id: 50876
date: 1/27/2006 10:34
refid: 06DUSHANBE179
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 05DUSHANBE2012
header:
VZCZCXRO4064
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0179/01 0271034
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271034Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6546
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1433
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7631
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000179
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR R, P, EUR. SA, PA, IPP, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PROP, KDEM, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: COUNTERING NEO-SOVIET ANTI-U.S. AND ANTI-DEMOCRACY
PROPAGANDA IN THE CIS, ESPECIALLY CENTRAL ASIA
REF: 05 DUSHANBE 2012
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE
1. (U) Especially when analyzing
the so-called «color
revolutions» in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, neo-Soviet
authoritarians have dominated the information space and defined
the world view in Central Asia.
U.S. Embassies’ Public Affairs
Sections face an up-hill battle because Russian media dominate
the CIS countries. In Tajikistan,
press circulation is
extremely small, and most newspapers rely on Russian news
services or reprint directly from Russian sources. The vast
majority of the population relies on television and radio for
news and information, and what they see and hear are Russian
channels or else their own state-controlled broadcasts.
Internet usage is growing, but it is not universally available.
2. (U) The nearly universal
message from Russia is that the
United States seeks to export democracy through a
destabilization campaign and impose it on CIS countries that are
not ready for it (REFTEL).
President Putin’s most recent
assertions linking «Western spies» and civil-society NGOs have
only exacerbated this problem. In
this warped world view, the
goal of U.S. NGOs is to overthrow legal governments that are
friendly to Moscow to pull them into Washington’s orbit in order
to surround and weaken Russia.
3. (U) To counter this
disinformation, and to support the
Secretary’s vision of transformational diplomacy, we need an
SIPDIS
intensive and on-going public diplomacy campaign that could
include the following elements.
— Op-Eds by Secretary Rice, National Security Adviser Hadley,
members of Congress, and other eminent people, fully translated
for press and Internet placement, spaced monthly for the next
year or more.
— Digital Video Conferences between senior U.S. officials and
journalists in CIS countries.
Translated transcripts for
placement and Internet posting.
— Digital Video Conferences between leaders of major U.S. NGOs
and journalists in CIS countries.
Translated texts for
placement and Internet posting.
— Leaders and eminent board members of major U.S. NGOs visit
key CIS countries, call on most senior leaders, meet with other
officials and civil society.
Conduct press conferences and
media roundtables. Press releases
and transcripts in
translation for all events.
— Regular fact sheets about U.S. NGOs, civil society, and
political reform.
— Q&A fact sheets debunking managed democracy and about the
role of NGOs — hard questions and clear answers. (See suggested
hard questions in para five below.)
— Draw in UK, Germany, and other Europeans to get them, too, on
the offensive to do all of the above.
— Monthly U.S. Embassy newspaper (as Embassy Tashkent has
proposed) that could be centrally produced (economy of scale)
for distribution throughout Central Asia, or even all CIS. A
hard-copy product is essential.
— New State website for U.S. NGOs.
Would include U.S. policy
statements, short and pertinent summary of each NGO’s mission
statement, list of each NGO’s programs in individual Central
Asian countries and what they have accomplished. No jargon —
real stories, not the bureaucracy talking to itself. Links to
each NGO’s website.
— Print-product summary (brochure or booklet) of NGO website
for broad distribution in Russian and other appropriate
languages.
— Make countering Russian anti-democracy propaganda a Public
Affairs Rapid Reaction and press-briefing priority.
OTHER EFFORTS
DUSHANBE 00000179 002 OF 002
4. (S) While overt public
diplomacy can play a useful role, it
would be worth considering whether other complementary efforts
should be authorized. These could
include the following.
— Aggressive media campaign through the Russian media, like
www.gazeta.ru , Radio Echo Moskvy,
Interfax, and others, as well as placement of articles in the
major Russian newspapers read in Central Asia.
— Attempt to gain a presence on Russian electronic media,
especially television.
— In Central Asia, ensure that editors see the positive
material from the Russian media, and pay them, if necessary, to
reprint it.
— Counter-press campaign — who is against U.S./Western NGOs and
why. Name names and what they
gain. Counter the old-guard
ideology.
— Write and place positive articles on «Historic Mother Russia
in the Western Tradition,» the Russia of Peter the Great.
SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR A HARD-QUESTION FACT SHEET ON U.S. NGOs
5. (U) The following frequently
heard questions could be
answered for a hard-question fact sheet on U.S. NGOs.
— What is a U.S. NGO?
— Why do you call them NGOs even though they exist on U.S.
Government money and implement your foreign policy?
— You say Tajikistan gets about $50 million a year in U.S.
foreign assistance, but we don’t see that money. Don’t the NGOs
waste most of it with their fancy cars, big houses, and American
lifestyles?
— We’ve seen articles, even in the Western press, that U.S.
democracy NGOs caused the «color revolutions» in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Haven’t
you sent them here to «export
democracy» and overthrow the existing government?
— Russian authorities say that U.S. democracy NGOs are really
working for the CIA; besides plotting to overthrow governments,
they are also full of spies gathering sensitive information.
How do you respond to that?
— To preserve stability, don’t we have the right to decide
which of your NGOs to register, to ensure they are working
according to their charters, and to monitor them closely?
— Isn’t the «democracy» you’re exporting against our culture
and traditions?
— We’re a young country. We’re
not ready for democracy.
Democracy leads to instability.
Look at what’s happened where
there have been «color revolutions.» They’re worse off now than
they were before.
— We need economic development, not social experiments. We
want you to invest in our infrastructure and in business joint
ventures. Wouldn’t that be a
better use of your taxpayers’
money, and wouldn’t that help us more?
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51059
date: 1/30/2006 11:36
refid: 06DUSHANBE195
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06STATE205073
header:
VZCZCXRO5896
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0195/01 0301136
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301136Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6559
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 0487
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7655
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000195
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS FOR FRAUD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD, CVIS, CPAS, CMGT, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY — TAJIKISTAN
REF: STATE 205073
DUSHANBE 00000195 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Tajikistan, independent since the
Soviet breakup in 1991, is the poorest Central Asian republic
and the ninth poorest country per capita in the world. The vast
majority of the population lives well below the poverty line,
inducing many working-age Tajik males to become migrant workers
in Russia rather than face rampant unemployment and
underemployment in Tajikistan.
Though some Tajiks legally work
abroad and remit their earnings back to Tajikistan, trafficking
in narcotics and persons, as well as a large black and gray
economy, increase the use of fraudulent documents. Fraudulent
document venders are prevalent and target the migrant labor
population, as well as the local small-time trading community.
2. (SBU) Though anti-corruption
laws exist in theory,
enforcement and implementation remain elusive. Corrupt
government officials continue to thwart attempts to tighten the
issuance and regulation of national identity documents.
Instances of fraudulently issued domestic and international
passports are highly suspected, though Tajik officials will not
address this issue directly with Embassy officials. [NOTE:
Tajikistan continues to use domestic passports for travel and
registration for Tajik nationals within the country, and a
separately issued international passport for travel outside of
Tajikistan. Approximately 15% of
the population has an
international passport and large bribes are expected to receive
a new one.] The defunct skeleton
of the former Soviet
record-keeping system and the lack of integrated or organized
local and national archives make investigation and verification
of Tajik-issued documents difficult at best, irrelevant at
worst. Across the board, documents
from bank and real estate
statements to birth and marriage certificates can easily be
obtained fraudulently for any purpose.
3. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe will
not issue non-immigrant visas in
Tajikistan until the completion of its New Embassy Compound in
Summer 2006. Tajik nationals
currently travel to Almaty,
Kazakhstan, to interview for non-immigrant and immigrant visas.
4. (SBU) NIV FRAUD: Lack of trust in Tajik documents makes it
very difficult to assess local social and economic ties.
Tajikistan remains a very traditional society: Tajiks do not
typically put money in banks and letters of employment (even
government positions) are often created and issued within family
and clan structures. Tajiks will
change passports and names to
conceal previous visa refusals thanks to Tajik officials who
exhibit a cavalier disregard for the sanctity of national
identity documents. Recently, a
group of Russian sportsmen were
issued Tajik international passports listing their nationality
and place of birth as Tajikistan for the purposes of
representing Tajikistan in an international competition.
5. (SBU) IV FRAUD: Post accepts and processes a limited number
of I-130 petitions (approximately one a month). Marriage fraud
in Tajikistan is not common apart from DV applicants. Tajik
society is very traditional and is generally not open to
marriage to foreign citizens. In
addition, there are relatively
few Tajik-Americans, negating the rampant marriage fraud that
comes with large diaspora communities.
6. (SBU) DV FRAUD: DV fraud in Tajikistan echoes that of the
Central Asian region. Almaty
recently reported a sham marriage
(pop-up derivative) in a Tajik DV case.
Though high school
equivalent documents cannot be trusted implicitly, Tajiks
roughly fall into two categories and can be assessed based on
overall life situation: agricultural laborers from the villages
and mountains (unlikely to have earned a high school education)
and city residents (usually have college degrees in addition to
high school equivalent education).
7. (SBU) ACS and PASSPORT
FRAUD: Post has yet to record ACS or
passport fraud in Tajikistan. Due
to the small American citizen
community, the Consular Officer and Embassy local staff are
often personally acquainted with resident Americans. Few Tajiks
have U.S. citizenship, CRBA’s are issued no more than once a
year, and many of the Americans resident in Tajikistan have
diplomatic or official passports.
Lost or stolen passports are
rare occurrences and in the past few years lost passports were
often returned within one week of disappearance.
8. (SBU) ADOPTION FRAUD: Very few U.S. citizens successfully
adopt in Tajikistan. Those who
choose to follow the full legal
adoption system are often forced to give up due to senseless
bureaucratic wrangling. The
government of Tajikistan does not
have a set of laws governing international adoption and is
reluctant to make progress, leaving a chaotic and arbitrary
process. Large unofficial bribes
are suspected to be the reason
for the few completed adoptions in Tajikistan. There are no
NGOs or agencies in Tajikistan that work on adoption issues, and
DUSHANBE 00000195 002.2 OF 002
an American citizen recently could not even find Tajik lawyers
or judges willing to look at his adoption case.
9. (SBU) Fraudulent documents
required for adoption are not
difficult to obtain. During an
I-604 orphan investigation, post
discovered forged hospital records and a fraudulent birth
certificate submitted «by mistake» by a self-declared adoption
facilitator. The birth
certificate, fraudulently issued by a
Tajik hospital, listed the adoption facilitator and his wife as
the orphan’s birth parents. The
facilitator intended to use
this birth certificate in order to transport the adopted child
as his own to Almaty for visa processing and was caught because
he accidentally left it in the packet of information he
submitted for the I-604.
10. (SBU) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS
BENEFITS FRAUD: Post assists
DHS to verify documents and determine status. Though Tajik
documents are not to be trusted as a rule, recent investigations
discovered exact cases of documented fraud. In a recent asylum
case, post’s investigation revealed a forged birth certificate
that was material in final determination of asylum status in the
United States.
11. (SBU) COOPERATION WITH HOST
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:
Document fraud is technically a criminal offence in Tajikistan.
In combating these crimes, the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is at best an occasionally competent partner. The MFA
periodically informs us by diplomatic note about the numbers of
lost or stolen Tajik passports, and also cooperates with post’s
requests for verification of civil documents (though usually
months later than requested). But
endemic corruption, shoddy
record keeping, and lack of prosecution for document fraud limit
the utility of cooperation.
12. (U) AREAS OF PARTICULAR
CONCERN: Post will address new
concerns and increase examples of documented fraud once NIV
processing begins in Tajikistan in Summer 2006. An expected
boom in NIV applicants, able to interview in their own capital
for the first time, will undoubtedly increase the frequency and
complexity of NIV fraud.
13. (U) STAFFING AND
TRAINING: Dushanbe Consular Section
Chief
Evan McCarthy is also Post Prevention Manager. He expects to
complete the Fraud Prevention for Managers course at FSI in
Spring 2006. Post currently has
one Consular FSN, Natalia
Pilipenko, and will hire two additional positions for the
opening of the new fully functional Consular section, one of
which will be FSN fraud investigator.
Natalia has received visa
and document fraud training during the FSN Consular Training
Seminar at RSC Frankfurt, October 1998.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51231
date: 1/31/2006 11:48
refid: 06DUSHANBE199
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7299
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0199 0311148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 311148Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6562
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1255
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1288
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1314
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1344
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1378
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0919
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0722
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7660
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000199
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK CABINET SHUFFLE PLACES OLD RAHMONOV ALLY IN KEY ECON
POSITION
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) Tajik President Rahmonov appointed Matlubkhon
Davlatov
as State Advisor to the President for Economic Policy, replacing
Faizullo Kholboboyev. The January
30 decree elevated Davlatov
to the senior economic position in Tajikistan and named
Kholboboyev Representative to the CIS and the Eurasian Economic
Community (EAEC), a move considered a demotion.
2. (C) Davlatov comes from Rahmonov’s hometown of
Dangara and
is reported to be Rahmonov’s maternal uncle. According to some
observers, Davlatov is one of Rahmonov’s closest confidants.
Starting in the early 1990s, he played various roles in
Tajikistan’s privatization efforts until appointed Chief of the
Presidential Agency on Financial Control in 2001. Thought to be
highly corrupt and anti-reform, the former Secretary of the
Communist Party Committee of the Academy of Sciences may have
made his fortune selling properties during the privatization
schemes. Davlatov’s son works for
the Ministry of Security
(MoS) and Davlatov allegedly has at least one MoS security
officer with him at all times.
3. (C) Davlatov’s appointment came as part of a
larger
shake-up of mid-level government officials, and may have been
motivated by a personal conflict between Kholboboyev and
National Bank (NBT) Chairman Murodali Alimardonov when the World
Bank and IMF were inspecting the NBT’s activities. A PhD in
Economics, Kholboboyev has the reputation as being less rich,
less corrupt and more reform-minded than most of Rahmonov’s
cabinet.
4. (C) COMMENT:
Davlatov’s appointment could signal a shift
away from reform and towards a more Soviet way of approaching
the economy, or it could be part of the on-going effort to
consolidate power and wealth in the hands of the First Family.
His reputation for corruption and incompetence has not inspired
confidence on the street in Dushanbe and may not do much to pull
in the Western investors Rahmonov wants to court. END COMMENT
5. (C) BIO:
Matlubkhon Davlatov
Born 17 January 1950 in Dangara.
1970 — Graduated from Tajik State University. Candidate of
Economic Sciences
1970-72 — Served in Soviet Army
1972-83 — Graduate Student, scientist at Institute of Economy,
Academy of Sciences, Tajikistan
1983-88 — Secretary of the Communist Party Committee of Academy
of Sciences
1988-90 — Leading Scientist at Institute of Economy, Academy of
Sciences
1990-94 — Chief Specialist, Deputy Chairman of the State
Property Committee
1994-2004 — Chairman of the State Property Committee
2005 — Chairman of State Financial Control
January 30, 2006 Economic Advisor
to the President
Davlatov is married and has six children. Speaks good Tajik and
Russian, some English.
ARMBRUSTER
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51334
date: 2/1/2006 3:41
refid: 06DUSHANBE202
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06STATE12263
header:
VZCZCXRO8246
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0202 0320341
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 010341Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6567
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1379
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1315
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1256
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1345
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1289
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1250
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1146
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0920
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1400
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1435
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0723
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7665
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000202
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, EFIN, KPAO
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN- THE U.S. ROLE IN DEBT RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT
TALKING POINTS DELIVERED
REF: STATE 12263
1. Deputy Chief of Mission
delivered talking points per Reftel
January 31 to Sherali Jononov, Head of Legal Department at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Jononov acknowledged U.S. economic
assistance and leadership in the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51352
date: 2/1/2006 10:39
refid: 06DUSHANBE204
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8450
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0204 0321039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011039Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6571
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1346
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1380
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1384
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1316
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1257
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1346
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0235
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1290
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1251
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 0007
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1147
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USEUCOM FMFO BRUSSELS BE
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1401
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1436
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0921
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7669
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000204
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, DRL, SA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, PINR, TI
SUBJECT: NDI LOCAL DIRECTOR DEPARTS
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (U) National Democratic Institute (NDI) local
Director
Gegham Sargsyan left Tajikistan on Wednesday morning, February
1, after a final unannounced police check and brief detention on
the evening of January 31. The
NDI Director had been wrangling
with authorities for the past week or so, since they would not
allow him to re-register his Dushanbe residency. On
instructions from NDI in Washington, Sargsyan had already
planned to depart on February 1.
2. (U) Sargsyan called PolOff at
7:50 p.m. Tuesday, saying
there were four policemen in his apartment, demanding that he
come to the local police precinct for a «two minute
procedure.»
PolOff arrived at the apartment and tried to convince police
that this was unnecessary, since Sargsyan was leaving the
following day. DCM arrived at the
apartment a few minutes
later. At that point, Sargsyan
agreed to go the precinct police
station accompanied by the DCM.
3. (C) Once at the precinct, police escorted
Sargsyan and DCM
to the bare office of the local Commander. The precinct happens
to be in the Embassy’s neighborhood.
The Commander asked
Sargsyan his citizenship, which is Armenian. He then asked
whether he had any family ties to Iran.
Sargsyan said he did.
The Commander briefly lectured the DCM about Tajikistan’s
political situation, saying Tajikistan is not a country like
Iran. It is a «secure
society, civilized, and building
democracy.» DCM said he
understood Tajikistan very well. DCM
added that the Ambassador and Foreign Minister had reached an
understanding in principle on NDI and were working to resolve
all problems, including Sargsyan’s status. If that had been
worked out at such a high level, DCM asked, «why are you holding
Sargsyan?» The Commander
followed with a few more questions.
«Does Sargsyan work for the Embassy?» Answer: no.
When will
the new Embassy be completed?
Answer: This summer. That ended
the «procedure.» The
atmosphere throughout the meeting was
serious, but not intimidating.
4. (C) On February 1, DCM reached Sargsyan on the
plane before
takeoff. Sargsyan thanked the
Embassy for the support and said
he was sure the police interview would have been difficult
without Embassy intervention. He
felt the initial police plan
was to intimidate him one final time before leaving Tajikistan.
5. (C) The Ambassador will meet
with the Deputy Foreign
Minister (the Foreign Minister is in London) to strongly protest
this latest blatant attempt to keep NDI as marginalized as
possible, and will follow up with Foreign Minister Nazarov as
soon as he returns.
6. (C) COMMENT: After a long period during which NDI remained
unregistered but continued to work normally, the Tajik Security
Services resumed harassment and intimidation around the time
that Moscow began to publicize the alleged British spy scandal,
linking intelligence operatives to NGOs.
The Ambassador will
continue to press forcefully, making clear that continued
pressure on NDI, and other U.S. NGOs, could have serious
repercussions for U.S.-Tajik relations.
The old guard is alive
and well in Tajikistan, but we know there are reformers and the
ideological fight for Tajikistan is still on. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51360
date: 2/1/2006 11:37
refid: 06DUSHANBE208
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE58
header:
VZCZCXRO8514
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0208 0321137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 011137Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6578
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1385
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1317
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1258
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1347
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1291
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1252
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1148
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0922
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1402
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1437
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0724
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7676
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000208
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, DRL, SA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRISON FACILITIES IN POOR CONDITION
REF: DUSHANBE 058
1. (U) PolOff visited a youth detention center and
Tajikistan’s central penitentiary medical facility January 31.
Both facilities are in poor condition and lack adequate medical
supplies and equipment. Deputy
Minister of Justice, Izzatullo
Sharipov, granted EmbOffs access in hopes the United States
would provide medical supplies to the penitentiary system
(REFTEL). The Ministry told
EmbOffs it would consider allowing
other international organizations to accompany officers on
future visits.
2. (U) This visit is considered a significant
breakthrough,
since many international organizations still do not have regular
monitoring privileges and access to prisons. Ministry of
Justice officials told Embassy sources the Ministry denied the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access after
several months of prison visits because the ICRC failed to
produce assistance to the penitentiary system and had only
complaints for the Ministry. The
Ministry complained that the
ICRC did not cooperate and communicate fully with the Ministry,
and wanted to visit the prisons only on ICRC terms and schedule.
3. (U) The penitentiary medical center is the only
facility in
Tajikistan where prisoners can receive treatment. The center,
set up on December 9, 2005, is currently under renovation and
has 29 doctors for 200 patients.
Approximately 25 patients are
crammed bed-to-bed in each room.
There are two small operating
rooms with what appeared to be 1950’s equipment. The operating
room PolOff viewed was unclean and unhygienic. It had one
operating table, rusty pans, and one set of medical tools and no
signs of disinfectants.
Tuberculosis is the most common illness
among prisoners. Officials noted
they have enough TB
medication, donated by Moldova.
4. (U) PolOff spoke to patients in the presence of
several
officers and guards. Patients
remarked that the doctors treat
them well and respond to their requests and complaints. It is
likely their answers would have been more critical if officials
had not been present.
5. (U) The youth detention center housed 96 boys
ages 14-18.
The boys live 25 to a room and attend school on the compound for
four hours a day. They also work
on the facilities, shoveling
snow, cleaning rooms, and cooking in the cafeteria. A small
on-site factory is being built where the boys will work
manufacturing plastic goods for a small salary. The head of the
detention center pointed out that the center observes the law
and does not force the youths to do hard labor. Relatives are
allowed to visit the boys up to three times a week and are even
sometimes permitted to remain overnight with the boys. The
youth detention center medical facility consists of one room
with some rubbing alcohol, a bed, and a set of examination tools
for all to share.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: To say the penitentiary system’s
medical
facilities are sub-standard would be a gross understatement; it
is clear why even the notoriously hard-handed Sharipov would
request assistance. During the
visit, all officials were
cooperative and seemed to genuinely want to improve their
facilities. They specifically
requested medical equipment and
renovation help, but never direct financial assistance. Post is
working with Project Hope and the Ministry of Health to possibly
channel some medical supplies to the penitentiary system in
June. Post continues efforts to
establish a good relationship
with the notorious disciplinarian Sharipov and would like to see
sustained access to prison facilities before committing to U.S.
assistance. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51548
date: 2/2/2006 13:05
refid: 06DUSHANBE224
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE204
header:
VZCZCXRO9969
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0224/01 0331305
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 021305Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6593
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7692
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1149
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USEUCOM FMFO BRUSSELS BE
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1403
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1438
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0923
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1348
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1382
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1386
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1318
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1292
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1253
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0008
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000224
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, DRL, SA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, PINR, TI
SUBJECT: NDI DIRECTOR SHOULD RETURN TO TAJIKISTAN
REF: DUSHANBE 204
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador and Acting Foreign Minister
Yatimov paved a way for National Democratic Institute (NDI)
local Director Gegham Sargsyan to register and return to
Dushanbe. Sargsyan left for
Moscow on February 1 after
harassment and pressure from Tajik officials. Yatimov knew the
case in detail, and had met with Minister of Interior Sharipov
for forty minutes earlier in the week to persuade Sharipov that
Sargsyan did not pose a security threat to Tajikistan. Yatimov
admitted to the Ambassador that Sargsyan and NDI represent a
«political problem» and did not hide behind the technical
issues
of registration for Sargsyan as an individual. He tried to
caution the Ambassador about the use of a formal protest for
this case, saying we need to keep the relationship as a whole in
context, but the Ambassador did not weaken his initial strong
protest of Tajikistan’s treatment of NDI. Post recommends that
Sargsyan return to work at NDI in Dushanbe as soon as possible.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C) The Ambassador protested
in very strong terms the
continued harassment of NDI. He
related his urgent meetings on
the subject with Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov and
Presidential Adviser Erkin Rahmatulloyev and the Foreign
Minister’s assurance that the problem would be solved when he
returns from London later this week.
He also explained the
Embassy’s intervention when Sargsyan was taken to the police
precinct on January 31. He
pointedly asked Yatimov if
Tajikistan’s government knows what it is risking; saying U.S.
policy for Tajikistan is supported by cooperation on security,
commerce and energy, and political and economic reform.
3. (C) Two of those three pillars
of cooperation are in
excellent shape: security, and commerce and energy.
Tajikistan’s shortsighted attacks on NGOs, specifically NDI,
endangers the rest of the relationship.
The Ambassador
explained that NDI is not a subversive, intelligence
organization out to overthrow Tajikistan. That is a deliberate
distortion of reality calculated to subvert President Rahmonov’s
open-door foreign policy and return Tajikistan to the status of
semi-independent colony.
4. (C) The Ambassador said he needed a response.
5. (C) Yatimov said he
understood, and Tajikistan places
«special attention» on its partnership with the United States.
Yatimov gave a brief synopsis of Sargsyan’s infractions: for
example, changing residence without telling authorities and
working at NDI, while registering himself as a private citizen.
Yatimov said this would cause problems elsewhere, including the
United States. The Ambassador
rejoined, «We don’t register
people or take notice if they move.»
6. (C) With the technical avenue
closed for discussion, Yatimov
turned to his personal efforts to resolve the situation. He
said he met with the Minister of Interior for forty minutes to
explain that Sargsyan is not a security threat, but his
mistreatment could cause damage to the U.S.-Tajik relationship.
Yatimov told Security Minister Sharipov that this is a political
problem.
7. (C) Yatimov said Tajikistan wonders why this is so important
DUSHANBE 00000224 002 OF 002
to the United States. The
Ambassador replied NDI is important
to Tajikistan to help President Rahmonov fulfill his own pledge
to build democracy. Yatimov
insisted that U.S. motives remain
very difficult to explain. The
Ambassador also outlined NDI’s
U.S. domestic political support and its highly respected
reputation for doing good work around the world. The Ambassador
reminded Yatimov of NDI’s work with the President’s ruling
People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) and the plans,
now thwarted, to take PDPT officials to Poland for training.
8. (C) The Ambassador referred to
the unspoken compromise that
had kept the equilibrium until now.
For months NDI remained
unregistered, but continued to operate, albeit without American
directors. The Ambassador said
security forces taking local NDI
employees to hotels to «tell their secrets» is unacceptable.
The Ambassador asked for a guarantee that Sargsyan could come
back without harassment.
9. (C) Yatimov said the issue is
«officially solved» and
Sargsyan can come back as early as February 3. Yatimov said
that with advance notice, he can notify his consular officer at
the airport to ensure there is no problem.
10. (C) Yatimov referred to
Tajikistan’s economic problems,
thanked the United States for help on hydroelectric development,
and said people do not want to live under the present economic
conditions. He said it is
important to keep the relationship in
good condition. The Ambassador
said it is important not to let
small problems grow until they damage the overall relationship.
He ended by saying, «register NDI, watch them 24 hours a day,
surveille them all you want, and you’ll find they are not doing
anything wrong.»
11. (C) COMMENT: NDI is still not on any Tajik government
official’s list of favorite NGOs.
But high-level Tajik
officials now understand that there are consequences to
over-reacting and overstepping the bounds. Whether lower-level
officials feel constrained to respect those bounds remains to be
seen, but we should test the Tajiks at their word and see if NDI
can get back to work. We are sure
our Russian friends will be
working hard to re-write the rules and make NDI and other NGOs
persona non grata in Tajikistan, but until Tajikistan officially
closes its open-door policy, we’ll try to keep as many NGOs as
possible in our talking points, public statements, and press
releases to convince Tajikistan of their good work and
intentions. Gegham Sargsyan
could be subject to petty
harassment should he return, but Post does not believe he would
be in any physical danger and recommends he return as soon as
practical, if only to make the statement that he was not forced
out. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51556
date: 2/2/2006 13:46
refid: 06DUSHANBE226
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0024
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0226 0331346
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 021346Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6596
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1350
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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1350
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1294
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1255
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1151
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0925
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1405
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1440
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0725
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7695
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000226
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, DRL, SA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SDPT MEMBERS RELEASED FROM JAIL
1. Two Social Democratic Party of
Tajikistan (SDPT) members
imprisoned after the parliamentary elections last year have been
released. Nizomaddin Begmatov,
the Rasulov District SDPT
Chairman and Nasim Shukurov, a member of the Sughd Region’s SDPT
branch were released on January 31 and February 1, respectively
after serving nearly a year in prison.
2. Begmatov and Shukurov
attempted to register to run in the
February 2005 parliamentary elections, but government officials
did not register them. They
complained to the Rasulov district
judge and blamed the government for purposefully delaying their
registration for political reasons.
They also accused the judge
of being personally involved in the registration process. The
argument became heated and the judge had them arrested and
charged with hooliganism on March 12, 2005. Begmatov and
Shukurov were sentenced to one and one and a half years
respectively.
3. In August 2005, their lawyer,
Bakhtiyor Nasrulloev, appealed
to the Sughd Court for their release, claiming they were
illegally detained in the first place.
The Court never
responded to the appeal, but rather attributed their recent
release to «good behavior.»
4. SDPT National Chairman,
Rahmatullo Zoyirov, is pleased with
their release and maintains the arrest was politically
motivated; the two members were wrongly indicted and did not
commit any crime.
5. COMMENT: The SDPT members were released after serving
their
sentences for nearly one year because they are no longer seen as
political threats. Parliamentary
elections are long over and
the SDPT is seen by the ruling party as too weak financially and
politically to have any clout in the upcoming presidential
election in November. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51628
date: 2/3/2006 3:27
refid: 06DUSHANBE227
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE58
header:
VZCZCXRO4672
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0227 0340327
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 030327Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6597
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1441
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0726
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7696
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1351
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1385
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1389
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1321
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1262
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1351
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1295
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1256
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1152
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0926
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1406
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000227
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/ACE, DRL, SA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, CASC, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRISON FACILITIES IN POOR CONDITION
REF: A) DUSHANBE 208; B) DUSHANBE 058
1. (U) This message replaces REFTEL A, adding TAG:
CASC.
2. (U) PolOff visited a youth detention center and
Tajikistan’s central penitentiary medical facility January 31.
Both facilities are in poor condition and lack adequate medical
supplies and equipment. Deputy
Minister of Justice, Izzatullo
Sharipov, granted EmbOffs access in hopes the United States
would provide medical supplies to the penitentiary system
(REFTEL B). The Ministry told
EmbOffs it would consider
allowing other international organizations to accompany officers
on future visits.
3. (U) This visit is considered a significant
breakthrough,
since many international organizations still do not have regular
monitoring privileges and access to prisons. Ministry of
Justice officials told Embassy sources the Ministry denied the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access after
several months of prison visits because the ICRC failed to
produce assistance to the penitentiary system and had only
complaints for the Ministry. The
Ministry complained that the
ICRC did not cooperate and communicate fully with the Ministry,
and wanted to visit the prisons only on ICRC terms and schedule.
4. (U) The penitentiary medical center is the only
facility in
Tajikistan where prisoners can receive treatment. The center,
set up on December 9, 2005, is currently under renovation and
has 29 doctors for 200 patients.
Approximately 25 patients are
crammed bed-to-bed in each room.
There are two small operating
rooms with what appeared to be 1950’s equipment. The operating
room PolOff viewed was unclean and unhygienic. It had one
operating table, rusty pans, and one set of medical tools and no
signs of disinfectants.
Tuberculosis is the most common illness
among prisoners. Officials noted
they have enough TB
medication, donated by Moldova.
5. (U) PolOff spoke to patients in the presence of
several
officers and guards. Patients
remarked that the doctors treat
them well and respond to their requests and complaints. It is
likely their answers would have been more critical if officials
had not been present.
6. (U) The youth detention center housed 96 boys
ages 14-18.
The boys live 25 to a room and attend school on the compound for
four hours a day. They also work
on the facilities, shoveling
snow, cleaning rooms, and cooking in the cafeteria. A small
on-site factory is being built where the boys will work
manufacturing plastic goods for a small salary. The head of the
detention center pointed out that the center observes the law
and does not force the youths to do hard labor. Relatives are
allowed to visit the boys up to three times a week and are even
sometimes permitted to remain overnight with the boys. The
youth detention center medical facility consists of one room
with some rubbing alcohol, a bed, and a set of examination tools
for all to share.
7. (SBU) COMMENT: To say the penitentiary system’s
medical
facilities are sub-standard would be a gross understatement; it
is clear why even the notoriously hard-handed Sharipov would
request assistance. During the
visit, all officials were
cooperative and seemed to genuinely want to improve their
facilities. They specifically
requested medical equipment and
renovation help, but never direct financial assistance. Post is
working with Project Hope and the Ministry of Health to possibly
channel some medical supplies to the penitentiary system in
June. Post continues efforts to
establish a good relationship
with the notorious disciplinarian Sharipov and would like to see
sustained access to prison facilities before committing to U.S.
assistance. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51680
date: 2/3/2006 12:27
refid: 06DUSHANBE236
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5201
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0236/01 0341227
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INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1390
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1263
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1352
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1296
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1257
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1153
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0022
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0026
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1407
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0727
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1442
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0927
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7711
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000236
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/PGI, SA S/CT, INL
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: RUSSIA KICKS
OFF ITS G-8 YEAR
DUSHANBE 00000236 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Please handle accordingly.
Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Russian Ambassador convened the other
G-8 ambassadors on February 2 to announce a cooperative effort
during the Russian G-8 presidency.
Although this seems to be
mostly a public relations effort, it is welcome. We will seize
the opportunity to promote concrete cooperation where possible,
especially in counter-narcotics and counterterrorism. END
SUMMARY.
3. (U) Russian Ambassador to
Tajikistan Ramazan Abdulatipov
invited the representatives of the G-8 nations resident in
Dushanbe to his embassy on February 2.
The UK, French, and U.S.
ambassadors and the German and Japanese charges attended. Italy
and Canada do not have resident missions in Dushanbe. Each
participant received an information package that included a
four-page history of Russia’s participation in the G-7/G-8, two
pages of press statements by President Putin on Russia’s right
to be in the G-8 (including from his January 31 press
conference), and a five-point agenda proposal for the coming
year:
— That the G-8 ambassadors meet quarterly during the year;
— That they conduct joint press conference on the progress of
G-8 work in the region;
— That they organize regular joint meetings with Tajik
officials responsible for combating narcotics and terrorism;
— That they organize informal meetings with the Tajik Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to assess G-8 work in Tajikistan; and
— That an international conference take place in Fall 2006 in
Dushanbe, «Energy and Ecological Security in Central Asia:
Problems and Possibilities,» organized by the German Ebert
Foundation and the U.S. Marshall Fund, with participation by
research centers from the United States, United Kingdom, France,
and Japan, with the G-8 diplomatic corps and international media
in attendance.
4. (SBU) The UK Ambassador, given
first response, welcomed the
Russian initiative. When the U.S.
Ambassador praised the
initiative and welcomed the Russian spirit of cooperation,
Abdulatipov said that Russia wants to demonstrate that in
Central Asia it can work with, rather than compete with, other
countries. The U.S. Ambassador
asked if such G-8 «cooperative
meetings» were taking place in the other Central Asian capitals,
Ambassador Abdulatipov responded that «this is an initiative
from our Foreign Ministry, of course.» The French Ambassador
and the German Charge pressed for the local EU working-level
representative to be included in all meetings «since the EU is a
de facto member of the G-8.»
Ambassador Abdulatipov demurred
and said the meetings are for full members only, «although
occasional observers will not be turned away.»
5. (SBU) COMMENT: The Russian initiative is a welcome public
relations effort. That said, the
meeting at the Russian Embassy
had an element of kabuki theater.
Abdulatipov, although
formally cordial, appeared somewhat uneasy, and the meeting was
relatively stiff. There was a
check-the-box quality to his
effort. Nevertheless, Embassy
Dushanbe will use this Russian
initiative to promote concrete Russian-U.S. efforts in
DUSHANBE 00000236 002.2 OF 002
counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism, at the least. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51685
date: 2/3/2006 13:01
refid: 06DUSHANBE237
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5229
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0237/01 0341301
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 031301Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6614
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHI
