id: 167529
date: 8/27/2008 12:37
refid: 08STATE91989
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET
destination:
08ASTANA1286|08ASTANA1342|08STATE79112
header:
O 271237Z AUG 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
6838
NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
1375
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 091989
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2033
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, AF,
CH, KG, KZ, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) CANCELLATION OF
DPRK-IRAN FLIGHT: THANKING
CENTRAL ASIAN STATES FOR
THEIR COOPERATION
REF: A. STATE 79112
B. ASTANA 1286
C. ASTANA 1342
Classified By: ISN DAS Mary
Alice Hayward, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.
(S//REL Recipients) SUMMARY: On
23 July, we informed
Central Asian states of a
possible flight of proliferation
concern transiting Central
Asian airspace en route from North
Korea to Iran. Because similar flights in the past have
transported personnel and
items of proliferation concern, we
sought assistance from
countries along the flight path to
condition granting of
overflight clearance on requiring the
aircraft to land for
inspection. Our request was favorably
received, with Kazakhstan in
particular denying overflight
permission for the
flight. We understand that the flight in
question has been canceled.
2. (S//REL Recipients) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested
to approach
appropriate-level host country officials and
thank them for their
cooperation regarding this flight.
3. (S//REL Recipients) OBJECTIVES:
Post should seek to:
— Thank host government
officials for their cooperation as
PSI partners in preventing a
flight of proliferation concern
— Encourage continued
cooperation regarding such suspicious
flights in the future.
4. (S//REL Recipients) TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER:
— We would like to thank
you for your cooperation regarding
a recent Air Koryo flight of
proliferation concern that was
scheduled to transit your
airspace.
— According to our information, thanks to your
efforts the
flight had to be canceled,
and the shipment did not take
place.
— We believe that your
cooperation in this matter has led to
a successful outcome. This is exactly the type of
cooperation we seek to
foster in accordance with the
Proliferation Security
Initiative.
— We would like to ask for
your continued support regarding
flights of this nature.
— We would also like to
request any additional information
regarding actions you may
have taken concerning this flight,
as well as your policy
regarding the granting of overflight
clearance for similar
flights of proliferation concern.
— (FOR ASTANA ONLY) We will provide a response to your
inquiry regarding how other
countries in the region are
dealing with such flights as
soon as possible.
END POINTS.
5. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
is Mark
Felipe, ISN/CPI, (202)
647-5376, [email protected].
6. (U)
Please report delivery of points and any immediate
response by 8 August.
7. (U)
Washington thanks posts for assistance.
Please slug
responses for ISN, NEA, SCA,
and T.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167623
date: 8/28/2008 2:20
refid: 08DUSHANBE1107
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0185
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1107/01 2410220
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280220Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0952
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0153
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 001107
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KMDR, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: GEORGIA ON THEIR
MIND: TAJIK MEDIA REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO
ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA
1. (U) Summary: The Tajik
media, in its coverage of Russian actions
in Georgia, has mainly
copied Russian media reports, or offered
local opinion on the meaning
of the dispute for Central Asia. As
could be expected, it has
not criticized Russia, and has instead
focused heavily on the role
of the United States and multilateral
organizations such as the
Commonwealth of Independent States in the
dispute. Television news has either played down the
incident or
broadcast one-sided
reporting by Russian stations. End
summary.
2. (U) No Tajik newspaper
has a correspondent in Georgia, so all
reporting from Georgia
consisted of reprints directly from Russian
newspapers. As the conflict wore on, the spot reporting
dropped
from about 90% to 50% of
local coverage, with the rest of
Georgia-related articles
devoted to local analysis and speculation
on how the dispute would
affect Tajikistan and the region in
general.
JUST THIS SWEET OLD COLD WAR
SONG
3. (U) Newspapers relied
heavily on interviews and roundtables with
local pundits, including
members of the government. The experts
overwhelmingly cited the
United States’ influence in Georgia as a
cause of the conflict. Many
pointed to evidence of a «new cold war»
between Russia and the
United States, and cited the proposed missile
defense shield in Europe and
the expansion of NATO to include
Georgia and Ukraine as
catalysts for the conflict. One former
Radio
Free Liberty/Radio Europe
reporter wrote that the conflict was a
«dream» of the
«imperialistic» United States, but cautioned that
Russia might attack a
Central Asian country in a similar fashion.
4. (U) Russian opinion
dominated the media, particularly television
and radio, which carried statements
by Russia’s United Nations
Ambassador live. Local news continued to devote most of its
airtime
to the doings of President
Rahmon, with occasional Russian reports
from Georgia. The Tajik edition of Argumenti I Fakti
featured a
front page photo
illustration of President Sakashvilli nursing at
the breast of Condoleezza
Rice — this in a society where baring your
knees is risque.
OTHER ARMS REACH OUT TO
ME…
5. (U) On the eve of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
summit in Dushanbe, many
journalists and commentators predicted that
the Georgia situation would
change the tone of the organization’s
discussions, and some urged
SCO countries to express their support
for Russia’s actions during
the summit.
6. (U) Commentators made
much of Georgia’s withdrawal from the
Commonwealth of Independent
States, which inspired a debate as to
the organization’s
relevance. Some editorialists blamed the
Commonwealth for not
mediating the dispute earlier, but many
commentators said that this
proved its worthlessness as a mechanism
for addressing disputes
between member states. Newspapers argued
that Russia now would
pressure former CIS states to decide whether
«they are with Russia
or with the United States.»
7. (SBU) Possibly in
response to events in Georgia, the Government
of Tajikistan made a point
of showing SCO members that it had other
friends too. In the week before the summit the Government
quickly
agreed to hold two signing
ceremonies for USG grant assistance in
the areas of border security
and energy resource development. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs
personally attended one ceremony,
offering champagne (and
strong press coverage) to celebrate the
event. The other ceremony also featured television
coverage and
Ministerial attendance.
…BUT THE ROAD LEADS BACK
TO YOU
7. (U) While most reports
stopped short of expressing full support
Q7. (U) While most reports
stopped short of expressing full support
for Russia’s actions, many
commentators pointed to Tajikistan’s
historical and contemporary
ties to Russia as too important to
sacrifice in an ideological
debate. One Parliamentarian told a
reporter that former Soviet
republics should not only accept
Russia’s assistance, but
should actively promote and defend Russia’s
interests in tough
situations. Several commentators said
that
Tajikistan would face a
«choice» between Russia and the United
States, and they were
unanimous in their opinion that Russia was the
only choice.
8. (SBU) Comment: The Tajik
media interpret Georgia’s fate as a
warning to other former
Soviet states who get too close to the
United States. With the SCO summit looming over Dushanbe,
the
events in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia have inspired speculation in
the press about the
«right» path for Tajikistan and its neighbors —
that is, a path that will
appease Russia, but leave some room for
maneuver. End comment.
DUSHANBE 00001107 002 OF 002
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167629
date: 8/28/2008 5:44
refid: 08DUSHANBE1108
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08STATE91894
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1108 2410544
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 280544Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0954
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
PRIORITY 0155
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
PRIORITY 0212
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
PRIORITY 0246
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
PRIORITY 0165
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001108
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: PREL, GG, RU, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
REJECTING RUSSIAN RECOGNITION OF
SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA
AS INDEPENDENT STATES
REF: STATE 91894
Classified By: Ambassador
Tracey A. Jacobson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On August 27 Pol/Econ
Chief delivered reftel demarche
to MFA Director of North American
and European Affairs
(Assistant Secretary
equivalent) Khusrav Nosiri. Nosiri
could not offer a
substantive reply, but said he would try to
pass the substance of the
demarche to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and to President
Rahmon’s Foreign Affairs Adviser,
Erkin Rahmatulloev. Nosiri said it was difficult to contact
any senior officials because
of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) summit
currently taking place in Dushanbe.
2. (C) In an earlier meeting
Nosiri had commented that
Tajikistan was unlikely to
take any public stand on the
conflict between Russia and
Georgia. During this meeting he
commented that Russia’s
recognition of South Ossetian and
Abkhazian independence put
Tajikistan in «a difficult
position.» Nosiri said that if Tajikistan were to follow
Russia’s lead and recognize
the independence of these two
entities, «we would
have to recognize Kosovo too.»
Nosiri
claimed ignorance of whether
Russia had already requested
that Tajikistan or other
states recognize South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. When asked whether he agreed with the
assertion by
a Tajik newspaper that the
conflict in Georgia had central
Asian parallels, Nosiri
referred to Samarkand and Bukhara’s
status as «historically
Tajik» cities. But he doubted this
issue would lead to overt
conflict between Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan anytime soon.
3. (C) Comment: Several
heads of state are in Dushanbe for
the SCO summit, and some
will remain here until Friday,
August 29 (including Russian
president Medvedev, who will
have a state visit that
day). The Government’s emphasis on
lavish entertainments as a
diplomatic strategy makes it
unlikely that we will get
any high level response before the
Summit is over and the
guests depart. We would be surprised
if the Russian delegation
wasn,t pushing, as we write, for
some kind of joint statement
on Georgia and its recognition
of independence for South
Ossetia and Abkazia. It is likely
that the Central Asian
participants in the Summit will be
caught between an aggressive
Russia and a more cautious
China. We will report on any summit outcomes as soon
as they
are available. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167705
date: 8/28/2008 11:30
refid: 08DUSHANBE1109
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE1108
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1109 2411130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281130Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0955
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
PRIORITY 0156
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
PRIORITY 0213
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
PRIORITY 0247
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
PRIORITY 0166
RUEHUR/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
PRIORITY 0008
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001109
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: PREL, GG, RU, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — SCO
SUMMIT STATEMENT MENTIONS SOUTH
OSSETIA
REF: DUSHANBE 1108
Classified By: Ambassador
Tracey A. Jacobson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO)
summit has concluded with
bland statements and some confusion
about the members’ positions
on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The Summit Declaration
contradictorily endorsed Russian
peacemaking efforts in South
Ossetia, and also welcomed the
six point peace agreement
brokered by France. End Summary.
The Bland
———
2. (U) The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Summit concluded
at 1430 on August 28 with a
Soviet-style «press conference,»
at which President Rahmon
read a bland statement to the
effect that the summit was
productive, members found common
ground on a number of
issues, and cooperation in security,
economic cooperation, and
the cultural sphere was developing.
After noting that the summit had discussed the
issues of
terrorism, energy, and food
security, and that Tajikistan
called for the establishment
of an SCO anti-drug
organization, Rahmon
dismissed the media in attendance
without taking any
questions.
The Hopeful
————
3. (U) Russian President
Medvedev made several remarks about
Georgia and South Ossetia
during the open session of the
summit. In addition to condemnation of Georgian
«aggression,» he
thanked the other SCO members for what he
called their «objective
evaluation» of Russia’s activities in
South Ossetia, and said it
would achieve «international
resonance» and send a
signal to those who tried to support
aggression.
And the Confused
—————-
4. (U) The summit communiqu
expressed the members’ «deep
concern» about recent
events in South Ossetia, and urged the
parties to the conflict to
resolve it through negotiation.
The communiqu called also
said «member states of the SCO
welcome the 12 August
approval in Moscow of the six
principles to resolve the
conflict in South Ossetia, and
support the active role of Russia
in establishing peace and
cooperation in that
region.»
5. (C) Comment: We have no
word yet on what went on in the
closed-door session
preceding these remarks. In public there
was no mention of
independence for South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, but the
communiqu’s expression of support for
Russia’s role in the
conflict appears to go beyond
neutrality. We suspect that Russia pushed the Tajiks and
their Central Asian friends
a little further than they were
planning to go. August 29 will be Medvedev’s official visit
in Dushanbe, and we await
further words from him and Tajik
leaders on this
subject. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 167888
date: 8/29/2008 12:06
refid: 08DUSHANBE1118
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1118 2421206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291206Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0961
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY
ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0072
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA
PRIORITY 0081
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
PRIORITY 0157
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
PRIORITY 0077
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
PRIORITY 0250
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
PRIORITY 0072
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
0148
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
0068
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001118
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2033
TAGS: PARM, KNNP, PREL,
MNUC, IR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
CANCELLATION OF DPRK-IRAN FLIGHT
REF: 91989
Classified By: DCM Necia
Quast, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S) On August 28th, Post
delivered reftel Diplomatic Note
to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Because of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
summit, no reply was available.
Post will submit any
substantive response separately.
2. (U) Point of contact for
this issue is Political Officer
Wil Von Zagorski,
[email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 168092
date: 9/2/2008 11:46
refid: 08DUSHANBE1121
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08STATE93357
header:
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1121 2461146
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021146Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 0964
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY
ASHGABAT 0073
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0082
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
0078
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0050
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
0073
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
0001
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
0002
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001121
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
AND EUR/RUS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, TI, RS, GG
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — CSTO
MEETING AND POSSIBLE RECOGNITION
OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND
ABKHAZIA
REF: STATE 93357
1. (C) Acting DCM delivered
reftel demarche to Khusrav
Nosiri, Director of North
American and European Affairs
(Assistant Secretary
equivalent) on September 1. Nosiri said
he would pass the demarche
to his superiors, and commented
that Tajikistan would likely
maintain its current policy of
non-recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.
2. (C) Comment: In public
remarks following the August 29
Rahmon-Medvedev bilateral
meeting in Dushanbe President
Rahmon referred to the
events in the Caucasus, saying that he
preferred to see
«political-diplomatic» methods used to
resolve conflicts. He said nothing about the question of the
independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. We do not see
signs that Tajikistan will
depart from its current position.
Post will report any
substantive reaction to this demarche
septel. End Comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 168261
date: 9/3/2008 11:01
refid: 08ASTANA1648
origin: Embassy Astana
classification: SECRET
destination:
08ASTANA1286|08ASTANA1342|08STATE79112|08STATE91989
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTA #1648 2471101
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 031101Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3170
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T ASTANA 001648
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN, NEA, SCA AND T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2033
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, AF,
CH, KG, KZ, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) KAZAKHSTAN —
DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON DPRK FLIGHT
OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN
REF: A. STATE 91989
B. STATE 79112
C. ASTANA 1286
D. ASTANA 1342
Classified By: Pol-Econ
Chief Steve Fagin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1.(S) We delivered ref A
talking points on a North Korean
flight of proliferation
concern on September 2 to Sergey
Savelyev, Deputy Director of
the MFA’s Department of
Multilateral
Cooperation. Savalyev did not provide
any
additional information on the
actions Kazakhstan took
concerning this flight nor
on the Government of Kazakhstan’s
policies regarding
overflight clearance for similar flights.
However, he expressed
Kazakhstan’s continuing commitment to
preventing flights of
proliferation concern.
2. (S) Savelyev thanked the
USG for its promise to provide a
response to his inquiry
regarding how other countries in the
region are dealing with such
flights. He explained that this
information would assist him
in explaining Kazakhstan’s
crucial role in
non-proliferation to senior Kazakhstani
government officials. Savalyev also asked how the United
States can be certain that
this flight was not redirected
through other countries in
the region, in particular China
and Pakistan. Savalyev stated that for the Government of
Kazakhstan, understanding
China’s position on DPRK-Iran
flights was «crucially
important.»
ORDWAY
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 168396
date: 9/4/2008 8:30
refid: 08DUSHANBE1122
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08STATE93357
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1122 2480830
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040830Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
PRIORITY 0965
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
PRIORITY
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
PRIORITY 0074
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA
PRIORITY 0083
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
PRIORITY 0079
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PRIORITY 0051
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI
PRIORITY 0002
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
PRIORITY 0002
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
PRIORITY 0003
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001122
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND
EUR/RUS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, RS, GG,
TITI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON SOUTH OSSETIA
AND ABKHAZIA
REF: STATE 93357
Classified By: Acting DCM
Matt Purl, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Charge and Acting DCM
met on September 4 with Erkin
Rahmatulloev, Presidential
Adviser on Foreign Policy, to
discuss a number of
issues. Charge passed Rahmatulloev a
copy of reftel demarche, and
asked whether Tajikistan had
received a letter from
Russia officially informing the GOTI
of Russia’s decision to
recognize the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
2. (C) Choosing his words
with care, Rahmatulloev said «I
cannot confirm» the
receipt of such a letter, noting that «we
receive many
letters.» The GOTI was familiar
with Russia’s
explanation of its actions
in Georgia, and was also aware of
the U.S. position. There was no need for a written
explanation from the
Russians, since the leaders of Russia
and Tajikistan had just met,
and would meet again at the
Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) meeting on
Moscow on September 5. Rahmatulloev said the heads of state
discussed the «general
issue of Georgia» at the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
(SCO) summit in Dushanbe on August
28, but their discussions
did not focus on the specific issue
of Abkhazian and South
Ossetian independence. At the summit
«we felt no pressure
from Russia» regarding the overall issue
of Georgia, or recognition
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Rahmatulloev said, and
concluded that at the September 5 CSTO
meeting «we will take a
decision based on our national
interests.» He indicated he was not willing to say more
on
the matter.
3. (C) On a more
entertaining note, at meeting immediately
preceding the one with
Rahmatulloev, Presidential economics
advisor Matlubon Davlatov
opened the meeting by showing
Charge an article he was
reading off the internet that
reported the U.S. was
getting ready to help Saakashvili flee
and had offered him U.S. citizenship. Davlatov added that
the plan was to use a U.S.
army medevac helicopter to
exfiltrate the Georgian
president.
4. (C) Comment:
Rahmatulloev’s claim that Tajikistan «felt no
pressure from Russia»
to support its actions in Georgia at
the SCO summit is dubious,
but along with his other comments
does indicate how careful
the GOTI wants to be to keep a low
profile on the Georgia
conflict. His coy statement that
Tajikistan’s position would
be governed by «national
interest» is ambiguous,
leaving the door open to stronger
support for Russia at the
CSTO, or continued resistance. End
Comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 168445
date: 9/4/2008 12:45
refid: 08KABUL2432
origin: Embassy Kabul
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5249
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2432 2481245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041245Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
5406
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN
COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0106
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL
AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS KABUL 002432
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO,
SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR
ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG
CJTF-101 POLAD
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ETRD,
EFIN, AF, TI
SUBJECT: COLOMBIANS DISCUSS
ENGAGEMENT WITH QAL-E-NOW PRT
1. (SBU) A senior Colombian
military delegation led by Army Chief of
Operations, Major General
Matamoros, conducted a third fact-finding
mission on Aug 12 and 13 to
the Spanish-led PRT at Qal-e-Now in
Badghis province. Five other senior Columbian military
officials
also attended, including
Brigadier General Zapata Uribe, Army Chief
of Training and Doctrine, as
well as Colombian Police Brigadier
General Caro Melendez, Chief
of Counter Narcotics.
2. (SBU) Presentations
during the visit focused on Spanish efforts
and needs, and the link
between narco-trafficking and the insurgency
in Northern Badghis. The Spanish made presentations regarding the
security situation in the
province as well as their operational
efforts and logistical
capacities. Badghis Governor, Mohammad
Ashraf Nasery, who has a
counter-narcotics background and has
visited Colombia, emphasized
the problems caused by poppy
cultivation and the link
between narco-trafficking and the
insurgency. Spanish PRT Commander, Col. Rolan, underlined
the
governor’s comments, calling
narco-trafficking the insurgency’s
«motor» in the
province’s northern districts. He also
offered his
assessment as to what
military forces would be most useful in the
province: doctors to perform medical civil affairs
Programs
(MEDCAPs); maneuver forces;
combat engineers; tactical combat air
patrol (TACP); and special
forces.
3. (SBU) General Matamoros
stated that Colombia is interested in
assisting the international
mission in Afghanistan, but emphasized
this visit was a
fact-finding mission and the specific nature of any
assistance must still be
evaluated. He offered de-mining
activities
as a possible Colombian
engagement. The General also lowered
expectations, saying there
may be some political resistance to
providing military
assistance to Afghanistan as Colombia still faces
an active insurgency.
WOOD
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 168563
date: 9/5/2008 3:27
refid: 08TASHKENT1035
origin: Embassy Tashkent
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
08TASHKENT324|08TASHKENT344|08TASHKENT704|08TASHKENT866
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNT #1035/01 2490327
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050327Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0255
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU
COLLECTIVE
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
4327
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0542
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
4944
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
0800
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0567
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
0823
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
4528
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2820
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
0839
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7581
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
1478
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM
MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW
YORK 0364
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1446
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE
2781
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
0379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0230
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
TASHKENT 001035
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM,
KCRM, KCOR, PINR, KZ, KG, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: ACTING CENTCOM
COMMANDER GENERAL DEMPSEY MEETS
WITH ICRC IN TASHKENT
REF: A. TASHKENT 866
B. TASHKENT 704
C. TASHKENT 344
D. TASHKENT 324
Classified By: Political
Officer Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary: On August 28
visiting Acting CENTCOM
Commander General Martin
Dempsey met with Yves Giovannoni,
the ICRC Head of the
Regional Delegation in Central Asia, and
Raffaello Muller, the Deputy
Head. The meeting, which itself
sent a strong signal of USG
interest to the Uzbeks, focused
on the status of ICRC’s
prison visits at a critical juncture
when the six-month trial
period is drawing to a close amidst
tough negotiations with the
Government of Uzbekistan about an
extension. Giovannoni does not believe Uzbekistan
«has a
genuine intent» to
reform but rather is motivated by a desire
for «geostrategic
cooperation» with the West.
Nonetheless,
he said ICRC is taking
advantage of the opportunity and has
built a positive
relationship with Ministry of Internal
Affairs officials who
administer penitentiaries. The real
challenge, he noted, was in
convincing the National Security
Service (NSS) to provide
access to its interrogation and
detention facilities. Without such access, Giovannoni noted
that ICRC would gradually
cease its prison visits in
Uzbekistan to «avoid
becoming a fig leaf.» ICRC
appreciated
General Dempsey’s
willingness to raise this issue during his
official meetings, and they
also requested that we emphasize
with GOU contacts that
improving prison conditions can reduce
the risk that religious
prisoners could become radicalized.
End summary.
Six-Month Trial Draws to a
Close
———————————
2. (C) On August 28 Acting
CENTCOM Commander General Dempsey
met with Giovannoni and
Muller to discuss the status of
ICRC’s prison visits in
Uzbekistan. (Comment: Muller also
met with former CENTCOM
Commander Admiral William Fallon in
January, which we believe
contributed to ICRC’s breakthrough
six-month trial agreement
with Uzbekistan that is now drawing
to a close. End comment.)
The meeting comes at a pivotal
period, as the six-month
trial for prison visits ends on
September 11 but
negotiations to broaden the scope of ICRC’s
activities have not
progressed.
Limited Success in
Penitentiaries
———————————
3. (C) Giovannoni stated
that the ICRC’s primary government
interlocutor, Deputy
Minister of Internal Affairs Abdukarim
Shodiev (who oversees the
prison directorate), acted
according to «clear
signals from above» and exhibited «a very
positive
attitude.» Shodiev wanted to meet
with ICRC every
few weeks to discuss the
progress of prison visits. ICRC had
access to 28 penitentiaries
around the country encompassing
80 percent of Uzbekistan’s
total estimated prison population.
Yet even with a productive relationship with
the Ministries
of Internal and Foreign
Affairs, Giovannoni noted that the
Presidential Apparat and the
NSS need to be on board.
(Comment: This tracks with our experience in dealing
with
the government; a recent
parallel is the proposed return of
the DEA, which all
interlocutors supported only to have the
NSS nix it from the
shadows. End comment.)
Still No Access to
Interrogation Centers
—————————————-
4. (C) Giovannoni noted that
there are eight NSS
interrogation centers that
ICRC was not able to access during
the six-month trial period,
as well as 128 police stations
and other temporary places
of detention. While discussions
have been initiated on
visiting the latter, which are not
particularly sensitive,
Giovannoni lamented that the NSS
remains unwilling even to
start negotiations. He said he
«does not think there
is a genuine intention» on the part of
the Government of Uzbekistan
to implement reforms; rather, he
sees the Uzbeks as motivated
by the appearance of
«geostrategic
cooperation» with the U.S. and Europe.
Nonetheless, Giovannoni said
ICRC believes if it can work
according to its modalities
it can address some problems.
Yet if the NSS does not come
to the table, Giovannoni said
ICRC would gradually (to
give the Uzbeks time to rethink
their stance) suspend its
program «to avoid being used as a
fig leaf.»
U.S. Plays a Key Role
———————
5. (C) While ICRC expects
continued difficulties trying to
convince the NSS to
cooperate, Giovannoni noted that the U.S.
may be able to again play a
key role in facilitating
negotiations. Although the European Union included the
resumption of ICRC prison
visits as a factor in its decision
to lift sanctions,
Giovannoni believes the U.S. «has more
weight» and can
significantly influence the ICRC’s capability
to conduct an effective
humanitarian program. (Comment:
Like other foreign diplomats
in Tashkent, Muller told poloff
that the Ambassador’s
highly-publicized meeting with the
President in July indicated
an increase in perceived U.S.
influence. End comment.)
Giovannoni recommended that
General Dempsey express USG
interest in Uzbekistan continuing
cooperation according to the
confidential conditions the two
parties discussed.
No Focus on Rehabilitation
—————————
6. (C) Muller described some
of the flaws in the Uzbek penal
system, which he
characterized as «a repressive system» with
«no attitude of
reinsertion into society and no effort to
rehabilitate.» He added that those detainees who are
released «are
nobodies,» lacking in documentation and
employment prospects. This is in stark contrast to the
Government of Uzbekistan’s
oft-restated boasts about reforms
and liberalization of the
criminal justice system, Muller
said, cautioning that
«there is a distinction between the
reality and
paper.» Even the name of the correction
directorate of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, he pointed
out, includes the word
punishment («GUIN,» a Russian acronym
for the Main Department of
Incarceration and Punishment).
Muller also said corruption
results in conditions inside
prisons that should not
exist, and even the occasional
amnesties «are subject
to negotiation» as long as the
prisoner is not
high-profile.
Other Stans
————
7. (C) In response to
General Dempsey’s question about the
Central Asian regional
perspective, Giovannoni noted that
Kazakhstan has implemented
substantive penal reforms and that
there are far fewer
«security detainees» compared to
Uzbekistan. He explained that ICRC has worked in
Kyrgyzstan
for nine years and achieved
«a good dialogue.» In
contrast,
ICRC has not had any access
to Turkmenistan, but Giovannoni
will travel to Ashgabat at
the end of the year to attempt to
make inroads. The organization has not had any access to
Tajikistan in the past 15
years other than a brief nine month
window which quickly closed,
according to Giovannoni. He
also noted that Uzbekistan
is «very well organized» compared
to their regional peers, but
the seasoned 22-year ICRC
veteran added that
«rarely have I seen a worse situation.»
Radicalization
—————
8. (C) The Ambassador noted
that there are an estimated three
to seven thousand religious
prisoners accused of membership
in radical organizations and
asked if ICRC examined whether
Uzbek prisons are actually
increasing the number of radical
Islamic adherents. Giovannoni said he does not believe that
the Government of Uzbekistan
fully understands that prison
can be a radicalizing
experience and urged U.S. officials to
convey this to official
interlocutors as much as possible.
Muller emphasized that if
Uzbekistan cooperates with the ICRC
to improve prison conditions
it would have a corresponding
benefit to state security,
which the Uzbeks value above all
else.
Comment:
———
9. (C) The ICRC has had
partial success during the course of
its six-month trial period
for prison visits. We believe the
visits have already
positively impacted prison conditions in
penitentiaries, albeit
modestly, and ICRC has benefited from
the opportunity to build
relations with contacts in the
Ministry of Internal
Affairs. However, ICRC does not yet
have access to National
Security Service detention
facilities. The next few weeks will be an important test
of
the Government of
Uzbekistan’s commitment to address torture
and abuse in its prisons; we
will continue to press for GOU
cooperation that will allow
the ICRC’s prison visits to
continue.
10. (U) This telegram was cleared
by Acting CENTCOM Commander
General Martin Dempsey.
NORLAND
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 168649
date: 9/5/2008 11:38
refid: 08DUSHANBE1127
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination: 08STATE91908
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1127 2491138
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051138Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
0967
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 001127
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND
EUR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL, UN, UNGA, KV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — NO
KOSOVO ICJ POSITION YET
REF: STATE 91908
Classified By: A/DCM Matt
Purl, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On September 5 Acting
DCM spoke with Muzafar
Khuseynov, Chief of the
Department of International
Organizations, concerning
reftel. Khuseynov said that
Tajikistan had not yet
formulated a position on whether to
support referral of Kosovo’s
declaration of independence to
the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). A/DCM conveyed
U.S. concerns that referral
to the ICJ could have adverse
consequences in the Balkans
and beyond.
2. (C) Khuseynov declined to
predict what Tajikistan’s
position would be, saying
the government needed to consult
internally and with its
mission to the UN before deciding.
He assured A/DCM that he
would push to accelerate the
decision making process on
this matter, and to contact the
embassy if there were any
developments.
3. (C) On September 2 Charge
d’Affaires called on the French
Charge d’Affaires regarding
reftel. The French Charge said
that he did not have
instructions to raise the Kosovo/ICJ
matter in Dushanbe. The German Embassy also reported having
no instructions on this
issue.
4. (C) Comment: Tajikistan
has not recognized Kosovo, and
wishes to keep away from any
Kosovo-related matters. We do
not know of any pressure on
Tajikistan to support referral of
Kosovo to the ICJ. However, the Government of Tajikistan
clearly has only begun to
consider this matter, does not
easily absorb subtle
messages, and works best with formal
written demarches. It would be helpful if post received
cleared points on this
matter which could be left with the
Government for them to use
in their consultations. End
Comment.
QUAST
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 169180
date: 9/10/2008 11:21
refid: 08DUSHANBE1133
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08DUSHANBE1107
header:
VZCZCXRO9399
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1133/01 2541121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101121Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0977
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0251
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0216
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0169
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0158
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
0009
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 001133
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR, SCA and
INR/R/MR
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPAO, KDEM, PREL,
PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCO
SUMMIT MEDIA REACTION — CAREFUL BALANCE OF
INTERESTS
Ref: Dushanbe 1107
1. (U) Summary: Tajikistan’s
political analysts expressed few
expectations from the SCO
summit in the weekly papers prior to the
summit, except that Russia
would seek support for its actions in
Georgia and recognition of
independence for South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Most commentators praised Russian actions in
Georgia,
which they interpreted as a
resurgence of Russian power. Comments
after the summit focused on
the divisions within the SCO, as
reflected in China’s and
Uzbekistan’s refusal to recognize the
independence of Georgia’s
separatist regions. Other analysis
focused on the bilateral
benefits for Tajikistan from the summit and
what those relationships
mean for investment in the hydro-electric
power sector. End summary
Pre Summit — Careful Balance
of Interests Predicted
———————————————
——
2. (U) On the eve of the
summit August 27, Tajikistan’s weekly
papers anticipated that
Russia would seek SCO support for its
actions in Georgia and
recognition of independence for South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. Centrist «Tojikiston» predicted
that the members
would be «careful»
in response to avoid alienating foreign partners
like the U.S., which built
the Nizhniy Pyanj bridge in the south,
and Iran, which built the
Anzob tunnel north of Dushanbe. Abdunabi
Sattorzoda, an analyst with
the government sponsored Center for
Strategic Studies, was
quoted in the article saying he had no
particular expectations,
because SCO member states had over the
years signed 339 cooperation
agreements that had so far yielded no
visible results. A report in progressive «Farazh»
said Central
Asian states could not
choose between Russia and the West, because
each had developed its own
relations with the United States and
NATO.
«Cold War» Resumes
— Russia 1, U.S. 0
————————————-
3. (U) Also on August 27,
centrist «Kurier Tajikistana» expressed
concern that the
«information war» between Russia and the U.S.
regarding Georgia might lead
to real war between the two powers.
The paper criticized
Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili for
portraying Russia as the
aggressor in world media. He said the
international community
should instead be condemning «Saakashvili’s
genocide against the people
of South Ossetia,» just as it had
condemned the genocide in
Kosovo.
4. (U) Masud Sobirov, leader
of the government recognized wing of
the Democratic Party of
Tajikistan, commented in «Farazh» August 27
that he supported Russia’s
peacekeeping in the region, which he said
proved that «Russia
would decide sovereignty issues in Georgia, not
the United
States.» He also praised the way
power was transferred
from Yeltsin to Putin and
Putin to Medvedov, which meant a more
«consistent
policy» and helped Russia re-establish itself as a
powerful state. In a front page article for centrist
«Vecherniy
Dushanbe,» Rajab
Safarov, head of the Moscow-based «Center for Study
of Modern Iran,» said
that the United States’ «Georgian project» was
engineered to ensure
Georgia’s accession to NATO, which failed due
to Russia’s «quick and
effective response.» He said Russia
could
counterbalance aggressive
plans by the U.S. and NATO by annexing
South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
by strengthening military ties with
Lebanon and Syria; restoring
its military presence in Cuba; and
accelerating SCO membership
for Iran. «Tojikistan»
published a
Qaccelerating SCO membership
for Iran. «Tojikistan»
published a
dissenting view September 4,
claiming Russian «interference» was
aimed at proving that
«it still owns post Soviet states.»
The
article described the
Russian-Chechen conflict as «genocide» and
supported Georgia’s right to
defend its territorial integrity.
«Georgia Issue»
Not Ready for Prime Time
—————————————-
5. (U) After the summit
concluded August 28, President Rahmon held a
press briefing at which he
took no questions but read a statement
citing the
«considerable work» done over the past year in security,
trade, science and cultural
exchanges, with no mention of Georgia.
The official government
television networks followed his cue and ran
10-minute primetime news
reports that highlighted the numerous
agreements that were signed
to continue cooperation in
anti-terrorism and
anti-narcotics between SCO members. The
reports
did not mention Georgia or
the «Dushanbe Declaration» which
expressed
«concern» over tension in South Ossetia, called for
«efforts to find a
peaceful solution to the conflict, and praised
Russia’s role in these
efforts.
Summit Boosts Tajikistan’s
Bilateral Relationships
DUSHANBE 00001133 002 OF 002
———————————————
——
6. (U) Political analyst
Abdugani Mamadazimov commented in centrist
«Asia Plus» that
the summit had been an opportunity for Tajikistan
to strengthen bilateral
relations with individual member states.
He
said warm congratulations
were offered to President Hu Jintao for
the Chinese athletes’
performance at the Olympics, but «no one
rushed to congratulate
Russia for their victory in the Caucasus,»
preferring to maintain a
«careful» position vis-a-vis
Russian-Georgian relations
articulated in the Dushanbe Declaration.
He said the meetings between
Hu Jintao and Tajikistan’s ministries
and Parliament augured well
for Tajik-Chinese cooperation
progressing beyond the
current level. He expressed hope for
improved relations between
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan after the «warm
embrace» between
Presidents Rahmon and Karimov at the summit.
Mamadzimov doubted that
Iran, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan would
be offered full SCO
membership because of issues unique to each
case: Indian-Pakistani territorial disputes;
Afghanistan being
dominated by western forces;
and increased tensions in the Middle
Eastern if Iran joined the
organization.
More Divides than Unites SCO
—————————-
7. (U) Many papers noted
that the two «sensations» — membership for
Iran and recognition of
independence for Georgia’s separatist
regions — failed to
materialize, primarily because of China’s
concern about its own
restless regions. Social Democratic
Party
leader Rahmatillo Zoirov
commented in «Vecherniy Dushanbe» that the
SCO had not realized its
full potential because member states did
not have equal stature or
voice in the organization and the states
themselves blocked each
other’s ambitions.
Hydro Power Suitors Compete
for Tajikistan’s Favor
———————————————
——
8. (U) A Radio Free Europe
report with experts’ comments on
hydro-electric projects in
Tajikistan was reprinted in progressive
«Jomea.» Political analyst Parviz Mullojanov said SCO
membership
had benefited Tajikistan
economically by expanding the range of
potential partners and
thwarting Russia’s attempts to scare off
other investors. He said China had planned to build three
hydro-electric plants in
Tajikistan, but only one agreement for
Nurobod-2 was signed. According to energy expert Gulomiddin
Saifiddinov, Tajikistan was
better off working with countries like
China and Iran that had
«only economic interests in Tajikistan»
(compared to political
strings that that would be attached to
Russian investments). Mirzosharif Islomiddinov, the head of
Parliament’s energy and
industry committee, said a competition over
resources was natural and
Tajikistan’s economy would only win from
foreign investments if
Tajikistan handled them «in the right way.»
The article concluded,
«Tajikistan can choose its own partners.»
9. (U) Centrist
«Sobitiya» described the August 29 bilateral meeting
between Medvedev and Rahmon
as mutually beneficial because Russia
got Rahmon’s support for its
actions in South Ossetia, and
Tajikistan got Russia’s
promise to build three hydro-electric
stations and to complete the
long stalled Roghun project. The paper
included Rahmon’s statement
calling Russia and Tajikistan «natural
strategic partners and
allies,» which meant coordination and support
of each others’ actions,
«including those undertaken by Russia in
Qof each others’ actions,
«including those undertaken by Russia in
the Caucuses to establish
peace;» and his preference for «political
and diplomatic means of
resolving such disputes.»
U.S. «Iran Plans»
Foiled by Russian Action in Georgia?
———————————————
———
10. (U) Also on September 4,
«Asia Plus» carried a Russian reprint
from www.worldcrisis.ru that
claimed analysis of military equipment
including radar jammers
provided by the U.S. and used by Georgian
troops in the conflict in
South Ossetia proved the United States had
planned an air attack on
Iran for early September, but Russia’s
response foiled those
plans. The author claimed that the United
States was still
concentrating its military presence in that region
under the cover of providing
«humanitarian assistance.»
Quast
