Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 125936
date: 10/16/2007 17:23
refid: 07STATE144711
origin: Secretary of State
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0933
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHC #4711/01 2891733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161723Z OCT 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 2288
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 7602
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 6615
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9641
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 9731
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 144711
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BG, CE, IN, NP, PK, SENV, TBIO, TI
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO CABLE ON INDOOR AIR
POLLUTION AND FOLLOW ON ACTIONS
REF: 2006 STATE 192623
1. This is an action request. See Paragraph 3.
SUMMARY
2. SUMMARY: Reftel asked posts in countries where greater
than 20 percent of the population uses biomass and coal to
meet basic energy needs to assess host countries, commitment
to addressing the health concerns posed by indoor air
pollution (IAP) and to identify opportunities for
strengthening U.S. diplomatic outreach on the issue. This
cable provides a synopsis of the responses, identifies
priority countries for outreach, and asks posts to encourage
these countries to join the Partnership for Clean Indoor Air
(PCIA), one of the public-private partnerships launched by
the U.S. at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
registered with the UN Commission for Sustainable
Development. For more information on PCIA please visit
www.pciaonline.org. END SUMMARY.
3. ACTION REQUEST: Department asks Posts to share information
about PCIA with relevant host government ministries and
agencies (e.g. health, environment, energy, women and
children, economic development) and to encourage them to join
the Partnership. Posts may use the general comments in
Paragraphs 12-16 and also country specific comments in
Paragraph 17 in developing talking points for their
respective host governments.
Department would appreciate
post,s consideration of hosting roundtable meetings for
relevant civil society organization and government ministries
to encourage awareness about IAP, to introduce them to PCIA,
and to encourage membership in it. Organizations can register
to become a partner on the PCIA website.
Department
appreciates Posts, assistance and support for U.S. efforts
to mitigate indoor air pollution and improve global health.
Please contact OES/IHB,s Lindsey Hillesheim
([email protected] or 202-647-6922) or Dano Wilusz
([email protected] or 202-647-6817) with Mission,s response
and for any necessary additional background information.
Department requests a response by November 30, 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Summary (Paragraph 2)
Point of Contact (Paragraph 3)
Synopsis of Responses from 21
Countries (Paragraphs 5-9)
Encouraging Government PCIA
Membership (Paragraphs 10-11)
General Background on IAP
(Paragraph 12-15)
General Background on PCIA
(Paragraph 16)
Country Specific Comments
(Paragraph 17)
Further Resources (Paragraph
18)
SYNOPSIS OF RESPONSES TO REFTEL
5. Reftel asked posts in countries where greater than 20
percent of the population uses biomass and coal to meet basic
energy needs to assess host countries, commitment to
addressing the health concerns posed by indoor air pollution
(IAP) and to identify opportunities for strengthening U.S.
diplomatic outreach on the issue.
As of June 2007 Department
had received responses from posts in 21 countries. These 21
countries represent approximately 50% of the estimated 3
billion people who burn solid fuel for cooking and heating.
While the content and depth of individual responses varied
significantly, we were able to make conclusions in four
areas: host government
commitment; ministry responsibility;
public and non-governmental activities related to IAP; and
host government interest in the Partnership for Clean Indoor
Air (PCIA), one of the public-private partnerships launched
by the U.S. at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
registered with the UN Commission for Sustainable
Development. Since 2003, PCIA partner organizations have
succeeded in influencing 1.31 million households to adopt
clean and efficient cooking and/or heating practices;
resulting in 11 million with reduced exposure to harmful
indoor air pollution. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) coordinates PCIA and leads USG efforts within it.
6. GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT: Host government commitment to
reducing indoor air pollution and the negative health effects
associated with it varied considerably.
Approximately half
STATE 00144711 002 OF 005
of the response cables could not identify any government
action plan, besides further study, to address indoor air
pollution. Approximately
one-quarter of the cables noted
that host government officials in relevant ministries did not
think IAP was a major problem in their country.
7. MINISTRY RESPONSIBILITY: The government ministry
responsible for indoor air pollution varied significantly
from country to country; three-quarters of responding posts
said their questions about IAP were referred to the Ministry
of Environment and one-quarter to the Ministry of Health.
Approximately three-quarters reported that they were referred
to multiple agencies. It seems
likely that ambiguous
ministerial responsibility contributes to government inaction
on indoor air pollution in some cases.
8. INDOOR AIR POLLUTION INTERVENTIONS: Posts highlighted many
important public and private country-level efforts aimed at
reducing indoor air pollution from solid fuel use.
Approximately half of the responses indicated that private or
government projects to distribute improved cooking stoves had
taken place in the host country.
Approximately half also
indicated that host countries have had private or government
projects to encourage cleaner alternative fuels. However, it
is important to note that the vast majority of intervention
projects were carried out by private organizations and not by
the host governments. Almost no responses reported private or
government projects to educate people about the significant
and negative health impacts due to IAP.
9. PCIA INTEREST: Six of twenty-one host governments were
previously or have joined the Partnership. Another
one-quarter said that host governments were interested in
learning more.
ENCOURAGING GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN PCIA
10. One quarter of respondents indicated that host
governments are interested in learning more about PCIA.
Increased government participation in PCIA has the potential
to raise awareness about environmental health issues and to
increase international action dedicated to reducing the
health effects of indoor air pollution related to solid fuel
use. The USG provides a
substantial portion of the funding
and human resources required to maintain the PCIA, and the
Partnership,s capacity to address the negative health and
environmental consequences of solid fuel use for household
energy will grow with its membership base. In addition to
receiving notices for grants and Requests for Proposals
(RFPs), PCIA members also receive information about free
in-depth technical training in community outreach and
education, stove development and performance, market
development, and exposure monitoring. Another benefit of PCIA
membership is direct exchange, both regionally and globally,
between users/cooks, researchers, entrepreneurs, project
implementers, programs directors, and policy makers.
11. The Department and PCIA coordinators from EPA,s Office
of Air and Radiation have used the responses to identify
relevant government ministries to be encouraged to join PCIA,
as well as those governments that are already PCIA members
who we would like to deepen their involvement in the
partnership. Criteria for
selecting these governments
include: (1) high burden of disease from indoor air
pollution, (2) capacity to join and benefit from membership,
(3) willingness to partner with the PCIA, and (4) involvement
of international donors in national indoor air pollution
programs within that country.
GENERAL BACKGROUND ON INDOOR AIR POLLUTION
12. HEALTH EFFECTS: Indoor air pollution is caused by cooking
and heating with wood, dung, coal and other solid fuels on
open fires or simple stoves. IAP is a daily reality for more
than half of the world,s population and kills over 1.6
million people each year, making IAP the second biggest
environmental contributor to ill health behind unsafe water
and sanitation. The majority of
those deaths occur in
sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, where 396,000 and
483,000 people are estimated to die from exposure to IAP each
year, respectively. Worldwide, 1.2 million of the 1.6 million
annual deaths due to IAP occur in just eleven countries:
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, China, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria,
Pakistan and the United Republic of Tanzania. The smoke
produced by solid fuel combustion in fires or stoves contains
health-damaging pollutants including carbon monoxide, human
carcinogens, and fine particles that penetrate deep into the
lungs. These pollutants cause inflammation of the airways and
STATE 00144711 003 OF 005
lungs, impair the immune system, and reduce the
oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood. The result is a
significantly increased susceptibility to pneumonia in
children and chronic respiratory disease among adults.
Globally, pneumonia and other respiratory infections are the
single greatest cause of death in children under five. Women
exposed to indoor smoke are three times as likely to suffer
from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) than women
who cook and heat with electricity, gas or other cleaner
fuels. Because of gender norms in many societies women are in
charge of cooking and, depending on the local cuisine, spend
between three and seven hours per day near the stove. Young
children are often carried on their mother,s backs or kept
close to the hearth. Thus, indoor air pollution
disproportionately affects women and children, and in 2002,
is estimated to have resulted in 500,000 deaths among women
and 800,000 deaths among children under five years of age.
13. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: Demand for the fuel that produces
IAP causes severe land degradation and desertification in
many of the world,s poorest countries.
For example,
according to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO),
many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have lost three quarters
or more of their forest cover to deforestation. Such
resource depletion threatens food security, which, in turn,
can upset national and regional political stability.
14. GENDER INEQUALITY: In many countries women,s domestic
responsibilities make them disproportionately exposed to IAP.
Many women must spend several
hours per day collecting fuel
for cooking and heating; a recent study found that women in
Nigeria and Ethiopia spend on average more than two hours per
day collecting fuel. Alleviating
this time burden would free
women,s time for childcare, education, and income-generating
activities. Women also bear the brunt of IAP-induced disease.
For example WHO reports that each
year IAP kills fewer than
200,000 men but over 500,000 women.
The fight against gender
inequality is one key element of the 2002 Millennium
Declaration signed by the USG and 188 other nations.
15. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS: A recent WHO report, «Fuel for
Life», estimates that making improved stoves available to
half of those still burning biomass fuels and coal on
traditional stoves would save USD 34 billion in fuel
expenditure every year, and generate an economic return of
USD 105 billion every year over a 10 year period. The report
also suggests that halving the number of people worldwide
cooking with solid fuels by 2015 would cost a total of USD 13
billion per year but would provide an economic benefit of USD
91 billion per year. The majority
of these costs are borne
at the household level since donor investments are used to
design appropriate technologies, set up local businesses, and
put micro-credit systems in place. However, the majority of
the benefits also occur at the household level. Addressing
household energy needs through the introduction of improved
cook stoves not only reduces rates of illness and death but
also means that household members spend less time
recuperating from illness, caring for sick family members,
collecting fuel, and cooking. With more time available,
children may be in a better position to take advantage of
educational opportunities, while their mothers could engage
in childcare, agriculture or other income-generating
activities as a way to break the cycle of poverty.
GENERAL BACKGROUND ON PCIA
16. The Partnership for Clean
Indoor Air, an Administration
initiative launched at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg in September 2002, addresses the
environmental health risk faced by three billion people who
burn traditional biomass fuels indoors for cooking and
heating. This voluntary Partnership brings together
governments, public and private organizations, multilateral
institutions, industry, and others to increase the use of
affordable, reliable, clean, efficient, and safe home cooking
and heating practices. The mission of the Partnership for
Clean Indoor Air is to improve health, livelihood and quality
of life by reducing exposure to air pollution, primarily
among women and children, from household energy use. More
information on PCIA can be found at:
http://www.pciaonline.org
COUNTRY SPECIFIC COMMENTS
17. The following
country-specific information responds to
points raised in the individual country response cables or
provides country-specific information that could be useful in
raising awareness with host governments on the health,
environmental, economic and gender-based consequences of IAP
and recruiting host governments to join PCIA.
STATE 00144711 004 OF 005
** COUNTRIES NOT CURRENTLY PCIA MEMBERS **
A. Bangladesh: There are four
active PCIA members
implementing effective household energy programs in
Bangladesh, including the LocalGovernment Engineering
Department, one of the largest engineering departments in
Bangladesh. It provides technical support to the Local
Government Institutions, reinforcing diversified application
of renewable energy technologies in the off-grid areas. Very
recently LGED has engaged with a study on ‘Bangladesh Indoor
Air Pollution’ which is sponsored by the World Bank. The
other organizations are Practical Action Bangladesh, Village
Education Resource Center and Barendra Advancement Integrated
Committee. WHO estimates that Bangladesh,s national burden
of disease attributable to solid fuel use is 3.6%, and
accounts for 32,000 deaths per year among children under five
years of age and 46,000 deaths total. 89% of Bangladeshis use
solid fuels.
B. India: An estimated 90% of
rural Indian families use a
three-stone fire or a rudimentary stove indoors for cooking,
leading to 425,000 premature deaths each year. The 3rd
Biennial Partnership Forum was held in Bangalore in March of
this year. More than 120 partners
from around the world
gathered to celebrate the tremendous progress made and set
ambitious goals for the coming years.
Since 2003, PCIA
partners, efforts have led more than 1.4 million households
to adopt clean and fuel-efficient cooking or heating
practices, resulting in more than 7.6 million people with
reduced exposure to harmful indoor air pollutant. In the
next 2-3 years, the Partnership,s goal is for another 5.8
million households to adopt clean and fuel-efficient cooking
practices; of these households more than 2 million will be in
India. EPA has funded two highly
successful pilot projects
in India with local NGOs Appropriate Rural Technology
Institute and The Society for Development Alternatives.
Another leading partner, the Shell Foundation, is also
actively supporting projects in India.
In addition, private
sector partners such as BP India and Philips are actively
promoting clean and efficient cooking technologies that will
reduce people,s exposure to indoor air pollution and improve
their quality of life.
C. Pakistan: EPA is in the
process of awarding a grant to
the Aga Khan Foundation to support the promotion of 5,500
improved cook stoves in addition to other energy efficient
and home improvement products (e.g., water warming
facilities, solar geysers, wall and roof insulations) in the
northern areas and Chitral. WHO estimates that Pakistan,s
national burden of disease attributable to solid fuel use is
4.6%, and accounts for 52,000 deaths per year among children
under five years of age and 71,000 deaths total. 81% of
Pakistanis use solid fuels.
D. Tajikistan (DUSHANBE 200): WHO estimates that
Tajikistan,s national burden of disease attributable to
solid fuel use is 3.5%, and accounts for 1000 deaths per year
among children under five years of age and 2000 deaths total.
75% of Tajiks use solid fuels.
** PCIA MEMBER COUNTRIES **
E. Nepal (KATHMANDU 201): There are currently several IAP
projects occurring in Nepal, including a USEPA-funded project
designed and implemented by the NGO Practical Action. WHO
estimates that Nepal,s national burden of disease
attributable to solid fuel use is 2.7%, and accounts for 8000
deaths per year, including 5000 children under five years of
age. 81% of Nepal,s population uses solid fuels. The
Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology,s
Alternative Energy Promotion Centre/Energy Sector Assistance
Programme is a PCIA member. GON could be encouraged to take a
more active role in raising regional awareness for the
health, environmental, economic and gender-based consequences
of IAP.
F. Sri Lanka (COLOMBO 228): WHO estimates that Sri Lanka,s
national burden of disease attributable to solid fuel use is
1.3%, and accounts for 3000 deaths per year, including 100
children under five years of age. 67% of Sri Lanka,s
population uses solid fuels. GSL,s efforts to address IAP
have largely been focused on assessment of the problem, while
most IAP mitigation projects are carried out by NGOs. It is
not clear how coordinated these related efforts are. It is
worth noting that ARECOP and IDEA are PCIA members. Thus, GSL
membership in the partnership could provide a forum for
better coordination, as well as provide GSL officials
training in program development, implementation and
assessment. The GSL Air Resource Management Center (AirMAC)
STATE 00144711 005 OF 005
is a PCIA member. The Economics and Global Affairs Division
of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources,
identified in the response cable as the responsible GSL
office for handling IAP issues, is not a member.
18. FURTHER RESOURCES:
USG,s Sustainable Development Partnerships Website
http://www.sdp.gov
WHO General information on IAP
http://www.who.int/indoorair/en/
Fuel for Life report
http://www.who.int/indoorair/publications/fue lforlife/
en/index.html
WHO National burden of disease estimates for IAP
http://www.who.int/indoorair/publications/nat ionalburden/
en/index.html
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air resources
http://www.pciaonline.org/resources.cfm
RICE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 126041
date: 10/17/2007 12:36
refid: 07DUSHANBE1466
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07DUSHANBE1456|07DUSHANBE1460
header:
VZCZCXRO1825
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1466/01 2901236
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171236Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1121
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1992
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1261
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3024
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2261
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2273
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1830
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0170
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2217
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1646
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1788
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2037
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0191
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2022
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001466
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ETRD, PGOV, EAID, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: A TASTE OF YAK IN REMOTE MURGHAB
REF: REF A: DUSHANBE 1456; REF B: DUSHANBE 1460
DUSHANBE 00001466 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) Summary: Remote, harsh and cold, and sparsely populated
by residents with hardened wind-battered facial features,
Murghab sits atop an 11,778-foot plateau in an area that defines
remote in eastern Tajikistan.
EconOffs drove to Murghab in
eastern Tajikistan in early October to see how residents live.
They found a town offering little overall economic activity and
surviving on a combination of yaks, remittances, and assistance
programs, but benefiting very little from the flow of Chinese
traders. End Summary.
2. (U) Murghab sits at an international crossroads with China 90
kilometers to the east, Kyrgyzstan 420 kilometers to the north,
and Khorog 311 kilometers west.
The 7,000 people in Murghab
survive on yak and sheep herding, trading, handicrafts, and
remittance income from abroad.
Murghab physically resembles
rural Mongolia; residents of Murghab are mostly ethnic Kyrgyz,
typically former nomads who’ve settled there. Russian is the
common language in Murghab, and both the Tajik and Kyrgyz
primary schools teach Russian language to local youth. There
are separate mosques for the Kyrgyz Sunni Muslims and for the
Shia Pamiri Ismailis, who go to the Jamoat Khona (an Ismaili
mosque).
3. (U) The town of Murghab is a thicket of winding streets, with
small houses cobbled together from bits and pieces of wood,
scrap metal, stone, mud, bricks, and discarded car parts.
Residents heat their houses with coal, and use underground wells
for drinking water. There are no
cafes or restaurants, and by
6:00 PM the streets are empty.
Since almost nothing grows in
Murghab, nearly all food is imported, mostly from Kyrgyzstan.
EconOffs enjoyed yak-stuffed peppers and yak soup, along with
fried eggs, bread, and tea. The
night sky in Murghab, unspoiled
by electric lights, reveals billions and billions of stars with
a creamy Milky Way overhead; a nearby Soviet astronomy facility
was planned but not completed.
4. (U) Peeking into the stalls in Murghab’s bazaar reveals small
quantities of Chinese imported clothing, and small consumer and
electronics goods. Transportation
costs drive up local prices,
with the price for a 50 kilogram sack of flour 180 somoni, 50
somoni more than in Dushanbe; recent inflation has hit local
residents hard (reftel A). Local
businesspeople told EconOffs
October 4 that Tajik traders bring in goods from China through
the Kulma Pass or through Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Fifteen Chinese
trucks sat at a small truck terminal on the edge of town,
deciding whether to wait more than a week for the Tajik-Chinese
border to re-open on October 16, or to travel further to Osh
where the can cross any time, weather permitting. [Note: The
border crossing at the Kulma Pass is open 15 days, closed 15
days. End note.] The Chinese traders keep to themselves and do
not use Tajik services.
5. (SBU) The roads to Murghab are in poor condition, and China
is considering rehabilitating the road from the Kulma Pass to
Khorog through Murghab. Flying to
Murghab is not an option
(there is no commercial air service), although there is an old,
well-constructed Soviet airport a few kilometers north of
Murghab on the way to Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
The biggest surprise
about the airport in Murghab besides its existence is the
quality and length of the three-kilometer asphalt runway. The
terminal has been stripped completely bare, and there is no
fence preventing vehicles from driving right onto the runway.
According to Suhrob Garibmamadov of the Aga Khan’s Mountain
Societies Development Support Program, Russian military support
planes use the airport every seven to ten days.
6. (U) A variety of donors, particularly the Mountain Societies
Development Support Program and the international
non-governmental development Agency for Technical Cooperation
and Development fund education and health projects, ecotourism,
poverty reduction, and small business development programs. The
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development helps 104 women
DUSHANBE 00001466 002.2 OF 002
sell their handicrafts in Dushanbe through a project called the
Yak House. A small ecotourism
project puts up adventure
tourists in a local guest house or arranges yurt stays. USAID
helped rehabilitate the town’s mini-hydro plant (reftel B) in
2002. The area’s single Democracy
Commission grantee planned to
publish a bulletin but had to cancel her grant due to local
government pressure. A public
association «SUDVO» works on
basic poverty reduction; combining membership and donor funds,
SUDVO gives yaks, goats, and sheep to extremely poor people for
basic survival. Five residents of
Murghab made the final round
of competition for the Future Leaders Exchange Program this
year.
7. (U) Comment: Residents of Murghab are extremely welcoming to
foreigners, and blame the government for their predicament.
Opportunities are few, and there has been little attempt to
harness the economic benefits from transit traders, although the
anticipated Chinese influx into the region has only begun to
gain momentum. It is likely that
economic development will
largely pass by Murghab, along with most of Gorno-Badakshan’s
200,000 residents. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 126052
date: 10/17/2007 13:17
refid: 07DUSHANBE1467
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1888
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1467/01 2901317
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171317Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1123
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 2275
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2263
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1994
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3026
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001467
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: CONTINUING TROUBLES FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE IN
TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A Jacobson, Ambassador, American Embassy
Dushanbe, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: The National Democratic Institute Director in
Tajikistan, Harry Bader, has received another one-month,
two-entry visa, further blocking his efforts to obtain
registration for his organization.
The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs had previously promised Bader a three-month visa, which
would have made the registration process easier. Security
services reportedly blocked the three-month visa at the last
moment, and appear to be increasing harassment of National
Democratic Institute employees, including the American Director.
Embassy is not optimistic that
the Government will agree to the
National Democratic Institute’s registration, but will continue
to advocate with the Government for a long-term visa for Mr.
Bader, and to clarify legal conditions for the organization’s
registration. End summary.
2. (C) On 12 October 2007,
PolOffs met with Harry Bader,
Director of National Democratic Institute’s Tajikistan office,
to discuss his visa status in Tajikistan. Bader had applied for
a 3-month, multiple entry visa, the receipt of which is a
prerequisite to register NDI with the Tajik authorities. On
October 9 an office worker at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Consular Office showed the non-governmental organization’s Tajik
office manager an approved application for a 3-month multiple
entry visa, signed by the new head of the Consular Office (also
President Rahmon’s daughter).
National Democratic Institute’s
office manager left the Ministry thinking that final issuance of
the visa would be just a formality.
Pressure on National Democratic Institute Employees
——————————————— ——-
3. (C) However, on October 11
Tajik security officers (from the
State Committee on National Security) stopped National
Democratic Institute’s Tajik Program Manager and questioned him
regarding Bader’s activities. The
same State Security officers
have been questioning this employee regularly over a period of
years, but they have generally shown a friendly attitude. On
this occasion, however, the State Security officers took a
negative tone. They asked the
Program Manager about Bader’s
reaction to the recent high level summits held in Dushanbe, and
then reprimanded him for not informing them that Bader had met
with the Ukrainian delegation to the summit — although no such
meeting took place. They told the
Program Manager that he was
«not helping himself» by working for the American
organization.
They described National Democratic Institute as an organization
that is «attacking the Tajik government,» and backed up this
assertion by noting that the new National Democratic Institute
Country Director in Kyrgyzstan has come from the organization’s
Belarus office. Finally, they
threatened that Bader would not
get a visa at all. When the
Program Manager responded that the
State Committee on National Security did not decide visa
issuances, they then indicated that Bader would receive a
one-month visa.
4. (C) At approximately the same
time on October 11, Mr. Bader
said he was walking on a Dushanbe street when three men in a car
stopped in front of him and told him to get into their car. One
went so far as to put his hands on Mr. Bader, but Bader brushed
him aside and kept walking. The
men did not identify
themselves, and promptly drove off.
Bader also said that an
expatriate friend, head of the NGO Forum and Director of U.S.
implementing partner Mercy Corps, had been approached and
questioned on the street about her relationship with Bader.
Bader considers these two incidents to be annoyances, not
threatening.
And Another Short-Term Visa
————————————
5. (C) On Thursday, October 11,
Bader’s office manager picked
up his visa. Despite the earlier
approval for a three-month
visa, it turned out to a one-month, two-entry visa, valid until
mid-November 2007. In addition to
the limited flexibility of
the short-term visa, Mr. Bader explained that the length of the
visa’s validity has a bearing on the non-governmental
organization registration process.
Depending which Tajik law is
cited — the Law on Legal Entities or the Law on Public
Associations — Bader, as the organization’s foreign director
needs either a 3 month or a 6 month visa for his organization to
qualify for registration. Bader
said that Government officials
have not clarified which laws apply in the case of National
DUSHANBE 00001467 002 OF 002
Democratic Institute’s registration, but by either regulation,
Bader cannot register the organization while in possession of a
one-month visa. The deadline for
registering under the Law on
Public Associations is January 1, 2008.
6. (C) The Embassy has continued to advocate for
National
Democratic Institute in support of obtaining proper visas from
the Foreign Ministry and clarification from the Justice Ministry
about registration regulations and procedures. The Embassy’s
diplomatic note from July requesting a meeting with the Justice
Ministry remains unanswered despite frequent queries. We will
continue our efforts to overcome these bureaucratic obstacles
with the goal of helping National Democratic Institute get to a
point where they can resume their program activities.
Comment: Visa-ed to Death
———————————
7. (C) Tajik officials may be
using the visa issue (a Foreign
Ministry function) to re-direct our focus from the question of
registering National Democratic Institute (a Justice Ministry
function). By continuing to issue
Bader short term visas, the
Foreign Ministry has also taken the onus off the Ministry of
Justice to clarify its legal conditions for National Democratic
Institute’s registration. The
latest harassment tactics against
Bader and his staff and acquaintances, as well as our
conversations with Tajik officials make it clear that it is the
security apparatus — the State Committee on National Security
— that is most opposed to National Democratic Institute’s
presence here in Tajikistan.
Whether it’s visas or
registration, Tajik officials hope to use bureaucratic obstacles
to convince National Democratic Institute to withdraw from
Tajikistan without actually kicking them out. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 126215
date: 10/18/2007 14:21
refid: 07DUSHANBE1481
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3090
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1481 2911421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181421Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1136
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3040
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 2277
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2265
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001481
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: EAID, ELTN, PGOV, MASS, TI
SUBJECT: RENEWED PROMISE TO BEGIN OPERATIONS ON TAJIK-AFGHAN BRIDGE
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) Summary:
Since the August 26 ceremonial opening of the
U.S.-built Tajik-Afghan bridge, Tajik security authorities have
blocked opening the bridge for operations. Recent interventions
by the Embassy appear to have led to a new compromise among
Tajik government agencies which will allow a limited stream of
truck traffic across the bridge.
The Embassy will continue to
follow up to ensure trucks do actually start moving across the
bridge. End summary.
2. (C) Background:
At the time of the opening ceremony, Tajik
authorities promised us the bridge would be open to traffic —
up to 50 vehicles per day — the day after the ribbon-cutting.
In fact, Tajik security officials have hindered efforts to begin
even limited operations. Instead,
truck traffic across the
border from Sher Khan Bandar, Afghanistan to Nizhniy Pyanj,
Tajikistan continues via the barge just downstream from the new
bridge. The Japanese Embassy in
Tajikistan has complained to
the government that the bridge closure has seriously hampered
delivery Pakistani cement intended for the Japanese construction
project rebuilding the Tajik highway feeding into the bridge.
Despite public statements from President Rahmon and other Tajik
officials on the importance of the bridge and related road
projects, the State Committee on National Security has
effectively vetoed bridge traffic.
3. (C) Recent interventions from the Embassy seem to
have
escalated the level of discussion within the Tajik government on
this issue. The Ambassador spoke
with First Deputy Foreign
Minister Yuldashev and the Deputy Chief of Mission followed up
with discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Kasimov directly
challenging the wisdom of letting the bridge remain idle. Post
has communicated our intention to bring an assessment team from
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection service to review bridge
operations in mid November with an eye toward recommending
additional assistance. We have
consistently stressed the need
for all Tajik government agencies — in particular the Border
Guards, who are subordinate to the State Committee on National
Security, and Customs — to work together and cooperate directly
with their Afghan counterparts to establish operating procedures
for the bridge. Some early
momentum prior to the ribbon-cutting
dissipated soon after.
4. (C) Following our interventions last week, the
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs invited Deputy Chair of the State Committee on
National Security, General Gaffarov, to the Ministry to discuss
obstacles to opening the bridge.
The Ministry called in Deputy
Chief of Mission October 18 to discuss the results of the
meeting with Gaffarov. While the
security services continue to
be concerned about truck traffic from Afghanistan, they have
reportedly agreed to begin limited traffic across the bridge.
In particular, they will allow trucks carrying Pakistani cement
being imported for the Japanese road construction project.
These will be the first commercial vehicles allowed to cross the
bridge.
5. (C) The Embassy will continue
to monitor the situation and
watch whether this traffic is initiated.
Already, post’s
Regional Security Officer has heard from Tajik security contacts
established at the time of the ribbon-cutting, that preparations
are under way to «open» the bridge. EmbOffs will travel to the
bridge October 20 to observe first hand.
6. (C) Comment: Fewer and fewer Tajik officials seem
willing
to challenge the State Committee on National Security. Since
the Border Guards were subordinated to the State Committee in a
government reorganization last December, cooperation on some of
our key border assistance programs has diminished sharply. We
were pleased that our constant urging on this issue of
initiating bridge operations, backed by common sense and
continued public statements by President Rahmon about the
importance of the bridge, seem to have given the Foreign
Ministry enough backbone to call in General Gaffarov and obtain
this concession. It’s just a
start, but one that will allow the
Tajik and Afghan border guards and customs officials to work out
operating procedures.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 126389
date: 10/19/2007 13:36
refid: 07DUSHANBE1516
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 07DUSHANBE786
header:
VZCZCXRO4257
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHDBU #1516/01 2921336
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191336Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1175
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 2278
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2267
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 0058
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3079
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 DUSHANBE 001516
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA; DIA FOR DHO2; CENTCOM FOR CCJ5
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MCAP, OVIP, TI, AF
SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND’S 1
NOVEMBER VISIT TO TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (d)
1. (C) Executive Summary. Embassy
Dushanbe looks forward to
your upcoming visit to Tajikistan.
Besides the opening of the
bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan in August, little has
changed since your introductory meeting with President Rahmon in
June. As this is your second
visit, you will have an
opportunity to further develop personal relations with President
Rahmon as well as conduct initial meetings with Minister of
Defense Khairolloyev and the Chairman of the State Committee for
National Security Abdurahimov.
2. (C) Your second visit falls almost a full year after the
presidential election, which secured President Rahmon a third
seven-year term. In addition to
Department of Defense and
CENTCOM military and security-related programs which are
progressing well, we view economic and democratic development as
integral components to ensuring long-term regional stability.
Despite campaign promises and expected changes, Tajikistan
remains stalled on the road of reform, and in many areas is
losing ground. Throughout 2006,
Rahmon assured international
visitors and his public alike that «after the election,» new
blood and new ideas would take Tajikistan to a new era of
economic prosperity and open civil society. The Tajik leader
continues to sidestep the promises of the November 2006
election, and the government is less worried about international
perceptions and more confident in tightening its control over
society and the economy. President
Rahmon’s ministers and
advisors continue to argue for the need for stability before
democracy, and economics before politics.
3. (C) Despite these trends, Tajikistan remains an extremely
important country worthy of your time and investment as CENTCOM
Commander. Tajikistan has
significant potential to achieve more
prosperity and stability, which if seized, will provide
additional economic and strategic options. However, Tajikistan
also faces significant transnational threats that could affect
regional and international stability.
Although religious
extremism is currently not a major threat in Tajikistan, youth
are gradually becoming more disaffected with the government’s
increasing attempts to control religious practice. As you and
President Rahmon discussed during your June visit, the future of
Afghanistan is of primary significance to both Tajikistan and
the United States.
4. (C) The key theme that you can emphasize, both in your
bilateral meetings and in the press opportunity, is that
Tajikistan’s long-term security and economic prosperity are
closely linked to its progress in advancing democracy, the rule
of law, and respect for human rights.
This message is
counter-intuitive to President Rahmon and many of his advisors,
and certainly to Minister of Defense Khairolloyev and the
Chairman of State Security Abdurahimov, with whom you will meet.
Strong and consistent messages
from high-ranking U.S.
interlocutors will play an important role in slowing (or
reversing) Tajikistan’s slipping toward increasing
authoritarianism and corruption.
Background — Reform
————————
5. (C) Negative trends. Instead
of steering his country towards
much needed reform and growth, we see a number of worrying
tendencies in Rahmon’s leadership and government. Tighter
government control, a smaller, less competent inner circle,
little political will to go beyond rhetoric and increasing signs
of public restiveness are a few of the negative trends we see.
Increased unconditional economic assistance from China and Iran
undermine the importance of creating a business climate that
attracts private investors, and the pernicious
little-brother-big-brother relationship with Russia works
against the U.S. (and European) programs on rule of law and good
governance. Likewise the
government’s legislation of cultural
issues — the ban on wearing the hijab, the closing and
demolishing of unregistered mosques, and the ban on women
praying in mosques — are seen by some as an anti-Islamic
campaign. Failure to correct
these tendencies will risk
DUSHANBE 00001516 002 OF 008
Tajikistan becoming a less stable, less prosperous country mired
in poverty, unemployment and clan politics.
6. (C) Political reform. The Tajik government is still not sold
on the benefits of democratic reform or political openness. It
looks at Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and its own civil war,
and questions what good could come out of allowing more
political expression and the development of political parties.
They may not like Uzbekistan, but the Tajiks admire the
«stability» Karimov’s regime has wrought and count on the
international community to give Tajikistan leeway as long as it
remains better than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan — the bad
examples in the region. We must
convince the Tajik government
that creating democratic institutions and practices — such as a
reformed judiciary that promotes rule of law, a parliament that
is educated and engaged in legislating, rather than serving as a
rubber stamp, and a freer media to inform its citizenry — are
steps that will actually be in the government’s interest, and
not threaten President Rahmon’s authority.
7. (C) Economic reform. Economic
reform is more palatable, and
the government has taken a few small steps over the last year
towards improving the investment climate, such as a law on
inspections that could cut the number of inspections a business
faces in half, a Committee on Investments and State Property and
an Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes ostensibly
aimed at rooting out corruption on all levels. How these new
initiatives are implemented will demonstrate how serious
Tajikistan is about linking itself to the global economy. Thus
far, progress is slim.
8. (C) Freedom of religious expression.
Of concern are the
draft Law on Religious Organizations and the rising tension
between religious leaders and the government. According to
unconfirmed internet news reports, the Tajik government has
closed 213 mosques in Dushanbe alone over the last two months;
there are also reports that the government has demolished four
of these mosques. The government
argued that these mosques were
not properly registered, and did not have official government
permission to function. Another
recent example of unwarranted
regulation was a recent initiative to test the religious
knowledge of the imams at mosques in Dushanbe resulting in the
dismissal of four imams. A new
draft law on religion contains a
provision which could ban political parties with a religious
affiliation, such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
— Central Asia’s only legally sanctioned Islamic party. The
net effect of these attempts has been referred by one of our
contacts as «secular extremism.» The Government’s control of
religious life is — and will be — superficial at best, and
current policies are fostering discontent. In the near term,
vocal or violent opposition is unlikely.
However, severe
restrictions on religious practice will continue to allow
broader discontent to simmer.
9. (C) The Tajik response.
Government officials will likely try
to parry any discussion of better governance and democratic
reform with a request for U.S. investment in the economy and
infrastructure. Given the steady
flow of state-funded
investment from China, Iran and Russia in hydropower,
transmission lines, telecom, roads and tunnels, the Tajiks will
be looking for the same kind of engagement from the United
States — and will be less interested in hearing that they
should improve their business climate to attract private
companies.
Economics
————
10. (C) Economics before politics.
During your short visit, you
will once again witness the veneer of Dushanbe’s active consumer
economy, which hides the underbelly of massive corruption and
industrial decay. The government,
including the former Tajik
Ambassador to the United States and now Foreign Minister Zarifi
and President Rahmon (going back to their Tajik roots), insists
on talking «economics before politics.» However, they turn a
deaf ear when we insist that only reforming their business
climate will attract Western investors, and they dismiss the
suggestion that corruption scares off businesses. They point to
over $800 million in no-strings-attached Chinese loans they have
received for infrastructure projects, and tell us to bring
American companies to Tajikistan.
DUSHANBE 00001516 003 OF 008
11. (C) The investment climate. Although there is some
enthusiasm for U.S. investment and requests to send American
companies to Tajikistan, there are few substantial examples of
what the Tajiks are doing to create an attractive environment or
recruit international businesses beyond vague talk of «fighting
corruption» and a «law on foreign investments» that has
yet
truly to protect the few international firms that run into
problems. Cross-border trade
faces customs challenges, visa
issues, and political mistrust.
Courts do not always uphold
contracts or the rule of law.
Investors bristle at the hassle
of Tajik corruption; repeated demands for money from low and
mid-level officials across the government dissuade
entrepreneurs. Small businesses
flourish outside the official
economy trading agricultural and consumer goods, avoiding taxes
and customs fees.
Regional Integration
———————-
12. (C) The Uzbek problem.
Although the Tajik government shares
our enthusiasm for regional integration, deep down, they may not
share the same fundamental vision.
Tajik officials define
«region» differently, and cannot talk about regional issues
without including Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan causes Tajikistan
serious problems with electricity and gas, customs, imports,
exports, visas, landmines, water sharing and even locusts. FM
Zarifi has even unofficially told Ambassador that he will lobby
NATO to have old Soviet-era weapons transferred from former
Eastern-bloc countries to face the ensuing Uzbek onslaught.
13. (C) Energy as an export. As part of the emphasis on regional
integration, the United States is pushing for Tajik hydropower
to be exported to Pakistan and Afghanistan. A major issue is
who will pay for the electricity once it is produced. To that
end, the United States is working in Afghanistan and Tajikistan
to harmonize the regulatory environment.
The Asian Development
Bank is currently facilitating the negotiation of a power
purchasing agreement between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which
could encourage U.S. private sector participation in the
development of hydropower and related infrastructure.
14. (C) New bridge to Afghanistan.
Despite public statements
from President Rahmon and other Tajik officials on the
importance of the bridge and related road projects following the
August 26 ceremonial opening of the U.S.-built Tajik-Afghan
bridge, the State Committee on National Security had effectively
been vetoing bridge traffic.
Recent interventions by the
Embassy appear to have led to a new compromise among Tajik
government agencies which will allow a limited stream of truck
traffic across the bridge. In
particular, they will allow
trucks carrying Pakistani cement being imported for the Japanese
road construction project. Post
continues to communicate our
intention to bring an assessment team from the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection service to review bridge operations in mid
November with an eye toward recommending additional assistance.
We have consistently stressed the need for all Tajik government
agencies — in particular the Border Guards, who are subordinate
to the State Committee on National Security, and Customs — to
work together and cooperate directly with their Afghan
counterparts to establish operating procedures for the bridge.
The bridge is crucial to giving the Tajiks more opportunity to
bypass Uzbekistan and look to South Asia as a commercial
destination and partner.
Security and Military Structures
———————————
15. (C) Balancing Russia and others.
Rahmon has not changed his
«open door» policy of working with all countries; yet
Tajikistan
is still primarily influenced by Russia, and this factor
significantly colors its security perceptions. The presence of
the 201st Russian Military Base effectively supports the
existence of the Rahmon regime.
Russia also maintains a
relatively constant stream of black propaganda against U.S.-led
initiatives and activities in Tajikistan and Central Asia. There
was considerable Russian pressure on cabinet appointments during
the December 2006 government reshuffle and officials continued
to express their concern with Russian pressure as recently as
the CIS/CSTO/EurAsEC summits during the first week of October
DUSHANBE 00001516 004 OF 008
07. The presence of Russian
Border Advisors, while greatly
decreased, still leaves Tajikistan with an overseer who does not
necessarily always have the Tajiks’ best interests in mind.
Tajikistan also deftly balances China, Iran (see Dushanbe 786
and IIR 6 947 0016) and India, as well as membership in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
During the aforementioned
early October 07 summits, the SCO and CSTO signed a cooperation
document pledging joint efforts in international peacekeeping.
The Russia-inspired vision is that this cooperation may l
