Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 172394
date: 10/3/2008 6:34
refid: 08DUSHANBE1256
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
R 030634Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1024
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001256
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, G/TIP HALL, DRL/ILCSR HAILEY
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, EAGR, ELAB, TI
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TAJIKISTAN’S COTTON SECTOR
1. (U) Summary: During a recent visit to Sughd region emboff and
visiting G/TIP Officer explored trafficking issues and assessed
allegations that students were forced by government authorities to
pick cotton, despite a presidential decree prohibiting the practice.
Emboff and G/TIP Officer found
evidence of forced and child labor
in the cotton industry that contradicted the government’s position.
End summary.
2. (U) The cotton harvest in Tajikistan began about September 15,
and it will last approximately 70 days.
Emboff and G/TIP Officer
Megan Hall visited Sughd, a major cotton producing region, September
25-26.
3. (U) During the Soviet period, the government viewed cotton as a
strategic economic interest of the state. Students and government
workers throughout the country participated in the cotton harvest,
and many considered participation a patriotic duty. Students viewed
this time as a way to bond with classmates, in addition to
performing their civic duty. This
tradition continues in
Tajikistan, but the circumstances have changed significantly.
4. (U) The Tajik government has set a fixed price to purchase cotton
from farmers, which it then sells on the international market. This
fixed price is well below market value, making it difficult for
farmers to pay workers to pick cotton.
Accordingly, farmers turn to
local officials to mobilize labor, which inevitably leads to local
officials compelling people to participate in the cotton campaign at
untenably low wages or often no wage at all.
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS — FORCED LABOR
5. (U) In Sughd, Students in the first through third years of
university — ages 18 to 21 — have been forced to pick cotton for
this year’s harvest. David
Holzmeyer, an Amcit English Teaching
Fellow at Khujand State University, described to emboff how on
September 17 a university administrator told him to announce to his
students that the next day they would be taken out to the fields to
pick cotton. University
administrators and professors oversaw the
organization and transportation of students, and professors
accompanied the students to oversee the cotton picking. The
students were not given a choice about participating; classes for
first through third year students were cancelled. Several students
tried to «buy their way out» — either by bribing a university
official or a medical board examiner.
6. (SBU) Emboff spoke to three of Holzmeyer’s students (all in their
third year) who had participated in prior years. The students said
they wanted to stay in school and concentrate on their studies. Two
of the students bribed officials to avoid participating this year;
the third simply refused to go with her classmates. She said she
was concerned that the dean of the university would see her in town
during the harvest and would confront her; she was afraid she could
be expelled for refusing to pick cotton.
7. According to the students, while working in the fields, they
lived in run down shacks.
Conditions were generally deplorable, but
varied by farm and supervisor: working hours were 6 a.m. to 7 p.m.;
the drinking water was dirty; students were punished if they did not
meet quotas; some had to pay to take a shower. Students had to pay
for their food, and wages were extremely low; they essentially broke
even by the time the campaign was over.
Visits home were limited to
once a week, and students usually asked family members to bring them
changes of clothes or extra food.
Qchanges of clothes or extra food.
8. (SBU) University officials forced many students to sign
«applications» so that they could later claim that the
students were
voluntarily picking cotton. Those
who avoided going to the fields
were required to perform janitorial services at the university for
the duration. Those who avoided
service altogether were punished —
either with expulsion or with poor grades. University officials
notified military officials of male students who had been expelled,
so that the military could conscript them immediately.
9. (SBU) Holzmeyer and his students said that this set of
circumstances applied to most first to third year university
students in Khujand’s universities.
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS — CHILD LABOR
10. (SBU) Holzmeyer’s students said that secondary school students
in grades 8 to 11 (ages 14 to 17) also participated in the harvest.
Teachers gathered the students after classes and took them to work
in the fields for several hours during the day. The students then
returned home by bus. It was
unclear whether they were compelled in
the same manner as university students, and unknown whether there
was punishment for refusal to participate. This practice appeared
to be more prevalent in rural communities, rather than in the
region’s cities.
11. (SBU) While traveling in the area, EmbOffs came upon a group of
secondary school students picking cotton near Konibodom. A teacher
from the school had driven the students to the field in a bus; he
and a local farmer were relaxing in the bus while about 20 students
were hard at work in the hot afternoon sun. The teacher said that
the students were in grades 8-11, and that they were being
supervised by other teachers. The
farmer said that he had asked
local officials to send out some laborers to help him with his
crops; he said he paid the students for their work.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES — UNKNOWN
12. (SBU) Our contacts informed us that employees of some government
institutions were compelled to pick cotton. These employees
continued to draw their official salaries, but went to the cotton
fields instead of to work as usual.
Military conscripts also
harvested cotton. We did not have
a chance to corroborate these
allegations.
SEEING IS BELIEVING
13. (SBU) Comment: The official government line on this issue is
that no one picks cotton campaign against their will, and that
government officials are not involved in labor violations.
President Rahmon and the Minister of Education have issued a decree
to this effect. Our observations,
as well as numerous published
reports, contradict the government’s statements. Government
officials force university students to pick cotton under conditions
that satisfy the definition of trafficking in persons for labor
exploitation. At the very least,
local officials are complicit in
illegal child labor; further investigation is warranted, however,
there is strong evidence that the authorities are complicit in
forced labor trafficking of both children and adults. While we have
not had the chance to explore these issues in the south of the
country, it is likely — based in part on publicly available reports
— that the same situation exists in Khatlon Province.
14. (SBU) Comment continued: We will be reporting our findings to
the authorities, including the Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial
Commission to Fight Trafficking in Persons. A Tajik labor official
recently admitted to us that the government has not seriously
investigated claims of human rights violations in the cotton
industry by, for example, carrying out labor inspections.
Government attempts to deny involvement in labor violations and
trafficking are superficial; there are significant problems that the
government must address. End
comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 172592
date: 10/6/2008 2:57
refid: 08DUSHANBE1267
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8832
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1267/01 2800257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060257Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1030
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0225
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0262
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0177
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001267
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PHUM, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — FOOD SECURITY TAKES CENTER STAGE
1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified. Please protect
accordingly.
2. (SBU) Summary: Food security in Tajikistan likely will continue
to decline, and the inability of many Tajiks to buy sufficient food
likely will worsen in the coming winter.
President Rahmon is
calling for more food aid, and decrying the high price of food
worldwide and its impact on highly food-insecure and
import-dependent Tajikistan. The
Government is not coordinating
effectively with the donor community on strengthening food security,
however, and the President continues to pursue policies that prevent
increased food production in Tajikistan.
End Summary.
3. (U) President Rahmon has begun to call attention to the looming
food crisis in Tajikistan. In his
remarks at the UN General
Assembly he noted that food insecurity had «seriously
affected» two
thirds of families in Tajikistan.
He predicted the upcoming winter
in Tajikistan would be more difficult than the past severe winter.
Rahmon blamed climate change (for reducing water supplies and
agricultural output) and world food prices, for the inability of
many rural Tajiks to buy sufficient food.
4. (SBU) USAID partners and the World Food Program report that food
insecurity — the inability of Tajiks to afford to feed themselves
properly — this coming winter will be worse than last winter. World
Food Program surveys throughout Tajikistan found that 37 percent of
urban Tajiks and 34 percent of rural Tajiks were food-insecure.
About one-third of the rural food-insecure, and two-fifths of the
urban food-insecure are in the category of severely food-insecure,
unable to afford to feed themselves on a basic food basket of wheat,
oil, and sugar.
5. (SBU) Three main factors contribute to the worsening
food-security situation. First,
despite pronouncement to the
contrary, the Government in many regions discourages crop
diversification away from cotton.
Farmers forced to grow cotton are
driven further into debt by the artificially low prices they are
forced to accept for their cotton, in order that cotton investors
continue to reap profits. With
low incomes and no options to
diversify, farmers must sell what assets they have to buy food, in a
downward financial spiral of increasing debt and hunger. Second,
Tajikistan is highly vulnerable to increasing world food prices and
energy, because of its dependence on food imports. Food prices in
Tajikistan have doubled since late 2007.
DROUGHT AND A HANGOVER FROM LAST WINTER
6. (SBU) Third, last winter was unusually cold, with significant
power disruptions throughout the country, and was then followed by a
severe drought. Precipitation
levels in 2008 are less than half
their historic average throughout the country. Crops were damaged
by the weather, and overall food security declined. Food-insecure
Tajiks are going into this coming winter in a weaker financial
state, with more debt and fewer assets to sell to buy food.
Increasing unemployment has made lower-income Tajiks more dependent
on remittances and assistance from family members in Russia or on
the generosity of neighbors.
LACK OF COORDINATION
7. (SBU) The World Food Program (WFP) chairs a Food Security Working
Group combining most international donors, with the Government of
Tajikistan invited. Emboff met
with WFP’s food security specialist,
Cedric Charpentier (protect). He
said the Government of Tajikistan
rarely sent a representative to the Food Security Group, which meets
Qrarely sent a representative to the Food Security Group, which meets
twice a month. WFP reported
information on food security and donor
activities to the Ministry of Trade and Economy (which is charged
with coordinating GOTI efforts to mitigate winter food and energy
shortages), but received no information in return that would allow
it to judge whether donor activity was coordinated with Government
relief efforts.
LACK OF TRUST
8. (SBU) Charpentier also questioned food security survey
information from the Government.
He noted that in the past,
Government food production figures simply echoed the Government’s
own public production targets, and bore little relation to reality.
USAID partner Mercy Corps’ Director Brandy Westerman (protect) and
WFP’s Charpentier both commented that they could not get any sense
of the extent of GOTI food and fuel relief efforts during the
unusually harsh past winter, making them skeptical of Government
claims to be prepared for the coming winter.
9. (SBU) For the Government view, Emboff met with Minister of
Economy and Trade Bobozoda, on September 30. He said the GOTI was
DUSHANBE 00001267 002 OF 002
stockpiling wheat flour and fuel, and was ensuring that local
governments around the country had stockpiled coal to heat hospitals
and schools. He said the GOTI had
successfully distributed
generators and other relief supplies donated by foreign countries
last winter. Bobozoda said he
wanted to see better coordination
between the Government and foreign donors and NGOs, and worried that
certain NGOs focused too much on specific regions to the detriment
of overall relief efforts.
10. (SBU) The Embassy, like WFP, is skeptical of Government claims
on its preparations for the winter, because of lack of specifics,
lack of observed results last winter, and deceptive information
about related measures to help farmers.
As noted in other
reporting, official claims about freedom to farm consistently are
contradicted at the local level, where coercion to farm cotton
remains a firmly entrenched practice.
When USAID representatives
met with farmers in Shartuz district recently, the farmers
complained that they were required to devote 75% of their land to
cotton, could not find markets for food crops (they noted that food
processing industries existed in the region during the Soviet Union,
but they had fallen into disrepair and no longer functioned), and
were worried about being able to afford food in the coming winter.
A local government representative at the meeting dismissed their
worries; the farmers in turn dismissed his assurances, noting that
the local government was preventing cotton farmers from removing
cotton stalks to plant winter wheat, in hopes of squeezing a little
more out of this year’s cotton crop.
COMMENT — BLAMING EVERYONE BUT HIMSELF
11. (SBU) Rahmon used his UNGA speech and various meetings with
foreign officials to draw attention to Tajikistan’s need for food
assistance, and this effort is welcome in so far as it helps focus
attention on the country’s serious and worsening economic problems.
But it does not represent a major departure from the GOTI’s usual
state of denial; Rahmon blamed the food security crisis on the
weather and on world prices, with no acknowledgement of his own
culpability in slowing land reform and perpetuating cotton
monoculture to benefit a few friends — while a large part of the
population literally goes hungry.
The most imaginative thing Rahmon
has done in response to increasing hunger has been to dispatch gifts
of food to 3,000 needy families, identified by local authorities.
12. (SBU) Increasing food insecurity has not reached the point where
rural Tajiks are fleeing their homes in search of food, but it has
gotten the attention of the President as an issue which could be
used against him, and therefore a threat to his grip on power.
Tajikistan will need significant international relief efforts this
coming winter, and continued long term assistance to build its
agricultural capacity and reform its agricultural and trade
policies.
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 172597
date: 10/6/2008 4:10
refid: 08DUSHANBE1268
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08STATE105173
header:
R 060410Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1032
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KABUL
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001268
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, ISN/RA NEPHEW
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MNUC, KNNP, IR, PARM, TI
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON IMPLEMENTING UN SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN
REF: STATE 105173
1. (SBU) On October 3, PolOff delivered reftel demarche on
implementing UN Security Council resolutions on Iran to Khusrav
Noziri, the Head of the Europe and Americas Department of the Tajik
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We
did not receive a substantive
response, but Noziri said he would pass the documents we provided to
his superiors.
2. (U) Point of contact on this issue is Greg Naarden,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 172629
date: 10/6/2008 9:14
refid: 08DUSHANBE1269
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE1131|08STATE105455
header:
R 060914Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
INFO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY ASTANA
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
SECSTATE WASHDC 1033
DIA WASHDC 0085
DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001269
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5, SOCCENT FOR J33, DIA FOR DHO-2, STATE FOR SCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV, MAS, OVIP, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DUSHANBE REQUEST FOR FY09
USCENTCOM/SOCCENT COUNTER NARCO TERRORISM TRAINING EVENTS
REF: A. SECDEF-APPROVED FY2009 GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT
ALLOCATION PLAN
(GFMAP)/CJCS/151900Z MAY
2008
B. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS)
INSTRUCTIONS
3710.01/28MAY93 FOR
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
FOR APPROVING
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO
DRUG AND/OR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND
COUNTER-DRUG
RELATED DEPLOYMENT OF US
DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE (DOD) PERSONNEL
C. 08 DUSHANBE 1131 (DTG
101115Z SEP 08)
D. 08 STATE 105455 (DTG
021659Z OCT 08)
Classified By: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Dushanbe,
STATE;
REASON: 1.4 (a) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. In accordance with REFs A and B, this
message is an Embassy Dushanbe request for FY09 DOD
operational support under 1004, National Defense
Authorization Act 1991, as amended for development of Counter
Narco Terrorism (CNT) training deployments with the National
Guard Special Forces (SF) Battalion, the Border Guard SF
Battalion/Separate Group for Special Reconnaissance, and the
Ministry of Interior Special Purpose Police Squad (OMON).
Post requests four CNT events for FY 2009, as sourced in the
past two years.
2. (U) U.S. agency requesting CNT events. This request has
been approved by the Ambassador,
Embassy Dushanbe, and is
made through the Embassy Dushanbe, Acting Drug Enforcement
Agency Country Officer (DEA CO), Mr. Paul Hackett.
3. (C) Partner Nation (PN) organizations requesting these
events. GEN-MAJ Rajabali Rahmonali, Commander of the Tajik
National Guard, GEN-MAJ Sherali Mirzo, Commander of the
Border Guards, and Tajik Interior Minister Solehov have
requested that their SF battalions/OMON receive the proposed
training.
Justification for the CNT Training
———————————-
4. (C) Narcotics, ultimately destined for the U.S. and other
international markets are transshipped from Afghanistan
through Tajikistan. Embassy
Dushanbe reporting concerning
transit/trafficking activity in Central and South Asia
indicates that past and current levels of narcotics
trafficking activity in Tajikistan are significant and are
likely to increase in conjunction with this year,s poppy
harvest in Afghanistan. Due to
persistent security incidents
and the lack of coordinated efforts, as of July 2008, the
poppy eradication campaign in Afghanistan was relatively
ineffective, and cultivation levels for the year are expected
to increase. The funds generated
from the sale of narcotics
are used to support terrorist activity and organized crime,
and the trafficking of drugs through Tajikistan fosters
corruption, violent crime, AIDS, and economic distortions,
all of which are destabilizing factors in the USCENTCOM area
of responsibility.
5. (C) The Tajik National Guard and Border Guards Special
Forces battalions, and the Ministry of Interior OMON
detachment, among other agencies, are the primary Counter
Narco Terrorist (CNT) special operations capable forces in
Tajikistan. The continuation of the CENTCOM, SOCCENT, and
QEmbassy Dushanbe CNT training program, as part of the overall
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) strategy and program for
Tajikistan, would expand and increase the development of a
strong combined and unified U.S./Tajik effort in disrupting
the escalation of illegal narcotics smuggled through Central
Asia and in denying insurgents and terrorists access to a
critical funding source for continued terrorist and insurgent
operations in Tajikistan and the region.
6. (C) A tactical CNT program promotes greater regional
stability, decreases the amount of illegal narcotics
transiting through Tajikistan and Central Asia to
international markets in the Russia, Europe and the United
States and is an indirect approach for defeating
international terrorism and insurgents that threaten the
stability of Tajikistan and the region. In the post 9/11
environment, a Tajik CNT capability has become more critical
in combating terrorist/narcotic activity and supports
USCENTCOM theater objectives for security cooperation and
both CENTCOM,s and the U.S. Special Operations Command,s
(USSOCCOM) regional and global war on terrorism.
7. (C) Critical training tasks that the Tajik National Guard,
Border Guards, and OMON squads have requested include the
following: staff organization and planning, orders
production, mission analysis and the military decision making
process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB),
direct action (raids and ambushes), special reconnaissance,
close quarters combat/battle (CQC/B), sniper/observe
operations, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT),
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), Sensitive Site
Exploitation (SSE), tactical communications and basic combat
life saving.
8. (C) Embassy Dushanbe requests that pre-deployment site
surveys (PDSS) and/or assessments be scheduled for all
events. The National Guard and Border Guard SF Battalions and
the MOI OMON have requested detailed training schedules and
programs of instruction (POI) be provided following each
PDSS. Training will be conducted
at the Fakhrabad, Lahur,
and Karatag training areas in Tajikistan. Other training
locations within Tajikistan may be designated by the host
nation.
Rules of Engagement
——————-
10. (C) CJCS standing Rules of Engagement (ROE) are in
effect. Deploying forces will not under any circumstances
accompany U.S. DEA or PN counter-parts on actual CNT field
operations or participate in any activity in which
hostilities are imminent. Embassy Dushanbe Country Team
further understands that units and individuals deployed
outside the United States, its territories and possessions
will deploy with assigned weapons and ammunition, whenever
possible. When carrying weapons is not required in country,
the weapons will be stored in a secure location which
provides reasonable access. Any
change in carry condition
will be coordinated with the RSO. Diplomatic plated vehicles
will be used for transport of all weapons to and from
training locations.
11. (C) Justification. US SOF units and individuals must be
capable of providing their own force protection when forward
deployed in all threat environments. Embassy Dushanbe
Regional Security Officer (RSO), Mr. Seth Green, is the
coordinating official for all weapons, ammunition and other
sensitive items issues. Mr. Green can be contacted at the
Embassy Dushanbe at comm: 992 37 229 2901 or 992 90 700 0911
or by unclass email at [email protected] or class email at
[email protected].
Human Rights Verification
—————————
12. REFTEL C is Embassy Dushanbe,s Leahy Human Rights
Vetting Requests for the National Guard and Border Guards SF
QVetting Requests for the National Guard and Border Guards SF
Battalions and for the MOI,s OMON.
REFTEL D is the
response to this request, stating that the Department of
State possesses no credible information of gross violations
of human rights by the identified units and commanders.
Points of Contact for Training
——————————
13. Defense and Army Attache,
Embassy Dushanbe, LTC Daniel
R. Green is responsible for assisting the CNT team with
issues while they are in Tajikistan.
DEA Dushanbe Country
Officer, Acting Country Attache Paul Hackett will be kept
informed of any issues should they arise.
14. (U) Any questions concerning
this message or CNT
training should be directed to the Defense Attache, LTC
Daniel Green, at 992-37-229-2701 or 992-90-700-7030 or the
DEA Acting Country Attache, Paul Hackett, at 992 37 224 2807
or 992 90 700 7095.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 173550
date: 10/14/2008 5:21
refid: 08KABUL2764
origin: Embassy Kabul
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO4828
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2764 2880521
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140521Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5838
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0302
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS KABUL 002764
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
STOCKHOLM FOR POL
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ETRD, EFIN, AF, TI
SUBJECT: BALKH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL
CHAIRMAN FRUSTRATED WITH SWEDISH
PRT CONTRIBUTIONS
1. (SBU) Summary: The Balkh
Provincial Council chairman recently
voiced his displeasure to Swedish PRT officials about Swedish
development efforts and asked them for visible reconstruction
projects. He repeated a message
first uttered by Balkh Governor
Atta that Sweden should pack up and leave PRT Mazar-e Sharif if it
is unwilling to contribute to infrastructure development. Sweden’s
plan to boost the level of its development assistance to Afghanistan
by approximately USD 14 million is unlikely to mute the criticism
its PRT is receiving from the Balkh government and the general
public. End Summary.
2. (SBU) During an October 5 meeting with the Swedish PRT commanding
officer and Swedish development and political advisors, Balkh
Provincial Council Chairman Farhad Azimi let loose with a litany of
complaints about the Swedish PRT’s development efforts. He
described the relationship between the provincial council and the
PRT as «cold,» saying that the only times the PRT commanders
visit
the provincial council are when they first arrive in Mazar and when
they pay their farewell calls.
Azimi compared the Swedish PRT
unfavorably to other PRTs around the country, citing the lack of
infrastructure reconstruction projects in Balkh and discounting the
impact of Swedish-funded, small scale training programs. He
referred to the letter Governor Atta sent to UNAMA last July in
which Atta asked UNAMA to ask ISAF to replace Sweden with another
lead country for PRT Mazar. Nor
did Azimi spare criticism for the
Swedish media, who he claimed never bothered to meet provincial
council members or ordinary people during visits to the PRT and thus
only heard positive accounts of the PRT’s work instead of hearing
how Balkh residents view the PRT’s contributions.
3. (SBU) Sweden plans to increase its development assistance to
Afghanistan by 100,000,000 Swedish kronars (approximately USD 14.3
million), for a total of roughly 74 Million USD. Currently Sweden
channels about 80 percent of its Afghanistan development assistance
through the central government in Kabul while 20 percent (roughly
USD 12 million) of the total is directed at the four provinces that
the Swedish-led PRT covers (Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, and
Sar-e-pol). Even with the funding
increase, the amount of
development assistance each of these 4 provinces will receive is
unlikely to satisfy critics within their provincial governments.
4. (SBU) COMMENT: Sweden has been battling the image of a «do
nothing» PRT and not doing a very good job at it. Azimi is echoing
the views of Governor Atta, but those two men are not alone in
expressing frustration with the PRT.
The governors of Jowzjan,
Samangan, and Sar-e-pol and religious councils and village elders in
those provinces have also lobbed similar criticisms at the PRT at
different times. Sweden has
funded some infrastructure projects,
such as road construction in Samangan and a few bridges in
Sar-e-pol, but has done nothing of that sort in Balkh where
criticism of its efforts is loudest.
Sweden’s most pressing
development focus should be on building and maintaining relationship
«bridges» to win over outspoken critics like Azimi and Atta.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 173862
date: 10/15/2008 17:22
refid: 08PARIS1893
origin: Embassy Paris
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0695
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0282
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001893
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: PREL, AF, FR, UZ, TI, TX, IR, PK
SUBJECT: FRANCE PROPOSES INFORMAL MEETING OF AFGHANISTAN’S
NEIGHBORS FOR END NOVEMBER
REF: A. PARIS POINTS FOR SEPTEMBER 23
B. 2008
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathleen Allegrone for
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is an action request,
see paragraph 7.
2. (C) Summary. On October 15, Pol M/C met with Philippe
Errera, Strategic Affairs advisor to FM Kouchner, to discuss
the French proposal for a meeting to discuss regional
cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbors. Errera apologized
that the initiative was publicized in the French press before
GOF officials were able to consult Kabul and key allies. He
assured us that Paris was not/not proposing creation of a new
international forum, but rather a one-time informal meeting
to address regional issues such as counternarcotics,
counterinsurgency, infrastructure and energy and regional
trade. The idea originated in
some of the bilateral meetings
that France hosted during the EU-Central Asia forum in
September and the GOF would welcome our input on format,
themes, outcomes and participants, although they have
sketched out some preliminary suggestions, noted in further
detail below. End summary.
—————————-
CONTEXT
—————————-
3. (C) Errera noted that all countries interested in
Afghanistan have put forward the idea of improving regional
cooperation as one way to further political and economic
development. He emphasized that
this element was also
included in the Bucharest NATO summit’s conclusions earlier
this year. He clarified that the
GOF had no/no intention of
creating a new international forum on Afghanistan, but merely
to host a one-time informal discussion to draw attention to
practical regional proposals. The
initiative is also an
effort to demonstrate to the European audience (and French
public) that efforts are being made to address the broader
strategy of political and economic development, as well as to
improve security via an augmented military operation. This
was an important element in France’s recent parliamentary
debate to reauthorize deployment of French troops in
Afghanistan (ref a). Errera
regretted that the initiative
was publicized in the French press before the GOF had an
opportunity to consult with Kabul and key allies, noting
ruefully that he himself learned of the proposal in the press
as it had not been vetted within the French bureaucracy
before the announcement appeared.
Errera has since traveled
to London to brief UK allies, and noted that the French
embassies in Washington and Kabul had provided additional
information to key interlocutors yesterday in their
respective cities.
——————————
SUGGESTED THEMES/PARTICIPANTS
——————————
4. (C) Errera stated that the GOF
would be happy to work
with us to identify common challenges that could be addressed
in this type of informal meeting.
Paris was considering
counternarcotics, counter-insurgency efforts, infrastructure,
energy and regional trade (the latter suggested by the UK) as
possible themes for the meeting.
He emphasized that the
meeting would not/not address the issue of reconciliation,
which is a sensitive subject that must be led by Afghanistan.
Errera informed us that there was
no intent to establish a
«Friends of Afghanistan» type of forum or to host a
full-fledged conference. Rather,
their hopes are that the
meeting would give political impetus to concrete regional
projects.
5. (C) Errera acknowledged that
there was «no good answer»
to the question of which countries should participate in the
meeting. The GOF wants to focus
on countries that share a
common border with Afghanistan, namely: Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and possibly China. Errera
said that the question of Chinese participation was an open
one, noting that the Chinese had «torpedoed» the «Friends
of
Pakistan» meeting on the margins of the UNGA; however, it was
better to invite them than not.
He speculated that it may be
best to have the meeting take place under the auspices of the
UN and the P5, so they could include countries such as the
U.S. and U.K. which have huge stakes in the region, but would
not open the meeting to all interested non-neighbors.
Responding to our question, he said the French share a
concern about inviting Iran at a time when we are also
isolating Iran for its failure to cooperate on the nuclear
issue, but believe it best to include them, in part because
the Afghans would insist and in part because it would show
them what they are missing by pursuing the nuclear path. The
French would host the meeting in their capacity as President
of the EU and would therefore want to include the European
Commission. The GOF would also
like to invite UN Special
Representative Kai Eide. The
meeting would take place at the
FM’s residence in St. Cloud, with mid- to late-November as
the likely time frame.
—————————-
POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
—————————-
6. (C) Errera said that the GOF did not anticipate
formal
conclusions at the end of the meeting; however, they were
open to issuing a Chairman’s statement or summary, or
reaching agreement on some key points (either publicly or
privately). He reiterated that
there was no/no long term
plan for follow-on meetings; the goal is merely to provide a
useful stepping stone to further regional cooperation.
Errera concluded the meeting by expressing strong interest in
USG views and input.
7. (C) Comment and action
request. After a public launch
that caught everyone (including France’s own bureaucracy) by
surprise, the MFA has made an effort to respond to our
concerns and requests for further information. We emphasized
that Washington’s initial and informal reaction had not been
favorable, noted that the reaction of the government of
Afghanistan would be a critical element to this proposal and
promised to pass the above readout to Washington as soon as
possible. Given the short time
frame that the GOF is
proposing to organize such a meeting, our opportunity to
approve, reject or help shape this proposal is limited and
post would appreciate guidance soonest to respond to the
above points. End Comment.
STAPLETON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 173981
date: 10/16/2008 12:08
refid: 08DUSHANBE1316
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE875|08DUSHANBE998
header:
VZCZCXRO7652
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1316/01 2901208
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161208Z OCT 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1050
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RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
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RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 001316
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN (HUSHEK)
STATE FOR INL/AAE (BUHLER)
JUSTICE (DUCOT AND NEWCOMBE)
DEFENSE FOR OSP/P
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, KCRM, KJUS, PGOV, PREL, CH, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: END-OF-FISCAL
YEAR PROJECT STATUS REPORT
REF: A) DUSHANBE 875 B) DUSHANBE 998
1. (U) Summary: At the end of
August, Ambassador Jacobson and
Foreign Minister Zarif signed two letters of agreement
totaling over $13 million to continue INL border security,
policing, and anti-crime programs and to initiate projects in
the justice sector. INL Dushanbe
provides the following end-
of-fiscal year project status report for new and existing
projects.
—————
BORDER SECURITY
—————
2. (U) INL is implementing seven construction and institution
building projects to improve border guard infrastructure and
technical capacity to control Tajikistan’s borders and
interdict drugs, terrorists, and weapons. The Ambassador and
Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the seventh and eighth
Amended Letters of Agreement (ALOA) at the end of August.
This provided over $13 million in funding for INL operations
and projects.
Border Guard Academy
3. (U) ALOA 7 provides the $1,200,000 balance of funding
necessary to move this $2 million project toward tender
competition and award. Worldwide
price increases in
construction costs over the last six months required
elimination or reduction in certain projects elements
including fewer garages, no perimeter wall, and gravel rather
than asphalt for the parade ground.
INL Dushanbe is waiting
on the Border Guards to provide an official letter agreeing to
the reduced project scope. Upon
receipt, Scope of Work
document will be forwarded to RPSO Frankfurt to start the
tender competition.
Khirmanjo Border Observation Post
4. (U) Using funding from ALOA 7 INL Dushanbe is re-competing
the renovation contract for the Border Guard observation and
control post at Khirmanjo. After
extensive consultations with
INL Washington and A/OPE, the previous contract was terminated
for cause by Dushanbe GSO. As
near as we can determine the
Border Guards have imprisoned the contractor. INL Dushanbe
Construction Engineer expects to complete re-writing the scope
of work and secure Border Guard agreement by the end of
October. Upon Border Guard
agreement, INL Dushanbe will
submit a request for procurement through the INL on-line
procurement system. INL Dushanbe
Construction Engineer is
winterizing the site to protect Border Guards and families
until the new contractor can begin reconstruction.
Kulma and Kizilart Border Crossing Points
5. (U) ALOA 7 provides the necessary funding to reconstruct
Kulma (China) and Kizilart (Kyrgyz Republic) border crossing
points. INL Dushanbe conducted
assessment trips to the region
in June and September and the Ambassador wrote to the Asian
Development Bank to request coordination with the ADB’s
Customs modernization project (Reftels).
INL Dushanbe
requested interagency-coordinated preliminary sketches and
site diagrams from the Border Guards.
We will make a similar
request at an upcoming meeting with the Customs Service.
Shogun and Yol Border Observation Posts
6. (U) INL Dushanbe pledged funding from ALOA 7 and 8 for
UNODC-implemented reconstruction of Shogun and Yol border
observation posts under project E-24.
UNODC informs us they
submitted the Scope of Work for approval by UNDP in Dushanbe
after which it must be approved by UNDP New York. Expected
Qafter which it must be approved by UNDP New York. Expected
tender competition date is mid-November.
Construction
completion date, depending on weather, is projected for early
spring 2009. Shogun will be a
modular construction rather
than a renovation of existing buildings.
This is a test of
the quality and durability of the modular building concept.
The Border Guards have been displeased with the retro-fitted
container structures that EU/BOMCA provided on the Afghan
DUSHANBE 00001316 002 OF 005
border but we hope they will accept the better designed
modular building. UNODC and INL
are defining requirements for
reconstruction of the Yol border observation post with
expected tender competition at the end of 2008.
Border Guard Barracks at Murghab
7. (U) ALOA 7 and 8 provide funding for the renovation of a
Border Guard barracks building at Murghab detachment (otryad).
INL Dushanbe received floor plan sketches of the requested
design but we are waiting on as-built drawings so the INL
Construction Engineer can gauge the scope of work. The Border
Guards promised the drawings by the end of October.
———————
Intelligence Capacity
———————
8. (U) Committee for National Security Analytical Center
Using funding provided under ALOA 6, INL Dushanbe agreed to
extend the construction completion deadline for the Analytical
Center on the 5th floor of the KNB Academy through the end of
November because of a recent presidential decree on heating of
government office buildings. The
original design was to
install split-pack heat/AC units in each room of the center.
Given the vagaries of the electrical grid in Dushanbe the INL
Officer requested a re-evaluation of heating the center with a
view to reducing electrical consumption and overloading the
split-pack units. After review,
the INL and KNB Construction
Engineers decided to rehabilitate the radiator and piping
system of the building so it could draw heat from the city’s
central heating system and not depend entirely on split-pack
units. INL Dushanbe is currently
scheduling a ribbon-cutting
for December.
Joint Field Intelligence Center
9. (U) ALOA 8 provides funding to establish and build a joint
field intelligence center and in September and October INL
Dushanbe conducted extensive consultations to secure
interagency agreement for the center.
Next step is for First
Deputy of the KNB General Gafarov to provide a promised
written recommendation regarding the composition, size, and
location of the center. INL
Dushanbe sustains ongoing
consultations with law enforcement and security service
agencies.
POLICING
Ministry of Internal Affairs Academy Reconstruction
10. (U) Using funding provided under ALOA 6, INL Dushanbe
drafted a Scope of Work to renovate the first and second
floors of the MVD Academy. The
MVD had agreed to the
renovation work described in the SOW and it has been submitted
to INL Washington via the INL on-line procurement system.
MVD Academy Reform
11. (U) INL is continuing a MVD Academy reform project. The
project is to work with the Academy leadership to redesign and
reform of the Academy to implement a modern law enforcement
personnel training regime. This
includes providing a new
organizational structure, rewriting the curriculum, and
revising the length of study, and improving the pedagogical
methods of instruction. Current
progress has been limited due
to poor project structure and management, insufficiently
rigorous implementation, and bureaucratic intransigence in the
MVD.
Community Policing
12. (U) $450,000 for creation of a Community Policing project
has been waiting on the companion piece of funding from the
Qhas been waiting on the companion piece of funding from the
1210 process. At the end of
September S/CRS informed the
mission the funding was approved and was not redirected to
fulfill Georgia requirements. INL
Dushanbe is currently
DUSHANBE 00001316 003 OF 005
exploring implementation options by competitive award in
Washington to be overseen by an Eligible Family Member
position at post.
COUNTER-NARCOTICS
Salary Supplements
13. (U) Using funding from ALOA 7 INL Dushanbe provided almost
$2 million to the UNODC to continue the development of the
Drug Control Agency under project HO-3.
The funding provided
was restricted to supporting salaries in the Agency for the
next 18 months. Funding was
conditioned on a successful DCA
budget request where the Agency’s budget would be increased to
begin paying for salaries currently supported by project
funding. INL Dushanbe agreed with
the DCA that the required
10% (or greater) savings in U.S.-provided funding necessary
for salaries would be redirected to enhancing agent
professionalism through increased training. In early October,
President Rahmon endorsed a 35% increase in the Agency’s
budget effective January 1, 2009.
The next step is for the
Parliament (Majilis) to consider the budget and approve by
year’s end.
Language Laboratory
14. (U) As part of an INL-CENTCOM CN cooperative venture, INL
Dushanbe Construction Engineer is serving as the Contracting
Officer’s Representative for a CENTCOM-funded English language
laboratory for the Drug Control Agency.
Located in the
headquarters building, installation of the language lab will
require upgrades to the electrical supply, windows, and
heating. CENTCOM is funding the
renovation and installation
while INL is providing the project oversight.
DCA Mobile Interdiction Teams
15. (U) INL is discussing reprogramming $500,000 in funds
originally provided in ALOA 6 to implement a nationwide HF
radio system. After signing ALOA
6 in 2007 we discovered this
project was not supported by all law enforcement and security
agencies. We will encourage the
GOTI interagency to consider
a nation-wide system. While
negotiations take place, we
propose to reprogram existing funds to higher priorities that
can be implemented now and have requested CENTCOM provide
funding for the communications system when agreement is
reached. The reprogrammed funds
will be directed to creation
of a GBAO-region Mobile Interdiction Team.
16. (U) DCA General Nazarov agreed to provide a concept paper
by the middle of November to begin planning. If the GOTI,
UNODC, and INL agree to the concept paper, we would reprogram
the funds as a pledge to the UNODC as part of the HO-3
project.
17. (U) Currently INL Dushanbe is renovating and transporting
old shipping containers to remote locations in GBAO and
elsewhere so DCA Mobile Teams rotating through an area have
shelter, a place to prepare food, and a small office desk.
Currently the team members are living in tents or in the back
of small vans. Work at the border posts is jealously guarded
by the Border Guards and Customs Service who claim that the
law prevents cooperation with the DCA and MVD Committee on
Contraband (Counter-Narcotics).
Demand Reduction
18. (U) INL Dushanbe is implementing a demand reduction
program. The first project will take place at the end of
October. In this project, we are
sponsoring an essay
competition on why drugs are bad in conjunction with a karate
Qcompetition on why drugs are bad in conjunction with a karate
tournament to provide young people with a healthy lifestyle
alternative. The winners of the
essay competition will
receive small prizes and free karate lessons. The karate
tournament champions have agreed to travel to selected schools
to deliver karate demonstrations and deliver an anti-drug
message.
DUSHANBE 00001316 004 OF 005
JUSTICE SECTOR
19. (U) Using $3,076,000 in reprogrammed prior year funding,
INL Dushanbe launched inaugural justice sector projects.
ABA/ROLI and the Criminal Procedures Code
20. (U) INL Dushanbe granted funds to the American Bar
Association Rule of Law Initiative to continue to persuade the
three uncooperative defense bars in Tajikistan to unite and
become more professional to address the imbalance between
defense and prosecution in the administration of justice.
This includes creation of a legal code of ethics.
21. (U) ABA is implementing a project to coordinate an
international donor group to assist in re-drafting the
criminal procedures code. ABA has
achieved only minimal
success with this project because the Government of Tajikistan
and the Minister of Justice in particular permit only the most
limited engagement. We will
reevaluate the project at the end
of 2008 and if warranted, reprogram the money to a project
with a greater likelihood of success.
22. (U) ABA also implements a program to combat religious
extremism in the field of law.
Working through the Islamic
University, ABA is providing Muslim jurists with an overview
of secular law trying to draw parallels to sharia law and
increase mutual understanding and respect.
Access to Justice
23. (U) INL Dushanbe collected project proposals from local
NGO’s to provide increased access to justice and the legal
system for the indigent, minors, women, rural dwellers, and
abused girls/TIP victims. We
distributed the proposals to the
embassy’s Development Assistance Working Group for
review/comments and will meet in the coming weeks to complete
evaluation of the projects and move to the award stage.
Training for Attorneys and Judges and Law School Scholarships
24. (U) Originally envisioned as an INL-implemented projects,
INL Dushanbe requested that ABA/ROLI, the only available and
qualified implementer in Dushanbe, prepare project proposals
to increase the professionalism and international awareness of
attorneys and judges through a multi-year training program in
Tajikistan and the United States.
INL Dushanbe also asked ABA
to prepare a proposal for a project to provide competitive
one-year law school scholarships to the United States for
graduates of Tajikistan’s law schools.
ABA promised to
provide completed drafts by the end of October.
Ministry of Justice and the Procuracy
25. (U) A $500,000 program to provide training on
international law to Ministry of Justice lawyers, assistance
to Tajikistan’s court marshal system, improve the MOJ’s
forensics capability, and work through the Ministry of Justice
to improve defense attorney professionalism through training
with prosecutors has run ashore because of changes in
personnel at the Ministry of Justice.
26. (U) The Minister of Justice replaced his previous Deputy
Minister, Gulchehra Sharipova, with Rustam Mengliev. At an
upcoming introductory meeting, the INL officer will assess
prospects for these projects. An
alternative exists, however,
as we have received inquiries from the Presidential
Administration regarding cooperation with a to-be-established
Legislative Institute to improve the qual
