Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 162781
date: 7/21/2008 3:09
refid: 08DUSHANBE947
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE928
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0947/01 2030309
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210309Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0804
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0175
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0206
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0144
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0056
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
0031
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0121
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL
AFB FL
—————— header
ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L
DUSHANBE 000947
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA,
DS/TIA/ITA,
DS/T/ATA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2018
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, PTER,
PINR, PGOV, UZ, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
CONVICTION IN SUPREME COURT BOMBING
CASE, BUT NOT THE WHOLE
STORY
REF: 07 DUSHANBE 928
Classified By: DCM Tom
Hushek, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (SBU) Summary: A Tajik
court has sentenced Komiljon
Ishonqulov to 22 years in
prison for the bombing of the
Supreme Court building on
June 16, 2007 (reftel). The
Chief Justice of
Tajikistan’s Supreme Court publicly
accused the Uzbek National
Security Service (SNB) of
orchestrating the
bombing. This will further strain
Tajikistan’s already bad
relations with Uzbekistan. End
Summary.
2. (C) Dushanbe newspaper
Asia Plus reported on July 12
that a court in Dushanbe
sentenced Komiljon Ishonqulov to
22 years in prison for the
June 16, 2007 bombing of the
Supreme Court building. Per reftel, the bomb caused no
injuries, only minor
structural damage to the court. The
court reportedly convicted
Ishonqulov of terrorism,
illegally possessing weapons
and explosives, contraband,
and «high
treason.» According to media
reporting, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court
Nusratullo Abdulloyev said at
a press conference that the
Uzbek National Security Service
(SNB) carried out the
attack. Abdulloyev said «Ishonqulov
met in the Uzbek city of
Denau with his friend ‘Said,'»,
who worked for the SNB,
«to carry out a bombing in Dushanbe
for the purpose of
destabilizing the situation.» He
identified «Said»
as Bobosubkhon Mirzoyev, a former
pro-government Popular Front
leader and a fugitive from
Tajik justice.
3. (C) In December 2007,
Avesta news service identified
Komiljon Ishonqulov and
Hasan Simirkhanov as two men jailed
and under investigation by
the State Committee for National
Security in connection with
the bombing. We do not have
any information on
Ishonqulov’s background. Simirkhanov is
a former police
officer. Media have not reported on
Simirkhanov’s legal process,
but embassy’s sources within
the Interior Ministry who
worked with Simirkhanov told us
that he received a six year
sentence for helping with the
bombing.
4. (C) According to a source
inside the Ministry of
Interior, Hasan Simirkhanov
held the rank of Senior
Lieutenant in OMON. According to multiple sources, he used
fraudulent documents and
bribery to gain admission to the
Ministry of Interior’s
police academy. After finishing his
studies, he began working
for the Ministry’s human
resources department at
headquarters, and became known for
poor behavior and insubordination. He later moved to the
Directorate for Criminal
Investigations, and from there to
the Militia Detachment for
Special Purposes (OMON).
5. (C) Simirkhanov worked in
OMON’s First Mountain Unit,
and showed an active
interest in explosives. He was
intelligent and was actively
trying to learn more about
explosives. The former OMON Commander, Colonel Oleg
Zakharchenko, wrote to
headquarters on at least one
occasion refusing to admit
Simirkhanov into OMON’s
Explosives Ordinance
Disposal team.
6. (C) One source told
embassy that Simirkhanov was
drinking in a tavern near
the Supreme Court before the
blast. According to a source who claimed to have
been
present, he had never seen
Simirkhanov drink before, and
noticed Simirkhanov became
upset when the blast occurred
Qnoticed Simirkhanov became
upset when the blast occurred
and refused to leave the
tavern to find out what had
happened.
7. (C) OMON investigated the
bombing and identified the
explosive as 400 grams of
TNT triggered by a multi-action
«MUV 2» fuse. Their report indicated that they believed
the bomb was a «trial
run,» because the explosive was
small, contained no
shrapnel, and was not placed to cause
serious structural damage or
be likely to hurt people.
8. (C) Multiple sources said
Simirkhanov was arrested a
month after the bombing, but
not in connection with it;
rather, his arrest was
because of suspicions he was an
Uzbek spy. Two sources told the embassy they saw an
identification document of
Simirkhanov’s indicating that he
was a Captain in the Uzbek
National Security Service
(SNB). A senior Ministry of Interior source
indicated that
the charge that he was the
«mastermind» of the Supreme
Court explosion was added
later. Other sources also said
Simirkhanov spoke English
well, and that his wife worked
for the United Nations.
9. (C) At the time of the
explosion, speculation focused on
the possibility of a revenge
attack connected to cases then
being heard in court, rather
than on political terrorism.
However, the Dushanbe
Prosecutor at the time immediately
called the case a terrorist
action. The confusing picture
which has emerged may
reflect a blend of actual intrigue
(perhaps the Uzbek SNB had a
spy inside OMON who was
caught) with the common
tendency here to blame threatening
events on foreign powers —
by assigning blame for the
bombing to the Uzbek
government. Media reported that Chief
Justice Abdulloyev linked
Mirzoyev (aka «Said») with Mahmud
Khudoberdiev, and said both
were employed by the Uzbek
National Security
Service. Tajik security service
officials recently told
emboff that they believed
Khudoberdiev was moving
armed men through northern
Afghanistan, with the
intention of supporting the Tajik
opposition in the
Gorno-Badakhshan region.
COMMENT — CONTRADICTIONS,
AND ANGST
10. (C) It would be
extremely embarrassing for the Tajik
authorities to admit that an
Uzbek spy infiltrated their
elite counter-terrorism
unit. While it is possible an
Uzbek citizen fraudulently
obtained employment at the
Ministry of Interior, and
later OMON, it seems unlikely the
Uzbek SNB would use such a
well placed infiltrator to
execute a small and
relatively insignificant bombing.
There are also
inconsistencies between press reports and
source information. According to Ministry of Interior
internal records and
witnesses, Simirkhanov was on duty on
June 16 and 17, 2007. However, media reports indicate that
Simirkhanov and Ishonqulov
illegally crossed the
Tajik-Uzbek border on June
16 and 17. Additionally, if
Simirkhanov was an Uzbek
spy, it would be reasonable for
him to receive the harsher
sentence, rather than a sentence
less than one-third the
length of Ishonqulov’s.
11. (C) Comment Continued:
The Chief Justice’s public
accusation of Uzbek state
involvement in the bombing
represents an escalation in
the long-running war of words
between the Governments of
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and
will add further strain to a
historically bad
relationship. The incident will increase Tajik paranoia
about Uzbekistan, and in the
run-up to the August 28
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Summit in Dushanbe, will
fuel rumors already in
circulation (we have heard them in
the past week from Russian
diplomats, and local
journalists) that Uzbek
President Karimov will not attend
the summit and that the
summit itself could be called off
or reduced in scale. It is still not clear who bombed the
Supreme Court, or why; but
Tajik-Uzbek relations just took
QSupreme Court, or why; but
Tajik-Uzbek relations just took
another hit. End Comment.
12. (U) The point of contact
for this and all security
related matters at Post is
Regional Security Officer Seth
Green.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 162991
date: 7/22/2008 9:18
refid: 08DUSHANBE950
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3042
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0950/01 2040918
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220918Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
0810
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0177
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0211
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
0146
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02
DUSHANBE 000950
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ECON, EAID,
PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN —
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENERGY EMERGENCY PLAN IN
DOUBT
1. (U) This message is
sensitive but unclassified. Please
protect
accordingly.
2. (SBU) Summary: Recent
discussions with the World Bank Dushanbe
office, and with various
government ministries, have revealed that
the Government of Tajikistan
is not implementing plans to avoid
another winter power
emergency in a coordinated fashion, slowing
progress on an issue which
is key to Tajikistan’s stability. End
Summary.
3. (SBU) PolEcon Chief spoke
with Jariya Hoffman, World Bank acting
resident representative on
July 18, concerning progress on the
Government of Tajikistan’s
Energy Emergency Mitigation Action Plan
(EEMAP), supported by the
World Bank and designed to avoid a
repetition of last winter’s
severe energy shortages. Hoffman said
the World Bank had not had a
resident specialist to monitor
implementation of EEMAP
since April, and was looking for a new
person to fill this
position. She said she worried that
procurement
of fuel oil, and of
electrical distribution equipment to repair
Tajikistan’s dilapidated
infrastructure was lagging, and that the
Government was generally
making little progress on implementation of
EEMAP.
4. (SBU) Key elements of
EEMAP include stockpiling 30,000 tons of
«mazut» fuel oil,
purchase and installation of a myriad of new
electrical distribution
equipment around the country to reduce
losses and lower the
incidence of system breakdowns experienced last
winter, improvements to gas
distribution to reduce losses, and
payment of outstanding debts
to Uzbekistan for gas, to ensure future
deliveries of gas from them
if needed. The plan, approved by the
Prime Minister in February
2008, estimates costs for these measures
at $20 million. The World Bank has provided $6.6 million,
while
other donors and the state
owned power and gas monopolies are to
provide the rest. The Minister of Economic Development and
Trade
was named Chairman of the
interministerial commission to oversee
implementation of EEMAP.
5. (SBU) On July 21 PolEcon
Chief also met with Deputy Ministry of
Energy Pulod Muhiddinov, to
discuss progress on EEMAP. Muhiddinov
said he was largely ignorant
of the status of the project, as the
Ministry of Energy had been
cut out of implementation of the plan.
He said the Ministry of
Finance was the authorized government
structure to handle a $6.5
million World Bank grant to support the
EEMAP, and that World Bank
grant money would be used for fuel oil
purchase, spare parts for
electric networks and switchboards, and
natural gas purchase. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for
conducting tenders for all
purchases, but Muhiddinov believed that
the fuel oil purchase
agreement the Finance Ministry had concluded
was significantly higher
than prices the Ministry of Energy could
find. He said Finance was agreeing to pay up to
$500 per ton of
fuel oil, when Energy could
buy for around $400 per ton [Note: both
prices much higher than the
$300 per ton envisaged in the EEMAP
document itself].
ELECTRICITY RATIONING COMING
SOON
6. (SBU) Muhiddinov said
that electricity rationing in Tajikistan
would begin September 10 or
15, and would apply to the whole country
except Dushanbe. When Emboff asked about rationing in Khujand,
Tajikistan’s second city
which experienced severe shortages for
months last winter and
spring. Muhiddinov said the Government
would
try to allow more
electricity there than it did last winter.
He
said that the Tajik Aluminum
Company (TALCO), which accounts for 40
Qsaid that the Tajik
Aluminum Company (TALCO), which accounts for 40
percent of all electricity
consumption in Tajikistan, would buy
electricity from
Turkmenistan to avoid having its massive needs
impact on supplies for the
general population. He predicted the
next winter would not see a
power crisis of the seriousness of last
winter, noting that the
Sangtuda-1 hydropower station was now partly
operational, and after completion
would provide 2.7 Billion Kilowatt
Hours (KWH) per year, and
that water conservation in other
reservoirs would yield an
additional 300-400 million KWH.
Muhiddinov further predicted
that regions outside Dushanbe would
receive 5 hours per day of
additional electricity this upcoming
winter.
7. (SBU) Emboff next called
on Deputy Minister of Finance Shavkat
Sohibov, the Ministry’s
coordinator for the World Bank grant to
support EEMAP
implementation. He was bemused to hear
that his
ministry had concluded any
procurement deals related to EEMAP,
whether for fuel oil or
otherwise. Sohibov said the Ministry had
made no deals, and had just
a few days earlier announced tenders for
procurement of fuel oil,
electrical distribution equipment, and
equipment to improve gas
distribution. He said the three
beneficiary organizations of
the World Bank grant, electrical
monopoly Barki Tojik, gas
monopoly TajikGaz, and Kommunalnoye
Hoziastvo (communal
services), would have to pay the Ministry of
DUSHANBE 00000950 002 OF 002
Finance back for their
portions of the grant, at no interest and
over a period of 5-6 years,
«so that they don’t treat this like a
present from Santa
Claus.» Shibov said the Ministry of
Finance
became the implementing partner
of the World Bank because the World
Bank did not trust Barki
Tojik and TajikGaz, but trusted the
Ministry of Finance to
handle the project in a transparent manner.
He complained that he lacked
specialists in procurement and
engineering to advise him,
and said he could not ask for help from
Barki Tojik and TajikGaz
because of conflicts of interest.
8. (SBU) Sohibov said he
believed that other donors, including Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Russia,
had provided about $4 million to support
EEMAP, but he did not know
what other financing there might be from
Barki Tojik or
TajikGaz. Sohibov said he had had no
contact with
the interministerial
commission chaired by the Minister of Economy
and Trade to oversee
implementation of EEMAP, and was unsure whether
the commission even still
existed.
NO INFORMATION, ALL AROUND
9. (SBU) Neither Muhiddinov
nor Sohibov could offer any information
on the repayment of gas
debts to Uzbekistan, advising us to ask
Barki Tojik and TajikGaz for
that information. On July 21 news
services reported that
Uzbekistan had reduced gas supplies to
Tajikistan from
30,000-40,000 cubic meters per hour to 22,000 cubic
meters per hour because of
non-payment of TajikGaz’ $7 million debt
to Uzbek suppliers.
10. (SBU) Embassy contacted
the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade on July 21 to inquire
about their efforts to oversee
implementation of
EEMAP. Chief of the Department of State
Purchases
Odina Odinaev told embassy staff that the
Government of Tajikistan
had sent a letter to
«the international community» through the local
UNDP office requesting $25
million for EEMAP. He said that as of
April 30, 2008 Tajikistan
had received $9 million from various
donors, including
contributions of fuel oil from Iran and
Kazakhstan. He said the last meeting the Minister of
Economic
Development and Trade had
with the interministerial working group on
the energy crisis was on May
8, 2008. Mr. Odinaev professed to be
unaware of the World Bank’s
$6.5 million grant to support EEMAP,
despite its central place in
EEMAP planning documents.
11. (SBU) Embassy Staff also
spoke on July 21 with the First Deputy
Chairman of Barki Tojik, Mr.
Alexei Silantiev. Silantiev said the
World Bank and Ministry of
Finance were slow to make any decisions
on procurements for
EEMAP. He said that Barki Tojik had
5,800 tons
of Kazakh and Iranian mazut,
but did not have the money to buy the
30,000 tons called for in
EEMAP, nor the electrical distribution
equipment called for in the
plan. He opined that since February
2008 nothing had been done
in Tajikistan to get ready for the next
winter.
12. (SBU) Embassy then
contacted Abdullo Yorov, Chief Adviser to the
President on Energy Issues
and a former Minister of Energy. He told
Embassy staff that he was
not aware of the status of implementation
of EEMAP, and suggested we
contact the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade.
13. (SBU) Comment: That the
Government will soon implement power
rationing to conserve water
in hydropower reservoirs is a good sign.
But the local World Bank Acting Representative
is right to be
concerned that the
Government is not effectively implementing EEMAP.
While the World Bank’s share of the plan seems
to be moving along,
Q While the World Bank’s
share of the plan seems to be moving along,
if slowly, we could get no
straight answer from anyone in government
about the overall status of
EEMAP. Despite the harsh experience of
last winter, Tajik
officialdom’s winter emergency planning seems
based on hope rather than on
coordinated preparation. As matters
appear now, we are headed
for another appeal for a massive bailout
from the GOTI when things
get rough this winter. End Comment.
Jacobson
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163198
date: 7/23/2008 12:36
refid: 08USNATO257
origin: Mission USNATO
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNO #0257/01 2051236
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231236Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 2093
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
IMMEDIATE 0976
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
IMMEDIATE 6013
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS USNATO 000257
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, SCA,
AND INL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, NATO, SNAR, TI,
RS, AF
SUBJECT: VETTING REQUEST FOR
PARTICIPANTS OF THE
NATO-RUSSIA
COUNTER-NARCOTICS TRAINING AT DUSHANBE,
TAJIKISTAN, AUGUST 11-19
2008
1. This is an action cable. See paragraph 3.
2. NATO’s International
Staff has provided the list below of
Tajik participants for the
NATO-Russia Counter-Narcotics
Training course to be held
at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August
11-19, 2008. Post will forward the Afghan trainers names
SEPTEL.
REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN
———————-
A. Name: Rustam Nabiev
Title: Operational officer, Mobile
Interdiction Group,
Unit 1
Passport: A3403998
DOB: 02.01.1974
B. Name: Rakhmatullo
Sharipov
Title: Operational officer, Mobile
Interdiction Group,
Unit 1
Passport: A0952567
DOB: 04.02.1960
C. Name: Mushamadsho
Kurbonov
Title: Senior inspector, Mobile Interdiction
Group, Unit 1
Passport: A3635614
DOB: 10.05.1975
D. Name: Bakhrom Yatimov
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 1
Passport: N601242
DOB: 12.03.1971
E. Name: Pavel Evdokimov
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 1
Passport: A0981575
DOB: 04.11.1982
F. Name: Orzu Amadbekov
Title: Operational officer, Mobile
Interdiction Group,
Unit 2
Passport: N108883
DOB: 19.01.1981
G. Name: Bakhtier Mahkamov
Title: Operational officer, Mobile
Interdiction Group,
Unit 2
Passport: A3676731
DOB: 18.10.1979
H. Name: Safarali
Sotiboldiev
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 2
Passport: A1194946
DOB: 21.03.1972
I. Name: Jamshed Safarov
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 2
Passport: A1237507
DOB: 26.03.1966
J. Name: Shamshod Hushvahtov
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 3
Passport: A2027866
DOB: 22.12.1983
K. Name: Rahmatullo Azimov
Title: Operational officer, Mobile
Interdiction Group,
Unit 3
Passport: A0085817
DOB: 26.04.1981
L. Name: Bahtier Gulomov
Title: Operational officer, Mobile Interdiction
Group,
Unit 3
Passport: A2107665
DOB: 17.09.1975
M. Name: Jamshedjon Sharipov
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 3
Passport: A0320273
DOB: 30.03.1982
N. Name: Giesjon Loikov
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 4
Passport: A4031850
DOB: 20.06.1981
O. Name: Furkat Tilloev
Title: Inspector, Mobile Interdiction Group,
Unit 5
Passport: A4276297
DOB: 27.10.1979
3. Action requested: Post
requests that Department and
Embassy Dushanbe
simultaneously check the above names for
possible human rights
violations and inform Post if any
derogatory information is
found.
4. The point of contact at
Post is Political Officer Reece
Smyth who can be reached at
[email protected] or by phone at
(32-2) 724-3268.
STEIN
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163221
date: 7/23/2008 15:00
refid: 08STATE79112
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET
destination: 08ASTANA1286
header:
O 231500Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 079112
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2033
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL, AF,
CH, KG, KZ, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) FLIGHT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN BETWEEN DPRK
AND IRAN
REF: ASTANA 1286
Classified By: ISN Acting
DAS Kenneth W. Staley,
Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and
(d)
THIS IS AN ACTION
REQUEST. SEE PARA 2.
1. (S) Posts are requested
to approach appropriate-level host
nation officials regarding a
planned North Korean flight to
Iran of proliferation
concern and encourage them to deny
overflight for the aircraft
or require that it land and be
subjected to inspection
before proceeding. Posts may draw
from background, objectives,
and talking points/non-paper
below as appropriate.
———-
OBJECTIVES
———-
2. (S//REL AFGHANISTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN,
TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN): Posts should encourage host
governments, as partner
nations in the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and consistent
with their obligations under
UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and 1747,
to deny overflight or to insist
that the aircraft land for
inspection before proceeding.
3. (S//REL CHINA) Embassy Beijing should
encourage China,
consistent with its
obligations under UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and
1747, to deny overflight or
to insist that the aircraft land
for inspection before
proceeding.
4. (S//REL KAZAKHSTAN) Our information currently
does not
indicate a North Korean
intent to overfly Kazakhstan,
suggesting that GOK, per
REFTEL, has denied the DPRK,s
request. Embassy Astana is requested to express
appreciation
for GOK,s proactively
notifying us of the DPRK overflight
request and urge them to
deny any such request if they have
not already done so. Post may share the below non-paper with
GOK, as appropriate.
———-
BACKGROUND
———-
5. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) The USG has received
information that a flight of
proliferation concern between
North Korea and Iran is
scheduled to occur in late July.
6. (S//REL AFGHANISTAN,
KAZAKHSTAN, TAJIKISTAN) Our
information does not
currently indicate a North Korean intent
to route the flight over
Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, or
Tajikistan. We are, however, providing them this
information
in the spirit of our
cooperation under PSI, and to ask them
to deny overflight or
inspect the aircraft in the event the
North Koreans re-route the
flight.
7. (S) Embassies should note
that bullet #1 is for Beijing
only, bullet #2 is for all
recipients except Beijing, and
bullet #3 is for Astana,
Kabul, and Dushanbe only. The rest
of the non-paper is for all
recipients.
————————
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
————————
8. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) Begin talking
points/non-paper:
— (S//REL CHINA) We would
like to raise with you a North
Korean flight of
proliferation concern that may request
overflight of your territory
as it transits to and from Iran.
— (S//REL AFGHANISTAN,
KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN,
TURKMENISTAN, UZBEKISTAN) In
the spirit of our cooperation
under the Proliferation
Security Initiative, we would like to
raise with you a North
Korean flight of proliferation concern
that may request overflight
of your territory as it transits
to and from Iran.
— (S//REL AFGHANISTAN,
KAZAKHSTAN, TAJIKISTAN) While our
current information
indicates that this flight will not cross
your territory, we are
providing it to you in the spirit of
our cooperation as PSI
partners and in the event that the
flight,s schedule is changed
and you do receive a North
Korean overflight request.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) We are concerned that
this chartered, round-trip
passenger flight may be carrying
DPRK personnel involved in
ongoing cooperation with Iran on
ballistic missiles.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) As you know, the
transfer by North Korea of
WMD components or delivery
systems, certain military
goods, and related materials
including spare parts, is
prohibited by UNSCR 1718. UNSCR
1718 also prohibits
transfers from or to North Korea of
technical training, advice,
services or assistance related to
WMD, their delivery systems,
and certain conventional arms.
Iran is prohibited from
obtaining WMD, delivery systems,
related components, and
related technical assistance and
training under UNSCRs 1737
and 1747.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) We therefore request
that overflight permission
be denied or made contingent on
inspection of the aircraft
to ensure that any cargo or
passengers it carries are
not arriving in Iran in violation
of UNSCR 1718, 1737, 1747 or
other UN resolutions.
Alternately, if this
aircraft requests a fueling stop in your
country, we request that you
grant this permission and
promptly search the aircraft
upon its arrival for evidence of
prohibited items or
activities.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) Information about the
flights are as follows. The outbound flight from the DPRK is
expected on or about July
31, 2008. The aircraft is a North
Korean-registered Il-62,
flight JS-621, scheduled to depart
Pyongyang on 28 July at
0001Z and land in Tehran at 0940Z.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) From North Korea, the
flight is scheduled to pass
into Chinese airspace at or about
0025Z and leave Chinese
airspace for Kyrgyzstan at 0600Z.
From there, the flight is
scheduled to pass over Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan and arrive
in Iranian airspace at or around
0825Z.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) The return flight,
JS-622, is scheduled to
depart Tehran on 31 July at 1330Z and
arrive at Pyongyang at
2220Z.
— (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) From Iran, the flight
is scheduled to pass into
Turkmenistan airspace on or about
1440Z and pass over
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, entering
Chinese airspace from
Kyrgyzstan at 1655Z. From there the
flight is scheduled to
re-enter North Korean airspace on or
around 2200Z.
END POINTS.
——————————
REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND
POC
——————————
6. (U) Please report delivery of demarche and
any immediate
response by July 24.
7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
information
is Tom Zarzecki, (202)
647-7594, [email protected].
Please slug all responses
for EAP, NEA, ISN, SCA, and T.
Washington appreciates
Posts, assistance.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163341
date: 7/24/2008 9:56
refid: 08BEIJING2877
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: SECRET
destination: 08STATE79122
header:
O 240956Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
8779
INFO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
CIA WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T BEIJING 002877
DEPT FOR EAP, ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2033
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL,
MTCR, AF, KG, KZ, TI, UZ, CH
SUBJECT: PRC INFORMED OF
DPRK-TO-IRAN FLIGHT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN
REF: STATE 79122
Classified By: Deputy
Political Section Chief Ben Moeling.
Reasons 1.4
(b), (c) and (d).
1. (S) PolOff delivered
reftel demarche and non-paper
regarding a planned July 28
Air Koryo charter flight from
North Korea to Iran to MFA
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department Missile Division
Director Zhang Junan. PolOff
informed Director Zhang that
we suspect the aircraft is
transporting DPRK personnel
involved in ongoing cooperation
with Iran on ballistic
missiles in violation of UNSCR 1718
and other resolutions, and
urged that the flight be denied
overflight permission or be
required to land for inspection
before proceeding. Director Zhang said the PRC would
«immediately
investigate.»
RANDT
NNNN
End Cable Text
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163402
date: 7/24/2008 13:50
refid: 08USNATO260
origin: Mission USNATO
classification:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08USNATO257
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHNO #0260/01 2061350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241350Z JUL 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
IMMEDIATE 0983
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
IMMEDIATE 2101
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY
DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
IMMEDIATE 6020
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS USNATO 000260
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM, SCA,
AND INL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, NATO, SNAR, TI,
RS, AF
SUBJECT: VETTING REQUEST FOR
AFGHAN PARTICIPANTS OF THE
NATO-RUSSIA
COUNTER-NARCOTICS TRAINING COURSE AT DUSHANBE,
TAJIKISTAN, AUGUST 11-19,
2008
REF: USNATO 257
1. This is an action
cable. See paragraph 3.
2. NATO’s International
Staff has provided the list below of
Afghan participants for the
NATO-Russia Counter-Narcotics
Training course to be held
at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, August
11-19, 2008. This request is an addendum to REFTEL
concerning Tajik
participants in the same course. Post
recognizes that this
information is incomplete and is
requesting additional
identifying information.
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
AFGHANISTAN
——————————-
A. Name: Mohamadullah
Title: 2nd Lieutenant Border Police
DOB: 1979
Place of Birth: Kabul Province
B. Name: Ghulam Ahmad
Title: 3rd Sergeant Border Police
DOB: 1978
Place of Birth: Kapisa Province
C. Name: Abdullah
Title: 2nd Lieutenant Border Police
DOB: 1978
Place of Birth: Logar Province
D. Name: Ataullah
Title: 1st Sergeant Border Police
DOB: 1986
Place of Birth: Kabul Province
E. Name: Mohammad Mansoor
Title: 2nd Lieutenant Border Police
DOB: 1979
Place of Birth: Logar Province
F. Name: Ahmad Jawed
Title: 2nd Lieutenant Border Police
DOB: 1984
Place of Birth: Parwan Province
G. Name: Matiullah
Title: 2nd Sergeant Border Police
DOB: 1987
Place of Birth: Badakhshan Province
H. Name: Mohamad Zaher
Title: 3rd Sergeant Border Police
DOB: 1987
Place of Birth: Qandahar Province
I. Name: Fazl Bari
Title: Major
DOB: 1963
Place of Birth: Maidan Wardak Province
J. Name: Abdul Saboor
Title: 2nd Lieutenant Border Police
DOB: 1986
Place of Birth: Parwan Province
K. Name: Hashmatullah
Title: 2nd Lieutenant Border Police
DOB: 1981
Place of Birth: Kapisa Province
L. Name: Shah Mirza
Title: 1st Sergeant Border Police
DOB: 1985
Place of Birth: Parwan Province
M. Name: Nesar Ahmad
Title: 2nd Sergeant Border Police
DOB: 1987
Place of Birth: Parwan Province
N. Name: Mohammad Nabi
Title: Brigadier MOI
DOB: 1966
Place of Birth: Parwan Province
O. Name: Husain Ahmadzai
Title: Colonel MOI
DOB: 1957
Place of Birth: Logar Province
3. USNATO requests that the
above names be checked for
possible human rights
violations and that it be informed of
any derogatory information
discovered. USNATO will forward
any additional identifying
information it receives.
4. The point of contact at
Post is Political Officer Reece
Smyth who can be reached at
[email protected] or by phone at
(32-2) 724-3268.
STEIN
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163482
date: 7/24/2008 21:53
refid: 08STATE80081
origin: Secretary of State
classification: SECRET
destination: 08ASTANA1286|08ASTANA1342|08STATE79112
header:
O 242153Z JUL 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PAGE 02 STATE
080081 242157Z
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T STATE 080081
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2033
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, AF,
CH, KG, KZ, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION ON DPRK-IRAN FLIGHT
REF: A. (A) STATE 79112
B. (B) ASTANA 1286
C. (C) ASTANA 1342
Classified By: ISN Acting
DAS Philip Foley,
Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and
(d)
THIS IS AN ACTION
REQUEST. SEE PARA 2.
1. (S) Posts are requested
to approach appropriate-level host
nation officials regarding
additional information vis-a-vis a
chartered North Korean
passenger flight to Iran (REF A). It
has come to our attention
that a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
meeting is scheduled to be
held in Iran on 27-30 July,
coincident with the
respective 28 July arrival and 31 July
departure dates of the North
Korean Il-62 flight. Because
the purpose of this flight
is unclear, potential overflight
states should continue to
carefully scrutinize it to prevent
any illicit transfers,
consistent with UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and
1747, to include overflight
denial or landing for inspection,
as they determine is
appropriate. Posts should make clear,
however, that it is not
USG’s intention to block North Korean
diplomatic travel to the
NAM. Posts may draw from
background, objectives, and
talking points/non-paper below as
appropriate.
———-
OBJECTIVES
———-
2. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN): Posts should alert
host governments to the
coincidence of the NAM meeting and
the planned North Korean
flight and stress that it is not
USG’s intention to block
North Korean diplomatic travel to
the NAM.
3. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN): Host governments
should continue to carefully
scrutinize the flight to prevent
any illicit transfers,
consistent with UNSCRs 1718, 1737, and
1747, to include overflight
denial or landing for inspection,
as they determine is
appropriate.
4. (S//REL KAZAKHSTAN) Although the Kazakh
government
apparently denied overflight
clearance prior to the US
demarche (REFS B & C),
post may share this non-paper with
Astana as it deems
appropriate.
———-
BACKGROUND
———-
5. (S//REL CHINA,
AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN): It has come to our
attention that a NAM meeting
is scheduled to be held in Iran
on 27-30 July, coincident
with the 28 July arrival and 31
July departure dates of the
North Korean Il-62 flight. We do
not know if the DPRK-Iran
flight will carry any associated
diplomatic personnel.
————————
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER
————————
6. (S//REL CHINA, AFGHANISTAN, KAZAKHSTAN,
KYRGYZSTAN,
TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN,
UZBEKISTAN) Begin talking
points/non-paper:
— We would like to provide
you with additional information
regarding the planned North
Korean flight that may request
overflight of your territory
as it transits to and from Iran
on 28 and 31 July.
— It has come to our
attention that a Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) meeting is scheduled
to be held in Iran on 27-30 July,
coincident with the arrival
and departure dates of the North
Korean flight.
— The purpose of this
flight remains unclear. We do not
know if it is carrying any
diplomatic personnel associated
with the NAM meeting.
— We would like to affirm
that it is not USG’s intention to
prevent or interfere with
North Korean diplomatic travel to
the NAM.
— We continue to urge that
you carefully scrutinize this
flight to prevent any
illicit transfers of prohibited arms,
equipment, or technical
assistance, consistent with UNSCRs
1718, 1737, and 1747, to
include overflight denial or landing
for inspection, as you
determine is appropriate.
— We appreciate your
cooperation in this matter. We will
provide you with any
additional information we obtain, and
ask that you do the same.
END POINTS.
——————————
REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND
POC
——————————
6. (U) Please report delivery of demarche and
any immediate
response by July 25.
7. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up
information
is Mark Felipe, (202)
647-5376, [email protected].
Please slug all responses
for EAP, NEA, ISN, SCA, and T.
Washington appreciates
Posts, assistance.
RICE
NNNN
End Cable Text
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163505
date: 7/25/2008 5:26
refid: 08BEIJING2887
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: SECRET
destination:
08BEIJING2877|08STATE79122|08STATE80081
header:
O 250526Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
8789
INFO AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
—————— header
ends —————-
S E C R E T BEIJING 002887
DEPT FOR EAP, NEA, ISN, SCA,
T
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2033
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL,
MTCR, AF, KG, KZ, TI, UZ, CH
SUBJECT: PRC INFORMED OF
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT
DPRK-TO-IRAN FLIGHT OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN
REF: A. STATE 80081
B. BEIJING 2877
C. STATE 79122
Classified By: Political
Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.
4 (b), (c) and (d).
1. (S) PolOff delivered ref
A demarche and non-paper
regarding the concurrent
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting
in Tehran and the July 28
DPRK-to-Iran flight of
proliferation concern to MFA
Arms Control and Disarmament
Department Missile Division
Director Zhang Junan on July 25.
PolOff stressed that the
United States does not wish to
interfere with or prevent
DPRK diplomatic travel to the NAM
meeting, but urged careful
scrutiny of the flight including a
possible overflight denial
or requiring a landing for
inspection, as
appropriate. Director Zhang thanked
PolOff
for the additional
information and said China will «consider
it carefully» in
deciding on a course of action.
RANDT
NNNN
End Cable Text
=======================CABLE
ENDS============================
id: 163507
date: 7/25/2008 6:00
refid: 08DUSHANBE980
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5118
RR RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDBU #0980/01 2070600
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 250600Z JUL 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON
DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0827
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0015
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
0188
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0222
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
0134
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0006
RUEHDIR/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0001
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0031
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA
LUMPUR 0001
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0001
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
0001
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0001
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
0038
—————— header
ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06
DUSHANBE 000980
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y — ADDED AMCONSUL ISTANBUL TO ADDRESS
LIST
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
DEA HQS FOR OGE/SOILES,
MONACO
DEA HQS FOR SOD/S KHAN
DEA HQS FOR SARI
STATE FOR INL AND G/TIP
ANKARA FOR DEA RD DESTITO
ISLAMABAD FOR DEA ARD MARSAC
KABUL FOR DEA CA BALBO
BEIJING FOR DEA SA KING
MANILA FOR DEA CA TEAL
DUBAI FOR DEA CA HUDON
LAGOS FOR DEA CA GAYE
MOSCOW FOR DEA CA JONES
KUALA LUMPUR FOR DEA CA RYAN
ISTANBUL FOR DEA A/CA GALE
WILLIAMS
OTTAWA FOR DEA CA KAPHING
PRETORIA FOR DEA CA BREEDEN
MADRID FOR DEA CA BOND
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: ARREST OF SEVEN FILIPINO AND
SOUTH AFRICAN
NATIONALS AND THE SEIZURE OF
13.5 KILOGRAMS OF HEROIN IN DUSHANBE,
TAJIKISTAN BETWEEN MAY 26
AND JUNE 19, 2008. UI-08-0014/YEH1K;
DLANGAMANDLA, NTOMBIZODWA
FELICIA
DUSHANBE 00000980 001.3 OF 006
CCX: UI-08-0013/XEHIF
GFAN-05-8001
GFUI-08-9322
GFUI-08-9320
GFUI-08-9123
This cable is a request for
action; please refer to paragraph nos.
23 to 29 for more
information.
SYNOPSIS
—————————
1. (SBU) Since May 26, 2008,
the Tajik Customs Service, Tajik Drug
Control Agency (TDCA) and
the Tajik State Committee on National
Security (TSCNS) have
arrested seven individuals (4 Filipino
couriers, 2 Filipino
facilitators and 1 South African facilitator)
and seized approximately
13.5 kilograms of heroin. The follow-up
investigation has resulted
in the full identification of one of the
leaders within the
organization, Sean Christopher TOWERS, a British
national, and the partial
identification of another organizational
leader, «Ucha»
LNU, a Nigerian national. A technical
analysis of
electronic data indicates
that «Ucha» may be residing in or around
Kabul, Afghanistan.
DETAILS
——————————
2. (SBU) On May 26 and 27,
2008, four Filipino subjects were
arrested by the TSCNS and
the Tajik Customs Service while carrying
multiple kilogram quantities
of heroin as they attempted to depart
from the Dushanbe
International Airport in Tajikistan on
international flights.
THESE FILIPINO SUBJECTS
INCLUDED
——————————
3. (SBU) Name Heroin Quantity Destination
Jona Gardose GARCIA 2.97 kilograms Istanbul, Turkey
Caroline Mejaro DUMAN-Ag
4.91 kilograms Istanbul, Turkey
Jonathan Luna BALONDO 3
kilograms Istanbul, Turkey
Loida Descaya LAURELES 1
kilogram Dubai, UAE
4. (SBU) During her
post-arrest interview, GARCIA related that she
was instructed to travel to
Dushanbe by Nancy Celestial QUINES.
QUINES is described as a
25-28 year old Filipino national female
residing in Guangzhou,
China. QUINES periodically travels to
Macau
and Malaysia. QUINES utilizes the following cellular
telephone
numbers: in China:
86-15920401520, in Macao: 853-66782264 and in
Malaysia: 60-172846716.
5. (SBU) QUINES is
frequently in contact with Muhammad LNU, a Tajik
national, who uses cellular
telephone no. 992-919433267. GARCIA
described Muhammad LNU as a
narcotics distributor operating in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
6. (SBU) During her
post-arrest interview, DUMAN related that she
and her friend, Luis BARING,
were recruited to transport narcotics
by another Filipino
national, only identified as «Dizi» LNU. «Dizi»
also resides in Guangzhou,
China. «Dizi» arranged for
their travel
Qalso resides in Guangzhou,
China. «Dizi» arranged for
their travel
from China to Dushanbe. After arriving in Dushanbe, DUMAN
eventually took delivery of
the drugs from a male subject, only
identified as
«John». «John» is
believed to be a Tajik national,
approximately 27 to 30 years
of age. After observing DUMAN being
arrested, BARING fled the
area and later returned to China on May
29, 2008.
7. (SBU) During his
post-arrest interview, Jonathan Luna BALONDO
related that he and his
friend, Cecil LNU, were recruited to
transport narcotics by
another Filipino national, only identified as
Atey Marloon LNU. Atey Marloon LNU uses cellular telephone no.
86-15918647148 and resides
in the town of Guangzhou, China. BALONDO
took receipt of the drugs
from Asiba LNU, believed to be a Tajik
national between 27 and 30
years of age. Also on May 26th, Cecil
LNU, approximately 26 years
of age, was successful in departing
Dushanbe with an unknown
quantity of heroin traveling via Istanbul
and Bangkok en route to
Guangzhou, China.
8. (SBU) During her
post-arrest interview, LAURELES related that she
was instructed to travel to
Dushanbe by a Nigerian male subject,
only identified as
«Obi» LNU. «Obi» LNU
is approximately 28 to 30
years of age. He’s described as an Anglo-African, who uses
cellular
telephone no.
+86-1379-442-5771. «Obi» LNU is illegally residing in
Guangzhou, China. LAURELES met «Obi» LNU through a
male subject
named «Maili»
LNU. «Maili» LNU is a resident
of Shuhai, China.
LAURELES received the heroin
in Dushanbe from «Obi» LNU’s brother,
«Emana» LNU, a
Nigerian national. «Emana» LNU
is approximately 24
to 26 years of age and came
to Tajikistan under the pretext of being
a «tourist».
9. (SBU) On June 18 and 19,
2008, the TDCA arrested three subjects
and seized 1.5 kilograms of
heroin, secreted inside the covers of
notebooks, sealed in plastic
bags and contained in a box that had
been dropped off at the
Dushanbe DHL office and was destined for
Madrid, Spain. Two of the individuals were Filipinos,
Etquibal
Marivic SANTA ROSA and Jaro
Manolito RUIZ. The third person is
Ntombizodwa Felicia
DLANGAMANDLA, a South African national, who
actually mailed the box
containing the drugs.
10. (SBU) All three subjects
are cooperating with the TDCA and have
provided statements that
establish a connection between these
individuals arrested by the
TDCA on June 18th and June 19th and the
previous four Filipino
couriers that were arrested by the TSCNS at
Dushanbe Int’l Airport on
May 26th and May 27th.
11. (SBU) During his
post-arrest interview, RUIZ stated that he was
recruited by Jairus DIZON, a
Filipino residing in Guangzhou, China.
DIZON bought RUIZ an
e-ticket and RUIZ traveled from Beijing through
Urumchi to Dushanbe in late
April and stayed at the Hotel Poytakht,
paying $10 night, until June
12, 2008. RUIZ also met SANTA ROSA,
who was also staying at the
Hotel Poytakht. While in Dushanbe, RUIZ
Qwho was also staying at the
Hotel Poytakht. While in Dushanbe, RUIZ
met Sean Christopher TOWERS
and «Aziz», an Afghan associate of
TOWERS’. After June 12th, RUIZ moved into TOWERS’
house, along with
SANTA ROSA and
DLANGAMANDLA. Inside another house that
TOWERS
controlled, RUIZ observed a
white powdery substance, which he
believed to be heroin, in a
black plastic bag. RUIZ stated that
TOWERS talked to RUIZ about
transporting 1-3 kilograms of heroin to
China, but RUIZ
refused. RUIZ observed a lot of drug
packaging
materials in TOWERS’ house
and also saw TOWERS’ British passport.
TOWERS would frequently talk
about the «goods», and it was obvious
to everybody that he was
referring to narcotics.
12. (SBU) During her
post-arrest interview, SANTA ROSA stated that
she was recruited by Nancy
Celestial, a Filipino residing in
Guangzhou, China. This is the same Nancy Celestial QUINES that
was
previously identified by
Jonathan Luna BALONO as his recruiter.
Apparently, QUINES recruits
other Filipinos to travel to Tajikistan
for «work», but
after arrival in country, they soon learn that no
legitimate work is available
and are pressured to act as heroin
couriers.
13. (SBU) SANTA ROSA also
stated that upon arriving in Dushanbe on
Apr. 24, 2008, Nancy
Celestial provided her with a telephone number
of an African male,
identified as Sean Christopher (TOWERS).
SANTA
ROSA then contacted TOWERS
and later met with him on a number of
occasions. TOWERS wanted SANTA ROSA to fly to Malaysia
with a bag
(containing heroin) that he
had prepared, and SANTA ROSA declined
the offer, but she remained
in Dushanbe and continued to associate
with TOWERS and also with
DLANGAMANDLA. Later, she moved into the
residence being occupied by
TOWERS and is believed to have assisted
in the packaging of the box
containing the heroin that DLANGAMANDLA
mailed at DHL.
14. (SBU) DLANGAMANDLA did
not implicate TOWERS in the 1.5 kilogram
heroin shipment, but she did
acknowledge that TOWERS is a heroin
trafficker. She also stated that TOWERS is her cousin and
that he
is a British National who
resides or has resided in Washington D.C.
She added that TOWERS had
flown from Dushanbe to Almaty, Kazakhstan
on or about June 12,
2008. TOWERS is currently utilizing
cellular
telephone number
7-7772658595.
15. (SBU) This information
was passed to the Kazakh authorities, and
they have subsequently
confirmed that TOWERS is a British national
and located him in an Almaty
apartment. The TDCA is in the process
of requesting a provisional
arrest warrant for TOWERS’ detention in
Kazakhstan and subsequent
extradition to Tajikistan.
16. (SBU) A TDCA source
related that TOWERS had previously made
reference to legal problems
in Canada, which prohibited his travel
to that country.
17. (SBU) Furthermore,
DLANGAMANDLA stated that «Ucha» LNU, a
