Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 221585
date: 8/20/2009 12:36
refid: 09DUSHANBE990
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09STATE85136
header:
VZCZCXRO7120
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0990/01 2321236
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201236Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0672
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0220
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0144
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0069
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0122
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0080
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0001
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0041
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
0001
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
0001
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0001
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0001
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
0009
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0001
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
1413
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
0035
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000990
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, AF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
MANAGING AFGHANISTAN’S NEIGHBORS
REF: STATE 85136
CLASSIFIED BY: Matt Purl,
A/DCM, POL, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: Tajikistan’s
leadership wants stability in
Afghanistan, and sees
President Karzai as the country’s best bet
to continue toward that
goal. The Tajik government insists it
takes no sides in the
election, and is not interested in
meddling in the ethnic power
balance in Afghanistan.
Tajikistan’s influence over
events in Afghanistan is limited,
but it would use what
influence it has to support a peaceful
outcome from the
elections. Specific answers keyed to
questions
posed in reftel are below at
para. 7. End Summary.
TAJIKISTAN JUST WANTS PEACE
AND QUIET, AND KARZAI
2. (C) A/DCM presented
reftel demarche on August 19 to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Director of North America and
Europe Khusrav Nosiri (the
Asia and Africa Director, who
oversees relations with
Afghanistan, was unavailable). Nosiri
commented that Tajikistan
supported «free and fair» elections in
Afghanistan, and that public
opinion in Tajikistan was in favor
of a stable and united
Afghanistan. He emphasized that ethnic
issues internal to
Afghanistan did not matter to the people of
Tajikistan.
3. (C) A/DCM discussed the
elections with Suhrob Sharipov, the
Director of the Tajikistan
Institute of Strategic Research.
Sharipov also emphasized the
importance of Afghan unity for
Tajikistan. Sharipov stated openly that President Rahmon
wished
for Karzai’s victory in the
elections, and asserted that during
the recent quadrilateral
summit in Dushanbe Rahmon had told
Karzai «you are my
candidate.» He predicted that there
would
not be a second round of
voting, and that if a second round were
to take place, Abdullah
Abdullah would likely settle for a
position of power in
Karzai’s government rather than contest the
second round. Sharipov doubted that serious tensions
between
ethnic groups would arise so
long as both Afghan Tajiks and
government-allied Pashtuns
continued to face the Taliban
insurgency; but the
Tajik-Pashtun power balance would again come
to the fore when the war
with the Taliban ended.
4. (C) Sharipov did think it
possible that Abdullah Abdullah, if
he received more than 30
percent of the vote, might see himself
as strong enough to contest
the validity of the election results
on the premise that he had
been the real winner, and that this
might lead to violence. Noting that Northern Alliance leaders
had been based in Dushanbe
for a long period when the Taliban
took control of most of
northern Afghanistan, Sharipov said that
Tajikistan’s leaders would
use their personal contacts with
ex-alliance members to push
for restraint.
5. (C) A/DCM also spoke with
Ilhom Rahmatov, a retired senior
officer of the Russian FSB,
who is of Tajik origin and who spent
much of his career in
Afghanistan. His view was that
Tajikistan
had little or no influence
over the Tajik population in
Afghanistan, because the
decades of isolation from Afghanistan
enforced by the Soviet Union
had severed most family and
business ties that had
existed earlier. Like official
interlocutors, he viewed
Tajikistan’s main interest in
Afghanistan as stability,
with little interest in the ethnic
question. He also commented that continuation of the
conflict
in Afghanistan was in the
interest of Russia, China, Iran, and
India, as each country
gained from the trouble the conflict
caused to its enemies or
regional competitors.
6. (C) The British DCM met
separately with Deputy Chairman of
the Committee for State
Security General Gafarov on August 18.
She reported than when she
asked Gafarov about the upcoming
DUSHANBE 00000990 002 OF 002
elections, he commented that
Karzai was the only candidate with
a real chance to win the
election, and that anyway «everyone
knows» that Karzai is
«an American puppet.»
ASSESSMENT OF INTERESTS AND
INFLUENCE
7. (C) Following are answers
to reftel’s request:
A: Tajikistan’s overriding
interest is greater stability in
Afghanistan. Conflict in Afghanistan deters investment in
Tajikistan, keeps it
dependent on Russia for security, massive
smuggling of Afghan
narcotics undermines the rule of law in
Tajikistan, and Afghan
extremist groups directly threaten
Tajikistan’s military
security. While Tajiks in Tajikistan
share a common language with
Tajiks in Afghanistan, their
cultural and political views
are still strongly
Soviet-influenced, and they
tend to view all Afghans, regardless
of ethnicity, as drug
smugglers, criminals, and terrorists.
The
Government of Tajikistan is
very interested in preventing a
return of the Taliban to
power, and is sophisticated enough to
understand that this goal
will not be served by any effort to
promote Tajiks over Pashtuns
in the Afghan power balance.
More parochially, the
Government of Tajikistan probably also
wants to see Karzai
reelected because a democratic and peaceful
change of administration in
the region would highlight the
shortcomings of Tajikistan’s
sham democracy — in short,
countries should not change
their president, in the Tajik view.
Tajikistan will hold
parliamentary elections in February 2010,
and does not need a
troubling regional example of democracy
leading to actual change.
B: As our interlocutors
emphasized, Tajikistan will use what
influence it has to urge
restraint by Afghan political leaders
after the elections. Every analysis of Afghan politics we have
heard from Tajiks has come
down to the basic view that Afghan
politics is clan- and
tribe-based, that democracy in Afghanistan
is a sham, and that
conflicts will be resolved by backroom
deals. So it seems likely that they will urge
privately that
the candidates avoid any
confrontation which could alienate
Afghanistan’s foreign
supporters, and find some accommodation of
each other. In public the Government of Tajikistan will
endorse
a Karzai victory, and
possibly remain silent if there is a
second electoral round.
C: If there is a second
round, or any violence between the
factions contesting this
election, the Government of Tajikistan
will be cautious in its
public and private response, and will
likely be receptive to our
advice, given the Tajik’s desire to
shows themselves to be solid
partners on Afghanistan. Their
efforts will be
constructive, but of limited value.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 221963
date: 8/24/2009 9:59
refid: 09ISLAMABAD2008
origin: Embassy Islamabad
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9464
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHIL #2008/01 2360959
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240959Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
4435
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0786
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0414
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
5393
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
0648
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 1866
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04
ISLAMABAD 002008
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEA HQ FOR: OC/HARRIGAN,
ODS/MASUMOTO,
OE/SHROYER/SHIGETA/VASQUEZ/ROSPOND,
SOD/EDDINGTON/LENARTOWICZ/QUINN/MCMURRY,
OSOC/HAMLET/MILIONE/KEARNEY,
OGE/MENDOSA/SCHRETTNER
E.O. 12958: NA
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: GFXZ-08-9180/MULLAH YUSEF DTO INTEL PASSED TO
PAKISTAN
CUSTOMS
1. (SBU) ON AUGUST 18, 2009,
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JOSEPH LABENBURG
BRIEFED PAKISTAN
CUSTOMS-PREVENTIVE, SOUTHERN ZONE, KARACHI,
PAKISTAN, WITH THE FOLLOWING INTELLIGENCE ON MULTI-TON HASHISH
TRAFFICKER MULLAH
YUSEF. THIS INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WILL
ASSIST
PAKISTAN CUSTOMS PREVENTIVE
WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION TARGETING
YUSEF AND HIS DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION (DTO). THE ICO
INTELLIGENCE WILL ALSO
ASSIST PAKISTAN CUSTOMS WITH OBTAINING A
PERPETUAL ARREST WARRANT (A
PAKISTAN PERPETUAL WARRANT WILL
AUTOMATICALLY RENEW EACH
MONTH) ON YUSEF. SA LABENBURG ALSO
PROVIDED PAKISTAN CUSTOMS
WITH A WRITTEN ASSESSMENT CONTAINING THE
INFORMATION IN THIS CABLE.
(AGENTS NOTE: ALL INFORMATION IN THIS
CABLE RELATED TO YUSEF IS
UNCLASSIFIED.)
2. (SBU) YUSEF IS A
MULTI-TON HASHISH SOURCE OF SUPPLY (SOS) WHO
CLANDESTINELY TRANS-SHIPS
LARGE HASHISH CONSIGNMENTS FROM THE MAKRAN
COAST, PAKISTAN TO AL
MAKALLA, YEMEN (GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
143303 N / 0490743 E) AND
UNKNOWN PORTS LOCATED IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA. YUSEF IS A SOS WHO WILL SUPPLY ANYONE WILLING
TO PAY FOR
HIS SERVICES.
3. (SBU) YUSEF’S PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN KOLONCH,
PAKISTAN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
252900 N / 0624400 E), NEXT TO AMBI
BAZAAR, PAKISTAN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES: 252200 N / 0624400 E).
THE DIRT ROAD THAT ENTERS
HIS MAIN RESIDENCE IS APPROXIMATELY TEN
FEET WIDE AND ABLE TO
FACILITATE SINGLE LANE TRAFFIC. THE DIRT
ROAD
APPROACHES FROM THE NORTH
AND IS LINED WITH SMALL HOUSES. ON THE
EASTERN SIDE OF YUSEF’S
PROPERTY IS A MOSQUE WITH A BALOCHI IMAM
NAMED BRAVI THAT IS USED BY
EVERYONE IN YUSEF’S NEIGHBORHOOD.
4. (SBU) YUSEF’S MAIN HOUSE
IS LOCATED ON THE WESTERN PORTION OF HIS
PROPERTY. YUSEF’S HOUSE HAS FOUR FLOORS WITH AN UNKNOWN
NUMBER OF
ROOMS. THE MAIN HOUSE IS SEPARATED FROM THE GUEST
HOUSE BY A 500
METER WALL THAT IS
APPROXIMATELY TWO METERS TALL. THE GUEST
HOUSE
IS APPROXIMATELY 400 METERS
EAST OF THE MAIN HOUSE AND APPROXIMATELY
100 METERS AWAY FROM THE
SEPARATING WALL AND 500 METERS FROM THE
MOSQUE LOCATED ON YUSEF’S
PROPERTY. THE GUEST HOUSE HAS TWO
BEDROOMS AND ONE BATHROOM
LOCATED IN THE SOUTHEASTERN BEDROOM. THE
DOOR TO THE GUEST HOUSE IS
LOCATED ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE HOUSE AND
THERE ARE TWO WINDOWS
LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SIDES.
THERE IS A CAR PORT LOCATED
30 METERS NORTH OF THE GUEST HOUSE.
5. (SBU) YUSEF OWNS TWO
JELIBUT TYPE DHOWS THAT ARE PORTED IN
GWADAR, PAKISTAN. THE DHOWS ARE APPROXIMATELY 45 FEET LONG WITH
A
PILOT HOUSE AT THE AFT
END. THE DHOWS ARE CREWED BY UNKNOWN
PERSONNEL. IT IS UNKNOWN IF ANY MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN
MADE TO THE
DHOWS. YUSEF REPORTEDLY HOLDS INDIVIDUALS AS
COLLATERAL DURING DRUG
DEALINGS WITH
CUSTOMERS. YUSEF CAN OBTAIN OFFICIAL
DOCUMENTS FOR
ANYONE WORKING FOR HIM.
6. (SBU) JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INVOLVED IN MULLAH
YUSEF’S DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON
THE SEIZURE OF HASHISH LADEN
DHOW AL ZAFAR:
7. (SBU) A MAN NAMED ‘BABU’
LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU): BABU IS
EMPLOYED BY YUSEF AS A
HASHISH COURIER AND POSSIBLY OTHER CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES. BABU TRAVELS WITH THREE TO FOUR ARMED MEN WHO
EACH
CARRY ONE AK-47 AUTOMATIC
RIFLE AND ONE DERA 9MM PISTOL. BABU AND
HIS MEN HAVE ALTERED
VEHICLES IN ORDER TO CARRY DRUGS TO SPEED BOATS
OWNED BY YUSEF. THE SPEED BOATS ARE USED TO DELIVER HASHISH
TO
DHOWS OWNED BY YUSEF, IN
GWADAR, PAKISTAN.
8. (SBU) MORDA JAN GURGUAG
AND MOHAMMED GUL GURGUAG: MORDA JAN
GURGUAG AND MOHAMMED GUL
GURGUAG ARE BROTHERS AND WORK AS DRUG AND
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
FACILITATORS FOR YUSEF. GURGUAG IS THE
BROTHER’S
TRIBAL NAME. THE MAIN JOB FOR MORDA GURGUAG AND MOHAMMED
GURGUAG IS
TO CONDUCT HUMAN SMUGGLING
OPERATIONS FROM GWADAR, PAKISTAN TO
NOKANDAN, IRAN. THE BROTHERS REPORTEDLY USE A BLUE TOYOTA
LAND
CRUISER WITH LARGER ALL
TERRAIN TIRES SO THEY CAN TRAVEL ACROSS THE
BORDER IN ANY SEASON OR
TERRAIN. MORDA GURGUAG HAS CONTACTS
(UNKNOWN) AT THE
IRANIAN/PAKISTAN BORDER STATION THAT HE BRIBES WITH
2000 IRANIAN RIALS ($217.00
U.S. DOLLARS) IN ORDER TO SMUGGLE PEOPLE
FROM IRAN INTO
PAKISTAN. MORDA GURGUAG ALSO HAS
CONTACTS (UNKNOWN)
AT THE PAKISTAN/IRAN BORDER
THAT HE BRIBES WITH 2000 PAKISTAN RUPEES
($23.00 U.S. DOLLARS). THE BORDER CROSSING USED BY MORDA GURGUAG IS
CALLED ‘REMDHA’ AND FROM
THERE THE SMUGGLED PEOPLE ARE MOVED TO
DUBI, IRAN (GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES: 251508 N / 0551648 E), SHIRAZ,
IRAN ((GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES: 311037 N / 0532210 E) AND TEHRAN,
IRAN. IT IS UNKNOWN WHY THE BROTHERS ARE SMUGGLING
HUMANS INTO
ISLAMABAD 00002008 002 OF 004
IRAN.
9. SBU) IN JULY 2007 AND
2008 MORDA JAN GURGUAG APPROACHED YUSEF
ABOUT CAPTAINING A HASHISH
LADEN SMUGGLING DHOW, POSSIBLY THE AL
ZAFAR.
10. (SBU) MORDA GURGUAG
RECRUITED THE MASTER (CAPTAIN) FOR THE
TRAFFICKING DHOW IDENTIFIED
AS THE AL ZAFAR. THE AL ZAFAR WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY INTERDICTED BY
COALITION FORCES ON OCTOBER 1, 2008.
YUSEF MET WITH AND CONFIRMED
THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD CAPTAIN THE AL
ZAFAR. PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, AKHTAR ALI BOSH AND MORDA
GURGUAG GAVE
THE AL ZAFAR CAPTAIN 50,000
PAKISTAN RUPEES ($684.00 U.S. DOLLARS)
TO FIND A CREW IN GWADAR,
PAKISTAN AND TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES. NINE
MEN
WHO WERE WAITING AT THE PORT
IN SEARCH OF WORK WERE ASKED TO TAKE
THE VOYAGE SOUTH TO HELP
DELIVER THE HASHISH. EACH OF THE NINE
MEN
WERE PAID 5,000 PAKISTAN
RUPEES ($68.00 U.S. DOLLARS) TO PURCHASE
THEIR OWN SUPPLIES AND MEET
AT THE AL ZAFAR IN THREE DAYS.
11. (SBU) IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
THEIR FISHERMAN IDENTIFICATION, THE MEN
PROVIDED TWO PASSPORT PHOTOS
AND THEIR PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS
TO THE AL ZAFAR
CAPTAIN. ON SEPTEMBER 18, 2008, UPON
ARRIVAL TO THE
AL ZAFAR, AKHTAR ALI BOSH
AND THE AL ZAFAR CAPTAIN GAVE THE CREW
THEIR NEW FISHERMAN
IDENTIFICATION CARDS. ON THE SAME DATE,
THE AL
ZAFAR CREW, INCLUDING THE
CAPTAIN, DEPARTED GWADAR, PAKISTAN AND
STARTED THEIR VOYAGE ON A
HEADING OF 180 DEGREES. THE AL ZAFAR
TRAVELED APPROXIMATELY SEVEN
NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF GWADAR,
PAKISTAN AND WAS INSTRUCTED
TO HOLD UNTIL A CALL WAS RECEIVED FROM
YUSEF.
12. (SBU) ON SEPTEMBER 18,
2008, AT APPROXIMATELY 12:00 PM, THE AL
ZAFAR CAPTAIN RECEIVED A
CALL FROM YUSEF AND WAS INSTRUCTED BY YUSEF
TO TRAVEL WEST TO RAS
PISHUKAN, PAKISTAN (GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
250600 N / 0620500 E) WHERE
HE WOULD RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
FROM NAZIR LAST NAME UNKNOWN
TO SET UP AN EVENING TO LOAD THE
HASHISH ABOARD THE AL
ZAFAR. ON SEPTEMBER 19, 2008, AT
APPROXIMATELY 8:00 PM, NAZIR
LNU CONTACTED THE AL ZAFAR CAPTAIN AND
INITIATED THE DELIVERY OF
THE HASHISH CONTAINED WITHIN TWO SPEED
BOATS. THE SPEED BOATS WERE WHITE WITH A RED STRIPE
ON THE SIDE,
APPROXIMATELY NINE METERS IN
LENGTH WITH ONE LARGE OUTBOARD MOTOR.
NAZIR LNU USED FOUR MEN AND
THE AL ZAFAR CREW TO TRANSFER
APPROXIMATELY THREE METRIC
TONS OF HASHISH FROM THE SPEED BOATS TO
THE AL ZAFAR WHICH TOOK
APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR.
13. (SBU) THE AL ZAFAR CREW
WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE CAPTAIN TO PLACE
THE HASHISH IN THE EMPTY
VOIDS OF THE DIESEL TANKS IN THE LOWER DECK
OF THE ENGINEERING
COMPARTMENT.
14. (SBU) FROM SEPTEMBER 19,
2008 TO SEPTEMBER 24, 2008, THE AL
ZAFAR TRAVELED AT A SPEED OF
APPROXIMATELY SIX KNOTS AND AVOIDED
OMAN AND YEMEN TERRITORIAL
WATERS.
15. (SBU) ON SEPTEMBER 24,
2008, THE AL ZAFAR WAS INSTRUCTED BY
YUSEF TO START A HEADING OF
190 DEGREES AND AWAIT FURTHER
INSTRUCTIONS.
16. (SBU) ON OCTOBER 1,
2008, THE AL ZAFAR RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS
FROM YUSEF TO HEAD TOWARD
THE COAST OF AL MAKALLA, YEMEN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
143431 N / 0490634 E).
17. (SBU) THE HASHISH THAT
WAS LOADED ONBOARD THE DHOW AL ZAFAR WAS
PROVIDED BY KHALID LNU. KHALID ACQUIRES THE HASHISH VIA CONTACTS IN
GIRDI JANGLE, PAKISTAN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES: 290721 N / 0643425
E) AND TRANSPORTS THE
HASHISH TO DHOWS OWNED BY YUSEF AND OTHER
HASHISH TRAFFICKERS YET TO
BE IDENTIFIED. KHALID PAYS FOR THE
HASHISH SHIPMENTS USING THE
HAWALA SYSTEM. KHALID INFORMS HIS
HAWALADAR TO CONTACT A
HAWALADAR IN AFGHANISTAN TO PAY THE HASHISH
CULTIVATORS A CERTAIN
(UNKNOWN AMOUNT) AMOUNT OF MONEY TO PACKAGE
AND SHIP THE HASHISH INTO
IRAN. KHALID IS A VERY WEALTHY MAN AND
HAS INFLUENTIAL CONTACTS ALL
OVER THE REGION
(IRAN/AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN). KHALID REPORTEDLY TRAFFICS HASHISH
ONLY.
18. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE DEA AGENTS MANUAL SECTION 6242.11,
THIS TELETYPE WAS PREPARED
IN LIEU OF A DEA-6, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION.
19. (U) PLEASE DIRECT ANY
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE INFORMATION IN
THIS CABLE TO SA JOE
LABENBURG OR ACTING COUNTRY ATTACH MICHAEL W.
ISLAMABAD 00002008 003 OF 004
BROWN AT PHONE NUMBER
011-92-51-208-2747.
INDEXING
1. MULLAH YUSEF — NADDIS NEGATIVE
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION
NARCOTICS SOURCE OF SUPPLY; CITIZENSHIP
PAKISTAN NATIONAL;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY PAKISTANI / BALUCHI; AGE
60-65 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF
BIRTH TURBET, PAKISTAN; HEIGHT 6 FEET 0
INCHES; WEIGHT 160-170 LBS;
BUILD MEDIUM; DOMINANT HAND RIGHT;
FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN
WITH A LONG WHITE BALUCH STYLE MUSTACHE
THAT HE TRIES TO COVER BY
DYING IT RED; HEAD HAIR BALD; EYE COLOR
BROWN; GLASSES NONE; TEETH
YELLOWISH; SKIN TONE PALE BROWN SKIN;
RELIGION/SECT MUSLIM/SUNNI;
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES/CHARACTERISTICS
WEARS A TRADITIONAL BALUCHI HEAD CAP; EDUCATION NO SCHOOL BUT
INTELLIGENT, UNDERSTANDS
PHONES AND COMPUTERS; LANGUAGES-BALUCHI,
URDU, ARABIC, FARSI; CONTACT
INFORMATION MOBILE PHONE 032118060190;
MARITAL STATUS MARRIED WITH
TWO SONS AND UNKNOWN NUMBER OF
DAUGHTERS; YOUNGER SON IS 13
TO 14 YEARS OLD AND STUDYING IN
KARACHI, PAKISTAN; OTHER SON
IS ALWAYS WITH YUSEF; VEHICLE ONE NEW
WHITE, FOUR WHEEL DRIVE
TOYOTA LAND CRUISER WITH A PAKISTAN LICENSE
PLATE
2. KHALID LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU) — NADDIS
INCONCLUSIVE
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION
HASHISH SOURCE OF SUPPLY; CITIZENSHIP
IRANIAN;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY; IRANIAN / BALUCHI; AGE APPROXIMATELY
25 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF BIRTH
UNKNOWN; HEIGHT 5 FEET 8 INCHES;
WEIGHT 170 LBS; BUILD
MEDIUM/STRONG LOOKING; FACIAL HAIR CLEAN
SHAVEN WITH SMALL BLACK
MUSTACHE; HEAD HAIR BLACK WELL CUT ONE INCH
ALL AROUND; EYE COLOR BROWN;
GLASSES NONE; TEETH WHITE; SKIN TONE
BROWN; SKIN; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; DISTINGUISHING
FEATURES/CHARACTERISTICS
SMALL EARS/SOFT SPOKEN; LANGUAGES BALUCHI,
URDU, ARABIC; TRAVELS TO
IRAN OFTEN
3. BABU LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU) — NADDIS
INCONCLUSIVE
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF MULLAH YUSEF;
CITIZENSHIP PAKISTAN
NATIONAL; NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY PAKISTANI /
BALUCHI; AGE 36-37 YEARS
OLD; PLACE OF BIRTH UNKNOWN; RESIDES IN
TURBAT, PAKISTAN; HEIGHT 6′
FEET; WEIGHT UNKNOWN; BUILD THIN; FACIAL
HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN WITH A
LONG MUSTACHE CURLED AT THE ENDS; HEAD HAIR
BLACK HAIR WITH A LITTLE
GREY; EYE COLOR BLACK; GLASSES NONE; TEETH
NORMAL BUT ROTTING; SKIN
TONE DARK SKINNED BLACK; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; LANGUAGES
BALUCHI, URDU, ENGLISH; VEHICLE TWO DOOR,
NEW, BLUE TOYOTA LAND
CRUISER OR NISSAN PATHFINDER; HOME ADDRESS
UNKNOWN; BODYGUARDS THREE OR
FOUR BODYGUARDS THAT CARRY AUTOMAT
KALASHNIKOV (AK-47) RIFLES
AND 9 X 19MM PISTOLS
4. MORDA JAN GURGUAG —
NADDIS NEGATIVE
GURGUAG IS A TRIBAL OR
SURNAME; ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION HEAD
HUNTER FOR MULLAH YUSEF AND
HUMAN TRAFFICKER BETWEEN IRAN AND
PAKISTAN; CITIZENSHIP IRAN
AND PAKISTAN; NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY
IRANIAN / BALUCHI; AGE 35
YEARS OLD; PLACE OF BIRTH IRAN; HEIGHT 6
FEET 3 INCHES; WEIGHT 190
LBS; BUILD LARGE; FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN
WITH BALUCHI MUSTACHE DYED
RED; HEAD HAIR LONG BLACK HAIR DOWN TO
THE MIDDLE OF THE NECK THAT
IS KEPT SLICKED BACK; EYE COLOR BROWN;
GLASSES NONE; TEETH WHITE;
SKIN TONE PALE BROWN; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; LANGUAGES
BALUCHI, URDU, FARSI; CONTACT INFORMATION
MOBILE PHONE 03213400081;
MARITAL STATUS MARRIED WITH 3 OR 4
CHILDREN; RESIDE WITH
YOUNGER BROTHER MOHAMMED GUL GURGUAG; VEHICLE
TOYOTA LAND CRUISER; HOME
ADDRESS LIVES IN BALAK, IRAN; TRAVELS
CHAH BAHAR, NOKEANDI, IRAN,
GWADAR, PAKISTAN;
5. MOHAMMED GUL GURGUAG — NADDIS NEGATIVE
GURGUAG IS HIS TRIBAL OR
SURNAME; ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION HUMAN
TRAFFICKER BETWEEN IRAN AND
PAKISTAN; CITIZENSHIP IRAN AND PAKISTAN;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY
IRANIAN / BALUCHI; AGE 22 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF
BIRTH IRAN; HEIGHT 5 FEET 11
INCHES; WEIGHT 200 LBS; BUILD LARGE;
FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN
WITH A SMALL MUSTACHE; HEAD HAIR BLACK TWO
INCHES FLUFFY; EYE COLOR
BROWN; GLASSES NONE; SKIN TONE PALE BROWN
SKIN; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; LANGUAGES BALUCHI, FARSI; VEHICLE
SHARES TOYOTA LAND CRUISER
WITH BROTHER MORDA GURGUAG; HOME ADDRESS
LIVES IN BALAK, IRAN;
LOCATIONS FREQUENTED CHAH BAHAR AND NOKEANDI,
IRAN AND GWADAR, PAKISTAN
6. AKHTAR ALI BOSH — NADDIS NEGATIVE
BOSH IS HIS TRIBAL NAME;
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION CLOSE ASSOCIATE
ISLAMABAD 00002008 004 OF 004
AND DRIVER OF MULLAH YUSEF,
POSSIBLE BROTHER IN LAW OF YUSEF;
CITIZENSHIP PAKISTAN;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY PAKISTANI / BALUCHI; AGE
21-22 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF
BIRTH UNKNOWN; HEIGHT 5 FEET 7 INCHES;
WEIGHT 145 LBS; BUILD
SKINNY; FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN WITH BALUCHI
MUSTACHE; HEAD HAIR LONG
BLACK HAIR WORN SLICKED BACK; EYE COLOR
BROWN; GLASSES NONE; TEETH
WHITE; SKIN TONE PALE BROWN;
RELIGION/SECT MUSLIM/SUNNI;
LANGUAGES BALUCHI, URDU; CONTACT
INFORMATION MOBILE PHONE
03218061070; MARITAL STATUS MARRIED / NO
CHILDREN; VEHICLE TOYOTA
LAND CRUISER OWNED BY YUSEF
PATTERSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 221983
date: 8/24/2009 12:03
refid: 09DUSHANBE996
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9556
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0996/01 2361203
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 241203Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 0680
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE 1421
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000996
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PTER,
KJUS, KDRG, TI
SUBJECT: FORMER GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES APPROACH EMBASSY, REQUEST
MEDICAL RECORDS AND
COMPENSATION
CLASSIFIED BY: Matt Purl,
A/DCM, POL, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (c), (d)
1. (C/NF) On August 12 Shafi
Rakhimovich Salikhov (as spelled in
his Tajik passport) walked
into the embassy, and asked to speak
with an embassy
officer. Local guards briefly
interviewed him,
then referred him to the
Assistant Regional Security Officer.
Salikhov explained to the
A/RSO that he had received medical
treatment while held at
Guantanamo, and that he needed
documentation of his
detention and his medical records there in
order to advance
bureaucratic proceedings related to his health
and pension in
Tajikistan. He also expressed interest
in
obtaining compensation from
the USG for harm to his health
stemming from mistreatment
he claimed to have suffered at the
hands of guards at
Guantanamo. A/RSO advised Salikhov that
he
would pass the request to
the proper authorities, and Salikhov
then left the embassy.
3. (C/NF) We believe this is
the same person as Maroof
Saleemovich Salehove
(partial ISN 208), held at Guantanamo from
2003 to 2005, then returned
to Tajikistan. His Tajik passport
indicates his date of birth
as 3 March, 1978.
4. (C/NF) Salikhov returned
to the embassy on August 21 to check
on the status of his
request. Emboff told him the request was
still pending. Emboff asked Salikhov what harm he had
suffered
while detained at Guantanamo
Bay. Salikhov became evasive, and
said he did not want to
describe the abuse he allegedly faced.
When pressed for specifics,
he said guards had knocked him down
with a blow to the head,
then several had lain on top of him.
He said this had happened
«too many times to recall» during his
detention at
Guantanamo. He added that when he was
released
from Guantanamo some guards
apologized to him for the ill
treatment. Salikhov said he could not work because of
his
injuries and associated
mental problems; he was living with his
parents in Kurgan Teppe.
5. (C/NF) With Salikhov on
the August 21 visit was Mehrabon
Faizuloevich Odinaev, DOB 11
October, 1962 as stated in his
Tajik passport. Odinaev said he also had been held at
Guantanamo, from 2002 to
2007, and asked for compensation from
the USG for his time there
and for damage to his health which he
had suffered while at
Guantanamo Bay. He said he suffered from
nervous and heart problems,
and could not stand for long periods
of time [note: he walked a
few hundred meters to the front of
the embassy, and away from
the embassy following the meeting].
Contradicting his assertion
that his poor health prevented him
from working, he added that
we wished to go to Russia to find
work, but could not enter
Russia because of his association with
Guantanamo. Odinaev said he had been taken prisoner in
Kandahar
in January 2002, while
traveling back to Tajikistan from a visit
to his son who was studying
in Pakistan, and was «sold by Dostum
to the Americans.» He said he was now living with his wife and
four children in Dushanbe,
and he insisted he never had any
connection to terrorism or
insurgency. His main interest seemed
to be in obtaining
compensation for his lost time in Guantanamo.
6. (C/NF) Odinaev appears to
be the same as Mehrubon Odinaev
(ISN 077), departed
Guantanamo on 31 March 2004. Post does
not
know why he said he was held
at Guantanamo until 2007, and this
may simply have been a
misunderstanding in translation from
Tajik to English.
7. (C/NF) Emboff asked both
Salikhov and Odinaev whether Tajik
security personnel had
abused them in any way since their return
to Tajikistan. Both said that upon return to Tajikistan they
were held in temporary
investigative detention for a few weeks,
then released. While in detention they were not abused, they
said.
8. (C/NF) Post also has
received from the OSCE mission to
Tajikistan an electronic
copy of a letter, dated April 6, 2009,
from Zainulabidin Merozhev
(ISN 1095) to the FOIA office of the
Defense Department,
requesting his medical records from his time
at Guantanamo. The letter notes that he is represented in a
habeas corpus case in the
U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia by Reed Smith,
LLP of Washington, DC. Merozhev
seeks his Guantanamo medical
history in order to «receive proper
and immediate medical
care.» Merozhev has not approached
the
Embassy.
9. (U) Post requests
Department guidance on how to respond to
these requests.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 222064
date: 8/24/2009 21:25
refid: 09STATE88234
origin: Secretary of State
classification:
SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 09ASTANA1210
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #8234 2362143
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 242125Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASTANA 3162
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 088234
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2034
TAGS: PINR, PGOV, PHUM,
PREL, SOCI, CH, KG, KZ, TI
SUBJECT: (SBU) KUDOS FOR REPORTING ON VIOLENCE IN WESTERN
CHINA (C-RE9-01741)
REF: ASTANA 001210
Classified By: MICHAEL P.
OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (S/NF)
WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE FOLLOWING THE RECENT
VIOLENCE AGAINST ETHNIC
UIGHURS IN XINJIANG, CHINA. REFTEL
OFFERED KEY INSIGHTS INTO
THE CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN HAN CHINESE AND
UIGHURS FUELING THIS UNREST. REFTEL
ALSO INDICATED THE NEGATIVE
EFFECT THAT CONTINUED UNREST MAY
HAVE ON KAZAKHSTAN DUE TO
KAZAKHSTAN’S OWN LARGE UIGHUR
POPULATION AND CLOSE
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. WE
WOULD APPRECIATE ANY
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION POST CAN PROVIDE
REGARDING CENTRAL ASIAN
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE ONGOING
CONFLICT, AS TIME AND
RESOURCES PREMIT.
A. (SBU)
HOW HAVE CENTRAL ASIAN GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN
KAZAKHSTAN, REACTED TO THE
EVENTS IN URUMQI? ARE THERE ANY
INDICATIONS THAT THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO ENLIST
THE COOPERATION OF CENTRAL
ASIAN GOVERNMENTS TO DEAL WITH THE
AFTERMATH?
B. (SBU)
HOW HAVE THE ETHNIC-UIGHUR COMMUNITIES OF CENTRAL
ASIAN STATES (KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN, AND
TAJIKISTAN)—ESPECIALLY IN
KAZAKHSTAN—REACTED TO THE EVENTS
IN URUMQI? PLEASE INCLUDE
ANY INFORMATION ON PUBLIC PROTESTS
AGAINST THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT’S ACTIONS.
C. (SBU)
ARE THERE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED OR UNUSUAL
ACTIVITY AT BORDER CROSSINGS
BETWEEN CENTRAL ASIAN STATES AND
CHINA IN RESPONSE TO EVENTS
IN URUMQI?
2. (U)
PLEASE CITE C-RE9-01741 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE
ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 222082
date: 8/25/2009 1:38
refid: 09ISLAMABAD2014
origin: Embassy Islamabad
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0107
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHIL #2014/01 2370138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250138Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
4439
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0790
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0418
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
5397
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
0652
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 1870
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04
ISLAMABAD 002014
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEA HQ FOR: OC/HARRIGAN,
ODS/MASUMOTO,
OE/SHROYER/SHIGETA/VASQUEZ/ROSPOND,
SOD/EDDINGTON/LENARTOWICZ/QUINN/MCMURRY,
OSOC/HAMLET/MILIONE/KEARNEY,
OGE/MENDOSA/SCHRETTNER
E.O. 12958: NA
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: GFXZ-08-9180/MULLAH YUSEF DTO INTEL PASSED TO
PAKISTAN
CUSTOMS
1. (SBU) ON AUGUST 18, 2009,
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) JOSEPH LABENBURG
BRIEFED PAKISTAN
CUSTOMS-PREVENTIVE, SOUTHERN ZONE, KARACHI,
PAKISTAN, WITH THE FOLLOWING INTELLIGENCE ON MULTI-TON HASHISH
TRAFFICKER MULLAH
YUSEF. THIS INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING WILL
ASSIST
PAKISTAN CUSTOMS PREVENTIVE
WITH AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION TARGETING
YUSEF AND HIS DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION (DTO). THE ICO
INTELLIGENCE WILL ALSO
ASSIST PAKISTAN CUSTOMS WITH OBTAINING A
PERPETUAL ARREST WARRANT (A
PAKISTAN PERPETUAL WARRANT WILL
AUTOMATICALLY RENEW EACH
MONTH) ON YUSEF. SA LABENBURG ALSO
PROVIDED PAKISTAN CUSTOMS
WITH A WRITTEN ASSESSMENT CONTAINING THE
INFORMATION IN THIS CABLE.
(AGENTS NOTE: ALL INFORMATION IN THIS
CABLE RELATED TO YUSEF IS
UNCLASSIFIED.)
2. (SBU) YUSEF IS A
MULTI-TON HASHISH SOURCE OF SUPPLY (SOS) WHO
CLANDESTINELY TRANS-SHIPS
LARGE HASHISH CONSIGNMENTS FROM THE MAKRAN
COAST, PAKISTAN TO AL
MAKALLA, YEMEN (GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
143303 N / 0490743 E) AND
UNKNOWN PORTS LOCATED IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA. YUSEF IS A SOS WHO WILL SUPPLY ANYONE WILLING
TO PAY FOR
HIS SERVICES.
3. (SBU) YUSEF’S PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN KOLONCH,
PAKISTAN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
252900 N / 0624400 E), NEXT TO AMBI
BAZAAR, PAKISTAN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES: 252200 N / 0624400 E).
THE DIRT ROAD THAT ENTERS
HIS MAIN RESIDENCE IS APPROXIMATELY TEN
FEET WIDE AND ABLE TO
FACILITATE SINGLE LANE TRAFFIC. THE DIRT
ROAD
APPROACHES FROM THE NORTH
AND IS LINED WITH SMALL HOUSES. ON THE
EASTERN SIDE OF YUSEF’S
PROPERTY IS A MOSQUE WITH A BALOCHI IMAM
NAMED BRAVI THAT IS USED BY
EVERYONE IN YUSEF’S NEIGHBORHOOD.
4. (SBU) YUSEF’S MAIN HOUSE
IS LOCATED ON THE WESTERN PORTION OF HIS
PROPERTY. YUSEF’S HOUSE HAS FOUR FLOORS WITH AN UNKNOWN
NUMBER OF
ROOMS. THE MAIN HOUSE IS SEPARATED FROM THE GUEST
HOUSE BY A 500
METER WALL THAT IS
APPROXIMATELY TWO METERS TALL. THE GUEST
HOUSE
IS APPROXIMATELY 400 METERS
EAST OF THE MAIN HOUSE AND APPROXIMATELY
100 METERS AWAY FROM THE
SEPARATING WALL AND 500 METERS FROM THE
MOSQUE LOCATED ON YUSEF’S
PROPERTY. THE GUEST HOUSE HAS TWO
BEDROOMS AND ONE BATHROOM
LOCATED IN THE SOUTHEASTERN BEDROOM. THE
DOOR TO THE GUEST HOUSE IS
LOCATED ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE HOUSE AND
THERE ARE TWO WINDOWS
LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SIDES.
THERE IS A CAR PORT LOCATED
30 METERS NORTH OF THE GUEST HOUSE.
5. (SBU) YUSEF OWNS TWO
JELIBUT TYPE DHOWS THAT ARE PORTED IN
GWADAR, PAKISTAN. THE DHOWS ARE APPROXIMATELY 45 FEET LONG WITH
A
PILOT HOUSE AT THE AFT
END. THE DHOWS ARE CREWED BY UNKNOWN
PERSONNEL. IT IS UNKNOWN IF ANY MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN
MADE TO THE
DHOWS. YUSEF REPORTEDLY HOLDS INDIVIDUALS AS
COLLATERAL DURING DRUG
DEALINGS WITH
CUSTOMERS. YUSEF CAN OBTAIN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
FOR
ANYONE WORKING FOR HIM.
6. (SBU) JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES INVOLVED IN MULLAH
YUSEF’S DRUG TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON
THE SEIZURE OF HASHISH LADEN
DHOW AL ZAFAR:
7. (SBU) A MAN NAMED ‘BABU’
LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU): BABU IS
EMPLOYED BY YUSEF AS A
HASHISH COURIER AND POSSIBLY OTHER CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES. BABU TRAVELS WITH THREE TO FOUR ARMED MEN WHO
EACH
CARRY ONE AK-47 AUTOMATIC
RIFLE AND ONE DERA 9MM PISTOL. BABU AND
HIS MEN HAVE ALTERED VEHICLES
IN ORDER TO CARRY DRUGS TO SPEED BOATS
OWNED BY YUSEF. THE SPEED BOATS ARE USED TO DELIVER HASHISH
TO
DHOWS OWNED BY YUSEF, IN
GWADAR, PAKISTAN.
8. (SBU) MORDA JAN GURGUAG
AND MOHAMMED GUL GURGUAG: MORDA JAN
GURGUAG AND MOHAMMED GUL
GURGUAG ARE BROTHERS AND WORK AS DRUG AND
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
FACILITATORS FOR YUSEF. GURGUAG IS THE
BROTHER’S
TRIBAL NAME. THE MAIN JOB FOR MORDA GURGUAG AND MOHAMMED
GURGUAG IS
TO CONDUCT HUMAN SMUGGLING
OPERATIONS FROM GWADAR, PAKISTAN TO
NOKANDAN, IRAN. THE BROTHERS REPORTEDLY USE A BLUE TOYOTA
LAND
CRUISER WITH LARGER ALL
TERRAIN TIRES SO THEY CAN TRAVEL ACROSS THE
BORDER IN ANY SEASON OR
TERRAIN. MORDA GURGUAG HAS CONTACTS
(UNKNOWN) AT THE
IRANIAN/PAKISTAN BORDER STATION THAT HE BRIBES WITH
2000 IRANIAN RIALS ($217.00
U.S. DOLLARS) IN ORDER TO SMUGGLE PEOPLE
FROM IRAN INTO
PAKISTAN. MORDA GURGUAG ALSO HAS
CONTACTS (UNKNOWN)
AT THE PAKISTAN/IRAN BORDER
THAT HE BRIBES WITH 2000 PAKISTAN RUPEES
($23.00 U.S. DOLLARS). THE BORDER CROSSING USED BY MORDA GURGUAG IS
CALLED ‘REMDHA’ AND FROM
THERE THE SMUGGLED PEOPLE ARE MOVED TO
DUBI, IRAN (GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES: 251508 N / 0551648 E), SHIRAZ,
IRAN ((GEOGRAPHICAL
COORDINATES: 311037 N / 0532210 E) AND TEHRAN,
IRAN. IT IS UNKNOWN WHY THE BROTHERS ARE SMUGGLING
HUMANS INTO
ISLAMABAD 00002014 002.2 OF 004
IRAN.
9. SBU) IN JULY 2007 AND
2008 MORDA JAN GURGUAG APPROACHED YUSEF
ABOUT CAPTAINING A HASHISH
LADEN SMUGGLING DHOW, POSSIBLY THE AL
ZAFAR.
10. (SBU) MORDA GURGUAG
RECRUITED THE MASTER (CAPTAIN) FOR THE
TRAFFICKING DHOW IDENTIFIED
AS THE AL ZAFAR. THE AL ZAFAR WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY INTERDICTED BY
COALITION FORCES ON OCTOBER 1, 2008.
YUSEF MET WITH AND CONFIRMED
THE INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD CAPTAIN THE AL
ZAFAR. PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, AKHTAR ALI BOSH AND MORDA
GURGUAG GAVE
THE AL ZAFAR CAPTAIN 50,000
PAKISTAN RUPEES ($684.00 U.S. DOLLARS)
TO FIND A CREW IN GWADAR,
PAKISTAN AND TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES. NINE
MEN
WHO WERE WAITING AT THE PORT
IN SEARCH OF WORK WERE ASKED TO TAKE
THE VOYAGE SOUTH TO HELP
DELIVER THE HASHISH. EACH OF THE NINE
MEN
WERE PAID 5,000 PAKISTAN
RUPEES ($68.00 U.S. DOLLARS) TO PURCHASE
THEIR OWN SUPPLIES AND MEET
AT THE AL ZAFAR IN THREE DAYS.
11. (SBU) IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
THEIR FISHERMAN IDENTIFICATION, THE MEN
PROVIDED TWO PASSPORT PHOTOS
AND THEIR PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION CARDS
TO THE AL ZAFAR
CAPTAIN. ON SEPTEMBER 18, 2008, UPON
ARRIVAL TO THE
AL ZAFAR, AKHTAR ALI BOSH
AND THE AL ZAFAR CAPTAIN GAVE THE CREW
THEIR NEW FISHERMAN
IDENTIFICATION CARDS. ON THE SAME DATE,
THE AL
ZAFAR CREW, INCLUDING THE
CAPTAIN, DEPARTED GWADAR, PAKISTAN AND
STARTED THEIR VOYAGE ON A
HEADING OF 180 DEGREES. THE AL ZAFAR
TRAVELED APPROXIMATELY SEVEN
NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF GWADAR,
PAKISTAN AND WAS INSTRUCTED
TO HOLD UNTIL A CALL WAS RECEIVED FROM
YUSEF.
12. (SBU) ON SEPTEMBER 18,
2008, AT APPROXIMATELY 12:00 PM, THE AL
ZAFAR CAPTAIN RECEIVED A
CALL FROM YUSEF AND WAS INSTRUCTED BY YUSEF
TO TRAVEL WEST TO RAS
PISHUKAN, PAKISTAN (GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
250600 N / 0620500 E) WHERE
HE WOULD RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
FROM NAZIR LAST NAME UNKNOWN
TO SET UP AN EVENING TO LOAD THE
HASHISH ABOARD THE AL
ZAFAR. ON SEPTEMBER 19, 2008, AT
APPROXIMATELY 8:00 PM, NAZIR
LNU CONTACTED THE AL ZAFAR CAPTAIN AND
INITIATED THE DELIVERY OF
THE HASHISH CONTAINED WITHIN TWO SPEED
BOATS. THE SPEED BOATS WERE WHITE WITH A RED STRIPE
ON THE SIDE,
APPROXIMATELY NINE METERS IN
LENGTH WITH ONE LARGE OUTBOARD MOTOR.
NAZIR LNU USED FOUR MEN AND
THE AL ZAFAR CREW TO TRANSFER
APPROXIMATELY THREE METRIC
TONS OF HASHISH FROM THE SPEED BOATS TO
THE AL ZAFAR WHICH TOOK
APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR.
13. (SBU) THE AL ZAFAR CREW
WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE CAPTAIN TO PLACE
THE HASHISH IN THE EMPTY
VOIDS OF THE DIESEL TANKS IN THE LOWER DECK
OF THE ENGINEERING
COMPARTMENT.
14. (SBU) FROM SEPTEMBER 19,
2008 TO SEPTEMBER 24, 2008, THE AL
ZAFAR TRAVELED AT A SPEED OF
APPROXIMATELY SIX KNOTS AND AVOIDED
OMAN AND YEMEN TERRITORIAL
WATERS.
15. (SBU) ON SEPTEMBER 24,
2008, THE AL ZAFAR WAS INSTRUCTED BY
YUSEF TO START A HEADING OF
190 DEGREES AND AWAIT FURTHER
INSTRUCTIONS.
16. (SBU) ON OCTOBER 1,
2008, THE AL ZAFAR RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS
FROM YUSEF TO HEAD TOWARD
THE COAST OF AL MAKALLA, YEMEN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES:
143431 N / 0490634 E).
17. (SBU) THE HASHISH THAT
WAS LOADED ONBOARD THE DHOW AL ZAFAR WAS
PROVIDED BY KHALID LNU. KHALID ACQUIRES THE HASHISH VIA CONTACTS IN
GIRDI JANGLE, PAKISTAN
(GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES: 290721 N / 0643425
E) AND TRANSPORTS THE
HASHISH TO DHOWS OWNED BY YUSEF AND OTHER
HASHISH TRAFFICKERS YET TO
BE IDENTIFIED. KHALID PAYS FOR THE
HASHISH SHIPMENTS USING THE
HAWALA SYSTEM. KHALID INFORMS HIS
HAWALADAR TO CONTACT A
HAWALADAR IN AFGHANISTAN TO PAY THE HASHISH
CULTIVATORS A CERTAIN
(UNKNOWN AMOUNT) AMOUNT OF MONEY TO PACKAGE
AND SHIP THE HASHISH INTO
IRAN. KHALID IS A VERY WEALTHY MAN AND
HAS INFLUENTIAL CONTACTS ALL
OVER THE REGION
(IRAN/AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN). KHALID REPORTEDLY TRAFFICS HASHISH
ONLY.
18. (U) IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE DEA AGENTS MANUAL SECTION 6242.11,
THIS TELETYPE WAS PREPARED
IN LIEU OF A DEA-6, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION.
19. (U) PLEASE DIRECT ANY
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE INFORMATION IN
THIS CABLE TO SA JOE
LABENBURG OR ACTING COUNTRY ATTACH MICHAEL W.
ISLAMABAD 00002014 003 OF 004
BROWN AT PHONE NUMBER
011-92-51-208-2747.
INDEXING
1. MULLAH YUSEF — NADDIS NEGATIVE
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION NARCOTICS
SOURCE OF SUPPLY; CITIZENSHIP
PAKISTAN NATIONAL;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY PAKISTANI / BALUCHI; AGE
60-65 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF
BIRTH TURBET, PAKISTAN; HEIGHT 6 FEET 0
INCHES; WEIGHT 160-170 LBS;
BUILD MEDIUM; DOMINANT HAND RIGHT;
FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN
WITH A LONG WHITE BALUCH STYLE MUSTACHE
THAT HE TRIES TO COVER BY
DYING IT RED; HEAD HAIR BALD; EYE COLOR
BROWN; GLASSES NONE; TEETH
YELLOWISH; SKIN TONE PALE BROWN SKIN;
RELIGION/SECT MUSLIM/SUNNI;
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES/CHARACTERISTICS
WEARS A TRADITIONAL BALUCHI HEAD CAP; EDUCATION NO SCHOOL BUT
INTELLIGENT, UNDERSTANDS
PHONES AND COMPUTERS; LANGUAGES-BALUCHI,
URDU, ARABIC, FARSI; CONTACT
INFORMATION MOBILE PHONE 032118060190;
MARITAL STATUS MARRIED WITH
TWO SONS AND UNKNOWN NUMBER OF
DAUGHTERS; YOUNGER SON IS 13
TO 14 YEARS OLD AND STUDYING IN
KARACHI, PAKISTAN; OTHER SON
IS ALWAYS WITH YUSEF; VEHICLE ONE NEW
WHITE, FOUR WHEEL DRIVE
TOYOTA LAND CRUISER WITH A PAKISTAN LICENSE
PLATE
2. KHALID LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU) — NADDIS INCONCLUSIVE
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION
HASHISH SOURCE OF SUPPLY; CITIZENSHIP
IRANIAN;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY; IRANIAN / BALUCHI; AGE APPROXIMATELY
25 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF BIRTH
UNKNOWN; HEIGHT 5 FEET 8 INCHES;
WEIGHT 170 LBS; BUILD
MEDIUM/STRONG LOOKING; FACIAL HAIR CLEAN
SHAVEN WITH SMALL BLACK
MUSTACHE; HEAD HAIR BLACK WELL CUT ONE INCH
ALL AROUND; EYE COLOR BROWN;
GLASSES NONE; TEETH WHITE; SKIN TONE
BROWN; SKIN; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; DISTINGUISHING
FEATURES/CHARACTERISTICS
SMALL EARS/SOFT SPOKEN; LANGUAGES BALUCHI,
URDU, ARABIC; TRAVELS TO
IRAN OFTEN
3. BABU LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU) — NADDIS
INCONCLUSIVE
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION
CRIMINAL ASSOCIATE OF MULLAH YUSEF;
CITIZENSHIP PAKISTAN
NATIONAL; NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY PAKISTANI /
BALUCHI; AGE 36-37 YEARS
OLD; PLACE OF BIRTH UNKNOWN; RESIDES IN
TURBAT, PAKISTAN; HEIGHT 6′
FEET; WEIGHT UNKNOWN; BUILD THIN; FACIAL
HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN WITH A
LONG MUSTACHE CURLED AT THE ENDS; HEAD HAIR
BLACK HAIR WITH A LITTLE
GREY; EYE COLOR BLACK; GLASSES NONE; TEETH
NORMAL BUT ROTTING; SKIN
TONE DARK SKINNED BLACK; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; LANGUAGES
BALUCHI, URDU, ENGLISH; VEHICLE TWO DOOR,
NEW, BLUE TOYOTA LAND
CRUISER OR NISSAN PATHFINDER; HOME ADDRESS
UNKNOWN; BODYGUARDS THREE OR
FOUR BODYGUARDS THAT CARRY AUTOMAT
KALASHNIKOV (AK-47) RIFLES
AND 9 X 19MM PISTOLS
4. MORDA JAN GURGUAG —
NADDIS NEGATIVE
GURGUAG IS A TRIBAL OR
SURNAME; ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION HEAD
HUNTER FOR MULLAH YUSEF AND
HUMAN TRAFFICKER BETWEEN IRAN AND
PAKISTAN; CITIZENSHIP IRAN
AND PAKISTAN; NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY
IRANIAN / BALUCHI; AGE 35
YEARS OLD; PLACE OF BIRTH IRAN; HEIGHT 6
FEET 3 INCHES; WEIGHT 190
LBS; BUILD LARGE; FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN
WITH BALUCHI MUSTACHE DYED
RED; HEAD HAIR LONG BLACK HAIR DOWN TO
THE MIDDLE OF THE NECK THAT
IS KEPT SLICKED BACK; EYE COLOR BROWN;
GLASSES NONE; TEETH WHITE;
SKIN TONE PALE BROWN; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; LANGUAGES
BALUCHI, URDU, FARSI; CONTACT INFORMATION
MOBILE PHONE 03213400081;
MARITAL STATUS MARRIED WITH 3 OR 4
CHILDREN; RESIDE WITH
YOUNGER BROTHER MOHAMMED GUL GURGUAG; VEHICLE
TOYOTA LAND CRUISER; HOME
ADDRESS LIVES IN BALAK, IRAN; TRAVELS
CHAH BAHAR, NOKEANDI, IRAN,
GWADAR, PAKISTAN;
5. MOHAMMED GUL GURGUAG — NADDIS NEGATIVE
GURGUAG IS HIS TRIBAL OR
SURNAME; ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION HUMAN
TRAFFICKER BETWEEN IRAN AND
PAKISTAN; CITIZENSHIP IRAN AND PAKISTAN;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY
IRANIAN / BALUCHI; AGE 22 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF
BIRTH IRAN; HEIGHT 5 FEET 11
INCHES; WEIGHT 200 LBS; BUILD LARGE;
FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN
WITH A SMALL MUSTACHE; HEAD HAIR BLACK TWO
INCHES FLUFFY; EYE COLOR
BROWN; GLASSES NONE; SKIN TONE PALE BROWN
SKIN; RELIGION/SECT
MUSLIM/SUNNI; LANGUAGES BALUCHI, FARSI; VEHICLE
SHARES TOYOTA LAND CRUISER
WITH BROTHER MORDA GURGUAG; HOME ADDRESS
LIVES IN BALAK, IRAN;
LOCATIONS FREQUENTED CHAH BAHAR AND NOKEANDI,
IRAN AND GWADAR, PAKISTAN
6. AKHTAR ALI BOSH — NADDIS NEGATIVE
BOSH IS HIS TRIBAL NAME;
ALIAS UNKNOWN; OCCUPATION CLOSE ASSOCIATE
ISLAMABAD 00002014 004 OF 004
AND DRIVER OF MULLAH YUSEF,
POSSIBLE BROTHER IN LAW OF YUSEF;
CITIZENSHIP PAKISTAN;
NATIONALITY/ETHNICITY PAKISTANI / BALUCHI; AGE
21-22 YEARS OLD; PLACE OF
BIRTH UNKNOWN; HEIGHT 5 FEET 7 INCHES;
WEIGHT 145 LBS; BUILD
SKINNY; FACIAL HAIR CLEAN SHAVEN WITH BALUCHI
MUSTACHE; HEAD HAIR LONG
BLACK HAIR WORN SLICKED BACK; EYE COLOR
BROWN; GLASSES NONE; TEETH
WHITE; SKIN TONE PALE BROWN;
RELIGION/SECT MUSLIM/SUNNI;
LANGUAGES BALUCHI, URDU; CONTACT
INFORMATION MOBILE PHONE
03218061070; MARITAL STATUS MARRIED / NO
CHILDREN; VEHICLE TOYOTA
LAND CRUISER OWNED BY YUSEF
PATTERSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 222164
date: 8/25/2009 11:19
refid: 09DUSHANBE997
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
09DUSHANBE21|09DUSHANBE954
header:
VZCZCXRO0458
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR
RUEHKUK RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHTRO RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0997/01 2371119
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251119Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0682
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0222
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0146
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
1423
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03
DUSHANBE 000997
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EINV, ENRG,
ELTN, PREL, TI, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN’S ROLE IN
TAJIKISTAN: LIMITED BUT INCREASING?
REF: A. DUSHANBE 954
B. DUSHANBE 021
DUSHANBE 00000997 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) Summary: After a
slow start, Iran has become a major
economic player in
Tajikistan. The vast bulk of Iranian
investment in Tajikistan is
direct state loans and grants for
major infrastructure
projects, including the Sangtuda-2
hydropower station, the
Istiqlol tunnel, and several highway
segments. The Tajik government has prioritized energy
and road
projects that help break its
transit dependence on unfriendly
neighbor Uzbekistan. For its part, Iran is interested in
gaining a foothold in the
Central Asian market. Despite the use
of Iranian companies on the
major government-funded projects,
Iranian trade with and
private investment in Tajikistan is
modest. Iranian companies are involved in
agriculture, food
production, and
construction. Iran’s efforts to
establish
closer political and
cultural ties with Tajikistan have been
more tentative. Although the countries share linguistic and
cultural ties, there remain
vast differences in religion and
mentality. End summary.
FOCUS REMAINS ON ROADS AND
POWER
2. (SBU) Although the
Islamic Republic of Iran was one of the
first countries to
acknowledge Tajikistan’s independence in
January 1992, until recently
it has played only a modest role in
Tajikistan’s economy. In recent years, however, Iran has become
involved in several
large-scale infrastructure projects, and now
ranks as the second-largest
foreign investor in Tajikistan,
after China (ref A). The government of Tajikistan has
prioritized investment in
its energy and transport sectors, in
part to decrease its
dependence on neighboring Uzbekistan, with
which it has very poor
relations. At the moment, all major
rail, road, and electricity
transmission lines to Tajikistan
pass through Uzbekistan,
which frequently has demonstrated a
willingness to block
supplies for little or no reason (ref B).
Iran is responding to this
priority by funding the construction
of the Sangtuda-2 hydropower
station, the Istiqlol Tunnel, and a
series of road segments.
3. (SBU) Iran’s single
largest investment in Tajikistan has been
its US $180 million
contribution to the construction of the
Sangtuda-2 hydropower
station on the Vakhsh River. The
220-Megawatt station’s two
turbines are scheduled to become
operational in late 2011, on
the twentieth anniversary of
Tajikistan’s
independence. The government of
Tajikistan
invested $40 million of its
own funding in the project, which is
being built by the Iranian
firm Farob under a Build, Operate,
Transfer arrangement. Iran will control Sangtuda-2 for the
first 12.5 years, during
which it can sell electricity to any
buyer it wishes, whether
inside or outside of Tajikistan. Like
the massive Roghun
hydropower project, the construction of
Sangtuda-2 began during the
Soviet era but halted after
Tajikistan’s
independence. The Iranians first
expressed
interest in the project in
1995, but due to the civil war and
other delays construction
did not begin until February 2006.
During bilateral discussions
in March 2008, Iranian Foreign
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki
emphasized Iran’s interest in
linking the Iranian and
Tajik national grids to increase the
capacity of both countries
to deal with spikes in consumption.
(It will be some time before
the grids are linked, however. New
transmission lines bypassing
Uzbekistan would have to be built
through Afghanistan.) Mottaki also expressed interest in having
Iranian companies invest in
two small-scale hydropower projects:
Shurob on the Vakhsh River
and Ayni on the Zerafshan River.
4. (U) The second largest
Iranian-funded project in Tajikistan
is the Istiqlol tunnel, on the
highway connecting the country’s
two largest cities, Dushanbe
and Khujand. The tunnel not only
shortens the travel time by
as much as five hours, but it allows
for year-round transit. The previous route involved a tortuous
road over 3,373-meter Anzob
pass that was open only 6 months a
year. The tunnel, which is being built by the
Iranian firm
Sobir, is being funded by a
US $21 million preferential loan and
a $5 million grant from the
Iranian government. The Tajik
government provided $14
million in its own funding. Although
there have been two grand
openings for the Istiqlol Tunnel — in
June, 2006 and again in July
2007 — it is still not fully
operational. The tunnel is often closed, and there are
frequent
problems with flooding,
ventilation, and lighting. The most
recent closure occurred at
the beginning of August, for
unspecified roadwork; the
tunnel is not scheduled to reopen
until October. After a 2008 visit by President Rahmon to
Iran,
President Ahmadinejad
promised to provide an additional U.S. $6
million to enable
ventilation, lighting, and other improvements
DUSHANBE 00000997 002.2 OF 003
in the tunnel. According to media reports, however, Iran has
so
far only delivered $1
million of the planned total.
5. (SBU) Note: Embassy staff
have experienced many of the
tunnel’s shortcomings. During a March visit the road surface
was coated with a thick
sheet of ice, pitted by craters as deep
as two feet. Several cars that had skidded out of control
and
collided with each other or
the tunnel walls littered the
roadway. By May the ice had been replaced by a torrent
of
running water, high enough
that an embassy vehicle began
floating near the northern
entrance to the tunnel. The journey
through the tunnel was made
more hazardous by rebar and other
sharp obstacles jutting out
from the tunnel floor. By June much
of the road surface had
improved. End note.
6. (U) Despite the problems
with Istiqlol, Sobir won another
tender in October 2007 to
work on a portion of the Shagon Zighar
road linking Kulob in
Khatlon Province with Darvaz in
Badakhshon. The $46 million project, being funded by the
Islamic Development Bank, is
a significant part of the upgrade
of the principal highway
linking Dushanbe with the eastern parts
of Tajikistan, known as the
Dushanbe-Kulyab-Darvaz-Khorog-Kulma-Karakorum
highway. The
portion under construction
weaves through some of the most
difficult terrain in the
country.
EVEN BIGGER PROJECTS UNDER
DISCUSSION
7. (U) In June 2003,
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran signed a
trilateral protocol
preparing for rail passenger and cargo
transfer from Tajikistan
through Afghanistan to Iran. In May
2007, President Rahmon made
a proposal to President Ahmadinejad
to attract Iranian companies
to begin constructing a railroad
from Kolhozabad, Tajikistan,
to Meshhed, Iran, via Nizhniy Pyanj
on the Tajik-Afghan border,
Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat.
He also proposed the
establishment of several free economic
zones in Tajikistan to
support international trade. Some of the
groundwork for establishing
this route may already be underway.
In March of this year,
President Rahmon launched construction of
the U.S. $130 million Vahdat-Yovon railway. So far the project
is being funded entirely by
the Tajik State Rail Company,
although the government
hopes to attract foreign investment.
Local media have reported
that construction has also begun to
connect Kolhozabad to
Nizhniy Pyanj. Taken together, the new
routes would link Dushanbe
to the Afghan border. On the other
side of Afghanistan, the
rail line linking the Iranian city of
Khavaf with Herat will
reportedly reduce transit costs between
the two countries
five-fold. According to the Iranian
Ministry
of Public Affairs, building
the railway through Afghanistan to
connect Iran with Tajikistan
will cost some US $4 billion, or $2
million per kilometer.
8. (U) Iran has expressed
tentative interest in investing in the
giant Roghun hydroelectric
project. Earlier this year, Russian
President Medvedev made
statements appearing to favor
Uzbekistan’s position that
Roghun fails to take into account
downstream countries’
interests. Local critics point out that
Uzbekistan promptly promised
to provide cheap gas to Russia,
suggesting a quid pro
quo. During a February press conference
in Dushanbe, Iranian
Ambassador Ali Ashghar Sherdust said Iran
was interested in helping
with Roghun.
TRADE AND DIRECT INVESTMENT
9. (U) Figures for
Iranian-Tajik trade are somewhat
inconsistent. According to Iranian sources, bilateral trade
between Iran and Tajikistan
has risen from US $40 million in
2000 to US $140 million in
2007, making Iran one
