
combating drug trafficking and terrorism. They also signed a
charter to establish the Intergovernmental Coordination Council.
Press quoted Rahmonov as saying
the council would be set up
within two months and hold its first meeting in Kabul. The
council will meet once a year «to tackle existing problems.»
9. (SBU) According to some press reporting, it
appeared as if
the three leaders spent all of July 26 together. In fact, there
was very little Ahmadinejad and Karzai overlap. Karzai arrived
in Dushanbe at 16:20 hours, and Ahmadinejad departed by mid- to
late evening.
MEET THE PRESS
10. (C) Rahmonov, Karzai and Ahmadinejad addressed
136
journalists after their meeting to announce the new agreements
and jointly call for fighting in the Middle East to stop
immediately. One press article
reported that Ahmadinejad
responded to questions about Iran’s support for Hezbollah, by
stating, «The United States has spread this slander in order to
conceal its shortcoming.»
(NOTE: Foreign Minister Nazarov
pulled aside the Ambassador
July 26 while diplomats were waiting for Karzai’s arrival. He
emphasized that the Tajiks had stressed to Ahmadinejad that he
should not say anything against the United States during his
press conferences. Nazarov
expressed relief Ahmadinejad had
honored their request during his first (July 25) media
opportunity, but Nazarov said he couldn’t guarantee that
Ahmadinejad still wouldn’t respond to «provocations» by
journalists, which he clearly did on July 26. According to a
BBC eyewitness, Ahmadinejad honored the Tajik request but
lingered at the press table after Rahmonov and Karzai had left.
He then reportedly said, «Ok now I will tell you what I really
think,» and let loose on the United States. END NOTE.)
11. (U) During the July 26 press
conference, the leaders also
announced support for construction of Dhosti-jhum, a proposed
4000 MW hydropower project on the Pyanj River between
Afghanistan and Tajikistan that the Tajiks continue to press
with investors and donors.
12. (SBU) The leaders spoke in
Farsi, which posed a difficulty
for many international journalists used to covering Tajik events
in Russian. The MFA refused to
offer any Russian-language
interpretation, telling journalists to hire their own since it
was not the responsibility of the MFA.
The MFA also refused
admittance to a U.S. Embassy staff member who is also an
accredited journalist.
13. (C) COMMENT: Despite the enormous protocol and press, the
summit appears to have been little more than an opportunity to
DUSHANBE 00001434 003 OF 003
feel good about the Persian language world, without holding any
of the three states to real commitments.
The Tajiks are still
waiting for delivery of some of the promises made during the
bilateral meetings in January, particularly the construction of
Sangtuda-II hydropower station.
This time around, it appears as
if expectations were lower.
14. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Tajikistan continues to join
organizations and sign memoranda which keep it in good standing
with its neighbors and allies.
Tajikistan needs economic
assistance, trade and investment too much to alienate Iran.
Rahmonov’s foreign policy door remains open to other countries
and the Tajiks continue to balance all the competing interests.
Rahmonov does not at all trust Tehran politically and
ideologically, but he wants Iranian investment. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
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date: 7/27/2006 13:11
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