Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 139839
date: 2/4/2008 8:58
refid: 08TASHKENT146
origin: Embassy Tashkent
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07TASHKENT1853
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNT #0146/01 0350858
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040858Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 9167
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
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RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9911
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
4315
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
0177
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0182
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
0193
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
3906
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2173
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
0265
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7293
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0851
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW
YORK 0119
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
2300
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL
AFB FL
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
TASHKENT 000146
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, OES/ETC,
OES/PCI, OES/STC, EUR/ACE
DOE FOR NNSA,
EPA FOR OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: ENGR, EAID, PREL, TI,
UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN TAKES
ANOTHER SWIPE AT TAJIKISTAN OVER
HYDROPOWER STATION
REF: A. 07 TASHKENT 1853
B. TASHKENT 114
Classified By: Poloff Steven
Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) Summary: The recent
publication in Uzbekistan’s
state-run press of an
article critical of Tajikistan’s
hydroelectric power
projects, and flagged by President
Karimov in his January 24
meeting with CENTCOM Commander
Admiral Fallon, is the
latest move in Uzbekistan’s
longstanding efforts to
derail the initiative, and is meant
as a signal to international
audiences. The article blamed
Tajikistan for inefficient
use of existing facilities and
called for a mutually
acceptable, environmentally-friendly
solution that does not
reduce water levels for downstream
countries. In addition to articles in the press,
Uzbekistan
also has urged other
countries including China, Russia, and
Kazakhstan to steer clear of
investment in Tajikistan’s
hydropower projects and
threatened to withdraw from
cooperation with the Asian
Development Bank if the bank
finances such projects. Uzbek officials have raised their
displeasure with Tajikistan
in meetings with U.S. officials
repeatedly over the past two
weeks. End summary.
2. (SBU) This cable includes
data from official press
reporting, Emboffs’
meetings, Embassy files, and the regional
ESTH LES, and has been
coordinated with Embassy Dushanbe.
3. (C) In a January 24
article in the state-run newspaper
«Pravda Vostoka,»
the Director of Uzbekistan’s Hydroproject
Institute, Sergey Zhigaryov,
criticized Tajikistan’s
hydroelectric power projects
in Uzbekistan’s latest move to
counter a project it
perceives as dangerous to Uzbekistan’s
national interests. This follows on the heels of President
Karimov’s speech on the use
of transboundary waters at the
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Summit on August 16 and
Uzbekistan’s September 4
accession to two United Nations
conventions on the use of
international watercourses (ref A).
(Comment: There was no sign
that the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization would take up a
mediation role on this issue.
End comment.)
4. (SBU) The author noted
that the test launch of the first
power unit at the Sangtuda-1
hydroelectric power station in
Tajikistan occurred recently
with substantial assistance from
Russia. While acknowledging that Tajikistan’s efforts
to
expand power production were
understandable given power
supply problems in the
winter, Zhigaryov cast the blame for
power shortages mainly on
Tajkistan’s inefficient use of
existing facilities and its
increased exports of electricity
to Afghanistan during
periods of electricity shortage. (Note:
Tajikistan actually curtails
its export of power to
Afghanistan in the winter
relative to the summer. Sizable
exports to Afghanistan have
not taken place yet. End note.)
Zhigaryov then criticized
claims that Sangtuda-1 benefits all
Central Asian nations,
stated that 95 percent of Central
Asians depend on farm
irrigation, and said that discharging
large amounts of water in
the winter has a disastrous effect
on the environment. He stressed the importance of
coordination on
hydroelectric projects, and that any
agreement must not reduce
the watercourse level for
downstream countries (i.e.
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan), and must not
threaten the environmental safety
of the region.
5. (SBU) Uzbekistan is the
largest water user among the
downstream countries
(Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
and parts of Afghanistan),
and some ninety percent of
Uzbekistan’s available water
resources stem from neighboring
countries. Uzbekistan’s economy continues to depend
heavily
on agriculture, particularly
cotton. Historically,
Uzbekistan has argued that
the discharge of water from
upstream hydropower projects
during the winter (when there
are power shortages
upstream) would be severely disruptive to
agriculture in Uzbekistan.
6. (C) In addition to using
the media, international law, and
statements at multilateral
summits, Uzbekistan has warned
potential investors in
Tajikistan’s hydropower projects to
stay away. A local Embassy employee reported that in a
conversation with an Asian
Development Bank official last
November, the official
indicated that then-Finance Minister
(and now First Deputy Prime
Minister) Rustam Azimov had
approached a visiting Asian
Development Bank official and
warned that if the bank
financed Tajikistan’s hydropower
project, Uzbekistan would
withdraw from cooperation with the
bank. Uzbekistan has actively steered other
countries such
as China, Russia, and
Kazakhstan away from cooperating on
upstream hydropower
projects.
7. (C) Uzbek officials have
raised Tajikistan’s planned
hydropower projects several
times over the past two weeks
with Embassy and USG
officials. Ismat Faizullaev, Director
of the MFA’s USA Office,
expressed his concern to P/E Chief
on January 24, before a
meeting with visiting CENTCOM
Commander Admiral
Fallon. President Karimov himself voiced
strong endorsement of the
views carried in the article when
he meet with Admiral Fallon
(ref B). Deputy Prime Minister
(and Head of the Fuel and
Energy Complex) Ergash Shaismatov
and Minister of Foreign
Economic Relations Elyor Ganiev
forcefully conveyed Uzbek
objections in January 29 meetings
with Ambassador Norland and
visiting SCA Senior Advisor Bob
Deutsch. All described the «disastrous»
consequences of the
planned hydroelectric
cascade. All in effect said that the
Tajik plans were
«unacceptable» to Uzbekistan and must take
into account the downstream
needs of Uzbekistan’s Amu Darya
basin.
Comment:
———
8. (C) Sangtuda-1 alone will
have little downstream impact.
If Tajkistan is able to
realize its goal of completing
multiple additional
hydropower stations including Rogun,
Shurob, Dashtijum,
Sangtuda-2, and others, however, these
stations could pose a serious
threat to Uzbekistan’s
agriculture if they are not
well-managed. Clearly, the
Uzbeks make a convincing
case that the Tajiks should take on
board Uzbek concerns,
particularly concerning winter water
releases. The Uzbeks are aware that both CENTCOM and
the
Embassy have been paying
attention to these issues, and they
certainly would like to
leverage our influence. We will
continue to pursue a policy
of encouraging all parties to
work through existing
mechanisms, such as environmental
impact assessments and
international conventions, and to
pursue greater regional
cooperation and integration on
underlying issues. An upcoming opportunity to register U.S.
views will be the
UNDP-sponsored conference on the Aral Sea
scheduled to take place on
March 12-13 in Tashkent.
NORLAND
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 139884
date: 2/4/2008 12:22
refid: 08DUSHANBE189
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0189 0351222
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041222Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0161
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY
ASHGABAT 0026
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0022
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
0026
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0050
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0013
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
0022
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 000189
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND CA/OCS
ALSO FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/ITA,
DS/ATA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2013
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, CASC, TI
SUBJECT: SHOOT-OUT IN GARM,
SITUATION CALM
Classified By: CLASSIFIED
BY: Tom Hushek, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU)
Colonel Oleg Zakharchenko, the commander of OMON,
the Interior Ministry’s
elite police squad, was killed
February 2 in a 15-minute
gunfight in Garm District, east of
Dushanbe. Zakharchenko had reportedly led a 30-man unit
to
Garm to effect the arrest of
Col. Mirzokhuja Ahmadov, a
former commander from the
United Tajik Opposition during the
Tajik civil war, and until a
month ago also head of a local
Interior Ministry police
squad in Garm. Three of
Zakharchenko’s men were
injured; it is unclear how many were
wounded or killed on the
other side. Zakharchecnko himself
is credited with clearing
the streets of civilians before
allowing any gunfire.
2. (C)
The Interior Ministry in Dushanbe reportedly fired
Ahmadov from his position
about one month ago. Post is not
aware of the reasons behind
his firing or the decision to
arrest him now. Rumors range from longstanding political
feuds to competition for
local coal reserves. A squabble
over control of narcotics
trafficking routes led to a similar
attempted arrest and
gunfight one year ago in Khorogh in the
Gorno-Badakhshan
region. The Garm incident also carries
echoes of the civil war
which ended more than ten years ago.
In the peace agreement,
opposition figures such as Ahmadov
received 30% of government
jobs. The government in Dushanbe
has whittled away at those
numbers, and since President
Rahmon’s re-election in
November 2006, many in the former
opposition have lost their
government positions and salaries.
3. (SBU)
Zakharchenko was a close contact of the Embassy.
His OMON unit is
instrumental in providing security for the
Embassy grounds. OMON has participated in several
Anti-Terrorism Assistance
training events funded through
Diplomatic Security. Zakharchenko was the highest ranking
non-ethnic Tajik that we
know in the government.
4. (SBU)
Post has issued a consular warden message
recommending that AmCits not
travel to Garm and the Rasht
Valley until further
information becomes available. We know
of no AmCits currently in
Garm. One private AmCit who was in
town during the shooting was
able to leave the next day. The
U.S. non-governmental
organization Mercy Corps is active in
the region, but its resident
American staff is currently in
Dushanbe. The OSCE cancelled scheduled travel to Garm
by
international staff over the
weekend. Its office remains
open with national
staff. The UN has temporarily closed its
office in Garm, with its
national staff asked to stay home
for a couple days. The local staff of these organizations
have been in touch with
their Dushanbe offices and have
reported that the situation
in Garm remains calm since the
gunfight on February 2.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 139885
date: 2/4/2008 12:28
refid: 08DUSHANBE191
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 08STATE10930
header:
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0191 0351228
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041228Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 0163
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY
ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 0027
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA
IMMEDIATE 0023
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
IMMEDIATE 0014
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
IMMEDIATE 0027
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
IMMEDIATE 0051
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
IMMEDIATE 0023
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 000191
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, EUR,
EAP, ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: PARM, PREL, KN, TI
SUBJECT: FLIGHT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN FROM NORTH KOREA
TO SYRIA — TAJIKISTAN WILL
COMPLY WITH UNSCR 1718
REF: STATE 10930
Classified By: TRACEY A.
JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (S) Emboff delivered
reftel demarche to Ismatulloh
Nasreddinov, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Director for
European and American
Affairs (Assistant Secretary
Equivalent) on February
4. Mr. Nasreddinov assured us he
would raise this matter
immediately with his superiors. He
also checked with the
Protocol Department, which receives
overflight clearance
requests, and told us that the Protocol
Department said the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs had received
no request for overflight
from North Korea. He said we
should not worry that
Tajikistan might allow the flight to
proceed unhindered through
Tajik airspace, as «we will uphold
any United Nations Security
Council resolution.»
2. (U) Mr. Nasreddinov
promised to give us further feedback
as it became available.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 140212
date: 2/6/2008 13:46
refid: 08DUSHANBE197
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
08DUSHANBE169|08DUSHANBE86
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0197/01 0371346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061346Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0171
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0015
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0038
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0052
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0019
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 000197
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
DEPT PASS USAID
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2013
TAGS: EFIN, EAID, EAGR,
PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: NEW DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER ALIMARDON DISCUSSES
AGRICULTURAL REFORM, AND
ASKS FOR MORE MONEY
REF: A. (A) DUSHANBE 86
B. (B) DUSHANBE 169
Classified By: Tom Hushek,
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Dushan
be, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Newly
appointed Deputy Prime Minister for
Economic Affairs Murodali
Alimardon briefed emboffs on his
agricultural reform
priorities and made a pitch for more
donor financing. EmbOffs said new financing was unlikely,
and suggested Tajikistan
make better use of the funds it has
now. End Summary.
2. (C) Mr. Alimardon was
previously known as Alimardonov; his
recent name change is part
of a general Tajikification of
names by senior government
officials. In January President
Rahmon removed Alimardon
from his position as Central Bank
Chairman in connection with
the cotton debt crisis and the
Bank’s misreporting to the
IMF (Reftels). However, Rahmon
did not fire him; instead he
appointed Alimardon to a new
senior government economic
policy position, as Deputy Prime
Minister for Economics, and
specifically charged him with
agricultural reform. Alimardon requested a meeting on
January 30 with PolEcon
Chief to lay out his priorities on
agricultural reform and get
the embassy’s views on them.
USAID Mission Deputy
Director also participated. Immediately
following this meeting
Alimardon had a larger meeting with a
group of donor organizations
including USAID, the Asian
Development Bank, European
Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and the
International Monetary Fund.
3. (C) Emboffs asked
Alimardon to outline his
responsibilities as Deputy
Prime Minister for Agriculture.
Alimardon said he would
focus on land reform and agricultural
sector reform and
modernization. He emphasized that the
Tajik Government was serious
now about agricultural reform,
and described this as a
critical point in time for Tajikistan.
4. (C) Alimardon laid out
his ideas in general: freedom to
farm, settling the debts of
cotton farmers and investors, and
modernizing the agricultural
sector to make it more
competitive. He mentioned getting harvesting machinery,
new
handling facilities, and
textile processing factories to make
cotton production more
competitive. When we asked whether
supporting cotton was the
right path, he said he also sought
modernization of other crop
sectors. These modernization
schemes included setting up
leasing companies for farm
equipment, and Alimardon
asked us to help bring U.S.
agricultural companies here
as investors. He also said the
Government could prevail
upon cotton gin owners to sell their
equipment to pay for new
technology, if necessary.
5. (C) Emboffs outlined for
Alimardon the agricultural
development and reform
programs the United States already
conducts in Tajikistan,
emphasizing that these programs
support agricultural
diversification and economic
sustainability, food
security, and land reform. Emboffs said
the U.S. Government was
fostering Tajikistan’s agricultural
reform, and would continue
to do so.
Still Subsidizing Cotton
————————
6. (C) We noted, however,
that we had heard anecdotally that
the Tajik Government was not
so enthusiastic on this score;
local officials were still
forcing farmers to plant cotton in
many parts of the
country. Alimardon acknowledged this was
going on, and said stopping
this practice would be his focus
for the next few weeks. He added that land reform was a key
Qfor the next few
weeks. He added that land reform was a
key
part of his portfolio, and
said tax policy presented an
additional serious problem,
as farmers had to pay taxes based
on the amount of land they
had in use, rather than on actual
production. They also paid profit taxes on their cotton
(it
is unclear to us whether
this tax is due regardless of actual
profit or loss), plus sales
taxes to local governments, which
«are used to living off
of cotton revenue.»
7. (C) We asked about recent
press reports that the Tajik
Government had ordered 100
million Somonis (approximately $30
million) to be used to
invest in a new cotton crop.
Alimardon argued that it was
impractical to switch away from
cotton production all at
once, and said the Government’s goal
was to reduce cotton
production by about 40 percent over the
next few years. We asked where the $30 million had come from
(suspecting it came from
Alimardon’s own pocket as a bribe to
keep his position in
government); Alimardon offered only that
the Ministry of Finance had
been ordered to loan this sum to
private banks to loan to
cotton farmers. He did not say
where the Finance Ministry
had gotten this money from.
8. (C) Alimardon emphasized
that the Tajik Government needs
donor financing to realize
its modernization plans, and hoped
the United States could
help. He did not give any estimate
of the amount of money he
sought; rather, he wanted to gauge
our general views on this. He also suggested that EximBank
could play a role in
financing U.S. agricultural equipment
for Tajikistan. (He seemed unaware that EximBank rates
Tajikistan as «off
cover,» i.e. not creditworthy and
therefore ineligible for
routine transactions — this is
clearly displayed on
EximBank’s website.) PolEcon Chief
replied that the
misreporting issues with the IMF made it
difficult to consider new
financial aid to Tajikistan at this
time, and suggested that the
Tajik Government has resources
it could draw on if it would
better prioritize its spending.
Alimardon agreed that the
Government did not always spend
public money wisely, and
said he looked to us and other
donors to help identify
problems. PolEcon Chief took this
opportunity to point out
some very expensive and economically
pointless presidential show
projects, such as the Palace of
the Nation now under
construction in Dushanbe, as examples of
problem spending which had
not escaped the notice of donors.
He also noted that while the
current winter energy crisis had
left most of Tajikistan
literally in the dark, the
state-owned Tajik Aluminum
Company continued to function and,
presumably, generate revenue
which the Government could use.
Alimardon smilingly agreed.
Plane Fantasy
————-
9. (C) However, he seemed
not to get the point, as he then
mentioned that EximBank
could also help with another
presidential priority — the
acquisition of a new Boeing
737-800 for presidential
transport service. This airplane
would be owned by
state-owned TajikAir and would also fly
commercial service,
Alimardon pointed out. PolEcon Chief
asked whether the President
might perhaps look for a
pre-owned airplane, which
could be considerably less
expensive than a new one;
Alimardon said the important thing
was not the price of the
airplane, but that it would be used
to make money whenever it
was not required by the President.
(Note: EximBank’s website
also indicates that aircraft
financing for «off-cover»
countries is more likely to gain
approval if it concerns a
private airline with an established
operating record — criteria
TajikAir is not on track to meet
in the foreseeable future.)
Credibility Gap
—————
10. (C) PolEcon Chief
commented to Alimardon that in dealing
with international donors in
his new position, he faced a
serious personal credibility
problem because of his lead role
in misreporting Tajik
government finances to the IMF, and in
involving the Central Bank
in propping up an unprofitable
cotton sector. Donors were surprised that in removing the
Central Bank Chairman
because of the misreporting issue, the
President had seen fit to
simply move him to another high
economic position. Alimardon agreed that he had a
credibility gap to overcome,
and reemphasized that he would
Qcredibility gap to
overcome, and reemphasized that he would
concern himself only with
Agriculture, not with state
financial policies. He seemed to miss the irony of this
explanation.
11. (C) At the follow on
meeting with donors, Alimardon
confirmed reports that the
$30 million from the Finance
Ministry mentioned in para 6
had been given to private banks
and that these banks were,
under government instruction,
using that money to give
loans to cotton growers.
Comment: All the Wrong Moves
—————————-
12. (C) Alimardon did not
give us reason to feel confident
that the Tajik Government is
as serious as he claims it is
about agricultural sector
reform. His appointment as Deputy
Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs, following his
problematic leadership of
the Central Bank, suggests that
President Rahmon does not
understand the degree of donor
unhappiness over the cotton
debt and IMF misreporting, and is
content to continue allowing
cronies to control economic
policy for their short term
personal gain. Our influence
here is limited because the
President believes there will
always be another
international economic bailout to save him
from his economic
mismanagement, is personally insulated from
the suffering of Tajik
cotton farmers, and because nothing
has yet arisen to convince
him that the current economic
difficulties threaten his
hold on power. We need to continue
to coordinate with other
donors and international financial
institutions to present a
united front on misuse of state
funds, lack of real reform
of the cotton sector, and lack of
senior-level accountability
in the government. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 140214
date: 2/6/2008 13:55
refid: 08DUSHANBE198
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0198/01 0371355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061355Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0174
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0018
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0041
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0055
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0022
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0011
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 000198
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
COMMERCE FOR ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2013
TAGS: ENRG, EINV, ECON,
PREL, TI
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS APPEALS FOR AES TO
RETURN TO TAJIKISTAN
Classified By: Tom Hushek,
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Dushan
be, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: At a January
30 meeting with several
diplomatic missions and the
regional AES representative,
Foreign Minister Hamrokhon
Zarifi called on AES to stay in
Tajikistan. AES did not change its decision to withdraw,
but
characterized its move as a
suspension rather than closure.
Tajikistan plans to approach
the U.S. Government and AES in
Washington to get AES back,
and to enlist the aid of the
Pakistan and Afghanistan
embassies in Washington in this
effort. End Summary.
2. (C) Minister of Foreign
Affairs Zarifi called a meeting in
his office on January 30 to
discuss the recent decision
announced by AES Corporation
to suspend its activities in
Tajikistan. The Ambassador of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s
Charge
d’Affaires, the World Bank
Representative, a representative
from the Ministry of Energy,
and AES’s Central Asian regional
manager, Murat Kozhakhmetov,
participated in the meeting.
Emboff observed the meeting.
3. (C) Zarifi, looking
morose, gave a lugubrious opening
speech, saying, «It’s
not a big deal if an old lady dies, but
if death visits a house
frequently, that’s another matter.»
He said it was hard for him
to bear the news of AES’s recent
decision to suspend its
Tajik operations, and paid some
compliments to AES for
having worked in Tajikistan over the
past few years. He then invited the AES representative to
explain his company’s
decision.
4. (C) Then AES Regional
Manager then read a prepared
statement giving the reasons
for AES’s decision. He began by
saying AES had not closed
but only «temporarily suspended»
its activity in Tajikistan
(at which the Minister laughed
bitterly and said «it
means the same thing»). AES said
the
suspension was not related
to internal problems in
Tajikistan, and AES was
grateful to the leaders of Tajikistan
for their support. AES pointed to the «high level of
risk»
in Central Asia,
particularly instability in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. These two countries were the key consumers of
electricity from Central
Asia, but AES could not get a
«concrete guarantee of
security» for its operations in
Pakistan and
Afghanistan.» He added that AES had
suffered
losses in Venezuela, and had
since reassessed its views on
political risk worldwide.
5. (C) The Afghan and
Pakistani representatives made
statements, emphasizing
their support for regional power
integration, and saying that
the security situation in their
countries was stable enough
for AES to build power
infrastructure there. The Pakistani representative said that
the stability picture in
Pakistan had not worsened, and he
saw no increased threat to
AES there.
6. (C) Zarifi jumped in
again, saying that he understood the
U.S. Government «policy
decision» not to interfere with
private companies, but noted
that the U.S. effort to
stabilize Central Asia and
defeat terrorism in the region
required economic
development and infrastructure improvements
more than it needed
firepower. He also asserted that there
had been almost no attacks
on power transmission lines in
Afghanistan during the past
«20 years of war.» Pakistan
was
quite stable and could pay
for electricity, Zarifi said, and
Tajikistan had signed
agreements with most of its neighbors
on electricity sharing. He took a swipe at Uzbekistan at
Qon electricity
sharing. He took a swipe at Uzbekistan
at
this point, saying
«only one country created obstacles» to
regional power integration,
«but God will solve this
problem.»
7. (C) Zarifi then concluded
by saying that AES had no good
reason to withdraw from
Tajikistan, and should return here
«and profit.» He added that AES’s decision would damage the
reputation of the United
States in Tajikistan. He urged AES
to move its regional
headquarters to Dushanbe, saying it
would be a better and
friendlier environment than Almaty.
8. (C) Zarifi said he would
instruct the Tajik embassy in
Washington to approach the
State Department, Commerce
Department, and AES
headquarters to try to reverse AES’s
decision. He asked the Afghan and Pakistani
representatives
to seek the support of their
counterparts in Washington to
pursue the same
objective. The AES representative said
he
supported this idea.
9. (C) Following the meeting
the AES representative told
emboff that in his view
Tajikistan had made «no progress»
toward concluding power
purchasing agreements with
Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and this had weighed in AES’s
decision to close its office
in Tajikistan.
10. (C) Comment — Theatrics:
We have heard that Zarifi’s
professional reputation
rides on his development of «western»
relationships, and that the
AES withdrawal appeared to him as
a career-threatening blow
which he had to reverse. The
meeting he chaired was
theatrical and a bit bizarre, long on
speechifying, and to little
purpose unless to show that the
Minister had done
something. Zarifi’s comment about our
«policy decision»
not to interfere with U.S. companies
betrays a misunderstanding
of the U.S. legal and economic
system; his assertion that
AES’s leaving the region
undermined the U.S.
reputation showed the confusion of a
person who doesn’t
understand the separation of the private
and public sectors in a
market economy. Unfortunately, this
misunderstanding exists at
all levels in Tajik government.
Once again, Zarifi failed to
recognize any Tajik Government
complicity in the risky
business environment here. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 140358
date: 2/7/2008 12:10
refid: 08DUSHANBE210
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
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RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0013
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0043
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0020
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0057
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 000210
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
COMMERCE FOR ITA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ETRD, EAIR, TI
SUBJECT: Tajik Commercial
Air Service Modernization — Baby Steps
Mixed News from Tajik Air
————————-
1. (SBU) In the past six
months Tajik Air, the state-owned national
carrier, has acquired four
Boeing aircraft, all on wet-lease. It’s
not quite the improvement
that it seems. The first two aircraft
acquired were 25-year old
Boeing 737s. They are not allowed to
land
in Russia or the European
Union due to inconsistencies in their
maintenance records, but are
flying between Dushanbe and Khujand and
Almaty. When they showed up here, media carried some
commentary
about their ineligibility to
fly even to Russia, and the dubious
financial planning involved
in their acquisition (they might fly at
a loss). With these shortcomings, they might still represent
a step
up from Tajik Air’s fleet of
decrepit Tupolev 154s. The Tajik Air
Tupolev fleet has dwindled
over the years as airplanes became too
old to use, and the Dushanbe
airfield is littered with these
abandoned aircraft. Only four Tu-154s actually fly, and these are
reportedly within two years
of the end of their service lives.
(When their service will
actually end is another matter.)
2. (U) On a better note, in
January 2008 Tajik Air leased a Boeing
757 from Russia’s VIM-AVIA,
and is flying it to Russian destinations
and Sharjah. Tajik Air reports it has agreed to lease a
second 757,
and will soon begin to use
both airplanes with Tajik pilots and
cabin crew. They plan to have the crews trained in the
United
States by Boeing subsidiary
Alteon Corporation. The government also
continues to express
interest in acquiring a new 737 to serve as a
presidential aircraft and to
fly commercial service for Tajik Air
when not serving the
president. Newly promoted Deputy Prime
Minister Alimardon insists
the president would need a brand new
aircraft — price tag $40-50
million.
Somon Air — a Better Bet?
—————————
3. (SBU) Meanwhile Somon
Air, Tajikistan’s «first private airline,»
seems about to fly (after
years of talk). Somon Air is owned by
Presidential brother-in-law
Hassan Asadullozoda (formerly
Saddulloev) and managed by
former General Director of Tajik Air Mr.
Mirzo Mastangulov. Like most other people of influence in Dushanbe,
Mastangulov is from the
President’s home district of Kulyob.
Insiders at the new
airline’s parent company, Somon Capital, report
that he is not an effective
manager, and that they are seeking
expatriate managers.
4. (SBU) Somon recently
acquired its first aircraft, a Boeing
737-800 wet-leased from a
Turkish company. Somon says it will
acquire more planes this
coming summer, but will begin with this one
plane flying to Moscow,
Almaty, Urumqi, Dubai, and Istanbul on a
weekly schedule. This is largely a virtual airline, with
maintenance carried out in
Istanbul, few staff, and ticket sales
being handled by Tajik
Air. This relationship has already
proven to
be a problem, as finding the
tickets is difficult, and Tajik Air has
prevented the Moscow service
from beginning by holding up delivery
to Russian civil aviation
authorities of a code-share agreement
between it and Somon Air.
5. (SBU) Tajik Air probably
also had a hand in a recent total
disruption of air service
with Russia. On February 2 Russian
authorities suspended all
Tajik Air flights into Russia because
Tajik civil aviation
authorities tried to impose a fee of $15 on
every passenger arriving in
Tajikistan on a Russian carrier. By
Qevery passenger arriving in
Tajikistan on a Russian carrier. By
late Saturday night the
suspension had been temporarily cancelled,
and the two sides have
agreed to talk this out over the next few
weeks.
6. (SBU) Comment — Not a
Free Market Revolution: Somon Air’s
strategy may be to
eventually replace a dying Tajik Air with its own
presidentially-connected
monopoly, but Tajik Air’s effort to
modernize suggest the state
airline isn’t going under without a
fight. And as long as Tajik Air exists, it will try
to hinder the
development of independent
air services. An example of this is
Turkish Air, which has tried
for years to get a third weekly flight
from Istanbul without
success, despite (or because of) the
overwhelming demand for its
existing two weekly flights. Relations
with Uzbekistan represent
another political distortion in the local
airline market; air service
to any point in Uzbekistan is
non-existent, due to enmity
between the two countries. This is
despite the fact that many Tajiks
have family and business
connections in Uzbekistan,
and vice-versa. Things are changing
slowly here, and Tajikistan
is still hard to access, expensive to
get to, and generally off
the map. End Comment.
DUSHANBE 00000210 002 OF 002
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 140361
date: 2/7/2008 12:18
refid: 08DUSHANBE215
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0026
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 000215
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, EFIN, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: Tajikistan’s
National Budget — The Best Parts are Hidden
DUSHANBE 00000215 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary: The
Government’s 2008 budget is much larger than
last year’s, and assumes
much greater revenues. Developed in a
totally non-transparent
manner, the document hides the true extent
of presidential
spending. End Summary.
2. (U) In November 2007
media conveyed a brief statement from the
Government noting that
Parliament had «endorsed» the 2008 budget,
and giving a few snippets of
information showing that it would be
considerably larger than the
2007 budget, and would include big
increases in spending on
health and education. The Government did
not release the actual
budgetary legislation, but the embassy
recently got a look at this
document, all fourteen pages of it
(gulp). What was most telling was its vagueness. Tajikistan’s 2008
budget is 38 percent larger
than the 2007 budget, reaching $1.3
billion. It is 3.7 times higher than the budget of
2002. It
includes a budget deficit of
$21 million, to be covered by
privatization and treasury
securities and deposits of the government
at the National Bank of
Tajikistan. The 2008 budget to GDP ratio
is
30.7 percent. Budget revenue per capita is 622 Somoni, or
$177.
3. (SBU) The Government
projects Tajikistan’s GDP for 2008 to be
14.8 billion Somoni, or
approximately $3.5 billion. However,
this
does not include the untaxed
«grey» economy. The grey
economy
includes all unreported
company operations and trade. Almost all
companies in Tajikistan
practice double bookkeeping to avoid taxes
and customs. Another major element of the grey economy is
remittances by labor
migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan; migrants
transferred officially about
$1.3 billion in 2007 through the Tajik
Banking system, accounting
for nearly 40 percent of that year’s GDP.
The true size of remittances is probably
larger. The government of
course does not capture
money made from the transit of illegal
narcotics from Afghanistan —
which may account for as much as 20
percent of actual GDP.
4. (SBU) Taxes and non-tax
collections are the main source of
government revenue,
accounting for 63 percent of the budget.
Tax
collection will have to
increase 66 percent on last year’s
collection to meet the
targets of 2008 budget. This will
increase
pressure on small and medium
businesses, and on anything which is
profitable and traceable,
notably the mobile telephone sector.
Investment project aid from
international financial institutions
such as the World Bank
accounts for 12.7 percent of the budget, or
$163 million (this includes
a portion of Chinese $1 billion
Government loan given to
Tajikistan in 2006).
5. (SBU) Some Key Items —
The government is going to spend 211
million Somoni ($61 million)
for defense. This is 4.6 percent of
the 2008 budget, and 46
percent more than in 2007. On education
the
government of Tajikistan
allocated 691 million Somoni ($198 million)
or 15 percent of the
budget. This is a 37 percent increase
since
last year. On health the budget allots 255 million
Somoni ($73
million) or 5.6 percent of
budget. It is a 43 percent increase
since 2007. This is the government’s «socially
oriented» budget,
which does increase spending
on health and education, but not nearly
enough to meet Tajikistan’s
educational and health needs. For
example, at present there
are 1.7 million students in Tajikistan’s
schools; the budget allots
less than 50 cents per day per student;
Qschools; the budget allots
less than 50 cents per day per student;
this includes salaries for
teachers, building maintenance, buying
new books and development of
new education materials. The health
sector is also in deep
crisis; since independence it has become
common practice for those in
need of treatment, including surgery,
to pay for it themselves;
officially it’s free. Many government
officials and businessmen
prefer medical treatment outside
Tajikistan, in Moscow,
Germany or Israel. Back in Tajikistan in
the
current winter power crisis,
despite government claims that most
hospitals have generators,
we receive reports that it is common for
babies to be born by
candlelight, in unheated maternity clinics.
6. (SBU) The most
interesting sections of the Tajik budget are those
containing «other»
or «administration expenses».
They include the
following: for «state
authorities and management» — $101 million
[which may partly cover
salaries and expenses for ministries, but
every ministry’s portion of
the budget already includes salaries];
«other economic sectors
and service» — $3.7 million; «other
expenditures» — $82
million; «other law enforcement» — $20.7
million; «unexpected
expenditures of Government» — $5.7 million;
«other expenses not
classified as economic sectors» — $125 million,
and finally the
«President’s Reserve Fund» — $17.2 million. In
total, the budget for
generic «other» expenses and administration is
around $355 million, or 28
percent of the total budget.
7. (SBU) In a February 7 meeting to elicit donor
contributions for
DUSHANBE 00000215 002.2 OF 002
the ongoing energy sector
shortfall, Ambassador asked Foreign
Minister Zarifi if the
government planned to re-prioritize funding
away from expensive palaces,
dachas and other show projects to cover
the energy needs of the
population. Zarifi explained that we
should
not worry about such
projects since they are not part of the
government’s budget, but
instead are funded by «sponsors.»
Zarifi
couldn’t or wouldn’t answer
the follow-on question: Why don’t these
«sponsors» pay to
import fuel oil or improve hydropower?
Zarifi
argued that the palaces were
«necessary» for Tajikistan to play a
role in regional
cooperation, to enhance political prestige, and to
«show the people of
Tajikistan that the country is respected
internationally.» «Paris has its Eiffel Tower, after all,»
he
added. Zarifi’s comments let slip a widely known
secret — that much
government spending is
completely off-budget where the international
financial institutions
cannot scrutinize it.
8. (SBU) Comment — Darkness:
As in the past, the details of the
budget remain closely held
by the Presidential administration. The
document is developed by the
presidency, and passed by Parliament
without debate. The large undefined «other
expenses» suggest that
the document is designed as
much to hide as to inform. There are no
public hearings on the
budget, and Tajik civil society does not
participate in or otherwise
contribute to budget discussions. We
called Parliament Deputy
Gulchehra Tursunovna Bozorova, who chairs
the Budget, Tax and Economy
Committee, to ask her to discuss the
budget, but she declined to
speak with us without first obtaining
written permission from the
Speaker of Parliament. (Bozorova is an
alumna of the recent Open
World exchange for Tajik
parliamentarians.)
9. (SBU) Comment Continued:
Helping to keep the wider public from
knowing how its money is
spent, Tajik mass media avoid any deep
analysis of the state
budget, and barely mention it at all.
This is
in part self-censorship, but
also reflects the media’s lack of
financial specialists. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 140368
date: 2/7/2008 12:46
refid: 08DUSHANBE216
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE189
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—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 000216
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, PTER, TI
SUBJECT: SHOOTOUT IN GARM:
UPDATE
REF: DUSHANBE 189
Classified By: Ambassador
Tracey A. Jacobson; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: The killing
of Oleg Zakharchenko, the head of
OMON, the Interior
Ministry,s elite police squad, appears to
have been the result of a
miscalculation by a local Interior
Ministry official in Garm,
who believed he could resist
arrest and face down the
consequences. We have been unable
to confirm some key aspects
of the incident, but it is
unlikely that it will touch
off broader unrest in the short
term. The significance of the incident, however,
will depend
on perceptions of the
government,s response. The GOTI
cannot afford to appear
either ineffectual or too
heavy-handed in its handling
of this incident. End summary.
Exact Course of Events
Unclear
————————-
2. (C) We have spoken to journalists and
security personnel
regarding the shootout in
Garm on February 2, in which
Zakharchenko was killed
(reftel). Details remain sketchy,
but we can piece together a
rough outline of what happened.
The Interior Ministry had
come up with an elaborate plan to
arrest Mirzokhuja Ahmadov,
the Chief of the Ministry,s
Organized Crime Section in
Garm. On February 1, two Interior
Ministry officials traveled
from Dushanbe to conduct a
general meeting with
personnel at the Interior Ministry,s
office in Garm. They spent the night in Garm, and went to
the meeting the following
morning, on February 2. One of the
Dushanbe officials left the
meeting several times to make
some calls on his cell
phone. During one of the calls,
Ahmadov overheard the
official saying &everything is OK )
you should come.8 Shortly thereafter, four Dushanbe OMON
vehicles (Zakharchenko and
his men) pulled up in front of the
building. Zakharchenko exited his vehicle alone,
approached
the building and was shot by
a sniper, setting off a
fifteen-minute
gunfight. At least three of
Zakharchenko’s
men were injured. We do not have figures on the total number
of dead and wounded.
3. (C) Our sources have told
us that Ahmadov received
advanced warning of the
attempted arrest, and had made sure
that men loyal to him were
armed and prepared to fight back.
Although we cannot confirm
which side started the shooting,
our assessment is that
Ahmadov’s men initiated the attack.
Prior reports that Ahmadov
had been fired from the Ministry a
month ago appear to be
inaccurate.
4. (SBU) It does not appear
that Ahmadov fled after the
incident. He remained in his office and called for a
full
investigation. On February 6, he was spotted in the office
of the local prosecutor,
presumably giving his version of the
events in the context of a
criminal investigation.
Ahmadov was a Small Fry
————————
5. (SBU) Rumors have been
circulating about Ahmadov,s
connections and
support. He is a former fighter with the
United Tajik Opposition who
was integrated into the Interior
Ministry in Garm under the
peace agreement in 1997. He
claims to have 100
&loyal men,8 and to have the support of
some former warlords such as
Mahmadruzi Iskanarov, who is
currently in prison. He claims that in the last 10 years,
there have been 5
assassination attempts against him (this
being the 5th).
6. (SBU) Ahmadov very likely
has engaged in dubious activity
in Garm. He may be the head of a local crime
syndicate; some
have claimed that he
&controls8 a local coal mine, and
Qhave claimed that he
&controls8 a local coal mine, and
others have classified him
as a &narco-baron.8
Nevertheless, he does not
have a national profile, and his
influence appears to be
limited to Garm. Zakharchenko was
well-regarded by those in
the law enforcement and
international
communities. He was considered to be a
competent professional and
apolitical.
An Isolated Incident, But
Potential for Wider Significance
——————————-
7. (C) Worries that the incident may touch off
broader
violence are likely
overblown. The general population is
deeply averse to rekindling
the violence of the civil war,
and little information about
the incident has reached the
public at large. Members of the opposition Islamic Revival
Party have denounced the
incident, and former United Tajik
Opposition figures have been
careful to distance themselves
from Ahmadov. The law enforcement community has rallied
around Zakharchenko,s death. Ahmadov seems to have
overestimated his ability to
inspire support and is in a very
tenuous position. While it appears that a criminal
investigation is ongoing, we
understand that the Interior
Ministry is planning to
arrest Ahmadov. Our sources have
told us that the Interior
Ministry has been very deliberate
in planning its arrest
operation, and that they have also
consulted Tajik military
authorities. There is also a rumor
that Tajik officials have
consulted with Russia,s 201st
military brigade.
8. (C) Comment: The Tajik
authorities, response will
determine the significance
of the incident. The shootout
occurred at a time when
general dissatisfaction with
President Rahmon,s government
is higher, due to nationwide
electricity shortages and
sharply higher food prices. A
response that is perceived
as being soft or not concerted
could signal to opponents
that the regime is weak. A
response that looks too
heavy-handed could add to the overall
disaffection with the
government. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 140506
date: 2/8/2008 9:39
refid: 08ASHGABAT199
origin: Embassy Ashgabat
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
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—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
ASHGABAT 000199
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
USAID/W FOR EE/AA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON,
ENRG, IR, AF, UZ, TI, TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN EMERGING AS PRAGMATIC REGIONAL
PLAYER
1. (U)
Sensitive but unclassified. Not
for public Internet.
2. (SBU)
SUMMARY: The delivery of a
significant amount of
humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan and enhanced provision of
electricity to Tajikistan,
combined with intensified economic
cooperation and diplomatic
activity in the region, suggest
that Turkmenistan’s
leadership sees value in establishing
itself as a responsible regional
player. END SUMMARY.
TURKMEN HUMANITARIAN AID TO
AFGHANISTAN
3. (U)
Turkmen and Afghan media reported February 7 that
Turkmenistan had sent off a
large caravan of humanitarian aid
to Afghanistan. The shipment reportedly contained 1,000 tons
of flour, 500 tons of diesel
oil, and 9,000 tons of mostly
children’s clothing. The donation was to be distributed in
forty-two districts in five
provinces of northern Afghanistan
— Jouzjan, Faryab, Balkh,
Kunduz, Badghis. President
Berdimuhamedov and Afghan
Presi
