Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 199576
date: 3/30/2009 13:11
refid: 09DUSHANBE401
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE290
header:
VZCZCXRO3843
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0401/01 0891311
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 301311Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0182
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0032
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0062
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0037
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0024
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0343
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000401
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: THREE FACES OF TAJIKISTAN’S SUNNI LEADERSHIP
REF: DUSHANBE 290
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson , Ambassador, EXEC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: EmbOffs have reached out to more of Tajikistan’s
imams to get their impressions of religious life in Tajikistan
and perceptions of the United States.
The dissatisfaction
voiced by Tajikistan’s increasingly popular independent imams,
as described in reftel, appears to be shared by many other
imams. The government, however,
continues to perpetuate the
fiction that it can control what imams say and think. The imams
we met ranged from strict adherence to the government’s policy,
to ignoring it. All of the imams
share a common goal — to keep
the country stable. However, they
express deep concerns about
the course the government has set.
End Summary.
2. (C) From March 10-12, EmbOffs spoke to imams in Dushanbe and
in Sughd to expand on the issues we reported on in reftel.
Three imams emerged who probably typify the state of the Islamic
leadership in Tajikistan. One
imam fully supports the
government’s religious policy, and toes the line in the same way
that secular officials do. An
independent imam ignores and, in
some cases, opposes the government’s policy. A third imam
attempts to comply with government requirements, but also
recognizes the untenable situation he is in.
THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRAT
3. (C) Qobiljon Boev, the senior religious official at
Dushanbe’s Central Mosque, is the prototype of the
government-compliant imam. In
addition to his duties at the
mosque, he is a member of the Council of Ulamo and a relative of
the Council’s Chairman. During a
meeting with PolOff on March
10, he deferred excessively to the positive role of government
in religious life, invoking «his excellency President Rahmon»
multiple times. He said that
«our government is our father, and
we are its children; if a child misbehaves, the father must beat
him.»
4. (C) Boev gave PolOff details about how the government
attempts to control imams. For
example, Boev and other Council
of Ulamo members prepare sets of sermons. They then send the
sermons to the Ministry of Culture, which in turn sends the
sermons to President Rahmon’s Office.
The presidential
administration and Ministry of Culture edit the sermons, and go
back and forth with the Council of Ulamo on which topics are
appropriate to discuss. Once the
sermons are completed, the
Council distributes them to imams at all Friday praying mosques
in Tajikistan by e-mail, post or fax.
Boev said that this
system was initiated by «his excellency,» and that the sermons
generally cover the historical aspects of religious figures or
main tenets of Islam.
5. (C) Boev said most imams are happy to follow the Council’s
guidelines because they are «not well educated, and they need
help writing sermons.»
Controls were necessary to prevent imams
from straying from acceptable topics: «As long as religious
figures do not touch sensitive issues, we will have no
problems.» He said Tajiks
have a positive image of the United
States, and that U.S. support for Israel is not an issue in
which Tajiks would interfere.
6. (C) As reported in reftel, the crowds at Boev’s mosque have
declined over the years. Boev
claimed that 7000 people — mostly
between 20 and 50 — regularly attended Friday prayers; during
trips to the mosque on Friday, however, EmbOffs never observed
anywhere near that number.
Amongst those who regularly attend
Friday prayers is a group of Salafis.
Boev fully supports the
government’s ban on the group, and is aware that they come to
his mosque. He reasoned that it
is not illegal for the Salafis
to pray; it is merely illegal for them to exist as a group.
DUSHANBE 00000401 002 OF 003
THE INDEPENDENT AND CHARISMATIC FIGURE
7. (C) In very stark contrast to Boev, Domullo Numonkhon, the
imam khatib of the Muhammad Iqbol Friday praying mosque in
Istravshan (Sughd Region), is typical of the type of independent
and increasingly popular imam we described in reftel. Numonkhon
took up his position in 1996, with about 500 followers. When we
visited him on March 11, he was supervising workmen putting the
final touches on a huge new addition to his mosque — a cavernous
building with space for 4000 worshippers. The crowds on Friday
spill into the street, and once his new building is finished, he
will start on yet another expansion that will double the
capacity of the mosque.
Worshippers and local businessmen are
financing the construction, including the marble siding brought
in from Iran.
8. (C) Like the imams we described in reftel, Numonkhon is
committed to sidestepping — and in some cases fighting —
government restrictions. He has
angered local authorities
because he «teaches people to think independently.» Toeing the
government line is senseless because «people have access to
television or the internet, and they talk to each other.» The
government «expects» him to report to the imam khatib of the
city’s central mosque; in reality, Numonkhon has little if any
contact with him. Numonkhon did
not dodge questions about the
United States’ reputation like Boev did.
Many Tajiks are upset
with the United States because of Iraq, Afghanistan and
Israel/Palestine, he said. The
United States is a democracy
internally, but many suffer because of its foreign policy.
9. (C) The Embassy will be sending Numonkhon to the United
States on an International Visitor Leadership Program in May.
Local officials told him that they could not issue him a
passport, however, unless he shaved his beard. Numonkhon told
them that they could shave his beard «if you cut off my head.»
The situation was resolved when Numonkhon allowed the officials
to use Photo Shop to crop much of his beard out of his picture.
THE RECONCILER
10. (C) We had anticipated that our meeting with Domullo
Safokhon, the imam khatib of the central mosque in Isfara, and
his deputy, Hoji Homidullo Karimov, would be similar to our
meeting with Boev. Isfara is one
of the most religious parts of
the country, and imams at central mosques are more likely to toe
the government line. However,
Safokhon and Karimov were
unusually frank with us. They
tried to follow the guidelines of
the Council of Ulamo; they dutifully distributed pre-prepared
sermons to the district’s nine Friday praying mosques.
11. (C) However, Karimov and Safokhon see themselves as
peacemakers, attempting to avert problems that could be caused
by the government’s ill advised religious policy. Karimov said
«we know the government’s restrictions are creating problems.»
Referring to law enforcement officials’ harsh methods to address
extremism, he said «we are creating terrorists.» Virtually
every month, Safokhon brings imams and law enforcement officials
in Isfara together to discuss relevant legal and religious
issues. Karimov was skeptical
about the future; as we were
leaving the mosque, he said the new religion law (septel) will
«cause instability.»
HOLDING THE PLACE TOGETHER
12. (C) Comment: Talking to Boev was like talking to a
government official. He used
broad characterizations to support
the government, and he either underestimated or willfully
DUSHANBE 00000401 003 OF 003
ignored the deep resentment that many imams feel toward the
government’s religious policies. We were surprised that he was
so open when speaking with us; no government official would have
given us this kind of information.
We assume that he was simply
not accustomed to speaking to foreign diplomats. While Boev was
probably correct when he said that many of Tajikistan’s imams
were poorly educated, we think he was deluding himself that the
government actually controlled what all imams said and did. We
suspect that a large portion of Tajikistan’s imams would agree
with Numonkhon, Karimov, and Safokhon, all of whom expressed
concern about the government’s collision course with the
religious community. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 199861
date: 3/31/2009 14:38
refid: 09DUSHANBE402
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 09STATE28885
header:
VZCZCXRO5172
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0402 0901438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311438Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0185
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0346
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0040
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0035
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0027
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0065
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000402
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, EEB/IFD/OMA — JULIA JACOBY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — REPORT ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
REF: STATE 28885
1. (SBU) Following is post’s response to reftel tasking:
A. Is the central government expected to receive or is it
already receiving U.S. foreign assistance funded using FY 09
funds?
Yes. Tajikistan receives U.S.
technical assistance, but not
direct financial support, through USAID funded programs. In
addition, the United States provides assistance to the central
government in counternarcotics and other law enforcement, border
control, and to the Tajik military for equipment and training.
B. Is the host country’s budget publicly available?
The Government publishes the state budget once a year in a
state-owned newspaper, «Sadoi Mardum.» The information
published lacks specifics and does not include information on
defense and security expenditures.
In theory, a person can
request a copy of the Tajik State Budget from the Government,
but in practice state agencies are reluctant to provide full (or
any) information on their budgets.
The state budget is not
available on the internet.
C. Are incomes and expenditures included in the
publicly-available budget?
Yes they are included, but with few specifics.
D. Post’s assessment of the extent to which the
publicly-available budget accurately reflects actual government
incomes and expenditures:
In principle, the budget reflects actual government income and
expenditure. However, endemic
corruption and murky
relationships between state-owned companies and offshore
enterprises (which funnel profits back to Tajikistan for
non-transparent projects like construction of presidential
palaces or hydropower) means the budget does not accurately
reflect actual profits from state-owned companies, or the
totality of state spending.
2. (SBU) Comment: Transparency and accountability of government
fiscal actions is poor in Tajikistan.
Government efforts to
improve this state of affairs have been inconsistent. The
economy is based on commodity production (aluminum and cotton),
with a high level of state ownership in key industries.
International assistance has helped develop respect for
principles of transparency and accountability, but the impact of
these efforts has been uneven.
Parliament does not exercise
effective oversight of the budget, neither seriously examining
and debating government budget plans, nor effectively overseeing
budget execution.
3. (SBU) Comment continued: The World Bank, the United States,
and other donors support a variety of programs to help
Tajikistan improve fiscal planning, accountability and controls.
These programs focus on improving
strategic planning, budget
execution, and smoothing fiscal relations between different
parts of the government at the local and national levels. In
particular, in 2008, the government accepted an International
Monetary Fund Staff Monitoring Program in response to a
misreporting scandal. This
program introduced greater capacity
and transparency in monitoring the finances of state-owned
companies, as well as improved accountability at the Central
Bank. The International Monetary
Fund judged the Tajik
Government’s performance under the Program to be sufficiently
effective to warrant the reintroduction of lending. However, we
expect that lack of commitment and understanding of fiscal
reform at the top levels of government will continue to pose a
serious challenge. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 199986
date: 4/1/2009 6:06
refid: 09DUSHANBE404
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 09STATE29482
header:
VZCZCXRO5922
OO RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0404 0910606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 010606Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0187
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0036
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0066
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0041
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0028
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0348
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000404
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, MOPS, AF, PK, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — CONCLUSIONS OF AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN STRATEGIC
REVIEW DELIVERED
REF: STATE 29482
1. (SBU) On March 30 Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel information
to Khusrav Nosiri, Chief of European and North American Affairs
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Nosiri had no immediate
comment on the conclusions of the strategic review, but
undertook to convey it to his superiors.
He added that
Tajikistan was eager for shipments under the Northern
Distribution Network of non-lethal cargo to Afghanistan, via
Tajikistan, to begin as soon as possible.
2. (U) Post will report any Tajik reaction to the strategic
review. Point of contact is
Pol/Econ Chief Matt Purl,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 200074
date: 4/1/2009 12:05
refid: 09DUSHANBE406
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE887
header:
VZCZCXRO6280
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0406 0911205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011205Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0189
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0350
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0012
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000406
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KIRF, TI
SUBJECT: IF I WERE A RICH MAN — HASSAN ASADULLOZODA DONATES A
SYNAGOGUE
REF: 2008 DUSHANBE 887
1. (SBU) Summary: The local and international press have
reported that presidential brother in law — and purported mensch
— Hassan Asadullozoda donated a building to Tajikistan’s Jewish
Community for use as a synagogue.
The reports have painted the
donation as an attempt to atone for destroying the synagogue in
June 2008 to make way for the grounds of a new presidential
palace. While the donation is on
its face a philanthropic act,
it is likely that the Jewish Community is the beneficiary of an
«arrangement» between two former Soviet businessmen. End
summary.
2. (U) On March 26, the Federation of Jewish Communities of the
CIS announced on its website that Hassan Asadullozoda, President
Rahmon’s brother in law, donated a building to Tajikistan’s
Jewish Community to use as a synagogue.
The website described
Asadullozoda as a «businessman and philanthropist» who visited
New York regularly and met with representatives of the Bukharian
Jewish diaspora. The Federation’s
President is Lev Leviev (also
spelled Levayev), a billionaire businessman with political
connections throughout the CIS.
3. (U) PolOff visited the building, a large house that is
located in a prime location in the center of Dushanbe. The
house has been completely renovated, with expensive looking
fixtures and wood floors.
Tajikistan’s Jewish Community has
been waiting for a miracle since June 2008, when Dushanbe
authorities destroyed their synagogue to make room for a garden
attached to the opulent Presidential Palace (reftel). A local
Jewish businessman had been storing the synagogue’s furniture,
books and assorted chachkas in a warehouse in Dushanbe. The
Head of the Community, Mikhail Abdurahmonov, told a reporter
that, «all of the members of our community thank this wonderful
man, who helped us in our most difficult hour.»
4. (SBU) Comment: In reftel, we reported that there was
something unkosher about the manner in which the synagogue was
taken from Community. We also
reported that Lev Leviev had
intervened with the Tajik authorities — including President
Rahmon — to craft a resolution to the Jewish Community’s woes.
It is highly likely that Asadullozoda’s mitzve was the result of
an agreement with Leviev, rather than a pure act of
humanitarianism. It is also
possible that the announcement was
timed to distract from President Rahmon’s signature of
Tajikistan’s controversial new religion law. One concern about
the donation raised by a prominent local expert on religion and
politics is that imams will complain that the President’s family
is helping the tiny Jewish community while at the same time the
government is restricting Islamic religious practice. He hoped
there would be no schmeer campaign.
End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 200197
date: 4/1/2009 20:53
refid: 09STATE31627
origin: Secretary of State
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6930
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHC #1627 0912111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 012053Z APR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 8933
INFO ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS STATE 031627
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, OSCE, TI
SUBJECT: OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL:
STATEMENT ON LAW ON
RELIGION IN TAJIKISTAN
1. Post is authorized to make the
following statement at the
April 2, 2009, meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council in
Vienna:
Begin Text:
Mr. Chairman,
The United States joins the EU in expressing our deep regret
that Tajik President Rahmon on March 25 signed into law
highly restrictive legislation on freedom of conscience and
religious associations. Numerous
provisions in the law
violate Tajikistan’s OSCE commitments on freedom of belief
and assembly.
In particular, the United States is concerned that the law
gives excessive power to the state to control the activities
of religious associations. Provisions in the law would
dramatically increase the membership threshold to register a
religious organization, tighten censorship of religious
publications, restrict the conduct of religious rites to
officially-approved places of worship, constrain children’s
religious activities and education, require state permission
for contact with foreign co-believers, and would make the
appointment of imams and activities of mosques vulnerable to
political interference. Taken as a whole, this law paints a
dim picture of religious tolerance in Tajikistan.
Although various versions of the legislation have been
discussed over the last two years, we are aware of only a few
instances where the concerns of religious groups,
non-governmental organizations or international experts
*including the ODIHR Advisory Panel on Freedom of Religion
*were taken into account. We also understand that both
houses of parliament passed the religion law without any
substantial debate, due in part to the unwillingness of
parliament to make the most recent draft of the law available
for full public scrutiny.
The United States fully understands concerns about religious
extremism and the need to address this issue comprehensively.
We believe, however, that this law will stifle freedom of
religion, isolate minority religious groups, and possibly
foment further extremism. Moreover, excessive government
intrusion undermines our shared undertakings, including that
undertaken in Copenhagen in 1990, to «recognize and respect
the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone
or in community with others, religion or belief acting in
accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.»
We hope the Tajik Mission to the OSCE will relay these
concerns to authorities in Dushanbe, and we appeal to the
government to ensure continued religious tolerance in the
country. We encourage the Tajik
authorities to take
advantage of assistance offered by the OSCE Office in
Tajikistan and the ODIHR on interpreting and implementing
this and other legislation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
End text.
CLINTON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 200226
date: 4/2/2009 5:07
refid: 09DUSHANBE409
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7144
RR RUEHDBU RUEHDE
DE RUEHDBU #0409/01 0920507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020507Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0037
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0012
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0067
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0004
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0002
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0353
RUEABND/DEA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000409
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
ANKARA/DESTITO/KROKE
KABUL/BALBO/MEYER
MOSCOW/JONES
DUBAI/HUDON
DEA HQ PASS TO: OC/HARRIGAN OGE/SOILES/SLATER/SCHRETTNER/MONACO,
OED/MASUMOTO/FARMER, NTRE/UPP, NIRE/LEHRER
NI/BORDER, NTRE/UPP/KREGOR, FOE/HAFF,
NIWF/MANZI, SOD/OSE/LENARTOWICZ/QUINN
GAITHER/EDAHL/JASSO
OSOC/HAMLET/MILIONE/JASSO/OEMLER/
EDDINGTON/DIEDERICH
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DEAX, SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: GFUI-09-9322/TAJIKISTAN/DEA DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE JOINT
INITIATION OF COUNTER NARCOTIC INVESTIGATIONS WITH THE MINISTRY OF
INTERIOR FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
1. (SBU) ON 03/31/09, ACTING COUNTRY ATTACHI FOR THE DEA
DUSHANBE COUNTRY OFFICE (DCO), MICHAEL W. BROWN MET WITH THE
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN, COL.
MANSUR BUHORIEV. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN ORDER TO REVIEW THE
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF THREE NARCOTIC INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED
BY THE MOI AND SUPPORTED BY THE DCO. THE DCO IS MAKING A
CONCENTRATED EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A MORE DEFINED RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE MOI WHICH WOULD RESULT IN THE INITIATION OF BILATERAL
INVESTIGATIONS, SHARING OF NARCOTIC RELATED INFORMATION AND THE
COOPERATIVE PLANNING OF NARCOTIC OPERATIONS IN TAJIKISTAN.
2. (SBU) COL. BUHORIEV REPORTED ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
NARCOTIC RELATED PROBLEMS THAT THE MOI FACES IS THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUMEROUS AFGHAN CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS TRANSPORTING AND SELLING NARCOTICS IN TAJIKISTAN.
COL. BUHORIEV STATED SMALL TO MEDIUM SIZE TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS BASED IN AFGHANISTAN ALONG THE TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER
FREQUENTLY CROSS THE TAJIK BORDER IN ORDER TO SELL
MULTI-KILOGRAM QUANTITIES OF HEROIN, OPIUM AND HASHISH TO AFGHAN
OR TAJIK BROKERS. THE BROKERS PURCHASE AND TRANSPORT THE
NARCOTICS THROUGH TAJIKISTAN TO DISTRIBUTION MARKETS IN RUSSIAN,
TURKEY OR WESTERN EUROPE.
3. (SBU) COL. BUHORIEV, WORKING THROUGH THE MOI HAS ESTABLISHED
A NUMBER OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES (CS) WHO ARE IN A POSITION TO
ASSIST THE MOI WITH THE INITIATION OF UNDERCOVER BUY/BUST
OPERATIONS TARGETING SPECIFIC TRAFFICKING CELLS OPERATING ALONG
TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER. THE MOI DOES NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC
INFORMATION WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS (HPT)
THAT COORDINATE, MANAGE, AND ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO DEA
PRIORITY TARGETS IN AFGHANISTAN OR THE SURROUNDING REGION.
(AGENTS NOTE; THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MOI SOURCES REFERENCED
IN THIS REPORT IS RAW UNEVALUATED DATA WHICH WILL BE FURTHER
CONFIRMED BY THE MOI THROUGH ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIVE
DEVELOPMENT.)
4. (SBU) THE DCO WILL WORK IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MOI
PERTAINING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEIR INVESTIGATION. THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ON-GOING CASE
INVESTIGATIONS.
5. (SBU) DURING MARCH 2009, THE MOI INITIATED AN INVESTIGATION
TARGETING THE DESIGNER DRUG DISTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES OF NEMATULLO
ISMATULLOEVICH DILDOROV. (DILDOROV IS DESCRIBED AS A TAJIKISTANI
MALE NATIONAL.) THE MOI DEVELOPED SOURCE INFORMATION WHICH
STATED THAT DILDOROV WAS DISTRIBUTING MULTI-GRAM QUANTITIES OF
ECSTASY IN DUSHANBE. AGENTS NOTE: ECSTASY IS THE NAME FOR THE
DESIGNER DRUG, MDMA (3, 4-METHYLENEDIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE.)
6. (SBU) ON MARCH 24, 2009, THE MOI CONDUCTED AN UNDERCOVER
OPERATION WHICH RESULTED IN THE ARREST OF DILDOROV AND THE
SEIZURE OF 50 ECSTASY PILLS; THE STREET VALUE FOR EACH PILL IS
APPROXIMATELY $12.00 IN DUSHANBE. DURING THE UNDERCOVER
OPERATION THREE ORGANIZATIONAL ASSOCIATES OF DILDOROV WERE ABLE
TO ESCAPE. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM DILDOROV INDICATED THAT THE
ECSTASY WAS SMUGGLED INTO TAJIKISTAN FROM RUSSIA. ONCE
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS OBTAINED FOR DILDOROV, SUCH AS
POSSIBLE PHONE NUMBERS AND OTHER IDENTIFIERS, THE DCO WILL
ANALYZE THE DATA IN AN ATTEMPT TO FURTHER IDENTIFY THE
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION ASSOCIATED WITH DILDOROV. ACCORDING TO
THE MOI, THEY ARE AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING ALL LEADS WHICH WILL
ASSIST IN THE LOCATION AND APPREHENSION OF THE THREE REMAINNG
SUBJECTS. THE INVESTIGATION IS ON GOING.
7. (SBU) THE SECOND INVESTIGATION INVOLVES AN AFGHAN-CROSS
BORDER TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION. ACCORDING TO MOI SOURCE
INFORMATION, AFGHAN-CROSS BORDER TRAFFICKING CELLS ARE
CONTINUALLY ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH TRAFFICKING/TRANSPORTATION
RELATIONSHIPS WITH TRAFFICKING ELEMENTS BASED IN TAJIKISTAN.
ACCORDING TO SOURCE INFORMATION, THE SURPLUS OF NARCOTICS BASED
ALONG THE AFGHAN BORDER HAVE CREATED A BUYERS’ MARKET IN WHICH
QUANTITIES OF HEROIN, OPIUM, AND HASHISH FAR EXCEED THE NUMBER
OF AVAILABLE BUYER/BROKERS. SOURCE INFORMATION REPORTS THAT THE
EXCESS ABUNDANCE OF NARCOTICS LOCATED ALONG THE BORDER WILL
RESULT IN A HIGHER NUMBER OF TAJIK BORDER CROSSINGS BY AFGHAN
TRAFFICKING GROUPS.
8. (SBU) A CS WORKING UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MOI HAS
REPORTED THAT MEMBERS OF AN AFGHAN TRAFFICKING CELL BASED IN THE
KHATLON PROVINCE OF SOUTHERN TAJIKISTAN HAVE CONTACTED HIM/HER
CONCERNING THE SALE OF 20 KILOGRAMS OF HASHISH FOR APPROXIMATELY
$2000.00 AND AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF EXPORT QUALITY WHITE HEROIN.
(HASHISH PRICES ALONG THE BORDER RANGE BETWEEN $80 AND $100.00
PER KILOGRAM; OPIUM IS APPROXIMATELY $190.00 PER KILOGRAM;
EXPORT WHITE HEROIN IS APPROXIMATELY $3000.00 PER KILOGRAM. THE
PURCHASE PRICES FOR NARCOTIC DELIVERIES TO DUSHANBE INCREASE BY
APPROXIMATELY 10 TO 15 PERCENT.) THE CS IS IN A POSITION TO
INTRODUCE MOI UNDERCOVER AGENTS TO THE AFGHAN TRAFFICKERS; THE
MOI INTENDS TO BUY/WALK 20 KILOGRAMS OF HASHISH WHICH WILL ALLOW
THEM TO RE-ORDER AN ADDITIONAL 200 KILOGRAMS TO INCLUDE 5 TO 10
KILOGRAMS OF HEROIN. THE AFGHAN TRAFFICKERS HAVE STATED THAT
ONCE THE 20 KILOGRAM HASHISH SALE HAS BEEN COMPLETED THEY WANT A
TOYOTA LAND CRUISER (APPROXIMATELY VALUE $35,000) IN EXCHANGE
FOR THE 200 KILOGRAMS OF HASHISH AND THE HEROIN. THE
INVESTIGATION IS ON-GOING.
9. (SBU) A CS WORKING UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MOI HAS
REPORTED THAT MEMBERS OF AN AFGHAN TRAFFICKING CELL BASED ALONG
THE TAJIK-AFGHAN BORDER ARE ATTEMPTING TO SELL APPROXIMATELY 40
KILOGRAMS OF OPIUM AND 2 KILOGRAMS OF HEROIN. THE CS IS IN THE
PROCESS TO ARRANGING AN UNDERCOVER MEETING BETWEEN MOI AGENTS
AND MEMBERS OF THE TRAFFICKING CELL. THE INVESTIGATION IS
ON-GOING.
10. (SBU) THE DCO WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT AND PROVIDE
INVESTIGATIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE MOI CONCERNING THE ABOVE
MENTIONED INVESTIGATIONS.
11. (SBU) THE AFOREMENTIONED INVESTIGATIONS MAY APPEAR TO BE
MODEST, BUT GIVEN THE MOI’S LACK OF INVESTIGATIVE EXPERIENCE IN
THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING OF UNDERCOVER NARCOTIC OPERATIONS,
SOURCE RECRUITMENT AND USAGE AND BUY/WALK OPERATIONS, THEY
REPRESENT AN ADVANTAGEOUS TRAINING/OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN
WHICH THE DCO CAN DIRECTLY ASSIST THE MOI IN FURTHERING THEIR
INVESTIGATIVE SKILL LEVEL.
12. (SBU) THE DCA WILL CONTINUE TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE MOI
CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED CASES, IN
ADDITION TO ESTABLISHING NEW INVESTIGATIONS.
13. (SBU) THIS CABLE WAS PREPARED IN LIEU OF A DEA-6; REFERENCE
THE DEA MANUAL SECTION 6242.11. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE
CONTENT OF THIS CABLE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ACTING COUNTRY
ATTACHI MICHAEL W. BROWN AT 992-37-229-2807.
INDEXING SECTION:
1. DILDOROV, NEMATULLO ISMATULLOEVICH
NADDIS: NEGATIVE;
DESCRIBED AS A TAJIK MALE NATIONAL; DOB: 1983. ON MARCH 27,
2009, DILDOROV WAS ARRESTED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FOR THE
REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN FOR DISTRIBUTING ECSTASY IN DUSHANBE.
ACCORDING TO SOURCE INFORMATION, DILDOROV IS ASSOCIATED WITH A
CURRENTLY IDENTIFIED RUSSIAN TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 200530
date: 4/3/2009 8:25
refid: 09TASHKENT437
origin: Embassy Tashkent
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08TASHKENT1315|08TASHKENT754|09TASHKENT129|09TASHKENT281
header:
VZCZCXRO1606
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNT #0437/01 0930824
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 030825Z APR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0682
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0033
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0009
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000437
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER AND TED BURKHALTER
CENTCOM FOR MAJOR CONRAD SCHUPAY
OSD POLICY FOR TRESSA GUENOV
ANKARA FOR DEA CHRIS MELINK
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
(ADDRESSEES)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, SNAR, KCRM, MASS, EAID, PINR, TI, AF, UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan:
Counternarcotics Meetings for CENTCOM and DEA
Highlight Possible U.S. Assistance
REF: A.) TASHKENT 129; B.) TASHKENT 281; C.) 08 TASHKENT 1315
D.) 08 TASHKENT 754
TASHKENT 00000437 001.2 OF 005
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy P Buckley, Second Secretary; REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)
1. (C) Summary: Experts in
counternarcotics, engineering, and
contracting from the U.S. Army’s Central Command (CENTCOM) as well
as the visiting Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Ankara-based
Country Attache participated in meetings with a wide range of law
enforcement and military representatives from the Government of
Uzbekistan on March 25 — 27. The
Defense Attache and CENTCOM
visitors described possible mil-to-mil counternarcotics assistance
programs but underscored the important coordination role that DEA
plays as the main U.S. Government entity responsible for
counternarcotics issues. The
Uzbek participants described
equipment and training priorities in Tashkent but were
uncooperative on a subsequent visit to the strategic city of Termez
on the Afghan border to give the U.S. experts an opportunity to
make field observations. We are
still getting mixed messages about
Uzbekistan’s willingness to cooperate on counternarcotics issues,
but this visit was an opportunity to reaffirm our position that no
active program will move forward until Uzbekistan makes a
long-delayed decision on whether to approve an Embassy proposal to
establish a Counternarcotics Section, which would be administered
by two openly accredited DEA Special Agents. End summary.
Still No Answer, But Please Don’t Cancel
——————————————— —————
2. (C) Following a denial in summer 2008 of a proposal to
reestablish a DEA office in the Embassy after cooperation was
suspended in spring 2007, emboffs and visiting DEA Special Agent
repeatedly discussed cooperation at numerous meetings (ref A). The
Embassy submitted a diplomatic note on January 25, 2009 proposing
to establish a «Counternarcotics Section» at the Embassy,
which
would be staffed by two openly accredited DEA Agents and
essentially be a DEA office in everything but name. The February
25 deadline listed in the note came and went — unsurprisingly —
with no response. Meanwhile,
prior to planned meetings with
CENTCOM experts, we submitted another diplomatic note on March 12
reminding the Government of Uzbekistan that DEA is an essential
player in any U.S. counternarcotics programming and the lack of
response to our proposal to establish a Counternarcotics Section
would necessitate the cancellation of the CENTCOM meetings.
3. (C) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) Americas Department
Chief, Takhir Mamajanov, quickly contacted the Ambassador and
requested that we proceed with the scheduled CENTCOM meetings,
which he explained could help facilitate the desired response.
Significantly, Mamajanov’s appeal came on the next business day
after President Karimov expressed anger to the Ambassador over the
selection of Mutabar Tojiboyeva as a recipient of the International
Women of Courage Award, which we expected would result in a
reactionary silence (ref B).
Thus, Uzbekistan — which has so
often been willing to cut off its nose to spite its face —
demonstrated a willingness to maintain engagement, perhaps an
indication of its genuine concern about narcotics trafficking on
its territory. We decided to
proceed with the meetings in order to
encourage this engagement.
Good Turnout for Meetings in Tashkent
——————————————— ————
4. (C) In typical Uzbek fashion, MFA instructed us to submit a
complete list of our participants down to the translator but did
not provide any indication of who would comprise the Uzbek
TASHKENT 00000437 002.2 OF 005
delegation for a March 25 meeting in Tashkent. In the end, a good
mix of Uzbek entities were represented:
the National Center for
Drug Control (which has a nominal overarching coordinating role),
the National Security Service (NSS), the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Customs Committee, and the
Border Guards (officially part of the NSS). Unusually, the MFA did
not have any representatives present.
A deputy director from the
National Center for Drug Control did most of the talking for the
Uzbeks from prepared scripts and sat at the center of the long
table, but the NSS Head of Section for Border Security was clearly
the key interlocutor, and the others consulted with or looked to
him before making any comments or answering questions. Curiously,
the NSS official seemed disengaged and spent much of the meeting
with his hands covering his face, but he interjected important
summary statements while quarterbacking the Uzbek lineup. Despite
it being a predominantly mil-to-mil discussion, the lone officer
from the Ministry of Defense remained silent and deferred to the
NSS for commentary.
A United Front
———————-
5. (U) The Defense Attache noted at the outset of the meeting that
CENTCOM, DEA, and the State Department work in concert on
counternarcotics activities. The
Ankara-based DEA Country Attache
echoed this, and added on behalf of the Ambassador that the U.S.
Government is prepared to move forward as a united front in helping
Uzbekistan address narcotics issues.
He noted that 100 tons of
Afghan opiates per year are believed to transit the northern
trafficking route, with Uzbekistan at the center of this transit
activity. He reminded that each
time a shipment passes through a
little bit stays behind and adversely impacts the local
communities. With this big
picture in mind, the DEA Country
Attache stressed our common interest in a renewed partnership to
address the problem — but stated that the U.S. cannot want this
cooperation more than Uzbekistan.
The CENTCOM counternarcotics
official present noted that the U.S. cannot make firm promises on
funding but that developing project priorities will help support
future justifications.
Priority Counternarcotics Projects
——————————————— —-
6. (C) The Uzbeks restated a list of priority projects for which
they would like U.S. assistance, which was originally submitted by
former Director of the National Drug Control Center, Kamol Dusmetov
(since removed from his post), on July 30, 2008. First on the list
is specialized equipment, including large scanners, surveillance
and detection instruments, mobile communications gear, off-road
vehicles, x-ray machines, cameras, document inspection tools,
computers, narcotic substance detection devices, and laboratory
instruments. The second request
is for support of Uzbekistan’s
annual «Black Poppy» eradication effort, specifically the
provision
of spare parts and aviation fuel for a fleet of ageing helicopters
used to assist in the aerial surveillance and detecting crops.
(Comment: As reported in our
annual INCSR submissions (ref C),
however, this operation typically yields only a few hectares of
poppy crops per year and cultivation has essentially been
eradicated in Uzbekistan. This is
not a high priority project that
cuts to the heart of narcotics problems affecting Uzbekistan. End
comment.) The third item on the
list is for upgrades to the
riverine port on the Amu Daryo River in Termez, including
«development of customs and border infrastructure and enhanced
technical capability of law enforcement agencies.» A separate
portion of this facility includes a station where river patrol
boats are based that also nequires rehabilitation. (Comment:
TASHKENT 00000437 003.2 OF 005
There is currently an ongoing project funded largely by the
Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL) being administered by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to upgrade this Termez River Port (ref D),
although there is clearly room for more investment beyond the
limited scope of the project budget.
End comment.)
Training Would be Very Useful
———————————————
7. (SBU) While equipment requests dominate the list submitted by
the Government of Uzbekistan, the most productive discussions at
the meeting focused on training assistance. The visiting CENTCOM
counternarcotics official provided an overview of how CENTCOM
offers training programs in partnership with DEA, and he also
mentioned mil-to-mil exchanges.
Specific training programs raised
as possibilities include patrol boat operations, precursor
identification, canines, cell phone linkages, and criminal
investigation assistance. While
the Uzbek attendees furiously
scribbled these notes, the NSS representative stated that «these
types of training would be very useful for all law enforcement
agencies in Uzbekistan.» The
DEA Country Attache promised to
generate a list of suggested training programs that the U.S. could
arrange expertise, and he also suggested that a group of Uzbek
authorities visit the United States to get a sense of how our
country integrates technology and human resources to address
similar border security issues.
(Note: The U.S.-Mexico border is
geographically very similar to the Uzbek-Afghan border, with a
river dividing two desert landscapes and an active narcotics
trafficking threat. End
note.) The Uzbeks also noted the
existence of a training center for noncommissioned officers and
requested U.S. «specialists» to conduct training for a large
group
at the facility.
Not a Political Linkage, but Reality
——————————————— ——
8. (U) In concluding remarks the Defense Attache once again
highlighted the key role that DEA must play as plans are drawn up
for enhanced counternarcotics cooperation with CENTCOM. He noted
that this was not an attempt to secure access for DEA by linking
projects to Uzbekistan’s decision to approve the Embassy
Counternarcotics Section, but rather that it reflects the reality
that DEA is the lead U.S. Government coordinating entity for
counternarcotics and it needs to be involved. (Note:
This message
has also been reinforced in numerous diplomatic notes and in
high-level meetings with government officials. End note.)
Chilly Reception on Termez Side Trip
——————————————— ———
9. (C) On March 25 the lead NSS official specifically announced
that our request to visit key sites in Termez «is approved,»
which
was an encouraging sign that the NSS concluded it was in its
interests to authorize access to what it sees as sensitive national
security sites. Yet after flying
to the country’s southernmost
point, on March 27 the CENTCOM and DEA visitors (accompanied by
poloff) were given a chilly reception at the Termez River Port and
barred from visiting the Hayraton Border Checkpoint (which was
built partially with U.S. funds) or the patrol boat base. The
on-site officials, which included two of the participants from the
Tashkent meetings, cited bureaucratic misunderstandings for the
denial and chided the U.S. by noting «next time you should be more
specific in your diplomatic notes.»
(Note: Uzbekistan’s
insistence on formal diplomatic notes for virtually all contact is
already a source of frustration and hindrance in the relationship.
TASHKENT 00000437 004.2 OF 005
End note.)
10. (C) The group was grudgingly shown around the commercial zones
of the Termez River Port but admonished not to take any
photographs, which we explained was unhelpful for field engineers
who were trying to determine conditions as a basis for design work
on infrastructure improvement projects that were in Uzbekistan’s
interest. A few NSS officers
quietly joined the entourage but did
not engage in discussions or even greet the visitors, instead
swirling around the periphery of the group like sharks. The patrol
boat base is located directly adjacent to the small commercial
port, but the uniformed Border Guard lieutenant who escorted our
delegation insisted there was no authorization to visit that
portion of the facility and even maintained everything was in good
working order (although we know that pier repairs are necessary and
intended to establish how the U.S. could implement repairs and
improvements). Incredibly, the
on-site officials said this was
technically considered part of the «seaport,» whereas we had
only
requested access by diplomatic note to the adjoining «river
port.»
(Comment: This is outrageous
nitpicking in doubly-landlocked
Uzbekistan and extremely unhelpful during a visit aimed at
establishing a baseline of cooperation.
End comment.) Perhaps
oblivious to the negative vibe that was extended to the group, a
Customs official who had attended the meeting in Tashkent two days
earlier concluded by saying «let us keep our fingers crossed»
that
the U.S. financial assistance will come through for priority
projects.
11. (C) Nevertheless, the team was able to glean some information
about the commercial activities of the Termez River Port during the
site visit. The Port Director
reported that 60 containers are
shipped to the Afghan side per day and about 42 mostly empty
containers arrive at the port.
There is a 1.7 kilometer stretch of
riverfront where barges can moor, although frequently low water
levels limit this considerably.
There is only one canine available
to examine incoming agricultural cargo from Afghanistan, and it
tires after no more than 20 minutes in the intense summer heat.
There is no central facility for processing, which inhibits the
ability of Customs officers to perform thorough inspections,
particularly in the hot summer.
There are rails dating from 1952
which are used primarily for moving rusting Soviet-era cranes back
and forth along the wharf; the port director identified replacing
these rails and repairing the cranes as a high-priority task.
There is no mobile equipment for performing inspections, and the
visitors quickly concluded that a centrally constructed processing
facility with air conditioning could significantly improve
operations. There are seven
storage facilities on-site, where
goods are stored after being unloaded from pallets on barges.
Comment:
—————
12. (C) While the Tashkent meetings seemed productive and a good
variety of government stakeholders were in attendance, the chilly
reception at key sites on the border left our visitors with a mixed
message about Uzbekistan’s intention to cooperate. The only thing
that really counts at this point is whether and how soon the
Government of Uzbekistan will approve our pending request to
establish a Counternarcotics Section at the Embassy under the
direction of DEA Agents. We have
made the case repeatedly of why
it is in the best interests of both countries to enhance
counternarcotics cooperation; we have dangled the prospect of
increased financial assistance to implement key projects; we
received overwhelming expressions of support from meetings at the
working level; the Ambassador and visiting high-level officials
have raised this at the highest levels, including with NSS Chairman
TASHKENT 00000437 005.2 OF 005
Rustam Inoyatov; and, at the MFA’s insistence, we proceeded with
this round of meetings. Lingering
suspicion about the activities
and intentions of U.S. «agents» no doubt underly Uzbek
hesitation
on this matter. Still, the ball
is now squarely in Uzbekistan’s
court, and it must at long last do its part and answer our (latest)
diplomatic note. Otherwise, in
the near future, DEA will be forced
to shift its resources elsewhere and an opportunity for both sides
will be lost.
NORLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 200561
date: 4/3/2009 10:16
refid: 09DUSHANBE413
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8636
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0413/01 0931016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031016Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0193
INFO RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0012
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0358
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000413
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND SCA/CEN
FRANKFURT FOR RCO
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS, KFRD, CPAS, CMGT, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY — DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN
DUSHANBE 00000413 001.2 OF 004
Country Conditions
1. Tajikistan’s continued poverty, high unemployment and
dependence on remittances from family members abroad result in a
significant number of working age Tajiks, mostly male, who seek
to leave Tajikistan for better prospects elsewhere. Until
recently, according to unofficial statistics, more than one
million Tajiks out of a population of seven million worked
abroad, primarily in the Russian Federation. However, in recent
months, the effect of the worldwide economic crisis on the
Russian economy as well as a December 2008 decree by the Russian
Prime Minister aimed at cutting quotas of foreign workers has
resulted in thousands of unemployed Tajik citizens being sent
back to Tajikistan. This portion
of the population may be
expected to look for job opportunities outside of Tajikistan
beyond Russia. At the same time,
living conditions in
Tajikistan have become even more difficult with rising prices in
rural areas as well as the major cities and another winter with
energy outages affecting the entire country. As the overall
economic situation in Tajikistan continues to deteriorate, there
is a concern that all of these factors may contribute to
increased fraudulent applications related to labor migration and
that the U.S. visa will be used as a means to seek a better
economic opportunities.
2. Fraud in Tajikistan is much
more primitive compared to the
efforts of visa applicants in many other countries
(petition-based fraud, for example).
We uncover most fraud
easily at the NIV window with a short interview. However, Post
sometimes encounters relatively sophisticated attempts, which
require follow-up investigations and further action by the Fraud
Prevention Unit or Regional Security Office. During the
reporting period, Post saw a case of apparent H1B fraud when a
Turkish school in the United States petitioned for a Tajik
teacher. After the applicant was
found unqualified for the
position through the visa interview, further CCD research
uncovered numerous H1B visa refusals in Turkey from this same
petitioner. This petition was sent back to DHS for revocation.
3. When Post uncovers fraud, it
is usually in connection with
tourist (B1/B2) or student (F1) visas.
Discovery often occurs
during the initial application review or during the interview,
when it becomes apparent that the applicant does not intend to
fulfill the stated purpose of the trip and likely seeks either
to work illegally for a short time or to join relatives who have
already illegally immigrated.
Applicants often submit false
employment and invitation letters in support of their
applications. Lexis/Nexis
searches provide invaluable
information in this regard. Post
has encountered fraudulent
applicants traveling in groups for various sporting events
(usually wrestling, arm wrestling or judo/taekwondo)in the
United States. One applicant
admitted to paying $3,500 to be
included in the group; another who recently contacted post
following deportation by DHS had apparently overstayed by 18
months. Applicants in these
groups are sometimes well prepared
for the visa interview and are often supplied with genuine
supporting documents as they sometimes accompany legitimate
travelers.
The majority of F1 visa applicants in Tajikistan wish to study
English as a Second Language (ESL) in schools or programs
preferably where large Tajik communities exist. Such places
include New York City; Lincoln, Nebraska; Denver, Colorado, and
more recently several schools in Miami and Los Angeles. Since
these applicants tend to apply to the same dozen schools in the
United States, post is interested in whether administrative
practices of such schools might facilitate non-compliance with
student visa status. Investigating one case, post requested an
applicant’s transcripts from the Computer Professional Learning
Center (CPLC), a school that offers an ESL program, to clarify a
discrepancy between the SEVIS record and applicant’s statements.
When the initial transcript
provided conflicted with the timing
the student claimed she was in the U.S., the school responded by
sending a second transcript with data in line with the
applicant’s statements. While
there is no hard evidence of
fraud here, we are now monitoring this U.S. school closely. In
another case, anecdotal information has indicated that students
applying to a different school in New York City take advantage
of course hours that allow foreign students to work while
studying. In regard to these
concerns, post highly values
recent DHS efforts to investigate further possible fraud trends
among Tajik students falsely claiming to attend ESL schools,
especially in New York.
4. Documents are generally
untrustworthy in Tajikistan, with
signatures and seals often forged.
The officer can detect many
of these documents by asking for supporting details about the
individual’s work, economic situation and financial sponsorship
DUSHANBE 00000413 002.2 OF 004
or details of the proposed US travel.
Document forgers can be
easily found in Tajikistan and provide fake job letters very
cheaply. However, not a
