Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 124121
date: 10/1/2007 5:46
refid: 07ASTANA2727
origin: Embassy Astana
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07State117583
header:
VZCZCXRO2820
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI
RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHTA #2727 2740546
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010546Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0842
INFO RUCNCLS/SCA COLLECTIVE
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS ASTANA 002727
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN — O’MARA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, EFIN, ECON,
PREL, AF, KG, KZ, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT TIFA
REF: State 117583
1. (U) Econoff delivered
reftel points on September 28 to Damigul
Kabiyeva, Head of the WTO
accession Department. Kabiyeva stated
that she thought this
summer’s Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) Council
events in Washington were a success and
reiterated Kazakhstan’s
commitment to developing the TIFA framework
as a means of facilitating
regional economic development.
2. (U) Kabiyeva was quite
supportive of the idea of holding
expert-level preparatory
events before next year’s plenary session.
Such an approach, she
stated, would help make the political-level
discussions more focused and
fruitful. She also suggested the
possibility of launching
concrete investment projects at future TIFA
meetings.
3. (U) Kabiyeva reacted
favorably to the idea of holding next year’s
TIFA events in Central Asia,
stating that holding them in the region
may help attract business
participation. She noted that Dushanbe
has recently hosted a number
of multilateral meetings, adding that
Kazakhstani officials go
there «with pleasure.»
Kabiyeva was
somewhat less enthusiastic
about Asghabat as a possible venue, but
said that holding TIFA
events there «may help bring Turkmenistan
into the fold a little
more.» She also suggested the
possibility of
determining meeting
locations on a rotating basis (an approach, she
noted, used by other
regional organizations). This, Kabiyeva
said,
would give each country a
greater stake in the TIFA framework.
4. (SBU) Still, Kabiyeva
emphasized the importance of a continuing
strong role of the U.S. in
the TIFA process. Initiatives, she
noted, are received better
if they come from the United States.
Other Central Asian
countries, she continued, are wary of the notion
of Kazakhstan’s
«regional leadership.»
MILAS
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 124431
date: 10/3/2007 5:50
refid: 07DUSHANBE1412
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4944
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1412 2760550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030550Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
1054
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2950
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001412
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/PPD AND SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: SPEAKER OF
PARLIAMENT FIGHTS FOR CONTROL OF OPEN WORLD
PROGRAM
1. SUMMARY: Deputy Chief of
Mission and Cultural Affairs Officer
met with Speaker of
Parliament Sadullo Hairuloyev October 2 to
ask him to consent to the
participation of four members of the
Tajik Parliament in the Open
World program. Hairuloyev initially
provided several reasons why
the participants, who were chosen
by an Embassy committee per
Open World program criteria, could
not travel and attempted to
insert his own choices. However, he
eventually permitted three
from our list to travel as scheduled,
or up to four if the
exchange could be postponed for a period.
Hairuloyev also indicated he
may allow future parliamentary
groups to participate in
USG-sponsored exchanges and programs.
END SUMMARY
2. Hairuloyev brought to the
meeting his own list of eight
parliamentarians, only two
of whom were on the Embassy’s list.
He said he is concerned with
sensitivities in Parliament about
who travels abroad and wants
to avoid a «scandal» in case some
members get to travel more
than once before others get their
first chance. We explained to Hairuloyev that Embassy
exchange
programs were not designed
to be used as fringe benefits for
members of parliament.
3. Pointing to the Embassy’s
list of applicants, he said various
candidates were either sick,
had previously traveled to the
United States, or need to
remain in Dushanbe to work on next
year’s budget. He then repeatedly attempted to insert
candidates from his own
list. We explained that the list of
candidates was selected by a
panel of American officers from the
Embassy following Open World
guidelines. Hairuloyev
acknowledged this but kept
asserting his prerogative to decide
who among the members of
Parliament could travel abroad.
4. Hairuloyev did say that
he would be open to parliamentary
travel in the future and
participation in other embassy
programs, as long as Embassy
officials inform him in advance
whom they have chosen. As for the Open World exchange under
question, Hairuloyev finally
agreed to three of our candidates,
and suggested that if the
exchange were postponed until
November, a fourth parliamentarian
from our list could also
attend. Note: The Embassy has bounced these two
options off
Open World staff: sending
three parliamentarians as scheduled or
postponing the visit in
order to fill out the group. Open World
prefers to postpone the
visit until November. End note.
5. Hairuloyev was generally
aware of and amenable to U.S.
assistance activities in
Tajikistan. He noted the recent press
reports about the renovation
of a historic madrassa under the
Ambassador’s Cultural
Preservation Fund and the opening of the
U.S.-build bridge at Nizhniy
Pyanj. Alluding to Iranian and
Chinese influence in
Tajikistan, he said it was a good thing
that the United States built
the bridge, and expressed surprise
when he learned that Tajik
border forces hadn’t yet allowed the
bridge to open.
6. COMMENT: Hairuloyev seems
to view USG-sponsored exchange
programs as rewards, despite
our insistence that they are in
fact working exchanges. At one point he mentioned that he has
not been selected to travel
himself, implying that he would be a
good candidate. Post will take steps to maintain its decision
making role, but will
involve Hairuloyev and other
parliamentarians more in the
initial design of future exchanges.
We have already explained to Open World staff
that direct
communications with high
ranking government officials would be
better coming from the
embassy directly rather than from Open
World’s local implementing
partner, American Councils. We hope
that after this initial bump
in the road, the way is set for
expanding our work with the
Tajik Parliament in several program
areas. END COMMENT
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 124494
date: 10/3/2007 12:11
refid: 07MOSCOW4849
origin: Embassy Moscow
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5287
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #4849 2761211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031211Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 4347
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL
COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
MOSCOW 004849
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, TI,
RS
SUBJECT: CIS SUMMIT IN
DUSHANBE: GOR EXPECTATIONS
Classified By: Political M/C
Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D)
1. (U) On October 2, the Kremlin announced that
President
Putin will visit Dushanbe
October 4-7 to participate in the
CIS Summit and two regional
organizations’ meetings —
Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) council
meeting and a EurAsEC
Interstate council meeting. GOR
officials expected that this
year’s CIS Summit would unveil
the roadmap of CIS future
development and essential steps for
its realization. The Summit also promises a declaration on
migration principles which
will govern the CIS space.
2. (C) Director MFA CIS First Department
Vladimir
Kudryavtsev confirmed for us
October 3 that all presidents
will be there although he
did not exclude the possibility of
last-minute drop-outs. Particular attention will be given to
whether Ukraine’s Yushchenko
and Georgia’s Saakashvili will
participate and will have
one-on-one meetings with President
Putin, although Russian
experts discount the possibility that
President Yushchenko would
leave Kyiv this week.
3. (C) According to Kudryavtsev, October 5
discussions will
be focused on how to
strengthen the CIS effectiveness as an
organization. The reform project initiated by Kazakhstan in
2004 has triggered a 30
percent reduction of the
administrative structure and
continues to be one of the main
themes of all CIS
meetings. With the CSTO meeting
following
the next day, anti-narcotics
efforts along the Afghan border
will be one of the topics on
the agenda as well.
Kudryavtsev noted that the
many CIS documents accumulated
over the years, not legally
or politically binding, led to
little results and the
disproportionally large CIS
bureaucracy, even after the
reduction, is another weakness of
the organization.
4. (C) Comment.
The CIS Summit continues to serve above all
as an opportunity for
regional leaders to meet one-on-one on
the margins to discuss
bilateral issues. We have not seen
any indication that Russia
is taking this year’s gathering
more seriously than previous
meetings.
Burns
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 124733
date: 10/4/2007 15:52
refid: 07DUSHANBE1420
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6831
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1420 2771552
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041552Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 1065
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 2961
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
PRIORITY 2261
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
PRIORITY 2250
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
PRIORITY 2206
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001420
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/4/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENT FIRES SENIOR ANTI-NARCOTICS
OFFICER TO
PROTECT A RELATIVE FROM
PROSECUTION
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek,
Charge d’Affaires, a.i., Exec,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
1. (S) Summary: President
Rahmon has fired a senior
anti-narcotics officer who
pressed for prosecution of a distant
relative and Major from the State
Committee for National
Security (i.e. the KGB) who
were arrested while transporting
heroin in a government
vehicle. The fired General has been a
close partner of the embassy
in developing counter narcotics and
counterterrorism
programs. Apart from what this incident
suggests about the
President, it shows one of the perils
involved in investing too
much of our program resources into one
person or agency, as the
President can remove senior officials
without notice. End Summary.
2. (S) Post learned from a
source in the Ministry of Interior
that on October 3 President
Rahmon personally fired Major
General Faizullo Gadoyev,
head of counter narcotics and
counterterrorism in the
Ministry of Interior. This resulted
from the intercept a week ago,
by Gadoyev’s police, of a State
Security vehicle in southern
Tajikistan carrying about 60
kilograms of heroin. The car was driven by State Security
officers, one of whom was a
distant relative of President
Rahmon. This was the third such detection and arrest
of State
Security personnel moving
narcotics in government vehicles in
the past year. Gadoyev pressed for the prosecution of all of
the officers involved,
including the president’s relative.
Gadoyev’s firing was
allegedly the result of this effort. The
Minister of Interior
reportedly met the president on October 3
and pleaded for Gadoyev to
keep his job, to no avail.
3. (S) This is the only case
we know of where the president has
intervened personally to
remove a high-level official to protect
his relatives from
drugs-related prosecution. However, this
is
part of a pattern of high
level intervention, sometimes using
the president’s
Anti-Corruption Commission, to protect organized
crime members involved in
drugs, money laundering, and
protection/extortion
activities within Tajikistan.
4. (S) Gadoyev led the most
effective counter narcotics
organization in
Tajikistan. His police division seized
several
times as much heroin per
year as the Drug Control Agency, and
has been a close partner
with us on counterterrorism activities
as well. Gadoyev had been in his position for the past
decade,
and had the reputation of a
competent, relatively uncorrupt, and
committed law enforcement
officer. Over the past two and
one-half years he cooperated
with the embassy to establish an
intelligence and analytical
center, including a historical
database of crimes and
criminals in Tajikistan. The United
States also funded Gadoyev’s
participation in three
international training
programs, including the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s annual
International Drug Enforcement
Conferences and
International Narcotics Executive Management
Seminar. Our relationship with Gadoyev helped to
increase
seizures of illegal
narcotics, but also helped in fighting
trafficking in persons,
dealing with other organized and
individual crimes, and in
counterterrorism. Gadoyev has been a
close partner of the embassy
and an excellent source of
information and insights on
the Tajik government and the
narcotics trade. His removal could slow our efforts to develop
the capabilities of the
Tajik National Police in a variety of
areas.
5. (S) Comment: General
Gadoyev stepped on two land mines:
repeatedly arresting State
Security officers who were working as
drug couriers, and then
going after a relative of the president.
Since the Minister of Interior supports him,
Gadoyev may
survive in another capacity
at the Interior Ministry but any
committed officer who, like
him, wishes to pursue drug cases to
a high level or close to the
president, faces the same
minefield. This incident emphasizes the vulnerability of
senior
officials to summary removal
if they displease the president or
touch his family
interests. This in turn illustrates the
need
for our engagement on
narcotics to be both broad and deep, and
not heavily reliant on
individuals who might disappear without
warning. End Comment.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 124806
date: 10/5/2007 5:12
refid: 07DUSHANBE1421
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07STATE135255
header:
VZCZCXRO7396
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1421 2780512
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 050512Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 1066
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN
NEW YORK PRIORITY 1508
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2962
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001421
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR IO/RHS LINDA LUM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, AORC, SOCI,
KWMN, UNGA, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN LEANING
TOWARD SUPPORTING RESOLUTION CONDEMNING
THE USE OF RAPE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF STATE POLICY
REF: STATE 135255
1. (U) On 26 September 2007, PolOff raised the
issue of
supporting the draft
resolution condemning the use of rape as an
instrument of state policy
(reftel) with Ismatullo Nasreddinov,
Chief of the Department of
European and North American Affairs
at the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. On 3 October 2007,
Nasreddinov indicated that
the Government of Tajikistan had not
yet made a final decision
regarding support of the resolution,
and that Tajikistan’s
delegation in New York was anticipating
discussing the matter with
members of the United States
delegation. He added that Tajikistan generally supports
the
United States in such
matters.
2. (U) It is unlikely that we will receive a
more specific
answer before the 9 October
deadline because the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has been
preparing for upcoming summits in
Dushanbe. We interpret the Tajik response as being
generally
supportive.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 124823
date: 10/5/2007 6:52
refid: 07DUSHANBE1422
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7491
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1422/01 2780652
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050652Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
1067
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2963
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2262
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
2251
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
0056
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
2207
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
1983
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 001422
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KISL,
KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: SEVENTH CONGRESS OF
THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF
TAJIKISTAN
DUSHANBE 00001422 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary: During the Islamic Renaissance
Party of
Tajikistan’s Seventh
Congress on 25 September 2007, the party’s
delegates elected Chairman
Muhiddin Kabiri to another four-year
term. Kabiri outlined his plans to continue
modernizing the
party and to attract
additional support from young people in
different parts of
Tajikistan. He said recent government
crackdowns on religious
practice have made the party more
popular in Tajikistan. Taking a cautious line, he expressed the
need to make concessions to
the Government in some areas, but
also referred to the
Government’s recent actions as a form of
«secular
extremism.» End summary.
2. (SBU) PolOff attended the Islamic Renaissance
Party’s
Seventh Congress on 25
September 2007. 138 of the party’s 178
delegates attended the
meeting from various parts of Tajikistan,
including Dushanbe, Kulyob,
Khujand, and Zarafshon. This
quadrennial meeting of the
party’s regular congress covered
three main issues: the
Chairman’s report on the activities of
the last four years; the
Report of the Commission on Inspection;
and the election of the
party’s Presidium, or governing council.
Party delegates elected 49 members of the
Presidium, including
two who are in prison:
Mulloh Qosim Rahimov, and Shamsiddin
Shamsiddinov. The Presidium has been expanded to 49 members
from 42, reflecting the
growth in membership in the party.
Party delegates also
re-elected Kabiri as Chairman for another
four year term. [Note:
Kabiri was elected Chairman in 2006 after
the death of the party’s
founder, and technical reasons
necessitated a vote at this
party congress. End note]
3. (SBU) Kabiri divided his report into two
periods. In the
first period, from 2003 —
2005, under the leadership of Said
Abdullohi Nuri, the party
had to contend generally with
worldwide pressure on Islam
and Islamic organizations in the
post-September 11th
environment. In the second period, since
2006, the party has had to
contend with increasing governmental
restrictions that Kabiri
termed «secular extremism.» He
thanked
local embassy
representatives in attendance for sponsoring
various kinds of exchange
programs, adding that open
communication with these
embassies has helped the party overcome
some of its image problems.
4. (SBU) Kabiri highlighted some party
successes, including
participating in the 2005
Parliamentary elections and increasing
party membership. He mentioned that the party could count on
40,000 supporters, of whom
25,000 are actual members (only
12,000 carry membership
cards). There are approximately 2,800
members in the Isfara area,
and 1,500 in the village of Chorku
alone (both in the Sughd
region). At the current time, the
party has representation in
all but five districts and
settlements in Tajikistan.
5. (SBU) Kabiri stated that his main goal was to
continue
modernizing the party. As membership in the party continues to
rise, he wants to focus more
on the quality of its members. He
was proud of the fact that
he kept the party united following
Nuri’s death, and that the
party enjoyed good cooperation with
the local government,
embassies and international organizations
in Dushanbe. Kabiri attributed part of this success to his
ability to make concessions
to local officials that served the
interests of the party. He did emphasize, however, that he
would make concessions only
up to a certain point. He wants to
continue to build trust
within the party, as well as within the
Government. He also outlined the party’s desire to
continue
working with the youth of
Tajikistan. He said that he had
recently met with students
in different parts of the country,
and he believed that the
country’s youth could be an important
constituency in the party.
6. (SBU) One of Kabiri’s key points was that the
Government has
ratcheted up its
anti-Islamic campaign in Tajikistan, citing the
ban on wearing the hijab,
the closing and demolishing of
DUSHANBE 00001422 002.2 OF 002
unregistered mosques, and
the ban on women praying in mosques.
He criticized the portion of
the draft law on religion which
bars a political party from
having a religious affiliation as
being unconstitutional. He stated that the Government views the
party as a kind of disease,
which if treated properly, would go
away. Kabiri termed the Government’s increasingly
authoritarian
actions as «secular
extremism.»
7. (SBU) Kabiri said that the threat of
religious extremism in
Tajikistan is currently low,
for which the Islamic Renaissance
Party can take credit. The party attracts individuals who are
opposed to the Government’s
restrictions and might otherwise
join extremist
organizations. He said that the best way
to
prevent religious extremism
in Tajikistan was to protect human
and religious rights within
the framework of the law. He argued
that if the Government continued
to use excessively
authoritarian measures, the
people would elect a new party to
power, as in Turkey. (As Kabiri finished this line, the
audience cheered, and many
called out «Allahu Akhbar!»
Kabiri
quickly took steps to quiet
the crowd and tone down the
appearance of religious
fervor in the presence of government
observers.)
8. (SBU) Atmospherics: An enormous picture of
Nuri hung on the
main stage. Approximately 15 women attended the congress
and
sat at the back of the
auditorium (they all wore hijabs, and two
had their faces fully
covered). The male delegates wore a mix
of business suits and
traditional Tajik garb. Also in
attendance were the Iranian
and Afghan Ambassadors;
representatives from the
Turkish Embassy and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation
in Europe; other political parties,
including the Social
Democratic Party of Tajikistan; Tajik
government officials,
including representatives of the Ministry
of Justice, and local
press. Kabiri sat on the stage, along
with Party Deputy Chairman
Jalolidin Mansurov and Chief of the
Inspection Committee
Muhammadali Faizmuhammad.
9. (SBU) PolOff met separately with Kabiri and
senior party
officers in Dushanbe on 28
September 2007. Kabiri reiterated
the figure of 40,000
supporters, but it did not appear as though
the party has a particularly
accurate means of assessing its
figures. He expanded on the party’s strategy to court
Tajikistan’s youth, remarking
that he has received a large
number of invitations to
speak at universities and other venues
outside of Dushanbe. Party officials also believe they have a
significant amount of
support among migrant workers in Russia
and elsewhere, but have had
difficulty coordinating party
activities abroad. Senior party members will begin traveling to
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey
and Kyrgyzstan to tap this support.
Kabiri spoke of the
challenges the party could face if and when
the new law on religious
organizations is passed. The law would
prevent political parties
from having religious affiliations,
and the party would have to
re-register under a different name.
10. (SBU) Comment: The Islamic Renaissance
Party’s support base
appears to be growing, and
this is likely thanks to increasing
government restrictions on
religious practice, and a
deteriorating economic
situation on many parts of the country.
The party has been able to
capitalize on the growing
disaffection of younger
Tajiks. However, Kabiri did not outline
a concrete parliamentary
platform, and it is unclear whether the
party can stand in serious
opposition to government supporters.
The focus of the party is
cultivating new members. Passage of
the law on religious
organizations will be an important event
for the party. Government officials may not allow the party
to
re-register. If the party can re-register by dropping its
overt
religious affiliation, some
party supporters may shift
allegiances to organizations
that have stronger religious
affiliations, such as
Hizb-ut-Tahrir. End comment.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 124881
date: 10/5/2007 10:49
refid: 07TASHKENT1740
origin: Embassy Tashkent
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07TASHKENT1664
header:
VZCZCXRO7971
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #1740 2781049
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051049Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 8560
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY
ASHGABAT 3320
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9516
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
3936
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
3799
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1925
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7173
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW
YORK 0133
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE
VIENNA 0058
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0811
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
2055
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
TASHKENT 001740
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, AF,
TI, UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKS THREATEN TO
DEPORT AFGHAN REFUGEES
REF: TASHKENT 1664
Classified By: Poloff Tim
Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary. United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Resident Representative in
Uzbekistan Fikret Akcura informed
DCM on the evening of
October 4 that the Uzbek mission in
Geneva may make a public
statement October 5 at the UNHCR
Executive Committee meeting
that it no longer recognizes
UNDP’s authority and is
invalidating refugee documents. The
GOU says it will deport
refugees unless they obtain valid
Uzbek visas. UNDP is increasing the size of a reassessment
team visiting in October in
an effort to speed up the
reassessment process. This may be a GOU effort to force UNDP
to find a quick solution to
the refugee issue. End summary.
UNDP DOCUMENTS «NO
LONGER VALID»
———————————
2. (C) UNDP Resident
Representative Fikret Akcura informed
DCM that on the evening of
October 4 the Deputy Charge
d’Affaires of Uzbekistan’s
Geneva mission informed UNHCR
officials that the
UNDP-issued documents carried by Afghan
refugees are «null and
void». He added that unless they
obtain valid Uzbekistan
visas the refugees will be deported.
(Note: Per reftel, the cost
of obtaining visas is
prohibitive. End note).
The Uzbek diplomat in Geneva also
noted that the GOU no longer
considers UNDP an authorized
representative of UNHCR in
Uzbekistan. Akcura told DCM that,
since the last meeting (see
reftel), there have been four or
five new known cases of
deportations of Afghan refugees,
however some of them may
have found a way back into
Uzbekistan. Akcura added that noone in the GOU has
double-tracked the Uzbeks’
message with him in Tashkent.
PUBLIC STATEMENT
FORTHCOMING?
——————————
3. (C) Akcura said that the
Uzbeks may make a public
statement on their policy as
early as an October 5 Executive
Committee meeting of the
UNHCR in Geneva. Given the
increased urgency of the
situation, UNDP is assembling a
larger team than originally
planned to reassess the status of
the Afghan refugees (see
reftel), which will speed up the
reclassification
process. The reassessment is still
expected
during October, after which
time there will be a more
accurate list of the numbers
of Afghan refugees and their
possible eligibility for
resettlement programs.
COMMENT
——-
4. (C) Despite the increased
rhetoric from the GOU, this may
actually be an effort to
force the UNDP to find a rapid
solution to the refugee
issue. However, the situation is
already difficult for the
Afghan refugees and the GOU appears
increasingly serious about
removing them from the country as
quickly as possible.
NORLAND
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 125197
date: 10/10/2007 7:15
refid: 07DUSHANBE1432
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5224
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1432/01 2830715
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100715Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
1083
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA
0380
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
0867
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
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RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
0501
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2983
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04
DUSHANBE 001432
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/AAE
(CARROLL AND BUHLER)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, ASEC, PREL,
KCOR, KCRM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN INL
DUSHANBE 2007 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
1. In the absence of INL
regular quarterly reports, the
Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Section in Dushanbe herein reports
on activities for the period
of January — September 2007:
———————————-
Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Activities
———————————
January 2007
2. Completed Grant Agreement with INIS Women’s
Legal Center
located in Khujand city;
grant provides funding to run the
facility and provides
salaries to defense advocates providing
free services to victims of
trafficking, domestic violence and
similar crimes against
vulnerable populations.
3. Border Guards assistance: completed purchase
and handover of
10,000 winterized uniforms
for border guards. In subsequent
inspection of the Border
Guard warehouse with Chairman of the
State Committee for National
Security, most if not all the
uniforms had not been
distributed. Although many uniforms have
since been distributed on
the Afghan-Tajik border, as of
September 2007, there are
still many outposts where border
guards and officers are
without winter gear. The Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Section (and
the rest of the Embassy’s Border
and Law Enforcement Working
Group (BLEWG) team) will endeavor to
assist the Border Guards in
distributing all uniforms and other
winter supplies before the
end of the year.
March 2007
4. Completed renovation of both wings of the
Border Guard
Regional Training Center at
Khorog; INL/IOM Project.
5. Conducted two-week Basic Driver Protective
Skills Training
Course for Representatives
of Tajik Law Enforcement agencies
(Ministry of Interior, Drug
Control Agency, State Committee for
National Security).
6. The Resident Legal Adviser (RLA) on board and
established.
April 2007
7. INL Officer attended INL Global Narcotics
Affairs Officers
(NAS) Conference in
Washington.
May 2007
8. Funded Tajik Drug Control Agency head General
Nazarov’s
participation in the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s (DEA)
International Drug
Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Madrid,
Spain.
June 2007
9. INL/United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) Joint
project, completed a full
reconstruction of border posts Bog and
Bakhorak. Furniture and limited equipment including
Russian UAZ
and GAZ Hunter trucks
delivered and in place; Ambassador and
Border Guard Deputy
Faizulloev attended ribbon-cutting ceremony.
10. Funded Interior Ministry Counternarcotics
Unit Chief
General Godoyev for DEA’s
International Narcotics Executive
Management Seminar (INEMS)
in Tampa, Florida.
11. Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section Staff
attended
Regional INL Workshop in Istanbul.
12. Embassy Dushanbe (coordinated by Narcotics
and Law
Enforcement Section) hosted
the monthly Border Assistance
International Group (BIG)
multi-donor meeting.
July 2007
13. Joint INL/ICITAP project. Completed INL/Senior Law
Enforcement Advisor project
(SLEA) to reconstruct the forensic
laboratory for the Ministry
of Interior. New furniture procured
and installed. With direct and full support from the U.S.
Department of Justice
International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program
(ICITAP) forensic expert, laboratory
equipment identified
purchased, delivered and installed.
DUSHANBE 00001432 002 OF 004
14. Completed Ministry of Interior Analytical
Center; conducted
building renovation,
purchased and installed necessary equipment
and ORACLE based software
(TAIS ONTOS level seven). Now the
Analytical Center of the
Ministry of Interior has potential to
exchange information with
other Tajik law enforcement agencies,
in particular the Drug
Control Agency, whose Analytical Center
was also provided with INL
assistance and also uses ORACLE-based
software.
15. Completed renovation of the 3rd floor of
Ministry of
Interior Police Academy,
with computer training lab and language
lab and completed classroom
furniture and server systems for
both centers.
August 2007
16. Completed two-week Advanced Driver Protective
Skills
Training Course for
representatives of Tajik Law Enforcement
agencies (Ministry of Interior,
Drug Control Agency, State
Committee for National
Security).
17. The INL Project Engineer hired and on board.
18. Completed Scope of Work and bid conference
for Border
Guards Training Academy and
State Committee for National
Security Training Center
projects.
September 2007
19. Completed renovation of Drug Control Agency
mobile team
training gym and shooting
range, purchased and delivered all
required equipment.
20. Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section met
with supervisors
and members of the Drug
Control Agency Mobile Teams to conduct a
review of Mobile Team
performance and use of resources. Unit
goals, priorities, and
requirements were better defined and the
group reviewed use of
donated equipment and vehicles. All
equipment and vehicles
provided were accounted for.
21. Grant Agreement for Demining Project: $1,730
grant to the
Tajik Mine Action
Center. This money covers costs to
facilitate
Tajik government passage of
the «Ratification of the Convention
on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities» under the Ottawa
Convention. This measure will facilitate equal rights and
protection under local laws
for Tajiks who have been injured in
mine-related accidents.
22. In order to improve existing Aviation
Security Service, INL
purchased and delivered to
the Dushanbe Airport three Dell
computers.
23. Handover of two specialized Honda All Terrain
Vehicles for
the Drug Control Agency’s
Mobile Teams; required training
conducted and All Terrain
Vehicle manuals translated.
24. Handover of specialized law enforcement
equipment to
representatives of Drug
Control Agency and Ministry of Interior
mobile team units with
training.
25. Completed development, installation and
training for new
SONDA AFIS (fingerprint)
center in the Ministry of Interior
forensics lab. All historical data and arrest files with
photos, biographical
information and latent prints migrated and
functioning well. Expansion of system will be completed in 2008
with interconnectivity with
regional offices.
—————
INL ENGINEER
—————
26. Due to the increase in INL-funded (and other
Embassy
agencies) construction
projects and problems encountered over
the last year dealing with
local contractors, Embassy Dushanbe
granted approval for INL to
hire a full time Project Engineer.
On September 3, 2007 the INL
Project Engineer Mr. John McCann
arrived in country. He has already visited the rural border
post at Khirmanjo several
times and fully revised a scope of
work for the border post’s
renovation and passed it to Border
Guards’ engineer for
evaluation. He has also visited the
Nizhniy Pyanj Bridge to
review construction projects for Customs
facilities to be undertaken
by the Office of Defense
Cooperation. The INL Project
Engineer also provided his
expertise to procure two
required Kamaz trucks for INL projects
DUSHANBE 00001432 003 OF 004
in the region.
——————————-
Resident Legal Advisor
——————————-
27. Since his arrival in March of 2007, the
Resident Legal
Advisor conducted a complete
analysis of the Tajik Criminal
Procedure Code and will be
part of the Tajik Government’s
Working Group responsible
for reviewing and revising the Tajik
Criminal Procedure Code — a
major and most critical step in
creating a comprehensive
rule of law reform program in
Tajikistan.
———————————————
—
United Nations Office on
Drugs Crime (UNODC)
———————————————
—
28. In June, UNODC, with U.S. Embassy
representatives and the
Tajik Drug Control Agency
conducted the semi-annual
International Working Group
on administering «Phase Two» of the
Tajikistan Drug Control
Agency Project (AD/TAJ/03/HO3), which is
fully funded by the
USG. The session included a review of
progress on benchmarks for
the first six months of 2007 and a
presentation and discussion
of benchmark proposals for the
second half of the
year. Protracted discussions ensued
regarding sustainability and
what percentage of the Tajik
government’s resources have
been invested into the Drug Control
Agency. We agreed to meet again in July to discuss
Drug Control
Agency sustainability and to
conduct a review of the operational
capability of the Mobile
Teams in September. Both subsequent
meetings were fruitful in
the sense that Embassy staff sent a
clear message that more
transparency on operational activities
is required to continue to
fund the Mobile Teams and that
meaningful investigations
leading to actual prosecutions is the
ultimate measure of the Drug
Control Agency’s success, not the
rate of seizures. (Note:
Seizures by the Drug Control Agency
decreased by nearly half in
2007 from 2006 due to shifts in
local and regional command
positions.) Embassy also reiterated
that recurring costs and
additional infrastructure to
headquarters facilities
would no longer be provided by the U.S.
Government with the
exception of salary supplements. The
Drug
Control Agency was also
informed that they must begin to put
together a plan to begin
taking on responsibility for paying
salary supplements by
2009. The group will meet again in
December 2007.
29. During this period (Jan to Sept 2007) UNODC
Regional
Director Jim Callahan
visited Embassy Dushanbe once to meet
Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Section staff. INL has
voiced its
concerns over the need for
more contact with the regional
headquarters but we have yet
to see increased engagement on the
part of UNODC. Meanwhile, E-23 project manager Sergey Bozhko
was moved to his next post
in Tehran without provision of a
replacement. Embassy staff was not notified of this
development
until a last minute
invitation to Bozhko’s farewell party in
July. The Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section
looks forward
to working with the new E-23
Project Manager when he/she
arrives.
———————————————
—-
International Organization
for Migration (IOM)
———————————————
—-
30. IOM completed renovations on the second wing
of the Khorog
Regional Training Center for
the Border Guards. Living
accommodations, classrooms,
cafeteria, etc. are provided for
both Tajik and Afghan border
guards. However, the Government of
Tajikistan has yet to agree
to conduct any joint training
exercises with Afghan Border
Guards. As a result of a full-court
press by the major donor
Embassies including the United States,
Germany, UK and EU, there
have been some signs that limited
training may be
allowed. Embassy will pursue this
possibility
in the coming months. IOM also continued to fund the Trafficked
Victims Shelter in Dushanbe.
Approximately 32 victims have
passed through the facility
from January 2007 to September 2007.
31. IOM has also proposed two additional
projects, both of
which were turned down by
Embassy Dushanbe. The first was a
proposed database to track
trafficking in persons victims and
cases. However, it was not
integrated with existing database and
intelligence gathering
capabilities within law enforcement and
was overpriced at
$500,000. The second was a proposal to
renovate/construct the
Tajik-China border crossing point at
DUSHANBE 00001432 004 OF 004
Kulma, Murghab in eastern
Tajikistan. At present, the Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Sectin
does not believe that IOM has the
capability to oversee such a
large project and without
significant oversight (which
is difficult given the remoteness
of the region); it would not
be prudent to allow a third party
implementer to subcontract
local vendors.
32. The IOM Country Director is on his way out to
his next post
in Almaty. We have heard that the new director will take
over
by November 2007. We look forward to working with a new
Director as the previous,
Mahmoud Naderi, had seemed to have
lost his enthusiasm for the
job and worn out his welcome after 6
years on the ground. One major problem we hope to overcome is
Naderi’s tendency to enter
into direct negotiations with the
government of Tajikistan on
projects for which funding was not
available. Naderi would in
essence use the Border Guards to
press the USG to fund
projects not yet vetted by any major
donors.
———————————-
Women’s Legal Initiative
(INIS)
———————————-
33. INL financially supported a Free Legal
Assistance for
Vulnerable Populations
Project implemented by the
Non-Governmental
Organization «INIS.» Report
statistics show
that during four months of
2007, from May to August, 38 males
and 261 females applied and
received legal support from the NGO.
Several different training courses for
prosecutors, defense
advocates and law
enforcement were conducted as well. The
Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Section is particularly interested
in the joint seminars with
law enforcement as we believe that in
the long run, more awareness
and better coordination between the
police, advocates and
prosecutors will enable investigations
that are more successful and
prosecutions of traffickers and
perpetrators of domestic
violence. The Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Section will
conduct a site visit to Khujand before
the end of 2007.
————————————
POSTPONED AND CANCELED
ACTIVITIES
————————————
34. Due to the sudden drop in the level of
transparency and
open cooperation between the
U.S. Embassy and the Border Guards
now under the State
Committee for National Security, INL
cancelled the
much-anticipated Border Guards Salary Supplement
Program. Protracted negotiations over control of the
bank and
availability of border guard
rosters made it clear that this
program would not be
feasible under the new management. Funds
will be redirected to
refurbish and reconstruct key areas of the
Tajik-Afghan border.
35. Renovation and construction of the Border
Guard Academy was
put on hold for nearly six
months due to prolonged negotiations
with the State Committee for
National Security over specifics on
the project schematics. For some months between January and
April it was unclear whether
the Embassy was to work with the
Border Guards directly or
the State Committee’s leadership. The
Embassy is now engaging the
Chief of the Border Guards, General
Mirzoev, and his new staff
to implement this project. A
contract will probably be
awarded by November 2007 and work will
begin in December, weather
permitting.
36. The Border Post at Khirmanjo was scheduled to
be completed
in the spring of 2007 but
due to various failures on the part of
the local contractor to
complete the work at acceptable
standards, the project is
not completed and will be
re-advertised with a new
statement of work for re-bid. Our plans
to finish the project before
winter sets in this year may not be
achieved. Therefore, INL
will use recouped expenses from the
first contract to provide
for shelters and other emergency
living facilities for the
officers and border guards who are
currently living outdoors.
———————-
CONTACT INFORMATION
———————-
37. Embassy Dushanbe POC is INL officer Ranjeet
Singh, office
telephone: 992-37-229-2000
x2111, email: HYPERLINK
«mailto:[email protected]»
[email protected]
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 125291
date: 10/10/2007 13:55
refid: 07DUSHANBE1437
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
07DUSHANBE1437|07MOSCOW4849
header:
VZCZCXRO5686
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1437/01 2831355
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101355Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 1092
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY
ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2256
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
PRIORITY 2267
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
PRIORITY 2212
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
PRIORITY 1988
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
2992
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001437
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: RAHMON SHOWS OFF
DUSHANBE FOR THE CIS SUMMIT; DUSHANBE
ENDURES
REF: MOSCOW 4849
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek,
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
Corrected Copy: SIPDIS
Caption added.
1. (U) Summary: The Summits
of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, Eurasian Economic
Cooperation Organization, and
Collective Security Treaty
Organization, held October 5-7,
brought Dushanbe to a
standstill, disrupting communications and
commerce, and costing a
fortune. The Government of Tajikistan
spared no expense to prepare
for the summits, seeming to ignore
President Rahmon’s recent
edicts to his own citizens to avoid
lavish social
celebrations. One concrete
accomplishment for
President Rahmon is the
reported agreement with Karimov for
Uzbekistan to extend its
power grid to facilitate transit of
Turkmen electricity to
Tajikistan. End Summary.
Paying for Our Glorious
Leader
——————————————
2. (U) Preparations for the
summit began months ago. The
Government beautified the
main avenues of Dushanbe, repainted
facades, opened new shops,
repaved roads, and strung holiday
decorative lighting around
buildings, trees, and across main
roads. Signs welcoming the visiting delegations in
Russian were
everywhere — a marked
change from the usual Tajik language
slogans and public service
banners.
3. (C) This facelift was
resourced in the same way the Tajik
Government (and the former Soviet
Government) supports the
cotton harvests: people were
cajoled and coerced to contribute
their time or their
money. Authorities reportedly forced
businesses to bear the costs
of mandatory improvements around
their premises. There are also rumors of monetary
«contributions»
extorted from banks and other businesses to
support the off-budget
summit expenses. Possibly several
hundred jobs were lost when
authorities destroyed informal
market areas and forced
kiosks off main streets approximately
two weeks before the summit
began. The bridge connecting two of
Dushanbe’s main streets was
closed for reconstruction for two
full months before the start
of the summit. And public areas
such as the Botanical
Gardens and other parks were closed for
weeks for refurbishments.
4. (C) Total government
expenses for the summit are unknown.
The government imported
several (10 to 20, according to rumors)
police cars from Germany to
sharpen up the motorcades.
Entertainment expenses seem
to have been divvied up among
various ministries. Ministries and Government departments were
each assigned national
delegations as their responsibility to
house, feed, and entertain
(e.g. the Ministry of Power got
Georgia). They reportedly did their utmost to impress
their
guests, arranging gifts for
every one of hundreds of delegation
members. A contact at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
commented
to us that the expense
imposed on taxpayers was disproportionate
to the significance of the
summits and made a mockery of the
President’s recent edicts to
Tajiks to waste less money on
lavish entertainment. Foreign journalists covering the summits
were reportedly surprised by
the lavishness of their hosts.
Security Inconveniences
———————————
5. (U) Tajikistan closed its
land borders to all car and truck
traffic prior to the
summits. We do not know the economic
impact of the border
closure, but noticed some goods
disappearing from store
shelves (e.g. most eggs are imported
from Iran, and grocery
stores ran out of them over the weekend).
Throughout the summits, main roads in Dushanbe
were closed to
all vehicular traffic aside
from Tajik Government, summit
participants, diplomatic
vehicles, limited public transit, and
press covering the summit.
6. (U) The mood on the
streets was calm and pragmatic. Most
government offices and
international organizations and many
businesses in the downtown
area had closed in anticipation of
the street closures and
security hassles during the summit.
There were hundreds of
people out walking along the main streets
as that was the only way to
get to work, go shopping, or visit
family. Overall, the citizens of Dushanbe were more
DUSHANBE 00001437 002 OF 002
understanding and less
hostile to the road closures than we
anticipated. Most international and local security
professionals anticipated
many more problems, harassment, and
incidents that never
materialized. Notably, this is one of
the
first times the government
released information to the public in
advance of an event
regarding road closures and movements of
VIPs.
7. (C) The State Security
Committee provided some entertainment
in its zeal to protect the
summiteers. On October 3 they
detained a suspicious party
of American and Australian tourists
at the Dushanbe train
station while they were reading the posted
train schedules. (They released the tourists soon afterward).
The same day State Security
agents showed up at the home of the
Director of the National
Democratic Institute, to ask him
whether he planned to meet
with the Ukrainian delegation during
the summit. The bemused Director replied that he did not,
as he
didn’t work on Ukrainian
issues, and didn’t know anyone in the
delegation anyway.
8. (C) The capacity of the
Tajik Government to host a large
summit was clearly
tested
