Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 175088
date: 10/24/2008 10:39
refid: 08DUSHANBE1343
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE654
header:
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PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1343/01 2981039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241039Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1086
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0175
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0232
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0270
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0181
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0168
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001343
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, PHUM, PREL, ECON, EINV, SENV, TI
SUBJECT: THE PAMIRS — GOING THEIR OWN WAY, WHETHER THEY
WANT TO OR NOT
REF: A. A) DUSHANBE 654 (B) IIR 6 947 0001 09
B. OCTOBER 22
C. 2008
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON, 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (C) Summary: Contacts in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous
Oblast (GBAO) say regional disaffection from the central
government is less pronounced than political leaders in
Dushanbe think. The Aga Khan
Development Network (AKDN) is
making GBAO an example of liberal economic development and
better education, but struggles continually to get buy-in
from a suspicious government most concerned with control.
Legal trade with China and Afghanistan, while useful, has
limited impact on the local economy.
Suspicion and
control-mania in Dushanbe, combined with GBAO’s physical
isolation, ensure it will continue to be an underdeveloped
region dependent on foreign donors.
End summary.
GETTING TO THE BOTTOM OF THE ROOF OF THE WORLD
2. (SBU) Embassy officers travelled to Gorno-Badakhshan in
late-September, visiting Khorog, Ishkashim, the Wakhan
Corridor, and Murgab. Travel time
to Khorog was slightly
down from previous trips, with a 13 hour drive via Tavildara,
largely thanks to the new smooth highway from Dushanbe as far
as Rogun. Just after Rogun, the
road over the mountains in
Tavildara district is very rough, dusty and bone-jarring in
an armored landcruiser. The
Tavildara region is a
poverty-stricken backwater. The
only new structure visible
along the road was the mansion of local warlord (and former
opposition leader) Mirzo Ziyoev.
Many soldiers passed in
military and civilian cars, possibly due to the President’s
visit to neighboring Garm district the following week.
Unusually in rural Tajikistan, virtually no one smiled or
waved at emboffs car. Beyond
Tavildara district, considered
a stronghold of opposition to President Rahmon, road
conditions improved noticeably.
3. (U) The mud-brick houses on the Afghanistan side of the
river sported many satellite antennae.
In Khorog, the lights
of the Afghan village across the river shone at night; until
this summer there was no electricity supply there.
AKDN-affiliated Pamir Energy recently put an electric line
across the river.
4. (U) China trade dominated the road to Khorog, and beyond.
Long lines of identical white Chinese minivans were headed
toward Dushanbe, loaded with people, boxes, and goats. The
vans were destined to serve as route taxis in the capital.
The only traffic going toward China were largely empty cargo
trucks. The traffic seemed to
make little economic impact on
the region, passing through with a bit of money made on
lodging drivers.
ENERGY — STILL BRIGHT
5. (SBU) Daler Juraev, Director of AKDN-affiliated Pamir
Energy in Khorog, described GBAO’s economic prospects, saying
the only real potential for the region lay in power
generation, mining, and tourism.
Pamir Energy was close to
covering its costs through improved collection, brought about
by intense outreach and customer service. Pamir Energy’s
collection rate from private customers in Khorog was around
80%, but there were continuing problems with government
clients. Daler was optimistic
that the problems were
solvable, and looked forward to expansion along the Pyanj
River and up to Murgab. He was
talking with a Chinese mining
QRiver and up to Murgab. He was
talking with a Chinese mining
company that wished to build a power line 170 km from Khorog
to Murgab. The recent extension
of power to villages just
across the river from Khorog in Afghanistan was going well,
though it benefited only a few hundred people. He noted with
pride that improved efficiency would enable Pamir Energy to
supply Afghan customers year-round.
TOURISM — ONLY FOR THE ADVENTUROUS
6. (SBU) AKDN had long been training locals in hospitality,
«to understand what foreign tourists expect», but the GBAO
Governor did not take tourism seriously because the local
tourism association supplied little tax revenue. «He doesn’t
care how many people it employs,» said Juraev. Senior
government officials viewed tourism in terms of control,
seeking to limit the number of visitors and their movements.
The continuing existence of GBAO entry permits was one
pointless administrative barrier to tourism. A few days
after this conversation, a pair of American kayakers were
detained at gunpoint by Tajik soldiers when they floated past
a military installation in central GBAO; and held for 3 days.
The same kayakers say Tajikistan
places so many
administrative burdens on tourists that they cannot recommend
it as a destination.
7. (SBU) Tourism throughout the region is very limited in
scope. There are no hotels
outside Khorog, only a few guest
houses. Western tourists
complained of misleading and
corrupt guides, and unsanitary conditions in guest houses,
but most seemed mentally prepared for the challenges. Not
that there are many such visitors.
According to Border
guards in GBAO the number of tourists crossing from
Kyrgyzstan was sharply higher than last year; from 150 in
2007 up to 500 in summer 2008.
Daler Juraev believed visitor
numbers were growing, but were still in the low thousands for
all of Badakhshan each year.
ENDANGERED LUNCH
8. (SBU) Hunting Marco Polo sheep provides one income source
for locals, with foreigners paying thousands of dollars to
shoot a sheep. The business is
famously corrupt. Daler
Juraev said the oft-cited price of $20,000 to shoot a Marco
Polo sheep was misleading; foreigners officially paid $5,000
per sheep, but were then misled by their guides, who set them
up with difficult shots and used fake blood to convince
customers they had wounded sheep that they had actually
missed. The hunters then must pay
thousands of dollars more
to take another shot. The number
of sheep are reportedly
declining. The President ordered
a moratorium on hunting
Marco Polo sheep to take effect in early 2009, but it may not
make much difference. At Shaimak,
at the eastern end of the
Wakhan corridor, a local invited emboffs in for lunch and
explained that yes, the numbers of Marco Polo sheep was
declining — not because of foreign hunters, but because «we
hunt them ourselves for food.»
He pointed at meat emboffs
were sharing; «that’s Marco Polo sheep right there. Tasty?
It was. INL officer had a similar
experience at Kizilart
Border Post, where the Border Guards gave him horns from the
Marco Polo sheep they had just served him.
BRAIN DRAIN TO AFGHANISTAN — NO KIDDING
9. (SBU) The Afghan Consul in Khorog, Aziz Ahmed Barez, said
the consulate issued about 200 visas per month to Tajiks, and
a few to western tourists traveling to Afghan Badakhshan and
Mazar-i-Sharif. But the Tajik
Foreign Ministry
representative in Khorog approved visas to only twenty
Afghans a month. The State
Security Committee Chief in
Khorog told Aziz he would allow one employment visa, for a
cook to work in an Afghan restaurant; he likes Afghan
cooking. Aziz believed Afghans
paid up to $1,500 to bribe
Tajik officers for single visa.
Aziz noted a brain-drain of
skilled Tajiks; about 2,000, mainly doctors, worked in
Afghanistan, making several times the income they could earn
at home. While his work seemed
limited (he suggested the
Qat home. While his work seemed
limited (he suggested the
embassy hire him part time for consulting services), Aziz was
vague about his consulate’s activities; they did «legal» and
«cross border cooperation» duties with five full-time
diplomats. He hoped a Chinese
consulate would open soon in
Khorog to facilitate regional trade.
Pamiris had to go to
Dushanbe for a Chinese visa, then fly to Urumqi. Chinese
border authorities at Kulma Pass allowed only one-way traffic
for Tajiks — out of China. Aziz
frankly wished to leave
Khorog.
ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT
10. (SBU) A relic of USSR-PRC enmity, the border security
zone is more than 20 km deep, with a stout fence running
along it to keep Tajiks to the main road. On the road to
Kulma pass, border guards kept the security zone closed
except to authorized traffic, but a few kilometers away there
were long stretches of fence missing, as locals had used the
posts as winter fuel. There were
also long stretches of
power lines torn down near the border, perhaps sold as scrap
metal. There were many gates left open and apparently
unwatched, giving easy access into the security zone. Border
guards didn’t know why the security zone still existed,
except to say they found the Chinese aggressive in exploring
GBAO territory they might wish to acquire, and it was better
to keep the populations separated.
But there didn’t appear
to be enough people present to supply a confrontation (Ref B).
BORDER GUARD ENCOUNTERS
11. (SBU) While trying to reach the Chinese border at Kulma
Pass (unsuccessfully, because of the government was slow to
forward our request to Murgab), emboffs spoke with several
border guards. At a district
headquarters outside Toktashim,
one officer complained of corruption that reduced his monthly
fuel supply for general operations from the official 1 ton to
just 50 liters. He had to buy his
uniform and boots himself.
At the border guards’ base at
Kara Kul, two conscripts
circulated among the few tourists in SUVs, asking for a ride
to Murgab. They had finished
their term of service, but had
no transport home. In Murgab, the
border guard regional
commander told us by telephone he would meet with us, but
then left. His deputies would not
speak with us, as they had
no orders to do so.
BUSTED FLAT IN ISHKASHIM, WAITING FOR A PLANE
12. (SBU) Emboffs passed through Ishkashim, a small pleasant
town on the Afghan border at the western end of the Wakhan
corridor. The Mayor, Amrihudo
Hakdod, wants a free trade
zone in town. It would specialize
in processing local food
products and trucking or flying them around the region.
Ishkashim was close to several large central Asian cities by
air. A local hydropower plant
would supply power for the new
industries. The government
supported a Free Economic Zone in
Ishkashim, and the President visited during his July visit to
GBAO. At the silent Ishkashim
airfield, a few men painted
and plastered what looked to be a bus stop, in fact the
terminal building. A worker with
wet plaster covering his
hands introduced himself as the airport director, and said
that Tajik Air, after some years hiatus, now served Ishkashim
once or twice a week via Khorog, and was paying to upgrade
the «terminal.» Daler
Juraev later told us there was no such
air service, and AKDN paid for the terminal repainting in
preparation for the visit of the Aga Khan in late-October.
On the edge of town lay the Free Economic Zone site — an
empty field without water, electricity, or even a sign.
13. (SBU) Ishkashim’s Saturday Afghan border market was in
full swing. In a fenced-in
no-man’s-land on the Afghan side
of the river a couple hundred Afghans and Tajiks milled
about, eyeing each other’s junk; plastic shoes, cheap
clothes, dubious medicines, and sacks of potatoes and onions.
A few European adventure-chic
tourists mixed with the crowd.
Their SUVs, parked on the Tajik
side, were emblazoned with
expedition logos and maps showing their drives around Asia.
THE MAYOR AT THE END OF THE WORLD
14. (SBU) The Mayor of Murgab, Maizambek Tuichiev, sat in his
freezing cold office in the town center.
He summed up the
economic situation in Murgab as «bad», but with glimmers of
hope. Microfinance loans
increasingly were used to start
Qhope. Microfinance loans
increasingly were used to start
small businesses, mainly in livestock.
Wool processing and
brick making could be growth areas.
Mining interests from
Kazakhstan and China were coming into the area. Tajik Air
had transferred the airfield to local government ownership,
perhaps tourists would fly directly to Murgab. But the near
total lack of electricity retarded development. The dim red
glow of electric lights in Murgab were not enough to light a
room. The power shortage fed an
environmental problem that
threatened the region’s livestock base — locals harvested
grass for fuel, and ranged many kilometers looking for grass
to burn in winter. Stripping all
the grass led to erosion,
and reduced fodder for livestock.
But without power or other
fuel, as there had been under the USSR, locals had no other
option.
15. (SBU) On reported tensions over illegal land transfers
the Government made to China along their border near Murgab
that sparked a demonstration in Khorog in early 2008, the
Mayor said some «old people» did not understand the issue and
got upset, but they had since changed their attitudes. In
the middle of the meeting he received a telephone call. «Are
they there?» we overheard.
«Yes» he said, and hung up.
16. (SBU) On inspection, Murgab’s market bazaar was doing
slightly better than a year ago.
Fruits and vegetables were
for sale, and a better selection of packaged foods. The town
also looked better. Many houses
were newly painted. While
mobile telephone service was limited to a sole company, a
second provider was about to begin service. A visit to a
local school found many children eager to learn English, and
able to converse in limited fashion.
But Murgab was still
seemed empty and dilapidated. At
the airfield, previously
used by Russian border guards, the terminal building was a
ruined shell, with bits of its debris scattered across the
tarmac. The departing Russian
border guards ripped out
anything they could use or sell; window frames, wall tiles,
plumbing.
REGION VERSUS CENTER? NOT SO MUCH
17. (C) Buribek Buribekov, a Khorog journalist, described the
problems of the region as low salaries, high prices, and
electricity debts. He, Juraev,
and Dilovar Butabekov, Campus
Head of the AKDN-supported University of Central Asia (UCA),
played down the recent demonstrations against the prosecutor
and the military in Khorog (Ref A).
Juraev said the
demonstrations were organized by four local «warlords» —
narcotics smugglers, who got family and neighbors from their
villages to attend the demonstration that was really against
increased government pressure on their activities. All three
of them said the President’s July visit to GBAO had reduced
tensions there, and helped win support for the central
government.
18. (SBU) Gulhasan Mirhasan, Executive Director of the
Ismaili Tarika Relief and Educational Council, noted the many
people leaving for Russia, and the loss of local teachers
because of low salaries. He
dismissed the economic impact of
the President’s recent visit as insignificant. He and
Dilovar Butabekov complained of rising heroin use among
locals. As for religious differences between Ismailis and
Sunnis, he thought this had little potential to spark
tensions, since the populations lived in different areas of
Tajikistan.
19. (C) While all our contacts dismissed regional alienation
from Dushanbe as a non-issue, there were hints of Dushanbe’s
mistrust of GBAO. Butabekov
discussed the need to keep
central government officials involved in development
projects, so that they felt they had helped plan them; but he
dismissed their contributions, describing the process as one
of «opening their eyes.»
He described the AKDN’s role as
setting a new standard in education and in development
priorities, mainly through more liberal economic and
political views. Butabekov
thought the regional separatism
of the 1990s was completely dead, dismissing it as a fad
associated with the breakup of the USSR.
Buribekov talked
about a rumored draft agreement between the GBAO
administration and the central government defining the
regional government’s revenue share from mining investors.
According to him, the document had sat in parliament for
years, as the government did not want to allow GBAO real
Qyears, as the government did not want to allow GBAO real
autonomy or to develop economically.
20. (SBU) Back in Dushanbe, Minister of Economic Development
Bobozoda reacted testily when asked about the role of the
AKDN in GBAO. He was tired of the
Aga Khan getting credit
for so much that was actually done by the Government of
Tajikistan. He skipped the
inconvenient fact that much of
«the Government’s» assistance to GBAO is funded by AKDN.
COMMENT: BIG MOUNTAINS, SMALL HORIZONS
21. (C) The government of Tajikistan is suspicious of all
foreign involvement in the country, whether in economic,
political, or educational matters.
This reflects the
leadership’s sense of Tajikistan’s weight in relation to
surrounding powers, and the weakness of their own position
within Tajikistan. GBAO will
always be viewed in this
suspicious light, because of the short-lived separatist
movement there during the civil war, and the region’s
religious ties to a wealthy and ill-understood outside power
who supports modernization, liberalism, and western-style
education. The claims by the
Economic Development Minister
and the Ishkashim airport director that AKDN support was
really GOTI support, and UCA’s need to involve Dushanbe
officials in educational reform illustrate the Government’s
insecurity and need to claim credit for the efforts of
others.
22. (C) Comment Continued: AKDN’s activities in GBAO and
elsewhere may help drag Tajikistan into the twenty-first
century by the force of their example.
For the people of
GBAO, lacking natural resources, physically isolated, and
politically neglected, AKDN is a lifeline they can use to
pull themselves to a basic economic future. Electricity is
key to developing tourist services and mining, and Pamir
Energy is in capable hands with a vision to expand. Regional
trade is unlikely to contribute much to GBAO’s economy,
because of the region’s paucity of products and consumers.
Such trade as there is could decline in the next few years as
road improvement projects through northern Tajikistan open up
new and much shorter routes from Western China to Tajikistan
and on to Afghanistan, bypassing GBAO.
Deterioration of the
situation in Afghanistan would also cut off GBAO from another
useful, albeit limited, direction for international trade and
cooperation. End Comment.
23. (SBU) Exhausted, sunburned, and happy, our journey ended
at the five-star Serena hotel in Khorog, with hot water in
large bathtubs, excellent food, a beer in the minibar, and
Afghanistan sitting pretty across the river. While the
region’s economic prospects seem limited, the trip was
defined by the deep blue sky at noon at Murgab, the amazing
stars, the Andromeda galaxy visible to the naked eye, long
haired Yaks nibbling their way across the valley floors,
horses walking up the pass north of Kara Kul, and the wind
driving clouds of dust down the Wakhan Corridor, with the
Pakistani Hindu Kush towering above like thunderheads. The
people and politics of Badakhshan are fascinating in their
varied mundane and fantastic aspects; but compared to the
place itself, they seem like an afterthought.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 175510
date: 10/28/2008 10:22
refid: 08DUSHANBE1347
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE735
header:
VZCZCXRO6465
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1347/01 3021022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281022Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1094
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001347
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: US-FUNDED AG PROGRAM PREPARES RASHT VALLEY FOR WINTER
REF: 08 DUSHANBE 735
1. (U) Summary: Econoff and USAID representative traveled to the
Rasht Valley town of Gharm, four hours northeast of Dushanbe, to
attend an agricultural exhibition organized by USAID grantee Mercy
Corps. The event highlighted
Mercy Corps’ efforts to help residents
increase food production and prepare for the winter by providing
inputs and training for greenhouse construction, canning, fruit
drying, and other skills. With
food prices soaring and harvests
uncertain, these efforts play a vital role in improving food
security in a region that, even after the recent visit of President
Rahmon, remains both geographically and politically remote from the
capital. End Summary.
FFP PROGRAM HELPING GHARM RESIDENTS PREPARE FOR WINTER
2. (U) USAID/Food for Peace implementing partner Mercy Corps’ work
in Gharm focuses on mother/child health and agricultural practices.
The mother and child health program offers a monthly food allotment
to mothers who agree to have a series of pre- and post-natal
check-ups and to take classes on nutrition and health. The primary
goal of the agricultural program is to help the region’s residents
sustain themselves more effectively during winter by improving crop
yields and ensuring that a greater proportion of the yield is
available for consumption during the long winter. The Mercy Corps
program operates in six of Rasht District’s 14 subdivisions,
reaching more than 4,500 beneficiaries a year. It focuses on five
strategies: greenhouse construction, composting, improved fruit
drying, canning, and the use of potato seeds.
3. (U) Mercy Corps staff and volunteers are teaching residents how
to work with potato seeds to prevent a repeat of last winter, when
potato stores were destroyed by the record cold temperatures,
hitting residents with a double-whammy: they lost an important
over-winter food source as well as the means of planting this year’s
crop, which is usually done by planting potatoes from the previous
year. Using potato seed should
free farmers from this vicious
cycle. Mercy Corps also helped
build 2,700 greenhouses in Rasht.
They provided the plastic sheeting and technical advice while
residents obtained the other construction supplies and built the
greenhouses at their own expense.
Using the greenhouses they were
able to significantly increase crop yields for tomatoes and
cucumbers, as well as extend the growing season. Most of these
vegetables were used for personal consumption.
4. (U) According to Mercy Corps’ agricultural advisor in the valley,
residents benefited particularly from the improved drying and
canning techniques taught through the program. Mercy Corps provided
residents with 42,000 canning jars, but in a subsequent evaluation
discovered that the practice had spread widely, and some 126,000
jars were actually used.
Additionally, some 99 tons of fruit — the
Rasht ValleyQs main crop — were dried for use over the winter, and
1,000 people were actively composting.
5. (U) The new techniques were highlighted in an agricultural
exhibition on October 22 in Gharm’s House of Culture that drew
between 100 and 150 visitors. The
event included speakers and
exhibits demonstrating the techniques.
The Deputy Head of Rasht
District, Loiqov Qanoatshoh, spent the majority of his time praising
Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who had visited the valley earlier
in the month (reftel), for improving agriculture in the region, but
concluded by asking for more USG support. He said he would like to
see an additional 2,000 people engaged in agricultural production in
the district (whose population is over 90,000), and the construction
Qthe district (whose population is over 90,000), and the construction
of facilities for juice production and leather and wool processing.
He hoped to see the expansion of the program into Rasht’s remaining
8 sub-districts (jamoats) as well.
BUT OUTLOOK REMAINS PRECARIOUS
6. (U) Food prices in Gharm, as in much of Tajikistan, are
significantly higher than last year.
Residents said that a 50-kg
bag of flour sells for between 35 and 37 USD, compared to 16 USD
last year. (Econoff confirmed
prices in the local market.) Despite
last winter’s calamitous conditions, this year’s harvests have not
been disastrous: Mercy Corps staff said potato yields have been
about average, or slightly below, while there was a bumper crop of
apples, for which Rasht is locally renowned. The pear crop mostly
failed this year, however. The
addition of greenhouse-grown
vegetables and dried fruit has provided many residents with a hedge
against another bad winter. One
animated beneficiary took the
microphone at the exhibition to boast that she had prepared some two
tons of fruit for drying. When
asked whether she would sell the
surplus she laughed and said no, this would be her personal supply
of «glucose for the winter.»
PRESIDENT’S VISIT TO GHARM: SHOWCASE OR DOG AND PONY SHOW?
7. (U) Travel from Dushanbe to Gharm took about four hours, along a
road being improved by Chinese laborers as part of an Asian
DUSHANBE 00001347 002 OF 002
Development Bank project. The
first stretch of 100 kilometers from
Dushanbe to the town of Obi Garm is complete, while the remaining
100 km is mostly gravel and tattered asphalt. Several Chinese road
crews were at work near the approaches to Gharm, leveling the
roadbed and building small bridges.
8. (U) On the face of it, Gharm residents were enthusiastic about
the recent visit of President Rahmon.
Several of those questioned
said they enjoyed the accompanying fireworks display and dance
performances, and were happy for the tractors and other supplies the
President brought. Some raised
their eyebrows, however, at the
lavish production of the visit, wondering whether a contingent of
ambulances and a retinue of 7,000 visitors — equal to the town’s
population — were really necessary.
9. (SBU) Comment: The Rasht valley is one of the poorer places in
Tajikistan and its resident struggle along with little support from
the government. Because of its
history as a center of
anti-government sentiment, Gharm’s economic conditions may have a
significance outweighing the town’s status as a small regional
center. While the President
pulled out all the stops to ensure a
successful and fanfare-laden visit this month, another bad winter
could leave the valley even further alienated. Both direct
beneficiaries and the regional leadership see the
Food-For-Peace-funded program as a success in providing sorely
needed support to the area. Local
leaders pointedly asked what more
could be done to increase food security in the region. This modest
effort not only supports a vulnerable population; it also allows us
to monitor both the humanitarian situation in a remote part of the
country and to check the political pulse of a sensitive region.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 175938
date: 10/30/2008 11:49
refid: 08DUSHANBE1350
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE760
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1350/01 3041149
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301149Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1099
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0278
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0173
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001350
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ECON, EINV, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DAS KROL VISIT NOVEMBER 10-13
REF: 08 DUSHANBE 760
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (U) Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to the upcoming visit
of DAS George Krol. Following is
a brief overview of the
current situation in Tajikistan and our thoughts on the key
issues DAS Krol will confront during his visit.
POLITICAL OVERVIEW — STAGNATION IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY
2. (C) Little has changed in Tajikistan’s policies since your
last visit. The country
approaches its next winter
ill-prepared for the inevitable power shortages and
intensified food insecurity. The
GOTI claims it has
stockpiled food and fuel, but we cannot verify this and other
donors report a continuing unwillingness by the GOTI to
coordinate with them. The global
financial crisis has yet to
hit ordinary Tajiks, as the remittances from Russia which
support so many continue to pour in.
However, a downturn in
the Russian construction sector could have serious impact on
Tajikistan. If this happens in
the next few months, it could
hit Tajikistan simultaneously with less money for food during
the difficult winter period, and possibly more unemployed
Tajiks returning home with no job prospects.
3. (C) If the Government is feeling any effects from the
financial crisis and the decline of world aluminum prices by
over a third since July, it is not yet evident. The
Government continues to make payments for construction of the
massive $300 million presidential palace in the center of
Dushanbe, which will be complete in December. Work on other
presidential dachas around the country goes on.
4. (C) Tajikistan’s political leadership continues to
stagnate, with some signs of increased intolerance of
alternate viewpoints. The
Government appears to be
increasing pressure on foreign religious organizations, by
deporting religious NGO staff and banning activities of some
churches, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. For other
motivations, namely property expropriation, the Mayor of
Dushanbe is forcing the U.S. affiliated Grace Sun Min Church
out of property it legally acquired several years ago. The
Mayor has reportedly told his staff he is «unafraid» of the
U.S. Embassy, which has sent diplomatic notes on behalf of
the Church and monitored legal proceedings in the case.
Observers of the case use it as an example of the Mayor’s
willingness and ability to manipulate the court system,
getting the judge in the case to make rulings that contradict
the facts and the law. There has
been a U.S. congressional
inquiry concerning this case. In
other fields, the Foreign
Ministry has refused to meet with Department officials that
it invited to Tajikistan to discuss the Nuclear Smuggling
Outreach Initiative, and the Ministry of Justice has rebuffed
efforts by donors to assist in rewriting the criminal
procedure code.
POLITICAL SONG AND DANCE
5. (C) Rahmon has attempted to firm up his control of the
regions in the face of opposition which has been violent on
at least one occasion. In
response to demonstrations last
spring against government activities in Badakhshan, and the
February killing of the national police special unit
commander during an attempted arrest in Gharm, Rahmon
recently traveled to both regions, bringing clothing,
computers, tractors, and other «gifts» for the local
population (he also has brought hundreds of dancers and
singers on these regional visits).
In the case of
Badakhshan, contacts there report that the President’s July
visit was a success, in that it undermined any legitimacy
Qvisit was a success, in that it undermined any legitimacy
that local protest organizers had (they were reportedly drug
smugglers angry at government pressure on them, despite the
ostensibly political reasons for the demonstrations). The
early October visit to Gharm is harder to assess. The region
is generally anti-government, but Rahmon showed that he could
go there and get some results; the local police officer and
ex-oppositionist who was behind the killing of the police
special unit commander agreed to step down and have his unit
disbanded. He also turned in
several weapons, although
sources in Gharm dismiss the handover as small in comparison
to the numbers of illegal weapons floating around the area.
President Rahmon’s nascent personality cult was on display
during the Rasht visit; excessive and repetitive television
coverage of his public meetings there featured locals calling
him «king of kings» and saying there was no need for any
further elections in Tajikistan.
6. (C) Tajikistan’s long-term political and developmental
challenges have not gone away.
Economic flight of Tajiks to
Russia continues, and in rural areas embassy contacts report
that boys as young as their mid-teens are now leaving to look
for work abroad. More women are
leaving as well, as are
those with higher education. The
embassy does not see an
imminent threat from conservative Islamic movements, but the
Government’s fear of fundamentalist Islam is obviously
increasing. In mid-October the
Government announced that the
Salafi movement would be banned, and Salafis are now barred
from mosques (as are women and boys under eighteen years
old). Identifying Salafis is a
mysterious process, but to
the degree that they exist in Tajikistan they will certainly
be driven underground and further radicalized by this
measure.
ECONOMIC STEPS, AND MISSTEPS
7. (C) The Government says it plans to develop domestic
sources of alumina to supply the giant Talco aluminum plant
at Tursunzade, however this plan is years away from
execution. As noted above, low
aluminum prices are likely
reducing revenues from Talco. The
international press has
reported extensively on the lawsuit involving Talco in
London. Tajikistan has reportedly spent over $150 million )
approximately 5% of the country’s 2007 GDP ) pursuing a case
that experts give it very little chance of winning. Trial
proceedings have commenced in the case, in which Tajikistan
is pursuing the old Talco management for stealing Talco
revenue, and the old management team has lodged counter
accusations of massive fraud. An
audit of Talco is in the
offing, as part of the Government’s agreement with the IMF to
resolve the latest misreporting scandal; but whether the
audit will encompass the offshore company through which
Talco’s revenues reportedly flow is still in doubt. The
audit and staff monitoring program at the Central Bank is due
to conclude by November 10, with a preliminary report to come
out by the end of the month.
8. (SBU) In late-August Tajikistan and Afghanistan signed a
Power Purchase Agreement for electricity supplies from
Tajikistan to Afghanistan, opening the door to ADB financing
to construct a 220 kv transmission line to Kunduz by spring
2010. The Government is funding
construction of the giant
Rogun Dam project, to the tune of $50 to 100 million per
year, but it has so far been unable to secure international
involvement in the project.
9. (C) Reform of the agricultural sector continues to be
largely rhetorical; farmers are still forced to grow cotton,
students are forced to pick it, and a few well-connected
investors continue to squeeze everyone else with unfair labor
practices and below-market prices.
G/TIP recently visited
Tajikistan, and expressed concern about students forced to
pick cotton. The New York Times
has also picked up on abuses
in the Tajik cotton sector. The
cotton sector is headed for
serious troubles; disruptions last year due to extreme cold
and financial uncertainties stemming from delays in land
reform legislation, have led to a low harvest this year.
Cotton investors will likely respond to this situation by
squeezing farmers even more.
THE ECONOMY — TAJIKS LOOK FOR THE EXITS
10. (C) Estimates are for inflation to reach 20% this year,
and prices for basic foodstuffs are often double last year’s
prices. With few legitimate
business opportunities in
Tajikistan, and deteriorating education and other public
services, much of the population relies on remittances from
Tajiks working abroad. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the
QTajiks working abroad. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the
percentage of Tajiks who move abroad to seek permanent or
temporary work ) estimated at 50 percent of the working
population ) is increasing. Tajik
social indicators are
declining, health care and educational systems are
degenerating, and young Tajiks are arguably worse prepared
for life than those who grew up under the Soviet Union. The
business climate is not improving.
Tajikistan remains a
remarkably difficult place to do business, and the climate
shows few signs of improving.
11. (C) Last year’s unusually harsh winter damaged crops and
seed stores. It was followed by drought and locust
infestations in spring and early summer, resulting in lower
food production this year.
Combined with mounting
agricultural debts and rapidly increasing food prices, rural
families who sold their tools and livestock to survive last
winter are headed into the next winter in poor shape to deal
with its difficulties. Tajikistan
is highly dependent on
imports for its food supply and is vulnerable to the ongoing
worldwide food price increases.
We expect food insecurity to
worsen. Tajikistan badly needs
continuation of the
agricultural development assistance funded by Food for Peace.
BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT CLIMATE
12. (C) International investors do not view Tajikistan as a
viable place to do business.
Would-be investors, large and
small, find themselves stymied by corruption at all levels,
and local investors have been the targets of property grabs
by the well-connected. Foreign
investors must also overcome
restrictive visa rules, lack of air connections, and the
government’s suspicion of foreign involvement in any sphere.
What little foreign investment exists is state-sponsored or
directed from Iran, China, and Russia.
The President has
formed an Investment Council, including participation of
foreign investors, and attended a meeting with American
businesses in New York during the UNGA.
While the meeting in
New York saw some frank comments from would-be investors, it
is too soon to tell whether they will have any impact on
Rahmon.
COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
13. (C) The Bridge: Use of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan bridge
at Nizhny Pyanj is relatively static, with some 150 to 200
trucks a day crossing it in either direction. Several
obstacles to full use of the bridge remain: there are still
no provisions for pedestrian traffic, it is difficult for
Afghans to obtain a Tajik visa because of bureaucratic delays
and demands for bribes from Tajik officials, and both sides
are moving slowly to finish and occupy the border facilities
at the site. The inspection
facilities on the Tajikistan end
of the bridge are almost complete, and the Government took
legal possession of them this August.
We are working with
the PRT in Kunduz to bring the Tajiks and Afghans together to
take steps to open the bridge to more traffic.
14. (C) Narcotics: Cooperation on narcotics continues to be a
relative bright spot, but only superficially. While
Tajikistan’s law enforcement and security services seize more
narcotics than other Central Asian state (and overall
narcotics seizures were up 19% over 2007), they are not
willing to take on the arrest and prosecution of narcotics
smuggling ring leaders, some of whom are politically
well-connected. We promote and
see active and productive
cooperation between the Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Afghan drug
agencies. In a mid-October
speech, President Rahmon called
for joint Tajik-Afghan law enforcement training. While we
welcome and will vigorously pursue this opening, Border Guard
and Committee on National Security generals have obstructed
any forward movement on joint training of their service
personnel in the past.
15. (C) Security Cooperation: Security Cooperation remains a
strong part of our relationship, as we pursue shared
interests in building stability in Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s
Ministry of Defense is opening up to cooperation with
Afghanistan. The Tajikistani
Military Institute will begin
training 30 officers from Afghanistan in November 2008. This
seems to be a sincere effort to assist in the process of
building stability in Afghanistan, and stands in sharp
contrast to the refusal of Tajikistan’s Border Guards to
allow joint training with Afghan counterparts in the past.
Tajikistan has also accepted the Global Peacekeeping
Operations Initiative, funded at $1.5 million, with
additional follow-on funding of another $1 million, and are
forming an interagency commission to explore the standup of a
peace keeping unit.
16. (C) Regional Integration: Efforts to spark regional
Q16. (C) Regional Integration: Efforts to spark regional
integration between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and more
broadly between Central and South Asia, have seen some
successes since your last visit.
In August Tajikistan signed
a commercial power purchase agreement with Afghanistan,
paving the way for sales of seasonal hydroelectricity to the
Afghan grid starting in spring 2010.
In late-October the USG
hosted a conference of Central and South Asian aviation
sector officials and companies, to foster quicker integration
of their markets. USTDA and State
Department are following
up on this conference to implement a consultative mechanism
to address issues raised there.
However, Tajikistan’s
relations with Uzbekistan remain poor, and there has been no
progress toward resolution of Uzbekistan’s opposition to
construction of the Rogun Dam.
ISSUES FOR YOUR VISIT: THE IMF, CHURCHES AND NGOS
17. (C) IMF/Assistance: In the wake of the misreporting
scandal with the IMF, in which the Central Bank obtained debt
relief under false pretenses, international donors are still
very skeptical of Tajik government financial plans and
pronouncements. The audit of the
Central Bank is underway,
and the Bank has made its first scheduled debt repayment to
the IMF.
18. (C) Tajikistan is backsliding on democracy and civil
society development. Corruption
remains rampant, and
government attempts to control it are viewed by observers as
insincere and ineffective. The
government continues to
attempt to control all aspects of religious life, monitoring
mosques, guiding the selection and appointment of imams, and
harassing or expelling religious organizations that are
deemed to be «foreign influences.»
19. (C) Our dismay at the expulsion of NDI apparently made no
impression on the Government of Tajikistan. Since NDI’s
departure, the government has continued to harass NGOs, even
those ) such as Mercy Corps ) that are involved in
non-controversial humanitarian development work. There has
been a rash of Tajikistani officials who have balked at
participating in U.S. Government-funded programs or meeting
with U.S. Government employees.
COMMENT: IS THE SLOW-MOTION TRAIN WRECK GAINING SPEED?
20. (C) Comment: Constriction of political space, intolerance
of religion, obstruction of foreign assistance and
investment, a leadership single-mindedly committed to
personal enrichment, short-term gain, and control of the
economy at the expense of economic growth; these factors have
retarded Tajikistan’s development and driven hundreds of
thousands of Tajiks to emigrate.
Embassy’s earlier analyses
predicted these would lead to an eventual breakdown, but not
for several years. We are
watching closely to see whether
the global financial crisis should change our time calculus.
Tajikistan’s banking sector is isolated, but the country is
highly food-insecure and vulnerable to disruptions in the
Russian economy or decline in the world price of aluminum.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 176137
date: 10/31/2008 9:46
refid: 08ASTANA2156
origin: Embassy Astana
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO9960
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #2156/01 3050946
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 310946Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3706
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0755
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0154
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0864
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2038
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1987
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2323
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0316
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0233
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002156
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, OES (PHUDAK, NFITE)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SENV, TX, TI, KG, UZ, KZ
SUBJECT: CENTRAL ASIAN LEADERS
REACH AGREEMENT ON WATER AND ENERGY
FOR THE UPCOMING WINTER
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified.
Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: The presidents
of the five Central Asian states
overcame their disagreements and signed an agreement in Bishkek on
October 10 to share water and energy resources this winter. One
expert sees Gazprom’s influence behind this deal, which, if
implemented, would represent an important step forward on water and
energy cooperation in Central Asia.
END SUMMARY.
SUMMIT AGREEMENT ON WATER AND ENERGY
3. (SBU) The presidents of the five Central Asian states overcame
their disagreements and signed an agreement on October 10 in Bishkek
to share water and energy resources over the winter period. If
implemented, the agreement should improve the winter situation in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Ruslan
Ayabov, head of the Bilateral
Cooperation Division of the Kazakhstani MFA’s Central Asia
Department, confirmed to the Regional Environmental Officer (REO)
the results of the October 10 Biskhek meeting, which followed a CIS
heads of state gathering. Ayabov
gave the REO a non-paper with the
following details about the agreement:
— Kazakhstan will supply Kyrgyzstan the amount of coal it needs for
the winter period.
— Uzbekistan will guarantee an uninterrupted supply of natural gas
to Kyrgyzstan during the first quarter of 2009, an amount that will
exceed by 150 million cubic meters the amount delivered in the first
quarter of 2008. (NOTE: The media in Kazakhstan have reported that
Uzbekistan will be supplying its natural gas to Kyrgyzstan at a cost
much lower than the current market rate.
END NOTE.)
— Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed on the transit of approximately
1.3 billion kilowatt hours of electricity from Turkmenistan through
Uzbekistan’s electrical power grid.
— These agreements are directed toward maintaining the level of
water in Kyrgyzstan’s reservoirs necessary to guarantee the demands
of neighboring countries for water for the irrigation period (i.e.,
the 2009 crop season).
DID GAZPROM GREASE THE SKIDS?
4. (U) In an article entitled «Kyrgyzstan Could Deny Uzbekistan the
Status of Gas Monopolist,» which appeared on October 20 in the
Russian newspaper «Vremya Novosti,» Central Asia expert Arkady
Dubnov reported that Gazprom has signed memoranda of understanding
regarding buying controlling shares in Kyrgyzstan’s state-owned gas
company KyrgyzGaz and in Kyrgyzneftegaz.
Dubnov claimed that
Gazprom also bought up a significant amount of Uzbekistan’s natural
gas, and that Gazprom informed the Uzbeks that if they refused to
supply gas to Kyrgyzstan this winter at subsidized rates, then
Gazprom would do so using part of the gas that it had purchased from
Uzbekistan. According to Dubnov,
Gazprom’s hidden hand thus greased
the skids for the Central Asian presidents to reach the water and
energy agreement for the winter.
5. (SBU) COMMENT: In the past,
various factors inhibited water and
energy cooperation, causing the countries to negotiate annual
bilateral deals. The interests of
the upstream countries
(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in using water for electricity
generation have clashed with the interests of the downstream
countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) in using water for crop
irrigation. Additionally,
Uzbekistan has held out from cooperating
because of disputes with Kyrgyzstan over the status of the Amu-Darya
and Naryn rivers, and has retained ambitions to remain the monopoly
supplier of electricity in the region.
If implemented, this
agreement will represent an important step forward on water and
energy cooperation in Central Asia, even if Gazprom/Kremlin Inc.
banged the table to make it happen.
END COMMENT.
ASTANA 00002156 002 OF 002
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 176433
date: 11/3/2008 11:05
refid: 08DUSHANBE1364
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0020
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1364 3081105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031105Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0025
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0239
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001364
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
DEA HQS FOR OTP/WELCOME, JAMES
DEA HQS FOR FNO/BALAS
DEA HQS FOR OI, OID, OIE/BROWNING
DEA HQS FOR OE/HARRIGAN, SHROYER, GIUFFRE
DEA HQS FOR OGE/SCHRETTNER, MENDOSA, MONACO, VASQUEZ
DEA HQS FOR NIR, NIRE/ARREDONDO/HAGY, SPENCER-HARRELL
DEA HQS FOR NTR, NTRE
DEA HQS FOR OSE/LENARTOWICZ, ERDHAL
DEA HQS FOR SARI
ANKARA FOR DEA RD DESTITO
ISLAMABAD FOR DEA ARD DUDLEY, A/ARD CORTINOVIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: DEAX
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR $1,750 IN
DFAS FUNDING FROM OPERATION ALL
INCLUSIVE TO SUPPORT TDY PERSONNEL IN ASHGABAT, TURKMENISTAN AND
DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN.
CCX: GFAN-05-8004/SEO560
OPERATION ALL INCLUSIVE
THIS CABLE CONTAINS AN ACTION REQUEST FOR OTP
SYNOPSIS
1. (SBU) The Dushanbe Country Office (DCO) requests funding from
Operation All Inclusive to support TDY Special Agents who will be
assisting the DCO in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan and Dushanbe,
Tajikistan.
2. (SBU) The requested funds are further described as being utilized
in support of TDY personnel related to operations along the Northern
Route in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan and Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
3. (SBU) Funds requested are as follows:
TDY travel expense for SA Vladimir Trynkin to attend the DoS
Security Overseas Seminar in Arlington, VA on November 17 and 18,
2008.
Transportation of TDY personnel — $1,750
Total request — $1,750
4. (SBU) This cable was prepared by A/CA Paul S. Hackett. Please
direct any questions to A/CA Hackett at +992-37-229-2807. Please not
that Dushanbe is 10 hours ahead of Eastern Standard Time.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 176445
date: 11/3/2008 11:44
refid: 08DUSHANBE1370
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO1595
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1370/01 3081144
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031144Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1105
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0282
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001370
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ECON, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: ANNUAL ENERGY CRISIS COULD BE EVEN MORE
DISASTROUS THAN LAST WINTER
1. (SBU) Summary. On November 1,
Tajikistan began receiving energy
from Turkmenistan as part of an agreement to import 1.2 billion
kilowatt-hours this winter. A
separate arrangement to import 600
million kWh from Uzbekistan is still some distance from being
realized. The Turkmenistan deal,
which had been held up several
times this fall because of Uzbekistan’s reluctance to allow the
power to be transported along its electricity grid, will be
essential to helping Tajikistan get through the winter. But it will
not be enough. With record-low
water levels at the Nurek
Hydroelectric Station, which generates 75% of Tajikistan’s domestic
power, some worry that the country may be facing a repeat of last
winter’s energy crisis. Rising
fuel costs will exacerbate the
problems. End summary.
Turkmenistan Has the Electricity but Uzbekistan Wields the Power
2. (U) The Tajik media reported that on November 1, Tajikistan began
receiving much-needed supplies of power from Turkmenistan.
According to an agreement signed between the two countries in 2007,
Ashgabat will provide Tajikistan
