Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 64547
date: 5/18/2006 13:22
refid: 06DUSHANBE909
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 06DUSHANBE870|06DUSHANBE908
header:
VZCZCXRO9513
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0909/01 1381322
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181322Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7526
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1632
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1606
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1634
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1559
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1609
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1560
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1431
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1375
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8780
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000909
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL, S/P
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN HOSTS REGIONAL CN CONFERENCE
REF: A) DUSHANBE 908 B) DUSHANBE 870
CLASSIFIED BY: Jonathan Edwards, DATT, USDAO Dushanbe, DIA.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (U) SUMMARY:
The George C. Marshall European Center for
Security
Studies along with U.S. CENTCOM and Tajikistan’s Committee on
State
Border Protection organized the International Conference on
Counter
Narcotics and the second Meeting of the Central and South Asia
Counter
Narcotics Security Working Group in Dushanbe, Tajikistan May
15-17. Ten
countries including the Central Asian countries, except for
Uzbekistan,
Afghanistan and Pakistan sent senior representatives to discuss
security
and border cooperation.
Tajikistan’s Chairman of the State
Border
Committee General-Colonel Saidimir Zuhurov chaired the
conference and
hosted senior level participants on excursion trips to the U.S.
Army
Corps of Engineers bridge construction site at Nizhny-Pyanzh and
border
posts to see what is already underway to strengthen border
protection
and get a first hand understanding of the work that remains.
Over the
three-day conference, a Sub-Group drafted concrete
recommendations on
regional border cooperation (reftel A).
END SUMMARY.
RAHMONOV KICKS OFF CONFERENCE
2. (U) As the keynote speaker, President Rahmonov
kicked off
the
conference with an energetic speech reiterating Tajikistan’s
commitment
to fighting terrorism and drug-trafficking. He called for
international
support, not just regional cooperation, on securing borders and
strengthening Afghanistan to stem drug production.
3. (U) Often putting aside his notes, Rahmonov told
stories of
local
Afghans who have no other choice but to grow opium for their
livelihood.
He cited Afghanistan’s high unemployment rate as the root cause
of high
drug production and made a plug for the Dasti-Zhum hydropower
project as
a means to supply energy to Afghanistan as well as irrigate 1.5
million
hectares of land and provide jobs.
4. (U) Rahmonov also cited Tajikistan’s good record
on drug
interdiction and its success serving as a buffer country for
drugs
trafficked through Central Asia to Europe. In the first quarter
of this
year alone, drug seizures have risen by 26%. Over the past 10
years
Tajikistan has confiscated more than 60 tons of drugs, more than
50% of
which was heroin. Tajikistan is
the fourth in the world when it
comes
to amount of drugs seized and the first in the former Soviet
Union. The
Drug Control Agency and other security bodies are taking an
aggressive
approach to fighting drugs. They have arrested thousands of
traffickers
and targeted drug demand, reducing the number of drug addicts
from
nearly 30,000 to 6,000 over the past ten years. In the past
DUSHANBE 00000909 002 OF 004
five years
they have arrested more then 500 government officials involved
in drug
trafficking.
5. (U) Rahmonov emphasized that Afghanistan and
Central Asia’s
drug
problem is an «evil» that afflicts the entire world.
International
donor assistance is needed and only a unified approach can solve
the
problem.
RUSSIAN NON-PARTICIPATION
6. (S) Prior to the conference, Post learned the
Russians were
not
willing to participate and encouraged regional countries to
boycott the
conference (reftel B), but the Russians made their presence known
throughout the three-day affair.
The Russian station chief in
Dushanbe
made an appearance at the conference.
7. (S) Although the Embassy had contracted two Tajik
Air
helicopters
to fly participants to the border on the first day and Nurek the
second
day of the conference, upon arrival at the airport the second
day, the
group was informed one Tajik Air helicopter was not available,
and
participants would have to fly in an Border Guard MI-8. Colonel
Tojibaev, Chief of the Border Guard Foreign Relations Department
later
informed the DATT the Tajik helicopter at the last minute was
redirected
to take the Russian and Tajik Transport Ministers to visit the
Nurek dam
site, coincidentally the same place the conference delegation
was going
for lunch. The Russian and Tajik
ministers also lunched at the
same
venue. The helicopter carrying
the ministers also flew over the
border
outpost while the conference’s international delegation toured
the
sites. (COMMENT: The helicopter heist was likely purposeful
because
plenty of Russian helicopters were sitting at the Dushanbe
airport idle.
END COMMENT.)
TAJIK-HOSTED BORDER EXCURSIONS
8. (U) The Conference’s Senior Executive Committee,
including
INL’s
Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson, the German Ambassador, the
U.K.’s
Head of the Drug and International Crime Department, Pakistan’s
Minister
of Narcotics Control and Post’s DCM and DATT flew down in three
helicopters to the Nizhny-Pyanzh bridge site where the U.S. Army
Corps
of Engineers is constructing a $33 million bridge between
Tajikistan and
Afghanistan. The Corps of
Engineers briefed the seniors on the
construction details of the bridge.
The delegation crossed the
bridge
over to the Afghan side where the engineers briefed them
further. The
U.S.-funded bridge is an integral part of Afghan reconstruction
linking
trading routes and a road network that will eventually start from
Kazakhstan and run through Afghanistan to southern ports.
9. (SBU) Realizing the bridge would more easily
facilitate the
DUSHANBE 00000909 003 OF 004
transport of goods north and south, some were concerned the
bridge would
also allow for increased drug trafficking. The Senior Executive
Committee visited the border post on the Tajik side. Mirrored
border
posts on both sides of the bridge are being renovated and
modernized.
In addition, modern customs checkpoints and inspection areas are
also
being constructed. The border
areas have been well thought out
and
designed to maximize the economic benefits of trade, but also
take into
account the need to aggressively target drug-traffickers.
10. (C) On the second day of the conference, the
Senior
Executive
Committee visited the Khirmanjo border post on the Tajik-Afghan
border.
The Tajik border facilities are ill-equipped and do not have
modern
amenities, many without access to water or electricity.
Flooding has
destroyed roads along the southern Tajik border making some
checkpoints
inaccessible by vehicle and the delivery of supplies difficult.
At some
border posts, soldiers have to manually carry water from a local
stream
for use. When the Russian border
guards left Tajikistan, they
stripped
the facilities of their technical equipment including
communications
systems. In order to renovate the
one border outpost at
Khirmanjo, it
would cost $410,000. To date, the
United States has provided
uniforms,
food and fuel to run the outpost’s generators. Due to the remote
location of the border posts and poor transportation
infrastructure,
bulldozers to widen roads would be needed to get materials to the
outpost.
11. (C) The United States assists border checkpoints
and
outposts
along the southern Tajik border from Uzbekistan to Kalaykuum,
which is
approximately half of the southern border. Nineteen border
posts line
that stretch with 660 soldiers, ten border posts of which are in
need of
assistance. In total, 6,700 Tajik
soldiers at 47 posts are
supposed to
man the southern border with Afghanistan, however, in reality the
numbers are most likely lower, with at most 40 guards per
outpost. In
between checkpoints, Tajik guards patrol the border on foot,
horseback
or donkey.
12. (C) The European Union’s Border Management
Program in
Central Asia
(BOMCA) assists posts from Kalaykuum to Ishkashim. Although
BOMCA is
supposed to assist outposts from Ishkashim all the way to the
Chinese
border, the reality is that the area is unmanaged. Outposts
have not
been renovated or received assistance.
It is one of the most
vulnerable
border areas and is where the entrance to one of the more highly
trafficked routes for illicit activity is located. Tajikistan’s
eastern
border with China is extremely difficult to traverse through due
to the
mountainous terrain. The Chinese
have also set up fencing all
along the
DUSHANBE 00000909 004 OF 004
border and allowed for one crossing point that is well guarded.
13. (U) After the visit to Khirmanjo, General Zuhurov
scheduled a
visit to the Nurek dam site for a tour of the facilities and
boat ride
in the placid reservoir. Nurek is
a popular tourist site for
local
Tajiks during the hot summer months and Tajikistan is especially
proud
of its energy capabilities.
General Zuhurov treated the group
to a
typical large Tajik spread outdoors by the dam.
14. (C) COMMENT:
Despite the hot weather and at times
over-the-top
Tajik hospitality, it is useful for senior delegates to see
firsthand
the difficult challenges Tajikistan faces in managing border
outposts.
With 38 drug production labs in Northern Afghanistan, Tajikistan
is
literally on the frontlines of the war against drugs. Regional
cooperation, increased training for guards and officials and
modern
equipment are much needed tools to stem drug-trafficking.
Because of
the regional countries’ poor status, the war against drugs
cannot be
fought without international assistance.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 64683
date: 5/19/2006 10:52
refid: 06BEIJING9673
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination: 06SECSTATE72746BEIJING8117BEIJING9506
header:
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OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHBJ #9673/01 1391052
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191052Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5973
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 1818
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0672
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1223
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6378
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0234
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1061
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 3403
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 009673
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PREL, MARR, RS, CH, KZ, TI, UZ
SUBJECT: SCO: MFA, SCO SECRETARIAT AND RUSSIAN EMBASSY
DISCUSS UPCOMING SUMMIT, IRANIAN PRESIDENT’S PARTICIPATION
AND DOWNPLAY EXPANSION
REF: A. SECSTATE 72746 BEIJING 8117 BEIJING 9506
B. BEIJING 8927
Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
——-
1. (C) Senior Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO)
official Du Wei, who serves as Assistant to SCO Secretary
General Zhang Deguang, expressed understanding of U.S.
concerns regarding the possibility of statements critical
of the U.S. presence in Central Asia being issued at the
June SCO Summit and said he would convey our views to the
group’s members. Russia’s
Permanent Representative to the
SCO Secretariat stated that the declaration will not
address the issue of coalition forces in Central Asia.
According to an MFA official handling SCO affairs, Beijing
recognizes U.S. apprehension and does not wish to see any
«unpleasant stance or situation» at the June Summit that
does not serve the interests of U.S.-China relations. Our
contacts highlighted that statements made by individual
observer country representatives do not represent the
official SCO or Chinese position.
The Iran nuclear issue
will not be «specifically or formally» raised during the
Summit, Du asserted. There is no
plan for the joint
Declaration to address the Iran or Coalition force issue,
but the document will outline members’ views on certain
international situations. In
preparation for the Summit,
the May 15 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting approved draft
documents on SCO election observers, cooperation between
SCO member and observer states and coordination between
Afghanistan and the various SCO institutions for the heads-
of-state to endorse at the Summit, the MFA reported. While
the SCO will not become a «security haven» for member
countries, security cooperation is fundamental for further
development. End Summary.
Declaration Not Likely to Include Coalition Forces
——————————————— ——
2. (C) Assistant to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
Secretary General Zhang Deguang, Du Wei, thanked poloff for
SIPDIS
his May 18 delivery of Ref A points on the June SCO Summit
and expressed understanding of U.S. concerns. While poloff
explained that the United States is delivering the same
message separately to all SCO members, Du stated that the
Secretariat has the responsibility to pass the information
SIPDIS
along to member nations, pending Secretary General Zhang’s
approval.
3. (C) Deputy Director of the MFA Department of European
and Central Asian Affairs Fifth (SCO) Division Wang Wenli
(Ref B), in a separate meeting on May 19, noted that she
was aware of the concerns recently conveyed by high-level
U.S. officials to the MFA (Ref C), as well as discussed by
Presidents Bush and Hu, over the July 2005 Astana
Declaration’s call for a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal
from Central Asia. Wang said that
following the Astana
Summit, China stressed on several occasions its respect for
other SCO members’ requests and decisions, which were the
main factors behind the statement’s inclusion in the Astana
Declaration. The PRC understands
that the United States
does not wish to see similar language issued during the
Shanghai Summit in June, she remarked, adding that the two
countries share the interests of regional peace, stability
and prosperity. Wang maintained
that the member states
have not discussed incorporating language on the Iran
nuclear issue or the presence of Coalition forces in the
region in the joint Declaration to be issued in Shanghai.
Beijing does not want such issues to be included in the
Declaration or see any «unpleasant stance or situation» at
the June Summit that does not serve the interests of U.S.-
China relations.
4. (C) In a separate May 18 meeting, Russian Federation
Permanent Representative to the SCO Secretariat Gregory
BEIJING 00009673 002 OF 004
Logvinov told the A/DCM that the SCO Summit Declaration
would not address Coalition forces in Central Asia. He
said that the SCO’s current position is that the issue
should be handled bilaterally.
Iranian President Will Attend
——————————
5. (C) Du said that he had «heard» that Iranian President
Ahmadinejad will attend the Summit, and the MFA
subsequently confirmed Iran’s acceptance of the invitation.
Wang noted that Ahmadinejad has begun to arrange bilateral
meetings during the Summit and that China and Iran are also
discussing a possible bilateral event.
Du asserted that
all observer nations have the right to attend most SCO
events. President Ahmadinejad
attended and spoke at last
September’s UN High-Level Event, and neither the U.S.
Government nor UN Secretary-General Annan would have denied
him these rights.
Iran’s Statements not Representative of SCO or China
——————————————— ——-
6. (C) Du and Wang stressed,
however, using almost
identical language, that statements by individual observer
country officials do not represent the official SCO
position. Wang added that they
also do not represent the
PRC position. The SCO does not
want any statement issued
at the Summit to run contrary to the principles and spirit
of the SCO, Du remarked. He said
he did not expect
sensitive issues involving its observers, such as India-
Pakistan tensions or the Iran nuclear issue, to negatively
affect the SCO’s operation. The
SCO offers observer
nations a favorable environment for resolving their
internal problems and preventing an «escalation of
disagreements.» Du also
highlighted that they are not full
members and therefore exert limited influence on the
organization.
7. (C) Wang exhibited a greater
degree of anxiety over the
possibility that President Ahmadinejad might make certain
contentious statements at the Summit and that the media
would play up these remarks. The
MFA does not have the
authority or leverage to persuade him to soften his
rhetoric. She maintained,
nonetheless, that the Iranian
President will not have the opportunity to manipulate the
SCO into adopting a common stance in support of Tehran’s
position on the nuclear issue. As
an observer, Iran is
only invited to the general session, not the closed-door
heads of states’ or working-level meetings reserved for
members. President Ahmadinejad
will not be permitted to
sign the Declaration or other agreements, she noted.
8. (C) Logvinov stated that
Beijing is very anxious about
Ahmadinejad’s involvement in the Summit and predicted that
future developments in the Iran nuclear crisis could
preclude Ahamdinejad’s participation (Ref C).
Iran Issue Will Not Be «Formally» Addressed
——————————————-
9. (C) Asked whether the SCO would adopt a position on
Iran’s nuclear program at the Summit, Du stated that the
Iran nuclear issue has not been «formally» adopted into the
Summit agenda and will not be «specifically or formally»
addressed during the event.
Remarking that he had not seen
a finalized version of the agenda, Du reported that the
joint Declaration will summarize and evaluate the SCO’s
progress over the past five years, analyze the current
state of SCO cooperation in various fields and outline
goals for the next five years of development. The document
will also touch on member states’ views toward certain
international and regional issues.
Based on the procedures
and discussions among SCO members, there is no current plan
to raise the Iran nuclear issue at the Summit, Wang
confirmed. She remarked, however,
that given SCO
countries’ concern over the issue, an escalation in the
situation could force the SCO to adopt a common position in
BEIJING 00009673 003.2 OF 004
the future.
10. (C) Logvinov commented that the SCO «does not support»
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, pointing out that as
an observer Iran is obligated to uphold the principle of
nonproliferation. He also said
that Iran is expected to
uphold the principle of mutual respect for all nations,
cultures and civilizations.
The SCO Will Not Serve as a «Security Haven»
———————————————
11. (C) While some member states
hope the SCO will focus
more on security, Wang asserted that the SCO will not
become a military alliance or an organization that provides
a «security haven» for its members. Remarking that the SCO
must expand into a wide range of fields, she stated that
security cooperation is nonetheless the foundation for
further development in Central Asia, particularly through
combating the «Three Forces» of terrorism, extremism and
separatism, as well as drug trafficking.
Central Asian
countries also want to see China and Russia play a greater
role in their development through increased economic and
trade cooperation. Wang stated
that at the June Summit
China will announce some large-scale bilateral assistance
projects funded with the USD 900 million in preferential
credit loans pledged by Beijing last year.
No New Membership, New Observers Unlikely
——————————————
12. (C) Responding to poloff’s question about a possible
announcement of new members during the Summit, Du noted
that he is frequently asked about plans for SCO expansion.
Echoing previous MFA statements (Ref B), he highlighted
that the SCO lacks the legal foundation for and a common
stance on absorbing news members.
The topic will not be
«officially» included in the Summit agenda. Du
acknowledged that there is strong interest among current
observers to obtain full membership and remarked that
observers are theoretically «one step closer» to becoming
full members. Noting that the
four current observers all
border SCO member states, he asserted that geographic
proximity is a necessary precondition for potential new
members. Du expressed doubt that
new observers will be
admitted in the near future, remarking that the
organization still requires some time to «digest» its
current observers. The SCO is now
formulating an agreement
that will standardize the relationships between member and
observer nations. Logvinov said
that it is «impossible» to
expand the SCO at present and noted that drafting the legal
procedures for expansion has been «hell work.» Logvinov
claims that despite pressure to expand, the SCO will not
address this issue at the Summit.
Other Summit Participants
————————-
13. (C) In addition to the six member and four observer
countries, representatives from Afghanistan, ASEAN, CIS and
possibly the UN, in which the SCO possesses observer
status, will attend the June Summit, Du stated. Wang
reported that Pakistani President Musharraf, CIS Executive
Secretary Rushailo and an unspecified ASEAN Deputy
SIPDIS
Secretary General have already responded positively to the
SIPDIS
SCO’s invitations. China is still
discussing participation
with Mongolia and India.
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting: Focused on Internal Regulations
——————————————— —————
14. (C) Wang stated that the May
15 SCO Foreign Ministers’
Meeting in Shanghai focused on preparations for the June
Summit, although the agenda and schedule will be finalized
at a vice foreign minister-level meeting a few days prior
to the Summit. The May 15 Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting
approved several draft documents for the heads-of-states to
endorse at the Summit, the first of which standardized the
BEIJING 00009673 004 OF 004
procedures and strengthened the legal framework for the SCO
election observer mechanism.
While the SCO has already
begun to send observers during member countries’
presidential elections, this agreement discusses procedures
for forming observer committees and standard reporting
practices, she said. The Foreign
Ministers also approved a
document regulating cooperation and interaction between
members and observer states. The
third draft approved was
an internal SCO document on enhancing coordination between
Afghanistan and the various SCO institutions, including the
Secretariat, building on the 2005 establishment of the SCO-
SIPDIS
Afghanistan Contact Group. Wang
stated that SCO countries
have provided significant assistance to Afghanistan in
counterterrorism and counter-narcotics over the past few
years and highlighted the importance the SCO places on
Afghanistan’s stability.
15. (C) Logvinov claims that the Foreign Minister’s meeting
approved 10 draft documents for approval at the Summit. In
addition to the drafts on SCO’s internal mechanizations,
the Summit will announce statements on education, economic
development and cooperation, energy cooperation, and joint
law enforcement activities.
Logvinov also noted that the
SCO observers have requested that English be adopted as the
third formal language of the organization after Chinese and
Russian.
China’s Future Role in Secretariat Undecided
———————————————
16. (C) According to SCO
procedures, Kazakhstan will be
offered the role of Secretary General at the Summit, Wang
noted. It is unclear whether
China will retain a deputy-
level position within the Secretariat.
Wang said that
member states have still not reached a final decision on
which country will receive the next Regional Anti-Terrorism
Structure (RATS) directorship.
RANDT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 64705
date: 5/19/2006 12:29
refid: 06DUSHANBE920
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0736
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0920/01 1391229
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 191229Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7540
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1636
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1638
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1610
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1613
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1563
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1564
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1549
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1435
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1379
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1589
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1631
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0950
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8794
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000920
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: ELECTIONS
COMMISSION APPEALS FOR INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE
DUSHANBE 00000920 001.2 OF 002
1. Heads of diplomatic missions
convened at the United Nations
Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) for the international
donor community’s monthly meeting on electoral issues May 17.
Mirzoali Boltuyev, Chairman of the Central Commission on
Elections and Referenda (CCER), presented a chart outlining
concrete actions the CCER proposes to take in order to improve
upon the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s
(OSCE) criticism of the 2005 parliamentary elections.
2. Boltuyev made clear to
international donors the government
of Tajikistan would like to hold a transparent election, fully
compliant with Tajik law and international standards. However,
the technical assistance required to bring the election up to
that level means Tajikistan would require international donor
support. The CCER and Center for
Strategic Research (CRS)
together with IFES formed a working group to tackle election
reform. The group took each one
of the OSCE’s criticism
mentioned in their 2005 parliamentary report and suggested
concrete actions to remedy the problem.
The chart, based on the
OSCE report for the 2005 parliamentary elections, is a work in
progress and modifications may be needed because presidential
election procedures are different.
Participants encouraged the
CCER to share the chart with political parties for their input
and buy-in to the process, noting that their involvement would
boost the election’s validity.
3. The chart suggests
wide-ranging changes, not all of which
would require financial assistance.
Some recommended actions
include targeted voter education programs for women and young
adults and preparing reference manuals for local government
officials explaining their legal obligations and restrictions,
designed to reduce local government interference. The chart
also lists amendments to laws clearly defining local officials’
roles and implementing fines if officials overstep their
authorities. Procedural changes
such as securing ballots are
also included in the chart.
Technical assistance, such as
procuring indelible ink and pens, is required. The media will
be invited to key events such as ballot printings to ensure
transparency, and the CCER hopes to receive funding to organize
television debates and issue media spots to publicize election
rules and activities.
4. The Tajik government plans to
host a two-day conference in
July to discuss the constitution and presidential election law,
criteria for permitting observers and assessment missions as
well as how to improve voters’ rights and the CCER’s role in the
election. Parliament will
officially announce the November
presidential election in August.
It is then the CCER will
establish 68 district election committees and 3,000 precinct
committees.
5. NOTE: Patrick Bradley from the United Nations
Elections
Needs Assessment Mission was also present at the meeting.
Foreign Minister Nazarov wrote a letter to the UN’s Secretary
General requesting a Needs Assessment Mission. Unfortunately
Bradley could not share his report to the Secretary General,
because most of it will be confidential and used to determine UN
assistance for the November presidential election. END NOTE.
6. COMMENT: All of this is the result of the work IFES
has
been doing since the beginning of the year with the CCER and the
President’s Strategic Research Center.
It is especially
heartening that Boltuyev has gone public with the international
donor community. We are grateful
for DRL’s extraordinary
election-year grant to accomplish this work. We will work with
IFES to analyze the charts to see what really needs to be
funded, and may propose a demarche to donor capitals. The
international community that cares about democracy has a chance
to help Tajikistan do something right.
When Dushanbe appears
DUSHANBE 00000920 002.2 OF 002
increasingly committed to taking significant steps forward in
the conduct of the November presidential election, we cannot
afford to let them down. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 64856
date: 5/22/2006 7:14
refid: 06DUSHANBE928
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2346
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0928/01 1420714
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220714Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0025
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8809
RHEBAAA/HQ DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1615
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1565
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0023
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1566
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0285
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1551
RUSBC/RRF NEW DELHI
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0608
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY USAID
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000928
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
SCA/CEN; ECA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, SOCI, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: PENJIKENT: ANCIENT CITY,
MODERN PROBLEMS
DUSHANBE 00000928 001.2 OF 002
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR
PUBLIC INTERNET.
1. (U) Penjikent, one of Central Asia’s ancient
cities, faces
many modern problems, all compounded by its double isolation.
Cut off from Dushanbe and its markets to the south by
snow-blocked mountain passes six months of the year, and now
restricted from the markets of neighboring Uzbekistan due to
strained Uzbek-Tajik relations.
With the border just a few
kilometers away, trade should be bustling, but Tajiks have a
hard time getting visas from Uzbekistan.
While Penjikent should
be a vibrant border trade town, this city of 200,000 is forced
to find other ways survive. DCM
and PAO visited Penjikent May
17-20 to dedicate houses built by Shelter for Life for flood
victims, open a Schools Online Internet Learning Center, meet
local civil society leaders, open an Ambassador’s Fund for
Cultural Preservation project (septel), and visit the local gold
mine (septel).
2. (U) Penjikent is a beautiful
city, surrounded by good
farmland, and further out by high mountains. It is not
surprising that a local farmer found an ancient axe handle in
the 1970’s that led to the discovery of an ancient civilization.
Penjikent claims a history of
5,500 years and many of the
artifacts point to Penjikent having a rich culture and trade
with cities now in India, Iran, and many other countries in the
region. The Ambassador’s Fund for
Cultural Preservation is
helping local museum curators protect and document this cultural
heritage, some of which is now on display in the Hermitage
Museum in St. Petersburg.
3. (U) Tourists could travel from
Samarkand and Bukhara, also
ancient Tajik cities now in Uzbekistan, but Tajik-Uzbek
relations are strained and trade and tourism have dropped to a
trickle. To make ends meet, many
men have left their families
and are working in Russia. When
they return, some are HIV/AIDS
positive. One civil society
leader described the mix of
unemployment, families in crisis, and HIV/AIDS as the most
serious challenge facing the region.
4. (U) Penjikent is also prone to
natural disasters. Emboffs
dedicated 120 new homes built with U.S. funding for families
whose homes were washed out last year.
For the villagers, the
homes provide shelter, but the new village, «Sarazm,» is
located
on the plains, not on the mountains, and they’ve had to adapt to
the hotter weather and more austere conditions for their
livestock. The City of Penjikent
also contributed to the
project, along with local businesses.
5. (U) The U.S.-funded Relief
International internet project
highlighted just how much talent there is in the area. The DCM
asked how many students spoke English.
He then selected a
volunteer to translate his remarks.
The student translator did
an excellent job. Although he had
applied three times for an
exchange program in the United States, and although his marks
were «excellent,» he was not selected. Post hopes Tajikistan’s
DUSHANBE 00000928 002.2 OF 002
more remote regions are also given consideration for exchange
programs, although we recognize there is better access to
quality education in Dushanbe and Khojand.
6. (U) Emboffs had breakfast with
the Mayor and his team, and
the Mayor also took part in the internet program, but he was
also hosting the Iranian Ambassador and another local
delegation. Iran’s Anzob Tunnel
project should reduce
Penjikent’s isolation and allow locals access to Dushanbe year
round. Our trip over the pass
included a half hour delay to
repair the dirt road that had washed away overnight during heavy
rains. Tractors were on the scene
and made the repair in good
time, but a first-class paved road is badly needed.
7. (SBU) COMMENT: As elsewhere in Tajikistan, the United
States is seen in a good light in Penjikent. Our cultural,
educational, humanitarian and exchange programs all make a real
difference. And there, as
elsewhere, they are waiting for
American companies to come. We
will put local entrepreneurs in
touch with the Lancaster company, a U.S. dried fruit exporter
opening its Central Asian headquarters in Dushanbe this summer.
We also hope that relations with Uzbekistan improve and give
farmers and businessmen in Penjikent access to Uzbek markets.
Knowledgeable sources in Penjikent worry that Uzbek authorities
were behind a recent attack on a northern Tajik border post, and
that the Uzbeks will find pretexts like the attack to prevent
relations from improving. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 65052
date: 5/23/2006 10:57
refid: 06DUSHANBE944
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4005
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0944 1431057
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231057Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7581
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1647
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1645
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1617
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1383
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1167
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1593
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1635
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0954
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8840
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000944
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ETRD, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK CAPITAL CLAMPS DOWN ON CD PIRACY
1. Tajikistan is building on its
impressive narcotics
interdiction record with a new campaign against CD piracy.
According to Asia, Plus, the tax police, Ministry of Security
and other law enforcement agencies have seized over 90,000 CDs
and DVDs in a month-long operation.
Raids on Dushanbe vendors
have resulted in shutting down 35 pirate operations. Most of
the illegal, unlicensed merchandise is imported into Tajikistan,
probably from Russia, but possibly from China too. News reports
claim that Tajikistan is considering asking for Russian help to
further the investigation.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 65056
date: 5/23/2006 11:14
refid: 06DUSHANBE945
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06STATE81632
header:
VZCZCXRO4028
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0945 1431114
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231114Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7582
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8841
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0008
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1168
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1636
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0955
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000945
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, KPAO, IZ, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: SEEKING
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR IRAQI GOVT FORMATION
TALKING POINTS DELIVERED
REF: STATE 81632
1. DCM delivered talking points
per reftel to Ismatullo
Nasredinov, Head of the Department of European and American
Countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 22. Nasredinov
promised to pass the points on to the MFA’s Asia and Africa desk
and will respond to the Embassy if the desk has any comments.
Nasredinov commented that Tajikistan views the formation of the
Iraqi government positively.
2. The Embassy has also issued a
press release noting the
successful formation of the Iraqi government.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 65215
date: 5/24/2006 8:41
refid: 06DUSHANBE949
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5414
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0949 1440841
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240841Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7589
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8848
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1169
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000949
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR IO, SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/24/2016
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, UN, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: UNTOP
MANDATE NEEDS IMMEDIATE RENEWAL ACTION
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) UN Secretary General’s
Special Representative Ambassador
Vladimir Sotirov (please protect throughout) of the United
Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building (UNTOP) asked to see
the Ambassador urgently on May 24.
2. (SBU) In mid-May every year,
the UN Security Council extends
the UNTOP mandate based on the Secretary-General’s
recommendation to the President of the Security Council. The
current UNTOP mandate will expire on May 31, but no action has
been taken so far.
3. (C) Ambassador Sotirov
suggested it would be most useful for
the USUN mission to ask the President of the Security Council to
move quickly on this issue.
4. (SBU) The Ambassador fully
concurs. UNTOP, highly
professional and an honest political broker, is essential in
Tajikistan. UNTOP is active in
building national mechanisms for
conflict prevention, strengthening rule of law, promoting human
and civil rights, and — most important — establishing national
dialogue during election periods.
Tajikistan’s next
presidential election will be in November.
5. (C) UNTOP just received a
two-year $883,000 grant from
Sweden’s CIDA for democracy, human rights, and mass media. All
proposed projects fit hand-in-glove with U.S. transformational
diplomacy goals and objectives.
4. (C) Embassy Dushanbe asks that
USUN consider pressing for
immediate action to extend UNTOP’s annual mandate.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 65425
date: 5/25/2006 11:02
refid: 06DUSHANBE977
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7346
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0977/01 1451102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251102Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7620
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1650
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1646
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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1441
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1384
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1170
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1594
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1637
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0956
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8880
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000977
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EAGR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: LAND DEBT
RESOLUTION SLOW GOING: MORE DONOR
ASSISTANCE, LESS CONFLICT OF INTEREST NEEDED
DUSHANBE 00000977 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:
Tajikistan’s impoverished farmers owe over
$292 million in land and cotton debt.
The government,
international financial institutions and NGOs have long
recognized the problem and that solving it takes political will.
Conflicting interests in the
government have slowed reform, and
international donors need to cooperate more closely to make
progress. The extent of the
problem and gaps in current
solution plans mean there is room for the United States to play
a larger role in land reform.
Land reform, which includes
reducing land debt and empowering farmers, could significantly
reduce poverty in Tajikistan.
END SUMMARY.
THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION’S FINDINGS
2. (U) During a Farm Debt Resolution Conference May
13,
Tajikistan’s Independent Commission Working Group on farm and
cotton debt reported farmers’ debts are increasing. Total debts
amount to over $292 million. The
government established the
commission, led by Matlubkhon Davlatov the State Economic
Advisor to the President, to resolve Tajikistan’s massive land
debt problem. Tthe Commission includes international financial
institutions and donors.
Commission representatives reminded
the audience the government is not to blame, but is taking
action to resolve the problem, namely caused by unscrupulous
investors, commonly referred to as «futures companies.»
Investors typically write a «futures contract» with the
farmers
for a minimum quantity of cotton calculated to repay the value
of inputs provided. Investors
supply farmers with in-kind
technical equipment including seeds and fertilizers at higher
than market prices, and typically charge 30% interest until the
cotton is sold 15 months later.
Investors are responsible for
marketing the cotton and return any surplus funds (usually none)
to the farmer.
3. (U) According to the commission, 85% of cotton
farms are
not profitable. However, the government will attempt to
resuscitate farms because it believes cotton is an attractive
commodity on the world market.
Cotton is the largest
agricultural export in Tajikistan and its second largest export
overall. Cotton is sent by rail
from Tajikistan to Baltic
seaports, another inefficiency considering the closer markets of
Pakistan, India and China.
4. (U) A baseline study of farm debt ordered by the
independent commission shows, among farmers surveyed, the
average cotton farmer’s salary is 129 somoni per month
(approximately $40) for the entire family. Some families only
earn 73 somoni per month (approximately $23). Farmers explained
the most serious economic problems they face are lack of funds,
debt accrued, lack of farm machinery and equipment, delayed
procurement of resources, and lack of water.
5. (SBU) The majority of farms report receiving
instructions
from the local government on which cotton ginnery to use and how
much cotton they must produce.
Investors work closely with the
local government and sometimes instruct the local government how
to manage the farms. In most
cases, the investors also own the
gins, so farmers are instructed to use the companies’ partner
gins.
6. (SBU) The government collects up to 30% of its
state
revenues from taxes in the cotton sector. The commission called
on international assistance to relieve the debt. One reason the
investors and local government have control over the farmer is
that each district has a tax quota it must deliver to the
central government. Therefore,
local governments want farmers
to use gins within the district to collect taxes and meet their
quota. Local government officials
have been known to destroy
farms that refuse to obey orders.
DUSHANBE 00000977 002.2 OF 004
7. (U) The study also reports 76% of farmers believe
they
would be unable independently to sell their cotton harvest
themselves without investors.
These figures show the need for
low-interest loans and to provide technical assistance to
farmers to create business plans and skills to negotiate and do
business with investors to bring their products to the market.
On average, 59% of farmers have never heard of the independent
commission established to resolve the land debt crisis. In some
districts, no farmers have heard of the commission. Farmers are
uneducated and unaware of the comprehensive cotton business in
Tajikistan.
NEXT STEPS FOR DONORS
8. (U) USAID Country Director and PolOff have
attended a
series of international donor meetings led by the Asian
Development Bank outlining next steps for the donor community.
Meeting participants, including the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the International Financial
Corporation, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and other diplomatic missions, support a unified
approach towards the government in order to implement change.
Prior to the independent commission’s May 13 presentation, ADB
advisor Hans Woldring sent Davlatov a memorandum outlining areas
where progress has been made towards farm debt resolution, and
areas where additional donor assistance is needed.
9. (U) LAND USE CERTIFICATES: Currently, the government owns
all land in Tajikistan. Some
donors, including the World Bank
and USAID, have been working with farmers to issue each farmer a
land-use certificate, which in the future would, it is hoped,
serve essentially as lease certificates showing the farmer has
irrevocable rights from the government to use the land. Donors
also hope farmers will have the ability to pledge these land-use
certificates as lending collateral for new loans and for the
certificates to be tradable, thereby creating a land-use rights
market. Local banks currently
charge interest at upwards of 36%
to farmers and only for a two to three month period for cash
flow purposes. Often banks
require collateral, which farmers
are not able to provide. Land-use
certificates as collateral
would allow farmers to take out loans from the banks. The
government does not want to privatize land, and donors should
make the government aware that allowing for tradable land-use
certificates does not require land privatization.
10. (SBU) NEW LAND REGISTRATION LEGISLATION: One of the first
tasks for the donor community is to approach the Tajik
government to suggest redrafting land registration legislation.
A draft law may go to parliament in June, allowing the Ministry
of Justice (MOJ) to register buildings and other improvements on
land. The State Land Committee
currently registers all land and
will continue to do so. Having two agencies register land
parcels and buildings separately with no links between the two
databases would be expensive, inefficient, and non-transparent.
It would also make the property and potential land market more
difficult to manage. Bill Kennedy
of ARD/Checchi (USAID) is
advising the Tajik government on creating a system to register
immovable property and opposes giving the Ministry of Justice
registration authority. In his
opinion, the entire law needs
to be redrafted. The Ministry of
Justice does not have proper
expertise or resources to start a registration system.
(COMMENT: Some donors fear MOJ
officials may personally benefit
from the registration system, or use the mechanism as a
political tool. END COMMENT.)
11. (U) A unified registration system, either under
one agency
or through a common database, would mean a unified tax
collection system that would be cheaper and more efficient,
DUSHANBE 00000977 003.2 OF 004
thereby allowing the government higher
tax revenues. Also, a
single land registry database would consolidate information,
allowing for easier access to more consistent information. It
would limit the opportunities for corruption and reduce the
number of property disputes.
Overall, it would improve the
security of land tenure, giving private parties the confidence
to invest and further raise the government tax base and
facilitate&nbs
