id: 179356
date: 11/21/2008 3:29
refid: 08DUSHANBE1407
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6229
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1407/01 3260329
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210329Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1201
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0237
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001407
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (HUSHEK)
INL/AAE (BUHLER)
JUSTICE (DUCOT AND NEWCOMBE)
DEFENSE FOR OSDP/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, PGOV, SNAR, KCRM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2008-2009
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
STRATEGY REPORT, PART II
General
1. Is the jurisdiction considered an important regional
financial center?
1A. Tajikistan is not a major financial center in the region and its
banking system is still developing.
Prosecutions for financial
criminal activity are unusual. In
2008, authorities did not
prosecute or convict anyone for significant financial crimes.
2. Do the criminal proceeds laundered in the jurisdiction derive
primarily from domestic or foreign criminal activity?
2A. Tajikistan has a weak formal economy, with growth fueled largely
by foreign remittances from up to one million Tajik migrant workers
in Russia. In 2008, official
remittances entering Tajikistan via
the banking system are projected to reach nearly $2.5 billion. The
remittances form a significant portion of Tajikistan’s 2008 $4.8
billion Gross Domestic Product, up from $3 billion in 2007. While
the bulk of remittances enter the country via the formal banking
system, these funds do not remain in the banking system, as
individuals usually keep savings in cash, invest in property, or
spend money on consumer purchases.
It is unknown what percentage of
remittances comes from legal versus illicit sources on income.
3. Is there a significant black market for smuggled goods in the
country? If so, is there evidence
to suggest that it is
significantly funded by narcotic proceeds or other illicit proceeds?
3A. Domestic goods smuggling occurs in Tajikistan. Consumer goods,
mostly apparel and low-cost household appliances, are smuggled to
avoid customs duties and local taxes.
There are several schemes for
smuggling goods into the country.
In most cases, goods such as
tobacco, alcohol, and fuel are not «officially» imported to
Tajikistan. For example, a
shipment nominally intended for
Kazakhstan transiting Tajikistan never reaches Kazakhstan. The same
practice occurs with goods nominally intended for Afghanistan.
While there is certainly a market for smuggled goods, there is
little evidence that most items are financed with narcotics money,
with the exception of imported cars and other luxury items.
3B. Drug traffickers can sell drugs outside the country, buy goods
with the proceeds (or simply exchange drugs for goods), import the
goods into Tajikistan, and sell them.
Such a scheme occurred a few
years ago with Russian automobiles Q the traffickers sold the cars
in Tajikistan at prices even lower than in Russia.
4. Is the country considered an offshore financial center?
4A. Tajikistan is not an offshore financial center. There are no
offshore companies or banks in Tajikistan. Existing legislation
does not favor offshore banks and financial centers. There are
foreign banks in Tajikistan, including an Iranian bank.
4B. While concluding deals with foreign enterprises businesses often
use offshore zones. Tajikistan’s
largest commercial companies such
as the management arm of the state-owned aluminum producer TALCO,
and CDH International, the alumina supplier to TALCO, are connected
to President Rahmon and are registered in the Virgin Islands or
other offshore zones.
5. Are there free trade zones operating in the jurisdiction? If so,
please give the number and name, and briefly describe their
operations, capability and function?
5A. In 2008, the President signed a resolution creating the free
economic zones «Panji Poen FEZ» and «Sugd FEZ» which
will operate
Qeconomic zones «Panji Poen FEZ» and «Sugd FEZ»
which will operate
for 25 years. «Panji Poen
FEZ» is in the Kumsangir district of
Khatlon Region in southern Tajikistan.
It will cover 400 hectares
(988 acres)and focus on processing agricultural products and
livestock.
5B. «Sugd FEZ» in Khujand area of northern Tajikistan will
total 320
hectares (791 Acres)and will focus on increasing production capacity
by building new plants and factories and attracting innovative
technologies. The Government
announced the establishment in the
near future of an additional FEZ in Ishkashim to create a trade zone
in Gorno-Badakshan, and another in Khatlon to improve agricultural
trade.
Laws and Regulations to Prevent Money Laundering
DUSHANBE 00001407 002 OF 004
6. What laws and regulations exist in relation to AML/CTF?
Is money laundering a criminal offense in this jurisdiction? Does
the law apply only to drug-related money laundering?
6A. Tajik law prohibits money laundering. This prohibition includes
not only narcotics money laundering, but also circumvention of other
financial currency controls (for example, unlawful transferring of
currency into offshore zones, usage of charities, insurance
companies, etc., to transfer funds and avoid complying with the
law).
7. Has the country enacted secrecy laws that prevent
disclosure of client and ownership information by domestic
and offshore financial services companies to bank supervisors and
law enforcement authorities?
7A. Banks are not required to know, record, or report the identity
of customers engaging in significant transactions unless authorities
opened criminal proceedings against a specific individual or
organization. Some civil
proceedings can also trigger this
scrutiny. For example, in civil
or administrative proceedings, a
court can request information about accounts or the nature and value
of property kept in banks, or request information, which is
considered a «bank secret» in cases when the bank’s client
represents one of the sides in the criminal case.
8. Are banks and other financial institutions required to
know, record, and report the identity of customers engaging
in significant transactions, including the recording of large
currency transactions at thresholds appropriate to the country’s
economic situation? What is the
statutory threshold?
8A. Banks and other financial institutions are not required to
maintain records to reconstruct financial activity. Financial
institutions make no regular reports of transactions or other
activity, and reporting officers have no special legal protections
with respect to cooperating with law enforcement. There is no legal
mechanism to insure law enforcement access to the information
related to illegal financial operations, such as money laundering,
corruption, terrorism financing or other crime.
9. Are there statutory requirements for limiting or
monitoring the cross-border transportation of currency and
monetary instruments?
9A. The «Law on Banking Activity» prevents disclosure of
client and
ownership information to bank supervisors and law enforcement
authorities for domestic and offshore financial services companies.
While Tajikistan has not yet addressed the problem of international
transportation of illegally-sourced currency and monetary
instruments, and has a long way to go to meet «due diligence»
standards, it has instituted cross-border currency reporting
requirements.
9B. In accordance with the «Joint Order of the National Bank and
the
Ministry of State Revenues and Duties», Tajik travelers may depart
with a maximum amount of $3,000 without registering it in the
customs declaration. Tajiks, can
depart with amounts up to $10,000
with a customs declaration.
Foreigners may depart with a maximum of
$3000 without a customs declaration.
When the amount exceeds $3,000
a foreigner must present documents of origin, customs declaration,
source of money, provide reasons why he has the funds, justify where
he is going to take it, and prove which bank which gave him the
funds. Travelers may enter
Tajikistan with unlimited quantities of
Qfunds. Travelers may enter
Tajikistan with unlimited quantities of
cash.
10. Are the AML/CTF controls applied to non-bank financial
institutions (NBFIs) and designated non-financial businesses and
professions?
10A. Money laundering controls are applied to all financial
institutions, including exchange offices, brokerages, etc., that are
licensed by the National Bank and subject to the same laws as banks.
There have been no arrests or
prosecutions for money laundering or
terrorist financing since January 1, 2002.
Terrorist Finance
11. Has the jurisdiction criminalized the financing of terrorism as
required by the UN International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism?
DUSHANBE 00001407 003 OF 004
11A. Tajikistan has criminalized terrorist financing, as covered by
the above-mentioned general money laundering statute. Tajik
authorities consider terrorist finance «serious crime.» There were
no reported cases of authorities freezing suspected terrorist assets
in 2008 because authorities did not discover any terrorist assets.
11B. Tajikistan adopted several laws including the Civil Code,
Article 284-Illegal Transactions with Precious Metals, Gems and Gold
Q to address the misuse of gold, precious metals and gems.
12. Does the jurisdiction acknowledge the existence and use
of value transfer systems that bypass, in whole or part, the formal
financial system?
12A. The government has not addressed alternative remittance system.
Tajikistan is a party to the 1999
International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Tajikistan signed the
Convention in November 2001 and ratified it in October 2004.
Remittances from labor migrants who are mainly in Russia and other
CIS countries are seasonal. The
government waived a 30% fee on bank
transfers, making remittances sent via banks more effective.
International Cooperation
13. Has the country adopted laws or regulations that allow
for the exchange of records with the United States?
13A. Tajikistan and the U.S. Government have agreed to exchange
records in connection with investigations and proceedings relating
to narcotics, terrorism, terrorist financing and other serious
criminal investigations, and negotiations are currently underway
regarding specific law enforcement cooperation. The U.S. Government
regularly sends information regarding designated individuals and
organizations subjected to asset forfeiture to the Tajik Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA
distributes this information to the
State Committee for National Security, Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Internal Affairs, and other ministries that conduct appropriate
checks.
13B. Tajikistan has not adopted laws or regulations that ensure the
availability of adequate records in connection with narcotics,
terrorism, terrorist financing or other investigations. USAID has
contractors who work to improve the banking sector and to date these
contractors have good access into Tajik banks and accounting
systems.
13C. The International Monetary Fund is currently auditing the Tajik
National Bank for misreporting currency reserves under a previous
loan which requires auditing of the National Bank and two major
state-owned enterprises.
14. Is the country a party to the UN International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism or other applicable
agreements and conventions?
14A. In spite of a primitive banking system and the use of a barter
system in many rural areas, Tajikistan has entered into several
international agreements and acceded to international conventions.
Tajikistan signed the UN Convention for the Suppression of Financing
of Terrorism, the CIS Agreement on the Legal Assistance and
Cooperation on Civil, Family and Criminal Cases of January 22, 1993,
and is a member of the CIS Antiterrorism Center.
Asset Forfeiture and Seizure Legislation
15. Has there been seizure and forfeiture of assets?
15A. The Tajik Government passed Article 57 of the Criminal Code,
which states that asset forfeiture is possible but the article also
specified exceptions. On March
20, 2008, the Tajik Parliament
Qspecified exceptions. On March
20, 2008, the Tajik Parliament
adopted the «Law on Executive Proceedings» that enables
asset-seizure mechanisms. In
previous years, the Drug Control
Agency worked to gain authority to utilize this law as a means of
achieving self-sustainability.
The Government, primarily the
Prosecutor General’s Office did not support the program.
15B. In 2008 authorities used asset forfeiture procedures in the
case against Maruf Oripov, the owner of the M&P Company and
«ORIMA,»
Tajikistan’s largest grocery store chain. Oripov faced charges
under three articles of TajikistanQs Criminal Code: giving bribes;
DUSHANBE 00001407 004 OF 004
tax evasion and forgery. The
Court sentenced him to eight years of
imprisonment and property forfeiture.
Law enforcement detained
Oripov in July 2007 when he was trying to give $10,000 in bribe to a
State Committee for National Security investigator. Inspections
carried out by the National Security economic section in July
revealed that more than 1,500 tons of confectionery and other
products beyond their shelf life were stored in the M&P warehouses
in Dushanbe.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 179433
date: 11/21/2008 10:54
refid: 08DUSHANBE1409
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07DUSHANBE1531|07DUSHANBE1772|08DUSHANBE1408|08DUSHANBE887
header:
VZCZCXRO6529
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1409/01 3261054
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211054Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1208
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0342
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001409
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KIRF, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: WHERE IS THE GOVERNMENT
OF TAJIKISTAN’S RELIGIOUS POLICY
GOING?
REF: (A) 07 Dushanbe 1531
(B) 08 Dushanbe 887
(C) 07 Dushanbe 1772
1. (U) This is a resubmission of 08 Dushanbe 1408 with a subject
heading.
2. (SBU) Summary: Tajik officials have continued to impose
limitations on personal conduct as part of the government’s
restrictive religious policy.
Officials have also continued to
crack down on religious groups that they consider to be «threats to
national security.» At the
same time, the government has attempted
to portray itself as the protector of Islam. Superficial actions,
such as dedicating 2009 to the religious figure Hanafi, have done
little to convince Tajiks that their government actually respects
religion and rights of religious expression, and imams with no
connections to the government appear to be gaining influence. End
summary.
CONTROLLING RELIGIOUS LIFE
3. (SBU) EmbOffs spoke to some of those who attended the early
October meeting of the Council of Ulamo, Tajikistan’s supreme
religious authority. Most of the
imams in the country attended, as
did representatives of the Ministry of Culture’s Department of
Religious Affairs and the law enforcement community. One of the
government representatives announced a new set of rules that imams
were expected to enforce: members of the Salafi sect are prohibited
from praying in mosques in Tajikistan; no one under the age of 18
may attend a mosque during school hours; no new mosques will be
registered (no time period was given); and no meals may be served at
mosques. He announced that the
government would form «commissions»
that will inspect the country’s mosques and other public
facilities.
4. (U) In recent weeks, EmbOffs have spotted these commissions —
which include representatives from the Presidential Administration,
the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Council of Ulamo and law
enforcement — in Dushanbe, warning people in markets and shops not
to wear clothes that have religious significance, and telling
business owners that employees should not be allowed to wear hijabs
or beards. Istravshan Ministry of
Interior officials initially
refused to give Domullo Mu’monkhon, the imam of a mosque in
Istravshan, a passport until he shaved his beard. Mu’monkhon had
been chosen to participate in an Embassy-sponsored exchange program
for religious figures; they ultimately relented, but only after a
few weeks of wrangling.
5. (U) The local media have reported on efforts to enforce unwritten
public dress codes. Sabohat
Qilichbekova, a Dushanbe shopkeeper,
told a reporter for Najot newspaper that one of these commissions
visited her store and told her not to sell «modern
Islamic-style»
clothes. A Radio Liberty
correspondent reported that the Council of
Ulamo considered «foreign-made» hijabs unsuitable for women,
who
should instead wear traditional Tajik headscarves; one of the
Council’s members was quoted as saying, «imported hijabs do not
meet
Islamic standards…they seem to be too tight.»
6. (SBU) In addition to policing a dress code, Tajik authorities
have stepped up their attempts to control, monitor and restrict the
activities of the Salafis. In
mid-October, the Khatlon prosecutor’s
office called for the sect to be banned; around the same time,
Council of Ulamo representatives publicly called for Salafis to
renounce their beliefs or stay away from mosques. On October 17,
Amonullo Ne’matzoda, the Head of the Council of Ulamo, announced in
a sermon at the Central Mosque that Salafis are not welcome in
Tajikistan’s mosques, and he called on imams throughout the country
to prevent Salafis from praying in their mosques. Ne’matzoda
Qto prevent Salafis from praying in their mosques. Ne’matzoda
justified his comments by equating the Salafis with Wahhabism; he
said the religious differences the Salafis and Wahhabis introduced
were some of the main causes of the civil war. He warned that the
Salafis threaten to split religious society in two. The Salafis who
were in the Central mosque at the time appeared to ignore
Ne’matzoda; they simply remained in the mosque and continued to
pray. After the service,
Ne’matzoda spoke to the Salafis in
private.
7. (U) The increased attention on the Salafis comes shortly after
government officials took action against the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
In late September, a military court ruled against the group, who
were challenging a government ban on their activities (reftel A).
During monitoring of the trial, EmbOffs noted that the testimony of
representatives of the Customs Service, Committee on National
Security, and Ministry of Culture were remarkably similar, as if
they had been coached about what to say.
The Committee on National
Security representative said that «sects like the Jehovah’s
Witnesses threaten the country’s national security»; the Ministry
of
Culture’s lawyer said that the Jehovah’s Witnesses needed to be
«mindful of the interests of the nation»; and Adolat Jalolova,
the
DUSHANBE 00001409 002 OF 003
principle of a local high school said she «hates this sect because
they can split our nation and break our families apart.» During a
break in the proceedings, Saidbek Mahmadulloev, from the Ministry of
Culture, told EmbOff that after finishing the Jehovah»s Witnesses
case, they would start a campaign against the Salafis.
8. (SBU) The government continues to monitor NGOs that it suspects
of surreptitiously conducting religious activities. A Dushanbe
court has indefinitely suspended the activities of ORA
International, a non-denominational Christian relief and development
organization based in Germany, and the authorities deported the
NGO’s U.S. citizen director in October.
Official documents cite
violations of NGO registration provisions as the reason for
government action, and ORA employees have denied involvement in
religious activities.
9. (SBU) Government officials also continue to interfere with the
property rights of religious organizations. Earlier in the year,
the authorities demolished Tajikistan’s only synagogue (reftel B).
The City of Dushanbe has now manipulated the court system to deprive
the Grace Sun Min Church, of property that it lawfully purchased
almost a decade ago. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs has contacted
the Church to inform its U.S. citizen pastor that his visa may not
be renewed. The Grace Sun Min
case appears to involve a primarily
financial — as opposed to anti-religious — motive, but it
demonstrates that religious organizations are especially vulnerable
to the whims of local officials.
Repeated attempts by the Embassy
to advocate on behalf of the Church have fallen on deaf ears.
GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY: A BALANCING ACT
10. (U) The government has attempted to portray itself as the
protector of Islam in Tajikistan, but many see these attempts as
superficial. While the government
posits the Council of Ulamo as
the country’s independent religious authority, many view it as
beholden to the government. The
local media have published the
comments of Abdullo Rahnamo, an expert on religion at the Center for
Strategic Research, a government think tank, that the Council has
«always been close to the government and supported government
policies.»
11. (SBU) In September, President Rahmon proclaimed that 2009 would
be the year of Abu Hanifa an-Nu’man, the founder of the Hanafi
school of thought. Observers
interpreted the move as an attempt to
appease religious figures who were skeptical of the government’s
religious policy. However, it
appears as though the government
intends to celebrate Imam Hanafi in a secular way. Abdughaffor
Kamolov, a radio journalist, told EmbOff that the Chairman of the
Committee on TV and Radio has ordered media outlets to produce
programs about Hanafi, but that the programs should stress his
Central Asian origins (while he was born in Iraq, his father came
from Kabul), not his religious contributions; journalists should not
interview religious figures whose beards or clothes emphasize a
religious identity.
12. (SBU) Corrupt officials have alienated many in the religious
community, further challenging the government’s credibility in
implementing its religious policy.
In August, Murodullo Davlatov
was replaced as the head of the Department of Religious Affairs.
Davlatov was known as a corrupt administrator who alienated
religious figures; he came under particular scrutiny following
allegations of corruption in the 2007 Hajj (reftel C). According to
a retired imam who had served on the Council of Ulamo, Ne’matulloh
Amonzoda was pressured into removing his nephew, Saymuddin, as the
QAmonzoda was pressured into removing his nephew, Saymuddin, as the
Council of Ulamo’s Head of International Relations, for
misappropriating Council of Ulamo materials. Saymuddin reportedly
had used proceeds from selling donated good to build a luxurious
house.
WHO DO PEOPLE REALLY LISTEN TO?
13. (SBU) As public skepticism about the government’s role in
religious affairs continues, imams with no apparent government
connections appear to be coming more influential. EmbOffs have
visited mosques throughout the country, met with members of the
religious community, and spoke to producers who distribute religious
DVDs and CDs. Three imams who
appear to be particularly popular are
Nuriddin Turajonzoda (also known as Eshoni Nuriddin), the imam
khatib of the Friday praying mosque in the village of Turkobod (in
Vahdat); Mirzo Ibronov (also known as Hoji Mirzo), the imam-khatib
of the Friday praying mosque in Kulob; Rahim Nazarov (also known as
Mullo Abdurahim), the imam-khatib of the Qazoqon mosque in Dushanbe.
14. (SBU) Turajonzoda is 56 years old and comes from a prominent
family (one of his brothers is a former Deputy Prime Minister and a
DUSHANBE 00001409 003 OF 003
current senator); Ibronov and Nazarov are in their mid-40s. Each of
these imams attracts thousands of people to their mosques, and all
include criticisms of the government in their sermons. Tajik
newspapers regularly turn to them for commentary on religious
issues, particularly during religious holidays. CDs and DVDs of
their sermons are available throughout the country. Many young
Tajiks are sending each other video messages of Turajonzoda saying,
«Taking off our sisters’ and daughters’ hijabs is like taking off
the President’s daughter’s underwear.» Ibronov and Nazarov in
particular have attracted a large number of young people to their
mosques by modernizing their messages.
Ibronov has a wide following
in Russia as well; he often travels there to meet with religious
officials.
15. (SBU) Comment: The government
continues to try to sell the idea
that it is the protector of Islam in Tajikistan, but it lacks
credibility when continuing to reduce religious space. The
popularity of imams such as Turajonzoda, Ibronov, and Nazarov
suggests that as the government squeezes, religious sentiment is
shifting toward those seen as independent from the government. It
remains to be seen how far the government will go in restricting
personal conduct as it continues to try to control religious life.
As one local publication commented, efforts to ban the hijab have
not reduced womens’ desire to wear the hijab, but instead have
strengthened its appeal. Pressure on the Salafis likewise might only
increase the group’s popularity.
The poor treatment afforded
religious groups, from the Grace Sun Min Church property rights case
to the ban on new mosques, attracts the critical attention of
religious freedom defenders abroad and complicates Tajikistan’s
relations with Islamic and other countries. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 180749
date: 12/1/2008 13:22
refid: 08DUSHANBE1454
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0253
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001454
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: UNEXPECTED CLOSURE OF TAJIK BORDER BY UZBEKISTAN
1. (SBU) According to news reports, Uzbek authorities unilaterally
closed their border with Tajikistan beginning on November 27. The
Tajik State Committee for National Security said it had no warning
of this move from the Uzbeks. The
Uzbek Embassy in Dushanbe also
seemed not to know the reasons for the closure, and announced that
it was working with the Tajik MFA to resolve the problem. Post has
heard an uncorroborated rumor of a large drug seizure on the Uzbek
side of the border near Tursunzade around November 26, involving a
drug shipment which had just exited Tajikistan, but has no
information that this is the reason behind the closure.
2. (SBU) According to press reports, only diplomatic passport
holders, Russian citizens, and Tajik citizens crossing back into
Tajikistan are allowed through Uzbek border crossings. Emboffs
traveling November 27-30 between Tashkent and Khujand encountered no
delays in either direction.
Embassy FSN staff and American Foreign
Service staff crossing into Uzbekistan on November 27 for tourism
were briefly delayed when Uzbek border guards refused to let the
Tajik members of the party enter Uzbekistan. However, the border
guards relented after some discussion with the American member of
the party and intervention by the party’s Uzbek tour operator. The
party encountered no delays when it returned to Tajikistan on
November 30.
3. (SBU) Tajik media speculated that the restrictions on border
crossing were linked to preparations for celebrations to mark
Uzbekistan’s December 8 Constitution Day. A source at the Tajik
Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the closure was «a big mystery to
us,» and that the Uzbeks had made no explanation to the Tajik
government. The source noted that
this was the first time
Uzbekistan had closed the border for Constitution Day.
4. (SBU) Comment: Regional governments commonly close borders in
advance of major public events such as summit meetings or holidays.
Post has no solid information to explain this latest border closure,
which has disrupted commerce and the personal travel of many Tajiks.
End Comment.
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 181563
date: 12/5/2008 10:30
refid: 08ASTANA2404
origin: Embassy Astana
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RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002404
SIPDIS
STATE PASS AID FOR S/GAC CLANGLEY, AID/ASIA BWALLIN AND GCOOK,
AID/GH CVINCENT
CDC FOR COGH DCHRISTIANSEN, CDC/GAP OKHAN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, SOCI, KG, TI, TX, UZ, KZ
SUBJECT: HIV OUTBREAKS AMONG
CHILDREN HIGHLIGHT NEED FOR REFORM
REF: ASTANA 2290
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Recent outbreaks of HIV and AIDS among
children
in three countries of Central Asia point to dangerous and
unnecessary medical procedures being performed throughout the
region. A recent assessment
conducted by USAID through the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Emergency Plan, or
PEPFAR) found that health providers and managers lack the knowledge,
supplies, and equipment to protect their patients from acquiring
infections such as HIV in the clinical setting. In partnership with
the Emergency Plan, CDC has identified blood safety as another
crucial need, and is working to improve those systems. USAID and
CDC’s programs, made possible by PEPFAR, work to address the
institutional, systemic, and practical barriers to facility-based
infection prevention/ injection safety and control in the region.
END SUMMARY.
RECENT OUTBREAKS OF HIV AND AIDS AMONG CHILDREN IN CENTRAL ASIA DRAW
ATTENTION TO POOR CLINICAL PRACTICES
3. (SBU) Recent pediatric
outbreaks of HIV provided public evidence
that unsafe medical interventions have created a new risk group for
HIV in Central Asia: young children receiving medical care. In
2006, an outbreak of HIV and AIDS was discovered among hospitalized
children in southern Kazakhstan.
Further investigation by CDC,
supported by the Emergency Plan, determined that the outbreak had
been caused by a combination of contaminated blood supply and unsafe
— and often unnecessary — medical procedures. Of particular
concern are the practices of reusing contaminated medical equipment
and performing unnecessary blood transfusions. One child surveyed
was found to have undergone over 20 transfusions during his two
years of life. While cases are
still being identified, currently
155 children are known to have been infected in the Kazakhstan
outbreak.
4. (SBU) In 2007, an outbreak of
HIV in southern Kyrgyzstan was
discovered among children under the age of two who had been
hospitalized. Investigations
supported by PEPFAR determined that
this outbreak was also due to contamination of the blood supply and
re-use of medical instruments. To
date, 110 Kyrgyz children have
been identified as HIV-infected as a result of this outbreak through
contact tracing conducted by local specialists. Unofficial
information indicates that this is the second such outbreak in Osh
in the last three years.
5. (SBU) On November 11, reports
of a similar outbreak in Namangan,
Uzbekistan were provided to the international media. This outbreak
was discovered in October, and is also considered to be caused by a
contaminated blood supply and unsafe medical practices. More than
40 children have been identified as HIV-infected. While this is not
the first such outbreak to be documented in Uzbekistan, it is the
first time that news of this type of outbreak has been reported by
the media. The CDC, supported by
the Emergency Plan, did an
assessment in Uzbekistan in July 2008 which also highlighted the
lack of infection control procedures and the practice of reusing
contaminated medical equipment and performing unnecessary blood
transfusions in healthcare settings.
RECENT STUDY IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC FINDS SIGNIFICANT NEED FOR
UPGRADES AND REFORM
6. (SBU) USAID, in partnership
with the Emergency Plan, conducted
an assessment of infection prevention and control of facility-based
transmission of HIV in July 2008 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The study
found that, while centralized public health capacity to provide
training and monitoring assistance on infection prevention exist,
these efforts are understaffed and inadequately funded. Due to the
publicity surrounding the recent outbreak in Osh, a high level of
awareness of the need for infection prevention and control exists
among health workers there.
Unfortunately, awareness of the need
for better infection control is not matched by knowledge of what to
do about it. The assessment team
observed several risky practices,
ASTANA 00002404 002 OF 003
primarily related to improper handling of needles, disposal of
medical waste, and overcrowding of patients (more than one child per
cot or incubator). The assessment
also found a chronic shortage of
essential commodities and medical equipment, leading to reuse of
contaminated equipment.
7. (SBU) The supervision system
in Central Asia, adopted during
Soviet times, emphasizes inspection and punishment rather than
supportive supervision. For
instance, the Ministry of Health in
Kazakhstan fired dozens of health professionals as a result of the
pediatric HIV outbreak discovered in that country, and 21 people
were arrested and found guilty of negligence, fraud, and acceptance
of bribes. (NOTE: Per reftel, on November 19, Anatoliy Dervonoy
was replaced by Zhaksylyk Doskaliyev as Kazakhstan’s Minister of
Health. President Nazarbayev
criticized the Ministry for fostering
a system where doctors take bribes and sell medicine that is
supposed to be free, use state funding irrationally, and do nothing
to prevent maternal and child morbidity.
END NOTE). Kyrgyzstan has
arrested at least three health providers to date. In the aftermath
of the pediatric outbreak in Osh, health workers appeared panicked
and were reluctant to share information with outsiders. Very few
incentives and recognition exist for good work. Kyrgyzstan is
losing its trained health workers, who are migrating out of the
country due to low salaries and poor morale. High rates of turnover
threaten gains made in improving the quality of health services, and
migration is causing acute shortages of healthcare workers,
particularly in the southern region.
8. (SBU) The assessment report
provides a long list of specific
recommendations for the Kyrgyz Ministry of Health and donors to
improve the environment for infection prevention and control.
Recommendations range from reforms to policies and systems, to
upgrades in commodities and equipment; to building the capacity of a
range of health workers and better informing consumers to influence
patient demand for services.
INADEQUATE BLOOD SAFETY SYSTEMS AND CONSUMER DEMAND CONTRIBUTE TO
HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS
9. (SBU) A study supported by the
World Bank and the Emergency Plan
in 2008 drew attention to the serious risk of contracting HIV and
other infections via blood transfusions in Central Asian countries.
Findings indicate that current screening systems used on donated
blood in the region are weak, often leading to a false sense of
security in the blood supply, while some facilities do not test
donated blood at all. The study
found a 0.2% prevalence of HIV
among blood that had already been screened. Through PEPFAR, CDC is
providing technical assistance to blood centers in the region to
improve blood safety practices.
10. (SBU) A high demand exists
among healthcare consumers for
injections, intravenous transfusions of medicines, and blood
transfusions across the region. These procedures represent a
substantial source of informal income for underpaid health
providers, as consumers are willing to pay additional fees under the
table for these services. There
is little knowledge and awareness
among patients and health workers about when these procedures are or
are not necessary, what the risks are to the patient, and what
precautions are required when administering these procedures.
USAID SUPPORTS INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL UNDER PEPFAR
11. (SBU) Throughout November,
USAID, under the Emergency Plan,
will be training approximately 380 health workers in southern
Kyrgyzstan and Bishkek on best practices for infection prevention
and control in the clinical setting.
The curriculum used for these
training events is based upon an updated version of the Kyrgyz
national infection prevention policy, which USAID through PEPFAR
will publish in Kyrgyz and Russian and make available throughout the
country. Experts will conduct
mentoring visits in facilities where
the training sessions were conducted, in order to provide
supervisory support to trained staff as they implement new
techniques.
12. (SBU) USAID’s health program
seeks to improve care and decrease
infections by introducing and reinforcing the concept of
evidence-based medicine, or utilizing medical techniques that have
been scientifically proven to be effective, only when they are
ASTANA 00002404 003 OF 003
proven necessary. USAID’s
maternal and child health activities have
introduced HIV prevention through training events and mentoring on
effective perinatal standards in 50 maternity wards throughout the
five Central Asian countries.
Results include adoption of
international standards required to prevent infection. These
precautions improve injection safety, indicate judicious use of
blood and blood products, and promote the use of new interventions
to reduce post-partum hemorrhage and the subsequent need for blood
products.
13. (SBU) Last year, USAID funded
a study tour for ten public
health professionals and a representative from Kazakhstan’s Ministry
of Health to travel to the U.S. to learn about HIV prevention
programs, infection control regulations, and blood bank services.
14. (SBU) USAID is conducting a
situational analysis of primary
health care facilities and tuberculosis hospitals in the region, to
further identify institutional and systemic barriers to infection
prevention. This analysis will
add to the knowledge provided by the
recent assessment conducted in hospitals in Osh, and will guide
future health reform activities to address infection control as a
goal for financial and structural reforms.
15. (SBU) USAID is finalizing its
health strategy in Central Asia
for the period of 2009-2013, and is drafting scopes of work for
specific programs. These scopes cover many areas that should have a
significant impact on the root causes of unsafe medical practices
and poor infection prevention, including: support for workforce
planning and performance-based incentives for health workers to
increase retention and encourage quality of care; improvement in
commodities management to ensure adequate stocks of required
supplies and equipment; the institutionalization of evidence-based
medicine to discourage inappropriate medical interventions;
participatory quality improvement programs to encourage self
monitoring and transparent reporting; building the capacity of
national organizations tasked with monitoring and promoting
infection prevention; and creating centers of excellence to
demonstrate, teach, and practice proper treatment procedures.
During the coming months, USAID will post on the internet draft
scopes of work on new health programming for public comment.
MILAS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 181782
date: 12/8/2008 8:08
refid: 08DUSHANBE1470
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0583
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1470/01 3430808
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080808Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1237
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0011
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001470
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EIND, EMIN, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TALCO SETTLES MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR LAWSUIT IN BRITISH
COURTS
1. (SBU) Summary. On November 27,
Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco),
Tajikistan’s largest enterprise, settled a three-year lawsuit in
British courts against former Talco managers and suppliers, whom it
alleged defrauded the company of $500 million. Details of the
settlement have not been released, but embassy contacts say Talco
got $200 million in the deal. The
lawsuit, which had grown into one
of the most expensive cases in UK legal history, has already cost
Talco at least $134 million in legal fees, fueling charges that the
government of one of the world’s poorest countries has misplaced
priorities. Such accusations
perhaps played a role in the decision
to settle this case, but have not ended the legal wrangling. There
is talk that Talco may now be considering a suit against Russian
aluminum giant Rusal, which it accuses of participating in the
fraud. End summary.
SETTLEMENT ANNOUNCED
2. (SBU) On November 27, Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco) withdrew its
$500 million lawsuit in British courts against the Ansol company,
run by former Talco supplier Avaz Nazarov. The suit had gained
international notoriety as one of the most expensive cases ever
litigated in the United Kingdom, with legal bills topping GBP 90
million ($134 million) — equivalent to over 3.6% of Tajikistan’s
2007 GDP. (An Embassy source says
that Talco’s bills have actually
topped $150 million, although this has not yet been reported in the
press.) According to a brief
statement issued by Talco and
confirmed by Ansol, the parties reached a settlement in the case
with no admission of liability by either side. Ansol dropped a $130
million countersuit it filed against Talco. Talco said it would
hold a press conference to reveal further details about the
settlement.
3. (U) Talco initiated the lawsuit in 2005 against its former
director, Abdukadir Ermatov, and his son, Cherzod, accusing them of
accepting lavish bribes from the company’s main supplier of alumina,
a group of companies controlled by Nazarov. According to lawyers
for Talco, the defendants conspired to divert more than $500 million
in profits between 1996 and 2004, when President Rahmon ousted the
Ermatovs and Nazarov. The
defendants denied the charges and
launched their counterclaim against current Talco management,
including members of the President’s family and inner circle. The
case has had an international character as well, with claims
emerging that Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska, who controls the
aluminum giant Rusal, was involved in the scheme with Nazarov.
Talco lawyers alleged that Ansol partnered with Rusal to sell the
smelter alumina at grossly inflated prices, then buy processed
aluminum at a bargain rate. Rusal
has denied wrongdoing.
4. (U) After the ouster of Talco’s former management team in 2004,
control of the operation — and its substantial profits — was moved
offshore to the British Virgin Islands.
Under the new management
arrangement, a company called CDH Investments, which reportedly is
controlled by President Rahmon and several other prominent Tajik
figures, pays Talco a straight «tolling fee» for the use of
the
smelter. CDH provides Talco with
inputs, including alumina, and
reaps whatever profit (or loss) emerges from sale of the smelter’s
output on the world market. Since
Tajikistan imports all of the raw
materials required for aluminum production and lies at the end of a
long and difficult supply line, Talco’s single competitive advantage
Qlong and difficult supply line, Talco’s single competitive advantage
has been the country’s bargain-basement electricity prices, which
are kept below generation costs by the political leadership.
Critics, including the defendants in the London court case, accuse
the government of defrauding its citizens by directing crucial
energy resources to the smelter and then exporting its profits
offshore, so that the state coffers see little in the way of income
or tax revenue. At the same time,
Tajikistan’s citizens continue to
suffer from chronic energy shortages, with most parts of the country
currently limited to six or seven hours of power per day.
TALCO RUMORED TO GET $200 MILLION IN DEAL
5. (SBU) While no details about the settlement have appeared in the
press, an Embassy contact with ties to Talco reported to us that
Ansol had agreed to compensate Talco in the amount of $200 million
by transferring property in Tajikistan belonging to Nazarov,
including several buildings, schools, and other real estate, to the
Tajik government and by repaying debt to Tajikistan’s state
electricity company Barki Tojik for electricity used during the late
1990s and early 2000s.
Reportedly, Ansol also agreed to repay
Talco’s debt to Gerald Metals, a U.S. firm which sued Talco for
non-delivery of aluminum for which Gerald paid $25 million.
6. (SBU) Another Embassy contact, who works for an international
financial institution in Dushanbe, said that if the $200 million
settlement figure was real, it would be a considerable achievement
DUSHANBE 00001470 002 OF 002
for Talco in a case that has otherwise been an embarrassment for the
company. He had seen some
circumstantial evidence that Talco was
happy with the settlement. At a
party he attended earlier this
week, Talco Deputy Director Sherali Kabirov showed up unexpectedly,
«a little tipsy» and in exceptionally high spirits, and
clapped
everyone on the back. When asked
why Talco might have decided to
settle now, our contact speculated that it was connected with the
low price of aluminum on world markets.
Talco management might have
doubted there was much more to gain from Ansol, which is also
affected by the slump.
7. (SBU) Many top Tajik officials were in London to participate in
the case, including Murodali Alimardon, Deputy Prime Minister and
former head of the National Bank; Faizullo Kholboboev, Tajikistan’s
representative to the Eurasian Economic Community in Moscow and
former advisor to President Rahmon on economic policy; Hasan
Asadullozoda, chief of Tajikistan’s largest private bank, Orion
Bank; Jamshed Ziyaev, head of TajPromBank and Chief Prosecutor of
the city of Tursunzade, where TALCO is located; and Gulomjon
Bobozoda, Minister of Economic Development and Trade.
8. (SBU) According to Embassy’s contact, Talco had some documentary
evidence against Deripaska’s Rusal company and was now planning to
file a case against the Russian aluminum giant. Our contact
speculated that this strategy was a dangerous one, however, because
Rusal was likely to have similarly incriminating evidence against
Talco that it could reveal in open court.
TOUGH TIMES FOR TALCO
9. (SBU) Even with the rumored $200 million settlement — which
comes out to only some $50 million after the company pays its legal
fees — these are difficult times for Talco. In the face of the
world economic crisis aluminum prices are as low as $1,400 per ton,
over 50% off their summer high.
Our contact reports that some
50,000 tons of aluminum currently lie unsold in Talco’s warehouses.
While because of the tolling arrangement this will not have a direct
impact on Tajikistan’s economy — since profits are taken off-shore
the country in fact did not benefit when times were good — it may
have an indirect effect as the President and other Talco
beneficiaries cast about for ways to replace their lost income.
10. (SBU) Comment: If the $200 million figure proves to be accurate,
Talco did better than expected in the settlement. Initial
speculation suggested that Talco settled the case for little or
nothing in order to stem its hemorrhaging legal expenses and
international embarrassment.
Rumors that President Rahmon himself
might be called to testify may have been another inducement to end
the case. In the end, however,
the primary consideration may simply
have been cold, hard cash. End
comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 182289
date: 12/11/2008 3:35
refid: 08DUSHANBE1498
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE433
header:
R 110335Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1239
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA AU
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001498
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, EAID, KDEM, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: ELECTORAL REFORM IN TAJIKISTAN — DON’T BET ON IT
REF: Dushanbe 433
1. (SBU) Representatives from OSCE’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) visited Dushanbe last week to
speak about amending electoral laws before the elections in 2010.
In conjunction with this visit, OSCE held a roundtable on December 3
attended by representatives of political parties, the government,
and civil society organizations.
While observers of the roundtable
were treated to some entertaining theatrics, it appears that the
prospects for meaningful electoral reforms are slim to none. End
Summary.
SEVERAL YEARS OF KNOWING WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
2. (U) Representatives from OSCE’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) were in Dushanbe last week to
speak to Tajik officials about amending the country’s electoral laws
prior to the country’s next elections in 2010. In 2006 and 2007,
ODIHR issued several reports outlining necessary reforms to the
country’s electoral infrastructure; they found that the 2006
elections «did not fully test democratic electoral
practices.» In
2008, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, with USAID
funding, brought together political party members to agree on a set
of recommendations for changes to the country’s election laws
(reftel). These suggested changes
are almost identical to the
issues raised in ODIHR reports.
3. (U) In conjunction with the visit, OSCE held a roundtable on
December 3 attended by representatives of political parties, the
government, and civil society organizations. During the meeting Mats
Lindberg, an ODIHR Election Adviser, raised 25 of the most pressing
areas for reform, covering the entire spectrum of the electoral
process: accountability for election violations; abolishing or
amending election law provisions and enacting new legislation;
improving electoral administration; establishing a fair environment
for campaigning; and helping political parties to become more
professional.
GOVERNMENT LIP SERVICE
4. (U) Government representatives spoke in generalities about broad
concepts of democracy. Muhibullo
Dodojonov, the Deputy Head of the
Central Election Commission, said «we need to move forward,»
and
«transparency is important to us.» Yusuf Salimov, the Head of the
Department of Constitutional Guarantees and Citizens’ Rights in
President Rahmon’s executive office, said that «our goal is to have
transparent and democratic elections.» Government officials,
however, either downplayed or ignored the significant deficiencies
outlined by ODIHR. Salimov said
that in the 2006 elections,
«observers said that there were some minor mistakes,» but that
overall the country has a «framework for fair elections.» Mirzoali
Boltuyev, the Head of the Central Election Commission, said that
elections were «based in law,» and that he was committed to
fairly
implementing that law.
AND NOW, THE THEATER
5. (U) During the discussion session, Konrad Olszewski, the Deputy
Head of ODI