Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 137540
date: 1/16/2008 13:58
refid: 08ANKARA89
origin: Embassy Ankara
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08ASTANA4
header:
VZCZCXRO3239
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0089/01 0161358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161358Z JAN 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4953
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000089
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ENRG, EPET, EINV, KZ, KG, TI, TX,
UZ, ZK, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY RE-LAUNCHES BID TO WIN CENTRAL ASIAN HEARTS
AND MINDS
REF: ASTANA 0004
ANKARA 00000089 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4, b, d
1. (C) SUMMARY. Turkish President Abdullah Gul is
spearheading a renewed GOT effort to strengthen
Turkish-Central Asian relations through visit diplomacy.
Unlike Turkey’s initial, post-Soviet era approach to the
region, the Turks are viewing Central Asia as a partner not a
patron, and offering a wide range of political and economic
cooperation. The GOT is also
striving for energy supply
security and believes warmer relations with Central Asian
leaders can create the conditions for Turkey to realize its
Caspian energy objectives. While
sensitive to the cultural
and linguistic differences between Turks and Central Asians,
GOT officials still believe «Turkic-ness» gives them a
strategic advantage and a foundation for bolstering relations
in the region. Shared democratic
values are not necessarily
a basis for strengthening ties.
Turkey will patiently
support its neighbors’ gradual democratic development, in
part by recognizing important achievements, notably in
Kazakhstan, where Turkey is supporting the Kazakh OSCE
chairmanship bid. The GOT does
not believe its previous
alignment with Western critics of human rights abuses in the
region paid dividends; President Gul is preparing to warmly
congratulate Uzbek President Karimov on his re-election,
despite GOT recognition that the Uzbek election was
undemocratic. Gul has already
signaled his desire to visit
Uzbekistan at the earliest opportunity.
END SUMMARY.
BONDING WITH CENTRAL ASIAN LEADERS
———————————-
2. (C) Personal politics are a
must for doing business in
Central Asia, MFA Central Asia Head of Department Sule Gurel
told us recently. Former Turkish
Presidents Ozal and Demirel
recognized this; so does President Gul.
Former President
Sezer, by contrast, was protocol-driven.
When Central Asian
leaders failed to make return visits to Ankara, high-level
contacts decreased and relations cooled.
Abdullah Gul has
been willing to cast aside formalities and take the
initiative to rekindle strong leader-to-leader relations. He
has already visited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (reftel) in
December 2007, and plans to travel soon to Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
TRADE, INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
UNDERPIN TURKISH OUTREACH
———————————————
3. (SBU) Gul primarily sees his
role abroad as helping to
create the positive spark need to kindle wide-ranging
bilateral cooperation. Business,
in particular, should be
the engine driving relations, and huge trade delegations have
accompanied him on his travels to the region.
4. (SBU) According to Gurel,
head-of-state participation in
Turkey-Turkmenistan and Turkey-Kazakhstan Business Council
meetings was an important feature of Gul’s visits to those
two countries. Turkey-Turkemenistan
trade is paltry at only
$500 million per year.
Turkey-Kazakhstan bilateral trade is
valued at about $2 billion per year — still a relatively
small figure given Kazakhstan’s size.
The two countries are
aiming for $5 billion by 2010.
Gurel noted that over 140
Turkish companies operate in Kazakhstan.
Most are small and
medium sized enterprises, focused not just on energy and
construction, but on sectors such as food processing and
financial services. She
emphasized the contribution these
companies make to employment and to diversifying the Kazakh
economy.
5. (SBU) To help further Turkish
investment in Kazakhstan,
the Turkish Chambers and Commodity Exchanges Union (TOBB)
pledged to create an industrial zone there, augmenting
President Gul’s diplomatic outreach as it has in the Middle
East and Pakistan. In addition,
Turkish Defense Minister
Gonul accompanied Gul to Kazakhstan, where the two sides
pledged to bolster defense industries cooperation. The GOT
has also sought to boost commercial ties by relaxing visa
requirements. In July 2007,
Turkey unilaterally exempted
Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek citizens from visa requirements for
visits to Turkey of 30 days or less.
Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan had already mutually abolished visa requirements
with Turkey.
ANKARA 00000089 002.2 OF 003
6. (SBU) Along with Pakistan and
Iran, Turkey is a founding
member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), of
which all Central Asian republics are members. According to
Gurel, the Central Asian states particularly value ECO
transport projects. The Kazakh
government would like to see
enhanced transport links between Istanbul and Almaty, and
Kazakh President Nazarbayev committed Kazakh cargo to the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway — the final link in a
trans-Eurasian rail corridor — during Gul’s visit.
7. (U) The legislation creating
the Turkish International
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in 1992 expressly
mandated the new agency to provide development assistance to
neighboring countries and developing countries where Turkish
is spoken. While TIKA’s mandate
has broadened since then,
the lion’s share of Turkey’s $700 million 2006 official
development assistance budget went to Central Asia and the
Caucasus. TIKA maintains a
coordination office in each
Central Asian republic.
CASPIAN ENERGY: GUL OFFERS TO
MEDIATE
AZERI-TURKMEN DISPUTE
—————————————
8. (C) Harkening back to its role
leading negotiations on
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Turkey has offered to
play a leading role in developing a trans-Caspian natural gas
pipeline (TCP). Gul offered to
mediate the dispute between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the disputed
Serdar-Kapaz gas field, which both claim in their territorial
waters. Resolving this dispute
could lead to an agreement
between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan on Caspian Sea
delimitation and pave the way for a trans-Caspian pipeline.
According to Gurel, both sides viewed Gul,s proposal
positively but negotiations have not yet begun. While
advocating for TCP, Gul was careful not to press too hard,
recognizing that Berimuhamedov must balance doing business
with Russia and Europe.
9. (C) International Strategic
Research Organization
Director Sedat Laciner, who is close to Turkey’s foreign
policy establishment, told us he believes there has been a
significant improvement in Turkmenistan’s relations with
Turkey and the West since Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov
took office last year. But he
does not believe the new
president is strong enough, or has the freedom of action, to
be able to appear to be defying Russia by committing Turkmen
gas to Turkey and Europe — even if Turkmenistan has ample
and sufficient resources. Turkey
can provide political
support and guarantees to help Turkmenistan move in this
direction, but can only be effective in cooperation with the
United States and the EU.
THE LONG VIEW ON DEMOCRACY
—————————
10. (C) The GOT is under no
illusions about democratic
shortcomings in Central Asia.
Turkey is encouraging Central
Asian governments to do more on democracy, Gurel told us, but
does not believe Central Asian leaders will respond to
pressure. She cited Uzbekistan as
an example, arguing Turkey
gained no benefit whatsoever from aligning itself with the
West in the 2006 UNGA Third Committee resolution to condemn
Uzbekistan’s human rights record.
Turkey-Uzbek relations —
already fragile over the presence of Uzbek opposition figures
in Turkey and the closure of Turkish-run schools in
Uzbekistan — further soured. In
a bid to shore up Turkey’s
ties with the government of Central Asia’s most populous
nation, Gurel said President Gul is preparing to send a warm,
congratulatory message to Uzbek President Karimov on his
recent re-election, and hopes to receive an invitation to
visit Tashkent soon. While
conceding the Uzbek election was
deeply flawed, she convey no uneasiness with the prospect of
President Gul being among the very first world leaders to
visit Karimov after his widely criticized re-election.
11. (C) The democratic situation
in Central Asia is uneven,
and not all bad, Gurel emphasized.
Citing Kazakh FM Tazhin’s
November 29, 2007 speech to the OSCE Ministerial in Madrid,
she said the Kazakh government has made strong and important
democratic commitments, including to press freedom, free
elections, political party liberalization, and religious
freedom. Turkey strongly supports
Kazakhstan’s bid to chair
the OSCE in 2009.
ANKARA 00000089 003.2 OF 003
A TURKIC COMMONWEALTH?
———————-
12. (C) Improving Turkey’s
relations with Turkic states and
communities is a key foreign policy component of the ruling
Justice and Development (AK) Party’s government action plan.
While respecting the cultural differences between Turkish and
Central Asian Turks, the GOT believes shared ethnicity and
cultural values still form a basis for developing political
alliances in the region. One way
the GOT has sought to
advance this agenda is by reinvigorating the
intergovernmental Turkic Summit, which Turkey founded in
1992. Turkey would like to
institutionalize the summit and
create a permanent secretariat for the grouping in Istanbul.
After a hiatus from 2002 to 2005, Turkey hosted the event in
November 2006, but the Kazakh and Kyrgyz presidents were the
only Central Asian leaders to attend.
Uzbek President
Karimov’s last minute cancellation, following Turkey’s UNGA
Third Committee vote, was a stinging disappointment for
Turkey. Baku is hosting the next
summit this spring, and the
GOT is hoping for a strong Central Asian turn-out. Gurel
told us the GOT has asked Kazakh President Nazarbayev to
intervene with President Karimov to encourage his
participation.
13. (C) The GOT views Nazarbayev
in particular as a strong
ally on this issue. Gurel noted
Nazarbayev was the first
foreign leader to visit President Gul in Ankara following his
election last year — a meaningful gesture for Turks. Sedat
Laciner believes Nazarbayev is a strong admirer of Turkey’s
western integration and democracy, and sees Kazakhstan’s
Turkic heritage as a means of strengthening his country’s
sense of nationhood. Yet he
cautioned that Nazarbayev, like
other leaders in the region, has to be mindful of Russian
relations and will tread carefully in «turcofying» his
country.
14. (C) According to Laciner, the vast network of Fetullah
Gulenist schools operating throughout Central Asia — and now
other regions of the world — are also deepening
Turkish-Central Asian relations.
While emphasizing the
schools provide a secular education, he said they offer a
Turkish environment and help convey an «Anatolian Islamic
understanding.» In Laciner’s
view, Islam is an important
part of Central Asian identity, and reminded us that Islam
came to Turkey from Central Asia.
The principal schools of
Islamic thought that have influenced Turkish Islam were
Central Asian, and there are strong similarities in the
religious practice of the Turkish and Central Asian peoples.
For Laciner, this constitutes an important opportunity — an
alternative, moderate Islamic understanding expanding across
a large part of the Islamic world.
COMMENT: THE GUL SUPRA-FOREIGN
MINISTRY
—————————————-
15. (C) Since taking office in
August 2007, President Gul
has blazed a trail across the Caucasus and Central Asia, to
Pakistan, and, most recently, on to Washington. His energy
seems to leave MFA diplomats breathless.
But President Gul,
PM Erdogan and FM Babacan do not appear to be operating at
cross-purposes, despite media efforts to exploit any hint of
space between them. Gul’s visits
to date have reinforced
well-established AKP foreign policy priorities, notably in
Central Asia. As a former
politician and FM, he is uniquely
suited to advancing GOT objectives in regions where personal
connections count. According to
Gurel, the operational
relations between MFA and the presidency are equally smooth.
Gul has an exceptionally large, experienced foreign policy
staff, hand-picked from MFA. As
the former FM, MFA staff
know his style. If we’ve heard
one complaint, it is that
Gul’s — and Erdogan’s — frequent international travel has
meant Babacan does not spend much time in the Ministry in
Ankara, leaving some key issues unattended to.
Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
WILSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 137635
date: 1/17/2008 8:34
refid: 08DUSHANBE106
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 07DUSHANBE1760
header:
VZCZCXRO4626
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0106/01 0170834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170834Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0119
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0010
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0025
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0005
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0030
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0012
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000106
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: DUSHANBE CONSUMERS TAKE A HIT
REF: 2007 DUSHANBE 1760
1. (SBU) Summary: While food shortages and lack of power hit rural
areas of Tajikistan hardest, the Government has tried to spare
Dushanbe these difficulties, to avoid unrest close to the center of
power. This winter is the coldest
in decades. While freezing
temperatures and snow persist, years of shortsighted economic
mismanagement and rising world food and fuel prices have brought the
hardships of the countryside to the capital in the form of power and
fuel shortages and much higher food prices. End summary.
2. (SBU) The first 40 days of winter, the «Chillai Kalon» (or
big 40
days of cold) ended on January 10, and now Tajiks prepare for the
second 40 days, the»Chillai Khurd» (or Small 40 days of
cold). The
first half of winter was marked by two major holidays associated
with doubled or tripled food prices, Id-Al Fitr and Idi Qurbon. The
second half of winter seems, so far, to be one of high prices
without holidays to ease the blow.
These price increases illustrate
Tajikistan’s extreme vulnerability to trade disruptions and world
price fluctuations. This
vulnerability in turn is the result of
non-diversification of the economy, this due to government neglect.
Power Rationing in the Capital
——————————
3. (SBU) Since independence in 1991 and the ensuing collapse of the
Soviet power grid, electricity has been in short supply every winter
in Tajikistan from November to April, as hydropower reservoirs run
low. Tajikistan exchanges much of
its excess electricity production
in summer months with Uzbekistan, and in return receives Uzbekistani
excess power in the winter.
However, this does not cover the winter
production-demand gap. Even newly
negotiated supplies from
Turkmenistan (via Uzbekistan) would come nowhere near to closing the
gap. Kyrgyzstan, a smaller supplier
to the Tajik grid, has also
reduced supplies this year. In
response, Tajikistan has reduced
electricity to regions outside Dushanbe to 2-5 hours per day. In
the capital, chronic outages, scheduled and unscheduled, are the
worst in years.
4. (SBU) Projects to bring additional generating capacity on line
have faced repeated delays.
Bickering over financing and ownership
terms has delayed the huge Rogun project for years; its site sits
idle and many years from completion.
The Sangtuda 1 hydropower
project was supposed to begin test operations in December, but
technical problems have delayed its startup. As a result, no
significant new generating capacity is in sight for this winter.
Even when/if these mega-projects come on line, their commercial
viability will depend mostly on exports or aluminum production.
It’s not clear how much of their output would go toward domestic
household consumption.
5. (SBU) The cities of Dushanbe and Khojand are the places most
vulnerable to electricity disruption, as most of their inhabitants
rely exclusively on electrical energy.
(Rural areas can, in some
cases, fall back on coal or wood.)
In cold weather, this leads to
overloading of power distribution systems, causing failures and
blackouts at the coldest times.
Power rationing began in Dushanbe
in November, despite previous Government assurances that the capital
would be spared. About forty
percent of Dushanbe is now without
power for several hours each day.
Street lights in the city have
been switched off, leaving the roads completely dark at night,
except for cars speeding through the fog.
Qexcept for cars speeding through the fog.
6. (SBU) People are blaming the government, and the usually stoic
press is even publishing complaints and articles critical of the
government. There has been public
discussion of the need to close
schools, as they are too cold to use; the education ministry has so
far rejected this measure. The
connection between the public’s
suffering and the government’s desire for more revenues is also
evident in rumors surrounding the cutoff of power for several days
in December at Dushanbe’s main train station. Although considered a
strategic object, the station and surrounding area were without
power, giving rise to the rumor that the electricity was
disconnected to export more power to Afghanistan.
7. (SBU) An opposition political party has called for the government
and the parliament to take measures to resolve the energy crisis,
saying that authorities are not able to provide power to hospitals
and maternity houses and alleging that this has caused the death of
newborn babies. Opposition
politicians argue that the best short
term measure would be to reduce electricity supQes to the massive
Tajik aluminum plant, which consumes about forty percent of
Tajikistan’s peak electricity production and is the country’s
DUSHANBE 00000106 002 OF 002
largest earner of foreign exchange.
On January 16 President Rahmon
called for diverting some power from Talco to public use.
Food Price Increases
———————
8. (SBU) Reftel described increasing food shortages in rural areas
of Tajikistan. Food in Dushanbe,
while not in short supply, has
increased dramatically in price since last fall, from 20 to 100
percent. Most food is imported —
overall Tajikistan imports close
to ninety percent of its food items, making it one of the world’s
least food-secure countries and very vulnerable to current increases
in world food prices. This is at
the same time that the government
has diverted funds from the central bank to shore up the failing
cotton sector, and had local officials force farmers to grow cotton.
Now with the Central Bank
pleading for an international bailout to
repay its cotton debts, the Government is pressuring private banks
to step in and continue non-market based financing of cotton
growing. This will benefit cotton
investors close to the President,
but will help keep the majority of Tajik farmers in cotton-based
servitude, and will help ensure that Tajik consumers continue to
face higher food prices and narrower choice of products.
9. (SBU) Combined with onerous customs regulations in central Asia,
bad transport infrastructure, winter supply disruptions, and the
unpredictable political mood of neighQing Uzbekistan, Tajik
consumers are in a tight spot this winter. The main source of
finance for imported food is the remittances from labor migrants in
Russia and Kazakhstan.
10. (SBU) According to the resident IMF representative, in 2007
price inflation reached twenty percent.
It is rumored to be even
higher. The IMF Director recently
told local media that inflation
in Tajikistan increased sharply since July 2007. This was mainly
due to the increase in prices of food stuffs including wheat flour.
Wheat flour is the largest contributor to the consumer price index
in Tajikistan — about fifteen percent — and is all imported. The
IMF representative called for diversification of agricultural
production to keep prices stable, saying that prices could be lower
in Tajikistan if farmers had freedom of choice on what to grow.
Instead, he noted, the Government trumpeted results of the cotton
harvest, perpetuating Soviet-style cotton quotas.
Gasoline Prices Spike
———————
11. (SBU) Tajik drivers depend on imports of refined petroleum
products, mostly originating in Russia, and all coming via
Uzbekistan. In December the price
of gasoline increased almost
overnight from 2.3 Somonis per liter to 4 Somonis per liter. Taxis
and the microbuses doubled their fares and became hard to find, and
traffic overall was down noticeably.
Up to half of Dushanbe’s
filling stations ran out of gas because drivers made a run on
gasoline in fear of further increases.
Now the price of gasoline is
down to 3.5 Somoni liter, still well above its earlier level.
12. (SBU) Comment: The Government of Tajikistan’s failed and
negligent economic policies have begun to have a strong impact in
the capital city, Dushanbe. Many
young Tajiks experiencing this
neglect and corruption firsthand are paying less attention to the
warnings of their parents’ generation to avoid protest at all cost
to preserve stability. The
memories of Tajikistan’s bloody civil
war — the fighting ended by 1993 in Dushanbe — seem much less
Qimmediate than the freezing temperatures and high fuel and food
costs. In addition, many
thousands of migrant workers home from
Russia for the slow winter non-working season can see the sharp
contrast between Tajikistan’s political economy and the relatively
efficient and open Russian system.
While the current difficulties
are unlikely to lead directly to unrest, they will add significantly
to the accumulation of discontent with the administration of
President Rahmon. End Comment.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 137826
date: 1/18/2008 10:10
refid: 08DUSHANBE120
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07DUSHANBE1046|07STATE87036
header:
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #0120/01 0181010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181010Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0123
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0009
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000120
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EEB/CBA, EEB/EX AND SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AFIN, BEXP, BTIO, ECON, EINV, ETRD, ADPM, TI
SUBJECT: FY07 BFIF REPORTING FROM DUSHANBE
REF: (A) 2007 STATE 087036 (B) 2007 DUSHANBE 1046
1. Per reftel A, Embassy Dushanbe
submits the following report
regarding participation in the Business Facilitation Incentive Fund
(BFIF) program in FY 2007. Post
again thanks the Economic Bureau
for its support for these two successful programs.
2. Dushanbe — Regional
Transportation Infrastructure Conference
BFIF contribution: $2,000
Amount disbursed: $2,000
Budget breakdown:
$500 for conference facility rental
$1,000 for interpretation
$500 for in-country transportation expenses
BFIF funds contributed to the Central Asian Transportation
Infrastructure Conference in Dushanbe May 7, sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Commerce along with Embassy Dushanbe. The conference
provided an opportunity for Central Asian transport representatives
to discuss their accomplishments and challenges within their
respective transport sectors, along with the potential for future
cooperation and growth.
Representatives from Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan focused on improving aviation
and road construction efforts to integrate Central and South Asia.
The high level of participation — more than 80 attendees —
demonstrated the desire for economic integration in the region and
building/renovating roads between Kazakhstan and Karachi.
Department of Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe Paul
Dyck opened the conference by explaining the U.S. government desire
to expand U.S. trade links with Central Asia, while reducing trade
and investment barriers through initiatives such as the Central Asia
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. He also highlighted our
mutual goal to create a regional electricity market, improve customs
regimes and border security, and integrate telecom systems. A
representative from Caterpillar made a presentation on their
products to the audience, with potential sales leads.
Continued U.S. support for development and reform in the Central
Asian transportation sector remains necessary to keep the dialogue
going. This conference demonstrated
that regional leaders share the
goals of Central and South Asian regional integration, and are
actively working towards them.
3. Dushanbe — Tajik-Afghan Cross
Border Trade
BFIF contribution: $9,500
Amount disbursed: $9,500
Detailed budget breakdown of costs incurred May 2 — December 31:
Salary 2841
Honoraria 250
Taxes 772.75
Equipment 50
Communications 83.87
Rental of Trade Fair Facility 500
Lodging Trade Fair Participants 1200
Meals during Trade Fair 600
Visa Expenses 700
Bank Fees 150
Stationary 520
Seminar costs 1,380
——
SubTotal 9047.62
EFCA Overhead (6%) 452.38
Total 9500
The Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, through their subgrantee
non-governmental organization «Sapeda», conducted a series of
seminars for businesspeople in the border areas of Tajikistan and
Afghanistan in the vicinity of the U.S.-funded Nizhniy Pyanj bridge
that opened in August 2007. Over
480 people attended the seminars
that increased the possibility for cross-border trade. As part of
this project Sapeda has also completed a legal manual in Tajik and
Dari for government officials and entrepreneurs. The project
culminated in a cross-border trade fair October 21-23 in Kunduz,
Afghanistan. 40 Afghan and Tajik
traders displayed their goods at
the trade fair, which generated strong public interest and press
coverage, and gave a boost to cross border trade and regional
economic integration.
The project built on the success of two previous cross-border
QThe project built on the success of two previous cross-border
partnership projects implemented by Sapeda and the Eurasia
Foundation, and helped small businesses and farmers on both sides
realize their trade potential by seeking to eliminate administrative
barriers across the border.
Bolstering cross-border trade and small
and medium enterprises fits with the Embassy Kabul and Embassy
Dushanbe’s mission priorities of economic development and regional
trade. The project gets to the
heart of regional economic
integration by building capacity on both sides that could lead to
increased trust between the countries and strengthened regional
stability, in addition to developing markets for U.S. products and
equipment.
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 137864
date: 1/18/2008 12:34
refid: 08DUSHANBE121
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
destination: 07DUSHANBE1596
header:
VZCZCXRO7395
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDBU #0121 0181234
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181234Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0125
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000121
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DRL/NESCA, SCA/CEN, NEA/IR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2018
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, TI, IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMS OFF TO GOOD START
REF: 2007 DUSHANBE 1596
Classified By: Tom Hushek, DCM, STATE; reason 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C/NF) PolEcon Officer met January 15 with International
Research Exchange Council Dushanbe staffer Anna Crowley, to
discuss progress on State Department-funded training programs
targeted at Iranian civil society organizations (reftel).
Crowley said that the first seminar, held November 11-15 in
Dushanbe, had gone well. Four
Iranian non-governmental
organization representatives from the field of social
protection participated, along with ten representatives from
similar organizations in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan.
2. (C/NF) The seminar went well, albeit with some small
tensions due to the Iranian participants’ presumption that
they were the natural leaders of the other Farsi-speaking
participants. The Iranian and
Tajik representatives received
small grants following the seminar to do follow-on training
and seminars on social protection with additional Iranian
social protection organizations.
The Afghan and Pakistani
participants were not interested in the small grants
following the seminar, as they have larger funding bases than
their Iranian and Tajik counterparts.
3. (C/NF) The Iranian participants encountered no
difficulties before, during, or (so far) after their
participation. They did not seem
worried about political
implications of their cooperation with a U.S.
Government-funded program, because their activities were
non-political. They were well
aware of the seminar’s U.S.
Government connection.
4. (C/NF) One difficulty encountered was for Afghan
participants to obtain Tajik visas.
Reportedly the Tajik
embassy in Kabul refused to take any action on their
applications. Fortunately, the
head of Fidokor, the Tajik
implementing partner, knew the Director of Asian affairs at
the Tajik Foreign Ministry as an old friend; she asked him to
resolve the problem, and he directed the embassy in Kabul to
issue the visas. Some Tajik
embassy staff in Kabul «got into
trouble over this» Ms Crowley had heard.
5. (C/NF) Fidokor is now on a recruiting mission in Iran for
participants in the next seminar, on child protection,
planned to take place in Dushanbe in early April. They hope
to follow up with two seminars on women’s issues in June and
July.
6. (C/NF) Comment: It is likely the Tajik Foreign Ministry is
aware of the nature of this program, especially given its
involvement in the visa issuance process. But so far the
program seems to be flying under the radar of the Iranian
government. The problems the
Afghan participants encountered
with visas are typical, resembling many other cases of
Afghans trying to come to Tajikistan for legitimate reasons
and being unable to obtain a visa (or being told to pay a
large bribe to get the visa). The
need for the personal
intervention of a senior official of the Foreign Ministry in
Dushanbe over routine visa matters illustrates the difficulty
of doing business of any sort in Tajikistan. End comment.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 138868
date: 1/28/2008 8:49
refid: 08ASTANA128
origin: Embassy Astana
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 08State1132
header:
VZCZCXRO2469
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPW RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0128 0280849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280849Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1551
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 0375
RUCNCLS/SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHAST/USOFFICE ALMATY 0149
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS ASTANA 000128
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN — O’MARA
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD, EFIN, ECON, PREL, AF, KG, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN CONTINUES
SUPPORT FOR TIFA, REQUESTS
ESTABLISHED FUTURE AGENDA
REF: A. 07 State 170917, B. State 1132
1. (SBU) Econoff delivered
Ambassador Donnelly’s letter to Vice
Industry and Trade Minister Aitzhanova(Reftel A) on January 15 via
Damigul Kabieyeva, Head of the Ministry’s WTO accession department.
Econoff simultaneously delivered TIFA demarche points (Reftel B) to
Kabiyeva and her deputy, Saadat Assanseiteva.
2. (SBU) Kabiyeva reiterated Kazakhstan’s support for the proposed
TIFA Council Meeting to be held in June/July 2008. She shared the
GOK’s concerns about the organization of the event in either
Dushanbe or Ashgabat, and wanted to know if the meeting would
definitely be held in one of those cities, or if other sites could
be considered. She contended that
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan’s
limited budgets may impact the effectiveness of the event. She
acknowledged, however, that 2008 TIFA Council Meetings held in
either location might provide a needed economic stimulus. Kabiyeva
also inquired whether or not requirements would be made of
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan regarding the size of their
participating delegations.
3. (SBU) Kabiyeva said that after
three years of participation in
TIFA, the GOK feels that there are few demonstrated results and
remains anxious to see TIFA and the Council Meetings «go from
dialogue to practical measures.»
Both she and Assanseiteva agreed
that the theme of streamlining customs processes would be
advantageous. Kabiyeva strongly supported the involvement of private
sector representatives and was amenable to facilitating regional
working groups prior to the Council Meeting.
4. (SBU) Kabiyeva recommended
creating an established agenda of
locations and themes for future Council Meetings based on a
consistent rotating roster of hosts and issues (similar in structure
to the Eurasian Economic Community.)
This structure, she added,
would allow for the more effective inclusion of desired private
sector representatives. Kabiyeva also recommended regular systematic
meetings held at different levels prior to the Council Meetings,
organized such that concrete negotiations could be held and
agreements (such as MOUs between business groups) signed during the
plenary. Her final recommendation was to invite representatives from
other organizations involved in similar work (such as the EEC) to
participate in the meeting.
5. (SBU) Kabiyeva noted that she
and Vice Minister Aitzhanova have
not discussed in detail their official recommendations for the 2008
TIFA Council Meeting. She
promised an official response in writing
by February 15. Kabiyeva also requested information regarding the
composition of the proposed U.S. private sector delegation.
ORDWAY
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 139035
date: 1/29/2008 6:35
refid: 08DUSHANBE168
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3757
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0168/01 0290635
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290635Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0140
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0012
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0028
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0007
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0037
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0019
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000168
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ENRG, ECON, TI
SUBJECT: Tajik Government Flounders as Electricity Threatens to Run
Out
DUSHANBE 00000168 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary: The Government
of Tajikistan has announced that
the reservoir feeding the Nurek power station, the country’s largest
source of electricity, might run out of water by February 6.
Extreme low temperatures have reduced inflow, causing the reservoir
to drop to critical levels. A
Nurek shutdown would lead to a
nationwide blackout. Even if this
does not occur, severe energy
shortages are probable for the next two months. The Government has
no particular plan to deal with this situation, except to declare a
«state of emergency» and possibly close more businesses and
educational institutions. The
government will likely try to keep
the Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco) running for as long as possible;
it accounts for 40 percent of Tajik electricity consumption, and is
the government’s main source of income.
The World Bank and UN are
considering staff draw downs if this situation continues. End
summary.
Dire Predictions and Contradictions
————————————
2. (U) On January 22 the Director of Barki Tojik, the national power
monopoly, announced that due to the coldest winter in 40 years, the
water flow in the Vakhsh River had sharply decreased, and because of
this the water level in the Nurek hydropower reservoir was
approaching the point at which the power station would cease to
function. He estimated that
current energy consumption would bring
the Nurek station to a halt by February 5 or 6. Without Nurek,
Tajikistan is largely in the dark, as the few smaller power stations
currently in operation cannot power much of the country, and
certainly could not power Talco.
The Director of Barki Tojik said
the government might then declare a national emergency, with
unspecified consequences. There
has been talk of closing
educational institutions and businesses.
However, on January 24
Deputy Energy Minister Pulot Muhiddinov denied that there would be
an emergency situation, but warned that there would still be serious
limitations on power use this winter.
3. (U) Some numbers: Nurek Hydropower station’s installed capacity
is 11.2 billion Kilowatt Hours (KWH) annually, or 30 million KWH per
day on annual average. This is
fully two thirds of Tajikistan’s
total annual power production.
The Tajik Aluminum Company consumes
18 million KWH per day on average.
This month Tajikistan’s
electricity daily demand is estimated at over 70 million KWH daily;
total production is much lower, hence the power cuts everywhere.
The World Bank told embassy on January 28 that Barki Tojik’s latest
figures for Nurek were that the reservoir was 6.5 meters above the
power cutoff point, with consumption drawing the reservoir down by
50 centimeters per day. This
suggests that, absent a thaw, the
power station may operate until February 10. We note that at this
time last year the water level was within 10 meters of shutting off
power production; but the weather was not as cold, allowing
neighbors Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to supply more power to
Tajikistan.
Scattershot Response
———————
4. (U) On January 23, 2008 President Rahmon announced the reduction
of electricity supplies to Talco by 1 million KWH. Later the same
day Barki Tojik reported energy supplies to Talco would be reduced
by 2 million KWH. The next day
the Mayor of Dushanbe ordered the
disconnection of all industrial enterprises in Dushanbe except the
Qdisconnection of all industrial enterprises in Dushanbe except the
Cement Plant and Milk Factory.
Small shops, service centers, public
bath houses and restaurants, and all Dushanbe markets were ordered
to disconnect from electrical lines.
5. (U) At a partially televised meeting of the government on January
25-26, President Rahmon complained about the performance of the
Ministry of Energy, Barki Tojik, and Tajikgaz. He called for faster
construction of small hydropower plants, and called for Tajikgaz and
the Dushanbe city administration to refurbish the Dushanbe and Yovon
heat and power plants. He also
ordered Talco to provide funding for
this refurbishment.
International Organizations Worried
————————————
6. (SBU) World Bank resident manager Chiara Bronchi met January 27
with Minister of Energy Sherali Gul to discuss the current power
crisis. She characterized him as
«completely in denial.» The
Minister confirmed the press reports that there are only a few days
of water left in the Nurek reservoir.
Once the reservoir reaches
the critical level, the country will be in a blackout. The
DUSHANBE 00000168 002.2 OF 002
record-breaking cold temperatures have resulted in a significantly
larger than normal amount of the reservoir’s water freezing, which
will delay the thaw needed to run the turbines. How long this
blackout will continue is difficult to predict.
7. (SBU) According to Ms. Bronchi, the Ministry of Energy has no
crisis management plan and is «sitting around doing
nothing.» She
noted that Talco uses 40 percent of the country’s electricity, but
due to the nature of aluminum production cannot be shut down
overnight. Bronchi asked the
Minister specifically about diverting
more energy from the plant to the population, but the Gul said there
are no plans to do this.
Just Give Cash
—————
8. (SBU) When Ms. Bronchi offered to bring in World Bank engineering
experts to look at the possibility of rehabilitating unused, old
hydropower facilities, the Minister responded that the only aid the
Ministry needed was cash. When
she said they’d have to give any
financial assistance to the Ministry of Finance, not directly to the
Barki Tojik electrical utility, the Minister said «then we don’t
want it.» Bronchi will meet
with Presidential Economic Advisor
Davlatov today and may raise the issue directly to the President.
The World Bank is also looking at a staff drawdown; Bronchi is more
concerned about clean water than electricity because in a complete
blackout, the water pumps supplying the city and individual homes
will fail.
9. (SBU) The United Nations is also making plans to draw down staff,
or close up shop altogether. On
January 26 the chief UN
representative, Michael Jones, called together UN staff to discuss
evacuation, as the UN does not have the infrastructure to support
staff living here if there is no power or water. The UN is looking
at moving staff to Almaty, and possible departing the country in an
evacuation convoy to Uzbekistan.
10. (SBU) Embassy called Talco, Barki Tojik, and the Ministry of
Energy directly on January 28, to get their views of the situation.
Talco contacts were reluctant to speak to us, asking us to contact
their press department for details on their plans regarding the
current energy shortage. The press
department didn’t return our
calls. No one at the Energy
Ministry answered the phones either.
At Barki Tojik, Mr. Salamsho, chief of the international department,
discounted statements of alarm about the situation, saying that
strict limitations on electricity use would help to maintain the
water level in the Nurek reservoir, and he did not expect the Nurek
power station to close.
11. (SBU) As temperatures rise in the Central Asian region, Salamsho
said, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would be able to resume some
electricity supplies to Tajikistan.
(On January 28 media reported
that Kyrgyzstan had agreed to sell 11 million kilowatt hours of
electricity to Tajikistan in return for increased Tajik power
supplies to Kyrgyzstan in summer.)
He believed the situation in
Tajikistan would «not be pleasant» until the end of March,
with
strict electricity limitations in place, but said Barki Tojik
definitely would not allow the Nurek station to reach a crisis level
where it would cease to operate.
12. (SBU) Comment: The government’s response to the power shortage
has been to blame the weather, neighboring countries, excessive
energy use by households and small businesses, and mismanagement by
government ministries. The
President blames his subordinates, but
Qgovernment ministries. The
President blames his subordinates, but
this crisis has been brewing for as long as Rahmon has been
president. He has overseen years
of little progress on new
hydropower projects while large resources from Talco and other
revenue makers, which could have been invested in new power
infrastructure, instead were wasted on subsidies to a
non-competitive cotton sector and on palaces and lavish
entertainments. Rising temperatures
in the next few weeks will
probably alleviate the worst aspects of this crisis, but if they
don’t rise fast enough, Talco will have no power to operate. End
Comment.
13. (SBU) Post will hold an Emergency Action Committee meeting on
January 29 to examine our posture and tripwires for further steps if
the power and water shortage worsens.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 139037
date: 1/29/2008 6:50
refid: 08DUSHANBE169
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3565
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0169/01 0290650
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290650Z JAN 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0142
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0009
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0030
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0039
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0014
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000169
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA
MARKING CHANGE)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENT RESHUFFLES GOVERNMENT, SAYS
COUNTRY,S PROBLEMS ARE NOT HIS FAULT
DUSHANBE 00000169 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) Summary: On January 25 and 26, the Government of
Tajikistan met to discuss its performance during 2007, and to
outline its plans for 2008.
President Rahmon presided over
the session from a flower-adorned stage in one of the
Presidential Palace,s large halls.
Ministers and regional
government representatives made presentations from podiums on
the floor of the hall, and President Rahmon directed
questions, comments, and criticism at them from the stage.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Rahmon announced a
government reshuffling. President
Rahmon used the government
session to lay blame for the country,s woes at the feet of
his ministers and other civil servants, and he used the
reshuffling to perpetuate the illusion that he is committed
to reform. End summary.
It,s the Emomali Rahmon Show, Starring…
——————————————
2. (SBU) While the intent of the session was ostensibly to
review the work of the government, President Rahmon used the
opportunity to reinforce his image as a strong leader
surrounded by underperforming subordinates. The televised
portions of the session showed President Rahmon empathizing
with the problems of the average Tajik, criticizing energy
officials for squandering resources, and berating those who
failed to implement economic reforms.
He used an
authoritative ) and at times condescending ) tone to bark
out orders, broadly outlining measures to address the
difficult situation affecting most Tajiks.
3. (SBU) President Rahmon also took the opportunity to dress
down a major political rival, Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev, the
Mayor of Dushanbe. Rahmon went
through a litany of problems
that he attributed to Ubaidulloev,s administration, accusing
him of ignoring basic public services.
He said that Dushanbe
did not look like the capital of a country, adding that he
felt embarrassed to show off areas outside the city center to
visitors. Ubaidulloev was visibly
agitated, and he was the
only official who did not refer to President Rahmon as &your
respected excellency.8 However,
he did not fight back, and
he said that his administration &would improve.8
Don,t Blame Me ) I,m Just the President
—————————————
4. (U) While Rahmon heard from representatives of all
government offices during the two-day session, televised
portions focused on four areas: economics and finance,
energy, agriculture, and social issues.
These are the areas
in which President Rahmon,s government has come under
increasingly overt criticism recently.
5. (U) Rahmon acknowledged the economic hardships facing most
Tajiks, and he gave the Ministers of Finance, Economy, and
Industry six months to a year to implement reforms. He said
that Tajikistan has received enormous loans and credits, but
that the financial sector has not been strengthened. He
demanded that at least one &free economic zone8 be opened
in Tajikistan before mid-year. He
questioned why, in 15
years, government officials have failed to make significant
economic improvements.
6. (U) Rahmon also acknowledged the frustration of most
Tajiks about the severe energy shortages and the high cost of
fuel. He criticized the Ministry
of Energy and the power
companies (mainly state-owned electricity monopoly Barki
Tojik), ordering them to improve their fee collection
QTojik), ordering them to improve their fee collection
mechanisms, renovate existing thermo-electric plants in
Dushanbe and Yovon, and build smaller hydro-power stations,
as Gorno-Badakhshan has done. He
berated energy managers,
adding &I am humiliating myself by begging for energy from
other countries, and you are just giving it away8 by not
collecting fees.
Up With Cotton
—————
7. (U) Rahmon addressed all of those involved in the cotton
sector in direct terms. He said
that the government had
allocated 110 million somoni to address the current cotton
crisis, but he said that &we will not give 1 diram to
extinguish cotton debts.8 He
directed the Minister of
Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister to put on a pair of
boots, roll up their sleeves, and &get working.8
DUSHANBE 00000169 002.2 OF 003
8. (U) Rahmon identified corruption as having affected the
government,s ability to provide social services. He said
that $10 million may have been misappropriated by the
Ministry of Health, and that irregularities had been reported
regarding agencies involved in determining land use rights.
He ordered the Prosecutor General and Anti-Corruption Agency
to look into the allegations.
And Now, the Changes
———————
8. (SBU) At the end of the session, Rahmon announced a
government reshuffling. The
changes related directly to the
problems that Rahmon identified during the government
session, and they showed that Rahmon is committed to ensuring
that Kulyobis dominate his administration. Curiously, the
most anticipated change did not occur.
While the current
Prime Minister, Oqil Oqilov, has reached retirement age, the
President did not replace him.
9. (U) The President placed old hands with dubious
backgrounds into positions that relate directly to the cotton
sector. Muradali Alimardon, fired
from his position as
National Bank Chairman, assumed a newly created position,
Deputy Prime Minister for Agricultural Affairs. Qosim
Qosimov, who had been Governor of Sughd Oblast, became
Minister of Agriculture. As
National Bank Chairman,
Alimardon was intimately involved in the spiraling cotton
sector crisis, and he was known as &President Rahmon,s
personal cashier.8 Qosimov is
widely reputed to be a mafia
kingpin who was loyal to the Kulyobis while governing the
country,s Northern province.
These two officials will be
charged with reforming the cotton sector.
10. (U) Changes in the finance sector have brought in new
blood. The new National Bank
Chairman is Sharif Rahimzoda,
who has a well-established reputation in finance. He was the
National Bank,s First Deputy Chairman from 1993-2001, and
was Tajikistan,s Ambassador to the European Union and NATO
from 2001-2006. He was also
briefly Chairman of both the
State Committee on Financial Control and the State Committee
for Investment and Property. All
3 National Bank Deputy
Chairmen were removed and replaced by Jamshed Yusupov (a long
term employee of the Bank) and Malohat Kholiqzoda, one of
Rahmon,s senior economic advisors.
The new Chairman of the
State Committee on In
