id: 206551
date: 5/12/2009 12:54
refid: 09DUSHANBE571
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2079
RR RUEHDBU RUEHDE
DE RUEHDBU #0571 1321254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121254Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0072
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0028
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0105
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0033
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0062
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0018
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0626
RUEABND/DEA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000571
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEA HQ PASS TO OC/NEWTON-BELL, OE/TRAPP, A/OC/HARRIGAN
OCX/WILLIAMS, OEX/MASUMOTO, A/OGE/SCHRETTNER, OGA/RYAN,
OGPA/STATEN, NTRE/UPP, NIRE/LEHRER
NI/BORDER, NTRE/UPP/KREGOR, FOE/HAFF,
NIWF/MANZI, SOD/OSE/MCMANAMON/YASEVICH/KHAN/OSE/SHROYER/D EA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: UI-09-0003/YEH1K/NOSIRI, SARAF- DEA DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE
JOINT COORDINATION OF INL DONATION OF TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIVE
EQUIPMENT TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF TAJIKISTAN.
1. (SBU) THE DEA DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE (DCO), WORKING IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY DUSHANBE,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SECTION (INL), HAVE
COMBINED RESOURCES TO ENHANCE THE APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL
EQUIPMENT IN SUPPORT OF TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MVD)
NARCOTIC-RELATED INVESTIGATIONS.
2. (SBU) THE DCO HAS initiated A joint-wire intercept
investigation WITH THE MVD targeting the NOSIRI SARAF DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION. THIS OPERATION REPRESENTS THE FIRST
JOINT DEA WIRE-INTERCEPT INVESTIGATION IN CENTRAL ASIA. THE DCO
IS ALSO ASSISTING THE mVD with operational planning to include
extensive undercover operations TARGETING THE SARAF DTO IN
DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN.
3. (sbu) ON MAY 8, 2009, the dco coordinated the inl donation of
advanced surviellance equipment to THE MVD. The equipment
consists of 12 units and has a value of approximately $15,000.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT INL HAD THE EQUIPMENT IN STORAGE; IT WAS
NOT SPECIFICALLY PURCHASED FOR DONATION TO THE MVD. (THE
EQUIPMENT CANNOT BE USED FOR INTERCEPTING TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS.)
4. (SBU) THE DCO WILL PROVIDE TRAINING AND OPERATIONAL
ASSISTANCE TO THE MVD CONCERNING THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE
EQUIPMENT. THE INL DONATION WILL ENABLE THE MVD TO DEVELOP MORE
COMPLEX INVESTIGATIONS AND ASSIST IN PROTECTING MVD AGENTS WHEN
CONDUCTING UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INL
DONATION TO THE MVD SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED TO REGIONAL HOST
COUNTRIES COUNTER-PARTS OR THE PRESS.
5. (SBU) THE DCO WOULD LIKE TO THANK INL AND THE UNITED STATES
EMBASSY DUSHANBE FOR THEIR SUSTAINED SUPPORT CONCERNINGS DEA’S
LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORT IN TAJIKISTAN.
INDEXING SECTION:
SARAF, NOSIRI
NADDIS: 6479196
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 206979
date: 5/14/2009 11:16
refid: 09DUSHANBE575
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09DUSHANBE406
header:
VZCZCXRO4214
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0575/01 1341116
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141116Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0630
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0323
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0106
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000575
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KIRF, KPAO, SCUL, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S NEW SYNAGOGUE: BUSINESS, CENTRAL ASIA STYLE
REF: 09 DUSHANBE 406
DUSHANBE 00000575 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary: On May 4, Tajikistan’s Jewish Community held
an opening ceremony for its new synagogue, donated by
presidential brother-in-law Hassan Asadullozoda (reftel).
Delegations of Bukharan Jews from the United States and Israel
flew to Tajikistan to participate in the event, which was
covered by the international press.
While the Jewish community
may be the beneficiary of a generous gift, the Government of
Tajikistan manipulated the moment to deflect attention from its
harsh religious restrictions and curry favor with wealthy
immigrant groups. End summary.
THE JEWISH COMMUNITY: SMALL, DISORGANIZED
2. (SBU) A May 4 ceremony dedicating a new Synagogue and Jewish
Community Center, and the 2008 demolition of Tajikistan’s old
synagogue, received a great deal of attention from the
international press.
International journalists continue to
inaccurately refer to the leader of the Jewish community,
Mikhail Abdurahmonov, as a rabbi.
Abdurahmonov, however, is a
layman; there is no rabbi in Tajikistan.
A rabbi comes to
Tajikistan from Uzbekistan to lead services on high holy days.
3. (SBU) No one knows how big (or small) the Jewish community is
in Tajikistan. The press often
have reported that there are
about 300 Jews remaining in Tajikistan, but it is unclear where
this estimate comes from. EmbOffs
who have attended services at
the synagogue have never seen more than about 12 people.
4. (SBU) EmbOffs sat in on a May 3 meeting between the visitors
and the Tajik Jewish community to discuss future activities.
Representatives of the New York and Israeli contingents berated
the Tajik Jewish community for not keeping records of the aid
that had been provided to the community over the years. One of
the Israeli representatives expressed frustration that the Tajik
Jewish community had no membership records, and had no idea of
how many Jews there were in Tajikistan.
He told Abdurahmonov,
«We cannot help you if you cannot help yourselves.» The Tajik
Jews squabbled amongst themselves, and there was a heated
argument between Abdurahmonov and another member of the
community.
5. (SBU) The New York and Israeli representatives were clearly
in charge at the May 4 opening, leading toasts and engaging
EmbOffs in conversations about how to help Tajikistan and its
Jewish community. Asadullozoda
was one of the guests of honor.
The Israeli representatives with whom we spoke work with or for
Lev Leviev, the Israeli billionaire and president of the
Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS.
6. (SBU) The organizers set up a separate dining room for the
VIP guests at the ceremony.
Ambassador Jacobson was ushered
into the room to break bread with Asadullozoda and
representatives of the U.S. and Israeli delegations; no one from
the Tajik Jewish community was invited in. In a discussion with
EmbOff, Abdurahmonov did not think his presence in VIP room was
necessary.
7. (SBU) Ambassador’s security detail noticed that a film crew
from Iranian state television attended the ceremony. The crew
filmed the grounds of the synagogue and left without conducting
any interviews.
THE DIASPORA: GIVE TAJIKISTAN WHAT IT WANTS
8. (SBU) EmbOffs arranged to meet with the U.S. delegation at
the Embassy on May 6, anticipating a discussion of how we could
assist the delegation in supporting the Jewish community, or
facilitate business interests.
The delegation had a different
idea, however.
DUSHANBE 00000575 002.2 OF 002
9. (SBU) The group that showed up to the Embassy was led by
Asadullozoda, and during the meeting with EmbOffs, delegation
members deferred to him as their unofficial leader, praising him
profusely. Delegation members
referred to President Rahmon as
the «brave man» who brought peace to Tajikistan, and they
implored EmbOffs to «support Tajikistan with grants.» They told
EmbOffs to ask the U.S. Government to «please build Tajikistan a
hydro-electric station,» referring to Tajikistan’s long-standing
pleas to fund a project at Rogun, and echoing a request made by
Asadullozoda to Ambassador during the May 4 lunch and on other
occasions. The septuagenarian
delegation leader assured us that
the Tajiks would reward our beneficence with an unshakeable
loyalty: «I have lived with Tajiks my whole life. Believe me
when I tell you that loyalty is in their blood, they will never,
never let you down.»
10. (SBU) EmbOffs attempted to engage the delegation in a short
discussion of the investment and economic situation in
Tajikistan, but it was unclear how much they were actually
listening to us. EconAssistant
made two concrete
recommendations: if delegation members wanted to assist
Tajikistan, they should consider working with the American
Chamber of Commerce and establishing an education or social fund
for the Jewish community.
THE TAJIK GOVERNMENT: REALITY CHECK
11. (SBU) Comment: Based on our observations, the synagogue
donation has all of the hallmarks of a private arrangement
between President Rahmon and Lev Leviev.
However, we can
analyze this situation on several levels. The Jewish community
is the beneficiary of a new synagogue.
While the Tajik
Government itself created the situation by destroying the old
synagogue, the Tajik Government was not motivated by a
particular animus against the Jewish community. The government
did find a way to resolve the problem through «private
diplomacy.»
12. (SBU) Of course, the government is clearly attempting to
manipulate the situation for its own purposes. The government
has posited the new synagogue as an example of its tolerance of
religion, and it has made statements to this effect in
international fora, including OSCE ministerial meetings. The
government is using the Jewish diaspora to help lobby for its
long-standing pleas for financial assistance and large
infrastructure projects, without reference to the country’s
untenable business climate.
13. (SBU) We have not observed a particularly strong public
reaction to the synagogue’s opening.
However, there is a
possibility that the opening can be drawn in a negative light.
Some Tajiks may question why a presidential relative would
devote so much time and attention to a small community when
economic conditions are so bad in the country. The government’s
religious policy also creates the possibility of a backlash.
Members of the religious community may question why the Tajik
Government is making so many accommodations for the Jewish
community when it imposes so many harsh restrictions on other
religious expression. End
comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 207073
date: 5/14/2009 16:21
refid: 09USOSCE123
origin: Mission USOSCE
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4612
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0123/01 1341621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141621Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6379
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0751
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1308
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1246
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000123
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM, PREL, KCFE, OSCE, MD, TI, XG
SUBJECT: FSC MAY 13: STOCKPILE AND BORDER SECURITY
HIGHLIGHTED
1. (SBU) Summary: Moldova and the OSCE proposed construction
of new facilities to improve the safety of munitions storage
facilities near Chisinau at the cost of 834,000 euros and
requested participating State financial support. Tajikistan
outlined its Border Security and Management Strategy and
stressed the need to improve the training and equipment of
border forces who confront increasing levels of trafficking
and terrorism originating in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The
new Border Security Staff College in Dushanbe will include
students from Afghanistan. In the
working groups, the Danish
proposal for a December 2009 meeting of heads of verification
agencies gained wide support. The
draft decision on FSC
contributions to the Annual Security Review Conference will
be brought to plenary on May 20.
End summary.
Moldova Stockpile Security
—————————
2. (SBU) OSCE Mission to Moldova project coordinator Kenneth
Pickles and Moldovan Colonel Andrei Sarban addressed
upgrading Moldovan conventional ammunition storage
facilities. They requested
financial support for
constructing a new conventional ammunition storage facility
at the Bulboaca training area outside of Chisinau. Pickles
noted that the aging storage structures existing at Bulboaca
were originally designed as garages and storehouses for a
Soviet airborne unit. The
existing facility does not provide
safe storage of conventional munitions for a number of
structural and environmental reasons, as well as inadequate
separation distances.
3. (SBU) Pickles noted Moldova’s December 2006 request for
technical and financial assistance from the OSCE to enhance
stockpile security, as well as the May 2007 FSC assessment
visit to Moldova which recommended new construction at
Bulboaca among other tasks. In
response to the FSC
assessment, Pickles said the OSCE proposed to improve the
site by constructing three new ammunition storage units.
These units would be part of the larger effort to upgrade
existing storage sites and provide munitions destruction
assistance. Sarban noted that new
facilities would bring the
Bulboaca site into compliance with international standards,
raise standards for stockpiling in Moldova more generally,
and promote OSCE best practices for storage of conventional
ammunition. Pickles estimated the
cost of the construction
project to be 834,000 euros and requested financial support,
noting that the project timeline depends largely on the
timing and size of contributions.
4. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) asked about the sustainability
of the project and questioned whether the Mission would
provide transparency measures to Transnistria to ensure that
de facto authorities therein are not threatened by improved
storage capabilities at Bulboaca and within Moldova more
generally. Pickles noted that the Mission would fully brief
Transnistrian authorities and that they are routinely invited
to visit and inspect the military sites and exercises. In
response to another U.S. question, Pickles noted that MANPADS
were not included in Moldovan plans for destruction of
surplus ordnance while S200 missiles and R60 air-to-air
rockets are slated for elimination.
Border Security in Tajikistan
USOSCE 00000123 002 OF 004
——————————
5. (SBU) General Kasym Gafarov, First Deputy Chief of the
State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan, briefed
on the finalization of the Tajikistan 2009-2015 National
Border Security and Management Strategy, crafted jointly by
the OSCE and the Tajik Border Task Force, and asked for
assistance in resulting joint OSCE-Tajik projects. Gafarov
noted that the Task Force, comprised of relevant Tajik
ministries, had identified core threats along the border,
including human trafficking, transnational criminal groups,
illegal migration, and terrorism and extremism. Based on
these threats, the task force recommended a long-term,
«integrated system of border management» consisting of five
initiatives:
— synchronization of national legislation with international
standards for border security;
— protection of human rights;
— increased coordination between border patrol and other
military units;
— streamlining of customs and border crossing; and
— upgrades to technical infrastructure.
Stressing the need to upgrade border units, Gafarov closed
his presentation by requesting expert and financial
assistance to implement the strategy.
Tajikistan Details Its Needs
—————————-
6. (SBU) Colonel Saymudin Mirzoev of the Tajikistan State
Committee for National Security followed Gafarov with a more
detailed appeal for financial assistance to modernize Tajik
border patrols, noting the threat that increasingly
well-armed and trained non-state actors pose to Tajikistan’s
current border security forces.
To implement the new border
management strategy in this environment, Mirzoev stated that
the OSCE was working on a project with Tajikistan to create
«roving» border security patrols along the southern border
with Afghanistan. The patrol
units will act as a separate
border detachment comprised of highly-trained and equipped
officers, akin to the system employed by Russia. Mirzoev
focused on the importance of state-of-the-art equipment such
as all-terrain vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
and requested funding to proceed with necessary equipment
modernization.
7. (SBU) Mirzoev frequently referred to Tajikistan’s concerns
over its border with Afghanistan, while presenting some
positive notes on Tajik-Afghan cooperation. On several
occasions, Mirzoev specifically noted Tajikistan’s increasing
concerns with drug trafficking, terrorism, and religious
extremism originating from Afghanistan, which are not
expected to decrease in the short term.
Kazakhstan (Asanov)
seconded this sentiment and encouraged other participating
States (pS) to contribute.
8. (SBU) Mirzoev stated that Tajikistan continued to seek
partner participation with Afghanistan and any other
interested party on border security.
He noted that twenty
Afghan border officers will attend a June 2009
train-the-trainer session offered by Tajikistan, and that
USOSCE 00000123 003 OF 004
Tajikistan was in close contact with top Afghan border
security officials about potential cooperation on mobile
border patrols.
9. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said it supported increased Tajik
border security and OSCE assistance for this, observing that
it planned to «pay particular attention» to the types
assistance offered by pS. The
U.S. (Neighbour) praised the
cooperative efforts made by Tajikistan, especially with
Afghanistan, and hoped that its border strategy would work
well so it could serve as a model to its neighbors.
10. (SBU) Given the funding requests by both Gafarov and
Mirzoev, several pS noted the upcoming May 27 launch of the
Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe and questioned
whether financial shortfalls would prevent its operation.
Both Mirzoev and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center director
(Salber) agreed that the college still needed funding but
fully expected needs would be met and noted that the college
was moving forward on hiring and equipment purchases.
FSC Inputs to ASRC
——————
11. (SBU) The draft decision on the FSC contributions to the
2009 Annual Security Review Conference (FSC.DD/2/09) was
approved by the working group and will be considered by the
May 20 plenary. Per the draft,
the FSC would:
— present an oral and written report of its activities
through the FSC chair;
— propose that an FSC Troika member of the director of the
Conflict Prevention Center coordinate and chair a working
session of the ASRC; and
— submit to the CiO a list of politico-military elements for
discussion and use in keynote speeches.
12. (SBU) The chair (Giorgadze, Georgia) announced that the
list of politico-military elements will be distributed May 15
and discussed in the May 20 working group.
Vienna Document
—————
13. (SBU) Turkey (Bekar) announced it hosted Vienna Document
Chapter IV contact events May 4-8, including visits to a
military facility and an air base, and the demonstration of
new equipment. Representatives of
48 participating States,
the OSCE Secretariat, and the Zagreb-based RACVIAC Center for
Security Cooperation attended.
14. (SBU) The CPC announced a May 26-27 conference on Vienna
Document implementation in Almaty.
The CPC, the OSCE Center
in Astana, and representatives from Central Asia and Caucasus
participating States will attend.
HOV Meeting
————
15. (SBU) The Danish proposal for a meeting of heads of
verification agencies on December 14, 2009, received wide
support (FSC.DEL/107/09). The
U.S. (Silberberg) asked
Denmark to elaborate on the relative advantage of a meeting
USOSCE 00000123 004 OF 004
in December instead of on the margins of the Annual
Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) in the spring. The
U.S. also asked what was the added value of a free-standing
meeting, noting there was wide
agreement that recent HOV
meetings had only duplicated discussions in the AIAM.
16. (SBU) Denmark (Petersen) replied that a meeting in
December would allow delegations and capitals sufficient time
to consider and develop any proposals made by the HOV.
Petersen said a December meeting need not impose additional
costs if held in conjunction with the annual information
exchange. The Czech Republic,
Greece, Luxembourg, Spain,
Sweden, Austria, and Georgia support the proposal. Canada
(Linteau) offered general support, but proposed a January 10,
2010 meeting. Petersen noted the
later date might entail
added expenses. The proposal will
remain on the working
group agenda.
Code of Conduct
—————
17. (SBU) The FSC coordinator for the Code of Conduct
(Eischer, Austria) will start discussion in the May 20
working group on a proposal for annual review of
implementation of the Code of Conduct.
Conventional Ammunition
————————
18. (SBU) The CPC announced that the Handbook of Best
Practices on Conventional Ammunition has been issued as a
CD-ROM. Also, the CPC has
recently translated the handbook
into Russian.
Information Exchanges
———————
19. (SBU) The CPC (Martynuk) noted that national submissions
were due June 30 for the information exchanges on measures to
prevent illicit air transport of SALW (FSC.GAL/53/09) and
conventional arms transfers (FSC.GAL/43/09/Rev.1).
20. (SBU) Martynuk also noted that the UN was reviewing its
reporting instrument on military expenditures. As the OSCE
used the same instrument for its annual information exchange,
it would need to consider revisions if the UN made changes.
Next Meeting
————
21. (SBU) The next FSC will be on May 20 and will feature Dr
Alexander Lambert of the Geneva Center for the Democratic
Control of the Armed Forces on the recent technical update of
the Code of Conduct questionnaire (FSC.DEC/2/09).
SCOTT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 208021
date: 5/21/2009 4:48
refid: 09DUSHANBE602
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9544
RR RUEHDBU RUEHDE
DE RUEHDBU #0602/01 1410448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210448Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0073
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0029
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0108
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0034
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0063
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0038
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0010
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0019
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0672
RUEABND/DEA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 000602
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NIWF/MANZI, SOD/OSE/MCMANAMON/YASEVICH/KHAN/OSE/SHROYER/D EA
KABUL PASS TO ARD WEIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: UI-09-0003/YEH1K/SARAF, HAJI NASIR — TAJIK MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR TOLL AND SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION RELATED TO THE HAJI NASIR
SARAF DTO
ACTION REQUEST FOR THE FOLLOWING DEA COUNTRY OFFICES: MOSCOW
CO, NEW DELHI CO, TASHKENT CO, KABUL CO, BEIJING CO AND THE
DUBAI CO IN PARAGRAPH 5.
CXX: SOD/OPERATION TAJIK EXPRESS
1. (SBU) ON 05/15/09, ACTING
COUNTRY ATTACHE (A/CA) MICHAEL W.
BROWN MET WITH TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD), COL. MANSUR
BUHORIEV PERTAINING TO TELEPHONE
TOLL AND SUBSCRIBER
INFORMATION RELATED TO THE ONGOING WIRE INTERCEPT OPERATION
TARGETING THE HAJI NASIR SARAF DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION
(DTO).
2. (SBU) THE MVD PROVIDED SUBSCRIBER AND TOLL INFORMATION FOR
THE FOLLOWING TAJIK BASED CELLULAR TELEPHONE NUMBERS:
[992] (91) 8300651
[992] (91) 9006949
[992] (91) 9629805
[992] (91) 9974349
[992] (91) 9997750
[992] (92) 7103899
[992] (93) 5872727
[992] (95) 1739220
[992] (91) 1424877
3. (SBU) ON 05/15/09, DUE TO THE HIGH VOLUME OF TOLL INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY THE MVD, THE DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE (DCO) FORWARDED
ALL OF THE TOLL AND SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION TO DEA/SOD FOR
FURTHER ANALYSIS. THE MVD, DUE TO
THE HIGH VOLUME OF REQUESTED
TOLL DATA WAS ONLY ABLE TO OBTAIN CALL INFORMATION FROM 05/01/09
TO 05/05/09. THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION REPRESENTS A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF EACH NUMBER AND THE INTERNATIONAL NUMBERS WHICH ARE
LINKED TO THEM:
[992] (91) 8300651:
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION: ABDURAHIM SAIDOVICH HABIBOV
PASSPORT NUMBER: TAJIK/A 4374802
ADDRESS DOCUMENTS REGISTRATION LOCATION: OVD HUKUMATA, CITY:
KULYAB, TAJIKISTAN
PLACE OF BIRTH: TAJIKISTAN-FEBRUARY 20, 1966
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: HATLONSKSYA REGION, CITY: KULYAB, STREET H.
SHEROZI BLD#8, APT#7, And TAJIKISTAN.
CASE LINKAGE: INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MVD LINKED THIS NUMBER TO
A TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBER, [922] (95) 173-9920. THE MVD REPORTED
THAT THIS NUMBER MAY BE UTILIZED BY SAIDABROR HAYRULLOEVICH
KURBONOV AKA THE DOCTOR. KURBONOV HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CLOSE
ASSOCIATE OF SARAF.
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: NO INTERNATIONAL CALLS WITHIN THE
REQUESTED TIME FRAME WERE LOCATED.
DUSHANBE 00000602 002 OF 005
[992] (91) 9006949
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION: NAIM NOSIR SAID
PASSPORT NUMBER: TAJIK/ A4436816
DATE OF BIRTH: JULY 22, 1985
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: STREET BORBAD 120, APT #37, DUSHANBE,
TAJIKISTAN
CASE LINKAGE: THIS NUMBER WAS IDENTIFIED BY AN MVD CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE WHO REPORTED IT WAS LINKED TO SARAF IN AFGHANISTAN.
LISTED CALLS TO A CELLULAR PHONE UTILIZED BY SARAF DTO
ASSOCIATE, BOS MOHAMMED AKA BOS MOHAMMED SARAF MOHAMMED ([992]
(91) 962-9805)
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: AFGHANISTAN-[93] 794100390.
[992] (91) 9629805
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION: MVD INFORMATION HAS IDENTIFIED THE
SUBSCRIBER OF THIS NUMBER AS BOS MOHAMMED. MOHAMMED HAS BEEN
PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS A PRIMARY ASSOCIATE OF THE SARAF DTO
BASED IN AFGHANISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN.
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: CALLS TO AFGHAN NUMBER, [93] 788
374740, [93] 788579234, [93] 2919997750.
[992] (91) 9974349
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION: TOIRZHON SHARIPOV
PASSPORT NUMBER: TAJIK/ OVD-1 REGION RUDAK #A14825492
DATE OF BIRTH: SEPTEMBER 12, 1974
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: SETTLEMENT/VILLAGE ZAINABOBOD, STREET
KIZILARIK. APT.-RUDAKI, TAJIKISTAN.
CASE LINKAGE: INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MVD LINKED THIS NUMBER TO
A TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBER, [922] (95) 173-9920. THE MVD REPORTED
THAT THIS NUMBER MAY BE UTILIZED BY SAIDABROR HAYRULLOEVICH
KURBONOV AKA THE DOCTOR. KURBONOV HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED A CLOSE
ASSOCIATE OF SARAF.
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: CHINA-[86] 1527664948, RUSSIA-[7]
9269612384. MVD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION REPORTS THAT
THIS NUMBER MAY BE LINKED TO SARAF DTO ASSOCIATES IN RUSSIA AND
AFGHANISTAN.
[992] (91) 9997750
NO SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.
CASE LINKAGE: MVD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION REPORTED THAT
THIS NUMBER IS LINKED TO SARAF’S AFGHAN BASED CELLULAR TELPHONE
NUMBER, [93] 794245620.
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: AFGHANISTAN-[93] 786367080, [93]
797808060, [93] 786410513, [93] 778424041, [93] 799151315, [93]
788434642, [93] 786151690.
DUSHANBE 00000602 003 OF 005
[992] (92) 7103899
NO SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.
CASE LINKAGE: MVD CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE INFORMATION REPORTED THAT
THIS NUMBER IS LINKED TO THE SARAF DTO IN AFGHANISTAN, UNITED
ARAB EMIRATES AND RUSSIA.
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE:
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: [996] 772665887,
RUSSIA: [7] 9500664320, POSSIBLE RUSSIAN NUMBERS: [7]
9648971748, [7] 7026534648, [7] 9270432736, [7] 9270432736, [7]
9279073513, [7] 9608245299, [7] 9199231738, [998] 909896228
(UZBEKISTAN: PAGER-DAEWOO)
[992] (93) 5872727
NO SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.
CASE LINKAGE: TOLL DATA FOR KURBONOV’S CELLULAR PHONE, [992]
(95) 1739920 IS LINKED TO ABOVE MENTIONED NUMBER.
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: RUSSIA: [7] 9269612384; CONTACT
DATE: 05/04/09. PREVIOUSLY LISTED
TAJIK NUMBER, [992] (92)
7103899 ALSO CONTACTED THIS RUSSIAN NUMBER ON 05/02/09.
[992] (95) 1739220
SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION OBTAINED BY MVD STATES THAT A TAJIK
NATIONAL IDENTIFIED AS HAKIM ASLIDINOVICH SHAMSOV IS THE
SUBSCRIBER FOR THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED NUMBER. MVD CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED THIS NUMBER AS ONE OF
THE PRIMARY TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBERS USED BY KURBONOV AKA THE
DOCTOR TO COORDINATE TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY WITH SARAF.
DATE OF BIRTH: JULY 19, 1981.
PASSPORT NUMBER: TAJIK- OVD VARZOB REGION #A4194896.
NO FURTHER INFORMATION.
[992] (91) 1424877
MVD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE ABOVE
MENTIONED NUMBER IS USED BY A PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED SARAF DTO
TARGET IDENTIFIED AS YULIA VLADIMIROVNA ALEKSEEVA. SUBSCRIBER
INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE MVD STATES THAT THE NUMBER IS
REGISTERED TO ALEKSEEV. ALEKSEEVA IS THE SUBSCRIBER FOR THE
FOLLOWING TWO TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBERS: [992] (90) 7903333 AND
[992] (92) 9629805. THE INVESTIGATION HAS FURTHER IDENTIFIED
THAT ALEKSEEVA IS MARRIED TO A SARAF DTO ASSOCIATE IDENTIFIED AS
BOS MOHAMMED.
ACTION REQUEST
5. (SBU) THE DCO REQUESTS THAT THE FOLLOWING DEA COUNTRY OFFICES
REVIEW THE INFORMATION IN THIS CABLE, IDENTIFYING THE
DUSHANBE 00000602 004 OF 005
INTERNATIONAL CELLULAR NUMBERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE THEIR AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONDUCT A SUBSCRIBER/TOLL ANALYSIS, CRIMINAL
QUERY AND INVESTIGATIVE CROSS-CHECK WITH THEIR CURRENT CASE
FILES TO IDENTIFY ANY ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES TO THE SARAF DTO:
MOSCOW CO, NEW DELHI CO, TASHKENT CO, KABUL CO, BEIJING CO AND
THE DUBAI CO.
6. (SBU) ON 05/18/09, A/CA BROWN MET WITH THE COL. BUHORIEV
CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE WIRE INTERCEPT INVESTIGATION. THE
COL. STATED DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE SARAF INVESTIGATION IS
DIRECTLY LINKED TO SEVERAL DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, THE GENERAL
PROSECUTOR ORDERED THAT THE TAJIK STATE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY (SCNS) MONITOR THE COURT-AUTHORIZED AND MVD-APPROVED
INTERCEPT NUMBERS. THE RECORDED
INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED TO
THE MINISTER OF THE MVD FOR REVIEW. ONCE THE MINISTER HAS
REVIEWED THE INFORMATION IT WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE MVD. A/CA
BROWN STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY FOR SCNS’S
INVOLVEMENT BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE INVESTIGATION
RELIED HEAVILY UPON IDENTIFYING AND PASSING SIGNIFICANT
INTERCEPT INFORMATION TO THE OTHER DEA COUNTRY OFFICES INVOLVED
IN THE INVESTIGATION. A/CA BROWN STATED THAT THE INTERCEPT ON
THE 9805 NUMBER HAS BEEN ACTIVE FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS AND
THE INFORMATION ON THE INTERCEPTS COULD HAVE VITAL INFORMATION
WHICH WOULD FURTHER IDENTIFY THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
SARAF DTO. THE COL. FURTHER REPORTED THAT HE WAS SCHEDULED TO
MEET WITH THE MINISTER ON 05/20/09 IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE
NECESSITY FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE REVIEW PROCESS.
6. (SBU) THIS CABLE WAS PREPARED IN LIEU OF A DEA-6; REFERENCE
THE DEA MANUAL SECTION 6242.11. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
CONTENT OF THIS CABLE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ACTING COUNTRY
ATTACHE MICHAEL W. BROWN AT [992] (37) 229-2807.
INDEXING SECTION:
1. SARAF, HAJI NASIR
NADDIS: 6479196; POSSIBLE ADDRESS: KONDOZ,
MASJIDI
KHIYBON-STREET KHUSTIHO, AFGHANISTAN.
2. KURBONOV, SAIDABROR HAYRULLOEVICH NADDIS: PENDING;
DESCRIBED AS AN TAJIK NATIONAL; DATE OF BIRTH: AUGUST 28, 1965;
PLACE OF BIRTH: DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN; FATHER’S NAME: KURNONOV
HAYRULLO; MOTHER’S NAME: KURBONOVA; ADDRESS: FIRDAVSI STREET
7/7, APT. 61, DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN; TAJIK PASSPORT NUMBER:
A5124604; ISSUE DATE: SEPTEMBER 2000; PROFESSION: DENTIST;
OFFICE ADDRESS: NAVOI STREET 12/3, APT. 19, DUSHANBE,
TAJIKISTAN; POSSIBLE TAJIK CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER, [992] (95)
173-9220. BASED ON A TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD)
COFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION AND MVD PAST CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS, KURBONOV HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A SIGNIFICANT
DRUG TRAFFICKER BASED IN DUSHANBE AND A PRIMARY BROKER FOR THE
SARAF DTO BASED IN KONDOZ, AFGHANISTAN.
3. ALEKSEEVA, YULIYA VLADIMIROVNA: NADDIS:
PENDING; DESCRIBED AS A RUSSIAN FEMALE; DATE OF BIRTH: DECEMBER
7, 1986;
PLACE OF BIRTH: DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN; NATIONALITY: RUSSIAN;
FATHER’S NAME: VLADIMIR ALEKSEEV; MOTHER’S NAME: NELYA ALEKSEEV;
PASSPORT NUMBER: A3047944; ISSUE DATE: FEBRUARY 12, 2004;
RESIDENT: RUDAKI STREET 85, ENTRANCE 5, 4 FLOOR. MVD HAS
ESTABLISHED THAT ALEKSEEVA IS MARRIED TO AN AFGHAN NATIONAL
IDENTIFIED AS BOS MOHAMMED. THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD)
HAS ESTABLISHED THAT MOHAMMED RESIDES IN DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN
WITH HIS WIFE AND IS A DIRECT ASSOCIATE OF THE SARAF DTO. BASED
ON TOLL RECORD DATA IT APPEARS THAT MOHAMMED USES THE FOLLOWING
TWO TAJIK BASED CELLULAR NUMBERS TO CONDUCT TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY
ON BEHALF OF THE SARAF DTO: [992]
90-790-3333 AND [992] (91)
962-9805. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM MVD REPORTED THAT TAJIK
CELLULAR TELEPHONE NUMBER [992] (91) 1424877 IS REGISTERED TO
ALEKSEEVA.
4. MOHAMMED, BOZ AKA AHMED: NADDIS:
DUSHANBE 00000602 005 OF 005
NEGATIVE; DESCRIBED AS AN AFGHAN NATIONAL WHO RESIDES IN
DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN AND IS MARRIED TO YULIYA VLADIMIROVNA
ALEKSEEVA. THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD) HAS ESTABLISHED
THAT MOHAMMED RESIDES IN DUSHANBE WITH HIS WIFE AND IS A DIRECT
ASSOCIATED OF THE SARAF DTO. MVD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION
AND TOLL RECORD DATA STATES THAT MOHAMMED USES THE FOLLOWING TWO
TAJIK BASED CELLULAR NUMBERS TO CONDUCT TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY ON
BEHALF OF THE SARAF DTO: [992]
90-790-3333 AND [992] (91)
962-9805.
5. HABIBOV, ABDURAHIM SAIDOVICH NADDIS:
NEGATIVE; DESCRIBED AS TAJIK NATIONAL; TAJIK CELLULAR PHONE
NUMBER: [992] (91) 8300651; PASSPORT NUMBER: TAJIK/A 4374802;
ADDRESS DOCUMENTS REGISTRATION LOCATION: OVD HUKUMATA, CITY:
KULYAB, TAJIKISTAN; PLACE OF BIRTH: TAJIKISTAN-20 FEBRUARY 1966;
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: HATLONSKSYA REGION, CITY: KULYAB, STREET H.
SHEROZI BLD#8, APT#7, TAJIKISTAN. CASE LINKAGE: INFORMATION
PROVIDED BY THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD) LINKED THIS
NUMBER A TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBER, [922] (95) 173-9920. THE MVD
REPORTED THAT THIS NUMBER MAY BE UTILIZED BY SAIDABROR
HAYRULLOEVICH KURBONOV AKA THE DOCTOR. KURBONOV HAS BEEN
IDENTIFIED A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF SARAF.
6. SAID, NAIM NOSIR
NADDIS: NEGATIVE;
DESCRIBED AS A TAJIK NATIONAL; TAJIK
CELLULAR PHONE: [992] (91) 9006949; PASSPORT NUMBER: TAJIK/
A4436816; DATE OF BIRTH: JULY 22, 1985; RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:
STREET BORBAD 120, APT #37, DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN; CASE LINKAGE:
THIS NUMBER WAS IDENTIFIED BY AN MVD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO
REPORTED IT WAS LINKED TO SARAF IN AFGHANISTAN. LISTED CALLS TO
A CELLULAR PHONE UTILIZED BY SARAF DTO ASSOCIATE, BOS MOHAMMED
AKA BOS MOHAMMED SARAF MOHAMMED ([992] (91) 962-9805);
INTERNATIONAL CALL LINKAGE: AFGHANISTAN-[93] 794100390.
7. SHARIPOV, TOIRZHON NADDIS:
NEGATIVE; DESCRIBED AS A TAJIK NATIONAL; TAJIK CELLULAR
TELEPHONE PHONE NUMBR: [992] (91) 9974349; PASSPORT NUMBER:
TAJIK/ OVD-1 REGION RUDAKI #A14825492; DATE OF BIRTH: SEPTEMBER
12, 1974; RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ETTLEMENT/VILLAGE ZAINABOBOD,
STREET KIZILARIK. APT.-RUDAKI, TAJIKISTAN; CASE LINKAGE:
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD)
LINKED THIS NUMBER A TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBER, [922] (95) 173-9920.
THE MVD REPORTED THAT THIS NUMBER MAY BE UTILIZED BY SAIDABROR
HAYRULLOEVICH KURBONOV AKA THE DOCTOR. KURBONOV HAS BEEN
IDENTIFIED A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF SARAF; INTERNATIONAL CALL
LINKAGE: CHINA-[86] 1527664948, RUSSIA-[7] 9269612384. MVD
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE INFORMATION REPORTS THAT THIS NUMBER MAY BE
LINKED TO SARAF DTO ASSOCIATES IN RUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN
8. SHAMSOV, HAKIM ASLIDONOVICH
NADDIS: NEGATIVE; DESCRIBED AS A
TAJIK NATIONAL; TAJIK CELLULAR
TELEPHONE NUMBER: [992] (95) 1739220; SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION
OBTAINED BY THE TAJIK MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MVD) STATES THAT A
TAJIK NATIONAL IDENTIFIED AS HAKIM ASLIDINOVICH SHAMSOV IS THE
SUBSCRIBER FOR THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED NUMBER. MVD CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED THIS NUMBER AS ONE OF
THE PRIMARY TAJIK CELLULAR NUMBERS USED BY KURBONOV AKA THE
DOCTOR, TO COORDINATE TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY WITH HAJI NASIR SARAF.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 208317
date: 5/22/2009 12:12
refid: 09DUSHANBE617
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0949
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0617/01 1421212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221212Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0343
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0702
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0113
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0078
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000617
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA, ISN/EXBS,
S/CT
CENTCOM FOR J5, SOCCENT J3, SOCCENT CEG
DIA FOR DHO-2
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2019
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PREL, MARR, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: TAVILDARA SITREP
REF: IIR 6 947 0082 09
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (d), (g)
1. (C) Summary: On May 22, the
Regional Security Officer met
with the Ministry of Interior’s Deputy Chief of Staff following
a week of intense rumors about foreign fighters in Tavildara,
Tajikistan and the movement of government forces to the area.
(See REFTEL) While initially
providing the cover story of a
«counter narcotics operation», he quickly admitted that the
Ministry was deploying significant assets to put down a
recruitment effort by Mullah Abdoullah Rahimov. Recent media
reports interviewing a Taliban spokesman make threats to
Tajikistan for supporting U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
It is possible the foreign fighters in Tavildara could be
related, and Post is attempting to gather more concrete
information. End Summary.
The Rumors Begin
2. (C) Beginning May 14, the
Regional Security Office learned
that various former opposition commanders were being called to
Tavildara to meet with the commander there, former Minister of
Emergency Situations Mirzo Ziyoev (aka Mirzojaga). Sources from
within the former opposition based in Rasht Valley stated that
there were dozens of armed foreign fighters in Tavildara and
that the movement of other opposition commanders to the city
indicated a threat to government forces.
A former opposition
commander in Garm, as well as relatives of Embassy security
personnel separately reported the movement of Mirzohuja Akmedov
(aka «Belgi»), the commander from Garm, and a large number of
youths traveling from both Tajikabod and Kulyab.
3. (C) On May 17, a Regional
Security Office source and former
opposition commander, and separately a relative of Embassy
security personnel who work for the local government in
Tavildara indicated that in fact the foreign fighters belonged
to Mullah Abdoullah Rahimov, a former opposition commander
currently linked to Taliban-allied forces in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Along with him were at
least seventy fighters of
various nationalities including Chechens, Afghans, Pakistanis,
Dagestanis, and two Russian speakers. Senior advisors of
Rahimov’s named «Ne’emat» and Hakim Kalandarov (aka
«Bangi»)
were also in Tavildara. These
sources further reported that the
Rasht Valley based opposition commanders had been called down to
Tavildara by Rahimov for the purpose of recruiting them and
their forces to train and fight.
Sources were not clear whether
the intent was to fight in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Tajikistan.
As of May 21, updated information
from sources in Garm and
Tavildara indicate that the former opposition commanders from
the Rasht Valley had rejected offers to join Rahimov, and that
he was moving his forces just east of Tavildara to Saridasht.
4. (C) SOCCENT Marines are currently conducting
training for
the Ministry of Interior’s Militia Detachment for Special
Purposes (OMON), the elite counter terrorism element in
Tajikistan. On May 18, the deputy
commander and most proficient
sniper did not come for training along with two of his other
snipers. The Regional Security
Officer learned that he and a
team of thirty OMON operatives were moving to the town of
Sagirdash, in Darvaz district a few kilometers from Tavildara.
5. (C) On May 20, the Regional Security Officer met
with
security and law enforcement liaison officers from the United
Nations and Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe who
had local staff in Tavildara. One
Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe employee, who is also a regular source for
the Regional Security Officer, relayed information that while
hunting on May 12, two local men were approached by fifteen
Afghans who had crossed the border near Kalaikhum, also in
Darvaz district. According to the two men, there was a large
group further across the border heading towards them, and they
were allowed to drive away after surrendering their cell phones.
DUSHANBE 00000617 002 OF 003
6. (U) According to the Middle East Media Research
Initiative
(www.memri.org/bin/lastestnews.cgi?ID=SD23630 9) reports that «On
May 10, Agha-Jan Mu’tasim, director of the political committee
of the Taliban in Afghanistan ~demanded that ‘Tajikistan not
allow U.S. and NATO to use its territory'». Further, Aljazeera
reports that the Taliban threatened the security of Tajikistan
for allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit goods on their
territory.
Tajik Government Response
7. (C) On May 17, a senior official in the Committee
for
Emergency Situations unofficially stated that he and
representatives from the Ministries of Interior and Defense were
sent out to negotiate with Ziyoev and identify the threat.
Following this meeting, it appears the government understands
that Ziyoev and the other opposition commanders are not involved
in this threat, and have tried to push back on Rahimov.
8. (C) Beginning on May 18, all Ministry of Interior
operative
forces were put on «kazarmah», meaning that they were living
and
sleeping at work. Fifty percent
of non-operative workers were
also put on kazarmah. Multiple
helicopter lifts have been
conducted from Dushanbe towards the east. There are indications
that the State Committee for National Security has initiated
similar procedures.
9. (C) On May 22, the Regional Security Officer met
with the
deputy chief of staff for the Ministry of Interior. All General
Officers have either been in meetings or out of the city since
May 16. While relaying the
official cover story of «poppy seed
eradication», the deputy chief admitted that the story was
intended to calm the population, and he acknowledged that
foreign fighters had crossed into Tajikistan from Afghanistan.
He stated that there were likely 25 fighters, which the Regional
Security Officer disputed with multiple accounts of more. The
Regional Security Officer asked whether 120 OMON operative
officers, not to mention Internal Forces, Border Guards, and
others were necessary for 25 fighters.
The Deputy Chief
lamented he was not able to pass more «updated» information,
but
that when the Chief of Staff returned he would be able to
provide better information. The
Deputy Chief indicated that
they believed RAHMIOV’s forces were in Tajikistan for the
purpose of recruiting them and their forces to train and fight
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Post Actions
10. (C) The Front Office is reviewing all travel
requests to
eastern Tajikistan on a case-by-case basis, and a warden message
is being cleared with Consular Affairs.
Post will review
information next week in the Emergency Action Committee to
determine if any additional actions are required.
11. (C) RSO Comments:
The response of the Government of
Tajikistan’s law enforcement and security entities indicate that
they view the entry of foreign fighters from Afghanistan as a
threat to national security.
While certainly putting on a weak
cover story to «calm the populace», they have not shied away
from activating a large number of operational forces and
deploying them in a relatively public manner. The types of
forces deployed likely indicate they do not intend to arrest
Rahimov or his foreign fighters, but rather to fight. Post
DUSHANBE 00000617 003 OF 003
cannot confirm at this time that the news story and rumors of
intentional Taliban movement into Tajikistan in response to the
Northern Distribution Network.
There are many indicators and
official Tajik Government confirmation that foreign fighters
have entered Tajikistan from Afghanistan, however numbers,
purpose, and locations at this time are unclear.
11. (U) The point of contact for this and all
security related
matters at Post is Regional Security Officer Seth Green.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 208320
date: 5/22/2009 12:21
refid: 09DUSHANBE618
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE508|09DUSHANBE514|09DUSHANBE570
header:
VZCZCXRO0961
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0618/01 1421221
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 221221Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0346
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0081
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0116
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0068
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0705
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000618
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2019
TAGS: EFIN, KCOR, EAID, EINV, PREL, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT TRIES TO TACKLE FINANCIAL CRISIS, BUT SHADOW OF
BANK AUDIT LOOMS
REF: A. A: DUSHANBE 508
B. REF B: DUSHANBE 514
C. REF C: DUSHANBE 570
CLASSIFIED BY: TRACEY A. JACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, EXE, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary. Last week the Tajik government convened a
donor meeting to discuss the effects of and potential responses
to the world economic crisis.
Little of the information was
new. Tajik officials described
the difficulties the country is
facing — falling remittances, sharply lower exports, and a big
budget gap. They also underlined
their commitment to reforming
the National Bank, the investment climate, and cotton financing.
Much of it felt scripted: telling
donors what they wanted to
hear before asking for more assistance.
But at times the Tajik
officials did not seem to be taking the problems seriously. End
summary.
Dog-and-Pony Show for Donors?
——————————
2. (U) The May 13 «Donor
Meeting to Discuss [the] Tajik
Economic Crisis» was co-chaired by Matlubkhon Davlatov, State
Adviser to the President on Economic Policy, and Motoo Konishi,
World Bank Regional Director for Central Asia. Speakers
included Minister of Economic Development and Trade Gulomjon
Bobozoda, Minister of Finance Safarali Najmiddinov, National
Bank of Tajikistan Chair Sharif Rahimzoda, and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Deputy Division Chief for the Middle East
and Central Asia Axel Schimmelpfennig.
3. (U) Davlatov’s opening presentation
highlighted the progress
Tajikistan had made in recent years.
Average GDP growth was
7.2% over the past three years, allowing for steady increases in
the national budget, more attractive investment opportunities,
and increased social expenditures.
Poverty decreased from 83%
in 1999 to 53% in 2008. The
financial crisis, however,
threatened these gains.
Tajikistan’s exports in the first four
months of 2009 fell 48% compared to the same period last year,
led by declining prices for aluminum and cotton. Remittances
declined by over 30% and the national budget by 20%.
4. (U) The second half of
Davlatov’s presentation discussed
Tajikistan’s response to the crisis in light of IMF requirements
for receiving assistance under its recently-approved Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) (see reftels). Davlatov
said Tajikistan had implemented required monitoring programs,
while acknowledging the need to take further measures, including
reforming National Bank management and improving transparency at
large, state-owned enterprises.
All this was included in the
government’s anti-crisis plan «in order to improve trust with
the donor community.»
5. (U) Bobozoda and Najmiddinov
hit similar themes. They noted
further difficulties stemming from the crisis, including an 11%
decline in the national currency (the somoni) and a similar drop
in imports. (Note: The somoni has
appreciated against the
ruble, however. Since most of
Tajikistan’s imports come from
Russia, prices have remained relatively stable. End note.)
Bobozoda said despite the difficulties, GDP has risen by 2.9%
this year, though it may be tapering off. Najmiddinov noted
that even after a recent revision, the national budget faced a
$180 million shortfall. He hoped
international donors would
cover the gap in order to maintain social services