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id: 216505
date: 7/14/2009 12:32
refid: 09DUSHANBE845
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE617|09DUSHANBE714
header:
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0539
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0177
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0121
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0100
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000845
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINR, PTER, KCRM, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — FORMER UTO COMMANDER ZIYOEV KILLED
REF: A. A: DUSHANBE 617
B. REF B: DUSHANBE 714
C. REF C: IIR 6947 0086 09
D. REF D: IIR 6947 0084 09
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A.JACOBSON, AMB, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: On July 11 former United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
commander and Minister of Emergency Situations Mirzo Ziyoev was
killed in mysterious circumstances in Tavildara district. He
was with the armed group led by Ne’mat Azizov and Mullo Abdullo
in the week preceding his death.
There are conflicting stories
circulating that members of the armed group killed him because
he had betrayed them to security forces, or that government
forces killed him to prevent him from revealing information
about weapons smuggling by government employees. Whatever the
truth, another major opposition figure has just left the scene,
as the long process of eliminating opposition figures continues.
Ziyoev’s death occurred during an
uptick in reports of clashes
in the Tavildara area of central Tajikistan as armed groups
attacked police checkpoints and, reportedly, the village of
Tavildara itself. The government
increased its security
presence in areas near the fighting and in the capital. Post
has yet to see any local reaction to Ziyoev’s death. End
summary.
CLASHES FLARE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION FORCES
2. (C) On the night of July 8, a group of armed men attacked a
police checkpoint near Tavildara village. According to reports,
police repelled the attackers, injuring several of them. Post
does not know whether the attackers were members of the group of
fighters led Ne’mat Azizov and Mullo Abdullo, which has been in
the Tavildara area since May (Reftels).
Azizov is a former UTO
mid-level commander from Darvoz.
As part of the peace accords,
he was integrated into the Committee on Emergency Situations as
a Colonel. Abdullo, a former
mid-level UTO commander, left
Tajikistan in 1998 in disagreement with the Tajikistan peace
accords, and was rumored to have crossed into Tajikistan from
Afghanistan several weeks ago.
There is speculation here that
he and several foreign fighters returned to Tajikistan because
of pressure from Pakistan’s offensive against the Taleban.
A CONFUSING TALE, ENDING IN VIOLENT DEATH
3. (C) Ziyoev reportedly joined Azizov’s group in the Tavildara
region about a week ago. From
that point the stories about his
actions and death diverge. An
embassy contact associated with
Mirzo Ziyoev told embassy staff that Abdullo’s group occupied
Tavildara village on July 8.
According to this source,
government forces using armed helicopters forced the fighters to
retreat into the surrounding mountains, regaining control of the
village the following day.
However, press reports based on
government information claim that Ziyoev was captured during
this operation, and then agreed to reveal the locations of
opposition arms caches and to persuade the Azizov group to
surrender. But the embassy source
claims Ziyoev went of his own
accord to negotiate with government security forces on July 11,
and then returned to Azizov and Abdullo to persuade them to
surrender. According to the
embassy source, government
officials convinced Ziyoev to leave behind several of the
opposition fighters who had accompanied him to the negotiations,
held in Childara. When Ziyoev
returned to Tavildara to persuade
the Azizovo group to surrender, they accused him of betraying
them and shot him dead.
4. (C) OSCE Ambassador Pryakhin (protect) heard another version
of events, which he told Ambassador on July 13. Pryakhin said
that security forces killed Ziyoev because Ziyoev had been
involved in arms smuggling, and had actually purchased weapons
from government employees — in other words, he knew too much
about government corruption.
Pryakhin also said that the
foreign fighters with Azizov and Abdullo, reported in the press
to be Chechens, were in fact Dagestanis.
Indian Ambassador Amar
Sinha (protect) told Ambassador that helicopters had delivered
several prisoners to the Indian-constructed airfield at Aini,
just outside Dushanbe, but he had no further information on who
the prisoners were.
DUSHANBE 00000845 002 OF 002
5. (C) On the night of July 11, a group of armed men attacked a
teahouse in Labi Jar, on the main highway from Dushanbe to Garm
at the Tavildara junction. Post
has received rumors that the
attackers were from Rasht, and that they killed 10 police and
destroyed an armored personnel carrier.
Embassy has no
confirmation of these casualties.
The government reported only
that an unspecified «incident» took place at Labi Jar.
WHO WAS MIRZO ZIYOEV?
6. (SBU) Ziyoev was the senior commander of the United Tajik
Opposition during the Tajik civil war in the 1990s. When the
warring factions made peace in 1997, their deal called 30
percent of government positions to go to opposition members.
Ziyoev became Minister of Emergency Situations and Civil
Defense. He served in this
position from 1999 until President
Rahmon removed him without explanation in 2006. Despite being a
Minister, Ziyoev enjoyed little power while serving in national
government, and his ministry was poorly funded. Since leaving
government Ziyoev was a private businessman and owned a large
estate near Tavildara. He had
publicly reconfirmed his loyalty
to the government as recently as May 2009.
ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES IN DUSHANBE
7. (C) Post noticed an increase in armed police presence in
Dushanbe beginning late on Wednesday July 8, coinciding with the
first opposition attack on the Tavildara checkpoint. Armed
police were present in several outlying neighborhoods of
Dushanbe which had been UTO strongholds during the civil war.
Police in Ispechak and Avul neighborhoods reportedly stopped
vehicles and questioned their occupants.
The increased security
became sporadic over the weekend, and seems to have returned to
normal. There have been no
reports of attacks in Dushanbe.
COMMENT — TREES FALL IN THE FOREST, BUT LIFE GOES ON
8. (C) Comment: We must be careful not to speculate too heavily
on the implications of Ziyoev’s death.
Post lacks specific
information on any of the events noted in this cable, except for
the increase in security in Dushanbe.
However, Ziyoev was a
leading opposition figure, and his death continues the trend
wherein President Rahmon has sidelined, exiled, imprisoned, or
killed opposition leaders who joined the Government as part of
the accords ending the civil war.
The last opposition figure
with a senior position in government is now Deputy Defense
Minister Faiziyev. Beyond the
brief increase in security, we
have not seen actions resulting from Ziyoev’s death, although
there are rumors that the Labi Jar attack and other incidents
were the work of militants from Rasht, not Tavildara, and that
Presidential brother in law Hassan Assadulzoda was offering
money to Rasht militants to keep quiet.
Superficially the
government does not appear to be in crisis mode. The President
of Latvia visited over the weekend, the European Union
«Troika»
is in town for consultations, and President Rahmon left the
country on July 13 for the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Egypt.
The Government may be going to
some lengths to show that all is
normal, because they do not want to give Russia an excuse to
offer them security protection.
So far as post knows the
Russian military units based in Tajikistan have engaged in no
unusual activities. We will be
watching for further incidents
or unusual military movements, and for any sign that violence is
spreading beyond Tavildara
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 216700
date: 7/15/2009 11:36
refid: 09DUSHANBE846
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1548|09DUSHANBE570
header:
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1138
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000846
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, EAID, PGOV, EFIN, TI
SUBJECT: AGRICULTURAL REFORMS IN TAJIKISTAN: MORE MANURE?
REF: A. A: 08 DUSHANBE 1548
B. B: DUSHANBE 570
DUSHANBE 00000846 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Summary: At the end of May President Rahmon signed a
decree calling for writing off over half a billion dollars in
debt owed by cotton farmers to agricultural investors and,
ultimately, the National Bank of Tajikistan. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) required the passage of a debt resolution
plan before providing further assistance to Tajikistan. On July
8 — eight days late — the government distributed an action plan
detailing how the process will work.
The comprehensive plan
provides not only for debt relief, but — as donors demanded —
also includes other reforms, including the establishment of
land-use rights and guarantees that farms can choose which crops
to grow. Given the failure of
previous reforms that threatened
the interests of those in power, the current plan will be a
challenge to implement. The debt
relief stands the most chance
of succeeding, because it is in the interests of the elite.
Cotton investors, many of whom are government officials or
politically connected, get to write off millions of dollars in
government loans they may never have intended to pay back. End
summary.
——————————
A Plan to Resolve Cotton Debt
—————————-
2. (SBU) One of the major conditions to resume IMF lending to
Tajikistan this year under the $116 million Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF) was the resolution of over half a
billion dollars of debt owed by cotton farmers to investors.
These investors had in turn borrowed most of the money from the
National Bank of Tajikistan or abroad, an arrangement the
government had kept hidden from the IMF (Ref A). Although an
audit of the National Bank earlier this year revealed that it
and other lending institutions were shockingly lax in keeping
track of the debt owed to them (ref B), donors were concerned
that investors continued to force farmers to grow cotton to pay
off their accumulated debt.
(Comment: The failure to track
outstanding debt likely had a great deal to do with the fact
that many of the investors were in the government or closely
tied to it — up to and including former National Bank chairman
Murodali Alimardon — and were essentially providing themselves
loans they never intended to repay.
End comment.)
3. (SBU) With a consultant paid for by the World Bank, Tapio
Saavalainen, the government began drafting a comprehensive plan
to reform the agricultural sector, including resolving the debt
issue. The first step was the
passage of Decree 663, signed by
President Rahmon on May 30, «On additional measures to support
the agricultural sector in the Republic of Tajikistan.» The
decree calls for writing off U.S. $548 million in debt
accumulated by farmers before January 1, 2008. This includes
U.S. $435 million owed to cotton investors, who in turn owe the
money to the National Bank (through the quasi-governmental
institution KreditInvest), as well as U.S. $113 million owed by
farmers to cotton investors who borrowed from commercial banks.
(Comment: The basis for these numbers is unclear. They appeared
without explanation in the initial draft legislation prepared by
Saavalainen, and they have remained through each successive
draft. Neither donors nor the
government appear to have any
firm sense of where they come from.
The donors’ general sense
is that the government’s commitment to forgive the farmers’ debt
is the most important issue, and that the sums under
consideration are probably in the rough ballpark. End comment.)
4. (U) In return for writing off these debts, commercial banks
will receive newly-issued long-term government securities. An
additional U.S. $154 million lent from the National Bank through
KreditInvest to support ancillary, profit-making enterprises,
such as ginneries, spinning factories, machinery, warehouses,
and other infrastructure, must be repaid at an interest rate of
12% over eight years on equal quarterly installments. The decree
calls for the establishment of an institution to implement the
process of cotton debt restructuring, including ensuring that
debts to and from investors are repaid as planned.
———————————————
DUSHANBE 00000846 002.2 OF 004
Action Plan Leaves Some Questions Unanswered
———————————————
5. (SBU) While Decree 663 outlined the broad goal of resolving
cotton debt, it was short on specifics.
The IMF set a deadline
of June 30 for a detailed action plan laying out the specific
debt resolution mechanisms as well as a series of other
agricultural reforms required by the PRGF. On July 8 a plan —
Resolution 406, bearing the date July 2 — was finally
distributed to donors, ending some suspicions that the plan had
not been approved. Despite
persistent suggestions from the IMF
and the donor community that cotton sector investors be made to
shoulder more of the outstanding debt, the numbers in the
resolution are the same as those in the earlier decree: $548
million in debt will be written off, including $435 million to
the government and $113 to commercial banks. In the view of
many of the donors, this was too generous to the investors, who
were the only ones to profit in an otherwise unprofitable
sector. They received government
loans they had no intention of
paying back, leaving the farmers with debt and the government
holding the bag, while reaping the proceeds of cotton sales.
6. (SBU) It was not clear whether donors made headway on three
other demands. First, in a July 1
meeting with the Donor
Coordination Council (DCC), the government agreed to move the
cut-off date for debt write-off from January 1, 2008, to October
1, thus including more debt. In
the final resolution, however,
there is no mention of any cutoff dates.
Second, the government
agreed to remove Alimardon — promoted last year from National
Bank chairman to Deputy Prime Minister — from the working group
in charge of debt resolution.
While the final document notes
specifically that the Prime Minister’s office will supervise the
implementation of the resolution, it does not list members of
the working group. Finally, the
Donors have long insisted that
an essential component of the action plan must be a public
communication strategy to ensure that farmers are aware of and
understand their rights and responsibilities. Although the
original decree was widely publicized in June, to date there has
been only very minor discussion of the action plan in the press.
7. (SBU) The Donors raised all of these issues at a July 10
Donor Coordinating Council meeting (DCC) meeting. State
Economic Advisor Matlubkhon Davlatov assured donors that their
concerns hinged primarily upon legal formalities. He insisted
that there would be flexibility in the amounts of debt relieved
and the dates of debt accrued, provided that the debts were for
cotton cultivation. He also
reiterated that Alimardon would
have no role in determining what debts are forgiven (he
explained that in accordance with Tajik law, the action plan can
only list offices, not individuals).
Both of these were key
issues for the IMF, and can be expected come up during the next
evaluation mission at the end of August.
As for the
communication plan, Alimardon responded that donor assistance in
this sphere would be welcome, but did not promise to increase
official publication.
8. (SBU) The final resolution was apparently as controversial
within the government as it was outside of it. At the July 1
meeting, Davlatov admitted that the government was having some
«heated» internal discussions about the draft, although he
would
not go into further details. Some
donors suspect that these
discussions were the cause of the resolution’s delay.
——————————————— ————
Will New Agriculture Reforms Do Any Better Than Old Ones?
——————————————— ————
9. (U) In addition to resolving the cotton debt, the government
resolution aims to satisfy another IMF demand by detailing a
program for reforming the entire agricultural sector. Some
elements of this plan have been provided for by previous
legislation, so it remains to be seen how the current resolution
will succeed where its predecessors have failed. Resolution
DUSHANBE 00000846 003.2 OF 004
111, issued in March 2007, guaranteed farmers the freedom to
grow the crops they wished and provided them with the ability to
use land rights — tantamount to ownership — as collateral in
transactions. Some 37,000 land
use certificates have so far
been granted under Resolution 111.
In reality, however, there
has been no enforcement mechanism behind the law, and local
governments (hukumats), in collaboration with central
authorities, have continued to require and subsidize cultivation
of a single crop: cotton. The
increasing amount of cotton debt
was likely responsible in part for the unprecedented number of
rural Tajiks who went abroad in the past few years in search of
work as labor migrants. A
subsequent resolution, designed to
improve implementation of Resolution 111, similarly failed to
make much headway.
10. (SBU) According to Justin Holl, Jr., director of the Land
Reform and Market Development Project funded by USAID,
Resolution 111 had myriad problems.
There was no related
legislation governing how long land use certificates will last;
the process of obtaining a certificate was lengthy and
complicated; debt from collective farms would be transferred to
new owners, even though they may still be physically unable to
use their land; local governments had a say in the process,
opening the door to bribery and bullying; and, finally, farmers
very often received parcels of land entirely different from the
ones they sought. According to
several agricultural experts,
many «former» collective farms have been deliberately parceled
out in such a way that individual farmers receive plots of land
that are not adjacent to one another, or that are distant from
irrigation sources. In this way,
according to Kathrine Kelm, an
agricultural consultant with the World Bank and DFID who has
been intimately involved in the reform process, although the
farm has technically been privatized, in fact it continues to be
operated on a collective basis, usually by the former brigade
leader, who controls all of the infrastructure and equipment, as
well as access to markets. Yet
there is some cause for
optimism. Mr. Holl reported that
even as the action plan’s
status was in doubt, a separate government-donor working group
that his project leads approved all of the reform objectives
that donors sought.
11. (U) Similarly, although Resolution 111 theoretically
guaranteed farmers «freedom to farm» the crops they wished,
the
reality has been otherwise.
According to a survey released
earlier this year by the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), despite the fact that 80% of respondents had heard of
Resolution 111, 86% of them still did not feel free to cultivate
any crop other than cotton. The
survey also revealed very high
levels of interference by local hukumats in farmers’ decisions.
12. (SBU) Given past difficulties with agricultural reform, some
donors are skeptical of the current effort. They point out that
the current system benefits those in power — from the local
hukumats all the way to Alimardon himself. Perhaps because of
this, it is unclear how much ownership or interest the
government has in seeing Decree 663 work. The draft decree
appears to have been prepared in its entirety by Saavalainen and
the action plan by another international consultant, Romas
Zemekis, in both cases with limited input from official sources.
Some doubt was put to rest last
Friday, when the government
gave a surprisingly detailed presentation on how it intended to
fulfill the action plan. The fact
that the government speaker
was none other than Alimardon — in theory removed from a
position of responsibility — illustrated what many donors feel
is an ongoing difficulty the government faces. Alimardon is the
one official who has the clout, knowledge, and inclination to
lead agricultural reform, while his obvious conflicts of
interest and poor track record should clearly disqualify him
from participating.
——-
Comment
——-
13. (SBU) The government’s interest in debt relief seems clear,
although its motivations might be different from those of the
international donor community.
Where the IMF sees the debt
DUSHANBE 00000846 004.2 OF 004
forgiveness as an essential means of freeing farmers from
crushing obligations to cotton investors, state officials — many
of whom are themselves cotton investors — may very well see it
as a state-funded bailout: they get to keep half a billion
dollars lent out of the state treasury.
This is quite a coup:
in light of recent audit findings, it is likely that much of
this money was diverted before it ever reached its intended
recipients. And, given the
financial crisis and plummeting
cotton prices, the investors were unlikely to see much if not
most of the money they actually lent on to farmers. But the
government’s broader commitment to reform the agricultural
sector remains in question. State
lending to unprofitable
cotton operations continue, just on-budget. Last year 180
million somoni was loaned to cotton investors. According to
recent estimates, only 40% has been paid back. This year 140
million was lent, although technically to agriculture as a
whole, not just cotton. The action plan calls for this amount to
be decreased by 30% each year.
14. (SBU) Even assuming a genuine desire to reform, Decree 663
will be difficult to implement.
Tajikistan’s continued reliance
on cotton production is the result of ingrained economic and
social practices dating from the early days of the Soviet Union.
Many of the underlying problems
are social and economic:
hukumats often exercise dictatorial authority, farmers remain
relatively uneducated and poorly informed about new practices
and possibilities, and the agricultural sector is structured
around getting cotton to market.
While the debt resolution plan
attempts to get to the root of this by introducing systemic
reform, the very comprehensiveness of the plan, in a country
with little monetary or technical capacity, will make it
difficult to carry through.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 216896
date: 7/16/2009 13:04
refid: 09DUSHANBE855
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
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RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0855/01 1971304
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0546
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1157
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0183
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000855
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPAO, SOCI, TI
SUBJECT: HOLLYWOOD IN TAJIKISTAN: L.A. MOVIE WORKER SEES FLEDGLING
TAJIK FILM INDUSTRY FIRST HAND
DUSHANBE 00000855 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) Summary: Jon Green, a film industry worker from Los
Angeles, met with local movie enthusiasts on a recent trip to
Dushanbe. Green’s discussions
yielded insights on local
culture, the effects of endemic corruption on the development of
fledgling industries, and Tajiks’ impressions on America and its
movies. End summary.
NO «SATURDAY NIGHT AT THE MOVIES» IN DUSHANBE
2. (U) Green met with a local film makers’ organization,
comprised of several artists of varying ages, at the American
corner in Dushanbe. Members of
the organization screen their
films at Dushanbe’s only cinema, but the government has recently
decided to take the building for its own use. Police have
ordered the group to remove their film equipment from the
facility. The reason for the
government takeover is unclear.
The group currently has no alternative public venue for
screening films.
3. (U) The cinema in Dushanbe screened commercial films as well
as amateur projects. Most
commercial films shown at the cinema
came from India and China. The
film makers remarked that there
is hardly any market for movies in Tajikistan because people
have so little money. The
government does not promote the film
industry in the country because it does not perceive any
potential financial or cultural benefit from doing so.
WHO ARE TAJIKISTAN’S FILM MAKERS?
4. (U) Green noticed that the local film making community was
almost evenly split between old artists— many of whom took
inspiration from Soviet-era films— and their younger, more
commercially-minded counterparts.
The older film makers prefer
to engage in film making as a hobby rather than as a way to earn
money or expose the outside world to Tajikistan’s culture. The
younger ones, however, were interested to hear Green describe
how movies are marketed in the United States, and expressed a
desire to show their films outside Tajikistan. These young
artists stated that many administrative roadblocks exist that
prevent them from sending their work abroad.
5. (U) Young film makers expressed a particular interest in
Hollywood-style themes for their movies, eschewing Tajik
cultural influences. Several
times, Green asked group members
why they relied on Hollywood for creative inspiration instead of
seeking to promote Tajik cultural awareness through the films
they produce. While some seemed
receptive to this idea, most
continued to indicate an affinity for Hollywood blockbusters
despite expressing dismay at the violence those films often
portray.
LOST IN TRANSLATION?
6. (U) Several of the group’s members chided the United States
for its «violent culture» as portrayed in popular Hollywood
movies. They linked this violent
behavior to America’s «desire»
to launch wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, many members
expressed a liking for violent films.
7. (U) Green’s interpreter noted that many pirated American
films (which are often subtitled in Russian and widely available
throughout Tajikistan) are not accurately translated. He told
of a locally available version of the popular children’s movie
«Shrek» in which the subtitles contain numerous profanities
not
present in the original film.
REFLECTIONS
8. (U) Green expressed doubt that a Hollywood film could be
DUSHANBE 00000855 002.2 OF 002
filmed in Tajikistan any time soon.
The same administrative
roadblocks that hinder film makers from sending their work
outside Tajikistan would hinder American companies from
producing inside the country.
Corruption and poor governance
are major deterrents to such activity.
9. (U) Comment: The prevalence of
pirated American films in
Tajikistan is a clear violation of international copyright law,
but the films are one of the few means by which Tajiks are able
to gain regular exposure to Western culture. Green’s meeting
with Dushanbe’s small film community offers an interesting
glimpse into how some Tajiks may be primarily exposed to
American cultural influences. His
outreach also revealed
another opportunity for engagement, through the January 2010
International Visitor multi-regional program on U.S. film
production. The Public Affairs
Section will nominate one of the
local filmmakers to participate.
End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 217146
date: 7/17/2009 17:05
refid: 09STATE74733
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09YEKATERINBURG36|09YEKATERINBURG40
header:
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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2015
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 074733
NOFORN
SIPDIS
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2034
TAGS: PINR, ETRD, KSUM, PREL, CH, KG, KZ, RS, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) KUDOS FOR REPORTING
ON JUNE 2009 SCO SUMMIT
(C-AL9-01463)
REF: A. YEKATERINBURG 000036
B. YEKATERINBURG 000040
Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS GREATLY APPRECIATE REF
REPORTS, INSIGHTS ON THE OUTCOME OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION (SCO) SUMMIT IN YEKATERINBURG, RUSSIA. CHINA’S
ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIA CONTINUES TO ATTRACT
CONSIDERABLE SENIOR POLICYMAKER INTEREST, AND ANY FURTHER
REPORTING POST CAN PROVIDE WILL FIND AN AVID READERSHIP.
MANY THANKS.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 217320
date: 7/20/2009 12:11
refid: 09DUSHANBE865
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE774|09DUSHANBE845
header:
VZCZCXRO1541
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0865/01 2011211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201211Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0549
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0025
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0123
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0185
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0102
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1176
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000865
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, AGRICULTURE FOR FAS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, PHUM, EAGR, ECON, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: LINKS BETWEEN FOOD INSECURITY AND POLITICAL
INSTABILITY
REF: A. A: DUSHANBE 774
B. REF B: DUSHANBE 845
C. REF C: O/I FROM DESK TO DUSHANBE, JULY 14, 2009
DUSHANBE 00000865 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) Summary: Tajikistan faces serious ongoing food
insecurity, and the situation may worsen as the year progresses.
While the link between poverty
and political instability is not
simple, experts here agree that a decline in the availability of
food in Tajikistan will contribute to political instability in
the region. As families face more
problems putting food on the
table, they will find it more difficult to resist the easy
profits of the drug trade. The
trade in Afghan poppy is known
to be the major source of income for Afghan terrorists. While
there is no evidence yet to suggest that food insecurity is a
factor behind recent anti-regime activity in Tajikistan itself,
some are concerned that new food problems in traditional
opposition areas may fuel conflict.
End summary.
—————————————
Food Problems May Go from Bad to Worse
—————————————
2. (U) Tajikistan faces ongoing problems with food security and
rising prices (reftel). Some
experts are concerned that the
situation — already precarious for many Tajiks, 53% of whom
live under the poverty line, according to the World Bank — may
worsen before the year’s end.
This spring’s heavy rains and
related natural disasters may result in low fall harvests,
making it more difficult for families to buy the food they need
to last them through the coming winter.
At the same time, as a
result of the ongoing financial crisis, Tajik families are
receiving lower remittances from relatives working abroad,
primarily in Russia. Already
money transfers are down over 35%
compared to last year. Tajikistan
is more dependent on
remittances than any country in the world; the loss of this
economic lifeline could be disastrous for individual families
and the country as a whole. The
loss of jobs in Russia presents
a double-whammy: families are not only losing a crucial source
of income, but they have to feed more mouths as newly unemployed
workers return home.
3. (U) Prices are rising as well.
Despite deflationary
pressures, the consumer price index in Tajikistan has risen by
2.8% since the beginning of the year, including 2.1% on food.
Food prices are almost 10% higher than at this time last year.
The price increases have not been distributed evenly across all
products. Wheat flour and
vegetable oil have decreased in price
while potatoes and pulses have increased. The single biggest
price rise has been in the Rasht Valley — an opposition
stronghold during the civil war that has seen a recent uptick in
violence — where potatoes are now 190% more costly than they
were last month.
———————————
Lack of Food May Fuel Drug Trade
———————————
4. (SBU) While the link between poverty and political
instability is neither simple nor easy to measure, local experts
here say that a decline in food availability in Tajikistan poses
a threat to regional security. A
primary pathway is through the
drug trade, which is known to support terrorist activity in
Afghanistan. Tajikistan is the
main route for taking Afghan
poppy north into Russia, and the country seizes more drugs than
the other Central Asian states combined.
With an average income
of less than US $70 per month, a single drug shipment represents
DUSHANBE 00000865 002.2 OF 003
an almost unimaginable profit for many Tajiks. The difficulty
is exacerbated by the fact that Tajikistan’s 1,344-km border
with Afghanistan is rugged and difficult to patrol.
Furthermore, although U.S. assistance is making progress in
training border guards, conscripts continue to be underpaid —
earning as little as $3 a month — and undernourished. Many of
those on front line border posts spend most of their time
scavenging for food, leaving relatively little time and energy
to patrol the border. For those
facing difficulty simply
putting food on their plates, we frequently hear that
involvement in the drug trade, even if it is turning a blind eye
in exchange for a small consideration, can be difficult to
resist.
————————————
And May Fuel Local Violence as Well
————————————
5. (SBU) Although some Tajik migrant workers are remaining in
Russia in the hopes of finding new work, others are returning
home. Last winter we noticed that
migrant men made their
seasonal return without the gifts and savings they have brought
in the past, leaving their families to face the most difficult
season without this critical assistance.
The worsening economic
climate has frayed tempers: a few months ago we witnessed a
shoving match break out at a food distribution between returning
migrants and local authorities over how the food was
distributed.
6. (SBU) Many of the areas hardest hit by the drop in
remittances and rising prices were opposition strongholds during
the civil war. For example, the
former Food for Peace program
worked in the Rasht Valley, where according to reports an armed
group — including fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan — is
currently operating (ref B).
Recent skirmishes in and around
the town of Tavildara, south of Rasht, have begun making
international news, causing some to speculate that Tajikistan
may be entering a period of renewed instability. In mid-July,
police officers manning checkpoints along the road through the
Rasht valley came to the local office of USAID food assistance
implementer Mercy Corps and asked to be given food in exchange
for «guarding» their offices.
Mercy Corps declined to take part
in the nascent protection racket.
(Comment: It is unlikely the
police officers would have approached an International NGO with
this request unless they were motivated by actual lack of food.
It is noteworthy that this comes in mid-summer when food is much
more available than in winter.
Hungry law officers potentially
could complicate an already tense situation in the area. End
comment.)
7. (SBU) According to Michael Jones, the UN Resident
Representative in Tajikistan, who has worked for twenty-five
years on food aid, the link between food insecurity and
political instability, while complicated and difficult to
measure, is nevertheless taken for granted by most experts.
Indeed, he said, he has worked in numerous countries where
governments deliberately sought to quell anti-regime activity by
delivering food assistance to targeted regions. He said that a
carefully-crafted food distribution program might achieve the
same results in Tajikistan. Such
a program he said, should
require buy-in from beneficiaries, whether cash payments or
in-kind work contributions, and work toward self-sustainment by
providing beneficiaries with skills and inputs for future
income-generating activity.
Tajikistan is lucky in some ways,
he said, because the abundance of rivers provides a ready source
of energy and irrigation water for agriculture. Agricultural
development is important not only as a source of income, but to
reverse the current trend in which Tajikistan produces less and
less of its own food needs.
DUSHANBE 00000865 003.2 OF 003
8. (SBU) Comment: While no strong evidence has yet emerged to
directly link food insecurity with the spate of anti-regime
attacks in Tavildara and elsewhere, the government’s failure to
ensure that its citizens are adequately fed could fuel the
violence, by adding another grievance to longstanding complaints
about being excluded from power and giving anti-regime forces a
rallying cry and message for recruitment. For this reason,
observers here worry that the growing
poverty in these regions
may be a factor that heightens the conflict. Less tenuous is
the relationship between poverty and involvement in the drug
trade. While the key factors
there are supply in Afghanistan
and demand in Russia, the involvement of Tajik middlemen helps
terrorism and instability in the region.
End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 217482
date: 7/21/2009 12:11
refid: 09DUSHANBE866
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2372
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0866 2021211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211211Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0552
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0028
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1179
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000866
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (PRESCOTT)
INL/AAE (BUHLER)
JUSTICE FOR DUCOT
DEFENSE FOR OSD/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, SNAR, KCRM, EAID, PINR, MASS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN ASKS FOR ANOTHER BORDER ACADEMY
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The First
Deputy of the State Committee for
National Security requested U.S. assistance to construct a new
Border Guard Academy on the grounds of a soon-to-be-handed-over
Russian military base near Dushanbe.
End summary.
2. (SBU) First Deputy of the
State Committee for National
Security, Qosim Gafarov told Emboffs that the KNB was going to
approach President Rahmon for approval for a new, larger, Border
Guard Academy to increase the cadet student body size from 150
to 250. He said the current
location in Dushanbe was too small
for desired growth.
3. (SBU) Gafarov said the best
location for the new Academy was
the Russian military base located on the outskirts of Dushanbe
near the meatpacking plant (myasokombinat). The Russians
promised to turn over their base at this location to the Tajiks
this year and the 14-hectare site was a great location for a new
academy. He painted a colorful picture of a full scale academy
with ample space for classrooms, dormitories, tactical training,
firing ranges, and other needs.
4. (SBU) When we pointed out that
INL was spending $2 million
to reconstruct the current Border Guard Academy and that CENTCOM
was building an interagency tactical training base Gafarov said
the Border Guards had sufficient requirements for tactical
training of their own but would consider using the new base when
CENTCOM has finished. Gafarov
discussed the idea for a new
Academy with current Academy Director, General Alodust Guraev,
and they concluded the soon-to-be-vacated base would be ideal.
5. (SBU) Obviously sensitive to
the U.S. concerns about the
funds invested in the current academy facility Gafarov said it
would be used to traing Afghans and mid-level Tajik officers who
are becoming post commanders, Customs Service, phyto-sanitary,
and others working at the border.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: EU/BOMCA also has invested considerable
funds in renovation of the current Border Guard Academy and OSCE
has a plan for curricula and teaching methodology reform; both
could be impacted by the new idea — if it comes to pass. The
OSCE Office border advisor told us that during the year long
effort to craft the about-to-be-released Border Management
Strategy Gafarov made no mention of a GOTI desire for a new
academy. Further, it is far from
clear that the Russians are
prepared to give up the base. We
understand the Tajik side is
currently pushing for a higher rent for the Russian presence; we
may know more after the visit of Russian President Medvedev next
week. It is possible that the
GOTI wants to use a potential
U.S. offer to revamp the base as a negotiating point with the
Russians. In any case, this
latest request reflects the general
trend of increasing requests for infrastructure investment from
the GOTI.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 217636
date: 7/22/2009 11:28
refid: 09DUSHANBE869
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09STATE68590
header:
VZCZCXRO3342
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0869 2031128
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221128Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0555
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0013
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1182
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000869
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/UNP (SUN), USUN (DUGAN), SCA/RA (MAZZONE)
NSC FOR BROWN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, OTRA, OVIP, KSEP, CVIS, UNGA, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — ATTENDANCE AT UNGA
REF: STATE 68590
1. (U) On July 8, per reftel, Post sent a request for
information regarding Tajikistan’s plans to send high-level
officials to this year’s United National General Assembly. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Post by diplomatic note on
July 14 that four Tajik officials plan to attend.
2. (SBU)
A. Attendance of the Head of State: President Emomali Rahmon
does not plan to attend the 2009 UNGA.
B. Attendance of the Head of Government: President Rahmon also
serves as head of Government.
C. Attendance of the Foreign Minister: The Foreign Minister
plans to attend.
— Hamrokhon Zarifi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Tajikistan
D. Attendance of other VIP’s: Tajikistan’s Permanent
Representative to the UN and Tajikistan’s Ambassador to the
United States plan to attend.
— Sirojiddin Aslov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of
Tajikistan to the United Nations
— Abdujabbor Shirinov, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Tajikistan to the United
States of America
E. Attendance of the Foreign Ministry official responsible for
IO affairs:
— Muzaffar Huseinov, Head of the Department of International
Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Tajikistan
3. (SBU) The Ministry said it would provide details of scheduled
dates of arrival and departure from the United States later.
The Ministry did not provide information on plans for
participation in the General Debate, spouses’ plans for
attendance, or need for translation or interpretation services.
Post will report this information septel when it is available.
However, all four of the officials listed above speak English.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 217709
date: 7/22/2009 15:46
refid: 09STATE76452
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09YEKATERINBURG36|09YEKATERINBURG40
header:
VZCZCXRO3711
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHC #6452 2031601
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 221546Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9322
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1287
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 2887
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 5509
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0888
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2101
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1095
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 076452
NOFORN
SIPDIS
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2034
TAGS: PINR, ETRD, KSUM, PREL, CH, KG, KZ, RS, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) CHINA’S ASSESSMENT
OF THE JUNE 2009 SCO
SUMMIT (C-AL9-01463)
REF: A. YEKATERINBURG 000036
B. YEKATERINBURG 000040
Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE VERY INTERESTED IN
CHINA’S ASSESSMENT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
(SCO) SUMMIT HELD IN JUNE 2009 IN YEKATERINBURG, RUSSIA.
CHINA’S ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIA IS OF POLICYMAKER
INTEREST, AND ANY FURTHER REPORTING POST CAN PROVIDE, TIME
AND RESOURCES PERMITTING, ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
REGARDING CHINA AND THE SCO WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.
A. (S) WHAT IS BEIJING’S OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES DURING THE SCO SUMMIT?
B. (S) HOW DOES THE SCO FIT INTO CHINA’S OVERALL
REGIONAL
OUTREACH TO CENTRAL ASIA, AND TO WHAT EXTENT DOES BEIJING
VIEW THE SCO AS A TOOL TO MANAGE US PRESENCE IN THAT REGION?
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES CHINA SEEK TO USE SUMMIT AGREEMENTS TO
MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US OR OTHER NON-SCO MEMBERS?
C. (S) DOES CHINA PREFER TO WORK BILATERALLY ON
CERTAIN
ISSUES AND MULTILATERALLY ON OTHERS?
WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES?
DID CHINA OR OTHER SCO MEMBERS
TAKE ANY STEPS DURING THE
YEKATERINBURG SUMMIT TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF THE SCO IN
FACILITATING REGIONAL COOPERATION?
D. (S) WHAT IS THE STRENGTH IN RELATIONS AMONG SCO
MEMBER
STATES, AND DOES CHINA VIEW THESE RELATIONS WITH THE SAME
REGARD AS DO OTHER MEMBER STATES?
E. (S) WHAT IS CHINA’S STRATEGIC INTENT FOR THE $10
BILLION
LOAN, AND HOW DOES BEIJING EXPECT TO DISPENSE THE PLEDGED
AMOUNT? WHAT INITIATIVES OR
PROJECTS HAVE BEEN PROPOSED, HOW
MUCH MONEY WILL BE ALLOCATED TO EACH, AND WILL THE PROPOSED
PROJECTS BE IMPLEMENTED ON A BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL BASIS?
F. (S) WHAT IS THE PURPOSE BEHIND CHINA’S PLANS TO
HAVE
INVESTMENT DELEGATIONS MEET WITH SCO MEMBER STATES? WHAT NEW
STRATEGIES, IF ANY, HAS BEIJING FORMULATED TO ENCOURAGE TRADE
AND INVESTMENT IN THE REGION? IN
WHAT SPECIFIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY AREAS DOES CHINA SEEK IMPROVED MULTILATERAL
COOPERATION?
2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-01463 IN THE SUBJECT LINE
OF
REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 217738
date: 7/22/2009 20:51
refid: 09STATE76696
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09YEKATERINBURG36|09YEKATERINBURG40
header:
VZCZCXRO3983
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHC #6696 2032106
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 222051Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9335
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1288
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 2894
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 5515
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0889
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2117
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1098
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 076696
NOFORN
SIPDIS
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2034
TAGS: PINR, ETRD, KSUM, PREL, CH, KG, KZ, RS, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) CHINA’S ASSESSMENT
OF THE JUNE 2009 SCO
SUMMIT (C-AL9-01463)
REF: A. YEKATERINBURG 000036
B. YEKATERINBURG 000040
Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE VERY INTERESTED IN
CHINA’S ASSESSMENT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
(SCO) SUMMIT HELD IN JUNE 2009 IN YEKATERINBURG, RUSSIA.
CHINA’S ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIA IS OF POLICYMAKER
INTEREST, AND ANY FURTHER REPORTING POST CAN PROVIDE, TIME
AND RESOURCES PERMITTING, ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
REGARDING CHINA AND THE SCO WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.
A. (S) WHAT IS BEIJING’S OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES DURING THE SCO SUMMIT?
B. (S) HOW DOES THE SCO FIT INTO CHINA’S OVERALL REGIONAL
OUTREACH TO CENTRAL ASIA, AND TO WHAT EXTENT DOES BEIJING
VIEW THE SCO AS A TOOL TO MANAGE US PRESENCE IN THAT REGION?
TO WHAT EXTENT DOES CHINA SEEK TO USE SUMMIT AGREEMENTS TO
MANAGE THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US OR OTHER NON-SCO MEMBERS?
C. (S) DOES CHINA PREFER TO WORK BILATERALLY ON
CERTAIN
ISSUES AND MULTILATERALLY ON OTHERS?
WHAT ARE SOME EXAMPLES?
DID CHINA OR OTHER SCO MEMBERS
TAKE ANY STEPS DURING THE
YEKATERINBURG SUMMIT TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF THE SCO IN
FACILITATING REGIONAL COOPERATION?
D. (S) WHAT IS THE STRENGTH IN RELATIONS AMONG SCO
MEMBER
STATES, AND DOES CHINA VIEW
