id: 72886
date: 7/28/2006 8:16
refid: 06DUSHANBE1439
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1420|06DUSHANBE1439
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001439
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
STATE FOR P, R, M, SCA, EUR, INR, DRL, S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/28/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EAID, AMGT, KPAO, KDEM, RS, TI
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THREE YEARS IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: DUSHANBE 1420, «AMBASSADOR’S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT
RAHMONOV»
DUSHANBE 00001439 001.2 OF 005
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, Embassy
Dushanbe, State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Three years ago, before I
arrived in Dushanbe, I noticed
wryly that nearly every reporting cable from the Post seemed to
include the descriptive phrase, «Tajikistan, destroyed by civil
war~.» Greatly harmed and
set back? Yes. Destroyed?
No.
Especially not the spirit of the nation and people. Until I
lived here, I didn’t understand the importance of the fact that
Tajiks are Persian, not Turkic — and that seems to make a subtle
but very important difference. I
have found the people, from
market ladies to high-school teachers to the highest officials,
pleasantly open to new ideas, quietly confident about their
historical and intellectual heritage stretching back to the
medieval Islamic Renaissance in Bukhara and Samarkand, always
calculating their self interests and national interests, but
moving toward a better future.
2. (C) Tajikistan is a remarkable
success story for a small new
country, the poorest of the former Soviet Republics before
independence, that has pulled itself up by its bootstraps and is
determined to move forward. Of
course it’s not smooth sailing
all the way. As an optimistic
realist, I would never
de-emphasize the negatives, of which there are many. But I am
impressed by this plucky little country land-locked in a
geographically and ideologically dangerous neighborhood. As
President Rahmonov has frequently told me, «Tajikistan didn’t
choose its neighbors.» He
gets easily exasperated by some of
the more pushy regional powers, especially Russia, and is
constantly worried about unpredictable Uzbekistan. He says,
«Karimov is a sick person.
He’s dangerous.» All the
more
reason why Rahmonov praises the tact and objectivity of senior
U.S. officials who visit him. Our
values stand us in good stead
with this outspoken leader who often wears his heart on his
sleeve. He may physically look
like Brezhnev-lite, but he’s
shrewd and has been a quick study.
MISSION NORMALIZED
3. (SBU) I arrived at Embassy
Dushanbe with a mandate from the
Department to normalize the Mission.
When I arrived, the
chancery was a charming but shockingly make-shift compound of
three local houses cobbled together in a traditional,
narrow-laned neighborhood in the center of the city. With
superlative support from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, we
made it as safe as possible, to protect our people, but let’s
say it didn’t meet Inman standards.
The previous Ambassador
lived, by choice, in two rooms above the garage. Most of the 14
U.S. direct hires, still technically posted «off-shore» in
Almaty, lived in group housing at this then-unaccompanied,
danger-pay Post. They couldn’t
venture outdoors without an
armed bodyguard and traveled around the city in fully armored
vehicles by day. By night, they
were not allowed out without
specific permission. This was
unnecessary by 2003, but the
Mission hadn’t caught up with the times.
4. (SBU) Thanks to sustained
efforts by OBO, we now have a
state-of-the-art, purpose-built chancery, which was truly the
project from hell, but is now an over-engineered marvel. All
34-plus U.S. direct hires (soon to be 40-plus) have decent,
standard housing. More important,
they may have lost danger pay
but they lead normal private lives that include their spouses,
members of household, and minor dependents. Whereas the
Department previously had to approve every TDY country-clearance
request, we now make our own decisions, welcoming a constant
flow of visitors from multiple U.S. Government Departments and
Military Commands. The Ambassador
has a decent Residence
DUSHANBE 00001439 002.2 OF 005
appropriate to represent the interests and standards of the
United States.
5. (U) All of this is thanks to
sustained, above-and-beyond
support from multiple senior State Department officials who
trusted us «to do the right thing» and supported our
decisions.
For their trust and support, I am truly grateful.
«WHY DON»T THEY LISTEN TO US?»
6. (C) After 9/11, the U.S.
Government formulated a policy that
said our relationships in Central Asia would be qualitatively
different. We confirmed a
fundamental policy that has not
appreciably changed since then:
that political reform to build
democracy and strong civil society, and economic reform to
achieve an open market economy, would lead to long-term
stability and eventual prosperity for this strategic region. We
formulated our assistance, and our diplomatic talking points, to
achieve these goals. But five
years down the road (just five
years!), Tajikistan has still not fully embraced Thomas
Jefferson and Adam Smith, although I believe it is still
scrabbling sideways toward those goals.
We have to ask
ourselves, «Why haven’t they done better? Why don’t they listen
to us?»
7. (C) I well remember at the end
of 2001 and beginning of
2002, in the mad rush to formulate a coherent policy for the
region, some of us warned change would not happen overnight. In
fact, we predicted it would take several generations. Slowly,
each succeeding generation would wring more of the past from its
worldview. And we hoped the United States would be patient
enough to stay the course through thick and thin. For the most
part, we have indeed stayed the course — especially with
partners that in general want to work with us, like Tajikistan.
But for some, it’s difficult and frustrating to understand why
Tajikistan hasn’t moved farther, faster.
Some hurdles:
TAJIK INCOMPREHENSION
8. (C) They — the government and
citizens of Tajikistan —
sometimes don’t really know what we are talking about. From a
pre-modern khanate, through the Russian and then the Soviet
Empires, they were radically isolated from Western thought and
information. And they are still,
even increasingly, isolated
from Western information, and are bombarded by Russian
disinformation. They experienced
culturally and intellectually
neither the European Renaissance nor the Western Enlightenment,
which fundamentally shape our political ideals; and during the
Soviet years they were propagandized to feel pity and disdain
for the decadent and oppressive West.
And now, we preach that
our model will lead them to a blessed future. They heard
similar from the Bolsheviks in the 1920s.
9. (C) All of our laudable values
and goals, in which we truly
believe, come wrapped in our full cultural understanding of
their meanings and complex historical and intellectual
connotations. Each of our
short-hand bullet points contains a
wealth of assumed cultural information and historical
understanding about democracy and free markets that the Tajiks
simply do not have. They, it
sometimes seems, are in a graduate
seminar taught in a foreign language, trying to take careful
notes, hoping they’ll pick up enough to pass Professor USA’s
exam in Reform 101.
RUSSIA
10. (C) I’m not sure the United
States still fully comprehends
the power, at least in this region, of resurgent Russia under
the sovereign autocrat (not democrat) Putin. In November 2001,
when I helped initiate the first-ever formal U.S.-Russia
consultations on Central Asia and the Caucasus, all of what has
DUSHANBE 00001439 003.2 OF 005
come to pass was already present in our Russian colleagues’
sometimes sincere but often smolderingly resentful
conversations. In 2001, a
somewhat bedraggled Russia was just
beginning to surface from the 1998 financial collapse and the
lawless decade of the sort-of-charming but erratic and too-often
tipsy Yeltsin. Now, we have an
acid-tongued, sober,
self-confident, and demanding Putin, with a full complement of
corporately corrupt siloviki, heading an increasingly
hydrocarbon-wealthy Russia returning genetically to its
neo-imperialistic impulses. No,
Putin-and-Company won’t
reconstruct the Soviet Union, but he is damn well doing his best
to create a virtual image of it, at least with those who will
play in his political and economic sandbox.
11. (C) We have pooh-poohed and
smirked at all the new
Russia-originated «international organizations» — like the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth Security
Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community —
dismissing them as Soviet-style talk-shops of no substance.
They are growing in substance, and have tapped into the last 80
years of Soviet political culture that insists on the legally
binding quality of international agreements (at least those it
initiates or agrees with) and legalistically demands law, if not
justice.
12. (C) As President Rahmonov
told me on July 19 (reftel),
Tajikistan is now entrapped in a «spider web» of new, legally
binding agreements and cannot make fully independent decisions
«without consultation and consensus.» Further, the Tajik
economy’s reliance on remittances from maybe as many as a
million labor migrants working in Russia is a Sword of Damocles
the Kremlin can dangle over Rahmonov’s head.
13. (C) Resurgent Russia,
demanding exclusive control of its
«sphere of influence,» demanding exclusive control of its
«near
abroad» from the «encircling West that want to limit, even
harm,
it» may be a passing phase, and maybe the eventual demographic
implosion of Russia will deflate this noisome balloon; but it
has complicated and is subverting U.S. goals for the region. To
support the sovereignty and independence of those who will work
with us, like Tajikistan, we need to swallow hard, accept this
reality, and redouble our efforts to try to create a true
partnership with Russia for the region — where we can — but also
think outside of the box how we can best truly communicate with
and support those states, like Tajikistan, who do truly, if not
wholly clearly, understand they must protect their sovereignty.
If, however, we put Central Asia far down on our agenda with
Russia, then it’s Russia’s by default.
«COLOR REVOLUTIONS»
14. (C) Rahmonov almost accepts
our repeatedly stressed points
that «color revolutions» occurred because of chronically
stagnant economies where only the favored few prospered;
pervasive corruption, including at the very top; and were
triggered by fixed elections to keep the crooks in power. Yet
his Russia-dominated Ministry of Security constantly feeding him
the Kremlin line that «subversive» U.S. NGOs are to blame
gives
him more than second thoughts.
15. (C) Tajikistan looks around
the neighborhood and has few
good examples of democratic development.
The situation in
Kyrgyzstan particularly unsettles the Tajiks and serves as a
cautionary tale about too much reform, too fast. Very senior
Tajik officials still cite the «events in Andijon and Bishkek»
as cautionary tales.
VESTED INTERESTS AND CORRUPT PERSONAL RELATIONS
16. (C) President Rahmonov is
fond of recounting his fatherly
advice to Afghanistan’s President Karzai: «If you want peace,
DUSHANBE 00001439 004.2 OF 005
bring the warlords down out of the mountains and make them
rich.» That’s what Rahmonov
did after the Tajik Civil War, but
the trade-off has been informal economic fiefdoms based on
personal relations, with much of the economy in the gray zone.
I believe Rahmonov somewhat understands to be an effective
leader he has to «normalize» the economy. Two years ago, he
offered an amnesty to get «black cash» back into the country,
out of the mattresses, and into the banks. In his April 2006
annual address to the nation, he suggested it’s time for a
property amnesty to get the off-the-books businesses and,
especially the plethora of new, increasingly huge, McMansions
into the tax books.
17. (C) But it’s not easy. If he pushes too hard, too fast,
the current delicate balance among the clans is upset — which is
likely why he holds his nose and maintains ditente with the
politically ambitious and wildly corrupt Mayor of Dushanbe
Mahmadsaid Obaidulloyev. Further,
Rahmonov himself doesn’t set
the best example, with First Brother-in-Law Hasan Sadulloyev
greatly enriching the family with large chunks of the economy
through his various holding companies and Orien Bank.
18. (C) During the 2001-2003
U.S.-Russia consultations on
Central Asia, our Russian colleagues never failed to tell us
condescendingly that we don’t understand the clans. In fact,
that’s true. In Tajikistan, it’s
only recently that we have
begun to gather this kind of information. Much more needs to be
done.
19. (C) Better understanding
Tajikistan’s clans would help us
better comprehend the internal politics beneath the surface and
why full-fledged Western democracy will be a long time coming.
Political parties are mostly irrelevant, except the Party of
Power, whichever that may be. The
ruling clan has predominant
power and, thus, the wealth from the spoils of power.
20. (C) To some in the West,
Rahmonov appears to be an oriental
despot who picks off his political opponents as soon as they
stick their heads above the foxhole.
To others, he’s one more
example of a product of his time and place, his Soviet education
and his youthful collective farm experience. I believe what
he’s really doing is trying to balance interests — his own, his
Dangaran clan’s, and his nations.
Decidedly not our taste, but
that’s the reality.
WE DON»T ALWAYS KNOW HOW TO WORK HERE
21. (C) Sometimes, Washington
complains the United States has
sunk so much assistance into the region for political and
economic reform and has so little to show for it. I would argue
that if we toted up all the small successes, we’d be a little
surprised how far we’ve come. On
a macro level, we have seen
fairly serious banking reform and a real growth in civil society
— and much more is possible on both the political and economic
fronts.
22. (C) I believe it is essential
to work for reforms both from
the bottom up (with the grassroots) and from the top down (with
the honchos). We cannot dismiss
the top as unreformable
dinosaurs, because we have seen success here. Much of the
success in banking reform is due to the day-to-day grind that
Bearing Point’s Barbara Kaminski has done with Chairman of the
National Bank Murodali Alimardonov.
When democracy advocates
turned up their noses at working directly with the government,
IFES Director Katherine Muller rolled up her sleeves and burnt
the midnight oil with the President’s Strategic Research Center
and the Central Commission for Elections and Referenda, coming
up with a Rahmonov-approved plan that, if implemented, will
significantly improve how elections are conducted here. When
Internews Director Troy Etulain couldn’t get his community radio
stations registered, he took time to learn how things really
DUSHANBE 00001439 005.2 OF 005
work and then began a nearly year-long campaign to convince all
the relevant ministries. The
stations are not yet licensed, but
they are finally beginning to gain registration.
23. (SBU) My point is that
achieving reform is hard work. It
doesn’t occur via talking points.
It requires gaining trust and
one-to-one work with people who matter.
INDISPENSIBLE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
24. (SBU) The United States was
good at public diplomacy during
the Cold War, but then we rather lost our way. Ironically, the
Kremlin is now intent on projecting «soft power,» which bears
a
familiar if skewed resemblance to old-fashioned U.S. public
diplomacy.
25. (SBU) We no longer have the
financial and human resources
to do the job right.
26. (C) If we say we’re going to
sustain our long-term
commitment to reform in Tajikistan, we need multiple times more
exchanges than we have now, especially educational exchanges. I
well remember a former U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan’s famous
comment: «Every returned
FLEX student is a little democracy
time bomb waiting to go off.»
My team and I continually run
into returned Tajik exchange students who are beginning to make
a difference. If we can’t in the
near term radically increase
our exchange programs — and I suspect that won’t happen — then
allocate funds each year for 100 scholarships for graduating
Tajik high-school seniors to the American University of Central
Asia in Bishkek.
27. (C) Russia has a near
stranglehold on the information space
here, as I have reported many times before. It’s well we
recognize it; now it’s time to do something about it. The ideal
would be a commercial — not U.S. government — Russian-language
television channel for the entire former Soviet Union. But
there’s much, much more we could do in the shorter term, if we
had the people and money. We
can’t depend solely on web sites,
because, from my personal observation, too many young Tajiks in
the ubiquitous Internet cafes are playing video games or even
visiting free porn sites, but not reading our Electronic
Journals.
28. (U) We need vastly to
increase that «last three feet of
diplomacy» — people-to-people diplomacy — as we used to do so
terribly well in the latter half of the 20th century.
29. (SBU) Last but not at all
least, Peace Corps. I have tried
for three years, but Tajikistan is not yet even on the list to
survey for a future program.
President Rahmonov has asked for
the Peace Corps. This is an open,
welcoming culture. There is
so much that could be accomplished here.
But there needs to be
a high-level political decision in the Department to let the
Peace Corps headquarters know that Tajikistan is high priority
for a new program.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72899
date: 7/28/2006 9:29
refid: 06DUSHANBE1440
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001440
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, S/P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, INR
NSC FOR MILLARD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PROP, ECON, MARR, RS, ZK
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MILITARY NEWSPAPER ASSERTS MOSCOW’S RIGHT
EXCLUSIVELY TO DOMINATE CENTRAL ASIA
DUSHANBE 00001440 001.3 OF 005
1. SUMMARY: A seminal July 25 analytical article in
Russia’s
official military newspaper asserts Russia’s right to dominate
Central Asia and to prevent the United States and NATO —
«[Russia’s] traditional geopolitical rivals» — from any sort
of
further military presence in the region.
The article ignores
Turkmenistan, but states that Kazakhstan, though rich enough to
attempt an independent foreign policy, is reliably in the
Kremlin camp; Uzbekistan is now Russia’s because of rigid U.S.
human rights ideology; Kyrgyzstan is coming to its senses and
knows who butters which side of its bread, especially because of
American spies from Embassy Bishkek working to undermine
President Bakiyev’s government; and Tajikistan owes its
existence and its current leaders solely to Russia. This is not
«black propaganda,» like usually appears in the Russian press:
it’s a mostly sober political analysis and policy assertion.
END SUMMARY.
2. From time to time, Post has
reported examples of Russian
disinformation and «black propaganda» that floods the Central
Asian information space. This
article (full text in para four
below) from the official Russian military newspaper, «Krasnaya
Zvezda» [«Red Star»], is qualitatively different from
previous
examples because it is a relatively sober analysis that asserts,
country by country (except for Turkmenistan) how much Moscow
«owns» Central Asia, and what remains to be done to sew it up
for good. Embassy Dushanbe
suggests it is important that U.S.
Posts in the former Soviet Union, Washington analysts, and other
addressees, be aware of this important article.
3. The article, with the byline
Vladimir Mokhov interviewing
pundit Andrei Grozin and headlined «Asia is Subtle,» was
published July 25. It asserts,
«Central Asian states are still
within the orbit of Russia’s political, military-political, and
economic influence. And Russia
must not stop there; it needs to
continue building up its influence in all the areas of
activity.» The author
asserts the following:
KAZAKHASTAN: Because the country
is rich and has $11 billion in
U.S. foreign investment, it can afford to attempt a balanced
foreign policy; but, in fact, Nazarbayev is reliably in the
Kremlin’s camp.
TAJIKISTAN: President Emomali
Rahmonov’s attempt to pursue a
Tajjk version of multi-directional [«open-door»] foreign
policy
isn’t very far-sighted. In terms
of its economic, demographic,
intellectual, defensive, and other resources, Tajikistan is
nowhere near equal to Kazakhstan.
It’s a much more vulnerable
and less self-sufficient state.
In the final analysis,
Tajikistan owes its existence — within its current borders and
with its current political elites — entirely to Russia.
(COMMENT: Dushanbe, which closely
monitors the Russian press,
will see this as an assertion that President Rahmonov serves at
the pleasure of the Kremlin. END
COMMENT.)
UZBEKISTAN: [When] the West
started portraying Karimov as some
sort of «mad dog,» Russian companies and politicians gained a
window of opportunity for expanding cooperation with Uzbekistan.
KYRGYZSTAN: The Bishkek
government’s statement announcing the
expulsion of two U.S. diplomats says plainly this decision was
made on the basis of intelligence reports from the Kyrgyz
special services, which repeatedly caught the Americans
interfering in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs. According to some
accounts, they were establishing a spy network in southern
Kyrgyzstan, where Kyrgyz intelligence predicts an outbreak of
radical activity at the end of this summer. Although the U.S.
Embassy in Kyrgyzstan has denied all allegations, there’s
obviously no smoke without fire.
CONCLUSION: Central Asian states are
still within the orbit of
Russia’s political, military-political, and economic influence.
And Russia must not stop there: it needs to continue building up
its influence in all areas of activity.
One reason to do this
DUSHANBE 00001440 002.3 OF 005
is to minimize the possibility of any further American military
facilities being established in Central Asia, whatever they may
be called: training centers for
local military personnel,
points for monitoring the Afghanistan drug-trafficking
situation, or anything else. One
way or another, they would be
military facilities controlled by the United States or NATO —
our traditional geopolitical rivals.
4. BEGIN TEXT:
The United States has completely abandoned its plans for a
strategic partnership with Uzbekistan. Washington now describes
the regime there as unacceptable and «undemocratic.» The White
House does not consider it necessary to engage in dialogue or
bridge-building with the Uzbek regime; moreover, it expects that
regime to be replaced as a result of socio-political upheavals.
Uzbekistan has not lived up to the expectations of the US State
Department and the Pentagon. But was it ever capable of doing so?
Andrei Grozin, head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan
department at the CIS Countries Institute: «Clearly, after what
happened in Andijan in May of 2005, American strategists decided
that Uzbekistan was dependent on them, so it could be pressured
into agreeing to an ‘international investigation’ into the
tragic Andijan events — thus bringing the Uzbek administration
entirely under American control, or at least giving the United
States substantial leverage.»
But President Islam Karimov refused to give in to pressure.
Instead, he learned some appropriate lessons from what had
happened. The Andijan events could hardly be described as
another «revolution» in the former Soviet Union. This was more
like an armed uprising in one particular city, with the prospect
of instability spreading to adjacent cities and the entire
Ferghana Valley. If the first and second phases of the Ferghana
Valley power-grab attempt had succeeded, the rebels could have
escalated the situation and overthrown the existing political
regime, or at least attempted to proclaim some sort of
independent state formation in the Ferghana Valley.
In contrast to the West, Moscow and Beijing understood this —
and in general, they did not condemn the resolute measures used
to crush the revolt. Russia, for example, behaved quite
rationally under the circumstances. By refraining from any
active involvement, and accepting the Tashkent government’s
official account of events in Andijan, we not only maintained
good relations with Karimov, but actually strengthened that
relationship. What’s more, while the West started portraying
Karimov as some sort of «mad dog,» Russian companies and
politicians gained a window of opportunity for expanding
cooperation with Uzbekistan.
These opportunities have been developed successfully, as
confirmed by Uzbekistan’s decision to renew its membership of
the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the
gradual change in Tashkent’s foreign policy priorities as it has
re-entered Russia’s sphere of influence. By the end of this
year, Uzbekistan will have joined the dozens of agreements
within the Euro-Asian Economic Community framework. Another
logical development has been Uzbekistan’s official request for
Washington to withdraw its troops and hardware from the Khanabad
airbase.
But the United States was thrown out of Uzbekistan so fast that
American military experts and State Department officials had to
rewrite their Central Asia strategy on the fly. This strategy
cannot be implemented without some new allies in the region.
Washington is primarily focusing its attention on Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan.
Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, has been visited by many
DUSHANBE 00001440 003.3 OF 005
American officials over the past six months — including
high-level officials like Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and Energy Secretary Sam Boden. Observers note that all of a
sudden, as if by command, Washington officials have started
expressing support for Kazakhstan’s claims that it is a leader
in the region. American officials had not been known to support
such statements before. Over the
years of Kazakhstan’s
independence, the United States has invested just over $11
billion there — primarily in hydrocarbon production. American
transnational corporations hold very strong positions in
Kazakhstan, stronger than in any other post-Soviet state in
Central Asia.
Note that none of the above applied to Uzbekistan. Of course,
Taskhent was initially promised a great deal of investment, but
this never materialized. American business projects in
Uzbekistan weren’t very large or substantial; they mostly
concerned gold-mining, uranium-mining, and some other raw
materials projects.
Andrei Grozin: «The situation is completely different in
Kazakhstan. In economic and investment terms, it is very
dependent on the United States — much more than Uzbekistan was.
After all, Kazakhstan’s economy has been reformed to a far
greater extent, and is more liberal. Consequently, it has long
been tied to world energy markets, and that makes it far more
vulnerable.»
So President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has consistently pursued
a multi-directional foreign policy, finds it absolutely
essential to maintain good relations with all of his large and
influential neighbors, especially China and Russia, as well as
with the West, especially the United States. Thus, on the one
hand, Kazakhstan has recently decided to participate in the
overtly anti-Russian Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project.
On the other hand, when Nazarbayev attended the G8 summit in his
capacity as CIS chairman, Kazakhstan agreed to sign a number of
major energy project deals with Russia. The CIS Countries
Institute maintains that Kazakhstan has always balanced on the
boundary of the interests of various other countries, and seems
likely to continue this policy.
That applies to defense as well. Kazakhstan can probably be
described as Russia’s most consistent Central Asian ally in
defense cooperation, participating actively in all CSTO measures
— just as actively as it participates in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace.
Astana doesn’t reject Western aid either. The United States, for
example, is spending substantial sums on infrastructure for
Kazakhstan’s marines on the shore of the Caspian Sea. The very
same Kazakhstan battalion, now a brigade, has been equipped by
the Americans and uses the Hummers they donated. Only the
artillery is still Soviet- or Russian-made.
Tajikistan was the main target of US Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld’s visit to the region. The Americans make no secret of
their vital interest in air corridors over Tajikistan and
refuelling rights there. So there was some discussion of a
substantial increase in NATO flights over Tajik territory, and
allocating another airfield for NATO there.
The Tajik government in Dushanbe is interested in additional
revenues for its scanty budget — in the form of plentiful
American dollars. Tajikistan is willing to take full advantage
of its key geostrategic location in Central Asia. Moreover,
Tajikistan fully approves of everything the Americans are doing
in Afghanistan. The American presence there reduces the danger
of terrorism from the south, allowing Tajikistan to get on with
fortifying the Tajik-Afghan border. So Dushanbe’s readiness to
respond to Washington’s requests has more to do with simply
wanting to make money, rather than adopting a multi-directional
foreign policy course. Tajikistan
hasn’t found any other
DUSHANBE 00001440 004.3 OF 005
money-making opportunities so far. This seems to be the sole
explanation for current American-Tajik cooperation.
Some experts maintain that Tajikistan is talking of a
multi-directional foreign policy partly because its hopes of
attracting substantial investment from Russia haven’t yet been
fulfilled. So this is a way of putting pressure on Russian
companies which have discussed plans for a number of major
projects in Tajikistan. Chief
among these companies is RAO
Unified Energy Systems (RAO UES).
Andrei Grozin: «But Anatoly Chubais’s company has some equally
large projects in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, in my view, there’s
obviously some bargaining going on here — these two post-Soviet
republics have a monopoly on water resources in Central Asia,
and it’s a question of deciding which one of them will be the
priority partner.»
It’s no secret that some of America’s intellectual elite have
been floating the idea of a «Greater Central Asia» project
over
the past six months. When Rumsfeld visited Dushanbe, he noted
once again that there is a great deal of scope for energy
projects in American-Tajik cooperation. American corporations
could invest $1.5-2 billion in these projects over the next few
years. RAO UES CEO Anatoly Chubais was mentioning similar
figures for potential Russian investment in Tajikistan. But the
Tajiks seem more inclined to believe the Americans, rather than
Chubais.
Russian border guards have left Tajikistan; Russia’s 201st
Division, which recently became a military base, has been asked
to relocate from central Dushanbe to the outskirts. According to
some observers, these developments indicate that Tajikistan is
trying to distance itself from Russia, or at least show Russia
its place, to some extent.
Andrei Grozin: «President Emomali Rakhmonov’s attempt to pursue
a Tajik version of multi-directional policy isn’t very
far-sighted, in my view. In terms of its economic, demographic,
intellectual, defensive, and other resources, Tajikistan is
nowhere near equal to Kazakhstan. It’s a much more vulnerable
and less self-sufficient state. In the final analysis,
Tajikistan owes its existence — within its current borders and
with its current political elites — entirely to Russia.»
One of the few post-Soviet states to resist American dominance
is Kyrgyzstan. Washington has been somewhat annoyed by President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev independent stance in deciding his foreign
policy direction. This annoyance peaked when Bakiyev made a
much-publicized statement about the presence of America’s
[former Uzbekistan] Khansi airbase being unwelcome in
Kyrgyzstan. Some experts maintain that the statement was
political: Kyrgyzstan’s new administration wants to restrict
Washington’s influence on its domestic policy-making.
Observers link the same factor to Kyrgyzstan’s recent expulsion
of two American diplomats, declared personae non grata. The
Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry’s statement says plainly that this
decision was made on the basis of intelligence reports from the
Kyrgyz special services, which repeatedly caught the Americans
interfering in Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs. According to some
accounts, they were establishing a spy network in southern
Kyrgyzstan, where Kyrgyz intelligence predicts an outbreak of
radical activity at the end of this summer. Although the US
Embassy in Kyrgyzstan has denied all allegations, there’s
obviously no smoke without fire.
This diplomatic scandal had a negative impact on American-Kyrgyz
negotiations regarding terms for the Pentagon’s lease on an
airbase at the Manas International Airport. These talks have
been under way for several months. The Americans will have to
pay up — unless they want to lose their strategic bridgehead in
Kyrgyzstan like they lost the one in Uzbekistan. Most likely,
DUSHANBE 00001440 005.3 OF 005
they’ll also have to restrain their zeal in imposing the Western
model of democracy on Kyrgyz society.
Andrei Grozin: «Kyrgyzstan’s ‘willfulness’ is due to a
combination of various factors. I get the impression that
Kurmanbek Bakiyev is gradually bringing the situation in
Kyrgyzstan under control. At any rate, the unrestrained
lawlessness observed only six months ago — the bacchanalia that
continued for a few months after the revolution — is now gone.
The central authorities are gradually establishing control over
unruly regions. Life is slowly returning to normal, more or
less. The economy is doing relatively well, for a country which
has experienced such cataclysms.»
Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s initial demand was $200 million a year for
use of the airbase. Obviously, the United States could easily
afford that. It could afford much more. In principle, the
Pentagon’s budget would cover it. According to recent reports,
the two sides seem to have agreed on $150 million. One way or
another, this is a lot of money for Kyrgyzstan, which is a
fairly poor country, lacking minerals or other resources; it
would amount to about a third of Kyrgyzstan’s annual budget
revenues. So the Kyrgyz government does have something to fight
for.
Over the past 12-18 months, Russia has gone on the offensive in
Central Asia. Compared to the preceding five years, the heights
reached there by Gazprom, LUKoil, RAO UES, some defense
enterprises, mobile communications operators, and even large
retail networks show that our country is making a comeback to
the region. But it’s coming back as a reliable economic partner,
not a politically dominant forces. As the economists put it:
banks are better than tanks.
Andrei Grozin: «Central Asia is still dependent on Russia to a
considerable extent. For this region our country means trade
routes, a market for surplus labor, and a market for a
substantial proportion of the raw materials that come from
Central Asia, including exports across Russian territory.»
But the «tanks» should not be overlooked either. Russia
remains
the leading supplier of arms and military hardware to Central
Asian countries (some of it at concessional prices for members
of the CSTO). The overwhelming majority of future officers are
trained in Russia. For example, Kazakhstan has over 700
officer cadets studying at Russian military education
institutions, while only about a hundred are studying in Western
Europe and the United States. This is an obvious example of how
closely Kazakhstan cooperates with the Russian Federation. In
principle, the same can be said for other Central Asian states.
Moreover, there are the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. There are associations within these influential
international organizations: the Regional Anti-Terrorism Center
(within the SCO) and the CSTO Regional Coalition Group in
Central Asia. In other words, Central Asian states are still
within the orbit of Russia’s political, military-political, and
economic influence. And Russia must not stop there; it needs to
continue building up its influence in all the areas of activity.
One reason to do this is in order to minimize the possibility of
any further American military facilities being established in
Central Asia, whatver they may be called: training centers for
local military personnel, points for monitoring the Afghanistan
drug-trafficking sitation, or anything else. One way or another,
they would be military facilities controlled by the United
States or NATO — our traditional geopolitical rivals.
END TEXT.
Hoagland
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 72910
date: 7/28/2006 10:36
refid: 06DUSHANBE1442
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1434|06DUSHANBE1440|06DUSHANBE1442
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001442
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RUS, S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/28/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PHUM, MARR, RS, AF, IR, TI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI WORRIES ABOUT RUSSIAN INTENTIONS IN CENTRAL
ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1440 B) DUSHANBE 1434
DUSHANBE 00001442 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, Embassy
Dushanbe, State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Afghanistan President
Hamid Karzai invited the
Ambassador for a private one-hour breakfast at the Presidential
Guest House in Dushanbe before returning to Kabul July 28.
After a 20-minute one-on-one, Karzai invited his foreign
minister and two other advisers to join.
WHAT’S RUSSIA UP TO?
2. (C) Karzai asked how the
United States was doing in Central
Asia after losing the military base at Karshi Khanabad in
Uzbekistan. The Ambassador
replied that the situation is fluid
and depends on the country, but the key trend worth watching is
Russia’s assertion that Central Asia is its own exclusive
«sphere of influence» [REF A].
3. (C) Karzai said he, too, is
increasingly worried about
Russia, not only in Central Asia but also in Afghanistan.
«Putin is pushing with venom and vigor.» He recounted that when
he was in Kazakhstan in July for an international conference,
Russian President Putin had told him directly to pay more
attention to the Tajiks from the Northern Alliance: «They’re
our guys.» Karzai said he
took that to mean senior Afghan
Tajiks like the former defense and foreign ministers are
Russia’s agents of influence.
4. (C) Karzai recounted that the
Russian Ambassador in Kabul
frequently points out to him and his ministers collateral damage
to civilians from U.S. and coalition military actions against
Taliban elements and demands to know why Afghanistan doesn’t
protest this more strongly in the name of human rights.
5. (C) Karzai added that he
believes recent small explosions in
Kabul are the work of «Russian friends» [Afghan Tajiks
influenced by Russia] to destabilize his government. «If it had
been Taliban or al-Qai’ida, the bombs would have been more
effective.»
6. (C) Karzai praised Tajikistan
President Rahmonov for his
unwavering support and his even-handedness with the Tajiks in
Afghanistan. «In fact, when
I discussed the Russia problem with
him this time, he promised to try to help.» Karzai mused that
Rahmonov is the only Central Asian leader who respects
Afghanistan’s sovereignty and is willing to help enhance
stability in Afghanistan.
FORMALITIES ONLY WITH AHMADINEJAD
7. (SBU) In response to a
question, Karzai said he did not meet
bilaterally in Dushanbe with Iranian President Ahmadinejad, and
that the trilateral meeting had been brief and rather formal
[REF B].
RAHMONOV: «SORRY YOU MISSED
THE SAUNA»
8. (C) Karzai expressed surprise
that President Rahmonov had
spent the entire day, July 27, with him and his delegation.
«Clearing his schedule like that was a true sign of friendship
and hospitality, although we could have done without the
hot-springs sauna.»
9. (SBU) After the breakfast, the
Ambassador’s vehicle had to
wait to exit the dacha compound because President Rahmonov had
arrived to accompany Karzai to the airport. Rahmonov spotted
the Ambassador 30 meters away and waved him over. Taking him by
the hand, Rahmonov said, «We’ve never had a good photo of just
you and me together,» and he called over his photographers.
DUSHANBE 00001442 002.2 OF 002
10. (C) The Ambassador told
Rahmonov, «You know that Karzai is
a long-time personal friend of mine, but he’s even a better
friend of Tajikistan.»
Rahmonov squeezed the Ambassador’s hand
and said, «Thank God Karzai and the United States are in
Kabul!»
11. (C) Rahmonov apologized for
not inviting the Ambassador to
join him and Karzai for the hot-springs sauna in the mountains.
He said, «I really wanted to do it, just among friends, but
realized `some’ would take it wrong.» (COMMENT:
We’re relieved
he thought twice. END COMMENT.)
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 73284
date: 8/1/2006 10:43
refid: 06DUSHANBE1462
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHDBU #1462 2131043
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1738
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9576
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001462
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, INL, S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/1/2016
TAGS: PREL, ENRG, SNAR, RS, TI
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION STILL POSSIBLE IN TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, Embassy
Dushanbe, State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) The departing U.S.
Ambassador hosted a final farewell
reception at the U.S. Residence July 31.
Russian Charge
d’affairs Vyacheslav Svetlichniy, a career diplomat, attended.
He pulled the Ambassador aside and said he sincerely wished our
two governments could attain the same degree of mutual respect
that pertains between our embassies in Tajikistan. He praised
the U.S. Embassy for developing, over time, non-ideological
relations of mutual respect with a broad range of Tajik society
— government, students, intelligentsia, and others. Svetlichniy
said, «We haven’t learned how to do that. We make demands and
expect obedience. I will long
remember your lessons.»
2. (C) In fact, it is important
to know that the entire U.S.
Embassy team has worked hard to sustain a positive relationship
with the Russian Embassy, especially at the DCM and working
levels. Current Russian
Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov is, on
the surface, a slightly charming high-level Kremlin political
appointee sent to Dushanbe to «save» Tajikistan for
Russia. In
the end, unfortunately, he is a rigid ideologue of the old
school, who seems to burn as many bridges as he tries to build.
DCM Svetlichniy, on the other hand, is a seasoned diplomat who
seems genuinely interested in a positive working relationship
with the United States. Also
important, unlike many Russians,
he views the Tajiks as competent, educated partners, not poor,
other-race country cousins.
3. (C) The best possibility for
U.S.-Russia cooperation in
Tajikistan is counter-narcotics.
We sincerely hope Team Embassy
Dushanbe will be able to work productively with the new Russian
Embassy counter-narcotics officer, expected to arrive before the
end of this calendar year. Svetlichniy
said, «We hope he will
be a real professional, not an FSB has-been.» There is also
room for cooperation in hydro-energy for the greater region —
if, indeed, Moscow truly wants to cooperate and not compete.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 73289
date: 8/1/2006 11:05
refid: 06DUSHANBE1463
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE275
header:
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RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1463/01 2131105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8258
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1466
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9577
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001463
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, ENRG, TJ, UZ
SUBJECT: TAJIK-UZBEK TENSIONS GROWING IN GAS, WATER AND COUNTER
TERRORISM
REF: DUSHANBE 275
DUSHANBE 00001463 001.2 OF 002
1. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: In the last six weeks, the Tajik media
has reported on a series of small incidents, the sum of which
suggest that the already fractious relationship between
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is not getting smoother, despite the
hopes raised when Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC) in January.
Gas, water, crime and
terrorism, pollution and student visas have all recently been
sources of bilateral tension.
Moreover, President Rahmonov
publicly became more critical of Uzbekistan’s failure to fulfill
its membership obligations in EurAsEC.
Taken separately, none
of these issues seriously threatens regional stability.
However, a pattern of constant squabbling over minor topics-as
well as serious disagreements over water and gas — could lead
to more intense rhetoric or actions, possibly making regional
transport and trade all the more difficult. END COMMENT.
GAS
2. Uzbekistan’s natural gas
supply company Uztransgaz limited
gas supplies to Tajikistan around June 19 due to more than $7
million in outstanding debts.
Press reports quote state-owned
utility Tojikgaz head Shavkat Shoimov saying Tajikistan could
not repay its debt due to low collection rates. Shoimov called
Tajikistan’s largest industrial enterprises the biggest
problems; Tojikcement alone owes Tojikgaz $2 million.
3. Another news report stated
July 24 that in response to
Uzbekistan cutting the delivery of natural gas to Tajikistan,
Tajikistan blocked a pipeline transporting gas across Tajikistan
to the Uzbek part of Ferghana Valley. The report listed
Tojikgaz’s debts to Uztransgaz as $7.63 million accumulated over
half a year, according to a representative of Uztransgaz. He
noted that Uztransgaz, having supplied gas to Tajikistan in a
volume of 347 million cubic meters for $19.88 million only
received $11.46 million.
WATER
4. In Ferghana valley, Tajikistan
was unable to satisfy
Uzbekistan’s water demand, Tajik Minister of Land Reclamation
and Water Resources Abdukokhir Nazirov announced July 17.
Tajikistan’s Kairakkum reservoir had not yet reached its full
capacity due to a delay of water from the Kyrgyz Toqkogul
reservoir; therefore, Tajikistan could not provide Uzbekistan
with 600 cubic meters per second without threatening Tajik water
demand. Nazirov blamed the Kazakh
and Kyrgyz governments for
implementing agreements too slowly on water transfer from
Toqtogul reservoir in exchange for gas and coal supplies for a
Kyrgyz power station. Nazirov
commented during a press
conference that it would be «incorrect» to link
Tajikistan-Uzbekistan water regulation to gas supply issues.
TERRORISM
5. Tajik Interior Minister
Khumdin Sharipov announced July 17
that in the first six months of 2006, Tajik authorities arrested
10 suspected members of the terrorist organization Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), after a special operation in the
northern city of Khujand. These
arrests included four suspected
IMU members involved in November 2005 and January 2006 shootings
in Sughd region. July 26 Sughd
police allegedly arrested a top
IMU figure, 30-year old Uzbek citizen, Ruslan Haqberdiyev, on
charges of organizing criminal activities and inciting ethnic
and religious enmity. Media
reports claimed police confiscated
texts in English, Arabic and Uzbek on jihad as well as how to
organize explosi