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id: 213635
date: 6/24/2009 4:29
refid: 09DUSHANBE782
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000782
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (HUSHEK)
INL/AAE (BUHLER)
JUSTICE FOR (DUCOT AND NEWCOMBE)
DEFENSE FOR OSD/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, SNAR, KCRM, KJUS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: MAY 2009 LAW ENFORCEMENT DEVELOPMENTS
REF: DUSHANBE 723
DUSHANBE 00000782 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jacobson and Tajik Minister of
Foreign Affairs Hamrokhon Zarifi signed Amendment 9 to the INL
Letter of Agreement which provides almost $9.5 in additional
counter-narcotics, law enforcement, and justice sector
assistance to Tajikistan, and a Memorandum of Understanding
regarding bilateral cooperation in a $7 million USAID project on
Local Governance and Citizen Participation Program. Police
seized sizable quantities of hashish, heroin, and destroyed
large quantities of marijuana in the initial weeks of the annual
anti-drug operation «Poppy-2009». An unfortunate mountain-road
traffic accident uncovered 330 kilos of opium in a freight
truck. The OSCE launched (but did
not open) the Border
Management Staff College. INL
Dushanbe issued eight grants
totaling $300,000 to Tajik non-governmental organizations for
programs in court monitoring, legal aid to indigents, legal
education, legal representation of minors, and third party
arbitration. End summary.
2. On May 8 Ambassador Jacobson
and Tajik Minister of Foreign
Affairs Hamrokhon Zarifi signed Amendment 9 to the Letter of
Agreement between Tajikistan and the United States to provide
$9,426,000 in additional assistance for narcotics control, law
enforcement, and justice sector reform.
With this assistance,
the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program has
provided more than $37 million to support Tajikistan’s security,
rule of law and counter narcotics efforts since 1992.
3. On May 8 Ambassador Jacobson
and Tajik Foreign Minister
Hamrokhon Zarifi signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding
bilateral cooperation in a $7 million project on Local
Governance and Citizen Participation Program. The project has
five areas of emphasis: promoting government decentralization,
working with a Presidential Working Group to support reform
empowering local government at the all levels and including
local government and community stakeholders in the national
policy dialogue on local government reform; training to make
local governance more effective;
increasing citizen awareness
of local issues and participation in local governance; improving
accountability of local governing institutions; sharing
information with the public about government budgets, progress
in decentralization, and how citizens can participate in
government. The program is funded
by USAID, and implemented by
the Urban Institute.
DRUGS. DRUGS, AND MORE DRUGS
4. Police seized 48 kilograms of
hashish in the border village
of Qizil Sou of Farkhor oblast in southern Tajikistan, and
arrested an Afghan national Abdurazzoq valadi Abdugaffor.
Police reported seizures on May 8 and 9 of more than 20 kilos of
heroin in two separate operations.
Police officers seized two
kilograms of heroin in Dushanbe, more than 18 kilograms of
heroin at the Sino Hotel in Chkalovsk, and also 1.5 kilograms of
hashish in northern Tajikistan’s Sugd’s Spitamen district.
Police officers detained a local resident and an Afghan national
near the border village of Samonchi in Farkhor on May 17 on
suspicion of drug
trafficking. Police seized 36 kilograms
of
raw opium from them. One of them
tried to flee and police
wounded him in the leg. The Drug Control Agency destroyed
500,512 marijuana bushes in Sugd’s Bobojon Gafurov district.
5. On May 10 the Police and the
Drug Control Agency launched an
anti-drug operation, dubbed Poppy-2009 which will continue until
November 30. The operation
involves all law enforcement
agencies as well as Ministry of Agriculture, Agency for
Environmental Protection, the Committee for TV and
Radio-Broadcasting and local authorities. The Drug Control
Agency is responsible for coordinating the operation. In all,
law enforcement officers seized some 100 kilograms of narcotics
in Tajikistan over the first ten days of the operation.
DUSHANBE 00000782 002.2 OF 003
6. Officers from the Sugd
Counter-Narcotics Directorate began a
large-scale effort to uncover heroin distribution rings in the
province. According to
Mirzoravshan Qutbiddinov, an official
with the Sugd Counter-Narcotics Directorate, a number of
operations carried out in the province since the beginning of
the year led to the arrest of 11 heroin pushers. Narcotics
confiscated from them would have been enough for 16,000 doses.
The investigation discovered that about 80% of heroin pushers
are drug addicts themselves.
7. On May 26 Police discovered
about 330 kilos of opium when
heavy truck fell off a precipice near Nurek. A heavy Kamaz
truck loaded with 15 tons of rice fell into precipice 39
kilometers northwest of the city of Nurek. The truck was moving
from GBAO’s Shugnan district to Dushanbe when the driver lost
control and drove off a 150-meter precipice. The driver died on
the scene. When examining the
vehicle, police officers
discovered a number of hiding places containing the raw opium.
8. Officers from the Drug Control
Agency broke up a
drug-smuggling gang dealing with transporting narcotics to
Russia. Drug Control Agency
officers arrested a Tajik national
in Rudaki district on May 26 on suspicion of drug trafficking.
When searching his car, drug control officers found 12 packages
containing over 11 kilos of heroin.
9. The Border Guards reported
that Border Guards and officers
from the Drug Control Agency carried out a special joint
operation in GBAO’s Darvoz district on May 23. The officers
spotted and tried to detain a group of drug traffickers who were
crossing the Pyanj river near the area of Zighar-Valvalak in
Darvoz. A firefight ensued and
the drug traffickers retreated
to Afghanistan. Officers seized
about 25 kilos of narcotics,
including 12.5 kilograms of hashish, 12.3 kilograms of heroin,
and one Kalashnikov sub-machine gun.
10. Border Guards and Drug
Control Officers carried out an
operation in the area of Patkmou-Sari Ob in Darvoz on May 25 and
arrested 10 members of an organized drug-trafficking ring.
Officers seized 65 kilograms of narcotics, including five
kilograms of hashish and 58 kilograms of raw opium, as well as a
large number of weapons. The ring
consisted of both Afghans and
Tajiks.
YEAR-TO-DATE SEIZURE
11. Over the first five months of
this year, Tajik law
enforcement agencies seized more than 2 tons of narcotics. The
total includes 444 kilograms of heroin, 362 kilograms of raw
opium and some 1000 kilograms of cannabis.
BORDER MANAGEMENT COLLEGE
12. On May 27 the OSCE launched
the Border Management Staff
College which will train border security managers and promote
co-operation between OSCE States and Partner countries,
including neighboring Afghanistan.
Foreign Minister Hamrokhon
Zarifi, senior representatives from the Border Guards, the Head
of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Ambassador Vladimir Pryahin as
well as ambassadors and other representatives of OSCE
participating States attended the launch ceremony. The College
is scheduled to open in the fall in temporary quarters on the
DUSHANBE 00000782 003.2 OF 003
OSCE premises. A research and
development centre will also be
housed at the college. Training and research will focus on the
free and secure movement of persons, border crossing procedures,
facilitating trade and transport security. The College aims to
provide a single point of knowledge delivery and promote
international standards and best practices in all aspects of
border management.
JUSTICE SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS
13. President Rahmon appointed
Mahmad Zabirovich Rahimov, a
Member of Parliament, as the Director of the National
Legislative Center under the President of the Republic of
Tajikistan. President Rahmon
called for the establishment of a
National Legislative Center in his annual speech to the
Parliament in 2008 and in March of 2009 he decreed its
establishment. The goal of the
Center is to eliminate
contradictions in laws, improve the quality of new laws, and
bring Tajik legislation into compliance with international
treaties signed by Tajikistan. In
the Soviet-era Mr. Rahimov
headed the department of commercial law at the National
University. INL Dushanbe
developed a project with the Justice
Sector portfolio to train lawyers who will work in the Center.
14. Via a recently launched
Justice Sector Reform program, INL
Dushanbe issued eight grants totaling $300,000 to Tajik
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to carry out programs in
court monitoring, legal aid to indigents, legal education, legal
representation of minors, and third party arbitration.
(reftel).
15. INL and IOM are setting new
priorities in counter
trafficking. Emboffs met with
Zeynal Hajiev, Head of IOM, to
discuss ways to improve the INL anti-trafficking project
implemented by IOM. IOM revised
the project plan to focus on
training to law enforcement bodies to increase detections,
investigations, prosecutions and convictions in trafficking
cases to help Tajikistan improve its counter trafficking efforts
and avoid degrading.
16. Comment: The signing of two important documents on
cooperation is an endorsement of the three-pillar approach the
mission strategic plan: security cooperation, economic
development, and democratic reform.
The agreements signify
continued Tajik Government interest in expanding cooperation in
fighting the spread of narcotics, terrorism and trafficking in
persons.
17. Comment continued: While Tajikistan’s counter-drug
operation is an annual event, we see increased interest in
interagency coordination in Tajikistan and cross-border
cooperation between the Tajik and Kyrgyz DCA.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 213888
date: 6/25/2009 10:50
refid: 09DUSHANBE785
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 DUSHANBE 000785
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2019
TAGS: EAID, ECON, EINV, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR A/S BLAKE’S JULY VISIT
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe welcomes the upcoming visit of A/S
Blake. Following is an overview
of the key issues in Tajikistan
and some talking points for your meetings with senior government
officials.
Overview
2. (C) Tajikistan has the potential to be a stabilizing
influence and a contributor to economic development in
Afghanistan and Central Asia, because of its huge hydropower
potential, untapped mineral resources, relative (to Afghanistan)
stability, and religiously moderate population. To play this
role, one which is vital to our interests in Afghanistan and the
region, Tajikistan must overcome the many political and economic
problems which have stymied its post-independence development:
bad relations with neighboring Uzbekistan, internal regional
rivalries, cronyism, endemic corruption, a dysfunctional economy
dominated by Soviet-era structures, dependence on remittances
and illegal drug trafficking income, chronic food insecurity,
and economic flight of much of the population to Russia. The
malign influence of Afghan instability cannot be underestimated;
traffic in its drugs undermines rule of law in Tajikistan,
Tajiks naturally fear the spread of extremist ideas from
Afghanistan, and militants in Afghanistan can threaten Tajik
security across the long, poorly-secured border.
3. (C) When they look south Tajiks sense the precariousness of
their situation. Chronic problems
with Uzbekistan, caused by
personal animosity between the presidents of each country and
Uzbek opposition to Tajik plans to build dams on rivers
Uzbekistan depends on for agriculture, compound their worries.
Fear of Russian interference looms large in the Tajik
consciousness. To ensure their
future, they seek alternative
partners, including the United States, China, and Iran. China
is a major infrastructure donor, with $800 million in low
interest loans to Tajikistan to build large road and power line
projects to connect the north and south of the country, while
Iran funds tunnel and hydropower projects.
Economic Situation
4. (C) The poorest former Soviet republic, Tajikistan faces
serious challenges. It is the
second most mountainous country
in the world, with earthquakes, floods, droughts, locust
infestations, and extreme weather.
Parts of the country are
frequently cut off by snow, landslides, and avalanches.
External links must pass through obstructive Uzbekistan,
unstable Afghanistan, or over the rough and remote passes to
western China or Kyrgyzstan.
5. (C) Tajikistan’s only real industries are aluminum and
hydroelectricity. The Tajik
Aluminum Company (Talco) accounts
for most of Tajikistan’s exports and should be a major source of
income. However, its revenues go
through a secretive offshore
company controlled by the President, and the Tajik state sees
little income from the plant.
Talco consumes up to half the
country’s electricity production, contributing to major
shortages and suffering for other consumers in the winter and
spring when water levels are low, disrupting other economic
activities, and deterring investment.
6. (C) Electricity is sold at prices well below cost, draining
state coffers and encouraging waste.
Electrical infrastructure
is crumbling. Tajikistan’s
leadership sinks some of its limited
resources into the massive Rogun hydropower station, begun in
the Soviet era but delayed by the civil war, ownership disputes
with Russia, and opposition by downstream Uzbekistan. The Tajik
government has been forced to reduce project financing in recent
DUSHANBE 00000785 002 OF 007
months due to the global recession.
Smaller hydropower stations
built with foreign financing have their own problems. The
completion date for the partly operational Sangtuda-1 power
station continues to recede as Russian and Tajik joint operators
squabble over payments, while the Sangtuda-2 station financed by
Iran is several years from completion.
7. (C) Agriculture is a major domestic economic sector. Cotton
production dominates, running on command-economy principles for
the benefit of a few politically connected investors; they sell
inputs to farmers, whom authorities then force to grow cotton to
sell back to investors at below-market rates. Cotton’s
profitability has declined because of lack of investment and low
world cotton prices. In recent
years, farmers have gone over
$500 million into debt. Meanwhile, little food is grown and most
food is imported.
8. (C) Arguably the greatest obstacle to improving the economy
is resistance to reform at all levels of Tajikistan’s
government. From the President
down to the policeman on the
street, government is characterized by cronyism and corruption.
As one foreign ambassador summed up, President Rahmon prefers to
control 90% of a ten-dollar pie rather than 30% of a
hundred-dollar pie. He and his
family have their hands in the
country’s major businesses, including the largest bank.
Falling Out with Donors
9. (C) The government’s support to the unprofitable cotton
sector led to a crisis in relations with donors. In December
2007, Tajikistan’s National Bank admitted that it had hidden
hundreds of millions of dollars in loans and guarantees to
cotton investors, violating the terms of its IMF program. The
IMF demanded early repayment of some debt, an audit of the
National Bank, and other reforms before renewing assistance.
The audit, which Tajik state and private entities obstructed,
revealed that in the past five years the National Bank had
loaned or guaranteed over $1 billion to cotton interests, over
half of which was never repaid.
The head of the National Bank,
Murodali Alimardon, had business ties to the cotton investors
his bank was supporting. To
placate donors, Rahmon removed him
from the Bank — promoting him to Deputy Prime Minister. Despite
the audit results, in May the IMF board extended a further $116
million loan to Tajikistan; the United States was the only IMF
member to vote against the renewed assistance, which infuriated
the Tajik government.
10. (C) The IMF has disbursed the first $40 million in
assistance. Before it releases
the next tranche of $30 million
in October, a team will review the country’s macroeconomic
performance, progress in reforming the National Bank and fiscal
oversight in general. Several
reforms have been announced: a
stronger supervisory board at the Bank with outside members, new
legislation barring the Bank from making fiscal policy,
conflict-of-interest regulations, and a commitment to disengage
from cotton-sector financing.
However, enactment is a far cry
from implementation. Though the
IMF is willing to continue
working with Tajikistan, the
government needs to show real
progress by September.
11. (C) Tajikistan must diversify away from cotton, and the
government must stop telling farmers what to grow. The recent
comprehensive cotton debt forgiveness plan that includes renewed
efforts to allow farmers the freedom to choose what crops to
grow is a positive step. However,
local officials ignored
previous «freedom to farm» decrees and the President’s decree
banning forcing university students to pick cotton. Students
who refuse have been expelled from university. Though this year
a few officials were reprimanded for using forced student labor,
it remains to be seen whether the government has the will to
DUSHANBE 00000785 003 OF 007
make significant changes.
Economic lifeline
12. (C) The most important economic lifeline for most Tajiks is
the remittances from some million compatriots working abroad,
mainly in Russia. The money they
sent home was equivalent to
over 50 percent of GDP last year, and literally keeps rural
communities alive. Though mostly
adult men go abroad, recently
we have seen younger labor migrants and significant numbers of
women. Parts of the Tajik
countryside have lost their entire
productive population.
Remittances grew dramatically in the
past six years, along with the Russian economy, but due to the
economic crisis they have fallen 40% this year. This compounds
the effects of the winter of 2007-2008, the coldest in decades,
which destroyed food supplies, and forced many to sell animals
or tools to make ends meet. Remittances fund imports of food and
goods from abroad, so the decline in remittances has reduced
government revenues, which depend largely on import duties.
Government agencies have orders to cut their budgets by 20%.
Donors have insisted that social sector spending be maintained.
Talking point: What concrete steps have you taken on the
conditionality for the IMF loan from the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) in advance of the mission in September
and the board vote in October?
What can you say about steps in
response to National Bank/TALCO audits?
Politics and Human Rights
13. (C) Despite declaring he is a democrat, Rahmon has reduced
the ability of opposition political parties to operate, and made
little progress on reforming election laws in the runup to the
2010 parliamentary elections. The
government subjects civil
society organizations to onerous registration requirements and
inspections, and has increased efforts to curb the activities of
non-traditional religious groups, Islamic or otherwise. Our
advice that this will only serve to radicalize religious
minorities falls on deaf ears.
The President appointed a human
rights Ombudsman recently, but the office is not independent of
him, nor does it have resources.
The Ombudsman has already
asked donors to finance his operations.
14. (S) Having gained power in the civil war, Rahmon distrusts
political pluralism and economic liberalism, and focuses on
increasing his control and undermining potential rivals. The
civil war ended with a power sharing arrangement between
Rahmon’s government and the leaders of various parts of the
United Tajik Opposition; Rahmon gradually reneged on that deal,
forcing oppositionists out of government, into prison, or out of
the country. In the last 18
months he has faced challenges to
his authority from regional strongmen in the Rasht Valley,
Kulyob, and Badakhshan, putting them down with a mixture of
force and largesse. Regional
strongmen have some autonomy, and
control official and unofficial armed groups. Since May
security forces have been watching, but not engaging, former
Tajik opposition leaders supported by foreign fighters in the
Tavildara and Darvaz districts.
15. (C) Parliamentary elections in February 2010 are unlikely to
lead to greater political openness.
Parliamentary opposition is
weak — 15 of the 62 members of the lower house of parliament are
not ruling party, and some of these are independent in name
only. Parliament acts as a rubber
stamp, barely discussing
important legislation such as the national budget. The one real
opposition party, the Islamic Revival Party, has not actively
opposed the new law on religion, is internally divided, and
could lose its two seats in the next election. The government
DUSHANBE 00000785 004 OF 007
forced the National Democratic Institute out of the country in
2008, preventing it from engaging in political party training.
Talking Point: The OSCE and IFES have sponsored roundtables on
electoral reform and made a series of recommendations, what
steps do you plan to take in advance of next year’s
parliamentary elections?
Security Cooperation
16. (C) Because of Tajikistan’s fear that instability in
Afghanistan could spread north, counterterrorism, border
security and counternarcotics are areas where the Tajiks are
most enthusiastic about cooperation.
Tajikistan joined the
Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, and with our help is
committed to fielding a peacekeeping company by 2010. We help
train Border Guards and National Guard forces, and provide our
International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military
Financing, and military-to-military programs.
17. (C) Tajikistan quickly agreed to our request to allow
transit of non-lethal supplies to our forces in Afghanistan, and
is eager to see actual shipments begin.
The Tajiks see this as
a way to show their support on Afghanistan. In return the
Tajiks routinely request more assistance for infrastructure in
Tajikistan, such as dams, roads and railroads.
18. (C) Narcotics cooperation has mixed results. The United
States largely funds the Drug Control Agency, whose successful
seizure rate has made it a model for other countries in the
region. However, the Tajiks have
been reluctant to go beyond
simple seizures to pursue criminal networks and higher-level
targets, possibly because of the political connections of higher
level drug traffickers.
19. (S/NF) Counterterrorism cooperation is vital, and is taking
on a new urgency in 2009 with the increased Taliban presence in
Northern Afghanistan and recent incursions by foreign fighters
into Tajikistan. However, the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
program’s budget was reduced in the past two years, limiting us
to classroom training. ATA
programs increase the Tajiks’
operational capabilities and give us vital liaison and
information opportunities.
CENTCOM’s Counter-Narcotics and
Terrorism training has been reduced from four annual engagements
to two, at a time when Tajikistan has more frequent
counterterrorism operations.
20. (C) Cross border cooperation has been slow to gain Tajik
acceptance. The Tajik government
has a distinct aversion to
cooperation with Afghanistan, viewing all Afghans as drug
smugglers and security risks.
This view has slowed the full use
of the U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhny Pyanj, and impedes programs
such as a joint border security training center. A program to
train Afghan National Army officers at the Tajik Defense Academy
did not go as planned as the training offered did not match the
level of the Afghan officers, and the Tajiks then ended the
program early.
Talking Point: We want to expand counter-narcotics cooperation,
and see real opportunities for Tajikistan to help train/improve
Afghan border security forces.
You discussed this nearly two
years ago with A/S Boucher. How
can we move this forward?
Regional Integration
DUSHANBE 00000785 005 OF 007
21. (C) The donor community is pushing for regional energy
market integration, with the construction of power lines that
will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell their surplus
summer electricity output to power-starved Afghanistan. A 220
kw line from Tajikistan to Afghanistan is under construction now
with Asian Development Bank financing, and will be finished in
late 2010. The larger CASA-1000
power line project to connect
Kyrgyzstan through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan has
not gotten off the ground.
According to the ADB, due to the
global financial crisis its focus has shifted to near term on
poverty reduction projects.
TIP Troubles
22. (C) Tajikistan made some progress in fighting Trafficking in
Persons (TIP) in the past year, punishing some local officials
for forcing students to pick cotton, and increasing the number
of trafficking convictions. They
made no progress on protection
of victims or investigating allegations of abuse of victims by
officials. Tajikistan barely
escaped a downgrade to Tier 3, and
we are now discussing with the government an action plan to
produce serious improvement in Tajikistan’s anti-TIP efforts.
Talking Point: It was thanks to the efforts of Ambassador and
Embassy that Tajikistan was not downgraded to Tier 3 on TIP this
year. To avoid downgrading next
year we need a serious
improvement in arrests, prosecutions and convictions. The time
for working groups and conferences is past. Who in the
government has the power to attack this issue?
Assistance Growing
23. (C) Until FY 2008 Tajikistan had a multi-year food aid
program that showed significant results against food insecurity
in some of Tajikistan’s most at-risk regions. We provided food
to the poorest and taught agricultural techniques and food
preservation methods to have a long term impact on the
communities.
24. (C) U.S. assistance to Tajikistan stands to grow
significantly to $52 million in FY 2010, from $30 million in FY
2009. The main growth is in
economic areas — agriculture,
trade, and private sector initiatives to compensate for the loss
of the much-needed food security programming in FY 2008. Our
programs help give farmers strong land use rights, improve the
business environment, and facilitate trade. Programs
establishing water users associations are very successful at
building sustainable local irrigation schemes and raising
incomes as much as 200 percent.
Health and Education
25. (C) The education and public health systems have declined
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Health and education
deficiencies are so acute they imperil our progress in other
areas. Our programs work to
improve health policies, systems
and services, focusing on safe motherhood, newborns and
management of childhood illnesses, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis
control. Our education programs
focus on teacher training,
education finance, national curriculum, student performance
assessment, and school governance.
DUSHANBE 00000785 006 OF 007
Public Diplomacy
26. (C) Public diplomacy efforts in Tajikistan face major
challenges — falling literacy, little knowledge of English, and
Russian «black propaganda» that portrays the United States as
a
destabilizing influence bent on importing radical Islamic and
Christian ideas, undermining traditional relationships, even
manipulating the drug trade for political gain. Russia sponsors
the best university in the country, so the brightest students
look to Russia as a model. Our
exchange and visitor programs
are vital to expand the horizons of future Tajik leaders beyond
a Russo-centric mindset. Our
programs have great impact for
their size, but are far too small to match our interests in this
region. Four imams who visited
the United States in May were
amazed by the religious freedom there.
On the down side, these
same imams refused to visit the embassy to watch President
Obama’s June 4 speech to the global Muslim community. Visits by
American Islamic clerics to Tajikistan could help build the
bridges of understanding to open the minds of Tajik Muslims to
our message.
27. (C) Without doubling or tripling the State Department budget
for English language teaching in Tajikistan, the embassy will
soon face a crisis in finding students to fill our already small
quota of high school and university exchange programs, leaving
Tajik youth even more isolated.
Access Microscholarships
provide great benefit to underprivileged, talented students but
the demand far exceeds the supply of six programs of 45 students
each. We have two English
Language Fellows doing professional
English teacher training, but three more co-located in cities
with American Corners could enhance the skills of more teachers.
28. (C) A Peace Corps program that provided English language
training would help keep Tajiks from falling further behind.
President Rahmon once asked to have Peace Corps in Tajikistan,
just as all other Central Asian states have, but for budgetary
reasons Washington could not respond.
With a new administration
which favors expanding Peace Corps, this would be a good time to
push for a mission here. Peace
Corps volunteers could address
pressing development needs at the local level, and would expose
many more Tajiks to American values.
Talking Point — We have a new administration and hope to have a
new Peace Corps director soon. We
can bring 50 native speakers
of English to serve as resources for your schools in all parts
of the country, but we need a new appeal from you to
successfully lobby for a program in Tajikistan.
Embassy Resources
29. (C) Embassy resources have not kept up with our expanding
interests here. In the past five
years embassy staff increased
500%, embassy space increased 250%, but our ICASS budget grew
only 24%. DEA, USAID, and ODC
need to add positions to properly
monitor their expanding programs, but Ambassador imposed a
moratorium on further American positions because of a lack of
management staff and resources to support them. This year we
have gained an HRO, and received approval for a second GSO, but
are still seeking approval for an additional IMS and a
significant increase to our ICASS base.
In the meantime, tens
of millions of dollars of programming is at risk because of
inadequate American oversight, caused directly by inadequate
management resources.
30. (C) We have serious recruitment and retention problems with
our locally engaged staff. We are
not only competing with
DUSHANBE 00000785 007 OF 007
businesses and companies in Tajikistan, but with opportunities
abroad as increasing numbers of highly educated Tajiks leave
because of high inflation and decreasing opportunities here. In
2008 local staff received a 12.5 % pay increase in an off-cycle
review; we hope for a follow on increase in 2009 on-cycle
review. Continued pay increases
for FSN staff will be vital to
allow us to compete with other organizations in Dushanbe. The
embassy also needs resources to fix inadequate facilities; we
have no on-site warehouse, workshops, or motorpool; these
facilities are located in a condemned property several miles
away, creating oversight problems and additional expenses.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 213917
date: 6/25/2009 12:43
refid: 09DUSHANBE786
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8764
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0786/01 1761243
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 251243Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0477
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0166
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0046
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1026
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000786
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, KCRM, TI
SUBJECT: WHO KILLED FORMER TAJIK INTERIOR MINISTER SOLEHOV?
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Summary: Competing explanations have emerged regarding
last week’s death of former Tajik Minister of Internal Affairs
Mahmadnazar Solehov. Initial
reports indicated that Solehov,
for whom an arrest warrant was issued the day before his death,
killed himself to avoid arrest.
The government of Tajikistan
continues to publicly insist on this explanation. However,
Solehov’s family members claim police murdered him after
entering his house. Solehov’s
death highlights the heavy-handed
nature of President Rahmon’s government in the midst of
Tajikistan’s growing internal troubles.
End summary.
A SUICIDE . . . ?
2. (SBU) At about 10 p.m. on the evening of June 17 a crowd
gathered outside Solehov’s house in Dushanbe, located a few
yards from an embassy staffer’s house.
A source at the scene
said that Solehov had shot himself less than an hour before.
According to a second source, a neighbor of Solehov’s, two
guests had arrived at the house shortly before the incident.
This source said he later heard two gunshots from inside
Solehov’s house. He claimed he
later saw two bodies being
removed from the home, including that of the former minister.
It was unclear to him who had shot whom.
3. (SBU) Subsequent media reports indicated that at least one
guest, Rahmatullo Asadulloev, had been eating dinner with
Solehov at the time of his death.
Asadulloev is the former head
of Tajikistan’s Committee for Youth, Sports, and Tourism. He
told local media that police entered Solehov’s home to arrest
him as they were eating. Solehov
then went into another room
and shot himself.
. . . OR MURDER?
4. (SBU) According to a local journalist who arrived at the
house shortly after the shooting, Solehov’s 12-year-old son was
still present at the scene. When
asked how his father had died,
the child replied that someone had shot Solehov. Later in the
evening, Solehov’s wife arrived at the hospital in which her
deceased husband lay, and reportedly exclaimed, «They’ve shot my
husband!» News media
published the family’s account of the
incident the afternoon following Solehov’s death. Since then
the family has been silent, arousing suspicion that officials
had intimidated or bribed them.
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
5. (SBU) The government continues to explain the death as a
suicide. It points to Solehov’s
impending arrest as his
motivation for killing himself.
President Rahmon announced
Solehov’s removal as Interior Minister on January 29 without
public explanation. In subsequent
months, Solehov was charged
with several offenses, including abuse of authority and
embezzlement of funds. The
Prosecutor General’s office called
him in for questioning on several occasions, but he apparently
ignored these requests.
6. (S) RSO spoke with five of Solehov’s former assistants on
June 20. All five, including
Solehov’s former Personal
Assistant and Chief of Staff, expressed their belief that it was
«impossible» for Solehov to have killed himself. They believed
Solehov simply knew too much about the inner workings of
Rahmon’s government, and had come to be seen as a liability to
the administration. None of these
contacts were at Solehov’s
home on the night of his death, and all had developed a strong
loyalty to Solehov, possibly biasing their judgment. However,
their willingness to engage Embassy staff and present a
collective viewpoint opposite that of the government is
noteworthy.
7. (SBU) Several second-hand sources have provided additional
information to EmbOffs which, while difficult to corroborate,
DUSHANBE 00000786 002 OF 002
casts further doubt upon the government’s suicide explanation.
Some reports claimed that Solehov was still alive while being
taken to the hospital. Solehov
was buried just 12 hours after
his death, quite hasty by local practice. The government has
not reported on the results of a post-mortem medical
examination, except to claim that Solehov had been drinking at
the time of his death.
WHO WAS MAHMADNAZAR SOLEHOV?
8. (C) Like President Rahmon, The 52-year old Solehov was from a
Kulyabi family, and held several high-level government jobs
throughout his life. Before
serving as Interior Minister,
Solehov was the Chief of the President’s administration from
2003 to 2006. He was also
Chairman of the Council of Judges
from January to December 2003 and Chairman of the Constitutional
Court from 2000 to 2003. During
the civil war he was a
prosecutor in Sughd Oblast. Like
other prosecutors, he likely
used his position for personal gain.
During his tenure as Chief
of the Presidential Administration, he allegedly sold government
positions to supplement his personal income. This is not
untypical behavior here.
9. (S) Rumors purporting to explain Solehov’s fall from grace
are making the rounds. There is
simply no way to confirm any of
these stories, and indeed many of them are likely false, but
their prevalence gives some indication of the fertile atmosphere
surrounding these events. In
early February embassy staff heard
from multiple sources that Russian police had arrested Solehov’s
son, along with the sons of the Minister of Energy and the head
of the Organized Crime Unit, for attempting to smuggle heroin
into Moscow. According to one
version, one of the sons tried to
buy his way out of captivity by offering Russian authorities a
$1 million bribe. This rumor
never made it into the newspapers.
According to another rumor, also
unprinted, Solehov had told a
close circle of friends shortly before his arrest that it was
time to see the President go. One
of the friends, however,
turned out to be an informant for the State Security Committee,
who informed the President’s staff.
A similar rumor but from
another perspective has it that Solehov was in contact with
Uzbek secret services, and aimed to somehow overthrow Rahmon.
10. (C) Comment: It is not unusual for senior officials to leave
government service only to be later charged with various crimes;
the system here is deeply corrupt, so there is no shortage of
compromising material, and the threat of arrest and prison is a
convenient tool to maintain the loyalty of former officials. It
is, however, quite unusual for a senior official to end up dead
under such suspicious circumstances.
The questions surrounding
Solehov’s death, including the speed of his burial, lend some
credence to suspicions that he was murdered, presumably for some
act of disloyalty to Rahmon. But
there is no way to be
confident about this conclusion.
Whatever the true story, this
incident serves as a reminder that Tajikistan, and especially
its ruling elite, may be less stable than it seems. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 214548
date: 6/30/2009 9:06
refid: 09DUSHANBE792
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE620|09DUSHANBE774
header:
VZCZCXRO3342
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0792/01 1810906
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300906Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0483
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0168
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1034
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000792
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, SENV, SOCI, TI
SUBJECT: HEAVY RAIN AND MUDFLOWS THREATEN RURAL LIVELIHOODS, TAJIK
ECONOMY
REF: (A) DUSHANBE 774, (B) DUSHANBE 620
DUSHANBE 00000792 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) SUMMARY: Heavy rainfall in recent months has left several
communities in Tajikistan under water or mud. Districts in
Khatlon province south of Dushanbe have been hardest hit. The
situation will have several short-term effects on health and
local hygiene. Damage to crops
and livestock poses long-term
economic risk for the country, already struggling in the ongoing
economic crisis. Though the
government and international aid
community have begun to respond, a lack of credible and
consistent data makes it difficult to discern the true extent of
the damage. END SUMMARY.
HEAVY RAINS CAUSE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE
2. (U) Spring is traditionally rainy in Tajikistan, but 2009 has
seen unusually heavy rain much later in the year than normal.
Heavy rainfall in April and May caused damage in 14 of 23
districts in Khatlon province, and 12 of 13 districts in the
Region of Republican Subordination (RRS), including Dushanbe.
In Khatlon, Khuroson, Panj, and Kulob districts were
particularly affected. In the
RRS, Tursunzoda, Hissor,
Tavildara, and Jirgatol districts fared worst. Most of the
damage was the result of floods, mudflows, and landslides.
DISLOCATIONS AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS
3. (U) Excessive rains have taken a serious toll on local
livelihoods. A Disaster
Management Partnership in Tajikistan —
Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) report
estimates 12,000 people have been directly affected. Twenty-six
weather-related deaths have been reported; additionally, 439
families have been forced to relocate, 13 hospitals have been
damaged, and 49 schools have been left inoperable.
4. (U) The dislocations are giving rise to public health
concerns. While many of those
affected are hosted by relatives,
in some communities, the national, provincial, or local
governments have set up tent camps.
There have been reports of
shortages of food and potable water.
In addition, several camps
are located in malaria-prone areas.
Residents and the local aid
community are calling for mosquito nets, food supplies,
children’s clothing, and medicine.
LONG-TERM EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE AND LIVELIHOODS
5. (U) Tajikistan’s economy relies heavily on agriculture, and
this year’s floods and mudflows coincided with the most critical
planting season for many crops. A
Ministry of Agriculture
official estimated that the agrarian sector sustained
approximately $10 million in damage, though other reports put
the figure as high as $20 million.
Agriculture is particularly
important in Khatlon province, where the government estimates
heavy rainfall damaged 40,000 hectares of cultivated land.
Cotton, the chief crop in Khatlon, suffered the heaviest damage
(22,000 hectares). Additional
losses were sustained in areas
under cultivation in grain (8,000 hectares) and potatoes and
other vegetables (960 hectares).
6. (U) Livestock has also suffered.
An estimated 3,000 animals
have perished in flooding and mudflows.
Additional damage to
irrigation systems, food storage facilities, and food processing
facilities suggests that the effects of the recent storms may
persist through the summer and autumn harvest season. Much of
Tajikistan’s population is already food insecure due to
declining remittances as a result of the world financial crisis
(ref A), and there are concerns that this year’s natural
disasters and failed harvests may increase the suffering of the
most vulnerable.
THINGS GET BIBLICAL…
DUSHANBE 00000792 002.2 OF 002
7. (U) A recent locust infestation is further damaging
Tajikistan’s agriculture, and is also taking the harshest toll
in Khatlon. So far, 55,000
hectares of farmland across
Tajikistan have been affected in 2009, 41,000 of them in
Khatlon. A 2008 locust
infestation destroyed 114,000 hectares
across the country.
RESPONSE
8. (U) On May 15, the Government of Tajikistan issued an appeal
for aid to the international community.
It noted a shortage of
building materials, fuel, food, medicines, tents, and
generators. The government
estimated the collective damage from
the storms at $100 million. The
government sent round-the-clock
medical teams to many of the tent camps, and delivered food
rations to some displaced families and plans to provide
dislocated families one-tenth of a hectare of new land for home
reconstruction. The Khatlon
provincial government helped by
allocating one-time cash payments of between US $110 and $330 to
affected households, depending on the level of damage sustained.
The UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent,
and NGOs have facilitated many
of the government’s aid efforts.
Despite these efforts,
however, there continue to be complaints that the government’s
response has been both too weak and too slow.
9. (U) Post responded quickly to the situation. The Ambassador
declared a state of disaster on 22 May and requested $50,000 in
USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds for the
purchase of hygiene kits and other necessary supplies (ref B).
In addition, a State Department-funded program that prepositions
humanitarian goods was able to respond by providing tents and
over 400 beds. These goods were
valued at over $200,000.
10. (U) Comment: Although obtaining accurate damage assessments
has been a challenge, it is clear that the recent round of
natural disasters struck Tajikistan at a particularly bad time.
The global recession is increasingly being felt here, with
remittances from Tajiks working abroad down 40% compared to last
year. The loss of this crucial
lifeline for many Tajiks has
increased their vulnerability to other shocks. The crucial
issue in the months to come will be the success of the harvests.
If yields are low, many rural
Tajiks may not have the income to
provide for themselves through the coming winter. A return of
U.S. food aid to Tajikistan would help stave off the most severe
food insecurity and help communities to recover from two
successive years of emergencies.
End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 214735
date: 7/1/2009 10:29
refid: 09DUSHANBE798
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3489
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHDBU #0798/01 1821029
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011029Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0501
INFO RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0016
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0009
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUCNEXC/EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/USCG HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0048
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1052
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000798
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC YWONG, ACHURCH, JHARTSHORN
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC-AMT LSPRINGER
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN ALONG, SCA/RA JMCCLELLAN
CBP/INA FOR SBAKER, GRISING
DHS/ICE FOR AMEFFERD
DOE/NNSA FOR JNOBLE, BPENTOLA
DOC FOR DCREED
USCG SHABTEMICHAEL
FRANKFURT PLEASE PASS TO ICE ATTACHE
BERLIN PLEASE PASS TO CBP ATTACHE
MOSCOW PLEASE PASS TO ICE ATTACHE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC, EAID, MNUC, PARM, PREL, KSTC, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: EXBS: TAJIKISTAN ADVISOR MONTHLY REPORTING CABLE — JUNE
2009
DUSHANBE 00000798 001.2 OF 004
I. BROAD ITEMS OF INTEREST TO ADVISORS AND AGENCY MANAGERS
A. NONE
II. COMPLETED ACTIONS FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD
A. SITE ASSESSMENTS AND MEETINGS DURING REPORTING PERIOD
1. Site Assessments
a) To monitor EXBS and Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC)
equipment end-use, and to get information on additional
equipment and training needs, the EXBS Advisor, EXBS Program
Management Assistant, Director, ODC, and the ODC Program
Management Assistant (hereafter the EXBS/ODC representatives)
visited a series of Otryads (regional HDQ), Zastavas (border
outposts), and border crossing points along the Tajik-Afghan
border in the Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) from June
10-19. The EXBS and ODC
representatives also traveled to the
Kulma border crossing point at the Tajik/China border. Of
special interest was communications equipment provided by EXBS
and ODC to the Tajik Border Guards and Customs Service from 2003
to 2009. Harris high-frequency
radios and Motorola hand-held
ultra-high frequency radios were provided with the intent that
the Harris radios would serve as the long distance, rough
terrain communication between Otryad and Zastava, and, the
Motorola radios would be used for short distance, line-of-sight
communication between Zastavas and patrols or stationary guard
towers/observation points.
b) The visits determined that generally the radios and radio
support equipment are used and as intended. The Harris AN/PRC
150 high-frequency radio i
