Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 219891
date: 8/7/2009 10:54
refid: 09DUSHANBE955
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination:
header:
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DUSHANBE 000955
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/7/2019
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ECON, MASS, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR AUGUST 14-16 VISIT OF GENERAL
DAVID PETRAEUS
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia L Quast, Charge D’ Affairs, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe welcomes the upcoming visit of General
Petraeus. Following are an
overview of recent developments and
key issues in Tajikistan. Since
your last meeting with
President Rahmon on January 17, Rahmon has met with Assistant
Secretary of State Boucher on April 20 and Assistant Secretary
of State Blake on July 6, in Dushanbe.
KEY GOALS FOR YOUR VISIT
2. (C) The mission’s key goals for your visit are to:
— Help you to solidify your relationship with President Rahmon
and his security officials,
— Reiterate our appreciation for support with over flight
access. It greatly assists our
efforts in Afghanistan,
— Secure Rahmon’s agreement to accept transit of lethal
materials to Afghanistan through Tajikistan,
— Press Rahmon for further economic and political reforms in
the run-up to the February 2010 parliamentary elections,
— Assure Tajikistan of our support as it works to contain
militants in the east of the country.
INTERNAL RIVALS, MILITANT GROUPS, AND SUMMITRY
3. (C) The Tajik civil war ended with a power sharing
arrangement between Rahmon’s government and the leaders of
various elements of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Since
the end of the war, Rahmon gradually has reneged on this deal
and forced oppositionists out of government into prison, out of
the country, or they have died mysteriously.
4. (C) Mullah Abdullo Rahimov, a former UTO commander, returned
to Tajikistan from Afghanistan in mid-May, reportedly with
several foreign fighters. Since
then, security forces have
engaged in a series of confrontations with his group and with
other former Tajik opposition leaders in the Tavildara and
Darvaz districts. By late July
the government claimed to have
largely destroyed these small groups.
In this process the
preeminent former opposition figure (and former minister in the
postwar government) Mirzo Ziyoev was killed. The government
claims militants killed Ziyoev when he tried to persuade them to
surrender to the government, but there is evidence government
forces murdered him. This leaves
only one former opposition
leader still in the government.
5. (C) In mid-July security forces arrested three alleged
members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and
reported the men admitted to planning attacks in Tajikistan.
Not long after their arrest, three small bombs exploded in
Dushanbe. There was no known link
to the IMU arrests.
Observers here generally interpreted the first two bombings as
an effort to embarrass the government before the July 30 summit
meeting of the leaders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, and
Tajikistan. The third bomb, which
injured two police officers,
was judged to be purely criminal in motivation.
DUSHANBE 00000955 002 OF 006
6. (C) The summit covered energy, trade, security, and military
cooperation. Russia and
Tajikistan discussed the possibility of
Russia paying Tajikistan for basing the 201st Motorized Rifle
Division. Presidents Rahmon and
Medvedev participated in an
opening ceremony for the Sangtuda-1 hydropower station.
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan discussed energy and trade
cooperation, agreeing to look at ways to increase commerce
between Central and South Asia.
Overall, the summit represented
a nod by Russia to Tajikistan’s interests, and papered over
tensions over debts owed by Tajikistan to Russia, and
Tajikistan’s growing relationships with others such as the
United States, China, and Iran.
Tajikistan still faces chronic
problems with Uzbekistan, caused mainly by personal animosity
between the presidents of each country and Uzbek opposition to
Tajik plans to build dams on rivers Uzbekistan depends on for
agriculture.
SECURITY COOPERATION
7. (C) Security Cooperation remains a strong point in our
relationship with Tajikistan. The
Ministry of Defense
volunteered this year for the first time to host CENTCOM’s
Exercise Regional Cooperation, which concluded 10 August.
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan participated in the
disaster response exercise.
CENTCOM and the Tajik Armed Forces
held Consultative Staff Talks in May and established the FY 2010
Security Cooperation Plan. The
plan reflects Tajikistan’s
increased interest in demining and participation in the Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
The U.S. Army Humanitarian
Demining Research and Development Office will provide Tajikistan
a mechanical demining machine for field evaluation in FY10 with
a planned FMF purchase in FY11.
Tajikistan reconfirmed its
commitment to deploy a company sized peacekeeping unit in 2011.
Training begins this month with a National Policy White Paper
Workshop that will help shape development in the Ministry of
Defense and their Mobile Forces.
A General Staff level workshop
and actual unit training will take place next year. Recent
meetings between the SAO and General Staff Director of
Operations confirmed establishment of a working group at the
General Staff level and commitment to have the battalion ready
in 2010 for the unit training.
8. (C) CENTCOM Counter Narcotics: CENTCOM’s Counter Narcotics
program is making strong contributions to Tajikistan’s security.
Your last visit helped expand
CN’s engagement by establishing a
permanent DoD contracting officer in Bishkek to support the
Central Asian States. This year,
$16.9M in funding, recently
approved in the Supplemental Bill, will support construction of
an interagency National Training Center, infrastructure at the
Nizhny Pyanj Point of Entry, and communications equipment. The
Training Center will be a multi-use facility by all Ministries
and serve as a venue for SOCCENT’s bi-annual Counter
Narco-Terrorism training. A
recent end-use monitoring visit
demonstrated the Tajiks are using previously provided
communications equipment and maintaining the equipment. There
is room to grow this program.
This year, we will begin
establishing an interagency communications architecture at
Nizhny Pyanj and the adjoining district.
This will allow five
government agencies to communicate using a compatible system.
9. (C) Nizhny Pyanj Bridge: The NP bridge and Point of Entry
facilities have improved the lines of communication between
Tajikistan and Afghanistan significantly. It is true the bridge
is not being used to its fullest capacity, however in contrast
to the old ferry system, the current traffic is much higher and
continues to increase. Counts
vary between 40 and 200
containers and transport trucks per day.
Pedestrians use the
bridge but must be shuttled across.
CENTCOM funding in 2010 at
this facility will improve force protection with lighting,
fences, and cameras, and additional parking areas.
DUSHANBE 00000955 003 OF 006
AF-PAK STRATEGY
10. (S/NF) Since the USCENTCOM conference in Washington D.C.,
where the Obama Administration’s AF-PAK strategy was explained
to the military representatives of Central and South Asia, there
have been several incidents along the border of Tajikistan with
ISAF forces. There have been two
alleged over flights of the
border by ISAF aircraft and several ground operations observed
by the Tajik Border Guards. The
last incident involved two ISAF
helicopters crossing the border near Kala-i-Khumb on June 9.
The Minister of Defense was in the area in response to the
situation in Tavildara and personally witnessed the helicopters.
To date, there has been no
response from CENTCOM, ISAF, or RC
North authorities to Tajikistan’s request for an explanation of
the incident.
11. (C) Tajikistan is eager to see us make use of our agreement
on transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan, and hopes for
economic benefits to Tajikistan from this agreement. So far no
cargo has transited Tajikistan.
COUNTER NARCOTIC EFFORTS
12. (C) Narcotics trafficking and related corruption problems
are serious in Tajikistan.
Tajikistan is a major transit
corridor for Southwest Asian heroin to Russia and Europe. About
half of heroin seizures in Central Asia occur in Tajikistan.
Capabilities of Tajik law enforcement agencies are severely
limited by lack of resources and wide-spread corruption. Law
enforcement agencies are reluctant to target well-known and
well-connected traffickers; however, they do show a willingness
to target low and mid-level traffickers, particularly those of
foreign nationality
13. (C) Multiple agencies in Tajikistan are involved in the
fight against drug trafficking: the Drug Control Agency,
Ministry of Interior, the State Committee for National Security,
and the Border Guards under the State Committee for National
Security. Tajik Border Guards are
poorly-trained, poorly-paid,
and under-equipped. It is not
uncommon to observe border
personnel without shoes and in short supply of food. A main
thrust of U.S. assistance is on border security. Assistance
provides equipment, training, and infrastructure, such as
building and refurbishing border posts, border-crossing
checkpoints (BCCs), and new training facilities for the Border
Guards. The Embassy also assists
other law enforcement
agencies. The Drug Control Agency
is a ten-year old, 360
officer agency developed through a United Nations Office of
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project, funded primarily by the
Department of State.
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
14. (U) Tajikistan’s economy has suffered since your last visit.
It is feeling the global
recession through major drops in
exports, imports, and remittances from Tajiks working abroad.
Tajik exports have fallen by half this year, largely due to
falling demand for Tajikistan’s two key exports, aluminum and
cotton. Imports have fallen along
with remittances. Because
Tajikistan’s budget depends heavily on customs revenue, both
declines have had a significant impact on state spending.
15. (U) The most important economic lifeline for average Tajiks
DUSHANBE 00000955 004 OF 006
are the remittances from a million compatriots working abroad,
mainly in Russia. The money they
sent home equaled over 50% of
GDP last year, and literally keeps rural communities alive. Due
to the economic crisis remittances they have fallen over 35%
this year. Besides reducing
imports, the drop in remittances
is reducing food security, especially in the countryside.
ELECTIONS ARE COMING, BUT DEMOCRACY ISN’T
16. (C) The government has limited the ability of opposition
political parties to operate, and made no progress on electoral
reforms for the February 2010 parliamentary elections.
Parliamentary opposition is weak — only 15 of the 62 members of
parliament are not ruling party, and some of these are
independent in name only.
Parliament acts as a rubber stamp,
barely discussing important legislation such as the national
budget. It recently passed a
restrictive law on religion,
curbing the activities of religious groups, Islamic or
otherwise. Our advice that this
will only serve to radicalize
many believers has fallen on deaf ears.
The President appointed
a human rights Ombudsman recently, but the office is not
independent of him, nor does it have resources. The Ombudsman
has asked donors to finance his operations.
CORRUPTION CLOUDS RELATIONS WITH DONORS
17. (C) In late 2007, Tajikistan’s National Bank admitted it had
hidden hundreds of millions of dollars in loans and guarantees
to cotton investors, violating its IMF debt relief program. The
IMF demanded early repayment of some debt, an audit of the
National Bank, and other reforms before renewing assistance.
The audit revealed the National Bank lent over $1 billion to
investors with close government ties, of which nearly $600
million was never repaid. Still,
in May the IMF voted to lend a
further $116 million to Tajikistan to help it through the next
three years; the U.S. was the only IMF member to vote against
this, which infuriated the Tajik government. The IMF has
disbursed the first $40 million.
Before it releases the next
tranche of $30 million in October, a team from Washington will
come to review the country’s progress.
One benchmark is a major
reorganization of agriculture to move away from unprofitable
cotton farming.
18. (C) Donors are pushing regional energy market integration
and the construction of power lines that will allow Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan to sell surplus summer electricity output to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. A 220
kw line from Tajikistan to
Afghanistan is under construction now with Asian Development
Bank financing, and will be finished in late 2010. However, the
larger CASA-1000 power line project to connect Kyrgyzstan
through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan has not gotten
off the ground.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
19. (C) Tajikistan made some progress in fighting Trafficking in
Persons (TIP) during the past year, including punishing some
local officials for forcing students to pick cotton, and
increasing trafficking convictions.
They made no progress on
protecting victims, or investigating abuse of victims by
officials. Tajikistan barely
escaped a downgrade to Tier 3, and
we are now discussing an action plan to improve Tajikistan’s
anti-TIP efforts with the government.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
DUSHANBE 00000955 005 OF 006
20. (C) U.S. assistance to Tajikistan stands to grow
significantly to $52 million in FY 2010, from $30 million in FY
2009. The major part of new money
will go to agriculture,
trade, and private sector initiatives to compensate for the loss
of the much-needed food security programs. Until FY 2008
Tajikistan had a multi-year food aid program that showed
significant results reducing food insecurity in some of
Tajikistan’s most at-risk regions.
New programs also will
address chronic energy shortages by building a regional energy
market and helping the central Asian states to address water and
power issues.
21. (C) Health and education deficiencies are so acute they
imperil our progress in other areas.
Our programs are working
to improve health policies, systems and services, teacher
training, education finance, national curriculum, student
performance assessment, and school governance.
TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RAHMON
22. (SBU) Following are suggested talking points for your
meetings with President Rahmon and other officials:
— Afghanistan: We are encouraged by Tajikistan’s initial steps
to train Afghan border guards and counter-narcotic agents at the
U.S.-built training center in Khorog.
We invite Tajikistan to
take on more robust training efforts with Afghanistan. What is
Tajikistan’s view of the proposed training program? Have there
been obstacles or opportunities in the planning to train with
Afghanistan?
— Summit Meeting: Are relations with Russia improving since the
recent meeting with President Medvedev?
What new role is
Russian trying to play in Central Asia’s security? What
progress did you make on economic integration with Afghanistan
and Pakistan?
— Stability of Tajikistan: We are concerned about recent events
in eastern Tajikistan, and reports that extremists from
Afghanistan may be seeking haven in Tajikistan. What is the
internal security situation, and what are your plans to better
secure the Afghan border? We are
also concerned by the recent
death of former Minister and former opposition commander Mirzo
Ziyoev. The deal ending the Tajik
civil war included reserving
30 percent of government positions for opposition members.
Since then, this deal appears to have broken down, and there are
no opposition members left in senior government positions. Will
this affect Tajikistan’s stability?
— Human Rights, Political Reforms: Maintaining space for
political and religious free expression is vital to internal
stability. We are concerned that
your new law on religion will
alienate religious adherents and that the upcoming parliamentary
elections will not give the people an opportunity to express
their political choices. You
should consider amending the
religion law and promptly passing electoral legislation
recommended by the OSCE. E are
discussing with your government
an action plan to better fight trafficking in persons; lack of
progress in this area could interfere with our assistance.
— OSCE: A new OSCE Head of Mission has been appointed, Mr. Ivar
Vikki of Norway. Working with the
OSCE on implementation of the
DUSHANBE 00000955 006 OF 006
Human Dimension, i.e. rule of law, human rights and political
reforms, is your primary path to international credibility and
to attracting the support of western countries that can help you
develop. The OSCE will review
Human Dimension implementation in
Warsaw September 28 to October 9.
We take this review very
seriously, and hope that your government will be
well-represented at the conference and prepared to engage in a
detailed dialogue.
— Economic Reform: Since my last visit, I know that you have
accomplished much; you have passed three new laws to improve the
business environment, begun a program for 200 Days of Reform to
build on these efforts, advanced preparations for eventual WTO
accession, and resolved to forgive cotton debt and to reform the
agricultural sector. These are
great steps for Tajikistan’s
stability and prosperity. I hope
you will continue your
reforms, in particular by giving farmers new freedoms to expand
and diversify their businesses, reducing dependence on cotton
and offering new paths out of poverty.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 219907
date: 8/7/2009 12:04
refid: 09DUSHANBE957
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE347|09DUSHANBE688
header:
VZCZCXRO7387
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0957/01 2191204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0140
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1347
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000957
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/7/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, KIRF, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: PROMINENT FORMER OPPOSITION LEADER TURAJONZODA SHARES VIEWS
ON KEY ISSUES, TAJIKISTAN’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE
REF: A. DUSHANBE 347
B. DUSHANBE 688
CLASSIFIED BY: Matt Purl, A/DCM, POL, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: On July 30, Embassy PolOffs and two DRL
representatives met with Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, a charismatic
religious leader who was among the top leaders of the United
Tajik Opposition during Tajikistan’s civil war. Despite his
continued harsh criticism of President Rahmon, Turajonzoda now
serves as a presidentially appointed Deputy in Tajikistan’s
Majlisi Milli (upper house of Parliament), and was Deputy Prime
Minister from 1998-2005.
Turajonzoda gave his views on recent
violence in the Rasht Valley, the status of religious freedom,
and the prospects for democratic reform in Tajikistan. He
predicted the government’s actions to restrict Islamic religious
practice would increase religious extremism and political
instability in Tajikistan, and said the United States could do
its part to keep extremism in check by reaching out to Islamic
leaders across the country. End
summary.
WHO IS HOJI AKBAR TURAJONZODA?
2. (C) Turajonzoda was the Qazi Qalon, the highest Islamic
authority in Tajikistan, from 1988-1991.
During the Tajik civil
war from 1992-1997, he commanded the United Tajik Opposition
(UTO) primarily from Afghanistan and Iran, but traveled
extensively to several Arab Gulf States, Russia, Europe, and the
United States [Note: Turajonzoda’s lifestyle and political
philosophy seemed heavily influenced by his time spent abroad.
A muted plasma screen TV tuned to Al-Jazeera news played
continuously during our meeting, and he repeatedly compared
Tajikistan’s political environment to that of several other
countries. End note.] After returning to Tajikistan in 1998,
he served as Deputy Prime Minister for seven years. Upon his
resignation in 2005, he was chosen to serve as one of only eight
presidentially appointed Deputies in the Majlisi Milli. In this
position, Turajonzoda may revise drafts of laws from the Majlisi
Namoyandagon, Tajikistan’s lower parliamentary house. His
appointment to the Majlisi Milli was reportedly the result of a
gentlemen’s agreement between Turajonzoda and President Rahmon;
in exchange for the Deputy job, Turajonzoda agreed that he would
not challenge Rahmon for the presidency.
Turajonzoda also
manages a personal business investing in local cotton farms.
RECENT CLASHES «NOT DOMESTIC PROBLEMS»
3. (C) On July 30, a meeting between Turajonzoda and State
Deprtment vistors from the DRl bureau began with a discussion of
recent armed attacks on police checkpoints in the Tavildara area
of central Tajikistan.
Turajonzoda noted that no armed group
had made an official statement regarding its identity or
intentions, but asserted that several armed opposition groups
were currently operating near Tavildara.
At least one of these
groups was comprised of militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and another of former opposition fighters from Tajikistan’s
civil war. Turajonzoda predicted
that clashes would continue
for the foreseeable future, but expected there would not be
widespread support for the groups.
Most Tajiks had painful
memories of the civil war, and feared any outbreak of violence.
4. (C) Turajonzoda dismissed two small explosions in Dushanbe on
July 26, as the work of Tajikistan’s security service. He
believed the explosions were intended to demonstrate
Tajikistan’s security relevance to Presidents Karzai, Zardari,
and Medvedev ahead of a summit of regional leaders in Dushanbe
last week.
TAJIKISTAN’S POLITICAL FUTURE
5. (C) Turajonzoda compared Tajikistan’s current political
environment to other countries, particularly Egypt. Asked if
Rahmon would ever lose control of Tajikistan, Turajonzoda
replied, «Look at Mubarak.»
He explained that both leaders were
unpopular among their people, but maintained control over their
DUSHANBE 00000957 002 OF 003
populations by crushing any prospects for democratic transition.
He commented that democracy
allowed India to avoid problems
with religious extremism [sic].
6. (C) Turajonzoda expressed doubt that democratic reform would
occur in Tajikistan. Similarly, a
coup or revolution would not
change Tajikistan’s political system; it would only result in a
«change of dictators.»
The only solution, he claimed, was for
the United Nations Security Council to mandate that world
leaders serve no more than 10 years, since «no one can become a
dictator in 10 years.»
7. (C) Asked what he expected of Tajikistan’s parliamentary
elections in February 2010, Turajonzoda shook his head and said,
«They are false.»
Still, he predicted the election would be
peaceful, since people are «afraid of mutiny» even if they
hated
Rahmon. In response to a question
about whether recent protests
in Iran over that country’s presidential election might inspire
similar demonstrations in Tajikistan, Turajonzoda replied, «Iran
did not have a civil war.»
Referring to Mir-Hossein Mousavi,
President Ahmadinejad’s primary contender in Iran’s election, he
said such candidates would have been jailed or killed in
Tajikistan for inciting unrest.
«NO RESPECT FOR ISLAM»
8. (C) Turajonzoda had much to say about Tajikistan’s new law on
religion (Ref A), which many observers have criticized as being
overly restrictive of religious practice and association. He
alleged that when the law was passed, the government secretly
instructed police not to enforce it strictly. The law was
intended to be a signaling mechanism, he said; to «let the world
know we are secular.»
According to Turajonzoda, most Muslim
leaders in Tajikistan are opposed to the idea of an Islamic
state and sought only the spread of Islamic ideals within Tajik
society. He criticized Rahmon for
failing to understand this,
saying the President had «no respect for Islam.»
9. (C) Pointing to frustration among the country’s youth over
the lack of economic opportunity and an inability to express
themselves, Turajonzoda predicted that a growing number of Tajik
youth would become extremists. He
cited the now-banned Salafi
movement as evidence that young people were beginning to turn
toward more conservative forms of Islam, calling them «youth
gone astray.» He expects the
situation to worsen as Tajiks’
violent memories of the civil war fade.
By his estimation, the
possibility of an opposition-led coup would be much higher in
15-20 years. He did not specify
whether such an opposition
would be Islamist or secular in nature.
VIEWS OF AMERICA
10. (C) Turajonzoda offered several warnings for U.S. policy in
Tajikistan. He predicted that if
the Taliban was not defeated
in Afghanistan, instability would spread rapidly to Tajikistan.
He also noted that a growing number of Tajiks believed the
United States was insincere in its desire to promote democracy
here. «People only see
things in two colors,» he cautioned,
indicating that Tajiks would not take America seriously unless
it ceased support for Rahmon.
Warning that it was unwise to
back «those who do not care about their people,» Turajonzoda
asked why the United States had not been more forceful in urging
Rahmon to release Tajik opposition prisoners jailed during the
civil war.
11. (C) Overall, Turajonzoda expressed a positive opinion of the
United States. He praised
America’s attitude toward Islam and
religious freedom, saying at one point, «When I was in America,
I saw Islam. Here, I do
not.» He also praised the Embassy
for
sending five Tajik imams to the United States in May under the
DUSHANBE 00000957 003 OF 003
IVLP (Ref B). According to
Turajonzoda, such programs are the
best way to counter the threat of extremism and anti-American
sentiment in Tajikistan.
COMMENT
12. (C) Turajonzoda was forthcoming with his opinions, even on
potentially sensitive issues. Our
meeting with him highlighted
his unique role in Tajikistan’s opaque political system. He is
one of very few former opposition leaders to obtain multiple
presidential appointments after the civil war. Unlike the
others, however, he makes his dislike for Rahmon public. As the
«gentlemen’s agreement» between Turajonzoda and Rahmon
suggests,
Rahmon prefers to keep Turajonzoda in his government as a means
of restraining Turajonzoda’s political clout. Though
Turajonzoda seems happy with this arrangement for now, many
Tajiks believe he may be biding his time and waiting for an
auspicious moment in which to seek the presidency himself.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 220566
date: 8/13/2009 8:31
refid: 09DUSHANBE966
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE458|09STATE79187
header:
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PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0966 2250831
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1364
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000966
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, PREL, ECON, EINV, EFIN, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK RESPONSE TO TIFA AGENDA
REF: A. STATE 79187
B. DUSHANBE 458
1. (SBU) Summary: EconOff met on August 10 with Deputy Minister
of Economic Development and Trade Larisa Kislyakova to discuss
the draft agenda for the 4th U.S.-Central Asia Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council meeting on October
8 (ref A). She said her ministry
supports the draft agenda.
During bilateral meetings with the U.S., the Tajik delegation
will be particularly interested in discussing WTO accession,
agricultural issues, and IMF concerns.
Minister of Economic
Development and Trade Ghulomjon Bobozoda will attend the
meetings, subject to approval of President Rahmon. End summary.
2. (SBU) Kislyakova, who had a central role in organizing the
previous TIFA meeting in Dushanbe, appreciated our effort to
solicit feedback on the upcoming TIFA agenda, although she said
she was seeing the draft for the first time. (Note: Although
Embassy Dushanbe had delivered the draft TIFA agenda by
diplomatic note over a week before, key officials at the
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade had still not
received it when we contacted them on August 10. This shows
some of the organizational challenges the Tajik government
regularly faces. End note.) Two days after our meeting she
confirmed by email that she had shared the agenda with Minister
Ghulomjon Bobozoda, who will head the Tajik delegation, subject
to approval from President Rahmon.
Bobozoda approved the draft
agenda and will send an updated note with more specific
comments. Kislyakova noted that
she was glad to see an emphasis
on integrating Afghanistan within Central Asia.
3. (SBU) Kislyakova and her boss were particularly interested in
the bilateral meetings. She said
Bobozoda would like to arrange
four meetings with U.S. counterparts: (1) the Secretary of
Commerce, to discuss trade and economic cooperation, and
particularly the WTO; (2) the Secretary of Agriculture, to
discuss supplying seed stocks to Tajikistan and other
agriculture issues; (2) the Secretary of the Treasury, to
discuss cooperation with the International Monetary Fund; and
(4) the Department of State. She
said the Tajik government
would be particularly interested in discussing WTO issues, since
the TIFA meetings will come shortly after Tajikistan
participates in WTO accession discussions in Geneva on September
25.
4. (SBU) Regarding the session organized by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Bobozoda would like to see a discussion of issues
related to energy, food processing and agriculture. Kislyakova
expressed interest in organizing meetings with representatives
from the business community to talk about these issues. She
said it would be an opportunity for the Government of Tajikistan
to publicize some of its recent moves to improve the investment
climate, including the establishment of a one-stop business
registration process.
5. (SBU) Kislyakova said that a frustration with the
multilateral Central Asian TIFA process has been that the
partner countries are happy to engage in general discussion but
reluctant to sign substantive agreements on specific points.
She said she looked forward to a successful meeting in October,
but implied that the bilateral meetings were more likely to
yield substantive results.
6. (U) Kislyakova asked whether the U.S. would provide Russian
translation at TIFA, or whether the Tajik delegation would have
to seek out its own translators.
If Department has any guidance
we would appreciate it. She asked
whether delegations would be
expected to pay their own way. We
said we presumed they would.
7. (SBU) Comment: Tajik government capacity remains minimal; our
impression is that Kislyakova is one of the few, if not the
only, people in the government conversant with TIFA issues.
That said, the government appears to have a genuine interest in
bilateral trade and investment discussions, where they see the
potential for more substance.
Their desire to talk about the
IMF is a good sign, indicating they are taking to heart U.S.
concerns about Tajikistan’s financial transparency. And despite
public pronouncements of brotherly affection and Kislyakova’s
comments, the government of Tajikistan overall remains deeply
wary of Afghanistan. End comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 220590
date: 8/13/2009 9:33
refid: 09MOSCOW2070
origin: Embassy Moscow
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1667
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2070/01 2250933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130933Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4517
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002070
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TI, KG, RS
SUBJECT: HARDLY WORTH THE TRIP: MEDVEDEV’S VISIT TO CENTRAL
ASIA
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David Kostelancik.
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (SBU) Summary: The most significant result of President
Medvedev’s recent trip to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where he
attended an informal meeting of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO), was the signing of an agreement
with Kyrgyzstan on the intention to establish another Russian
military base there. Many see
this trip as an indication of
the CSTO’s weakness and Moscow’s lack of influence in Central
Asia. End Summary.
———————-
Officially, a success
———————-
2. (SBU) During his July 30 visit
to Dushanbe, President
Medvedev’s joint and bilateral meetings with the Presidents
of Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan produced a statement
calling for greater assistance to Kabul to combat
Afghanistan’s drug problem.
Medvedev called the opening of
the Sangtuda hydroelectric power station, which he attended,
another example of the cooperation between Russia and its
«strategic partner» Tajikistan, which includes other energy,
banking, and construction projects.
3. (SBU) On July 31 in
Kyrgyzstan, Medvedev attended an
informal meeting of the CSTO and held bilateral discussions
with Kyrgyz President Bakiyev.
CSTO members discussed the
fight against religious extremism and terrorism within the
CSTO space and decided to establish an information technology
center in Russia for training security experts. However,
they failed to sign an agreement for the CSTO Rapid Reaction
Forces. As a result of their
bilateral meeting, Kyrgyzstan
and Russia signed only a non-binding memorandum of intent
(MOI) on establishing another Russian military base on Kyrgyz
soil.
—————————
Unofficially, not so much
—————————
4. (C) Meetings with two
interlocutors at the MFA suggest
that Russia is more focused on bilateral relationships than
the CSTO. Third CIS Tajik desk
officer Vasiliy Beldyugin
stated that, although Russia had problems with Tajikistan,
Moscow was working to develop stronger bilateral relations in
the areas of energy, education, agriculture, transportation,
migration, and aviation. He
stated that Tajik President
Rakhmon would make an official visit to Moscow in October
2009. In addition to the other
areas of cooperation, the
Russian military presence in Tajikistan would be on the
agenda. Beldyugin noted that
Russia intended to assist in
building three additional hydroelectric stations in
Tajikistan.
5. (C) Also from the Third CIS
Department, Vladimir Makarov,
representing the Kyrgyz desk, similarly said that Russia was
focusing on bilateral relations with Kyrgyzstan. He
described the informal CSTO summit as «not significant»
because there was only an exchange of opinions and no
official CSTO statement following the meeting. He termed the
issue of another base in Kyrgyzstan «overstated,» as the
agreement achieved was nothing more than a statement of
intention. He doubted Russia
needed or wanted another base
in Kyrgyzstan because it already had four sites there, and
expressed his prediction that it was unlikely the base would
actually be built.
—————————
Press: A failure of policy
—————————
6. (SBU) Russian press reports
were unenthusiastic about the
CSTO meeting and the success of Medvedev’s trip. Kommersant
called the fact that all seven CSTO leaders attended the
summit an achievement in itself.
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
stressed that Moscow could not be completely satisfied with
the summit’s results for a number of reasons. First, Belarus
and Uzbekistan were not on board with the establishment of a
rapid reaction force. Second,
Tajik President Rakhmon hinted
that Russia would have to pay for the presence of the 201st
Russian division stationed in his country. Finally,
Kyrgyzstan agreed only to sign an MOI, rather than an
agreement, on establishing another Russian base on its
territory. As a result, the
summit was an «utter failure of
Russia’s policy in nearby countries.»
7. (C) Moscow Carnegie Center’s
Aleksey Malashenko agreed
MOSCOW 00002070 002 OF 002
Medvedev’s visit to the region did not achieve anything. The
MOI on basing showed a lack of Russian planning because it
was a non-binding, bilateral (not CSTO) agreement. Writing
in Jezhednevniy Zhurnal, Arkady Dubnov concurred, noting that
the Russian-Kyrgyz memorandum did not mentQn the CSTO or the
rapid reaction forces. Malashenko
claimed that Belarus’ and
Uzbekistan’s positions on CSTO demonstrated that Russia was
unable to move the issue, showing the CSTO was a «useless
utopia.» Moskovskiy
Komsomolets echoed the sentiment,
contending that, while Moscow should not abandon the CSTO, it
should concentrate more on bilateral cooperation in the
region.
8. (C) Malashenko further stated
that while Putin had
personal connections to the Central Asian leadership,
Medvedev’s lack of authority in the region, made apparent
during his trip, would continue to make it difficult for him
to influence leaders in the region.
9. (C) Malashenko also posited
that Russia’s intention to
establish another base in Kyrgyzstan was a mistake that would
lead to more tension between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. He
speculated that the MOI might push Uzbekistan to work with
the U.S. to establish a base there and provide Tashkent more
money.
10. (SBU) Russian media
immediately picked up on the
notional nature of the Kyrgyz base agreement. Interfax
quoted General Nicolai Bordyuzha, CSTO Secretary, as saying
«As of today there is no location, no number of troops, and
essentially no decision on the placement of the bases.» The
Russian press also covered Uzbekistan’s negative reaction to
another Russian base in Kyrgyzstan, saying it could increase
«militarization and provoke nationalist struggles.» Russia’s
Interfax news agency quoted the Kyrgyz ambassador to Moscow
as saying, «We specifically want the military base close to
the border (with Uzbekistan). All
evil comes from the
direction of Uzbekistan.»
——-
Comment
——-
11. (C) By most measures, Medvedev’s trip to the eastern CIS
did not accomplish much, especially on the multilateral
(CSTO) front. In reaction, Russia
is focusing on improving
bilateral relationships in Central Asia to increase its
influence, although the MOI with Kyrgyzstan on a new base is
an inauspicious start.
RUBIN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 220626
date: 8/13/2009 12:04
refid: 09DUSHANBE968
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09STATE80911
header:
VZCZCXRO1298
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0968 2251204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131204Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0646
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0219
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0143
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0121
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1367
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000968
SIPDIS
LABOR DEPT FOR DOL/ILAB — SASSER AND CASTRO
DEPT FOR DRL/ILCSR — MITTELHAUSER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/2019
TAGS: EIND, ELAB, ETRD, PHUM, SOCI, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — POST CONCURRENCE WITH DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
UPDATE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13126 LIST
REF: STATE 80911
CLASSIFIED BY: Matt Purl, A/DCM, POL, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Embassy Dushanbe concurs with reftel listing of Cotton
produced in Tajikistan as being subject to E.O. 13126. Per the
annual Trafficking in Persons report for Tajikistan, and other
post- and department-generated reports, children continue to be
forced to participate in the cotton industry in Tajikistan, in
particular to participate in cotton harvesting.
2. (U) Dushanbe Point of Contact for this issue is Pol/Econ
Chief Matt Purl, [email protected], classified email
[email protected].
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 220628
date: 8/13/2009 12:19
refid: 09DUSHANBE969
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
08DUSHANBE1502|09DUSHANBE508|09DUSHANBE514|09DUSHANBE570|09DUSHANBE618|09DUSHANBE670|09DUSHANBE846
header:
VZCZCXRO1305
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0969/01 2251219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131219Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0647
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1368
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000969
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO LARRY NORTON AND JEFF BAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/2019
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, PGOV, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — IMF SEES PROGRESS BUT STILL NOT SURE GLASS IS
HALF-FULL
REF: A. 08 DUSHANBE 1502
B. DUSHANBE 670
C. DUSHANBE 618
D. DUSHANBE 846
E. DUSHANBE 570
F. DUSHANBE 514
G. DUSHANBE 508
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia L. Quast, Charge d’affaires, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: After initial assurances that the financial
crisis would not affect Tajikistan, government officials now
frequently cite dropping remittances, exports, and imports as
serious signs of the crisis here.
International Monetary Fund
Resident Representative Luc Moers said the situation might not
be as bad as some say. The
decline in exports is exaggerated,
inflation is low, and GDP grew by 2.8% over the first six months
of the year, surpassing expectations of zero growth. The
government has initiated some good economic reforms, most at the
behest of the IMF and other donors, but it remains to be seen
whether the changes will be effectively implemented. Financial
audits of key state entities, including Barqi Tojik, Talco, and
the National Bank, will not be made public; Moers, who has seen
some of the audit results, said they might not inspire much
confidence. On balance he is
pleased with the progress of
National Bank reforms after the misreporting scandal, and he is
cautiously optimistic about the future.
He confided he was
personally content with the U.S. decision to vote «no» on IMF
loans in April, saying it was important that the Tajik
government saw sticks, and not just carrots. End summary.
TAJIK ECONOMY: COULD (SHOULD?) BE WORSE
2. (SBU) Tajik officials first greeted news of the world
financial crisis late last year with assurances that Tajikistan
was safe because of its isolated banking sector and undeveloped
industrial capacity (ref A).
Since then, however, hardly a
month goes by without the government convening a roundtable to
discuss the effects of the crisis — and to solicit donor help
(refs B and C). The three key
statistics cited at these events
are: Tajik exports are down by nearly 50% as a result of reduced
world demand for the country’s two major products, aluminum and
cotton. Remittances from Tajiks
working abroad are down 35%
compared to last year (when they equaled 52% of GDP, the highest
ratio on the world). And imports
are down between 12% and 15%
because of reduced expendable income.
3. (SBU) According to Luc Moers, however, the situation may not
be so bleak. To begin with, the
decline in exports is not
nearly as dramatic as government officials — and many western
aid organizations — make it out to be.
The 50% figure is
calculated using world prices for aluminum, which is not
appropriate for Tajikistan, because its single large industrial
concern, the Talco plant, actually exports aluminum through a
tolling arrangement. Rather than
selling its output at world
prices, it has entered into a contract with an offshore company
to export aluminum (and import inputs to the smelting process)
at a fixed price. It has thus not
been exposed to the vast drop
in aluminum prices that has forced some smelters worldwide to
shut their doors. Moers said he
has on numerous occasions
spoken with government officials to push them to use more
accurate figures that reflect the tolling arrangement, but to no
avail. Government statistics
continue to seriously distort the
effects of the crisis on Tajik exports.
(Comment: Of course,
when world aluminum prices are high, the tolling arrangement
means the state of Tajikistan, which owns Talco, sees little of
the great profits that are made by delivering electricity to the
plant far below market value. The
real money-makers are the
President and members of his inner circle, who are believed to
have financial control of the offshore company that buys from
Talco. End comment.)
4. (SBU) While the drop in remittances is a real concern, Moers
said that other indicators for Tajikistan are surprisingly
positive. Inflation for the first
half of this year was 6.7%,
considerably reduced from 11.9% at year’s end in 2008. And GDP
has grown this year at a rate of 2.8%.
While this is a good
deal lower than last year’s figure of 7.9%, it surpasses earlier
IMF projections of 0%. Moers said
the GDP figure bodes well for
Tajikistan, although he admitted he was at a loss to explain it.
According to Jamshed
Rahmonberdiev, the CEO of Somon Capital,
his company has conducted a number of market surveys indicating
DUSHANBE 00000969 002 OF 004
that domestic consumption has continued to grow steadily, even
during the financial crisis.
Construction and real estate in
particular have remained strong (too strong, according to some
organizations shocked by Dushanbe housing prices), which has
contributed to GDP growth.
SOME GOOD REFORMS
5. (SBU) Moers was tentatively pleased with government efforts
to improve the banking sector and investment climate. Many of
these steps were conditions for renewed IMF assistance under its
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which went into
effect in April of this year.
(The IMF had suspended assistance
to Tajikistan early last year after the government admitted
misreporting its reserves to hide unauthorized investments in
the cotton sector.) The President
recently signed a new law on
commercial banking that significantly normalizes the sector.
And new amendments to the central bank law, drafted with
assistance from a World Bank consultant, were passed by the
government and currently await the President’s signature. These
will provide for term limits for the chairman of the National
Bank, require outside members on the Bank’s board, and detail a
number of other provisions designed to prevent conflicts of
interest. Moers admitted that
authorities were having some
difficulty finding qualified outside board members, however.
6. (C) Moers said that the government’s progress on putting
together a debt resolution plan for the cotton sector has so far
been more or less satisfactory (ref D).
Donors, including the
IMF, had insisted that the government wipe the slate clean for
farmers who have accumulated a tremendous amount of debt while
being forced by the government to grow unprofitable cotton
crops. Emphasizing that he was
speaking personally, he said
that he would have liked to see cotton investors shoulder much
more of the debt, rather than leaving it to the Ministry of
Finance to come up with the money.
He had no confidence the
government’s figure for outstanding debt, $548 million, had any
basis in reality. While the
ultimate cost will be a serious
issue for the government budget, the key issue from his
perspective is that the government make good on its pledge to
wipe out farmer debt. (Note:
During a donor meeting a month
ago, Finance Minister Safarali Najmuddinov was overheard cursing
former National Bank Chairman Murodali Alimardon and others for
authorizing the use of state loans to fund their own cotton
investments. Moers said he
doubted that Najmuddinov was as far
outside the loop as he wanted donors to think. End note.)
7. (SBU) The IMF has made it a firm requirement that the
government budget meet a deficit target of 0.5% and maintain
social sector spending at current levels. Moers said that the
government appears to be barely meeting these targets, even if
he was not thrilled about how they were doing it. The budget
has been significantly reduced chiefly by cutting capital
expenditures and running big wage arrears. The deficit target
looks like it will be met, although only by including $20
million in budget support from the World Bank, $40 million from
the Asian Development Bank, and a prospective 12 million Euros
from the European Commission.
Social spending at the end of
June — which the IMF uses as a test date in its progress
appraisals — appears to be just around the minimum level,
perhaps falling short by a tiny amount.
The government
continues to devote massive resources to constructing the Roghun
hydropower station, however.
KEY AUDITS INAUSPICIOUS
8. (C) In the wake of the misreporting scandal, the IMF had
pushed the government to audit key state institutions, including
the National Bank, the state electricity utility Barqi Tojik,
and Talco. Moers said the Barqi
Tojik audit, conducted by BDO
Unicon, was done, but that the audit is confidential and cannot
be released outside the go
