Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 249110
date: 2/17/2010 8:06
refid: 10DUSHANBE176
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE1443|10DUSHANBE103|10DUSHANBE171|10DUSHANBE52|10DUSHANBE67
header:
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PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0176/01 0480806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1259
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0453
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0167
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0256
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0188
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2711
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000176
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR JEFF BAKER, DAVID WRIGHT
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ETRD, PHUM, IMF, TI
SUBJECT: IMF TAKES STAND ON ROGHUN; SOME SAY NOT STRONG ENOUGH
REF: A. 09 DUSHANBE 1443
B. DUSHANBE 52
C. DUSHANBE 67
D. DUSHANBE 103
E. DUSHANBE 171
DUSHANBE 00000176 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Summary: An IMF team
recently completed a two-week
visit to Dushanbe to assess economic and government performance
before releasing further funding under its Extended Credit
Facility (ECF). A central issue
was the government’s campaign
to fund the Roghun hydroelectric dam.
The IMF outlined three
main concerns about Roghun: (1) there is no clear plan in place
to manage and use the funds it has raised — over $160 million
so far. (2) The funds are raised
in somoni, but the bulk of the
spending on Roghun will have to be in foreign exchange. (3) The
Roghun campaign is causing a modest but real increase in poverty
and decline in economic growth.
IMF team leader Axel
Schimmelpfennig acknowledged concerns that the government
continues to force its citizens to contribute to Roghun. He
said it was not the IMF’s role to question Roghun on human
rights grounds, but he urged the government to halt on economic
grounds: Tajikistan already has
raised more somoni than it
needs; the government must now turn its attention to raising
foreign exchange. Schimmelpfennig
told the government frankly
that the campaign was burning political capital with donors, all
to raise money it could not use in the short term. He
encouraged donors to press their concerns about Roghun with the
government directly. Apart from
Roghun, Tajikistan’s economic
performance had been better than expected given the financial
crisis. The IMF team will bring a
recommendation about future
assistance to the PRGF to the full IMF Board within the next few
months. End summary.
2. (SBU) On February 12, representatives from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) briefed donors on the tentative conclusions
of its two-week assessment mission to Tajikistan. The mission’s
specific task was to measure the government’s progress on the
2009 benchmarks set in the Extended Growth Facility (ECF)
(previously the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility). Deputy
Division Chief Axel Schimmelpfennig, who led the mission,
acknowledged that donors had serious and wide-ranging concerns
about the government’s campaign to raise funds for the Roghun
hydroelectric dam — including extortion, the anticipated
increase in poverty, and the lack of transparency in accounting
for the funds (see refs A through C).
He said, however, that
the IMF had to consider Roghun within IMF’s mandate — i.e., by
examining its effects on macroeconomic stability, fiscal
operations, and poverty. From
this narrower perspective, he
identified several concerns.
IMF PUSHES FOR BETTER MANAGEMENT OF ROGHUN FUNDS
3. (SBU) Schimmelpfennig said the government did not appear to
have a clear plan in place to manage and use the funds raised.
The government has a «pretty good idea» of the total costs of
Roghun, but did not present the IMF with a realistic timeline.
The government was officially maintaining that the dam would be
built by 2012, but no one with any knowledge about the project
believed it would be completed before 2014. The IMF was using
the later date for its calculations.
Another concern was the
management of the funds raised so far.
The government has
committed to releasing details of the fundraising campaign every
ten days. According to the
February 11 update, available on the
Ministry of Finance website (www.minfin.tj), the government has
sold 706,002,413 somoni ($162 million) in shares in Roghun.
(Note: Since shares are sold in 100 somoni increments it is not
clear why the total is not a round number. End note.)
The
money was held in eight banks and the treasury at the Ministry
of Finance. Schimmelpfennig said
the government had agreed to
have an external audit of the Roghun joint stock company for
2008 and 2009. While the audit
would not reveal anything about
the current fundraising campaign, which began in early January
2010, it was important to provide a baseline for future
accounting.
GOVERNMENT RAISES SOMONI BUT MUST SPEND DOLLARS
4. (SBU) The IMF’s second major concern about Roghun was the
«foreign exchange gap.»
The government was raising funds in
somoni, but the bulk of the expenditures for construction
materials will have to be made in foreign currencies.
Schimmelpfennig said the government had acknowledged its import
needs for Roghun lay between $500 million and $800 million (he
said it was not clear whether this was for the first phase alone
or the entire project). Using
somoni to buy large amounts of
DUSHANBE 00000176 002.2 OF 004
dollars could have profound macroeconomic consequences,
including a plunge in the exchange rate and a skewed balance of
trade.
EFFECTS OF ROGHUN CAMPAIGN ON POVERTY
5. (SBU) Under the ECF (formerly PRGF), the government of
Tajikistan has undertaken to maintain certain social sector
spending minimums. Donors
expressed concern that the
government’s policy of forcing doctors, teachers, and other
social sector employees to buy shares in Roghun effectively
undercut these spending floors.
Schimmelpfennig acknowledged
the concern, but said it has been difficult to determine the
effects of the Roghun campaign on poverty in Tajikistan. He
said the World Bank was working on a report on the social impact
of Roghun, while the IMF focused on the macroeconomic issues.
According to very preliminary calculations, the World Bank
estimated the Roghun campaign would increase poverty between
0.5% and 6.0%, probably closer to the lower figure. There were
two reasons for the relatively modest effect on poverty. First,
if one considered the Roghun payments to be a sort of ad hoc
tax, it appeared relatively progressive.
According to
discussions with government officials and anecdotal information,
it seemed the majority of shares have been sold to the better
off. Second, the Roghun campaign
was a «one-off effect,» that
should not have a lasting impact on poverty.
6. (SBU) Donors disputed both claims.
Numerous attendees
related how even the very poorest segment of the population had
been forced to contribute.
Schimmelpfennig appeared to
backtrack somewhat, saying it was true that although the overall
share of money collected from the poor was small, the campaign’s
«marginal effect» on poverty could be significant among this
population. He noted that the
poverty line in Tajikistan is
calculated at 86 somoni ($20) per capita per month, but the
minimum share purchase is pegged at 100 somoni. There were
reports that many Tajiks who cannot afford even the minimum 100
somoni payment have been «encouraged» to pool their resources
to
purchase shares. This raised an
additional problem, however,
since the share will be issued in only one person’s name, so the
others will have no equity. (Comment:
This assumes the shares
have any value at all — a concern the IMF acknowledged but did
not elaborate on. End comment.)
7. (SBU) Donors questioned whether the Roghun campaign would
truly be a «one-off» event.
Certainly the official rhetoric has
suggested a more permanent campaign.
Further, the very success
of the campaign — the IMF said they never would have expected
the government to be able to raise $160 million in this way —
might tempt the government to employ the same tactics for future
fundraising. Schimmelpfennig said
the IMF could not base its
analysis on hypothetical events, but encouraged the
international community to be vigilant and forceful with the
government to prevent future occurrences. He said the IMF
estimated that the Roghun campaign could slow GDP growth by «up
to 1%» in 2010.
ROGHUN COMPLETION DATE: 2012 or 12TH OF NEVER?
8. (SBU) World Bank Country Representative Chiara Bronchi
reinforced the IMF’s assessment that the government was raising
funds it could not use. She said
the Roghun project did not
have the capacity to absorb more than $40 or $50 million a year.
The only way the government could
spend more money would be to
bring supplies in by plane, a scenario she did not think
possible. If true, and assuming
stable exchange rates (an
unlikely assumption), the government had already raised enough
money to fund Roghun through 2014.
Bronchi agreed with the IMF
that the government’s timeline for completing the first phase of
Roghun by 2012 was untenable.
Builders still had not repaired
the damage to Roghun’s massive tunnels from severe landslides in
1993. (Roghun was begun in 1976
by the Soviets, but the project
was mothballed during the Tajik Civil War in the 1990s.)
Despite official announcements that builders had fully excavated
the collapsed tunnels late last year, Bronchi said it would be
at least another twelve months before this work was done. The
World Bank was underwriting two studies on the Roghun project,
an environmental and social impact assessment and a technical
feasibility study. Bronchi said
the long-delayed studies will
likely not be completed for another year.
IMF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
9. (SBU) In his conversations with government officials,
DUSHANBE 00000176 003.2 OF 004
Schimmelpfennig said he urged them to declare victory, cease the
Roghun fundraising campaign, establish a strong and transparent
governance framework for the Roghun funds, and work with the
Fund to secure further financing from an international
consortium that could raise forex.
Schimmelpfennig said this
was the IMF’s best path for convincing the government to stop
the forced contributions. He
lightly scolded donors for hoping
the IMF would do their dirty work by criticizing the government
on issues that lay outside of its mandate. He said donors must
take a firm and clear stand with the government about their
Roghun concerns. He said he
warned officials that the campaign
was unnecessarily burning political capital with the
international community. He
acknowledged, however, that the
message was so far falling on deaf ears: the very day he
delivered it to President Rahmon, the President issued a renewed
appeal to the population for Roghun funds.
10. (SBU) The IMF urged the government to establish a mechanism
to redeem shares issued in 1994 for the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric
plant, completed just last year with Russian financing. For
many Tajiks, the current Roghun campaign is a more aggressive
replay of the Sangtuda scheme.
Many who were prevailed upon to
buy the Sangtuda shares had long ago given up hope of redeeming
them. Schimmelpfennig asked
donors to underscore this issue as
well. It would be an important
demonstration of principle for
the government.
GOVERNMENT HAS MET MOST IMF OBLIGATIONS…
11. (SBU) Schimmelpfennig said Tajikistan’s overall
macroeconomic performance in 2009 had been satisfactory. (Since
Roghun share sales began on January 6, 2010, the fundraising
campaign had minimal impact on the 2009 IMF benchmarks.)
Tajikistan has weathered the global financial crisis better than
expected. GDP grew 3.4%, driven
by non-cotton agriculture,
which expanded as a result of reforms in the sector. The
depreciation of somoni (from about 3.3 to 4.3 to the dollar)
contributed, encouraging expenditure on domestic products
instead of more expensive imports.
According to preliminary
data, Tajikistan met all of its quantitative targets under the
ECF. Minimum social sector
expenditures were met for 2009, and
the government agreed to increase social spending by 1% of GDP
in 2010. Structural reforms have
been slower than anticipated,
but not enough to cause concern.
Annual audits of the National
Bank for fiscal years ending April 2008 and April 2009 have been
delayed, but are finally moving forward.
These audits must be
completed before further funding can be released under the ECF.
…BUT STILL NO AUDITS
12. (SBU) Audits of Barqi Tojik and the state-owned Talco
aluminum company have been mostly completed, but have not yet
been released to the public.
These are not formal requirements
under the ECF, but the IMF has nevertheless been pressing the
government for their release. The
Barqi Tojik audit, which was
supposed to have been published on the company’s website by
December, has reportedly been delayed because some financial
figures must be recalculated. The
fieldwork for the Talco audit
has been completed. In addition,
the government has agreed to
an audit of Talco Management, the offshore entity based in the
British Virgin Islands that controls the real profits from
Talco, to be tendered by the end of June. The audit would cover
2008 and 2009.
DONORS DISMAYED BY IMF REACTION
13. (SBU) At the briefing and afterward, a number of donors
expressed their dissatisfaction with an IMF approach they
considered too weak. Some were
particularly upset by a
subsequent press release from the IMF praising government
reforms while making scant mention of Roghun’s negatives, noting
merely that it «…may temporarily dampen growth in 2010 by up
to one percentage point, with households reducing consumption
and corporates investment in order to purchase Roghun shares.»
At the same time, the IMF tacitly endorsed Roghun itself by
calling it «…an important element of the government’s energy
strategy.» Donors noted as
well that the IMF was actually
proposing to increase the ECF from its original $116 million to
$156 million, «in line with the new norms for similar
countries.» Summing up the
feelings of several donors, the head
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation questioned
the rationale for continuing to provide multi-million dollars of
assistance to Tajikistan when the government has shown it is
capable of raising that money on its own — and, worse, taking
DUSHANBE 00000176 004.2 OF 004
for granted that foreign donors will step in to alleviate the
social sector problems that the government is exacerbating.
NEXT STEPS
14. (SBU) The IMF team will present its findings to management
in Washington, which will try to work out a package for delivery
of the next tranche of $42 million under the ECF. If things go
smoothly, management should take a request for approval to the
IMF Executive Board by the end of April.
If the Board has not
approved the funding by the end of June, the ECF is officially
considered off-track.
COMMENT: WHEN TO SAY WHEN?
15. (SBU) Donor frustrations with the IMF are understandable: As
an IMF insider recently said, the Fund’s natural priority is to
try to remain engaged where it is working. On the other hand,
Schimmelpfennig was right to be exasperated with those who
expected the IMF to carry all of their water on Roghun. Our
approach has been, and should continue to be, to pursue this
issue along two fronts: by
putting pressure on lending
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to carefully
review their programs, but also by raising our concerns that
fall outside of these institutions’ purview directly with the
government (ref D). On the first
front, we and several other
donors are asking our representatives on the IMF Executive Board
to think carefully before approving additional funding under the
so-called «Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility» for a
government whose policies are in fact increasing poverty and
reducing growth. On the second,
we are coordinating with other
donors to address the broader concerns of coercion and damage to
the investment climate (ref E).
Should these concerns fall on
deaf ears, we may wish to review some bilateral programs. End
Comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 249349
date: 2/18/2010 12:27
refid: 10DUSHANBE203
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 10DUSHANBE112|10DUSHANBE165|10DUSHANBE27
header:
VZCZCXRO6660
PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0203/01 0491227
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 181227Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1278
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2762
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0457
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000203
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK ELECTIONS: IT’S BEGINNING TO LOOK A LOT LIKE 2005
REF: A) DUSHANBE 165 B) DUSHANBE 27 C) DUSHANBE 112
DUSHANBE 00000203 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The week before
parliamentary elections,
opposition party leaders reported an uptick in government
harassment of their activities and a concurrent increase in
local officials’ support for People’s Democratic Party of
Tajikistan (PDPT) candidates.
Security officials briefly
detained and threatened several Islamic Revival Party of
Tajikistan (IRPT) members who distributed party leaflets in
Dushanbe and Kulob. IRPT leaders
warned that the environment
before the February 28 elections has become increasingly similar
to that of 2005 when the ruling party won in a fraud-ridden
landslide. Howver, they have
erected several IRPT billboards in
the capital. Freedom for
opposition parties to campaign has
varied district to district.
President Rahmon’s son, Rustam, is
running for a seat on the Dushanbe city council, which could be
the latest step in «Operation Successor». END SUMMARY
IRPT: INCREASED PARTY ACTIVITY,
INCREASED PRESSURE
2. (SBU) On February 17, large, color posters of IRPT candidates
draped IRPT headquarters as about 15 party workers manned
phones, pored over reports from IRPT affiliates, and prepared
bundles of slick campaign literature for distribution. IRPT
organizers were confident that their party organization and
dedicated support base will deliver votes on election day, but
warned that government officials have put increasing pressure on
IRPT members and candidates as the February 28 parliamentary
elections approach. «The
closer we get to elections, the more
it feels like 2005,» according to Deputy Chairman Wohidkhoni
Qossidin.
3. (SBU) Qossidin reported that police detained three groups of
party activists who campaigned door to door for the IRPT.
Police arrested two women in Dushanbe’s Sino District, held them
for three hours, and interrogated them about their activities.
IRPT leadership intervened by contacting government officials,
and the members were released.
The IRPT filed a lawsuit against
the police officer. In Dushanbe’s
Shokmansur District, police
detained two party activists for two hours. In Kulob, local
officials held an IRPT candidate and several of his supporters
for five hours. The police asked
the party members why they
were supporting «mujahedeen who killed our people in the
1990s»,
according to Qossidin.
4. (SBU) Though election officials registered all IRPT
candidates seeking to run for the lower house of the national
parliament, the Majlisi Namoyandagon, IRPT leaders said local
officials refused to register dozens of IRPT members who filed
to run in provincial and city council races. In one case, the
IRPT claims that two men appeared at the home of an IRPT
candidate for the Sughd provincial parliament and threatened him
to withdraw from the election.
According to Qossidin, the men
coerced the IRPT member to sign a statement withdrawing his
candidacy, which they subsequently submitted to the local
election commission on his behalf.
The IRPT has officially
filed its complaints with the Central Commission on Elections
and Referenda (CCER), but has not yet received a response.
5. (SBU) The IRPT has participated in public events organized by
local officials for candidates to meet voters (Reftel A), but
party leaders complained that local officials often invited only
PDPT candidates to these public events (intended for all
candidates) or informed IRPT candidates of the event only
minutes before they took place.
IRPT has organized its own
campaign meetings separately from the state-organized public
events. Qossidin said that until
February 16, local officials
did not permit the party to post any election banners in
Dushanbe.
6. (SBU) In the Sughd’s Isfara district, where U.S. Embassy
employee Muhibulloh Qurbon is running for the Majlisi
Namoyandagon as an IRPT candidate, police tore down IRPT banners
and allegedly spread information that Qurbon is both an Islamist
and an «American spy».
According to Qurbon, local officials
escorted the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(PDPT) candidate to campaign events and provided him
administrative support. He
reported that local schoolchildren,
doctors, and nurses were deployed to go house-to-house to
campaign for the PDPT candidate and advise residents how to
DUSHANBE 00000203 002.2 OF 003
properly vote for the PDPT on a ballot.
An independent MP
running for re-election in Sughd’s Konibodom District had a
similar account of government employees directed to support the
PDPT candidate, currently the Prosecutor of Kulob.
7. (SBU) IRPT leaders said that party supporters will continue
to organize campaign events and go door-to-door to drum up
votes. They hoped that local
officials would honor President
Rahmon’s pledge to conduct free and fair elections, but
speculated that many of the precinct election commissions
already received instructions for their election night vote
counts. An IRPT activist worried
that «if the public loses
faith in elections, it gives an opportunity for extremists to
say that the process is not working.
It will cause us to lose
people to radical elements.»
8. (SBU) Dushanbe officials permitted the IRPT to erect campaign
billboards in Dushanbe on February 16.
The party placed several
large, color billboards on major city roads, which remained in
place on February 18. The IRPT
posted smaller party fliers
featuring Majlisi Namoyandagon candidates throughout the city.
Embassy contacts report that election conditions in some
districts outside of Dushanbe, including former opposition
stronghold Rasht, have improved since 2005. A contact in Hissor
district said that local officials organized an election event
in which all candidates were provided equal time to address area
voters.
SDPT: PARTY OF LAWYERS COMPLAINS OF ELECTION VIOLATIONS
9. (SBU) Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) leaders
met Emboff in the cramped apartment the SDPT uses as its
headquarters and provided a list of alleged violations by local
officials of Tajik election law.
An exasperated SDPT Deputy
Jillovat Jurayev and political adviser Shonusayriev Shodavlat
charged that government officials routinely excluded SDPT
members from public election events and cancelled several events
where SDPT members were present.
Following a public election
event at the National Medical Center in Dushanbe at which a SDPT
candidate participated, the head doctor ordered hospital
employees to vote for PDPT candidates, according to the SDPT.
10. (SBU) SDPT leaders reported that Tajik National University
administrators directed students living in Dushanbe’s Sino and
Somoni districts to vote for PDPT candidates. In both
districts, the PDPT faces strong challengers. The SDPT also
alleged that officials at the Ministry of Justice and Prosecutor
General’s office ordered employees to campaign for PDPT
candidates. A SDPT candidate
running in the Gorno Badakhshon
Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) reported that the governor of GBAO
provided the PDPT candidate with a government car and escorted
him to campaign events.
PDPT USES RAHMON’S IMAGE; RAHMON’S SON RUNS FOR CITY COUNCIL
11. (SBU) The President’s 22-year old son, Rustam Emomali, threw
his hat in the ring for the Dushanbe city council. His
candidacy follows his December appointment to the PDPT’s Central
Committee. He already holds two
posts: Deputy Head of the
Youth Association of Tajikistan and Chief of the Department to
Support Medium and Small Enterprises in the State Committee on
Property and Investments(Reftel B).
Though an article on
centrasia.ru called the candidacy the «beginning of operation
successor», state media has been largely mute, with only one
pro-government news service reporting on Rustam’s campaign.
Rustam is three years too young to run for the Majlisi
Namoyandagon, and it is widely speculated that he will run for
national parliament in 2015.
12. (SBU) Large billboards
bearing the President’s image and
PDPT slogans have been posted throughout Dushanbe, along with
banners draped over the city’s major roads. On one billboard,
Rahmon stands in a field of flowers next to the caption, «The
People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan works to make life good
DUSHANBE 00000203 003.2 OF 003
and democratic for every Tajik.»
(NOTE: PDPT leaders argue that
Rahmon’s campaign endorsement is in his capacity as PDPT
Chairman, not as the President.
END NOTE)
ODIHR AND U.S. EMBASSY GEAR UP TO DEPLOY MONITORS
13. (SBU) ODIHR will issue a second interim report on elections
that will criticize the composition of district election
commissions, which include mostly PDPT supporters. ODIHR Deputy
Head of Mission Claudia Vollmer said Long Term Observers (LTOs)
have «credible evidence of police interference in campaigns».
LTOs have also heard reports that government officials have
pressured citizens to vote for the PDPT, but ODIHR does not yet
have enough evidence to include the allegation in its report.
ODIHR has received OSCE Member commitments for 150 Short Term
Monitors (STOs) and will deploy an additional 50 OSCE
Parliamentary observers. ODIHR
expects to thoroughly cover all
parts of Tajikistan, except Penjikent district and GBAO.
14. (SBU) The CCER promptly issued observer accreditation for
American and local U.S. Embassy employees. The Embassy is
organizing deployment of 32 observers to 8 electoral districts.
CCER officials promised that Embassy observers will have full
access to precinct polling stations and district polling
commissions and provided the Embassy with copies of Tajik
election law for its observation teams.
15. (SBU) COMMENT: Though the
Embassy could not confirm most of
the IRPT and SDPT’s allegations, they fit a pattern of local
officials micro-managing public life and pressuring state
employees to perform actions unrelated to their duties.
Qurbon’s claim that school children and doctors were deployed to
campaign for the PDPT is not surprising; when the government
needed money for Roghun, state employees and students were the
first to get muscled (Sughd officials also deployed doctors to
the 2009 cotton harvest). The
arrest of the IRPT activists is
troubling, but the government has not launched a war on the
opposition parties. The IRPT is
conductinga limited campaign,
despite cases of interference by local officials.
16. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED: The
government is keen to make the
elections look good and officials, from the President on down,
are reading from the same talking points: the election will be
free, fair, and better than in 2005.
On election day, this
could turn out to be true and the CCER has accommodated all of
the Embassy and ODIHR’s requests to accredit observers, although
they broke their promise to the Ambassador to register local,
non-partisan observers (Reftels A, C).
It is the hope of local
officials that, by supporting PDPT candidates and quietly
reducing opposition parties’ opportunity to campaign, they can
line up votes for the PDPT to have a «clean» win on election
day, and secure their own jobs too.
If, however, local
officials engage in widespread vote-rigging, as happened in
2005, the government may find that a well-organized IRPT will
not be content to quietly accept another flawed outcome. END
COMMENT
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 249605
date: 2/19/2010 12:06
refid: 10DUSHANBE207
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 10STATE12531
header:
VZCZCXRO7710
PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0207/01 0501206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1282
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0460
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2770
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000207
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/GWI
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, ECON, TI, KWMN, PREL, KPAO
SUBJECT: S/GWI PROJECT PROPOSALS FROM DUSHANBE
REF: A) STATE 12531
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1. (U) Summary: Post nominates four projects, in order of
priority, to be considered for funding under the Women’s Issues
Small Grant Initiative. From
highest to lowest priority are the
following projects: Tradecraft Training for Girls (NGO New
Generation); Guaranteeing Women’s Land Rights (NGO Bonu);
Women’s Property Rights and Access to Justice (League of Women
Lawyers); and Women’s Issues Television Series (TV Station
Jahonoro). A brief summary of
each project follows below. Full
proposals and detailed budgets are available upon request.
2. (U) TRADECRAFT TRAINING FOR GIRLS — NGO NEW GENERATION: NGO
New Generation was founded in 2001 and serves the people of the
Sughd Province in northern Tajikistan.
NGO New Generation
focuses on educational and vocational training programs that are
predominantly geared toward women and girls.
3. (U) One of the biggest challenges faced by young women in
Tajikistan is the lack of access to formal education, including
vocational training, because less value is placed on women’s
education. Tajik girls are often
pulled out of school after the
ninth grade because many families believe that there is no point
in educating girls any further.
The drop-out rate for rural
girls is twice that of rural boys, and in the cities three times
as many girls drop out of school.
With the fast-growing trend
of men leaving Tajikistan as labor migrants-at any given time,
more than one million of Tajikistan’s 6.5 million citizens must
work abroad because of a lack of employment opportunities in
Tajikistan-even married women are often left alone in Tajikistan
for years with no means of support if the remittances dry up.
But a chance at an educational and vocational program can change
the situation of Tajik women for the better. Education is one
of the most important factors helping girls and women survive
and improve their lives. It helps
women maintain more control
over their lives and gives them the skills required to
contribute to society and their families. Education gives women
an opportunity to make independent decisions and improve the
life of their families; therefore, NGO New Generation proposes
the expansion of an already-successful project which offers
comprehensive vocational training on such topics as computer
literacy, sewing, and baking, as well as training on such issues
as business development, women’s rights, conflict management and
tolerance, family planning, hygiene, and sanitation to young
women in northern Tajikistan who are unable to attend school.
The program also works to change the pessimistic attitude about
girls’ education held by teachers and parents alike. NGO New
Generation’s program has already changed the lives of more than
300 girls with little other recourse to education or vocational
training, and more than 1,000 girls in the region have since
approached the NGO with the desire to participate in the program.
4. (U) NGO New Generation proposes a program that will involve
conducting training courses for girls; expanding the current
curriculum, which is predominantly vocational, to include
classes in Russian, English, and Arabic; conducting seminars
with girls’ parents to alter their traditional belief that
girls’ education is not necessary; subsidizing school fees to
encourage girls from poor families to return to school;
organizing educational training for the mothers of the
participants; working with teachers to eliminate the gender
discrimination that causes so many girls to give up on getting a
formal education; and providing social support to women and
girls through collaboration with community councils. The total
requested amount is $93,270.
5. (U) GUARANTEEING WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS — NGO BONU: NGO Bonu
was founded in 2000 and serves the people of the Sughd Province
of northern Tajikistan. Its
mission is to improve the status of
Tajik women from all walks of life through education and
training programs, environmental protection, promotion of the
rights of mothers and children, and through humanitarian
assistance.
6. (U) The majority of the population of Sughd Province is
completely reliant upon agriculture and livestock production for
food and income, yet far too few people have access to resources
such as land, capital, and agriculture inputs. Lack of access
to resources mainly affects the wives of absentee migrant
laborers and the disabled. In
many cases, these women are
working on newly established dehkan (collective) farms and they
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receive miserable salaries for the hard work they do.
Decentralization of land ownership is one of the main components
of the process of reforms in the agricultural sector. Complex
land registration procedures, coupled with widespread ignorance
about land rights, have increased the inequality, especially for
female-headed households.
7. (U) NGO Bonu proposes a plan that is four-fold and involves a
number of activities geared toward improving the production and
sustainability of female-led dehkan farms, increasing women’s
empowerment, and ensuring food security:
Six female-led dehkan
farms will be established, involving a total of 60 women;
training on land rights will be provided; women’s
entrepreneurship, particularly in the area of grain and
vegetable production, will be promoted; and the information and
training offered by NGO Bonu will be taught to women from other
villages by the 60 participants.
The intended outcome of this
project is that six dehkan farms will be established; the
vegetable production and household income of 60 female farmers
will increase by at least 30%; 60 women will learn about
property rights, land reform, agricultural diversification,
entrepreneurship, and new agricultural techniques; and, through
cooperation with and outreach to other villages in Sughd, there
will be a significant multiplier effect as the 60 original
participants share what they learned with other female dehkan
farmers in the region. The
farmers will collaborate with local
agricultural specialists, community-based organizations, and
other dehkan farm associations and stakeholders in the district
in order to gradually improve their financial resources and
ensure eventual independence. The
total requested amount is
$98,111.
8. (U) WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE — LEAGUE
OF WOMEN LAWYERS: The League of Women Lawyers of Tajikistan was
established as an NGO in 1999.
The basic aim of the League is
establishing an independent, democratic state by way of
coordination and implementation of programs and projects
directed towards social development, equal access to
opportunities for men and women alike, reduction of violence,
and provision of legal assistance to vulnerable people and
at-risk groups in the Republic of Tajikistan.
9. (U) Gender-based violence is a global problem that has no
borders and is not unique to any one social group or economic
stratum, and its consequences concern the whole of society.
Unfortunately, the fight against violence against women and the
development of gender equality in Tajikistan are both recent
concepts in Tajikistan. Despite
the government’s efforts and
adoption of a number of laws pertaining to gender equality,
there is still a lack of enforcement.
In addition, public
awareness pertaining to human rights protection is very low, and
there is no guarantee of equal access to justice for women
because of long-held traditional gender stereotypes and
patriarchal views. In rural
areas, girls have no opportunity to
finish secondary school; because of widespread illegal
polygamous marriage customs, young girls enter into marriages
without formal registration.
Therefore they do not possess any
housing, property, or inheritance rights.
10. (U) The League proposes a project with the objective of
recognition of gender-based violence as a social problem and a
violation of human rights. The
project will support the
activities of law enforcement, government bodies, and NGOs
involved in the drafting of legislation aimed at the prevention
of gender-based and domestic violence.
The main activities of
the project are: Encouraging a more effective response from
judicial and law enforcement bodies in gender-based violence
cases through informational seminars conducted by the heads of
the local councils, local government authorities, and religious
leaders; staging a public-awareness campaign, using brochures,
TV shows, and radio programs, to break down stereotypes and to
promote the idea of equal access to justice for all; and
providing assistance to the victims of gender-based violence
through the establishment of five legal centers in rural parts
of Tajikistan. In order to ensure
access to justice and fair
trails, the League will monitor cases on women’s property and
land rights. The expected results
are that 450 officials
dealing with prevention of gender-based violence (judges, law
enforcement officers, local community activists, religious
leaders) will increase their legal knowledge and understanding
of women’s rights; public
defenders from various legal centers
will gain skills and experience on the protection of women’s
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rights and the fight against gender-based violence; over 2000
women will receive legal advice and assistance during pre-trial
and trial stages; and the public awareness campaign with attract
much-needed attention to the legal and human-rights problems
faced by women in Tajikistan. The
total cost of the project is
$100,339. The League of Women
Lawyers will provide $12,262 in
cost-sharing and requests $88,077.
11. (U) WOMEN’S ISSUES TELEVISION SERIES — TV STATION JAHONORO:
Private TV station «Jahonoro» was established in 1998 with the
aim of providing true and timely information to the population
of the Sughd Province of Tajikistan.
Today it is one of the
leading independent TV stations of Sughd Province and the only
one that has consistently attempted to cover developments in all
areas, including political issues, in Tajikistan. Their mission
is to provide true and independent information to the population
as an alternative to state-controlled TV channels and to serve
as a public advocate for pressing issues. Many independent TV
and radio stations in Tajikistan face pressure from state
structures, and licensing of new independent TV stations is
getting more difficult year by year.
The existing stations have
difficulty surviving because of limited sources of funding.
Jahonoro gets its revenues from advertisements, paid video
services, and foreign grants. The
company cooperates with
almost all of the international organizations operating in
Tajikistan, such as OSCE, IFES, NDI, and OSI, with the purpose
of implementing projects and programming devoted to civic
education the increase of awareness of human rights.
12. (U) Gender discrimination is a fact in Tajikistan.
According to a recent Amnesty International report, almost half
of the women in Tajikistan face abuse.
There were some efforts
undertaken to address gender discrimination in the government
level; however, the legal base is still weak and the situation
is deteriorating further due to limited economic opportunities
for women and the population at large.
There is no law that
specifically addresses domestic violence. Due to economic,
social, cultural, and political factors women are constantly
under pressure and have limited options in life. Domestic
violence, employment-based discrimination, forced marriages,
unequal access to land and family resources, labor migration,
and many other tendencies are becoming a reality for a large
number of women in Tajikistan.
This is one of the reasons why
the number of suicides is growing every year, especially in the
northern Sughd province.
According to information from the
Tajik Internal Affairs Administration, there have been 173
suicides and 87 attempts registered officially in Sughd.
Suicide is a form of protest against domestic violence and
abuse, as most of the victims do not see any other option. A
combination of factors that women find themselves in, such as no
education or economic opportunities, too many children in the
family, and social pressure, leave no other means to cope with
violence and abuse in the family.
Divorce is not an option
because of the stigma attached to it.
In addition, religious
circles in the community condemn divorce and tell women to be
obedient wives and never leave the marriage. Media can play a
vital role in changing stereotypes against women in society by
showing how other women cope with these issues, by presenting
role models for young girls, by advocating for change in
legislation, and by providing a venue to expose and discuss the
problems of gender-based violence and discrimination. Media can
help women raise their awareness of their rights, as well as
their self-esteem, and can provide information on economic and
educational opportunities for growth and development.
13. (U) Through a series of television programs, TV Jahonoro
will provide a forum for women to share their real stories and
talk about their successes. It
will also be a venue for debate
by legal experts, psychologists, and community leaders. The TV
programs will talk about issues such as women’s legal rights and
entitlements, the role of religion in ensuring equality in
marriage and society, women’s participation in the political
sphere, economic opportunities for women, women and labor
migration, and many other vital issues for society today in
Tajikistan. The monthly
talk-shows will feature real local
heroes- successful Tajik women leaders, and their real
stories-to foster public debate and to provide further
informational resources that will help others cope with their
individual situations. TV
Jahonoro will present 12 analytical
TV programs in the Tajik language in a talk-show format
dedicated to the unique social, economic, political, and
cultural problems faced by Tajik women, as well as possible
solutions for those problems.
Each program will be 35 to 40
minutes long and will feature women leaders from major cities of
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Sughd Province, including Khujand, Gafurov, Kayrakkum,
Chkalovsk, Jabbor Rasulov, Spitamen, and other adjoining
territories. The selected women
have achieved great success in
life and are included in a database of 600 successful women of
the Ferghana Valley. Their
stories reveal how successful women
can be, both economically and socially, and how they managed to
create opportunities, such as jobs, for other women. The
programs will be broadcast during prime time viewing hours and
are expected to reach up to 800,000 people. The topics include:
Ownership Rights of Women: Law and Traditions; Women’s Rights
and Islam; Marriage Contract: Rescue or Illusion?; Women-Headed
Households; Labor Migration and Women; Civil War and Gender
Imbalance in Society; Women and Elections; Divorce Through Text
Messaging and by Phone; Do Women Have a Right to Own Land?;
Unemployment and Women; Impact of the Economic Crisis on Women;
and Women Leaders and Successful Entrepreneurs. To supplement
the program, 12 analytical articles on the issue of gender
inequality will be published in conjunction with the TV shows.
The total requested amount is $68,831.
GROSS
