Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 185654
date: 1/5/2009 7:27
refid: 09DUSHANBE6
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09DUSHANBE1501|09DUSHANBE1548
header:
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0006 0050727
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050727Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1299
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0373
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000006
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARIAN VOICES DOUBTS ABOUT TAJIKISTAN’S
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
REF: (A) DUSHANBE 1501 (B) DUSHANBE 1548
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: On 20 December, Yusufjon Akhmedov, a deputy
in the lower house of Parliament, candidly discussed with
Poloff a number of issues, including the extent to which
President Rahmon personally benefitted from the Tajik
Aluminum Company (Talco).
Akhmedov speculated about a
possible declaration of bankruptcy by the Tajik government.
End summary.
2. (C) On December 20, Parliament member Akhmedov told Poloff
the Tajik government was relying heavily on foreign currency
reserves to finance its continued operations. The supply of
hard currency was dwindling, however, and Akhmedov believed
the reserves would be completely depleted by the end of
January 2009 or the start of February.
Akhmedov said the
government would deny bankruptcy if/when it occurred;
however, it would be impossible to continue functioning
without the reserves, and in the current economic climate
there were no obvious alternatives.
(Note: According to a
recent assessment by the International Monetary Fund,
Tajikistan’s National Bank was carrying adequate foreign
currency reserves, around $167 million (ref A). More
information about the health of the Bank may emerge when key
findings of a recent audit are announced in the coming weeks
(ref B). End note.)
3. (C) Akhmedov said President Emomali Rahmon personally
siphoned off 90% of the annual earnings of Talco,
Tajikistan’s main industrial concern.
Talco’s yearly
earnings were around a half billion dollars, some $450 to
$500 million of which Rahmon kept for himself in off-shore
accounts. (Note: This contradicts
a recent statement by
World Bank Country Director Chiara Bronchi, who told
Ambassador recently that proceeds from Talco,s British
Virgin Islands Management company do return to Tajikistan )
to private accounts in Orienbank owned by Presidential
brother-in-law Hasan Asadullozoda.)
4. (C) Akhmedov represents the nineteenth district of
Konibodom, Tajikistan, an industrial region in the north of
the country. Akhmedov is serving
his fourth term in
parliament as an independent and has faced significant
challenges to his position. In
particular, Akhmedov claimed
that during the parliamentary elections of 2005 a
representative of the People’s Democratic Party announced an
electoral victory over Akhmedov.
Supporters of Akhmedov took
to the streets and organized a small protest, which
successfully forced the PDP candidate to back down. Senior
members of Parliament and members of the PDP party view
Akhmedov as too independent and non-supportive of the
majority party. This was highlighted
when the PDP removed
Akhmedov from the Committee on Energy and Industry and
transferred him to the less-desirable Committee on Foreign
Affairs.
5. (C) Comment: It is impossible to verify Akhmedov’s claims
about the amount of money the President received from Talco.
Talco’s inputs and profits are handled by a privately-held
company based in the British Virgin Islands, and its balance
sheet is not public. According to
some Embassy contacts,
Talco nets just under $50 million a year in profits inside
Tajikistan, which is consistent with Akhmedov’s figures. But
the amount going to the President via the offshore branch is
a matter of speculation. Post has
heard speculation on
Rahmon’s finances from many sources.
The discussion with
Akhmedov was more notable for the openness with which a
senior member of parliament was willing to speak to us, than
Qsenior member of parliament was willing to speak to us, than
for its content. While it is
unclear how seriously the world
financial crisis will affect Tajikistan, there is little
doubt that it will be felt here and is impacting Talco.
Against that backdrop, the extent to which the President
helps himself to the country’s limited and possibly shrinking
wealth could become a destabilizing issue. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 186130
date: 1/8/2009 3:23
refid: 09DUSHANBE21
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1572
header:
VZCZCXRO1840
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0021/01 0080323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080323Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1307
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0375
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000021
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, EPET, EAID, PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: Power Politics: Uzbeks Hold up Critical Winter Energy
Supplies
Ref A: 2008 Dushanbe 1572
1. (SBU) Summary: Tajikistan concluded an agreement to buy a
critical 1.2 billion Kilowatt-hours (KWh) of electricity from
Turkmenistan from November 2008 through April 2009. Although
Uzbekistan agreed to transmit the first 400 million KWh through its
grid in November and December, it has so far refused to allow the
rest of the energy to pass to Tajikistan. The Uzbeks also have
failed to begin delivering an additional 600 million KWh as part of
a separate multi-year agreement.
Without this energy, Tajikistan
has cut back power to the population outside the capital, and even
supplies to Dushanbe will dry up in February at current consumption
rates. The two countries have
agreed on a 65% price hike for
deliveries of Uzbek natural gas.
Uzbekistan would like to see
Tajikistan’s domestic power generation capacity dry up before it
turns the taps back on, according to local contacts. End summary.
2. (SBU) Most of Tajikistan’s energy problems stem from the fact
that its electrical system was never intended to be independent.
The Central Asian electrical grid, built during the Soviet era, took
for granted that low seasonal production levels in one area would be
offset by increased generation elsewhere. With independence,
Tajikistan remains highly dependent for its energy needs on a
neighboring country with which its relations have soured.
Nurek Levels: Low and Lowering
3. (U) Three-quarters of Tajikistan’s domestic power supply is
generated at the Nurek Hydroelectric Station on the Vakhsh River.
More than adequate in summer, reduced winter water flows mean that
Tajikistan faces an annual energy deficit. Capable of operating at
3 Megawatts, Nurek has been operating at a fraction of that capacity
to husband the limited supply of water in the reservoir behind it.
The water level is currently 879 meters above sea level, several
meters below its level at this time last year, and only 22 meters
above the «dead point» at which Nurek can no longer generate
electricity. The power station is
consuming about a half-meter a
day, which is partly replenished by inflow of 176 cubic meters per
second from the Vakhsh. A contact
at Nurek says that at current
consumption rates the dam can provide electricity to Dushanbe and
the Talco aluminum plant through mid-February before running out of
water. This leaves out the rest
of the country.
Uzbekistan Turns Off Tap on Turkmen Transit
4. (U) In 2007 Turkmenistan signed an agreement to provide
Tajikistan with 1.2 billion Kilowatt-hours (KWh) of electricity
every winter through 2012, at a cost of 3 cents per KWh. Every
year, however, Dushanbe must negotiate with Tashkent to arrange the
transmission of the energy through Uzbekistan’s power lines. The
two countries concluded an agreement in October providing for the
transmission of the first 400 million KWh, at a transit cost to
Uzbekistan of 0.3 cents per KWh, for November and December, but
negotiations to transmit the remaining 800 million KWh have
foundered. A delegation from
Dushanbe is due to depart soon for
Tashkent; at the moment, Tajikistan is receiving no Turkmen energy.
5. (U) Uzbekistan also has failed to begin transmitting an
additional 600 KWh it agreed to provide Tajikistan this winter from
its own sources as part of a multi-year arrangement in exchange for
900 KWh from Tajikistan in the summer.
6. (U) Officially, Tashkent is telling the Tajiks that the energy
from Turkmenistan is being held up by technical problems in High
Voltage Line number 512 between Sirdarya, Turkmenistan and Karakul,
QVoltage Line number 512 between Sirdarya, Turkmenistan and Karakul,
Uzbekistan. According to a source
at the Tajik Ministry of Energy
and Industry, the Ministry has already expressed to its counterparts
in Tashkent and Ashgabat that it is willing to send specialists to
help fix the problems, but the Turkmen and Uzbeks have declined the
assistance. In the meantime, the
Ministry has reduced electricity
supplies to the regions outside of Dushanbe from 6-8 hours a day to
1-3 hours per day.
Power Politics
7. (SBU) Almost no one here believes the official explanation for
the energy holdup. An Embassy
contact at Barki Tojik, the company
that managed Tajikistan’s electrical grid, said Uzbekistan’s goal
this year was to bleed the Nurek reservoir dry before releasing any
electricity. Uzbekistan intended
to use the expanded outflow from
Nurek — which would be forced to run at higher capacity to make up
for the deficits in Uzbek and Turkmen energy — to feed its own
reservoirs downstream. More
broadly speaking, he repeated an
oft-heard view here that Uzbekistan wants Tajikistan to be entirely
dependent for its energy on Tashkent.
Another widely believed
assumption is that the energy will flow only if Tajik President
Rahmon prostrates himself before Uzbek President Karimov.
DUSHANBE 00000021 002 OF 002
Uzbeks Agree to Pass Gas
8. (U) Tajikistan has reportedly reached an agreement on increased
prices for natural gas imports from Uzbekistan. According to the
new arrangement, Tajikistan will pay $240 per 1,000 cubic meters
(tcm) of natural gas, a 65.5% increase over this year’s price of
$145. The Uzbek state gas
producer Uztransgaz initially had
demanded $300 per tcm, agreeing only on January 1 to lower the
tariff by $60. Some reports
suggested that the Uzbeks had intended
all along to fix the price at $240, and had only mooted the $300
figure so they could appear to be compromising. Analysts noted
that, since Tajikistan has access to only one potential seller,
Uzbekistan held all of the cards in the negotiation and could
dictate its price.
9. (U) Although the new figure is reported to be under world market
prices, Tajikistan nevertheless still will have difficulty paying
it. Even with the $145 per tcm
price, Tajikistan accumulated
massive debts to Uzbekistan. In
late December, Uztransgaz reduced
supplies from 70 tcm to 35 tcm per hour due to payment delays.
Tajikistan responded by remitting $3 million, but acknowledged that
it still owed an additional $8 million in arrears. The Tajik gas
company Tojikgaz reportedly cut delivery to its biggest non-payers,
including the Dushanbe cement plant and the Tojikazot company.
Supplies continued to the Talco aluminum plant and the Dushanbe
central heating facility. There
are concerns that the latter, upon
which many Dushanbe residents depend for winter heat, might not be
able to afford the higher prices set by Uztransgaz. The facility is
said to be examining the possibility of converting to coal or
low-grade mazut oil.
10. (SBU) Comment: While it is difficult to verify the claims that
Uzbekistan is waiting for Nurek to run dry, it is certainly
plausible. Uzbekistan has made no
secret of its desire to have a
greater say in Tajikistan’s exploitation of its energy and water
resources, and ensuring Tajik energy dependence is one way of
achieving this. To escape its
seasonal energy dependence,
Tajikistan needs to develop more production and other transmission
options to the north, south, and east.
A project underwritten by
the Asian Development Bank to build a north-south transmission line
to Afghanistan is one step in this direction. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 186350
date: 1/9/2009 4:57
refid: 09DUSHANBE42
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0042/01 0090457
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090457Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1311
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000042
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BUHLER)
INL/RM (BYRNES)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, EAID, MASS, PREL,
KCRM, TI
SUBJECT: Mission Law Enforcement
and Stability Goals
1. Introduction and Summary: A recent review of the Mission
Strategic Plan provides a good snapshot of what we achieved in the
last year and our top priorities looking ahead. This is the first in
a series of cables to provide a goal by goal look of what Embassy
Dushanbe is doing. The Border and Law Enforcement Working Group
(BLEWG) coordinates the work towards the peace and stability goal.
The BLEWG includes the DCM, POL/ECON, INL/DOJ ICITAP, EXBS, DAO,
RSO, ODC, DEA, AID, CONS, and Public Affairs. Key goals are to
disrupt criminal organizations, extend the reach of the national
government into remote areas, expand rule of law, and promote
stability. Key achievements in 2008 included improved law
enforcement coordination, the delivery of effective training, and
improved infrastructure. Key goals for 2009 include improved
communication infrastructure, more joint Tajik-Afghan training, and
demining work. End Intro and Summary.
Top 2008 Accomplishments
2. Much of our work was directed at achieving better coordination
among Tajik law enforcement agencies within Tajikistan and more
joint work with agencies in neighboring countries. With USG support
and advocacy, the Drug Control Agency and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs began to share forensics and intelligence technology. We
linked border posts along Tajik-Afghan border by tactical radio
communications. Our new initiatives with the State Committee for
National Security (GKNB)include an agreement to train Afghan Border
Guard and Law Enforcement officials. Various law enforcement
agencies, but most notably the State Committee for National
Security, agreed to create a Joint Intel Center. We negotiated
agreement on construction and multi-agency use of a National
Counternarcotics/ Counterterrorism Training Center at Karatog. DEA
successfully conducted joint Tajik/Afghan Drug enforcement training
— the first time we have succeeded in getting Afghans allowed into
Tajikistan for joint training. We supported one controlled delivery
and two joint investigations between Tajik and Kyrgyz drug agencies.
We secured the establishment of a
strategic planning committee to
guide reform of the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
began curricula review and revision, and conducted an intensive
summer seminar at the Academy for English language instructors from
multiple law enforcement agencies.
3. We made significant progress in improving infrastructure and
working conditions for those on the front lines of border security.
We increased the use of the Nizhniy Pyanj bridge/port of entry.
Diplomatic pressure yielded 200 vehicles crossing per day. We
furnished the existing facilities. We have made progress on
completing leftover Phase I construction elements and the commercial
customs facility. We are seeing some cross-border coordination with
Afghan counterparts. We currently are renovating and equipping the
GKNB analytical center, Kulma and Kyzyl Art joint border facilities,
and the Murgab detachment barracks. We completed the Sari Gor border
outpost. We overcame obstacles to
progress on projects underway in
Ribhoz, Sayod, Kokul, Shogun and Khirmanjo border posts.
4. We undertook a number of training events in which the units
successfully demonstrated the benefits of training in later
operations. The Defense Department completed four
Counter-narcoterrorism training (CNT) events in 2008. One of the
units trained, the Border Guard special force group, afterward
Qunits trained, the Border Guard special force group, afterward
conducted three successful operational missions resulting in drug
seizures. We developed counterterrorism capacity within the Ministry
of Internal Affairs OMON unit used for SWAT and other emergency
response operations. The MVD’s elite Militia Detachment for Special
Purposes (OMON) drill at the Embassy demonstrated an improved
anti-terrorist response and confirmed OMON’s capacity after a change
in leadership. We did follow-on
training with ARSOF CNT trainers,
who were integrated into SOCCENT’s CNT strategy.
5. Other achievements included our successful advocacy in the Border
International Group for OSCE’s national border control strategy. Our
Rule-of-Law initiatives improved the selection and training process
for judges. We trained both prosecutors and defense attorneys in how
to ensure balanced trials. We engaged the Islamic University Law
Center on Shariah and secular law.
Measuring Tajik Progress
6. In efforts against human trafficking, Tajikistan maintained its
place on the Tier 2 Watch list. In prosecutions in 2008 there were:
six cases under TIP Law compared to zero
in 2007; there were six
recruitment cases, down from 13 in 2007; there were 11 minors cases,
up from 10 in 2007. While the statistics may not be reliable, the
criminal justice system is nevertheless applying the new TIP law
(i.e. six new cases) and increasing public education/awareness
efforts. Forced cotton labor, which is a form of trafficking, is
still an issue. There is a forthcoming collaborative project between
ABA and IOM to advocate improved TIP legislation and a pending
project with IOM to train law enforcement officials.
7. In narcotics interdiction, according to DCA statistics, there
were total 775 crimes connected to drugs in 2007 and 603 in 2008. In
2008, DCA, BG and GKNB increased drug seizures, but seizures
decreased in the MVD for reasons unknown. Overall seizures
increased 11%. There were over 5 metric tons seized in 2008 up from
4.5 metric tons kg in 2007. In interagency and international
enforcement cooperation DCA conducted 37 joint operations with
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan. Joint Tajik-Afghan
counternarcotics cooperation yielded destruction of four large drug
labs. Tajik drug liaison officers
were deployed to Afghanistan.
Looking Ahead — Top Goals for 2009
8. We plan to improve border
security by upgrading Border Control
Points or Border Crossing Points. We have four in progress, three
planned, and four projected, not counting projects in Murghab. We
plan to provide alternative energy for critical border
infrastructure at remote posts.
In a related effort to improve
communications infrastructure, we will conduct a Harris
communications survey in the second quarter of FY 09 to expand the
design and implementation of a system to allow voice/data
communications by select law enforcement, military and security
services at the operational and strategic levels, including
SOCCENT-trained mobile units.
9. Training will continue to be a major activity and will include
joint Customs Service and Border Guards mentoring and training at
Nizhniy Pyanj; training for Customs Service and Border Guards at
border posts, railway crossing points, and railway freight yards
including active and passive scanning units. We will provide English
language training (ELT) to multiple agencies, including a four-month
DoD training team for the Ministry of Defense and the National
Guard, and will implement ongoing programs to create language
laboratories in the law enforcement academies. ELT links
Tajikistan’s law enforcement and security services to the
international law enforcement and military community and creates the
necessary platform to teach values such as rights of the accused,
ethics, anti-corruption, public service, and technical courses such
as crime scene procedures, chain of evidence, use of informants. Our
overall CN/CT strategy includes tiered training to multiple military
and law enforcement units:NG, BG SGSR, GKNB Personal Protection
Services, MVD OMON, Spetznaz, CT investigation unit] with emphasis
on train-the-trainer/leader development.
In 2009 we will design and
begin to implement SOCCENT’s National Training Center for U.S. and
all Tajik law enforcement/military structures with a CN/CT mission.
We will foster a partnership of the Customs Academy and Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center and seek to establish a technical
training branch to do training on interdiction equipment. Finally,
we will work on ways to better measure the effectiveness of training
and quantify the impact of training programs.
10. In 2009 we will carry out the Global Peace Operations Initiative
and support laws, regulations and cadre training needed to deploy a
professional peacekeeping unit. We expect this project to tie in
with military reform. We will also:
carry out Explosive Ordinance
Device (EoD) initiatives; provide demining equipment; implement a
second phase of bomb tech training with MVD; and, conduct EoD
officer training. We will continue to work to improve intelligence
sharing and collaboration among Tajik law enforcement agencies. We
will launch a major new community policing project with funds
provided by DOD through S/CRS.
Major Challenges and Positive New Developments
11. The most significant obstacle identified by the team to making
more progress on this goal included the limited management platform
in the Embassy to support staff needed to carry and oversee
projects. The second most significant obstacle was the uneven
Qprojects. The second most significant obstacle was the uneven
cooperation and limited capacity in Tajik law enforcement agencies,
for example the understaffed liaison office of the Tajik Border
Guards. On the positive side, the establishment of the
Inter-ministerial Commission on Trafficking in Persons looks to be a
step forward on TIP issues. President Rahmon’s public commitment to
joint training of Tajiks and Afghan law enforcement officers is an
opening we intend to pursue.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 186366
date: 1/9/2009 7:33
refid: 09DUSHANBE44
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2898
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0044 0090733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090733Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1315
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0379
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000044
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA and PA/PR/FPCW
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, KPAO, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — NEWSPAPER EDITOR ATTACKED IN KULYAB
1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified — Not for Internet Distribution.
2. (SBU) Summary: Abdumumin Sherhonov, editor-in-chief of an
independent weekly newspaper and a part time reporter for RFE/RL,
was beaten by a group of young men in Kulyab January 6 when he tried
to help two female journalism students.
The students had telephoned
him and asked for assistance because they were being harassed by two
of the men. Sherhonov is not sure
the beating was planned, but
Radio Ozodi, RFE/RL’s bureau in Tajikistan, reported that the
incident was in response to his articles critical of local
officials. Local police detained one
suspect in Kulyab and put out
a search for a second in Dushanbe.
They consider the attack a
random act of «hooliganism,» but they have launched a 10-day
investigation and will decide later whether to open a criminal case
against the attackers. End
summary.
3. (SBU) A group of men beat a newspaper editor who was responding
to a call for help from two female journalism students in Kulyab at
5 p.m. on January 6. Abdumumin
Sherhonov, editor-in-chief of the
Pajvok («Echo») newspaper and a contributor to Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), told local media that the two Kulyab
State University students, who also report for his newspaper part
time, called him for help from a cell phone because two young men
were preventing them from walking from their university dorm to the
newspaper offices located nearby.
When he approached and tried to
intervene, two men started beating him, were joined by a third, and
then one of them flashed a police badge.
He said two cars pulled up
a minute or two later, and two more men got out. Sherhonov said he
thought they were going to help him, but instead they started
punching and kicking him. He told
emboff January 8 that a crowd of
about 100 people gathered to help him.
Later that evening he went
to a district Ministry of Interior office to file a report about the
attack and provide forensic evidence.
4. (SBU) The next day Sherhonov told local media that the police
told him they had arrested one of the primary alleged attackers,
Khalil Imomov, a continuing education student in the Russian
language department of Kulyab State University. Sherhonov told
emboff that local law enforcement had identified the second suspect
who had flashed the police badge and had ordered a search for him in
Dushanbe.
5. (SBU) In his conversation with emboff, Sherhonov said he was not
ready to make a connection between the attack and his reporting,
although RFE/RL’s Tajik bureau reported that the attack was in
retaliation for his reporting.
Sherhonov told emboff he published a
story about corruption among Kulyab’s traffic police in early
December and a couple weeks later they called him and said, «That
wasn’t nice.»
6. (SBU) The BBC reported that local police believe the attack was
just another random altercation common among young men, but they
would conduct a 10-day investigation and possibly open a criminal
investigation after collecting evidence.
7. (SBU) Although Sherhonov is not ready to call the attack
retaliation and is willing to wait for the police to complete their
investigation, another reporter was beaten up Kulyab in August last
year. The National Association of
Independent Media of Tajikistan
(NANSMIT) reported that Zainaddin Olimov, chairman of the
«Kulob»
association, ordered the beating of Dzhurakhon Kabirov, a journalist
for the independent weekly Millat, because of Kabirov’s articles
criticizing Olimov.
Jacobson
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 186365
date: 1/9/2009 7:33
refid: 09DUSHANBE43
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2897
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0043/01 0090733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090733Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1313
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0270
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0377
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0209
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0260
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC 0100
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000043
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, EAID, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: Birth of Tajik Ag Working Group and Appeal to Donors
1. (SBU) Summary: The Tajik government recently convoked the first
meeting of a new agricultural working group, at which it made a
number of not entirely convincing statements on agricultural
reforms, especially in the cotton sector. Donors urged strict
requirements on further lending for cotton production. Although a
food deficit was not discussed, the Government ended the meeting by
passing out an appeal to donors to provide it with financial
assistance to address the impact of the global economic downturn and
Tajikistan’s «food deficit.»
End Summary.
2. (SBU) On December 19, 14 members of the Donor Coordination
Council (DCC), including USAID, met with the Tajik government’s new
Agriculture Working Group formed to ensure better communication and
coordination between donors and the government. The group is
accountable to Deputy Prime Minister Murodali Alimardon, who is
responsible for agriculture, and donor coordination. The Working
Group will present Alimardon with reports, recommendations and an
agriculture action plan. Presidential Economic Advisor Matlubkhon
Davlatov dominated the first 20 minutes of the meeting with a
presentation on the economic situation, which included GDP growth
(7.4% in 2008), lower than expected inflation (12.7%), the negative
impact of the global financial crisis, lower demand for cotton and
aluminum, falling remittances, the impact of energy problems on the
production of agricultural inputs (what energy there is will be
needed for heating), and the low repayments of $40m in government
cotton loans last summer. (Press
reports indicate only 10-20% of
the loans have been repaid.) In
light of all of this, at the end of
the meeting the government handed out an appeal to the donors
stating, «…the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan hereby
appeals to the international organizations and country-donors with
the request to provide emergency financial support to our country in
order to mitigate the consequences of the global financial crisis
and avert the escalation of the food deficit in the country.»
Interestingly, the «food deficit» was not discussed in the
meeting.
3. (U) After addressing the Working Group’s organizational structure
and logistics and defining its priority issues — debt resolution
and agricultural sector finance — the discussion moved to
agricultural and economic issues.
The government announced that an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission would arrive February 5 to
make recommendations about future IMF assistance to Tajikistan, and
a new banking law should be approved in March. Results of the IMF’s
Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), looking at the health of the Tajik
economy and government fiscal policy, would be made public soon.
The Government was on track to meet the SMP’s measures but the
external environment had deteriorated, reinforcing the need for
domestic reforms.
4. (U) The donors expressed serious concerns about the cotton
financing scheme and its risks to the banking system. The IMF
reiterated its warning about the current financing scheme, noting
that it is the biggest contributor to the banks’ liquidity problems,
especially as repayments are very low. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) said that it was
«suicide» to
continue financing cotton. The
donors recommended that any new
Qcontinue financing cotton. The
donors recommended that any new
financing scheme should be targeted to the agricultural sector in
general, not to any specific crop, farm, investor, region, etc. The
Finance Ministry concurred.
Donors emphasized that banks should
employ commercial standards in making loans. The EBRD’s Tajik
Agricultural Finance Facility (TAFF) program helps banks to make
assessments and decisions for lending.
Donors also called on the
Government to remove unofficial pressure on banks to lend for cotton
only and said no new money should be lent until the $40 million from
last year was repaid. The
repayment period has been prolonged by
three months owing to poor market prices; however, the donors noted
that it is unlikely that prices will go up.
5. (U) Donors regard the agricultural sector as a priority and need
to see that reforms are moving forward.
The group discussed
evidence that farmers growing non-cotton crops made profits in 2008,
but were highly doubtful that farmers (as opposed to
«investors»)
made a profit on cotton. The DCC
is monitoring the Freedom to Farm
provision guaranteeing farmers the right to grow the crops of their
choice; survey results monitoring implementation will be available
in January. Davlatov stated,
«I guarantee you that where cotton can
be grown, farmers will want to grow it» and that «we are not
going
to force farmers to grow cotton next year.» Alimardon said the
Government was serious about improving the profits for farmers and
that «cotton had nothing to do with politics.» Davlatov clarified
that 180 million somoni ($52 million) in 2009 budget funds for
agricultural loans were intended for the entire sector, not just
cotton. The government would set
up monitoring mechanisms to track
lending.
DUSHANBE 00000043 002 OF 002
6. (SBU) Comment: It was noteworthy that Davlatov, not Alimardon,
ran the meeting. The USAID
officer witnessed blatant eye-rolling
and head shaking by Alimardon while Davlatov spoke. Most of the
donors were skeptical about the government’s assurances that it
would not force farmers to grow cotton and that agricultural loans
this year would not be used exclusively for cotton. As for the
financial crisis appeal, most donors have been intensely concerned
with responding to Tajikistan’s food and energy deficit. The
Government appears to see the financial crisis as a pretext for
seeking more cash. Despite basing
the appeal partly on food
deficits, the Government did not discuss this deficit or how it
related to agriculture policy reform — a vivid illustration of the
frequent refusal of the Tajik government to recognize cause and
effect.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 186395
date: 1/9/2009 9:33
refid: 09DUSHANBE45
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0045/01 0090933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 090933Z JAN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1316
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0243
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0272
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0380
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0211
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0262
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0146
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000045
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019
TAGS: EAID, ECON, EINV, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — SCENESETTER FOR JANUARY 17 VISIT OF
GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe welcomes the upcoming visit of
General Petraeus. Following are
an overview of the situation
and key issues we face in Tajikistan.
OVERVIEW
———
2. (C) The poorest former Soviet republic, Tajikistan borders
Afghanistan (1200 kilometers), China, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan. It is critically important to our efforts to
stabilize Afghanistan and the region.
A major transit
country for Afghan opiates, Tajikistan relies on
international (mainly U.S. and EU) support to manage its
borders and build security capacity since taking over border
control from Russia in 2005.
Poverty, massive labor
migration, a past civil war, and geography put Tajikistan in
a precarious position. Whether it becomes a bulwark against
narcotics trafficking and terrorism, or a fertile breeding
ground for these evils, depends largely on the effectiveness
of our engagement and assistance.
KEY GOALS FOR YOUR VISIT
————————
3. (C) The mission’s key goals for your short visit are to:
—Help you forge a relationship with President Rahmon and his
security officials (time permitting)
— Thank Tajikistan for its provision of critically important
overflight rights
— Secure Rahmon’s agreement to accept a TRANSCOM team to
negotiate modalities for transit of materiel to Afghanistan
through Tajikistan
— Encourage Tajikistan to cooperate with Afghanistan on
security, trade and energy issues
— Emphasize that long term stability and security can only
come with real political and economic reform.
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RAHMON
——————————
4. (C) The following topics are perennial favorites during
meetings with President Rahmon.
Afghanistan: The Government of Tajikistan views Afghan-based
narcotics trafficking and Islamic extremism as serious
threats, and generally responds by minimizing contacts with
Afghanistan. The Tajiks have been
reluctant to cooperate
seriously with the Government of Afghanistan in any field,
and Tajik security services often seem bent on preventing
commercial, cultural, and security links between the
countries. This inhibits our
efforts to foster regional
integration and security cooperation and to make full use of
the U.S.-funded bridge to Afghanistan at Nizhniy Pyanj.
5. (C) At the same time the Tajiks want us to succeed in
stabilizing Afghanistan.
President Rahmon will want
reassurance that the United States remains committed to
Afghanistan. Further he is likely
to offer to support
routing supplies to our forces in Afghanistan through
Tajikistan although he likely will ask for assistance to
upgrade rail and road infrastructure on the route to the
bridge. Besides outlining the
enhanced U.S. military and
development efforts in Afghanistan, you should impress on him
the importance of greater Tajik commercial, security, and
cultural engagement to help that country’s development.
6. (C) Uzbekistan: Rahmon views Uzbekistan as the other main
external threat. The countries’
relations are marked by
Qexternal threat. The countries’
relations are marked by
mutual suspicion and recrimination.
He will complain that
Uzbekistan prevents Tajikistan’s economic development by
blocking construction of new hydroelectric stations and
limiting transit of agricultural inputs and other goods to
Tajikistan. On January 1
Uzbekistan refused to renew the
transit agreement for Turkmen electricity to Tajikistan,
reducing Tajikistan’s power supply when the country faces
electricity shortages and cold winter weather. Last winter
the Tajiks accused Uzbekistan of blocking humanitarian
assistance shipments to Tajikistan.
Ramon will accuse the
Uzbeks of intentionally trying to bring Tajikistan to its
knees.
7. (C) Investment: Rahmon and his ministers view foreign
investment through the prism of their Soviet experience, and
seek large state-led projects.
While paying lip service to
attracting private investment, Rahmon does not understand the
need to reduce corruption and bureaucratic barriers. Rahmon
likely will ask for USG financing for hydroelectric dams to
reduce Tajikistan’s chronic power shortages and to supply
Afghanistan. The USG supports
regional power integration
through the Asian Development Bank (ADB). USAID’s Regional
Energy Markets Program will provide technical assistance to
integrate central Asian energy networks.
8. (C) Relief for the Winter: Rahmon may ask for more U.S.
humanitarian aid for Tajikistan this winter. Inadequate
energy supplies and food insecurity remain serious problems
for Tajikistan. Last year’s brutal winter destroyed crops,
seed stocks, food supplies, and livestock, making it more
difficult for the rural poor to produce or afford food. Last
summer, locusts and drought compounded the problem. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) lists Tajikistan as one of
33 countries in crisis needing external food assistance, and
its latest report says food security in Tajikistan is
declining in the post-harvest period when it normally would
be improving. Remittances from
Russia, a critical economic
support, may slow due to the international financial crisis
and declining employment there.
The Government has appealed
for emergency financial support.
The USG is providing major
humanitarian assistance to help Tajikistan through the
winter. Last year, the USG
provided $3.5 million in
emergency assistance, and delivered $10.7 million in relief
supplies donated by private firms.
The USG is distributing
$6.3 million in emergency assistance this winter, and will
deliver $13 million of privately donated medical supplies in
2009. Unfortunately, our
multi-year $8.5 million
Food-for-Peace program is ending, however in part due to
strong DOD support, we were able to secure a one-time $5.8
million Food-for-Peace-funded food delivery in the spring of
2009.
9. (C) Security Cooperation: This is a strong part of our
relationship, as we share interests in Afghanistan. The
Ministry of Defense (MOD) is opening to cooperation with
Afghanistan. In November 2008 the
Tajik Military Institute
began training 30 Afghan officers.
This seems to be a
sincere effort to assist in building stability in
Afghanistan, and sharply contrasts to the Border Guards’ past
refusal to train jointly with Afghan counterparts.
Tajikistan accepted the Global Peacekeeping Operations
QTajikistan accepted the Global Peacekeeping Operations
Initiative (GPOI), funded at $2.5 million. The MOD received
a CENTCOM GPOI delegation in June, and with CENTCOM advisory
assistance and limited infrastructure upgrades, committed to
deploy a peacekeeping company by 2010.
GPOI will help build
a critical capability to will allow Tajikistan to «show the
flag» on an international scale, and offer training and
reform opportunities to others in the MOD. The Embassy is
working with MOD to synchronize training and support to make
this unit a reality. After
overcoming Tajik visas delays for
the Afghan contractor, we began to rebuild three border
outposts on the Tajik-Afghan border. We are supporting a
joint training facility at Tursunzade. We have robust
Counter-narco-terrorism (CNT) program, that includes training
and communications support. We also have IMET, FMF and
mil-mil programs that support the security relationship, as
do our programs through the State International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) and the Export control and
Border Services (EXBS).
10. (C) Counter Narcotics Cooperation: Cooperation on
narcotics is a relative bright spot, but only superficially.
While Tajik law enforcement and security services seize more
narcotics than other Central Asian states (and narcotics
seizures were up 11% over 2007 in the first 9 months of
2008), they are not willing to arrest and prosecute narcotics
smuggling ring leaders, some of whom are allegedly
well-connected politically. We
promote and see productive
cooperation between the Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Afghan drug
agencies. In mid-October,
President Rahmon called for joint
Tajik-Afghan law enforcement training.
We welcome and will
pursue this opening vigorously, but Border Guard and
Committee on National Security generals have obstructed joint
training of their service personnel in the past.
11. (C) The Bridge: Rahmon will almost certainly ask you to
build at least one new bridge.
However, the Tajiks have not
devoted enough manpower to operate the Nizhniy Pyanj bridge
around the clock. Traffic is 150
to 200 trucks a day
crossing in either direction, well below the 1,000 vehicle
per day capacity. Several other
obstacles to full use of the
bridge remain: it is difficult for Afghans to obtain Tajik
visas because of bureaucracy and demands for bribes, and both
sides are moving slowly to make full use of the border
facilities. The inspection
facilities on the Tajik end of
the bridge are almost complete; the Government took legal
possession of them last August. A
request to route supplies
to Afghanistan over this bridge will help push the Tajiks to
make full use of this facility.
However, they will still
have concerns over roads leading to the bridge, which have
been damaged by an increase in cargo traffic.
12. (C) Human Rights and Democracy: Although Rahmon tends to
avoid this topic, it is necessary to remind him that
long-term stability depends on democratic reform and respect
for human rights. Tajikistan is
backsliding on democracy and
civil society development. The
government continues to try
to control all aspects of religious life, monitoring mosques,
guiding the selection and appointment of imams, and harassing
or expelling religious organizations that are deemed «foreign
influences.» Parliament is
discussing a more restrictive
draft law on religion that would violate Tajikistan’s OSCE
commitments. Government policies
to control Islamic
religious practice are out of touch with what is happening in
the country, and have had the opposite of their intended
effect. We repeatedly tell the
government that aggressive
efforts to control religion can backfire, giving increased
credibility to fundamentalists.
The Government has increased
pressure on civil society refusing to register the National
Democratic Institute and harassing other international
organizations.
13. (C) Cultural and Educational Cooperation: In 2008 the
embassy’s public affairs section managed about 150 academic
and professional exchange visits, English language teaching
and scholarship programs, and small grants to help Tajik
civil society do community projects.
CENTCOM’s civil affairs
team,s school renovations complemented these efforts with
urgently needed repairs. Last
year the teams spent $185,000
Qurgently needed repairs. Last
year the teams spent $185,000
to renovate a school for the blind, an elementary school, an
orphanage, and a teacher training institute, and distributed
blankets to isolated areas in the winter. The civil affairs
team is consulting with the government and embassy on future
priorities.
14. (C) The Peace Corps would be an important addition to our
efforts to build English language skills and cultural
understanding among ordinary Tajiks.
The Peace Corps did not
come to Tajikistan after independence because of the Tajik
civil war; the war ended in the late 1990s, and the Peace
Corps could now operate in Tajikistan as it does in other
Central Asian states. Under the
new administration the Peace
Corps may expand, and you might mention to Rahmon to keep
this possibility in mind.
THE ECONOMY — ALUMINUM, COTTON, AND MANPOWER
———————————————
15. (C) Tajikistan’s largest industry is the Tajik Aluminum
Company (Talco), accounting for 40% of GDP. State-owned, its
revenue goes to an offshore company, controlled by President
Rahmon whose finances are opaque. It is clear, however,
Tajikistan gets little of Talco’s revenues, and senior
officials have acknowledged privately that Talco and other
state-owned enterprises do not pay their full tax bills, but
fund prestige projects like the $300 million presidential
palace in the center of Dushanbe.
The President has refused
to allow an audit of Talco’s offshore finances. Steep
declines in world aluminum prices since July have hurt Talco
and likely the President’s spending plans. International
press reported on a lawsuit in London, in which Tajikistan
reportedly spent over $135 million (about 4% of the country’s
2007 GDP) pursuing Talco’s previous management team for
stealing Talco revenue; the old management team made counter
accusations of massive fraud. In
November the Government
abruptly settled out of court.
16. (C) Cotton is the main agricultural product. The Soviets
started a cotton culture here, and the post-Soviet rulers
have found it profitable to continue.
Agricultural sector
reform is largely rhetorical; farmers are still forced to
grow cotton, students are forced to pick it, and a few
well-connected «investors» squeeze both with unfair labor
practices and below-market prices.
The cotton sector faces
serious trouble; disruptions extreme cold last year and
financial uncertainties led to a low 2008 harvest. Cotton
investors likely will respond by trying to squeeze farmers
even more.
17. (C) With few legitimate business opportunities in
Tajikistan, and deteriorating education and public services,
much of the population relies on remittances from Tajiks
working abroad. In recent years,
an estimated 50% of the
working-age population moved abroad to seek permanent or
temporary work. Donors observed increasing rates of
emigration to Russia and elsewhere by rural Tajiks, ever
younger boys, and women. Their
remittances equaled more than
half of GDP and supported a majority of households. The
global financial crisis will reduce jobs and/or wages for
Tajiks in Russia; the question in most Tajiks’ minds is, by
how much? Prolonged recession in
Russia could destabilize
Tajikistan, as hundreds of thousands of unemployed men return
home to no economic prospects.
18. (C) Inflation was 20% in 2007, and 16% in 2008.
Tajikistan imports 90% of its food. Basic food prices were
much higher in 2008 than in 2007.
The financial crisis might
alter this trend Tajik social indicators are declining,
health care and education are degenerating, and young Tajiks
are worse prepared for life than those who grew up under the
Soviet Union.
POWER PROBLEMS
—————
19. (C) Despite some new hydropower stations, the country
depends on a single hydroelectric station for almost all
electricity. Winter slowdown of
river flow, and problems
importing electricity from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan create
a dire situation. Tajikistan has
been forced to draw down
its reservoir, making massive power shortages by mid-February
more likely. Power rationing
began earlier this year than
last, with all of the country outside of Dushanbe getting
Qlast, with all of the country outside of Dushanbe getting
only six to seven hours of power per day since early October,
including the northern city of Khujand, despite promises of
full-time power there. Rationing
has intensified dropping
most places to one to three hours per day.
DONOR PROBLEMS TOO
——————
20. (C) In April last year Tajikistan’s credibility with
foreign donors sank to a new low, when the National Bank of
Tajikistan admitted it had purposefully failed to inform the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that it had used foreign
currency reserves to illegally guarantee over $240 million in
foreign loans for Tajik cotton investors. The President
fired the Central Bank Chairman — but immediately appointed
him Deputy Prime Minister. The
IMF demanded early repayment
of $47.8 million in loans to the National Bank. The Bank has
made its first four of six scheduled payments. The IMF
required the National Bank to undergo an external audit by a
reputable company, and key findings to be relayed to the IMF.
While no official results have
yet emerged, we hear that
auditors have been frustrated by poor recordkeeping and lack
of cooperation. The EU and World
Bank suspended over $30
million in budget support to the Government until they
receive a letter of assurance from the IMF, after the audit
and IMF- mandated changes in the Central Bank structure.
INTERNAL STABILITY
——————
21. (C) Tajikistan’s political leadership is focused on
control and increasingly intolerant of alternate viewpoints.
Corruption is rampant, and government attempts to control it
are viewed by observers as insincere and ineffective. While
public dissatisfaction about the state of the country has
started to affect President Rahmon’s popularity, he retains
considerable support. There are
no serious efforts to reform
the country’s electoral processes.
There is no opposition
party able to influence government behavior. The Islamic
Renaissance Party, Central Asia’s only legal Islamist party,
has two Members of Parliament, and growing popularity. But
it is too weak and divided to pose a challenge to the
President. Parliament rubber
stamps Rahmon’s decisions. The
civil service has few qualified specialists, and government
bodies have been driven to dysfunction by patronage and
corruption. Brain drain to Russia
and elsewhere is severe.
22. (C) The 1990s civil war was settled via a power sharing
agreement, in which opposing regional factions controlled
parts of the government with their attendant patronage and
spoils. Rahmon gradually has
reneged on this arrangement,
removing oppositionists from positions of power and replacing
them with loyalists from his home region of Kulyab. He fears
a renewal of regional opposition to his government, more so
since his government’s mismanagement during last winter’s
power and food crisis, and incidents early in 2008 of
sometimes violent opposition to his rule in the Rasht Valley
and Badakhshan. Both are regions
associated with opposition
groups, and Rahmon responded with material largesse for their
impoverished inhabitants. His
gift-laden visits to these
regions appear to have successfully undermined the legitimacy
of local opposition leaders, at least temporarily.
REGIONAL RELATIONS
——————
23. (C) Efforts to advance economic integration between
Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and more broadly between Central
and South Asia, have seen some success.
In August Tajikistan
and Afghanistan signed a Power Purchase Agreement for
