Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 144495
date: 3/6/2008 6:49
refid: 08DUSHANBE376
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08DUSHANBE70
header:
VZCZCXYZ0195
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0376/01 0660649
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060649Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0284
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0036
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0070
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0046
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0093
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0050
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000376
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT HUMAN RIGHTS SECTOR IN
TAJIKISTAN: STRONG INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP NEEDED
REF: DUSHANBE 70
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Jacobson; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: The Government of Tajikistan makes it
difficult for NGOs to operate effectively in the human rights
and democracy sector, and the NGO community has resigned
itself to the fact that significant improvements are simply
not possible in the current environment.
The presence of
international organizations like the OSCE and the United
Nations has marginally improved the operating environment for
NGOs, but the human rights components of OSCE and the UN have
taken low profile approaches that contribute to lethargy in
the human rights community. In
the meantime, the human
rights situation in Tajikistan continues to deteriorate. We
believe, however, that the international community can better
engage the government on human rights issues, and that NGOs,
if led by strong expatriates, can make a positive impact.
End Summary.
2. (C) The atmosphere for human rights and democracy work in
Tajikistan is characterized by pervasive corruption and
government opposition to substantive reform. Government
managers, particularly at the national level, are often
incompetent and unwilling to make decisions, and key
government institutions have been unable to perform basic
functions. Laws governing NGO
registration are overly
complicated and provide the government with a basis upon
which to prevent them from operating in the country for
myriad technical reasons.
Government officials use
passive-aggressive tactics to keep NGOs «in line» ) they
will not ban an NGO outright, instead claiming that an NGO
has not complied with registration requirements; they
selectively use tax and anti-corruption inspections to harass
or to curb activities.
3. (SBU) NGOs ) both local and international ) have been
unsuccessful at advocacy on sensitive human rights issues
(reftel). Much like the
independent media, NGOs self-censor
themselves by steering clear of subjects that would threaten
their relationships with the government.
Generally, when
human rights NGOs have attempted to engage the government
politically, the government ignores their concerns. In the
last 3 months, there have been two round tables designed to
elicit comments from civil society about the Law on the Human
Rights Ombudsman. The government
ignored concerns raised in
these meetings, submitting a version of the bill to
parliament that rejects key provisions on the office’s
independence and powers to access documents and premises of
law enforcement institutions. The
government, however,
continues to claim that it drafted the law after consulting
civil society.
4. (C) Local national employees of NGOs are susceptible to
harassment or intimidation by government officials. Security
officials have regularly picked up the National Democratic
Institute’s local program manager and verbally accused him of
being a traitor. Many local
national employees are subjected
to more subtle forms of intimidation.
5. (SBU) NGOs and international organizations also have to
contend with increasingly brazen attempts by corrupt
government officials to secure benefits.
A significant
number of NGO representatives have alluded to using lawyers
with «connections» to the Ministry of Justice during the
recent re-registration process.
It is commonly understood
Qrecent re-registration process.
It is commonly understood
that the lawyers built into their fees bribes to ensure that
the NGOs were in fact registered.
Ministry of Education
officials have attempted to extort our implementing partners
by withholding signatures on key documents contingent on
providing benefits outside of the parameters of the project.
In one instance, Ministry officials asked Relief
International to provide computers for Ministry staff
members. When Relief
International obliged by loaning the
Ministry 2 used computers, the Ministry officials rejected
them and demanded new computers.
Ministry officials are now
refusing to sign letters of support for the NGO’s continuing
programs. A Swedish colleague who
works for a UN agency told
us of an instance in which a government minister refused to
support a large development project because she (the UN
worker) refused his request for an Audi automobile.
6. (SBU) Even if an NGO actually does get registered, it
often must water down its programming.
The authorities
registered Internews Network after months of uncertainty and
embassy interventions. Staff
members from Internews, which
receives USG funding to produce programs for independent
television stations, told us at a recent meeting that they
cannot be too provocative if they want to keep their
operations going. They said that
independent television
stations «know their limits,» and that they stay away from
programs that focus on touchy subjects, like politics and
human rights. Tajik TV stations
broadcast Internews programs
that focus on cultural, social and economic topics that do
not provoke controversy.
Internews was unable to establish a
similar project for radio because the private community radio
stations it intended to serve were unable to obtain broadcast
licenses.
7. (C) In the case of an NGO like the National Democratic
Institute, which cannot water down its activities very much
to make the Tajik government more comfortable, registration
is still not complete, and we are unsure whether the
government will, in the end, take this step. Institute
representatives have told us that if the organization is not
registered by March 31, it will leave Tajikistan and
publicize the reasons why it closed its office. The Head of
the office in Dushanbe told us that the organization hoped to
get the participation of U.S. senators and congressmen in a
«powerful statement» bringing attention to Tajikistan’s
failure to allow NDI to operate, despite years of trying and
many assurances. We have told NDI
that we will support this
attempt to publicly hold officials accountable.
International Organizations Don’t Add Much
——————————————
8. (SBU) International organizations in Tajikistan have not
given the NGO community the confidence to challenge this
situation. PolOff attended a
recent human rights
coordination meeting that demonstrated the weak role that
international organizations play, and the void left by the
departure of the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding, which
had a Security Council mandate.
The OSCE Human Dimensions
Unit has shown that it can partly fill this void by reviving
the monthly human rights meeting.
However, the Unit’s
contribution to the meeting was to read portions of an OSCE
report with no analysis. The Unit
has organized marginally
useful meetings on human rights subjects, but has not
developed a coherent strategy to engage local authorities
(unlike other parts of the OSCE mission, such as the
Political Section). In November,
the Unit sponsored a
meeting on the Law on Religion that was a rehashing of a
similar meeting 2 weeks before.
The Unit sponsored a meeting
in February 2008 on the Law on the Human Rights Commissioner
that duplicated a similar meeting in December 2007.
9. (SBU) UN officials have also taken a low profile approach
to human rights issues. During
the coordination meeting, the
UNDP representative requested that the discussion be divided
thematically, so that those implementing human rights
programs could «skip» the portion of the meeting where the
more political aspects of human rights work were discussed.
UN representatives also took a muted approach during
discussion of the flawed Law on the Human Rights Ombudsman,
despite the fact that the UN was one of the prime
Qdespite the fact that the UN was one of the prime
interlocutors with government officials who drafted the law.
The UN also helped develop the law creating the
Anti-Corruption Agency, but could not or would not contest
the government’s amendments which placed the new agency under
the president and called into question its independence.
10. (SBU) High profile representatives of international
organizations have visited Tajikistan to discuss human rights
issues, and the government has been cooperative during these
visits. However, subsequent
reports or statements that
criticize or recommend changes sit idly, with little public
comment. The UN Special
Rapporteur on Religious Freedom
visited Dushanbe in March 2007, and urged that the government
take a balanced approach toward legislating on religious
issues. The UN’s field office,
however, did not play a big
role in efforts to amend the highly objectionable draft Law
on Religion later that year. In
2006, the ODIHR election
monitoring mission issued a report that criticized
Tajikistan’s electoral laws.
There is little mention of this
report in the international community, including amongst OSCE
representatives.
Are We Missing Something?
————————-
11. (SBU) While this environment is far from encouraging,
there may be room to maneuver.
Independent newspapers have
been critical of the government, and they are generally
willing to highlight reports that criticize conditions in the
country. Some issues, such as
corruption and economic
hardship, transcend politics and resonate with the public.
NGOs, international organizations, and some bilateral
missions, however, have been reluctant to openly discuss
accountability for failed programs, excessive bureaucracy, or
incompetence. NGOs are also less
willing to devote full time
international staff members to projects.
Comment — A Stronger Approach Needed
———————————————
12. (C) Comment: Especially with the departure last year of
UNTOP, we need to continue to take a leadership role on human
rights. We will use the rollout
of our Human Rights Report
to use targeted public comments to generate support for
ongoing initiatives. If the
National Democratic Institute
decided to leave Tajikistan, this will also present an
opportunity, albeit unsought by us, to publicly highlight the
Government’s unwillingness to seriously engage on human
rights. We also think it is
critically important that any
international NGO involved in human rights or democracy
activities have an international staff member. (We note that
in the past, when IFES had an international director, it was
quite effective on election reform.)
Local representatives
are subject to too much pressure from the Government to be
effective. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 144793
date: 3/7/2008 13:50
refid: 08DUSHANBE387
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08STATE22377
header:
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0387 0671350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071350Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0299
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000387
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/JOSHUA BLACK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, UNSC, UNMIK, KV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON SOLIDARITY WITH
KOSOVO AT THE OIC SUMMIT
REF: STATE 022377
Classified By: DCM Tom Hushek; reason 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) PolOff delivered the demarche on expressing support
for Kosovo’s independence at the ministerial summit of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference to Jamshed Khamidov,
Counselor in the Department for International Organizations
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Head of the
Department, Muzafar Huseinov, has already departed for
Senegal and will take part in the preparatory meetings for
the summit.
2. (C) Khamidov said that he still could not give us an
indication of Tajikistan’s position on Kosovo, and he did not
know whether Tajikistan would take any steps toward
supporting Kosovo at the summit in Dakar.
3. (U) Dushanbe point of contact for follow-up information is
Greg Naarden, [email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 145157
date: 3/11/2008 5:04
refid: 08BAKU221
origin: Embassy Baku
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 08STATE16737
header:
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHKB #0221/01 0710504
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110504Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4909
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS BAKU 000221
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/PGI, THOMAS CUNNINGHAM, EUR/ACE — MARTA YOUTH,
EEB/IFD/OMA — ANDREW SNOW, RICHARD FIGUEROA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID, ECON, PGOV, PREL, TI, AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN — REPORT ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
REF: STATE 16737
1. Per reftel, this cable contains Embassy’s 2008 country
narrative on fiscal transparency in Azerbaijan.
2. The process to publicize the state budget in Azerbaijan
has changed with the implementation of the Budget System
Law, which took effect in January 2003.
The President
submits the budget to Parliament for approval. Once
approved by Parliament, budget information is typically
published in the local print media.
Budget amendments are
also published in the media, once they are approved by
Parliament. During the fiscal
year, press releases
containing revenue and expenditure information are
regularly available. Information
about the State Budget
can be found on the Ministry of Finance web site
http://www.maliyye.gov.az/index_en.jsp
3. The Budget System Law, which was designed in close
cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, has improved
transparency. Over the last
three years World Bank staff
and USAID/U.S. Treasury technical experts have worked with
the government to improve the information included in the
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The dramatic
increase in oil revenues since the opening of the Baku
Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline in 2006 has made budget formulation
more difficult. Until recently,
the approved budget
included a one line lump sum amount for the investment
budget. Starting in 2007, public
investment projects to be
included in the budget were itemized in the budget document
submitted to Parliament for approval (although the total
amount of funding for the capital budget continued to be
stated as a lump sum amount). The
problem of selecting the
investment programs projects, after budget approval is not
addressed in the Budget System Law.
4.In 2007, with USAID support, the Ministry of Economic
Development (MOED)issued for the first time a systematic
capital budget call circular and established a Public
Investment Planning Department in order to promote more
well-organized and better informed capital budget planning
processes. In addition, USAID has
worked with the MOED and
line ministries to expand the number of budget planning
staff with training in cost/benefit analysis principles and
techniques. USAID experts have
been working with the MOED
since mid-2007 on development of a draft Public Investment
Planning Decree. Once approved,
the Public Investment
Planning Decree will mandate the adoption of rigorous
cost/benefit analysis procedures for all large-scale public
investment projects; and facilitate the formation of
sectoral medium-term budget planning committees to ensure
that sector strategies/operational plans and related public
investment plans are soundly formulated.
In addition, the
GOAJ recently approved a World Bank-supported resolution
mandating formation of a COM [What is COM?] macroeconomic
working group to ensure that consistent macroeconomic
forecasting projections are utilized for annual/medium-term
budget development purposes.
5. Treasury operations in Azerbaijan improved with the 2005
passage of the Single Budget Classification of budget
revenue and expenditures. The
lack of computerization of
the Treasury function has traditionally hindered the
Ministry of Finance from accurately determining its current
expenditures, commitments, and cash positions. The lack of
a computer system has resulted in the opportunity for graft
and a considerable lag time in the collection and
preparation of financial reports.
USAID has worked to
improve the budget tracking and execution system through a
treasury automation support program also supported by the
World Bank. Under this program,
an automated budget
execution system has been set up in four pilot sites
covering approximately 15 percent of public expenditures.
The GOAJ wants to roll the system out to cover about 85
percent of expenditures in 2008.
USAID’s current intensive
technical training support programs in the budget planning
and administration areas, which wrap up in early 2008, will
be followed by a new public expenditure reform support
program scheduled to start implementation in spring 2008.
The core goals of this program will be to ensure that
rigorous capital budgeting and medium-term budgeting
procedures are effectively introduced in key expenditure
sectors, and that the transparency and efficiency
characterizing the budget administration system is
significantly improved.
6. The IMF regularly reports on macroeconomic developments
in Azerbaijan through the Article IV consultation process.
In addition, the GOAJ also publishes a fiscal transparency
ROSC (Review of Standards/Codes); and is available on the
IMF website. A joint IMF and
World Bank-supported Public
Expenditure Management Assessment project is currently
underway.
7. Key relevant laws/regulations on budget disclosure:
Budget System Law 2003 as amended, and Single
Classification, Capital Budget Call circular (2007), and
draft Public Investment Planning Decree (expected 2008), as
already mentioned.
DERSE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 146692
date: 3/20/2008 12:57
refid: 08DUSHANBE432
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08DUSHANBE432
header:
VZCZCXRO2085
PP RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0432/01 0801257
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201257Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0319
INFO RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNS/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC 0024
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0059
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0038
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000432
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN/DUANE
DOJ FOR ICITAP/DUCOT, OPDAT/NEWCOMBE
OSD/P FOR KLUG, NSC FOR JORGAN ANDREWS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, KCRM, TI
SUBJECT: MVD MINISTER TALKS THE TALK WITH HIS HAND OUT
DUSHANBE 00000432 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary. In a March 14
meeting with Ambassador,
Tajikistan’s Interior Minister Mahmadnazar Solehov promised
continued cooperation with Embassy security operations and security
assistance programs and handed over a non-paper requesting $5
million in new assistance. He
lamented Tajikistan’s rampant
corruption (acknowledging the complicity of officers from the
Interior Ministry and other security agencies), the insidious
illegal drug problem, and trafficking of women abroad. Ambassador
Jacobson promised Solehov to give careful scrutiny to his request
but stressed that much more detail was necessary in order to
evaluate the proposals. She
highlighted the array of experienced
officers in the embassy with whom the Interior Ministry could
cooperate, pointing out that counter-narcotics, law enforcement, and
security experts were available to help improve the capacity of the
ministry’s officers and infrastructure.
End Summary
2. (SBU) During a March 14 meeting with Ambassador Jacobson,
Minister Solehov, waxing philosophical, said that he was saddened by
the crime and corruption in Tajikistan and wondered aloud whether
Tajik culture was predisposed to these activities or whether the
high crime rate resulted from the grinding poverty in the country.
He lamented Tajikistan’s rampant corruption, even acknowledging that
20 of his officers had been involved in taking bribes to look the
other way regarding a murder over property ownership. Sadly, but
ironically, Solehov recounted that the murderer had to spend almost
the entire value of the stolen property to buy off the authorities —
a vivid example of how crime doesn’t always pay for the criminal,
but is very lucrative for officials.
3. (SBU) Corruption is also endemic in the security forces trying to
combat illegal narcotics. Solehov
noted that Interior Ministry
mobile interdiction teams working near the Afghan border were
undercut by corrupt border guards and an inefficient Prosecutor
General’s Office. Furthermore,
the drug gangs could be formed from
as few as three to five men who could in a very short time transport
enough narcotics to reap $5 million a month. Solehov lamented that
even if the MVD arrested one or two of the narco-traffickers they
would quickly be replaced (or pay a bribe) and the cross-border
cooperation with Afghan drug runners would proceed as before. To
bust up larger smuggling rings, Minister Solehov said the MVD was
cooperating with law enforcement services in Russia and neighboring
countries to make arrests.
Responding to the Ambassador’s query
about the fate of Afghan smugglers detected in Tajikistan, Solehov
said half are arrested and the other half are put under surveillance
in order gain information on more senior drug gang members.
4. (SBU) Completing his trifecta of bad news stories, Solehov said
that trafficking of young Tajikistani women to Arab countries was a
serious problem. He asserted that
traffickers from Uzbekistan and
the Kyrgyz Republic recruit the young women and sell them into
slavery and prostitution abroad.
According to Solehov, breaking up
these rings is a priority for the Interior Ministry.
5. (SBU) Showing good timing if not good manners, in almost the same
Q5. (SBU) Showing good timing if not good manners, in almost the same
breath that he thanked Ambassador Jacobson for the U.S.
counter-narcotics and law enforcement assistance to modernize the
Interior Ministry’s forensics center and establish its analytical
center, he made a strong pitch for an additional $5 million in new
assistance. He handed over a
non-paper (subsequently received as a
diplomatic note) requesting $320,000 for modernization of the
ministry’s information directorate, $500,000 for modernization of an
operations center, and $4.2 million for construction of an OMON
training and operations center on 3.2 hectares of land outside
Dushanbe. (Note. OMON is a combination SWAT, K-9, and
explosive
ordnance disposal special forces team in the Ministry of Interior.
OMON also protects the embassy and responds to counter terrorist
events. The Regional Security
Office has provided special training
under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. Post emailed a scanned
copy of the non-paper to SCA/CEN, INL, and DS. End note.)
6. (SBU) The Ambassador praised the close cooperation between the
Interior Ministry and embassy’s office of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement which is assisting the ministry to improve
capacities to detect and investigate illegal narcotics and other
crimes through modernization of facilities and training. She also
highlighted the close cooperation between the embassy’s Regional
Security Office and the ministry’s OMON forces to improve
counter-terrorism capacity. She
pointed to the embassy’s Drug
DUSHANBE 00000432 002.2 OF 002
Enforcement Administration office as a source of expertise on
conduct of operations against drug smuggling. To improve the
professional competence its officers she pointed to the State
Department-funded Department of Justice Training Advisor as a
resource the ministry could draw on to improve its training regime.
7. (SBU) Ambassador Jacobson promised to carefully review the
proposals Minister Solehov made but emphasized that much more detail
was necessary, including engineering drawings, before the embassy
could complete a thorough analysis.
8. (SBU) Comment: During the
meeting, Solehov readily turned to his
Chief of Staff when a particular fact or name escaped his memory.
He did not appear to have an in-depth knowledge of the three funding
requests, but readily turned to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Khaidar
Mahmadiev, to clarify details.
Solehov was non-committal when
questioned about the current rumor that he is going to be appointed
the Prosecutor General in place of Bobojon Mahmudovich Bobohonov,
who has reached mandatory retirement age. Post finds Solehov a
reliable interlocutor and should he depart the Interior Ministry, we
would welcome seeing a friendly face as the Prosecutor General. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 146904
date: 3/21/2008 17:16
refid: 08STATE29748
origin: Secretary of State
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #9748 0811721
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 211716Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 7780
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 9309
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9254
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2504
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0543
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2994
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 9868
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 8831
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS STATE 029748
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PINS, PREL, SNAR, TI, PARM
SUBJECT: BORDER STRATEGY COORDINATION CONFERENCE IN
DUSHANBE
1. (U) This is an action request see paragraph 6.
2. (SBU) During a meeting with the EU’s Council
Working
Group on Eastern Europe and Russia (COEST) on February 28 in
Brussels, the EU asked A/S Boucher whether the United States
would support a border management coordination conference in
Dushanbe in October, possibly organized by the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Relevant bureaus at
State and other agencies agree on the potential utility of
such a conference.
3. (SBU) Background. Last year, the French Embassy in
Dushanbe offered to host a conference on a border management
strategy during France,s upcoming EU presidency. Embassy
Dushanbe convinced the French that the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe would be a better host,
because it already had a fairly well developed border
management strategy project; the 56 member States include
potential conference donors, the Central Asian states and
Russia; and Afghanistan is a partner.
Embassy Dushanbe has
convinced Organization officials in Tajikistan that the
conference should present a more or less agreed strategy,
developed by Organization experts and the Tajik Government.
The conference would seek donor buy-in for the strategy as
well as participation in its implementation.
4. (SBU) The situation, however, is complicated by the
ongoing debate on the mandate of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe Center (field mission) in
Dushanbe, which is set to expire in June. The Tajik
Government has proposed a new mandate, with greater Tajik
control over the Center’s activities, while reducing the
Center’s ability to pursue market reform and strengthen
democratic institutions. The
Finnish Chairman-in-Office has
prepared its own draft mandate, which the Tajik delegation
has rejected. Several European
governments are considering
an approach that insists the Tajiks accept a full mandate or
the Center will close.
5. (SBU) USEU and Embassy Paris are requested to convey to
appropriate officials U.S. support for a border strategy
coordination conference in Dushanbe drawing on the talking
points in paragraph 6.
6. (SBU) Talking Points:
— The U.S. supports holding a border management coordination
conference in Dushanbe in October.
— We believe the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe would be best suited to host the conference,
because of its ongoing work with the Tajik Government on a
national border management strategy.
— To maximize the benefit of the conference, the U.S.
proposes that Organization experts and the Tajik Government
develop a strategy, to be presented at the conference. The
conference would then seek donor buy-in for the strategy as
well as participation in its implementation.
— However, a final decision to
hold the conference in
Dushanbe would depend on the decision of the Tajik Government
to renew the mandate of the Organization,s field mission,
which expires in June.
RICE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 146919
date: 3/23/2008 6:16
refid: 08DUSHANBE433
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0433/01 0830616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 230616Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0321
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0103
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0077
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0053
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0042
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0061
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000433
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: EAID, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: NDI SEES «SCORCHED EARTH» DEPARTURE FROM TAJIKISTAN
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey Jacobson; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: The National Democratic Institute’s most
recent application for registration was refused by the Tajik
Government. With funding and
patience running out, the
Institute is considering exit strategies to implement by
March 31. Their resident
representative favors a «scorched
earth» departure (his words), drawing maximum negative
attention to Tajikistan. Post
supports the Institute’s
decision to make a political statement out of its departure,
but suggests the Institute hold off on any final moves until
after the April 1-4 visit by SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary
Spratlen. End Summary.
2. (C) On March 19 DCM and Pol/Econ Chief met with Harry
Bader, the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) Tajikistan
representative, regarding NDI’s exit strategy from
Tajikistan. Mr. Bader said the
latest refusal from the
Justice Ministry was full of specious arguments, including
faulting NDI for errors on documents that the government had
previously accepted. He said it
was obvious that the
Government had no intention of registering NDI. (Bader’s
suspicion that the government had no intention of approving
NDI’s registration was confirmed when his neighbor — who
runs a bordello whose customers include well placed
government officials — said she had heard he would be
leaving town soon.) Bader was now
seeking a meeting with the
Ministry of Justice; if it got the meeting, then NDI would
try to review its application with the Justice Ministry,
clarify any problems, and get an assurance that a new
application would be accepted and NDI be registered.
3. (C) Assuming that even getting a meeting will prove
impossible (as it has in the past), NDI is preparing to leave
Tajikistan, possibly with a bang.
Mr. Bader said NDI was
considering holding press conferences in Dushanbe and
Washington, DC early next week, highlighting the many petty
technical obstacles the Tajik Government has raised to
prevent registration, without actually coming out and
explicitly saying the Tajik Government is against political
pluralism. Then, if the
registration issue was not resolved
by March 31, NDI would announce its departure and blame it on
the Government’s opposition to democratic development. NDI
would try to draw maximum attention to this event, with press
releases in Washington, DC, Dushanbe, and Brussels.
4. (C) NDI is still deliberating on what course to pursue.
Mr. Bader said he favored a maximum impact departure, while
others at NDI’s headquarters were considering whether to
leave in a manner which would leave the door open to NDI’s
return. We told Mr. Bader that
the embassy would support
whatever NDI decided to do, and noted that a gentler
departure might simply reinforce the notion within the Tajik
Government that NDI’s departure would cost Tajikistan
nothing. State Committee officers
recently told an NDI
staffer exactly this, saying that Freedom House’s departure a
few years ago had had no consequences for Tajikistan — the
security relationship would go on, and aid would keep
flowing. We noted that this was a
rather parochial view;
since Freedom House could not come to Tajikistan to assess
the situation here, Tajikistan had no chance at Millennium
Challenge funding, unlike neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
5. (C) Mr. Bader said he was looking at options for maximum
Q5. (C) Mr. Bader said he was looking at options for maximum
public impact from NDI’s departure, and just needed clearance
from NDI/Washington, DC. He was
trying to enlist interest in
the issue by Members of Congress, to get a statement critical
of Tajikistan read on the House floor, and was trying to
exploit his Nebraska roots (Nebraska is home to the largest
Tajik community in the United States) by looking for interest
from Nebraskan Warren Buffet, to publicize that Tajikistan
was a bad place to do business and not creditworthy. We
can’t say how realistic his ideas were, and counseled him
that NDI’s departure would have an impact more in politics
than in business, but also that the Tajik Government needed
to understand that the two spheres are connected. We
suggested NDI also look for multilateral fora where it could
make a statement, such as the OSCE.
6. (C) Mr. Bader did not know whether or not the March 11
letter from NDI Chairman Madeleine Albright had reached the
President yet. NDI delivered it
to the Presidency on March
12. Given the propensity in the
government to avoid giving
the president bad news, we suggested that the letter might
not have reached President Rahmon, and suggested that if NDI
does leave Tajikistan, a second letter from a prominent
figure to President Rahmon might help explain to him what
happened, and why. (After meeting
Mr. Bader, we called the
President’s international relations adviser, who said he had
neither seen nor heard of the Albright letter. NDI also sent
a copy of the Albright letter to Foreign Minister Zarifi; a
contact in the Foreign Ministry’s administration section told
us that the Minister did not forward this copy to the
presidency; we don’t know whether the Foreign Minister has
raised this with the president in any other way.)
7. (C) Comment: We believe that few in the Government of
Tajikistan will derive any lesson from NDI’s departure unless
it is made with a media splash that makes clear that the
Government is to blame. As with
another dispute about doing
business in Tajikistan, that of Gerald Metals, the American
party found that quiet diplomacy accomplished nothing; it won
its case only after a loud, public, and protracted campaign.
However, we suggest that the Department counsel NDI to push
its deadline back a few days, to see if SCA DAS Pamela
Spratlen can make some progress on this issue during her
April 1-4 visit to Dushanbe. We’ll make the same case to Mr.
Bader here. It would be more
useful to have DAS Spratlen
help push the issue one more time, than to have her deliver
bad news after the fact. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 147139
date: 3/25/2008 13:21
refid: 08KABUL757
origin: Embassy Kabul
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07KABUL4142
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS KABUL 000757
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETRD, ECON, EAID, AF, TI
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN-TAJIKISTAN BRIDGE IMPROVES TRADE AND RELATIONS
BETWEEN TWO NEIGHBORS
REF: 07 Kabul 4142
1. (U) This report has been co-drafted with U.S. Embassy Dushanbe.
2. (SBU) Summary: Afghan and Tajikistani officials have agreed on
several steps to improve operations at the Afghanistan-Tajikistan
Bridge. Afghan vehicle traffic to
Tajikistan has increased
seven-fold and border tax revenue ten-fold since the bridge opened
in October 2007. Participants
agreed to a 50-percent increase in
operating hours and addressed pedestrian use of the bridge. The
Tajikistanis discussed plans for a consular facility in Kunduz and
raised the possibility of reducing taxes levied on trucks crossing
the border. The U.S.-built border
facilities will be completed and
ready for occupancy (with the exception of the truck scanning
facility) by the end of March 2008.
Both parties recognized the
need to revise the bilateral agreement regulating the
border-crossing point.
3. (U) The U.S. Government hosted a meeting on March 13 at the
Afghanistan-Tajikistan Bridge to facilitate discussions between
Afghan and Tajikistani officials on bridge operations.
Representatives from the Afghan and Tajikistani ministries of
foreign affairs, commerce, and transportation, border guards, and
customs services attended the meeting, along with representatives
from PRT Kunduz and OSCE Dushanbe.
4. (SBU) The bridge opened for limited traffic (four hours per day)
in October 2007 and regular traffic (eight hours per day) in
December 2007 (reftel). Prior to
the construction of the bridge,
approximately 30 trucks daily crossed the river on a ferry,
providing USD 40,000 monthly in tax revenue for the Afghan customs
office. Almost 200 trucks daily
now use the bridge, which the
customs office estimates will provide more than USD 400,000 in tax
revenue for March 2008.
5. (SBU) The Afghans proposed a 50-percent increase in the bridge’s
operating hours to accommodate increased traffic. The Tajikistanis
agreed to extended hours and will consider future 365-day
operations, but they expressed concerns about staffing and overtime.
While the bridge and
border-crossing facilities were built to
accommodate pedestrians, the Tajikistanis remain resistant to
allowing pedestrian traffic, and pedestrians currently must use a
passenger ferry to cross the river.
Both sides agreed to consider a
pedestrian shuttle service on the bridge.
6. (SBU) The Tajikistani Deputy Head of Consular Affairs, Yatimsho
Musofirov, outlined Tajikistani proposals to open a consular
facility in Kunduz Province, either at the border in Sher Khan
Bandar or in Kunduz City. The
Tajikistani MFA intends to reduce
visa-processing time for Afghan truck drivers to two weeks, and
extend the visa validity period t six months. The Afghan MFA
representative wecomed the proposals and recommended the Kunduz
City option for better accessibility and transportation links.
7. (SBU) Both parties referred to a January 2008 Afghan/Tajikistani
transportation agreement to facilitate cross-border vehicle travel.
The agreement includes provisions for temporary mutual recognition
of driver’s licenses and facilitated issuance of required
registration papers for vehicle use in the other country.
8. (SBU) The Tajikistanis initiated an unexpected discussion about
the reciprocal border taxes that are charged for trucks transporting
goods. According to the bilateral
protocol regulating the border
crossing point, trucks are charged anywhere from USD 50-200 on entry
depending on vehicle origin and weight.
Both parties were
interested in reducing or eliminating these taxes to improve trade
and will refer the matter to their respective ministries.
9. (SBU) Construction of the border-crossing facilities wll be
complete by the end of March 2008, withthe exception of the two
truck-scanning facilities that should be finished by May 2008. The
Afghan Minister of Finance plans to inaugurate the new Afghan
facilities at the beginning of April 2008. The Tajikistani side,
working on a slightly different timeline, may have a formal
inauguration, but at a later, yet unspecified date.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 147796
date: 3/31/2008 3:02
refid: 08DUSHANBE444
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0444/01 0910302
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0045
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0080
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0106
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0056
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0063
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY 0026
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000444
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
TASHKENT PASS DAS SPRATLEN, DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2018
TAGS: EAID, ECON, EINV, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — SCENE SETTER FOR APRIL 1-3 VISIT BY
DAS PAMELA SPRATLEN
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY JACOBSON, 1.4 (B) AND (D)
1. (U) Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to the upcoming visit
by DAS Pamela Spratlen. Following
is a brief overview of the
current situation in Tajikistan, and our thoughts on the key
issues DAS Spratlen will confront during her visit.
Political and Economic Overview
——————————-
2. (C) President Rahmon continues to consolidate his hold
over the government by ensuring that individuals from his
home district hold most of the top ministerial, law
enforcement, and revenue-related positions. Since the
President’s re-election in November 2006, most members of the
opposition have been removed from positions of authority,
reneging on one of the key provisions ending the civil war.
Rahmon and his appointees continue to argue that stability is
paramount, and that reform is a slow process. They view
democratic reforms as destabilizing, and have taken steps to
control all aspects of civil society in Tajikistan, while
beginning a personality cult around the President.
Government officials are committed to protecting their own
financial and political interests.
However, the leadership
faces long-term challenges.
Tajiks under the age of 25 (over
half the population) are more religious than older
generations, and their views are not swayed by the civil war
experience. Although religious
extremism is not currently a
major threat, worsening economic conditions and government
restrictions on religious practices are alienating the
country’s young people, and threaten long-term stability.
3. (C) The Government relies on revenue from aluminum
producer Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco).
State-owned and
non-transparent, Talco also serves as the President’s cash
cow; analyses in the press of production versus revenues
suggest that a large part of Talco’s revenue is diverted to
ends unknown. Talco in turn
survives on below-market price
electricity from state-owned Barki Tojik. Barki Tojik does
not get enough revenue to keep its infrastructure from
deteriorating and failing. With
deteriorating public
services and economic conditions, much of the population
relies on remittances from Tajiks working abroad.
4. (C) Government officials have failed to implement an
effective or coherent macroeconomic policy. Inflation in
2007 reached 18%, and prices for basic foodstuffs increased
50-100%. International investors
do not view Tajikistan as a
viable place to do business.
American energy company AES
closed its Tajikistan office in January, because it did not
see the Government as likely to conclude a power purchasing
agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the near future.
What foreign investment there is, is state-sponsored or
directed from Iran, China, and Russia.
Entities such as the
Committee on Investments and State Property are ineffective,
and the Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes
appears to be merely a tool to attack business rivals of
government leaders.
5. (C) The agricultural sector is dominated by cotton
production. Cotton is not
commercially viable, and is kept
artificially alive to the benefit of a few
politically-connected investors.
With government-backed
Qpolitically-connected investors.
With government-backed
loans, they have re-loaned money to farmers for cotton
inputs, used local officials to coerce farmers to plant
cotton, paid them below market rates for cotton crops, and
then kept the profits generated by this unfair, semi-feudal
system. Farmers go further into
debt, and agricultural
modernization lags. Over the past
winter much of rural
Tajikistan has faced a growing food shortage, as the
unusually harsh winter combined with mounting debts and
rapidly increasing food prices has forced rural families to
sell tools and livestock to survive.
Unusually severe winter
weather, combined with government hesitation on settling a
new land-ownership law, delayed sowing of the next cotton
crop (while long-standing policy prevented the planting of
other crops, of course), so that Tajikistan next year will
face a greatly reduced cotton crop, resulting loss in farm
incomes, and likely more severe economic disruptions in rural
areas and the banking sector.
Inputs and credit for other
crops are limited, so the next agricultural season looks
bleak for Tajikistan. Tajikistan
is highly dependent on
imports for its food supply and is vulnerable to the ongoing
worldwide food price increases.
We expect food shortages to
worsen.
Areas of Cooperation, and their Limits
—————————————
6. (C) Bridge: Use of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan bridge at
Nizhny Pyanj is growing. About
200 trucks a day now cross
the bridge going north, and the Tajik side recently agreed to
increase operations to 12 hours per day.
Obstacles to full
use of the bridge remain; there are still no provisions for
pedestrian traffic, and it remains difficult for Afghans to
obtain a Tajik visa. At a recent
trilateral meeting at the
bridge, Tajik MFA representatives said the MFA planned to
open a consulate in Kunduz, and possibly a visa operation at
the bridge itself — then said they looked to the United
States to fund construction of these facilities. The
inspection facilities at either end of the bridge are almost
complete, and will be turned over to Afghanistan in early
April. The Tajikistan hand-over
will be delayed slightly
because we are awaiting additional furniture and equipment;
construction may also continue on a larger commercial customs
facility on the Tajik side pending DOD funding. U.S. Customs
advisors plan to spend time mentoring Tajik counterparts at
the bridge later this year.
7. (C) Narcotics: Cooperation on narcotics continues to be a
relative bright spot, but only superficially. While the
Tajiks seize more narcotics than other central Asian states,
they are not willing to take on the arrest and prosecution of
narcotics smuggling ring leaders, some of whom are
politically well-connected.
8. (C) Security Cooperation: Security Cooperation remains a
strong part of our relationship, as we pursue shared
interests in Afghanistan. The
Tajik military is opening up
to cooperation with Afghanistan.
The Tajik Military
Institute intends to begin training 30 officers from
Afghanistan in Spring 2008. This
seems to be a sincere
effort to assist in the process of building stability in
Afghanistan, and stands in sharp contrast to the Tajik Border
Guards’ refusal to allow joint training with Afghan
counterparts. Tajikistan has also
accepted the Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, funded at $1.5 million,
with additional follow-on funding of up to $3.6 million, and
formed an interagency commission to explore the standup of a
peace keeping unit. The
commission will meet with DAO and
ODC later in 2008 to formulate next steps.
Key Issues for Your Visit: The IMF, OSCE, and NDI
——————————————— —-
9. (C) IMF/Assistance: In the wake of the latest misreporting
scandal with the IMF, relations with international financial
institutions have reached a new low.
The Government, seeking
another IMF bailout, has agreed to an audit of the Central
Bank. However former Bank
Chairman Alimardon, now Deputy
Prime Minister for Agriculture (area sector in which he is a
major investor), reportedly continues to coerce farmers to
plant cotton, and banks to loan money to farmers only for
cotton, despite the President’s declarations of «freedom to
farm.» A banking crisis is
looming; the Government has
Qfarm.» A banking crisis is
looming; the Government has
reportedly given banks money which they must loan to cotton
farmers and then must repay to the Government at 14% interest
— but the banks expect up to 90% of these loans to go bad.
10. (C) Presidential Economics Adviser Davlatov, when asked
how Alimardon continues in a senior government position after
misreporting to the IMF, said it was necessary to offer him a
good position after the Central Bank fiasco in order to keep
him from leaving the country with his wealth. Government
officials have begun to see declining support for financial
assistance, because of Alimardon’s transfer to be Deputy
Prime Minister, and because of the ongoing lavish spending on
prestige projects (palaces, dachas, and possibly a new VIP
Boeing), while the government simultaneously asks for large
amounts of unconditional aid.
Presidential advisers, in
turn, have expressed anger at what they perceive as our
«failure» to support them in the IMF. They do not see any
contradiction between spending on palaces, buying Boeings,
and simultaneously seeking unconditional financial assistance.
11. (C) Assistance in response to the winter power and food
crisis continues to arrive, including planeloads of relief
supplies from Saudi Arabia and train tank cars of fuel oil
from Iran. The Government has
insisted that all relief aid
be turned over to it for distribution by Tajik authorities, a
condition we and some other donors have refused. Government
officials have also told us in the last few days that most
relief supplies received by the Government are languishing in
warehouses, as the Government does not have effective
distribution mechanisms. The food
crisis of the winter is
not over, it will likely be worse next winter, may be
accompanied by another power crisis, and the Government has
taken few visible steps to improve its capacity to face such
crises.
12. (C) OSCE: The OSCE mandate in Tajikistan expires June 30.
The Tajik proposal for a renewed
mandate is unacceptable to
us. It includes increasing
support for security and economic
programs, but no mention of development of democratic
institutions or market reforms.
It also calls for a Tajik
national to be the deputy head of the OSCE mission, an
arrangement that no OSCE mission has, and for MFA operational
control over the mission’s activities.
The Tajik proposal
envisions the OSCE as a donor and humanitarian aid
organization, and the net effect of the proposal would be to
gut the OSCE’s ability to work on human rights and democracy
issues here. The Chairman in
Office (Finland) has circulated
its own draft mandate, which preserves the human dimension.
The Finnish Foreign Minister has written to President Rahmon
to make clear that the Finnish draft will be the basis for
negotiation, but the Taj
