Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 183578
date: 12/18/2008 4:04
refid: 08DUSHANBE1523
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1409
header:
VZCZCXRO9228
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1523/01 3530404
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180404Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1266
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0358
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0261
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0202
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0239
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001523
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KIRF, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: GROWING INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONAL ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN — WHAT
WE SHOULD BE DOING
REF: 08 DUSHANBE 1409
1. (SBU) Summary: On December 11 and 12, EmbOffs accompanied William
Trigg, USAID’s Regional Society and State Advisor based in Bishkek,
to meetings with Muslim clerics, government officials, and
researchers in Dushanbe. During
Trigg’s visit, interlocutors said
the Government of Tajikistan had little credibility in religious
circles, but would not rethink its failing policy. Traditional
Islamic leaders with no government connections — and who even openly
oppose the government — are growing in influence. The United States
should engage them in a discussion of the image of the United States
and its commitment to defending religious freedom. End summary.
GOVERNMENT POLICY ACCOMPLISHES OPPOSITE OF INTENDED EFFECT
2. (SBU) Abdullo Rahnamo, a researcher at the Center for Strategic
Research, said the Government’s religious policy over the last ten
years was a failed ideological experiment. The Government wanted to
co-opt religion to legitimize and augment its authority; government
officials have sought to both control and restrict religious
communities, and to court religious figures as allies of the
government. This contradictory
path had accomplished the opposite
of what the Government intended.
3. (SBU) According to Rahnamo, each restriction on religious
expression has hurt the image of the Government. The government
sought to control Tajikistan’s clerics by creating the
«independent»
Council of Ulamo and weakening the country’s muftiate. However,
individual imams became far more influential than those on the
Council of Ulamo (reftel). The
Government sought to control
religious instruction by taking over the Islamic Institute and
placing it under the Ministry of Education. However, imams trained
abroad had much more authority in religious communities than the
«secular imams» trained at the Institute. The Government sought to
control the country’s youth through dress codes. Banning the hijab,
however, energized young people, and wearing the hijab became a
symbol of individual expression.
4. (SBU) Traditional Islamic leaders — as opposed to those who the
Government posits as religious leaders — had a large and increasing
constituency. Rahnamo said Islam
was «in the hands of these
traditional leaders,» not government officials. For example, while
the Government cited the need to prevent the growth of
«foreign»
religious influence, it would be Tajikistan’s traditional religious
leaders who would prevent the growth of the Salafis.
5. (SBU) Nevertheless, President Rahmon’s government remained
committed to its highly flawed policy.
Officials in the newly
established Islamic Studies Center, the Ministry of Culture’s
Department of Religious Affairs, and law enforcement agencies lacked
the specialized knowledge to effectively engage religious
communities. They were detached
from the communities they
theoretically served; how could Murodali Davlatov, the head of
President Rahmon’s newly created Islamic Studies Center, formulate
policy when he was «against Tajikistan’s clergy?»
6. (SBU) Idibek Ziyoev, a senior official in the Department of
Religious Affairs, largely confirmed Rahnamo’s criticisms of
government officials. After
saying his agency had «no
complications» with the religious community, he spent fifteen
minutes explaining the problems posed by the Salafis and made
several factual mistakes about Islam.
He did not know the number of
Qseveral factual mistakes about Islam.
He did not know the number of
students who went abroad for religious studies and was unable to
explain how his agency collected information about religious
communities. He said the
Government had a «different way» of
approaching religious issues than Iran, Pakistan, and Arab
countries, but could not be more specific. He said the hijab issue
had been blown out of proportion; women and girls were wearing
hijabs mainly as a fashion statement, not out of religious belief.
NEGATIVE IMAGES OF SECULAR GOVERNMENTS
7. (SBU) Badriddin Karimov, the imam-khatib of the Pakhtakor mosque,
complained «the Government does not allow us to express independent
ideas in our sermons; if you go beyond the instructions of the
government, you will have problems.» He resented the Government’s
restrictions on religious expression, a sentiment shared by many
imams.
8. (U) On November 28, the State Committee for National Security
summoned Eshoni Nuriddin, the imam-khatib of the Muhammadi Mosque in
Vahdat and one of Tajikistan’s most respected and popular religious
figures (reftel) for questioning in Dushanbe. Local media reported
extensively on the incident.
Nuriddin told Asia-Plus the
authorities «accused me of criticizing the government policy…I
said that is not so. I just try to
put people to the straight and
narrow…» He accused
Murodali Davlatov, President Rahmon’s advisor
DUSHANBE 00001523 002 OF 002
on Islamic issues, of collaborating with the State Committee on
National Security.
9. (SBU) Traditional Islamic leaders’ views on the United States are
of particular importance because of their growing influence in
Tajikistan. In a meeting with
Mullo Abdurahim, the imam-khatib of
the Qazoqon Friday prayer mosque in Dushanbe, who is one of the most
popular of Tajikistan’s traditional Islamic leaders (reftel), he
appeared to have a negative — though not hostile — impression of the
United States, formed by the war in Iraq and U.S. assistance to
Israel. Other traditional Islamic
leaders have brought up the same
issues, including the rumor that the United States brought Salafism
to Tajikistan. In contrast,
Badriddin Karimov had a more positive
impression of the United States, which was likely a result of his
participation in a USAID Community Connections program.
WHAT WE SHOULD BE DOING
10. (SBU) Comment: The Government’s adherence to a highly flawed
policy appears to be increasing the alienation of religious
communities and strengthening the influence of traditional Islamic
leaders. The most recent draft of
a Law on Religion is now
circulating through Parliament, and we anticipate its passage within
the next month. This new draft,
which contains numerous provisions
that are objectionable to religious communities and civil society,
typifies the lack of foresight in the government’s approach. While
there is little that we can do to engage Tajik officials in a
discussion of this issue, we can step up our efforts to engage
traditional Islamic leaders.
Mullo Abdurahim said interaction with
American Muslims in Tajikistan and the United States would be
interesting and useful.
11. (SBU) Comment continued: In addition to continuing to meet with
imams around the country, Embassy staff, including from USAID and
PAS will:
-Identify important traditional Islamic leaders and share the
information with other sections and U.S. Government agencies at
Post;
-Obtain copies of sermons of these leaders on DVD and analyze their
messages;
-Distribute the International Religious Freedom report directly to
these leaders and discuss the U.S. commitment to religious freedom;
-Send these leaders to the United States on Community Connections or
International Visitor programs;
-Bring American Muslims to Tajikistan to discuss Islam in America
with these leaders.
12. Comment continued: Our small public diplomacy budget, a holdover
from the days when the Embassy was located in Kazakhstan, and our
overstretched public diplomacy staff, the smallest in the South and
Central Asia Bureau, limit our ability to engage effectively with
this mostly-Muslim population.
Post has requested additional
resources and believes that additional exchange and educational
programs would make a big impact in our understanding of and
influence on an increasingly religious population. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 183965
date: 12/19/2008 12:00
refid: 08DUSHANBE1548
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07DUSHANBE1753|08DUSHANBE1470|08DUSHANBE1502|08DUSHANBE1518
header:
VZCZCXRO1481
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHDBU #1548/01 3541200
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191200Z DEC 08 ZDK CTG RUEHZC #3645 3541809
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1274
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0263
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0360
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0204
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0257
RUCPDOC/DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC 0096
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001548
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, ETRD, PGOV, ELAB, TI
SUBJECT: Audits of Three Major Tajik Concerns May Not Reveal Much
Ref A: 07 Dushanbe 1753
Ref B: 08 Dushanbe 1502
Ref C: 08 Dushanbe 1518
Ref D: 08 Dushanbe 1470
1. (SBU) Summary: The international donor community in Tajikistan is
eagerly awaiting the results of audits of three key institutions:
the National Bank of Tajikistan, the state electrical company Barki
Tojik, and the country’s largest industrial concern, the Talco
aluminum smelter. The audits were
commissioned in part as a
response to the National Bank’s acknowledgment that it had
deliberately misreported its balances to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). While no official
results of the audits have yet
emerged — and indeed, most results will never be made public —
there are indications that auditors have been frustrated by poor
recordkeeping and restrictions on their scope. The National Bank
and Barki Tojik audits are nearly complete, while the Talco audit
has not yet begun. End summary.
2. (SBU) At the beginning of this year the National Bank of
Tajikistan acknowledged it had consistently and purposefully
misreported its balances by failing to the inform the International
Monetary Fund of over $500 million in loan guarantees to cotton
sector investors (refs A, B, and C).
As a result, the IMF demanded
early repayment of $47.8 million in past loans and interest to the
National Bank. The Bank has made
its first four of six scheduled
payments. To be considered for
future lending, the IMF required
that the National Bank undergo an external audit by a reputable
company, and that the key findings be relayed to the IMF. In
addition, the IMF pushed for two additional audits, of the national
electrical company Barki Tojik and of Tajikistan’s largest
industrial enterprise, the Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco). Although
the latter two companies were not directly linked to the
misreporting scandal, IMF resident representative Luc Moers said
that the IMF had decided to use its new leverage in the wake of the
scandal to demand more openness from key players in the Tajik
economy that have long operated under opaque and questionable
business practices.
National Bank Audit: Almost Finished
3. (SBU) The National Bank audit, conducted by Ernst and Young, is
being finalized in London and is nearly complete. According to an
embassy contact with long experience at the Bank, the audit did not
go entirely smoothly: auditors were reportedly frustrated with the
bank’s lack of responsiveness to requests and poor record-keeping.
Moers acknowledged that he had heard of some difficulties, but he
ascribed them more to a clash of different corporate cultures than a
deliberate attempt on the part of the National Bank to impede the
audit.
4. (SBU) According to the agreement under which the audit was
conducted, the National Bank is obligated to make public by
publishing on its website only the «key findings» of the
audit.
Moers said that although this did not seem to be a problem at the
time, in hindsight, he wished the IMF had been more forceful in
insisting that the entire audit be made public. Although the
auditors had been asked to prepare a section of the audit explicitly
entitled «key findings,» Moers said he was concerned that the
bank
might have enough wiggle room to keep even these points off of its
website if it would rather not see them publicized. World Bank
Qwebsite if it would rather not see them publicized. World Bank
Country Manager Chiara Bronchi was less concerned about this,
however. She said that since in
most cases forensic audits are
never made public, the decision to publicize even key findings is an
unusual step.
Barki Tojik: Not Very Encouraging
5. (SBU) The audit of Barki Tojik, the state company that manages
Tajikistan’s electricity grid, is being conducted by BDO Unicom
Russia, which Moers described as «a second-tier, but reputable
auditing firm.» The audit is
over, but no results have been
released. In all likelihood,
Moers said, it would «not be very
public,» although the World Bank might have some leverage here,
since the audit was part of its three-year (2007-09) Energy Loss
Recovery Project. He added that
so far the «results are not very
encouraging.» The auditor
had actually been «unable to come to a
conclusion» about much of Barki Tojik’s financial activity — not
because officials are trying to obfuscate, but because so much of
the company’s records are in «such a mess.»
DUSHANBE 00001548 002 OF 002
Talco: Real Activities May Never Be Public
6. (SBU) The audit of Talco has not yet started. The company is
just now finalizing its selection of an auditor. Moers said it
would be one of the big four accounting companies. Even once the
audit is completed, though, it may not reveal much about the
operation’s balance sheet, since Talco’s profits and inputs are
managed by an offshore company, Talco Management, based in the
British Virgin Islands. According
to Moers, although the IMF
insisted that the auditors be allowed to «look at third-party
arrangements» when going through Talco’s books, at the end of the
day they had no authority to actually audit the off-shore entitles
involved in Talco’s operations.
He was thus somewhat pessimistic
about what the audit would ultimately reveal.
7. (SBU) Comment: Of all three audits, the one of Talco has the
potential to be the most revealing, because Talco’s finances are the
most opaque, its revenue the largest, and its operations the most
closely linked with the inner circle of leadership. Given the
restrictions on the auditors, however, it is unlikely that the
results will be very illuminating.
Unfortunately, the same may also
be true of the National Bank and Barki Tojik audits. Because of
their limited scope, difficulties accessing records, or restrictions
on their dissemination, these audits may also fail to live up to the
hopes the international donor community had that they might peel
back the shroud of secrecy concealing the questionable economic
activities of Tajikistan’s political elite, and reveal the true
state of health of Tajikistan’s economy.
End comment.
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 184238
date: 12/22/2008 9:19
refid: 08DUSHANBE1553
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08STATE127423
header:
VZCZCXRO2117
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1553/01 3570919
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220919Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1276
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0362
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0265
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0206
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0241
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001553
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, TRGY, BEXP, BTIO, TI
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON TAJIKISTAN’S PLANS TO PURSUE NUCLEAR ENERGY
REF: STATE 00127423
1. (SBU) Enclosed is Post’s response to questions posed in reftel.
GENERAL SITUATION
— Plans for the development of nuclear power; existing or planned
nuclear power related facilities; foreseen expansion of these
facilities?
President Rahmon recently announced that his government would seek
opportunities to develop Tajikistan’s commercial uranium mining and
processing potential. During the
Soviet period, Tajikistan produced
yellow cake at Vostokredmet, a facility in Chkalovsk (Northern
Tajikistan), from raw materials that had been extracted from sites
in Tajikistan or was shipped in from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. The yellow cake would
then be sent on elsewhere in the
Soviet Union. Tajik authorities
estimate that there are 57 million
tons of waste left over from these operations.
While Tajik authorities have not developed specific plans to develop
this sector, any such plans would involve using new technology to
extract uranium from waste already stored in the country; exploring
possible uranium deposits in the country; and renovating the
Chkalovsk facility.
The Chkalovsk facility falls under the direct control of
Tajikistan’s Ministry of Energy and Industry; it has been largely
dormant since 1992. Kazakhstan
continued to send some materials for
processing after that time, but this stopped in 1996, when
Uzbekistan refused to allow the transportation of nuclear materials
to and from Tajikistan. The
Chkalovsk facility is now used
primarily for storage of ionized emission sources.
The Ministry of Energy and Industry has identified three main areas
with potential uranium deposits: the Gissar area; the Rasht Valley;
and in the Pamir Mountains, particularly the area covered by Lake
Sasikul.
— Underlying motivations for pursuit of nuclear power.
Tajikistan’s primary motivation is economic. The economy is
extremely weak, and Tajik authorities are searching for new sources
of revenue and ways to diversify the economy.
— Anticipated government role in the financing of civil nuclear
sector.
All current facilities are state-owned, and will likely remain in
government hands. We expect any
funding for commercial projects to
come from other sources.
— Names and titles of the key nuclear decision making government
bodies and top officials?
The prime nuclear decision making authority is the Inter-Ministerial
Commission on Energy Issues, which is headed by First Deputy Prime
Minister Asadullo Gulomov. The
Ministry of Energy and Industry is
responsible for developing the country’s commercial nuclear
capacity; Deputy Minister Makhmadsharif Khakdodov is responsible for
the defense and nuclear sectors within the Ministry.
— Existing nuclear regulatory authority; inspection/enforcement
powers?
The Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency (NRSA), established in 2003,
is Tajikistan’s state regulatory authority, and its director is
Prof. Ulmas Mirsaidov. Its
functions are to investigate, control
and regulate sources or radioactivity; monitor the environmental
impact of radiation; investigate and research nuclear and hydrogen
power engineering; and cooperate with international organizations
and foundations, especially the IAEA.
There are five departments
(Research, Information and Analysis, Licensing and Control, Exposure
Regulation, Research and Technology) and a branch office in
Chkalovsk.
— Does Tajikistan have a domestic nuclear liability law?
Q— Does Tajikistan have a domestic nuclear liability law?
Tajikistan passed legislation after ratifying the IAEA statute in
2001. The Laws on Radiation
Safety (2003) and Use of Atomic Energy
(2004) established a regulatory framework, but there does not appear
to be a specific nuclear liability law.
— Is the manufacturing base involved in nuclear-related products or
services? Does it seem likely
that any components or contracting
services for new plants could be sourced locally, or would the
majority of these need to be imported?
DUSHANBE 00001553 002 OF 002
It is not involved in such activities.
Tajikistan would have to
rely very heavily — if not completely — on imports for components or
contracting services.
— How extensive is the nuclear-trained workforce?
There are no programs in place to train domestic personnel for civil
nuclear power. The talent base
generally for the civil nuclear
sector is extremely small. There
are very few skilled engineers, no
high precision manufacturing, and few quality assurance programs.
Domestic construction capacity is of very low quality in every
aspect. There are still some
Soviet-trained scientists affiliated
with the Academy of Sciences and the NRSA; they are, for the most
part, not being replaced as they retire.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR US INDUSTRY
— Any current or anticipated nuclear-related tenders?
At this time there are none.
— What nuclear sector opportunities do you foresee for U.S.
industry (e.g., feasibility studies or other consulting services,
plant construction management, reactor sales, fuel cycle service
provision, plant operations, waste management, or logistics)?
There may be scope for feasibility studies on possible uranium
deposits, and on extracting uranium from existing nuclear waste.
The NRSA Director, Mirsaidov, was extremely pessimistic about
Tajikistan’s ability to develop uranium mining operations, or to
convince investors that such undertakings would be worthwhile. He
doubted that there were significant uranium deposits, and he thought
the expense of researching and extracting uranium would be
prohibitive.
— If applicable, what are the primary companies (domestic and
foreign) involved in (or considering involvement in) the civil
nuclear sector?
Domestically, the most important actor is the Ministry of Energy and
Industry. Vostokredmet, a
state-owned company under the direction
of the Ministry of Energy and Industry, is engaged in mining
activities, although it has not recently been involved in mining
uranium. In the past,
Vostokredmet had an arrangement with
Kazakhstan’s State Corporation for Nuclear Energy and Industry
wherein Kazakhstan supplied uranium ore to Vostokredmet for
processing into yellow cake.
There have been reports that a Russian
enterprise, Atomredmetzoloto, and a Chinese enterprise, Sino Hydro,
have explored uranium waste reprocessing in Tajikistan.
FOREIGN COMPETITORS
— Are there other nuclear supplier countries engaging your country?
According to the NRSA Director, Kazakhstan stopped sending raw
materials to Tajikistan in 1996.
Media reports have mentioned
Russia and China as sources of interest in the nuclear sector, but
there are no concrete projects.
Chinese Embassy officials have
denied knowledge of any concrete Chinese interest in this sector;
they did, however, say that a Chinese firm (possibly Sino Hydro)
researched uranium mining possibilities in late 2008 and concluded
that it would not be economically feasible based on Tajikistan’s
limited deposits of uranium. In
February 2008, a former President
of India, APJ Abdul Kalam, said that India is «very
interested» in
Tajikistan’s uranium mining possibilities; Post has not seen
evidence of such interest beyond his statement, however. The media
have also mentioned Iran as a source of interest, but post has found
no evidence of any discussions or plans.
— Are there any political considerations your country may take into
account when choosing to cooperate with competing nuclear supplier
Qaccount when choosing to cooperate with competing nuclear supplier
states?
Tajikistan maintains a complicated «multi-vectored» foreign
policy,
attempting to balance relationships with the United States, Russia,
China, Iran, and immediate neighbors.
These relations are a factor
in major economic decisions.
2. (U) Point of contact on this issue is PolOff Greg Naarden,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 184239
date: 12/22/2008 9:20
refid: 08DUSHANBE1554
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08STATE127059
header:
VZCZCXRO2119
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1554 3570920
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220920Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1278
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0267
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0364
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0208
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001554
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/ESC/TFS John Marshall Klein, and EAP/MLS Laura
Scheibe
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, EMIN, ECON, PREL, EFIN, TI
SUBJECT: Report on Tajikistan’s Ruby Industry
REFTEL: State 127059
1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified. Please protect
accordingly.
2. (U) Embassy staff met with Isojon Kurbanov, Deputy Head of the
Mining Department in the Tajik Ministry of Energy and Industry to
discuss reftel. According to
Kurbanov, in Tajikistan state
authorities control and monopolize mining, production, and export of
precious stones, including rubies.
There are several agencies and
levels of government involved in mining and exporting precious
stones, including the Presidential Administration, the Government of
Tajikistan, the Ministry of Energy and Industry, the State Mining
Technical Control Agency (Gosgortekhnadzor), the Ministry of
Finance, the State Commission on Evaluation, and the state-owned
enterprise Djamast («Amethyst» in English). The fundamental
document regulating precious stones operations in Tajikistan is the
Resolution of the Government of Tajikistan No. 215, dated May 6,
2006, entitled «Rules on sales and purchase of precious stones in
Tajikistan.»
3. (U) According to Kurbanov, in the past only Djamast had the
authority to conduct geological surveys and mine precious stones in
Tajikistan. However, the
Government recently granted a license to a
South Korean firm to conduct geological surveys and mining in
Tajikistan.
4. (U) Djamast reports annually to the Ministry of Energy and
Industry and to the State Mining Technical Control Agency on the
results of geological surveys and production of precious stones.
Every year by February 15 Djamast must report on annual estimated
deposits and mining output using form «5-GR.» Djamast must also
submit a classified report, «1-DMK,» to the State Statistical
Agency
of Tajikistan on production volumes and activities at each mine.
5. (SBU) Although Djamast issues certificates of origin for precious
stones mined in Tajikistan, according to the law, Djamast must sell
all precious stones to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry then
separates the stones by quality and sells those of lower quality on
the open market. The higher
quality stones are kept in a Ministry
safe until the President personally authorizes their export.
6. (U) Tajikistan’s rubies are of lower quality then Burma’s because
Tajik operations use explosives to mine rubies, whereas Burmese
miners extract them by hand.
Tajikistan’s official ruby export
markets are mainly Russia, Germany, the Czech Republic, South Korea,
and Thailand. In Thailand a
company named called Yavorskyy
([email protected]) is said to buy Tajik rubies.
7. (SBU) However, according to Embassy contacts in the
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Area, where Tajikistan’s rubies are
mined, there is a healthy illegal trade in rubies originating in the
areas of Murgab and Khorog. There
have reportedly been criminal
cases in Pakistan and India involving the seizure of illegally-mined
and exported stones from Tajikistan.
The official mining season in
Murgab runs from April through mid-October, when cold weather shuts
down state operations. This does
not mean that activity comes to a
halt, however. According to
Embassy contacts, scores of illegal
miners brave the frigid temperatures to extract rubies using
explosives. Although Kurbanov
said that Tajikistan’s State Security
Committee (GKNB) is aware of these activities, the Embassy is aware
of no effective measures taken to stop them.
8. (U) Mr. Kurbanov declined to discuss the actual amount of rubies
Q8. (U) Mr. Kurbanov declined to discuss the actual amount of rubies
produced in Tajikistan, or to state their market price. In late
2006, however, the Ministry of Energy and Industry reported to the
media that Tajikistan hoped to reach 42 million somoni ($12.35
million) worth of annual production of semi-precious and precious
stones by 2015.
9. (U) Industry representatives were unwilling to provide detailed
chain-of-custody information on stones originating in Tajikistan.
Even if they were able to do so, however, the amount of illegal
production would make such information questionable.
10. (U) Post will report on any further information about ruby
production in Tajikistan that becomes available.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 184447
date: 12/23/2008 4:34
refid: 08DUSHANBE1556
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08STATE123081
header:
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1556 3580434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230434Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1280
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0014
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001556
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, UNGA, IS, PA, LE, SY, TI
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON OPPOSING UNGA RESOLUTIONS WITH
ANTI-ISRAEL BIAS
REF: STATE 123081
1. (SBU) PolOff delivered reftel demarche on 20 November 2008. The
MFA provided no substantive response to the demarche, and has given
no indication that it will change its previous positions voting in
favor of resolutions specifically mentioning Israel. Post will
advise if the Government of Tajikistan offers any substantive
response to the demarche.
2. (U) Point of contact on this issue is William von Zagorski,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 184448
date: 12/23/2008 4:34
refid: 08DUSHANBE1557
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08STATE120019
header:
VZCZCXRO3045
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1557 3580434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230434Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1281
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC 0002
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001557
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (RHONDA SHORE) AND NCTC
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, ASEC, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
REF: STATE 120019
1. (SBU) Following is the text of Dushanbe’s 2008 Country Report on
Terrorism:
As the poorest of the former Soviet countries, the Tajik
governmentQs main impediment to counterterrorism remained its lack
of resources. The government, particularly the Border Guards, lacked
appropriate technical equipment, personnel, and training to
effectively interdict illegal border crossings and to detect and
analyze hazardous substances. Individual border guards and other law
enforcement personnel were not motivated to interdict smugglers or
traffickers due to systematic corruption, low income, conscripted
service, and lack of support from senior Tajik government officials.
As a result, Tajikistan served as a transit country for extremists
and terrorists traveling to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan. To
address this issue, the United States and other donors assisted the
government of Tajikistan to secure its 1400 kilometer porous border
with Afghanistan. Assistance included the rehabilitation and
equipping of three border outposts on the border with Afghanistan,
the creation of an Analytical Center to process counternarcotics
information, and a $5 million U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) radio
program to improve Border Guard communications capability. DOD held
four Counter Narcoterrorism Training (CNT) (formerly Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET)) events with Tajik security forces to
improve their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations.
The U.S. Embassy administered training on chemical weapons response
and detection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Defense
Institute for Legal Studies conducted a Response to Terrorism course
in Dushanbe that representatives from several ministries attended.
Tajikistan also participated in exercise Regional Cooperation 08,
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and hosted by
Kyrgyzstan. This exercise focused on dealing with terrorism, and
strengthened cooperation between the Central Asian countries. The
Counter Narcotics program continued to assist Tajikistan with
facilities construction, communications equipment, and training,
totaling nearly $10 million. This effort helped stabilize the
border regions and combat terrorism by stopping potential terrorists
attempting to cross the Tajik border, and enabling Tajikistan to
better control its borders. Tajikistan endorsed the joint
U.S.-Russia co-chaired Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism. The Tajik government also participated in regional
security alliances, including the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization.
Since September 11, 2001, the Government of Tajikistan has allowed
its airspace to be used for counterterrorist actions in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Tajikistan prohibited
extremist-oriented activities and closely monitored groups it listed
as terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizbut-Tahrir (HT). The Government of
Tajikistan believed that HT, in particular, was active in the
northern part of the country. U.S. government analysts believed
that supporters of terrorist groups such as al-QaQida, the Islamic
Jihad Union (IJU) and the IMU were active in the region this year.
The Government of Tajikistan did not provide safe haven for
terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the countryQs poor
economic climate and government policies to restrict Islamic
religious practice provided conditions that religious extremists
could exploit. Under the guise of fighting extremism, the
government of Tajikistan has taken increased measures against
Qgovernment of Tajikistan has taken increased measures against
opposition parties in the country, particularly the Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the only legal Islamic
political party in Central Asia. Tajik law enforcement and security
officials viewed the Salafi religious movement as a serious threat
to national security, comparing Salafists to the IMU. Security
organizations have diverted significant resources used to fight
terrorism in the country to investigate Salafists.
2. (U) Point of contact on this issue is William von Zagorski,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 184746
date: 12/24/2008 8:52
refid: 08TASHKENT1522
origin: Embassy Tashkent
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4365
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNT #1522/01 3590613
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240852Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0162
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 001522
SIPDIS
MACDILL AFB FOR CENTCOM MICHAEL NORDEEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, MASS, ETRD, PINR, PHUM, ECON, KCOR, TI, AF, UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: CENTCOM
Deputy Commander Lt. General Allen
Meets Foreign and Defense Ministers in Tashkent
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy P Buckley, Second Secretary; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) Summary: On December 19
CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt.
General John Allen met separately with Uzbek Foreign Minister
Vladimir Norov and Defense Minister Kabul Berdiyev in Tashkent.
Lt. Gen. Allen’s visit laid the groundwork for a planned visit by
CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus in January and wrapped up
what Norov described as a «fruitful year in relations with the U.S.
military,» characterized by five flag-officer visits and
cooperation in the wake of the July explosions at the munitions
depot in Kagan. Norov restated
Uzbekistan’s concerns about
stability in Afghanistan and outlined why President Karimov’s 6
plus 3 plan does not include the Government of Afghanistan, yet he
also pragmatically described how Uzbekistan needs Afghanistan and
Iran to further its own economic interests. Norov also portrayed
Uzbekistan as a conscientious regional broker that has resisted
attempts by Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to expand
influence in regional security; he also emphasized that «no
regional initiative can be successful without the participation of
Uzbekistan.»
2. (C) Both officials expressed support for proposed cooperation in
the transit of non-lethal supplies through Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan, including via Navoiy, which the Government of
Uzbekistan envisions as a budding air cargo hub. Berdiyev urged
Lt. Gen. Allen to «resolve the transit issue quickly by completing
contracts with Uzbekistan Airways and the Uzbekistan Transit
Agency.» Berdiyev also
requested military equipment for the armed
forces of Uzbekistan, which Lt. Gen. Allen suggested could be
discussed by a proposed joint military committee. Lt. Gen Allen
assured his interlocutors that the U.S. recognizes Uzbekistan’s
important role in improving peace and prosperity in Afghanistan,
but he also emphasized that we should work towards a strong
bilateral relationship based on broader mutual interests, including
human rights (he cited International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) access to prisons in particular).
End summary.
Background
——————
3. (C) CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt. General John Allen visited
Tashkent on December 19 for separate meetings with Foreign Minister
Norov and Defense Minister Berdiyev.
This was the latest in a
series of high-level U.S. military visits to Uzbekistan in 2008,
each of which Norov recounted in his opening remarks as
highlighting «a fruitful year in relations with the U.S.
military.»
Lt. Gen Allen informed his hosts that CENTCOM Commander General
David Petraeus values the relationship with Uzbekistan and plans a
visit in January 2009. The tone
of the meetings was very warm and
cordial. Unusually for official
meetings, Norov did not rely on an
interpreter and spoke in fluent English; he also displayed a more
intellectual side, quoting recent articles in the International
Herald Tribune and Foreign Affairs.
Norov also spoke more
off-the-cuff than usual and with surprising candor. He limited his
scripted remarks to allow more give-and-take with his visitor.
(Comment: Rumors have been
circulating that Norov could soon be
replaced as Foreign Minister and dispatched to Washington as the
Uzbek Ambassador, so perhaps he is trying to rebrand himself with
U.S. Government interlocutors.
End comment.)
Lt. Gen. Allen’s Message
————————————
4. (SBU) Lt. Gen. Allen emphasized that the U.S. understands that
the success in Afghanistan requires more than just a military
solution and made clear to his Uzbek interlocutors (as well as to
French Ambassador Hugues Pernet and UN Resident Coordinator Anita
Nirody, with whom he also met) that the U.S. remains committed over
the long haul to addressing the issues in Afghanistan. He
commended the Uzbeks for their willingness to enhance their
leadership on regional issues but emphasized that the Government of
Afghanistan must be included in any new contact group. Lt. Gen
TASHKENT 00001522 002 OF 004
Allen also noted that our bilateral relationship should grow to
encompass a broad set of issues affecting our countries beyond just
Afghanistan-related issues. These
should include human rights —
he praised the Government of Uzbekistan for cooperation on ICRC
visits to prisons and encouraged such cooperation to continue. In
advance of CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus’s visit, Lt. Gen.
Allen also thanked Uzbekistan for previously rendered military
assistance as well as its willingness to cooperate on the transit
of goods that will support NATO operations in Afghanistan.
Much at Stake in Afghanistan
——————————————
5. (C) Norov focused his remarks on Afghanistan and expressed the
Government of Uzbekistan’s concern at what it sees as a growing
threat from narcotics, terrorism, and instability. He reminded us
that Uzbekistan played a «crucial role» in initial U.S.
efforts to
oust the Taliban and, despite achievements by NATO, lamented that
«there is not a common position among NATO member states» to
resolving the problems in Afghanistan.
Whereas some NATO member
states are planning to end troop commitments in the coming years,
Norov stated that Uzbekistan has a common border and thousands of
years of shared history with Afghanistan (including three million
ethnic Uzbek kin residing in Afghanistan). He stated several
times, as did Defense Minister Berdiyev later in the day, that
«peace and stability are not possible solely through military
force.»
Another Pitch for 6 Plus 3
—————————————
6. (C) Norov acknowledged that the U.S. position on Uzbekistan’s
proposed «6 plus 3» (all neighboring states plus the U.S.,
Russia,
and NATO) UN-administered contact group on Afghanistan is clear —
that is, that the Government of Afghanistan must be included — yet
he nevertheless made another pitch on the grounds that the
Karzai-led government does not have «strategic vertical control
over its territory» and does not represent the majority of the
Afghan people. Norov reiterated
the typical Uzbek charges that
Karzai is inept and corrupt, and Norov expressed alarm that «for
the first time the Taliban has the support of ordinary Pashtuns.»
He cited Afghanistan talks prior to September 11, 2001 which put
the Taliban and the Northern Alliance on equal footing as a
precedent, and emphasized that opposition to Karzai would have no
voice if the current administration took part in the 6 plus 3
group. Norov said «Afghans
should decide what type of country to
construct,» and indicated that from the Uzbek perspective Karzai
does not speak for the population.
Norov expressed the Uzbek view
that «right now a Pashtun strongman with influence is key in
Afghanistan,» and that democracy could come later.
Other Suitors
——————-
7. (C) On several occasions Norov played up Uzbekistan’s value as
an independent-minded partner by mentioning that other countries
and entities are vying for its cooperation. He noted that
Uzbekistan resisted efforts to give a greater role to CSTO and SCO
in Afghanistan-related regional security questions. Norov also
said Uzbekistan «told President Medvedev that Russia lacks the
resources to succeed in Afghanistan.» Norov also said that Russia
had been interested in using the Navoiy Airport as a base for
bombers and claimed that Uzbekistan declined in order to pursue its
vision of turning the facility into a commercial air cargo hub. He
also referenced China’s growing profile in the region and said
«Iran is actively urging a state visit in either
capital.» Each of
these countries plus others (namely Korea and Malaysia with regard
to the Navoiy Airport), he noted, have proposed tangible
development projects inside Uzbekistan, whereas the U.S. has been
quiet on the investment front other than the GM engine plant which
broke ground the day prior to the meeting.
TASHKENT 00001522 003 OF 004
Venting about Tajikistan
————————————
8. (C) In characteristic Uzbek fashion, Norov blamed Tajikistan as
well as the Karzai-led government in Afghanistan for regional woes.
He accused the Government of Tajikistan of being directly involved
in narcotics trafficking and opined that the CSTO and SCO should be
more assertive in making Tajikistan accountable, especially since
«every day travelers are seized at airports throughout the region
— including Moscow — attempting to smuggle drugs via Tajikistan.»
Norov also explained that while most drugs in Uzbekistan originate
in Afghanistan, they are smuggled via the long, rugged border with
Tajikistan rather than the direct river border between Afghanistan
and Uzbekistan.
Transport Links are Top Priority
——————————————— —
9. (C) Norov stated that «transportation infrastructure is our
number one priority,» and was pragmatic about why Uzbekistan needs
a stable Afghanistan — and also Iran — as partners. «We are a
doubly-landlocked country,» he said, adding that it is essential
for Uzbekistan to secure access to the seaports of the Persian
Gulf. Other routes, he noted, are
much longer, more expensive by
several orders of magnitude, and cross the territories of several
countries (especially Russia, thereby increasing Uzbekistan’s
dependency). Norov said it is
imperative for the U.S. and NATO to
revive transit routes through Afghanistan, and he welcomed Iranian
construction of a railroad to Herat, noting that «Iran cannot be
excluded» from efforts to link Afghanistan. Norov also reminded
that links with Uzbekistan are in turn important for Afghanistan’s
development, and he emphasized the importance of a planned rail
link from the railhead at Hayraton (near Termez) to Mazar-i-Sharif.
Last year, according to Norov, 1.3 million tons of humanitarian aid
and 700,000 tons of commercial commodities were shipped into
Afghanistan via Termez and Hayraton.
Step-by-Step Cooperation
—————————————
10. (C) Norov reiterated the Government of Uzbekistan’s mantra
about a «step-by-step» increase in engagement with the U.S.,
explaining that there is a «strong potential for cooperation»
but
it should be «directed to areas of mutual importance.» (Comment:
This is Uzbekistan’s way of saying let’s do business but please
back off on human rights pressure.
End comment.) Norov expanded
on this theme by noting that «our Constitution was not designed for
making us look good in the West» but, rather, was focused on
meeting the needs and desires of the Uzbek people. He continued
that «we want cooperation on a strong basis, but without a public
relations component.»
Navoiy: Make a Deal Quickly
——————————————-
11. (C) In a separate meeting, Defense Minister Berdiyev echoed
Norov’s comments about potential bilateral cooperation, noting he
is «confident the relationship is growing,» as evidenced by 30
planned mil-to-mil events in 2009.
Like Norov, Berdiyev also
thanked the U.S. for its assistance in the wake of the Kagan
munitions depot explosions.
Berdiyev stated that «we are ready to
provide support on the upcoming transit of supplies» to
Afghanistan, and he recommended the U.S. «resolve the issue
quickly» by concluding contracts with Uzbekistan Airways and the
Uzbekistan Transportation Agency to ship goods via rail and via the
Navoiy Airport. Norov also had
touched on «the importance of
shipping non-lethal supplies via this route,» which he underscored
Uzbekistan «had supported from the very beginning.»
Military Equipment
TASHKENT 00001522 004 OF 004
—————————
12. (C) Berdiyev asked for the U.S. to provide military equipment
to Uzbekistan’s armed forces, attempting to link the need for the
equipment to the expanded role Uzbekistan foresees in protecting
cargo en route to Afghanistan via Uzbek territory. Specific
equipment Berdiyev requested includes early warning detection
devices, armored personnel carriers, unmanned aerial drones, and
helicopters. In addition,
Berdiyev suggested radar systems and
radio surveillance equipment as well as assistance with repairing
and replacing more than 1800 Harris radios purchased earlier with
Foreign Military Finance (FMF) monies in addition to possibly
replacing night-vision goggles likewise procured with FMF funds.
He also requested the Government of Uzbekistan be provided some
ability to assemble Harris radios in Uzbekistan. Lt. Gen. Allen
proposed establishing a joint committee with U.S. and Uzbek
military representatives to conduct a thorough assessment of
existing capabilities and projected needs before determining
whether such military equipment is warranted, which Berdiyev
immediately agreed to.
Embassy Comment:
—————————-
13. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan, clearly pleased to be back on
the map, appreciates the steady stream of high-ranking military
visitors who visited during 2008 and look forward to a high-profile
visit by CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus in early 2009.
Cooperating on the commercial transshipment of non-lethal goods to
Afghanistan makes economic sense for Uzbekistan which, despite its
insistence that it remains untouched by the global economic crisis,
is expected to suffer as remittances slow down from its citizens
working abroad. Nonetheless,
Uzbekistan will try to leverage this
cooperation in order to secure some sort of return favor, be it
military hardware, corporate investment, or slack on human rights.
Gen. Petraeus’s visit in January will be an opportunity to remind
the Uzbeks that the quality of our partnership with them on
Afghanistan will still depend in part on progress in the area of
human rights. Deploying senior
U.S. Government civilian officials
to reinforce this message in the wake of Gen. Petraeus’s visit
should be an important component of the enhanced, more
comprehensive bilateral dialogue that both we and the Uzbeks expect
will unfold in 2009.
NORLAND
To view the entire SMART message, go to URL
http://repository.state.sgov.gov/_layouts/OSS SearchResults.aspx?k=messageid:ab894a9c-de9b-
47cd-8804-93e495b8aead
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 185084
date: 12/30/2008 4:00
refid: 08DUSHANBE1572
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE1370|08DUSHANBE1518
header:
VZCZCXRO6487
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1572/01 3650400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300400Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1288
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0367
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001572
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ENRG, PHUM, EAGR, EAID, PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: WILL FINANCIAL, HARVEST,
AND ENERGY PROBLEMS CREATE TAJIK
WINTER STORM ?
Ref A: Dushanbe 1370
Ref B: Dushanbe 1518
1. (SBU) Summary: Inadequate energy supplies and food insecurity
remain serious problems for Tajikistan heading into the winter. The
water level in the Nurek reservoir is lower than it was this time
last year. Lower power generation
capacity at Nurek may be offset
somewhat by several factors.
First, the Talco aluminum plant is
dropping production in the face of declining world demand, which may
give some more power to cities — although it is not yet clear how
much this will help. New capacity
at Sangtuda has come on line and
for Dushanbe a nearby thermal plant is being upgraded. Power import
contracts with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have boosted imports,
although Foreign Minister Zarifi told Ambassador on December 29 that
Uzbekistan was balking on the transit of Turkmen electricity
(septel). Rationing of power
began earlier this year than last
year, with all parts of the country outside of Dushanbe receiving
only six to seven hours of power per day since early October,
including the northern city of Khujand, despite promises of full
time powe
