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id: 45027
date: 11/14/2005 8:13
refid: 05DUSHANBE1814
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05DUSHANBE1812
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001814
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, SA, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KDEM, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: IMAGINED
REPORT TO MOSCOW BY THE RUSSIAN
AMBASSADOR
REF: DUSHANBE 1812
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) The following is an
Embassy Dushanbe exercise to imagine
a report that Russian Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov might
submit to the Kremlin. It draws
on Post’s observations of the
last 18 months, Russian and regional media reports, and other
reporting. This cable should be
read as a companion piece to
reftel.
2. (C) BEGIN TEXT:
Respected Vladimir Vladimirovich!
I want to report to you that we can put Tajikistan firmly in the
«stable» column, thanks to the groundwork you’ve laid since
early last year. In response to
the American’s stabbing their
«Friend Shevandnadze» in the back at the end of 2003 (not to
mention Kiev and Bishkek!), our consistent message from the
beginning of these «color revolutions» has paid off — that the
U.S. so-called democracy NGOs are really covert intel tools sent
under the guise of «assistance» to plant the seeds of popular
revolution to overthrow legal governments. We picked off
National Democratic Institute early on here because they had set
themselves up by not having registered properly in previous
years. We should never
under-estimate the power of Soviet-style
legalism when we need to use it.
Even better, at the very same
time we set that particular samovar bubbling, the hapless
Americans sent in Freedom House.
Knowing how long any
bureaucracy takes to gear up, it was probably just a
coincidence, but the optic was perfect.
I wish you could have
seen Tajik President Emomali Sharifovich Rahmonov’s expression
when we laid out the whole scenario for him. We rightly judge
that he has an abundance of street smarts and a dangerous
independent streak that bears close watching, but in the end
he’s just like the others we deal with, burning to hang onto
power at any price.
Your first great public triumph in Tajikistan was when you went
to Dushanbe on October 16 last year to initial the agreements on
debt forgiveness, the legal-basis establishment of our permanent
military base, and our tactical withdrawal of the FSB Border
Force. I especially liked the way
our clever guys got the word
to Emomali Sharifovich, «Protect our base, or we’ll find someone
who can.» Yes, we had to
bite the bullet to get control of the
essential Nurek Space Object Tracking station, that was ours in
the first place, but you know why it was worth it.
It was well understood in advance part of the debt deal included
Chubais from RAO UES agreeing to sink some non-money into
Emomali Sharifovich’s pet hydro-electric projects that the West
had pooh-poohed up until that time.
But the real stroke of
genius was including the useful tool Oleg Deripaska and his
RusAl billions in your delegation at the last moment and
throwing stardust in Emomali’s eyes for Deripaska to «invest»
in
the Tajik Aluminum Plant (TadAZ) and the Rogun Dam. Exactly as
predicted, Rahmonov swallowed without chewing the absurd promise
of a new aluminum plant in his hometown.
Of course, that
«little consideration» we put in the Rahmonov family bank
account in exchange for free run at TadAZ didn’t hurt!
Your next great landmark was that inconvenient April 2005
meeting with Emomali Sharifovich in Sochi. Yes, I know he
insisted on interrupting your vacation, but you have to admit
now it was well worth it. He
arrived blowing smoke out of his
ears because our idiot Prosecutor General had released
Mahmadruzi Iskandarov — the so-called «democrat» — from
detention in Moscow and refused to extradite him. But Rahmonov
left all smiles the next day after you agreed we’d scoop that
rich «chornaya jopa» Iskandarov off the streets and bundle him
bound and gagged back to Dushanbe.
You bought great credit with
that one, Vladimir Vladimirovich!
We should never
under-estimate the burning desire of new wealth and power to
eliminate the opposition.
Since then, Rahmonov owes you big-time, and he’s making his
interest payments with admirable regularity. You have to give
him credit for how he’s instituted his stealth attack on the
American NGOs, and I predict we can count on him to
«over-fulfill the plan.»
The Americans know what’s up, but
Washington probably won’t do anything while we kill them with a
thousand small cuts.
I can’t take credit for any of this.
You and the boys had it
all under control before I got here.
But I have faithfully
instituted your orders, Vladimir Vladimirovich. Symbols count!
Under my amiable predecessaor, Maksim Aleksandrovich Peshkov,
our embassy seemed fairly benign on the surface, overtly
collegial with the few Western embassies here and pretending
«druzhba narodov» with the Central Asians. As you suggested,
I’ve changed the tone. No more
make-nice. No more schmoozing
at those awful little diplomatic events.
What a coincidence
that I’m usually «previously engaged»! It just adds to the new
mystique.
I also have to give credit to our FSB, SVR, and GRU boys. They
know how to wrap up the little brothers in the Presidential
Apparat and the Ministry of Security.
I love the way Security
Minister Abdurahimov pisses on the Americans’ shoes. One more
thing — keep sending your ministers here every few weeks. The
contrast with the West doesn’t go unnoticed, I assure you.
And so, allow me one more time to congratulate you, Vladimir
Vladimirovich. You’ve almost
wrapped up Emomali Sharifovich,
and we don’t even have to hold our noses the way we do with that
snake Karimov in Uzbekistan. Well
done!
END TEXT.
3. (C) COMMENT: We emphasize once again that this is an
imagined report. In fact,
Tajikistan continues to make clear,
and generally implements, its «open-door» multilateral foreign
policy that seeks to balance global and regional interests and
pressures. That said, the
creeping campaign against U.S. NGOs
following the «color revolutions» and the marked change in
tone
at the Russian Embassy are inescapable.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 45544
date: 11/18/2005 12:37
refid: 05DUSHANBE1826
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05DUSHANBE1766|05DUSHANBE1806
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5937
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USOSCE
USEU BRUSSELS 0601
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001826
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S NGOS TIRED OF CORRUPTION AND VISA DELAYS, BUT
SOLDIER ON
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1766 B)
DUSHANBE 1806
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, State, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:
At the monthly NGO Forum meeting, the only
surprise was
that a handful of NGOS had not experienced visa problems or been
forced to
pay bribes for airline tickets or continuous electricity. The
November 17
meeting underscored the Dushanbe development community’s
increased
frustration and confusion over visa and registration problems,
as well as
the hidden «fees» for getting things done in Tajikistan. All
but one NGO
declined to respond to the MFA’s recent request for information
about local
staff. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) No particular pattern has emerged to pinpoint
whether
the growing visa
delays and complications are due to a policy shift, or simple
bureaucratic
ineptitude (reftel a). Of the 25
Forum attendees, many
complained that
despite the MFA Consular Section’s stated policy of 15 days to
issue a
Letter of Invitation or renew a visa, in practice most visas are
taking
close to a month. In some cases,
Italian, French and American
NGO staff
worked without valid visas for several weeks.
3. (C) International organizations (including the
U.S.
Embassy) are frequently
resorting to high-level government intervention on routine visa
issuances.
The Italian NGO CEVSI had two refusals overturned only after a
deputy
foreign minister got involved.
The EU representative told an
anecdote about
a consultant not getting a visa until the Foreign Minister
himself inquired
of the consular section. «If we had known this was important to
you, we
would have issued it right away,» was the response.
4. (C) Aga Khan Foundation reported many of its
Pakistani
visitors were denied
visas, particularly if they identified themselves as Ismaili
scholars. Save
the Children noted similar problems for its Pakistani,
Bangladeshi and
Afghan staff.
5. (C) Corruption chafed more than usual, as several
NGOs
expressed frustration at
additional «fees» for purchasing airline tickets. The head of
CEVSI noted
that without 10% on top, she was told she would not get a seat
on any
flight. «Rudaki is a toll
road,» quipped Mercy Corps Director
Gary
Burniske, referring to the capital’s main artery. Traffic
police positioned
every few hundred meters frequently wave cars to the side of the
road, but
for a few somoni ($1-2), most drivers continue. About half the
participants
admitted they paid extra each month to ensure that basic
utilities-phone,
gas, water, electrical-continued uninterrupted.
6. (C) With the exception of German Agro Action, all
NGOs
present had refused to
provide the MFA with information about their local staff (reftel
b).
Several noted their lawyers had advised that the MFA had no
legal basis to
request the names, addresses and passport numbers of Tajik
citizens employed
by their organization. Burniske
related that Mercy Corps had
received the
same request three years running, and had never replied.
7. (SBU) COMMENT: The NGOS, while concerned about the
tightening work conditions in Tajikistan, showed no signs of
pulling up their tent pegs or even altering
their activities. They welcomed
a U.S.-proposed roundtable
with donors and
government officials, planned for late November, to clarify visa
and
registration procedures.
Meanwhile, the verdict is still out as
to why
there have been so many visa delays. END COMMENT
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 45639
date: 11/21/2005 4:04
refid: 05DUSHANBE1828
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001828
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/PPD, DRL, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: SERIOUS
POLITICIAN ZOYIROV CHARGES RAHMONOV
«ILLEGITIMATE» AND TWO NEW PARTIES «ARTIFICIAL»
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan
Chairman
Zoyirov continues to be a voice in the Tajik political
wilderness logically and intelligently demanding that the
Government of Tajikistan conform to the laws in its constitution
— at least in part because he was one of the key drafters of the
constitution which he based in large part on the U.S. model. He
asked that the West speak out more forcefully for democracy in
Tajikistan. Although he seems to
be clean and honestly
democratic, his constituency is miniscule (less than 2 percent
of the electorate) and is limited mainly to the upper levels of
the urban intelligentsia.
Nevertheless, Zoyirov is worth
listening to and cultivating. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) Social-Democratic Party of
Tajikistan (SDPT) Chairman
Rahmatullo Zoyirov called on the Ambassador November 17,
accompanied by independent journalist Marat Mamadshoyev.
Zoyirov asked the Ambassador to make a public statement to
support Zoyirov’s recent press release declaring President
Rahmonov illegitimate by constitutional standards. (NOTE:
Zoyirov was one of the original drafters of Tajikistan’s
constitution and served as the President’s legal adviser until
he resigned to protest the June 2003 referendum that gave
Rahmonov the possibility of two more seven-year terms that could
keep him in office until 2020.
END NOTE.)
3. (C) The Ambassador explained
that a diplomat cannot be
partisan in internal political affairs, but affirmed he would
continue to emphasize in public the importance of democratic
process. Zoyirov well understood
this, and simply deployed his
request as an opening gambit for a more serious discussion of
democracy, or lack thereof, in Tajikistan.
CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT FOR DEMOCRACY
4. (C) Zoyirov charged that the
U.S. Embassy has gone silent on
democracy issues since mid-2004.
The Ambassador refuted this
and said we would send Zoyirov every press statement and
transcript on democracy since June 2004.
5. (C) The Ambassador
acknowledged that the Tajik Government
has indeed gone backward on democracy and that the U.S. Embassy
has well documented it for Washington.
He explained in detail
that, since mid-2004, the Tajik Government has faced steadily
increasing pressure from Moscow, as a result of the «color
revolutions,» to limit the influence and even presence of the
United States and the European Union in Tajikistan. Related to
this, the government has step by step cracked down on anything
and anyone construed to be an agent of influence for change,
including independent political parties and opposition mass
media and even the international Rotary Club. Zoyirov fully
concurred.
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS MADE BY EMOTION
6. (C) The Ambassador noted that
his explanation of pressure
from Moscow is not meant to exonerate Rahmonov, who is
responsible for his own actions.
Zoyirov explained, from his
own experience in the Presidential Apparat, that Rahmonov,
somewhat like Uzbekistan’s Karimov, is emotional rather than
analytical and intellectual. When
he was in the Apparat,
Zoyirov said that he and his staff would spend six weeks
carefully drafting to meet international standards and then
broadly clearing presidential decrees to improve governance.
But Rahmonov as likely as not, to the staff’s great astonishment
and chagrin, rejected them just before he was to sign them,
based on whichever special interest had most recently had his
ear.
TWO NEW PARTIES «ARTIFICIAL»
7. (C) The Ambassador asked
whether Zoyirov thought that the
two newly registered political parties — the Agrarian Party of
Tajikistan (APT) and the Party of Economic Reforms (PER) are
legitimate and independent or government-created pocket parties.
He noted the notoriously
legalistic Ministry of Justice had
registered them on their first tries.
Zoyirov responded that of
course the parties are illegitimate government tools, if for no
other reason than their chairmen are academic rectors who are
government-approved civil servants.
(NOTE: Zoyirov released a
press statement on November 18 describing the APT and PER as
«artificial.» END
NOTE.) He explained these parties will
be
allowed to give «soft criticism» of the government to give the
illusion of open political debate for Western consumption.
OBAIDULLOYEV PANTING BUT TOLD TO BACK OFF
8. (C) The Ambassador asked if
Chairman of Parliament and Mayor
of Dushanbe Mahmadsaid Obaidulloyev will emerge as a serious
presidential contender for the late 2006 presidential election.
(NOTE: Obaidulloyev — his mafia
nickname is «Bini,» «the nose»
— has long been fuming because he thought he had a gentleman’s
agreement with Rahmonov that 2006 would be his «turn» to be
president before the 2003 referendum overturned his
expectations. END NOTE.) Zoyirov said that Tajiks, especially
Kulyobis, would probably view Obaidulloyev as a legitimate
contender, and that he indeed has a powerful desire to be
president, if only to better pay off his own cronies. However,
Moscow has made clear to both Rahmonov and Obaidulloyev they are
«on the same team» — i.e., pro-Moscow — and cannot be allowed
to
tear each other down.
DEMOCRACY SMALL GRANT STYMIED
9. (C) Journalist Mahmadshoyev
asked if his U.S. Embassy
Democracy Small Grant to create an independent newspaper,
«Imruz» («Today»), could be extended beyond its
November 30
expiration. He has been unable to
register «Imruz» with the
Ministry of Justice, he’s been explicitly told, because
«Imruz»
has U.S. funding. (COMMENT: The original grant was for a
«consortium of journalists to create an independent
newspaper.»
In fact, Mahmadshoyev has now allied himself with Zoyirov’s
SDPT, and «Imruz» would likely become a party voice. END
COMMENT.) The Ambassador agreed
to extend the grant, and
suggested Mahmadshoyev explore an independent web site for his
project, or other creative means, not yet subject to the
knuckle-draggers, of working around the Ministry of Justice
legalisms.
10. (C) COMMENT: Tajikistan is one year away from presidential
elections, which it is universally assumed President Rahmonov
will win. Even without the daily
«guidance» from Moscow, he
likely would maneuver to ensure that he has no legitimate
competition. We are impressed
that Zoyirov appears to be the
only politician in Tajikistan willing to take public stances
against Rahmonov and his regime.
He may calculate, because he
was not corrupt during his government service, unlike the
imprisoned Democratic Party of Tajikistan Chairman Mahmadruzi
Iskandarov, that he can risk confronting the regime because the
West would come to his defense.
That said, even though he seems
to be clean and honestly democratic, his constituency is
miniscule, likely no more than two percent of the electorate,
and is limited mainly to the upper levels of the urban
intelligentsia who have had some degree of exposure to the West.
Would he be a good president for
Tajikistan? Probably yes.
But he does not have a glimmer of hope of winning a free
election in the current stage of Tajikistan’s political
development. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 45682
date: 11/21/2005 12:22
refid: 05DUSHANBE1839
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE
001839
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, SA, INR, EB
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, MARR, EU, RS, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN NOT OVERLY PLEASED BY NEW RUSSIA-UZBEKISTAN
ALLIANCE
REF: HILLMEYER E-MAIL DTD 11-18-05
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador, Foreign
Minister Nazarov did not hide his unease about the November 14
Russia-Uzbekistan Alliance.
Tajikistan is concerned that
Tashkent will use it’s «new best friend» status with Moscow to
harm Dushanbe’s interests. He
judged it would be unthinkable
for Russia to establish a military base in Uzbekistan in the
near term. He also criticized the
European Union sanctions for
not including «big fish» like President Karimov himself. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) On November 21, Foreign
Minister Talbak Nazarov told the
Ambassador that only two points in the November 14
Russia-Uzbekistan agreement are serious:
mutual assistance in
the event of an invasion, and major military-technical
assistance to the Uzbek military.
Nazarov asked sardonically,
«So who’s threatening Uzbekistan?
Kyrgyzstan? I don’t think
they are planning to invade.
Tajikistan? We’re not planning to
declare war. Afghanistan? Not likely.
And how is Russia going
to help reform Uzbekistan’s military when it can’t even reform
its own?»
3. (C) Nazarov judged the real
problem for Tajikistan is such
close relations between Tashkent and Moscow will negatively
influence other issues.
«We’re especially concerned that
Karimov met [RusAl Chairman Oleg] Deripaska in Moscow. We’re
worried about his aims. We have
information that Karimov will
do everything possible to convince Deripaska to abandon his
plans to invest in aluminum in Tajikistan and to finish Rogun
dam and hydroelectric station.»
4. (C) Nazarov was less than
pleased with the briefing memo the
Russian Embassy in Dushanbe had provided the Tajik Government
about the Russia-Uzbekistan agreement.
‘There wasn’t anything
more than what we’d already seen in the press.» He added
sarcastically, «The important stuff must all be secret.»
5. (C) In response to a question
how Tajikistan would react to
a new Russian military base in Uzbekistan, Nazarov said in the
short term such a development would be «unthinkable,» because
it
would be especially bad «diplomatic ethics» for the Russians
to
move in as soon as the Americans depart from Karshi-Khanabad.
6. (C) Uzbekistan may eventually
join the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), according to Nazarov, but it cannot
be permitted to emerge as «Moscow’s enforcer in Central Asia —
CSTO works by consensus.»
EURASIAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
7. (C) Referring to the recent
decision to fold the Central
Asia Cooperation Organization into the Eurasian Economic
Community (EEC), Nazarov also expressed caution. He judged if
Uzbekistan is willing to accept and abide by all previous EEC
agreements, especially open borders, then the new arrangement is
positive. «You can imagine
that we would welcome Uzbekistan
opening its border with us and facilitating trade, but~,» he
trailed off.
EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS NOT SERIOUS
8. (C) Nazarov volunteered that
the European Union’s list of 12
Uzbek officials sanctioned as a result of Andijon is not very
serious «because it should have included the ‘big fish’ like
Karimov and Foreign Minister Ganiyev.»
9. (C) COMMENT: Although philosophical and phlegmatic as
always, Nazarov did not hide his concerns about the new
Russia-Uzbekistan Alliance because he fears Karimov will try to
use it to harm Tajikistan’s interests.
His comments about
Karimov courting Deripaska were especially telling, because
Rahmonov and his government are putting a whole lot of their
economic eggs in Deripaska’s basket.
We also were intrigued
that he criticized the Russian Embassy for not being more
forthcoming than the press reports.
The bottom line is that
Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry is not especially pleased with
this new development. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 45687
date: 11/21/2005 13:00
refid: 05DUSHANBE1840
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001840
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NP/ECC — PVANSON, ACHURCH, AND ACUMMINGS
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EURACE — DMARTIN
CBP/INA FOR PWARKER AND BPICKETT
USDOE/NNSA FOR TPERRY
DOC FOR PETERSEN — BEARD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC, KNNP, KSTC, MNUC, PARM, TI
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ISTANBUL CENTRAL ASIA TECHNICAL WORKSHOP
TO PREVENT THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS
1. The goal of the workshop was
to build a partnership between
technical advisors and export control agencies on a regional
level. The objectives were to
find regional common ground
against smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and propose
projects to support the primary goal.
2. Regional Cooperation: It was recognized that some borders
will not need radiation monitors depending on what their
neighboring country has installed.
The effectiveness of
radiation monitoring depends on the regional «protective net»
established within several countries not just on one countries
ability to protect its border.
Combined training and equipping
with common type equipment will save money and be more
effective. Regional cooperation
is extremely important in
identifying potential sources and users (information sharing).
Central Asia is seen as the transit ground; drugs north and WMD
south.
3. Conference Conclusion: The conference wrap-up was scheduled
for two hours with the goal being the production of a single
document, signed by all parties, agreeing on steps needed to get
to the next level. Unfortunately,
this was not as simple a task
as it seemed. The group, which
agreed on several issues during
discussion, could not agree on very much when it came to a
written agreement (what a surprise).
The Turkmens agreed to
publish the results of the conference but not the names of who
attended (this took 20 minutes).
All participants expressed an
interest in expansion of cooperation in the area of radiation
monitoring but argued for 45 minutes on terminology (the
difference between a control and a monitor). All had earlier
agreed on information sharing but all balked at the creation of
a website which would contain unclassified information on
systems and procedures. The
Turkmens and the Kazakhs said the
website would be an information center for terrorists to learn
how to defeat their systems. All
countries gave several
examples on how they share intelligence to combat illicit
narcotics trafficking, but none were willing to share technology
and tactics to defeat proliferation of WMD. Some things they
did all agree on were the use of a «risk based approach to
prioritize efforts and the development of mobile response
teams». (COMMENT: It was
very interesting to see members from
all the Central Asian countries together in one room addressing
a common problem. There were some
very strong personalities, a
strong sense of country pride, some minor barbs thrown at the
other countries, but in the end, some consensus was reached.
Regional cooperation is possible on certain issues; however we
have a long way to go to find true regional cooperation. END
COMMENT.)
4. CURRENT STATUS REPORTS BY
COUNTRY:
(A) Uzbekistan: Viewed as a transit country with established
and developed major transit routes.
Their top priority is to
control and eliminate the smuggling of drugs and WMD materials.
The Uzbeks consider themselves a leader in Central Asia when it
comes to installation of portal monitoring equipment (85 per
cent funded by U.S. dollars) but also realize that it is
impossible to install monitors at all potential border crossing
points. They see the need for a
joint initiative and regional
cooperation and view smuggling of WMD as a serious issue. They
currently have 11 monitors in place with eight more by 2006, 11
more by 2007, for a proposed total of 100 by projects end. They
have established a centralized information and dispatch center
staffed by both customs and radioactive material technical
experts. They regulate movement
of WMD in accordance with
several international regimes which includes monitoring the
internal movement of «legal» radioactive materials. Their
military doctrine prohibits the production and possession of
WMD. Uzbekistan is looking for
new approaches to solve
smuggling of WMD that would also compliment efforts to combat
illicit narcotics trafficking.
They have designed their own
monitors using a new approach (Z detectors shielded from each
other) which are still in the infant stage but have produced
peak data points. They feel that
continuous, explicit training
is required for customs and border guard units and proposed a
three level training plan. Level
one is basic training for
customs and border guards, level two is supervisory training,
and level three integrates university level training for customs
candidates.
(B) Kazakhstan: The Kazakh strategy for combating WMD
trafficking is a strong customs control.
They currently have
167 legal border crossing points, controlled by 16 regional
customs offices, which they consider a comprehensive customs
system. They have enacted several
new laws on radioactive
materials control, most of which were driven by WMD agreements
signed by the government. They
claim to comply with all
international standards and that their laws are written using
international regime control lists.
Several controls of varying
degrees are in place throughout the country. Aspect monitors
(Russian design) are used at the primary crossing points (major
road, rail, and airports) with portable monitors used at minor
ports and «green border» areas. Portable monitors consist of
ionizers, spectrometers, and radiation pagers. All data
collected is first evaluated by customs then sent to the
«experts» for review if deemed necessary by customs. Customs
also has «mobile labs» which they can dispatch to any area
reporting an anomaly. The Kazakh’s
also agree that information
must be shared in order to effectively combat illicit
trafficking of WMD. They
currently cooperate with neighboring
countries and the Russian Federation. They have a system in
place to get all collected information to one control server.
Most of the Kazakh effort with respect to WMD trafficking is
financed by Kazakhstan, with only approximately 10 percent
financed by the U.S. (a fact they are very proud of). They
currently have a 10-hour training course in place which follows
a step by step process from introduction and identification to
advanced operation of monitoring equipment. Supervisors are
offered advanced courses in «new developments».
(C) Kyrgyzstan: The Kyrgyz were very involved with the former
Soviet Union Nuclear program with regard to mining of
radioactive materials. All of the
mines with the exception of
Karabela have been closed leaving piles and tailings that pose a
radioactive hazard and need to be cleaned up. In 1999
Kyrgyzstan began revising laws on the regulation of radioactive
materials, which involved several agencies. From these
revisions a list of controlled products was compiled and
enacted; which has resulted in several vehicles traveling from
China being turned back at the border.
In 2003 IAEA spearheaded
a joint seminar that produced an agreement that included
equipment donations to Kyrgyz Customs.
There are several EXBS
technical programs ongoing, including capacity building projects
providing communications, transportation, inspection/detection
equipment, and computer support.
The Kyrgyz enjoy a close
relationship with the U.S. Department of State and wish to
continue and build on that relationship.
Portal monitors are
currently being installed at some ports with the help of the
EXBS program. In March of 2005,
Second Line of Defense (SLD)
had a meeting that included the Department of Energy, Department
of Defense and the Kyrgyz Government.
As a result of this
meeting the Kyrgyz Government is currently working on a WMD
agreement that should be completed and signed soon. The Kyrgyz
delegation sees information sharing as a very important step in
combating WMD trafficking and supports regional cooperation.
They also agree that regional training events and exercises
would be very beneficial.
(D) Tajikistan: The Tajik delegate started by saying,
«Tajikistan agreed that Uzbekistan was a good place to start a
pilot program on radiation monitoring because it helped to
strengthen the Tajik border as well, forming a ‘shield’ for the
Tajik border with Uzbekistan».
He went on to say that «we
should concentrate on securing the outer borders of Central
Asia; this would be cheaper and at the same time provide the
desired results».
(COMMENT: The Uzbek delegation
was surprised
at this proposal since it would result in no need for monitoring
on their borders and they consider themselves the leader in
Central Asia when it comes to radiation monitoring. END COMMENT)
Tajikistan has recently revised laws on dual use, narcotics, and
radioactive materials but they are still in the implementation
stage. The law states that
customs has the lead on radioactive
materials import and export however the Academy of Sciences has
the lead on radioactive materials in country. Tajikistan feels
there is a need to unite regional efforts in the areas of export
control and dual use legislation.
They see a need for a
regional advisory center to coordinate efforts throughout
Central Asia to include training and equipping with common types
of detection. Tajikistan admits
that several areas of their
border are very transparent and detection capability is limited.
They request help on the Afghan
and Chinese borders but feel
the current efforts of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan adequately
protect their common borders. Due
to limited infrastructure
there are really no established major routes as there are in
other CA countries. Tajikistan
currently deploys radiation
pagers for detection of radioactive materials and feels that
installation of permanent portal monitors, while effective,
would be a hit and miss proposition at best (due to terrain and
infrastructure constraints).
(E) Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan is no different than the other
CIS countries; it has signed the WMD agreement and will not
facilitate the production of any new weapons. It pays attention
to all international standards and cooperate with the IAEA with
respect to signed agreements on the regulation of nuclear
materials. Turkmen laws have four
provisions with respect to
WMD; 1.) Support combating of proliferation of WMD, 2.) Combat
illicit trafficking of any material that causes international
hazards and support all international efforts, 3.) Deny
over-flight of aircraft carrying WMD components (PSI agreement),
4.) Support additional steps on implementation of
nonproliferation efforts. As of
April of 2005 all major border
crossings have radioactive material monitoring devices in place,
this includes five crossing points with Iran, one with
Afghanistan, one with Uzbekistan, and one Caspian seaport. The
Turkmen delegate stated, «You can all sleep well at night
because our borders are locked down tight». In 2006 they will
be opening a new «state of the art» border crossing and
deploying a mobile X-ray van.
(COMMENT: All radiation
monitoring projects in Turkmenistan are 100 percent funded by
the U.S., a fact the Turkmen delegate seemed very proud of. END
COMMENT) Turkmenistan sees the
value in regional information
sharing but on a limited basis within the customs community
only.
5. U.S. PRESENTATIONS:
(A) Dr. Ken Sale, Lawrence Livermore
Laboratories, gave a
presentation on the U.S. perspective of WMD enforcement on U.S.
borders. He stated the strategy
was to have «smarter borders»
which involves pushing borders outward and relying on
international cooperation. The
highest payoff in border
management is not in the equipment, it’s in the people
coordinating and cooperating with each other. Radioactive
materials, some of which are legal, are small and easily
shielded from monitors. For this
reason the United States needs
more technical cooperation to help detect methods of
transportation and end users. It
is imperative that all
personnel involved have a complete understanding of detection
systems and their limitations.
The focus is changing to
detection and training that must be comprehensive and
compatible. There are several new
detection devices being
developed and deployed, to include the «ARAM system», a
portable
system being used by the California Highway Patrol that has
produced positive results. The
United States needs to cooperate
locally and internationally as a team in order to combat the
threat of WMD, which potentially threatens all countries.
(B) Major Chip Parker, CENTCOM J5
Disaster Preparedness, gave a
CENTCOM Strategy briefing which proposed a Regional Disaster
Preparedness Center for Central Asia.
This concept was first
introduced by CENTCOM in Africa which now has 11 nations
participating. It is not a U.S.
centric program; it relies on
regional cooperation in order to work.
CENTCOM considers
Central Asia a very strategically important region and feels
there is a willingness within the individual states to cooperate
with each other. The proposed
center would promote information
sharing on experiences and best practices as well as facilitate
regional training in legal, response, and equipment aspects.
CENTCOM will be visiting all the CA countries in the next couple
of months to discuss this concept with the respective ministries.
6. WORKING GROUP TOPICS AND RESULTS:
The delegates were separated into two working groups for the
morning session, then shuffled and formed two new working groups
for the afternoon session.
(A) Group I — Portal
Monitors. This group evaluated the
current status of the portal monitors currently being used and
made recommendations on further procurement. The consensus of
the group was that there are several different types in use and
all have pluses and minuses. The
need to integrate technical
experts into the detection process was split, some feel the
customs personnel can evaluate the data and don’t need technical
experts unless asked for, others agreed that the monitoring
staff should include full time technical experts to evaluate
data. The need to standardize
equipment and terminology was
agreed upon by all parties.
Standardized training and joint
exercises was also well received.
(B) Group II — Alternatives
Detection Systems. This group
looked at alternatives to portal monitors where portal monitors
weren’t feasible (ie. Small crossings and infrastructure limited
crossings). Several ideas were
tossed around but the group came
up with three priorities for implementation. 1.) Increased
awareness training for customs and border guards. 2.)
Development of a list of sources and container types to include
visual aids that can be maintained at all posts and easily
updated when required. 3.) Deployment of mobile groups
consisting of multi-agencies within the country. Coordinate
efforts to ensure mobile groups from one country aren’t working
the same areas as the neighboring country, thus providing a
larger coverage area.
(C) Group III — Training,
standards and exercises. This group
discussed training programs, the standards utilized by each
country, and exercises conducted (both internal and cross
border). Training was an easy
subject because everyone agrees
that training is important and should be standardized as much as
possible to include regional training. However, standards were
another story. Each country
agrees they are committed to
enforcing international standards however each country also has
its own laws and views of what international standards are.
Each country wants to hold on to the «individuality» of its
customs system and authority.
Cross border cooperation is
currently happening at the working level (ports and border
forces) but not at the capitol level.
All countries stated that
they work well with their counterparts across the border and all
are committed to enforcing common laws when it comes to illicit
trafficking. The consensus on
regional exercises was positive
with joint training as a favorable by-product.
(D) Group IV — Regional Advisory
Council. This topic was not
well received at all. All
countries stated that they already
have regional customs meetings and that don’t see any value in
this concept. When it was
explained to them that the concept
was to integrate the «technical experts» with the
«enforcement
agencies» they felt this wasn’t necessary. Turkmenistan was
adamantly against the proposal followed closely by Kazakhstan.
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were open to discussion
but were shut down by very strong personalities of the Turkmen
and Kazakh delegates. Bottom
line, there will be no regional
advisory council.
HOAGLAND
