Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 240525
date: 12/18/2009 8:13
refid: 09BISHKEK1300
origin: Embassy Bishkek
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0009
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHEK #1300/01 3520813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180813Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2892
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001300
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KG, AF, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ FOREIGN MINISTER PROTESTS «FAILED STATE»
Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Sarbayev called in the
Ambassador to complain about the December 16 VOA article that
said Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could be considered «failed
states.» Sarbayev, armed
with a copy of DAS Krol’s testimony
and a translation of the Q&A, peppered the Ambassador with
questions, ultimately asking if it was official U.S. policy
to consider Kyrgyzstan a failed state, adding that he «hoped
it was not true.» The
Ambassador explained that VOA had
inadvertently mischaracterized what DAS Krol had said in his
testimony and that he had not identified any failed states.
The Ambassador also raised U.S. concerns about the protection
of human rights in several ongoing trials. She pointed out
that the trials appeared to be motivated by political
considerations. The Ambassador
corrected misconceptions on
the part of Sarbayev about U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.
Sarbayev reiterated Kyrgyzstan’s interest in seeing the U.S.
successful in Afghanistan and playing a permanent, active
role in Central Asia. End
Summary.
MFA PROTESTS «FAILED STATE» MONIKER
————————————
2. (C) At Foreign Minister Sarbayev’s request, the Ambassador
met with him on December 18 at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to discuss the December 16 Voice of America Russian
language article on U.S. policy in Central Asia that
indicated that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could be considered
«failed states.» Armed
with DAS Krol’s official testimony,
Sarbayev pointedly asked the Ambassador if it was official
U.S. policy to consider Kyrgyzstan a failed state, adding
that he «hoped it was not true.» After presenting Sarbayev
with the VOA retraction and the new correct article, the
Ambassador explained to Sarbayev that VOA had inadvertently
mischaracterized what DAS Krol had said in his testimony
before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee and that
contrary to what the article reported, DAS Krol did not
identify any failed states.
3. (C) Sarbayev said that the Foreign Ministry had watched
the video of Krol’s testimony, including the question and
answer session, and noted that Krol had said that Kyrgyzstan
was a poor state. While not
disputing that Kyrgyzstan was
poor, Sarbayev appeared frustrated that DAS Krol had said so
publicly. Sarbayev said that
President Bakiyev was traveling
to Almaty, Kazakhstan this weekend for an informal meeting of
Presidents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus,
Armenia and Turkmenistan, and he was seriously concerned that
his President would be asked about Kyrgyzstan’s designation
as a «failed state.» He
said that he feared that the
Russians would taunt Bakiyev that «after all you have given
the Americans recently, they still call you a failed state.»
An annoyed Sarbayev concluded by complaining that the U.S.
criticizes Kyrgyzstan and yet has not made the October
payment for the Transit Center.
AMBASSADOR PRESSES HUMAN RIGHTS
——————————-
4. (C) Turning the conversation to U.S. concerns about two
high profile trials, one of election-day protesters at
Balakchy and the other accusing former Minister of Defense
Ismail Isakov of (fairly petty) misuse of government
resources, the Ambassador pressed hard that the trials
appeared to be motivated by political considerations. The
Ambassador said that such trials, especially if they result
in severe prison sentences, will hinder efforts to broaden
and strengthen U.S.-Kyrgyz relations and could be raised at
the Annual Bilateral Consultations.
A calmer Sarbayev said
that the Government of Kyrgyzstan will be prepared to discuss
all aspects of the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relationship at the ABCs,
including human rights and the referenced trials, asserting
BISHKEK 00001300 002 OF 003
that General Isakov had abused his power while at the
Ministry of Defense.
5. (C) Sarbayev briefed the Ambassador on the upcoming
meeting of Presidents in Kazakhstan and on a planned meeting
in the new year between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan in Bishkek. Sarbayev
said that the Government of
Kyrgyzstan wanted to discuss many issues with its neighbors,
including migrant workers, the border, and economic
cooperation. The main goal of the
meetings, according to
Sarbayev, was to discuss regional stability. Sarbayev noted
that the first U.S. Annual Bilateral Consultations in the
region will be with Uzbekistan; where the human rights
discussion will likely be difficult.
AFGHANISTAN WORRIES
——————-
6. (C) Sarbayev described the concerns about U.S. Afghan
policy voiced by diplomatic colleagues at the OSCE Foreign
Minister meeting in Athens and expressed his own concern
about the U.S. commitment to success in Afghanistan.
Sarbayev said that he had found his colleagues at the OSCE
Ministerial Council meeting to be quite concerned about the
implications of the December 1 speech by President Obama. In
particular, the French and Bulgarian Foreign Ministers had
evinced no understanding of or confidence in U.S. policy in
their meetings with him. He
reported that French FM Bernard
Kouchner had said, «I don’t know what the U.S. is trying to
do in Afghanistan. How can we
implement a policy we don’t
understand?» Sarbayev went
on to note that the Russians also
appear to be concerned that the U.S. is not committed to
victory in Afghanistan.
7. (C) From the perspective of Kyrgyzstan, Sarbayev said it
is very concerning that the U.S. has set a deadline for
exiting Afghanistan. The threat
of the Taliban had driven
Central Asia into the arms of the Russians and Chinese in
2001 with the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. If the U.S. were to
withdraw from the region
the Central Asians would have no choice, once again.
8. (C) The Ambassador pointed out to Sarbayev that the U.S.
has not set a deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Rather, President Obama had given a date on which we would
begin to move troops home, conditioning the speed at which
troops could leave to conditions on the ground. She
highlighted the priority of resolving the Afghan situation
for the USG and the Obama Administration, specifically. The
increase in troop levels would help create the conditions for
their return home. It became
clear in the ensuing discussion
that Sarbayev had misunderstood the speech, believing that it
set a deadline for a full withdrawal from Afghanistan. The
Ambassador clarified the policy for him.
9. (C) Sarbayev reiterated
Kyrgyzstan’s interest in seeing
the U.S. successful in Afghanistan and in continuing to build
a strong bilateral relationship with the U.S. Kyrgyzstan
would like to see the U.S. play a permanent and active role
in Central Asia. He said it was
important that Kyrgyz
citizens see concrete benefits from Kyrgyz-U.S. cooperation.
In that regard, he expressed concern about the contracting of
transportation for the Northern Defense Network (NDN) route
passing through Kyrgyzstan. He
said that he had received
reports that the first two shipments had been received in
Kabul and that they had been transported by Tajik companies.
He hoped, he said, that Kyrgyz companies would also receive
sub-contracts for transportation of goods on the NDN so that
the benefits of our cooperation would be made clearer to the
population.
PRESS COVERAGE AND INTERNET DISCUSSION
—————————————
BISHKEK 00001300 003 OF 003
10. (C) The VOA article has been picked up by some local
media which have mostly re-printed the VOA article and the
most popular online chat forum in Kyrgyzstan has had a
vibrant discussion about Kyrgyzstan as a «failed state.»
11. (C) Comment: The retraction by VOA will help this issue
to dissipate. This episode serves
to highlight the
hypersensitivity of the Kyrgyz Government to public
criticism, even where that criticism is only implied and
fully justified. However, if
carefully managed, that
hypersensitivity is something we may be able to use to our
own benefit in some cases.
GFOELLER
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 240938
date: 12/21/2009 12:42
refid: 09DUSHANBE1443
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE1348|09DUSHANBE1364
header:
VZCZCXRO1811
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1443/01 3551242
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211242Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1060
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0346
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2268
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001443
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, ECON, PGOV, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: GIVE ME YOUR LUNCH MONEY — TAJIK GOVERNMENT USES THE HARD
SELL TO PUSH SHARES IN ROGHUN HYDRO-ELECTRIC DAM
REF: DUSHANBE 1364; DUSHANBE 1348
DUSHANBE 00001443 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) Summary: The Tajik
government has launched an
expansive campaign to browbeat the public into buying shares in
the long-delayed Roghun hydro-electric project, which it
considers to be a «life or death» initiative to achieve energy
security. The President summoned
the Tajik press corps to line
up their support, and pro-government media have aired
testimonials of Tajiks who have committed to buy Roghun shares
when they go on sale January 6.
The initiative likely will put
only a tiny dent in the $770 million needed to complete Roghun’s
first two turbines (let alone the $3 billion or more needed to
finish the whole project), but is part of a larger strategy to
build nationalist sentiment and rally the public in support of
Rahmon’s national projects. End
summary.
ALL ROGHUN, ALL THE TIME
2. (SBU) Following Uzbekistan’s November announcement that it
would pull out of the Central Asian Unified Power System,
leaving Tajikistan to cope with its energy issues on its own
(Ref A), Tajik officials and state media have run a full court
press to pressure individuals and organizations into coughing up
cash for the Roghun hydro-electric station, which the government
offers as the sole salvation to chronic energy woes. Roghun, on
which construction began in 1976 and continued desultorily
during the Soviet period before stalling out in the Tajik civil
war, would generate 3,600 Megawatts, nearly doubling
Tajikistan’s domestic energy production capacity. On November
16 President Rahmon announced that shares would be issued for
Roghun and called on Tajik citizens to purchase them. He
ordered banks to facilitate Roghun stock purchases in branches
throughout the country, starting January 6, 2010, when shares
would be available for amounts ranging from 100 to 5,000 somoni
($23 — $1136). On December 2, the
President called on all Tajik
families «except for those most vulnerable,» to buy 3,000
somoni
(approximately $680) worth of Roghun shares. Wealthy Dushanbe
Mayor Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloyev called on workers to spend one
month of their wages on Roghun stocks.
3. (SBU) Post estimates that even if every «non-vulnerable»
Tajik household answered the President’s call to give 3,000
somoni to Roghun, the government would raise $330 million, well
short of the $770 million it says is necessary to bring the
first turbines online, let alone the $3 billion or more needed
to complete the whole project.
Actual donations to Roghun will
be much lower, however. With the
average Tajik salary only $71
per month (and per capita income only $25), few private citizens
have the expendable income to buy even a fraction of what the
government is asking. Even if
they wanted to, there is no way
for foreign investors to get in on the deal. Rahmon proudly
emphasized that Roghun shares would be offered only to Tajik
citizens, guaranteeing that only they would reap the benefits of
a completed dam.
RAHMON CALLS ON JOURNALISTS TO SUPPORT ROGHUN DRIVE…
4. (SBU) On December 7 Rahmon summoned 250 Tajik journalists to
a closed-door meeting and launched an extended pitch for the
government’s efforts to sell Roghun shares to the public.
Rahmon told journalists that while they «can criticize the
government, they should not oppose the government’s pursuit of
strategic goals,» including energy projects. Rahmon asked them
«not to be on the sidelines in the work to gather materials and
stocks for the construction of the republic’s energy giant….
This issue is one of life and death for our country.»
…AND BRAGS ABOUT CENTRAL ASIAN FIGHT CLUB
5. (SBU) A Tajik journalist who attended the meeting told Emboff
that Rahmon signaled that he expected them to participate in a
national mission to achieve energy independence and blamed the
country’s current energy woes on Uzbekistan. Rahmon underlined
his personal involvement in the struggle by bragging that he got
in a brawl with Uzbek President Islam Karimov at a CIS Summit in
DUSHANBE 00001443 002.2 OF 003
Sochi in 2004. As both men
grabbed each other by the collars,
former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma pulled the dueling
presidents apart. Rahmon claimed
to have had the last word:
«Anyway, Samarkand and Bukhara will be ours again one
day!» No
recording equipment was permitted at the meeting, and none of
the 250 Tajik journalists in attendance reported this story.
After a Russian journalist broke the story in a Moscow
newspaper, a pro-government Tajik paper denounced the Russian
journalist. Tajik authorities
also showed that Uzbekistan
threatened Tajikistan at least as much as Tajikistan threatened
Samarkand and Bukhara. They
claimed that a man possibly acting
on behalf of Uzbekistan had tried to kill the Mayor of
Tursunzade in October, allegedly to disrupt fundraising for
Roghun; Tursunzade is the home of Talco.
6. (SBU) The Tajik journalist we spoke with said that this was
not the first time the government had summoned journalists to
ask them to support its agenda.
When in February Russian
President Medvedev made a statement supporting Tashkent’s
position regarding regional hydropower development, the Head of
the MFA’s Information Department called a meeting with
journalists to tell them, «you are welcome to write articles
against Russia.» After the
Uzbek ambassador to Tajikistan
announced Uzbekistan’s decision to withdraw from the Central
Asian grid in November, the MFA again summoned journalists to
advise them, «you can go ahead and attack the Uzbek
ambassador.»
OLYMPIC CHAMPIONS AND GEOGRAPHY TEACHERS: EVERYONE WANTS A SHARE
7. (SBU) Since Rahmon called on citizens to cough up cash for
Roghun, media have tripped over themselves to report every new
pledge made by every Jamshed Q. Public.
State television has
broadcast daily vignettes about simple Tajik citizens who intend
to buy multiple Roghun shares. A
geography teacher, for
example, appeared on the nightly news to announce she will buy
5,000 somoni ($1,136) of shares.
State media interspersed
similar interviews with pensioners and other prospective stock
buyers with footage of the ongoing Roghun construction.
National electricity company Barqi Tojik has dispatched
representatives to schools to indoctrinate children on the
importance of supporting the Roghun project and the virtues of
now obligatory energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs. Barqi Tojik
already has delivered its presentation in Dushanbe, Hissar,
Khujand, Isfara, and Rudaki districts.
8. (SBU) Print media, too, is awash with Roghun stock purchase
commitments. Tajikistan’s only
Olympic medalist, Judo expert
Rasoul Boqiyev, committed to a 2,000 somoni stock purchase on
December 15. The same day, media
reported that the staff of the
Tajik embassy in London gave two days’ salary for Roghun. Not
to be outdone, the embassy staff in Washington gave three days’
salary. Teachers at the
Khujand-based Tajik State University of
Law, Business and Politics promised two days’ wages, totaling
20,000 somoni ($4,545). Employees
at the joint Canadian-Tajik
mining operation Aprelevka contributed one day’s wages totaling
30,000 somoni to Roghun, and promised to offer up another two
days’ wages «in the nearest future.» The next day
Tojiksodirotbonk, a major private bank (and the Embassy’s local
banking partner) announced it would buy $5 million in Roghun
shares, drawn from its own capital.
Bank management also said
employees expressed a wish to buy an additional $1 million at
their own expense. According to
the media reports, the Bank’s
Director would personally contribute $100,000. He added that
the Hotel Tajikistan, of which he is part owner, would
contribute another $2 million.
Tajik Railways has committed 1
million somoni (227,200 USD).
9. (SBU) The opposition Islamic Renaissance Party’s (IRPT)
commitment to buy shares was perhaps most striking. Party
leader Muhiddin Kabiri reconfirmed his reputation as the
Government’s favorite Islamist opposition politician when he
said he would contribute the Party’s money to help further a
national priority. Party contacts
report that they have not yet
decided how many shares to purchase and in fact need to resolve
whether they may legally purchase shares as a political party.
No one in the opposition nor in mass media appear to have
questioned the government’s continued operation of the
state-owned Talco aluminum plant, which consumes over 40% of
DUSHANBE 00001443 003.2 OF 003
Tajikistan’s energy. Yet Talco’s
profits are largely returned
not to state coffers but to an offshore company controlled by
the political elite.
10. (SBU) Neither the President nor his family have committed to
buying shares. Several major
government enterprises also have
failed to announce a stock purchase.
Neither Orion Bank, Somon
Capital, the national airline, Barqi Tojik, nor other major
banks and businesses controlled by the government have announced
stock purchases. Asia Plus
reported that Talco’s «top managers
and engineering personnel» committed to buy shares worth one
month of their salaries, but so far Talco itself has not
committed company funds.
ROGHUN CAMPAIGN IN CONTEXT
11. (SBU) This is not the first time the Tajik government has
employed Soviet-style drives to achieve «national goals.» Nor
is it the first stock campaign for a hydro-electric dam. In
1998, the government issued shares in the Sangtuda-1 dam.
Individuals who purchased these shares, however, never received
proceeds from their investment.
(The dam was completed in 2009
with heavy Russian investment.)
After the Dushanbe medical
university burned down in 2008, academics all over the country
«volunteered» to give up two days’ salary; academics we knew
who
lost this salary said they were never consulted. Urban and
government employees routinely must participate in the Soviet
tradition of what is tongue-in-cheek termed
«voluntary-obligatory» public service to clean streets. When
the President hosted an international conference on Hanafi Islam
in October, he reportedly ordered Dushanbe restaurants to feed
visiting delegations for free, and warned of severe consequences
should the guests have any complaints about the food. And, of
course, local government officials dispatch state employees to
pick cotton to meet national «targets.»
COMMENT: TAJIKISTAN, INC.
12. (SBU) The Roghun shares campaign is a demonstration that
Tajikistan’s leadership unquestioningly assumes that the people
exist to serve and glorify the state and can be employed as
state property and deprived of their earnings at the President’s
whim. This is in large part the
inheritance of Soviet rule, but
has older antecedents too. It is
the mentality on display when
high officials, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Yuldashev, argue
there is no forced labor in the cotton sector, because the
nation has a tradition of collective effort. This attitude
among senior government officials will challenge development and
reform efforts as long as the Soviet generation hangs on to
power. However, the generation
that replaces them may not be an
improvement; a collapsed education system and a corrupt
political culture could well produce future leaders who are no
better able to manage the situation, nor have any more
democratic vision for Tajikistan.
13. (SBU) Comment Continued: If
the Tajik government actually
thinks that by shaking down geography teachers it can raise
money to complete the Roghun project, it is badly in need of a
reality check. More than likely,
the goal of the President’s
campaign is to strengthen national unity under his leadership
and whip up nationalism so that anger sparked by the inevitable
winter power outages is directed at Tashkent, not Dushanbe.
Many individuals and businesses have rushed to announce their
donations of one or two days’ salary, to curry favor and preempt
calls for larger donations.
Despite Rahmon’s insistence that
only Tajik citizens could invest in Roghun, it seems likely that
if a major foreign donor materialized in Dushanbe tomorrow, he
would be happily accommodated.
Rahmon’s meeting with
journalists underlines the government’s view that the media
should fall in line to support «national» initiatives and has
a
chilling effect on independent journalists. Though independent
newspapers often print mild criticism of the government, it is
telling that no Tajik papers reported on Rahmon’s bizarre
braggadocio regarding his shoving match with Karimov. End
comment.
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 240941
date: 12/21/2009 12:43
refid: 09DUSHANBE1445
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1816
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1445 3551243
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211243Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1064
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2272
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001445
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, NCTC, INL, S/CT PLEASE PASS TO RSHORE AND NCTC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
1. (SBU) Following is the submission from U.S. Embassy Dushanbe
for Tajikistan’s Country Report on Terrorism:
2. (U) Tajikistan’s security forces confronted and neutralized
members of extremist groups in Tavildara district in spring and
summer 2009. Government forces killed several suspected members
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), while other
extremists fled the area as a result of counterterrorism
operations by the government from May to August. The extremists
had infiltrated from Afghanistan and, reportedly, from Russia.
Tajikistani security forces also fought extremists near Dushanbe
and in northern Tajikistan, as well as on the border with
Kyrgyzstan.
3. (U) While security forces were able to defeat the incursion
in Tavildara, they continued to suffer from lack of resources.
Border Guards and other services lacked appropriate technical
equipment, transport resources, personnel, and training to
interdict illegal border crossings, detect and analyze hazardous
substances effectively and quickly respond to incursions.
Pervasive corruption and low wages also undermined the
motivation of security force members to interdict smugglers or
traffickers.
4. (U) Tajikistan’s 1,300 kilometer long border with Afghanistan
is lightly guarded. Much of it
runs through remote and
difficult terrain, which allowed smugglers, extremists, and
terrorists to travel to and from Afghanistan. To address
transshipment of illicit goods across Tajikistan’s borders, the
United States and other donors assisted the Government of
Tajikistan’s efforts to secure its border with Afghanistan. We
provided communication support to the Border Guards, built a
commercial customs facility at the Nizhny Pyanj bridge, and
provided technical and scanning equipment at this location. The
U.S. Department of Defense sponsored two Counter Narcoterrorism
Training (formerly Joint Combined Exchange Training) events with
Tajikistani security forces to improve their capacity to conduct
counterterrorism operations. The
U.S. Department of State
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL)
provided the State Committee for National Security with a
Counter Narcotics/Counterterrorism Analytical Center which
included space refurbishment, computer hardware, analytical
software, and training. INL
refurbished three Border Guard
Service outposts on the border with Afghanistan.
5. (U) Tajikistan hosted Exercise Regional Cooperation 10,
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. This exercise
focused on regional response to terrorism and strengthening
cooperation among Central Asian countries. The Tajikistani
government participated in regional security alliances,
including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization.
6. (U) Tajikistan prohibited activities by groups it considered
extremist, including Salafis and the Jamaat e Tabligh, and
closely monitored groups it listed as terrorist organizations,
including the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir.
The USG assessed that
supporters of terrorist groups such as al-Qa’ida, the Islamic
Jihad Union, and the IMU were active in the region.
7. (U) Point of contact on this issue is William von Zagorski,
[email protected] .
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 241564
date: 12/24/2009 5:51
refid: 09DUSHANBE1454
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4779
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSK RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1454/01 3580551
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240551Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1074
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0038
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2284
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001454
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEFENSE FOR OSD/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, KCRM, KJUS, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: DRUG CONTROL AGENCY BENCHMARK REVIEW, JULY — DECEMBER
DUSHANBE 00001454 001.2 OF 005
1. (SBU) Summary: On December 17,
INL Dushanbe and DEA Dushanbe
participated in an International Working Group (IWG) meeting at
the Drug Control Agency (DCA).
General Nazarov is exposing his
executive staff to donors and DEA, a change in behavior. While
donors made up a 23,000 USD shortfall in DCA salaries in 2009,
the government took away 22,000 somoni from the DCA operating
budget to finance the Roghun hydropower project. Corruption
still blocks narcotics investigations in Tajikistan. Donors
dissuaded the DCA from continuing to compile a database of drug
addicts and HIV/AIDS infected persons.
During the first six
months of 2009, the DCA and partners achieved 17 of 18 benchmark
goals. Post assesses DCA
performance to be adequate but poised
to improve with a temporary moratorium on further salary
supplement cuts. Post will
prepare an in-depth DCA summary
cable in January 2010. END
SUMMARY
2. (U) On December 17, INL Dushanbe, DEA Dushanbe, UNODC
representatives, and four top DCA officers (collectively, the
International Working Group, IWG) reviewed the performance
benchmarks of the Drug Control Agency for July to December 2009.
Colonel Saidulloev, the new DCA
Chief of Staff, presented the
benchmarks. Post e-mailed the
full benchmark review document to
INL/AAE.
3. (SBU) Recently, DCA Director General Nazarov has included his
executive staff in meetings with INL, DEA, and UNODC. The DCA
deputy director, financial director, operational director, and
mobile team director participated in the IWG meeting, a
significant departure from DCA business as usual. Comment:
A
pending personnel shake up and/or the U.S. Embassy’s recent and
repeated demands for greater assistance process transparency are
the most likely reasons. End
Comment.
4. (SBU) The DCA said the Government of Tajikistan took 22,000
somoni from the DCA’s 2009 operating budget and diverted this
money to the Roghun hydropower project.
In the past 60 days,
INL and UNODC scrambled to provide funds to the DCA to make up a
$23,000 salary shortfall.
5. (SBU) General Nazarov advised
that during a recent drug
operation the DCA mobile unit in Kizil Art (GBAO) received
several phone calls from unknown persons requesting that a
particular vehicle not be searched.
The unknown callers warned
that the Tajik Customs and Border Guard Service were aware of
this vehicle and its special status (paraphrased). General
Nazarov said by constantly rotating the DCA mobile team officers
through the various regions it was making them less susceptible
to corruption and, in some quarters, too effective.
6. (SBU) The DCA created a database of drug addicts and HIV/AIDS
infected persons in Tajikistan (no USG funding), but was unable
to get names and other identifiable data from the Health
Ministry. During the IWG meeting,
DEA, INL and UNODC objected
to the DCA’s efforts to build the database as untoward
governmental intrusion and redundant; the Health Ministry
already maintains such a database.
General Nazarov conceded
that the DCA could obtain specific information from the Health
Ministry on a case needs basis and use the resources going
towards the database elsewhere.
Post will monitor this issue.
7. (SBU) BENCHMARKS
Benchmark 1.1. To convene
periodic IWG meetings to monitor the
project activities, to effect timely grants disbursement and
review funding and self-sustainability of the DCA.
Results: Achieved. IWG members met three times during the
first six months of 2009 and had several small working group
meetings.
DUSHANBE 00001454 002.2 OF 005
Benchmark 1.2. Regional Office
for Central Asia (ROCA) with the
Tajik Government is to seek alternative funding sources and
increase funding from state budget.
Results: Achieved. While the U.S. government is the principle
DCA donor, the Norwegian Government, through UNODC, allocated
23,000 USD to cover a 10% shortfall in DCA salaries. In 2009,
the Government of Tajikistan allocated the DCA 3,507,420 somoni
(610,500 somoni for salary supplement) from the state coffers.
This was 20% more than in the DCA’s 2008 budget. In 2010, the
Government of Tajikistan plans to allocate 3,252,000 somoni to
the DCA.
Benchmark 1.3. To provide payment
of grants to support DCA
employees (including Mobile Team staff).
Result: Achieved. No discussion.
Benchmark 2.1a. To develop and
strengthen bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with foreign agencies, work towards
agreements and protocols, and conduct joint anti-drug smuggling
operations at national and international levels.
Results: Achieved. During the reported period, DCA liaison
officers launched joint operations with Afghanistan law
enforcement agencies and conducted 27 joint operations leading
to the seizure of 4,827 kg of drugs (4,526 kg raw opium, 178 kg
heroin, and 121 kg cannabis).
Benchmark 2.1b. DCA liaison
officers (DLO) in Afghanistan
(Faizabad, Kunduz, Mazari Sharif, and Taloqan) and in Kyrgyzstan
(Osh) should promote and expand their drug control activities
and cooperation with Afghan and Kyrgyz enforcement partners.
Results: Partially achieved. The DLO Taloqan office reopened
in October after being closed for 10 months. INL identified
funds to re-launch and administer the Taloqan liaison officer
project previously funded by the DEA.
During the first two
months of resumed operation, the DLO in Taloqan, Afghanistan,
seized 65 kg of heroin.
Benchmark 2.1c. To sign a
cooperation agreement between the DCA
Tajikistan and the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan in
the framework of the UNODC ROCA.
Results: Partially Achieved. The DCA received verbal assurance
that Kazakh law enforcement would sign the document. General
Nazarov discussed this issue with the Kazakh Ambassador in
Tajikistan and awaits a formal reply.
This benchmark remains
pending.
Benchmark 2.2. To organize and
conduct operations KUKNOR
(poppy) 2009, CHANNEL 2009 and TARCET in Tajikistan, and to
inform the Government of Tajikistan, UNODC/ROCA, and donors of
the results.
Results: Achieved. However, no report was given for the
CHANNEL 2009 operation.
DUSHANBE 00001454 003.2 OF 005
KUKNOR 2009 was conducted between May 10 and November 30. The
DCA, with other Tajik law enforcement agencies, seized 2,385 kg
of drugs, including 687 kg of heroin, 532 kg raw opium, and
1,165 kg of cannabis.
TARCET — The DCA, with regional law enforcement partners, seized
177 kg of drugs.
Benchmark 2.3. To develop and
publish regular reports
(quarterly, semi-annual and annual) and information-analytical
surveys on the drug situation in the country and region for
presentation to the President, Government of Tajikistan, and
other ministries, agencies, and international organizations,
including UNODC and donors.
Results: Achieved. The DCA prepared regular reports on the
drug situation in Tajikistan and sent them to UNODC/ROCA, INL
and DEA.
Benchmark 2.4. To continue
development of the DCA officers’
professional skills (within the country and abroad) and to
jointly conduct a job task analysis as a basis for training
development/priority capacity building.
Results: Partially achieved. Two training sessions were
postponed until 2010.
Analysts in the DCA’s Regional Branch offices in Kurgan-Tube,
Khatlon, and Khujand, Sughd, were trained on i2 software to
compile information into a database from which telephone link
analysis could be conducted. Drug
Control Agency’s analyst
experts provided the training.
Analysts from the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, DCA,
and MOI Tajikistan received an advanced training in
iBase/Analyst’s Notebook. An
international expert from United
Kingdom provided this training. .
They assessed the DCA’s current working conditions and defined
specific shortcomings and achievements.
Benchmark 2.5. To create database
accounting of drug addicts
and HIV/AIDS infected persons in Tajikistan (see paragraph 6).
Results: Partially achieved. The DCA created a national
database of HIV/AIDs infected individuals which does not include
names. The DCA considers this a
partial achievement. The
database includes gender, age, location, cause of infection, etc.
Benchmark 2.6. The completion of
a «Harris» radio system to
increase coordination efficiency and interaction between DCA and
other Tajik law enforcement agencies.
Results: Not achieved. We will identify and install additional
radio equipment. This is an ODC
project and INL will coordinate
the issue with ODC.
Benchmark 2.7. To support
implementation of «Unified State
DUSHANBE 00001454 004.2 OF 005
Program of addiction prevention and prevention of illicit drugs
trafficking for 2008-2012.»
Results: Partially achieved. A UNODC/ROCA Expert studied and
reported on integrating the analytical Center info into the
forensic lab database.
Benchmark 2.8. To support the establishment of DCA canine
training center.
Results: Achieved. BOMCA/CADAP will build a new DCA canine
training facility starting in January 2010. (This is not a USG
supported project.)
Benchmark 2.9. Continuing the
provision of office equipment,
vehicles, and operational equipment to increase the efficiency
of the DCA.
Results: Achieved. INL procured equipment for the DLO in
Taloqan and mobile groups.
Benchmark 2.10. To enhance
technical capacity of the DCA
forensic functions.
Results: Achieved. UNODC renovated the Khatlon Forensic Lab
with Norwegian funds, and the opening ceremony will take place
on December 23.
Benchmark 3.1. Provide additional
and required equipment to the
GBAO Mobile Units.
Results: Achieved. No discussion.
Benchmark 3.2. To continue providing fuel to the DCA MOU within
the assigned amount.
Results: Achieved. The DCA’s request for continued support to
buy automotive fuel was granted.
UNODC will reallocate $30,000
USD in operational funds to the fuel line item. This
reallocation was approved by INL.
Benchmark 3.3. To establish and
staff Mobile Units in the
Murgab and Ishkashim regions of GBAO.
Results: Achieved. The DCA developed the structure of both
units, and is recruiting 20 officers, 10 in Murgab and 10 in
Ishkashim. INL will support the
Murgab officers through salary
supplements.
Benchmark 3.4. To start the
reconstruction of the DCA Mobile
Unit administrative buildings in Murgab and Ishkashim. To
provide office and computer equipment, and vehicles for the
Mobile Units. To recruit
candidates for the GBAO Mobile Units,
and to proved appropriate training for the newly hired officers.
DUSHANBE 00001454 005.2 OF 005
Results: Partially Achieved. The construction in Murgab is 20%
complete but has stopped for the winter.
A tender was announced
for the Ishkashim construction and UNODC is identifying a
contractor. The DCA advertized
the GBAO openings chose a
preliminary list of 32 applicants and presented the list to INL
for consideration.
8. (SBU) UNODC, DCA, and INL are reviewing the DCA benchmarks
for January — June 2010. UNODC is
updating the benchmark
document. While INL can’t
underwrite the DCA indefinitely,
the Tajik Finance Ministry has not been able to offset the 10%
reduction in INL provided salary supplements due to the economic
downturn. This created a morale
issue in the DCA and increased
attrition dramatically. INL
Dushanbe decided to not make the
next scheduled 10% reduction in 2010.
The announcement of this
decision resulted in an immediate improvement in morale, and DCA
officers who recently jumped ship are asking for reinstatement.
As a further inducement towards greater transparency, increased
operational cooperation with the DEA, and improved case results,
INL left the door open for negotiations on restoring the 10%
salary supplement reduction made in 2009. If warranted, such
negotiations will take place in June 2010.
9. (SBU) Comment: Despite the
negative impact of the 10%
decrease in salary supplement payments in 2009, the DCA is
functioning within expectations and improving. Seizure rates
are adequate, and the DCA developed 117 cases, 35 more than in
2008. Drug seizures totaled 963
kg (312 heroin, 324 kg of raw
opium, 300 kg of cannabis, plus 3123 ecstasy tablets and 9
firearms). END COMMENT
10. Post will prepare an in-depth DCA project summary cable in
January 2010.
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 241567
date: 12/24/2009 5:52
refid: 09DUSHANBE1457
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4798
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1457 3580552
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240552Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1085
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0355
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2295
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001457
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SOCI, EAID, KFLU, CDC, WHO, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — H1N1 SITUATION, INFORMATION SCARCE
1. (SBU) Summary: About one
fourth of all people in Tajikistan
will contract influenza by February 2010, according to a World
Health Organization (WHO) Adviser.
This number includes all
forms of influenza, not just H1N1.
In a worst-case scenario,
about 1,000 of those infected would die.
There is little hard
data on the extent of influenza infection around the country,
H1N1 or otherwise, and the government has little ability to
respond to the pandemic. End
Summary.
2. (SBU) A small number of H1N1 cases, but no deaths, have been
confirmed in Tajikistan but hard data is limited. By
extrapolating from infection rates observed in other countries,
Liduvina Maria Gonzalez Venero, WHO adviser to the Ministry of
Health of Tajikistan, predicted that 1.4 million people in
Tajikistan (out of a total resident population of about 6
million) would contract either H1N1 or seasonal influenza by
February 2010. At most, 1,000
people in Tajikistan would die of
influenza during this winter, according to her estimate. On
December 23, Gonzalez said that transmission of these diseases
was at its peak in Dushanbe now.
DATA DIFFICULT
3. (SBU) Gonzalez said that there is no reliable data on the
influenza pandemic in Tajikistan.
The government did not keep
records on influenza infection rates in past years, so there is
no historical context to compare to this year’s rate.
Administrations around the country also were reporting many
deaths as being the result of influenza which were from
different causes, inflating infection figures by an unknown
amount. She thought this
excessive false reporting of flu
deaths was the result of hype surrounding the spread of H1N1.
Gonzalez noted that the one «confirmed» death from H1N1
reported
in local media was actually caused by seasonal influenza. Eight
other deaths are under investigation.
Investigations would be
slowed because laboratory testing supplies had run out in
Tajikistan for the time being.
SUPPLIES DIFFICULT
4. (SBU) Gonzalez described the uneven nature of response to the
influenza pandemic around the country.
Each district had an
infectious disease hospital, but ill people were going to
district general hospitals, which usually misdiagnosed and over
reported influenza infections. At
the provincial level there
are hospitals with Intensive Care Units and training to operate
them, but district hospitals are not transferring needy patients
to the provincial hospitals. Some
areas had better supplies and
equipment than others. Gonzalez
cited Khorogh
(Gorno-Badakhshan’s capital) in particular as an area hard hit
by influenza every winter, but totally lacking in appropriate
equipment or medicines. She is
urging the Minister of Health to
distribute medicine and equipment to areas outside Dushanbe,
rather than keep supplies for the pandemic centralized.
Dushanbe is the other hardest-hit area of the country, but is
better equipped to deal with the situation.
5. (SBU) In mid-January H1N1 vaccines will begin to arrive in
Tajikistan in several shipments, which would eventually be
enough to vaccinate 10% of the population. There is virtually
no seasonal flu vaccine available in Tajikistan. H1N1 vaccine
would go to health workers and others most at risk from
infection, Gonzalez said. She
said that the government of
Tajikistan was not hiding information from the public or from
donors about the seriousness of the pandemic, but that the
government simply lacked information.
GROSS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 241566
date: 12/24/2009 5:52
refid: 09DUSHANBE1456
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4794
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1456/01 3580552
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1082
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0352
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2292
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001456
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EINV, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: NEW TAJIK BUDGET PRIORITIZES ENERGY
DUSHANBE 00001456 001.2 OF 003
1. (U) Summary: President Rahmon
signed the 2010 «anti-crisis»
budget on November 14, three days after it was approved by the
Parliament and a month earlier than previous practice. Despite
the financial crisis, the new budget is Tajikistan’s biggest
ever, totaling over 6.5 billion somoni (about $1.5 billion), 9%
higher than the original 2009 budget, and 18% higher than the
final version of the 2009 budget that was reduced to deal with
the crisis. The new budget
increases social sector spending
while addressing Tajikistan’s perennial energy difficulties by
stepping up funding for the Roghun Hydropower Station to 650
million somoni, 117 million more than the previous year. Budget
numbers are in the final paragraph.
End summary.
Budget Snapshot
2. (U) President Rahmon signed the 2010 «anti-crisis» budget
on
November 14, three days after it was approved by the Parliament
and a month earlier than previous practice. Expenditures in
2010 are calculated at 6.782 billion somoni, while revenue is
anticipated at 6.537 billion somoni, leaving a deficit of 245
million somoni, or 1% of expected gross domestic product (GDP).
This is an increase over 2009’s expected deficit of 0.5% of GDP,
but in the overall guidelines set by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). GDP for 2010 is
predicted to be 24.5 billion
somoni, up from 20.1 billion somoni in 2009. The government
expects to fill the budget deficit by loans from multilateral
donors (totaling 215 million somoni), proceeds from
privatization of state enterprises (15 million somoni), and new
treasury bonds (15 million somoni).
Debt service is estimated
at 162 million somoni, or under 0.7% of GDP, and will be
financed with loans from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and
World Bank as well as Finance Ministry deposits in the National
Bank.
3. (U) Expenditures in the 2010 budget have increased in all
categories except one. Overall
social sector spending next year
is expected to be 2.75 billion somoni, 16.2% higher than the
revised 2009 budget (and 12.7% higher than the original).
Government operations and defense have increased by 7.6% over
the revised 2009 budget, although they are down 6.7% compared to
the original. The biggest
increases in 2010, however, have come
in economic sector expenditures, which are up 29.2%, or 22.1%
compared to the original budget.
The only expenditure to
register a decline is education, which will drop from 1.11
billion somoni to 1.07 billion somoni.
This drop follows an
earlier reduction from 1.14 billion somoni in the original 2009
budget.
Social Sector Registers Modest Increases, but Education Falls
4. (U) The biggest increase over last year’s budget is for
social protections, including pensions, slated to receive 1.07
billion somoni in 2010, 348 million somoni more than last year.
Social protections comprise 45% of all social sector spending in
the 2010 budget. Pensions are
estimated at 770 million somoni
— a 15% increase over last year.
On average, statutory budget
items will receive a 24% increase against the revised 2009
budget with about 82% comprising wages and pensions. Overall
spending on social protections increases as a percentage of the
overall budget, from 12.6% last year to 15.7% in 2010.
Eliminating wage and pension arrears in 2010, however, will be a
real challenge in the context of tight fiscal constraints,
according to a World Bank expert.
The Ministry of Finance
envisages nominal wage increases of 15% in the health sector by
July 1, 10% in education by September 1, and 10% for public
employees in all other sectors by July 1.
5. (SBU) Not all of the press about the budget appears to match
the figures as released. For
example, Minister of Finance
Safarali Najmiddinov reported that education expenditures would
rise in 2010 by 126 million somoni, but according to official
figures they dropped by 42 million somoni (or by 71 million, if
one compares to the original 2009 budget). As a share of the
overall budget, expenditures in education drop from 19.6% last
year to 15.8%, roughly the same level as 2007 and 2008.
Relative health expenditures decline somewhat as well, from 6.8%
of last year’s revised budget to 6.0%.
(A World Bank consultant
DUSHANBE 00001456 002.2 OF 003
has calculated education’s overall share of the budget as 17.9%
and that of health at 6.5%; it is not clear where these figures
come from.) To a certain extent,
the reduction in expenditures
on health and education reflects the fact that 2009 figures were
relatively high, because donors insisted the government maintain
social sector spending in its revised budget as a condition for
receiving assistance to cope with the financial crisis. While
absolute numbers, with the exception of education, have
increased in 2010, the reduction in health and education
spending as an overall percentage of the budget indicates the
government plans to concentrate most anticipated 2010 revenue
increases in other areas.
Biggest Increases are in Economic Sphere
6. (U) Government economic sector outlays rise more, in both
absolute and relative terms, than any other part of the budget.
In percentage terms, the biggest increase over last year’s
