id: 132675
date: 12/4/2007 12:42
refid: 07DUSHANBE1724
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07SECSTATE162558
header:
VZCZCXRO3085
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDBU #1724 3381242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041242Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001724
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR T, NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, IR, TI
SUBJECT: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM — DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO TAJIKISTAN
REF: SECSTATE 162558
Classified By: Amb. Tracey Ann Jacobson, 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: The Government of Tajikistan, while concerned
about Iran’s nuclear programs, is unlikely to publicly
support calls for Iran to stop Uranium enrichment. Iranian
investment and business ties are more important to
Tajikistan, and the Government of Tajikistan will not
jeopardize them. End Summary.
2. (C) Political/Economic Section Chief delivered reftel
demarche to the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North
American Affairs Director Ismatullo Nasredinnov, on December
4. Nasreddinov could not offer an
official response, but
said he would bring the demarche to the attention of the
First Deputy Minister immediately following our meeting.
Foreign Minister Zarifi is in Japan with President Rahmon
until late on December 5 or early December 6. Nasreddinov
said he would ensure they also reviewed the demarche.
———————————
Iran Doesn’t Want to Hear From Us
———————————
3. (C) Nasreddinov commented that Tajik President Rahmon had
urged President Ahmadinejad, at a meeting in summer 2007, to
cooperate to the maximum extent possible with the IAEA and
the UN, in order to avoid having the nuclear issue
destabilize the region.
Nasreddinov added that within the
past week Tajikistan had received a letter from the Iranian
government explaining that its objectives in the nuclear
sphere were entirely peaceful.
Nasreddinov did not know
whether Tajikistan had made an official reply to that letter
yet.
4. (C) Nasreddinov said that Tajikistan sought a nuclear-free
zone in central and south Asia, including in Iran, as the
region had sufficient hydropower potential to make nuclear
power redundant (Note: Foreign Minister Zarifi contradicted
this position on November 12, when he told reporters that
Tajikistan supported Iran’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear
energy). Nasreddinov also said
that the Iranian government
had been «very touchy» whenever Tajik officials have raised
the nuclear issue with them.
Nasreddinov believed that the
Iranians did not wish to hear advice from Tajikistan on this
matter, as Tajikistan does not have nuclear power or related
facilities. He suggested that
Iran was unlikely to take
seriously Tajik advice on the nuclear front.
5. (C) Pol/Econ Chief requested that the Minister meet with
Ambassador Jacobson to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue
further. Nasreddinov replied that
the Minister and President
Rahmon would be leaving Dushanbe again on December 9 for
Ashgabat, and would return to Dushanbe about fours days
later. Nasreddinov would try to
get a meeting for the
Ambassador with the Minister during the two working days he
will be in Dushanbe this week, but was not sure this would be
possible.
——————————————
Comment: Polite Sympathy, Action Unlikely
——————————————
6. (C) In addition to the ties deriving from a common
language and regional proximity, Iran is an important
participant in Tajikistan infrastructure projects; the Anzob
pass tunnel connecting Dushanbe with northern Tajikistan, and
the Sangtuda-2 hydropower plant.
The Iranian Minister of
Energy was recently in Tajikistan looking at more
opportunities in power generation.
An Iranian bank and
Iranian businesses are active in Tajikistan, and there are
Iranian-funded schools, cultural institutions, and at least
one humanitarian relief organization.
Government officials
Qone humanitarian relief organization.
Government officials
and foreign policy experts have commented to us that they do
not wish to see Iran develop nuclear weapons or even civilian
nuclear power, which would compete with Tajik hydropower.
They want Iranian business and investment, and consider the
main danger posed by Iran to be in the area of religious
radicalism. With Tajikistan’s
difficulty in attracting
foreign investment, and its extreme infrastructure needs,
public official opposition to Iran’s nuclear program by
Tajikistan seems very unlikely.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 133024
date: 12/6/2007 6:37
refid: 07DUSHANBE1731
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1731/01 3400637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 060637Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0009
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001731
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: KJUS, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DUSHANBE,S RULE OF LAW PROGRAM
Classified By: Amb. Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4 (b) and 1.4(d).
1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy Dushanbe,s rule of law priorities
have become more sophisticated as we learn the depth to which
reforms are necessary. An
inter-agency advisory team
recently visited Tajikistan to assess the criminal justice
sector, and the team will soon provide recommendations on
program activities. We believe,
however, that program
recommendations constitute one part of a broader rule of law
strategy. We have started to
substantially participate in
legislative reform, and we anticipate political interventions
over a sustained period of time to test the willingness of
Tajik officials to investigate organized crime and
corruption. End Summary.
2. (U) From November 12-19, an inter-agency advisory team
visited Dushanbe to assess justice sector programs in
Tajikistan. The team, composed of
officials from the
Departments of State and Justice, met with representatives of
the Tajik government, non-governmental organizations, and the
international community. The
advisory team will make
specific recommendations, which Embassy Dushanbe welcomes.
We view the advisory team,s visit as the beginning of a new
phase of exploring rule of law issues, in which we become
more integrally involved in reform efforts.
The Foundation — Criminal Procedure Code Reform
3. (SBU) During a recent meeting with the advisory team and
Embassy Dushanbe,s Rule of Law Advisor, Sharif Aliev,
President Rahmon,s Advisor on Judicial Reform, said the
Tajik Government will look to the American Bar Association to
coordinate assistance in criminal justice reform,
specifically redrafting the Criminal Procedure Code.
President Rahmon has tasked Aliev with forming a working
group, and Aliev indicated that the government considers
redrafting the Code to be a priority.
While the American Bar
Association and Embassy Dushanbe,s Rule of Law Advisor have
been consulting with Tajik justice officials on this subject
for several months, this is the first time Aliev has
described arrangements in such a clear manner.
4. (SBU) The U.S. Department of Justice,s association with
the American Bar Association creates the pretext for Embassy
Dushanbe,s Rule of Law Advisor to have an official role in
the redrafting process. During
the meeting, Aliev agreed to
the Rule of Law Advisor having an «active role» in the
working group. In the past, two
additional members of the
working group, the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Head
of the Council of Justice, have also expressed enthusiasm
about the Rule of Law Advisor,s collaboration.
5. (U) The American Bar Association covers Tajikistan from
its office in Bishkek. An
American lawyer flies in to meet
with officials, and the Association maintains support staff
in Dushanbe. The Association does
not plan to permanently
place an American lawyer in its office in Dushanbe.
Not Buying In To Window Dressing — Organized Crime and
Corruption
6. (SBU) EmbOffs who work closely with Tajik law enforcement
organizations have observed that the the Tajiks hace the
ability to conduct serious organized crime and corruption
investigations, but lack the will to undertake serious
action. For the most part, Tajik
law enforcement officials
mask the absence of expanded investigations with statistics
that do not actually reflect progress.
For example, Ministry
of Interior officials point to a high number of drug seizures
as an indication that they have been successful in combating
narcotics trafficking. Virtually
all of these seizures,
Qnarcotics trafficking. Virtually
all of these seizures,
however, involve merely couriers, and there have been no
prosecutions of anyone suspected of having any influence
within organized drug rings.
7. (SBU) Numerous sources have pointed to the pervasive
corruption that characterizes official Tajik institutions.
EmbOffs view the Agency to Fight Corruption as yet another
organization established to fend off scrutiny from the
international community and the public at large. Tajik
government claims that it is taking concerted action to fight
corruption are not backed up by facts.
8. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe defines «concerted action» to mean
devoting significant resources and political capital to
empowering law enforcement and criminal justice institutions
to undertake extensive, complicated investigations and
prosecutions of mid- and high-ranking government officials
and organized crime figures. Such an endeavor could include a
special court to try suspects, with a corresponding team of
prosecutors and investigators.
Special legislation would be
adopted, and judges, prosecutors, and investigators would be
vetted. Ideally, Tajik authorities would invite technical
assistance from the international community.
9. (SBU) At this point, we have no indication that Tajik
authorities are prepared to even begin discussing a
comprehensive or serious approach to fighting organized crime
and corruption. We have observed,
however, that
Tajikistan,s unwillingness to engage in such an effort
severely limits the degree to which we can meet crucial
mission goals.
Programs and Exchanges
10. (U) We eagerly await the findings and recommendations of
the justice sector assessment team.
We recognize the
importance of funding exchange programs, civil society
projects, and law enforcement and judicial development
programs. We do, however,
recognize that we must complement
these programs with the rule of law interventions mentioned
above. Moreover, we recognize
that rule of law issues extend
beyond the justice sector — civil and administrative
processes also suffer from a high degree of corruption and
lack of due process.
Comment
11. (SBU) Comment: The Rule of Law Advisor,s participation
in redrafting the Criminal Procedure Code is an opportunity
that we have to seize. We will
initiate discussions with
Tajik officials to test their willingness to take serious
steps at enabling judges, prosecutors and law enforcement
officials along the lines mentioned above. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 133235
date: 12/7/2007 7:30
refid: 07DUSHANBE1734
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07DUSHANBE1589
header:
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1734 3410730
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070730Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0014
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DIRNSCPO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001734
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND SCA/RA LEO GALLAGHER,
EEB/IFD/OMA ANDREW SNOW, TREASURY FOR JEFF BAKER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: EFIN, EAGR, ECON, PGOV, PREL, EINV, ETRD, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK COTTON DEBT CRISIS UPDATE
REF: DUSHANBE 1589
Classified By: Tracyey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On December 6 Pol/Econ Chief spoke with Katherine Kelm
of the Asian Development Bank (protect), about the status of
efforts by the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and
International Monetary Fund, to resolve the problems of
Tajikistan’s $400 million cotton debt (reftel), and the
prospect that Tajikistan would accept another Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility from the International Monetary
Fund.
2. (C) Kelm informed us that an International Monetary Fund
assessment team arrived in Dushanbe early on December 6. The
team will spend a week in-country on a fact-finding mission
to determine to what degree the cotton debt crisis would
impact Tajikistan’s macroeconomic stability, and the extent
to which there are state guarantees on the cotton debt.
3. (C) The team will discuss the possibility of a Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility program for Tajikistan.
Tajikistan would have to formally request the program. Kelm
noted that if Tajikistan accepted such a program, then «all
projects must come under its umbrella.» She said that the
three international financial institutions were working
closely together on this issue, and «would take a strong
stance that Tajikistan must implement reforms.»
4. (C) After the International Monetary Fund team has
completed its week-long visit, it may issue a statement on
the degree of seriousness of the situation. The three
international financial institutions may also organize a
briefing for donors on the cotton debt crisis, to which the
U.S. Embassy would be invited.
5. (C) Prime Minister Aqil Aqilov November 28 publicly issued
instructions to Tajikistan,s banks to design new mechanisms
for financing next year,s cotton planting. This suggests
that the government may be panicking about where the funds
will come from for the upcoming season.
The Asian
Development Bank and World Bank programs would include
technical advice to private banks as well as agricultural
loan guarantees to help fund the foreseen shortfall in cotton
loans.
6. (C) The first of the foreign banks, reported repayment
calls with the non-banking institution Kredit Invest that was
due at the end of November came and went. We do not know
whether the Tajik government rescheduled the loan with ATF
Bank or if the Asian Development Bank assisted in holding off
the creditor.
7. (C) Comment: President Rahmon «hit the roof» when the
international financial institutions pushed him to accept a
new International Monetary Fund program in early November.
However, it is unclear whether the Asian Development Bank
will stick to its guns and insist that Tajikistan accept a
new International Monetary Fund program as a condition for it
to start its new $80 million budget support program. Members
of the President’s Center for Strategic Research commented to
the Ambassador on December 5 that there were still a variety
of paths open to the Government of Tajikistan, but that the
main goal must be to «free the farmers» from crippling debts
Qmain goal must be to «free the farmers» from crippling debts
and allow them to grow whatever crops they feel the market
demands, without undue government interference. The Tajik
government seems very reluctant to start a new International
Monetary Fund program and is carefully studying its other
options, possibly including the sale of state assets or
natural resource exploitation rights.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 133236
date: 12/7/2007 7:31
refid: 07DUSHANBE1735
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO5973
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1735/01 3410731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070731Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0015
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001735
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KJUS, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DUSHANBE,S RULE OF LAW PROGRAM
1. (U) This cable is being retransmitted to correct the
classification from Confidential to Sensitive But
Unclassified.
SIPDIS
2. (SBU) Summary: Embassy Dushanbe,s rule of law priorities
have become more sophisticated as we learn the depth to which
reforms are necessary. An
inter-agency advisory team
recently visited Tajikistan to assess the criminal justice
sector, and the team will soon provide recommendations on
program activities. We believe,
however, that program
recommendations constitute one part of a broader rule of law
strategy. We have started to
substantially participate in
legislative reform, and we anticipate political interventions
over a sustained period of time to test the willingness of
Tajik officials to investigate organized crime and
corruption. End Summary.
3. (U) From November 12-19, an inter-agency advisory team
visited Dushanbe to assess justice sector programs in
Tajikistan. The team, composed of
officials from the
Departments of State and Justice, met with representatives of
the Tajik government, non-governmental organizations, and the
international community. The
advisory team will make
specific recommendations, which Embassy Dushanbe welcomes.
We view the advisory team,s visit as the beginning of a new
phase of exploring rule of law issues, in which we become
more integrally involved in reform efforts.
The Foundation — Criminal Procedure Code Reform
4. (SBU) During a recent meeting with the advisory team and
Embassy Dushanbe,s Rule of Law Advisor, Sharif Aliev,
President Rahmon,s Advisor on Judicial Reform, said the
Tajik Government will look to the American Bar Association to
coordinate assistance in criminal justice reform,
specifically redrafting the Criminal Procedure Code.
President Rahmon has tasked Aliev with forming a working
group, and Aliev indicated that the government considers
redrafting the Code to be a priority.
While the American Bar
Association and Embassy Dushanbe,s Rule of Law Advisor have
been consulting with Tajik justice officials on this subject
for several months, this is the first time Aliev has
described arrangements in such a clear manner.
5. (SBU) The U.S. Department of Justice,s association with
the American Bar Association creates the pretext for Embassy
Dushanbe,s Rule of Law Advisor to have an official role in
the redrafting process. During
the meeting, Aliev agreed to
the Rule of Law Advisor having an «active role» in the
working group. In the past, two
additional members of the
working group, the Chairman of the Supreme Court and the Head
of the Council of Justice, have also expressed enthusiasm
about the Rule of Law Advisor,s collaboration.
6. (U) The American Bar Association covers Tajikistan from
its office in Bishkek. An
American lawyer flies in to meet
with officials, and the Association maintains support staff
in Dushanbe. The Association does
not plan to permanently
place an American lawyer in its office in Dushanbe.
Not Buying In To Window Dressing — Organized Crime and
Corruption
7. (SBU) EmbOffs who work closely with Tajik law enforcement
organizations have observed that the the Tajiks hace the
ability to conduct serious organized crime and corruption
investigations, but lack the will to undertake serious
action. For the most part, Tajik
law enforcement officials
mask the absence of expanded investigations with statistics
that do not actually reflect progress.
For example, Ministry
of Interior officials point to a high number of drug seizures
as an indication that they have been successful in combating
narcotics trafficking. Virtually
all of these seizures,
Qnarcotics trafficking. Virtually
all of these seizures,
however, involve merely couriers, and there have been no
prosecutions of anyone suspected of having any influence
within organized drug rings.
8. (SBU) Numerous sources have pointed to the pervasive
corruption that characterizes official Tajik institutions.
EmbOffs view the Agency to Fight Corruption as yet another
organization established to fend off scrutiny from the
international community and the public at large. Tajik
government claims that it is taking concerted action to fight
corruption are not backed up by facts.
9. (SBU) Embassy Dushanbe defines «concerted action» to mean
devoting significant resources and political capital to
DUSHANBE 00001735 002 OF 002
empowering law enforcement and criminal justice institutions
to undertake extensive, complicated investigations and
prosecutions of mid- and high-ranking government officials
and organized crime figures. Such an endeavor could include a
special court to try suspects, with a corresponding team of
prosecutors and investigators.
Special legislation would be
adopted, and judges, prosecutors, and investigators would be
vetted. Ideally, Tajik authorities would invite technical
assistance from the international community.
10. (SBU) At this point, we have no indication that Tajik
authorities are prepared to even begin discussing a
comprehensive or serious approach to fighting organized crime
and corruption. We have observed,
however, that
Tajikistan,s unwillingness to engage in such an effort
severely limits the degree to which we can meet crucial
mission goals.
Programs and Exchanges
11. (U) We eagerly await the findings and recommendations of
the justice sector assessment team.
We recognize the
importance of funding exchange programs, civil society
projects, and law enforcement and judicial development
programs. We do, however,
recognize that we must complement
these programs with the rule of law interventions mentioned
above. Moreover, we recognize
that rule of law issues extend
beyond the justice sector — civil and administrative
processes also suffer from a high degree of corruption and
lack of due process.
Comment
12. (SBU) Comment: The Rule of Law Advisor,s participation
in redrafting the Criminal Procedure Code is an opportunity
that we have to seize. We will
initiate discussions with
Tajik officials to test their willingness to take serious
steps at enabling judges, prosecutors and law enforcement
officials along the lines mentioned above. End comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 133293
date: 12/7/2007 11:43
refid: 07DUSHANBE1738
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07STATE162192
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1738 3411143
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071143Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0019
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001738
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/WCI C. HARQAND S. MUBANGU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017
TAGS: PHUM, PINR, PTER, TI
SUBJECT: 2007 CONTINUED DETENTION DETERMINATIONS REGARDING
CERTAIN DETAINEES
REF: STATE 162192
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Matt Purl for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel
demarche, on the continued
detention determination of JummQan, to Ismatullo
Nasreddinov, Head of the Department of European and American
Countries at the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Nasredinov indicated that he would forward the information we
provided to the State Committee for National Security.
2. (C) Nasredinov will notify
us if Tajikistan intends to
make a written submission for the Administrative Review Board
to consider.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 134038
date: 12/12/2007 17:18
refid: 07DUSHANBE1742
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07STATE164437
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1742 3461718
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121718Z DEC 07 ZDK CIT RUEHCB 4788 3471207
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0026
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001742
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/ESC/TFS JAY JALLORINA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ETTC, KTFN, PTER, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — TERRORISM FINANCE COORDINATION OFFICER
REF: STATE 164437
1. Dushanbe terrorism finance coordination officer is
pol/econ chief D. Matt Purl, telephone 992-37-229-2000, ext.
2501. Unclassified email:
[email protected], Classified
email: [email protected].
2. Dushanbe deputy terrorism finance coordination officer is
pol/econ officer James Ricker, telephone 992-37-229-2000,
ext. 2507. Unclassified email:
[email protected],
Classified email: [email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 134132
date: 12/13/2007 10:53
refid: 07DUSHANBE1746
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 07STATE164437
header:
VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1746 3471053
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131053Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0028
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001746
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/ESC/TFS JAY JALLORINA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN, ETTC, KTFN, PTER, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN — TERRORISM FINANCE COORDINATION OFFICER
REF: STATE 164437
1. Dushanbe terrorism finance coordination officer is
pol/econ chief D. Matt Purl, telephone 992-37-229-2000, ext.
2501. Unclassified email:
[email protected], Classified
email: [email protected].
2. Dushanbe deputy terrorism finance coordination officer is
pol/econ officer James Ricker, telephone 992-37-229-2000,
ext. 2507. Unclassified email:
[email protected],
Classified email: [email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 134396
date: 12/14/2007 12:09
refid: 07DUSHANBE1752
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 07STATE166405
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1752 3481209
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 141209Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0033
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001752
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA J. FOO
DEPT FOR NEA/IR T. STANDAERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: CASC, KDEM, KISL, KJUS, KPRP, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST — MISSING AMCIT ROBERT LEVINSON
REF: STATE 166405
Classified By: AMBASSADOR TRACEY A. JACOBSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)
1. (S) PolOff delivered a demarche regarding Robert Levinson
on December 14 to Ismatullo Nasredinov, Head of the Foreign
Ministry,s Department of European and American Affairs. He
said he would forward the information on Levinson to his
colleagues at the Department of Asian and African Affairs,
who have direct contact with representatives of the Iranian
Embassy in Tajikistan. He indicated that the Iranians would
likely tell the Tajiks that matters involving American
citizens in Iran should not concern them.
2. (S) If Ministry representatives receive any information,
they will forward it to us accordingly.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 135001
date: 12/19/2007 9:30
refid: 07BEIJING7550
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07BEIJING7329
header:
VZCZCXRO5460
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #7550/01 3530930
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190930Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4103
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0360
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0036
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 1321
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6642
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0608
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 1146
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 007550
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2032
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, KIRF, TI, PK, KG, AF, KZ, CH
SUBJECT: XINJIANG AUTHORITIES BLOCK UNSANCTIONED HAJJ
TRAVEL, LIMIT PARTICIPATION IN OFFICIAL PILGRIMAGES
REF: BEIJING 7329
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).
1. (C) Summary: A well-placed contact told Poloff December 3
that Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) officials seek
to eliminate all Hajj pilgrimages other than those arranged
by the Islamic Association of China (IAC). The contact said
that Saudi Arabia requested China to prohibit Chinese Muslims
from traveling on unsanctioned, or «scattered,» pilgrimages
via third countries. However, the
Saudi Consul in Beijing
told Poloff that China asked Saudi Arabia to bar issuance of
Hajj visas to Chinese citizens outside of China. Government
officials restrict Muslims seeking to exit China and run
propaganda campaigns to prevent unsanctioned pilgrimages.
Chinese officials who are Muslim closely supervise Chinese
Hajj participants throughout the pilgrimage. Only one-third
of all 2007 Hajj applications in Kashgar were approved and
the number of government-organized Hajj slots allocated to
Xinjiang increased by less than two percent in 2007.
Xinjiang officials enforce age restrictions on Hajj
participation that conflict with the State Administration for
Religious Affairs’ (SARA) published regulations. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Poloffs traveled to Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region December 3-9 as part of the Embassy’s Virtual Presence
Post/Transformational Diplomacy outreach activities.
XUAR Authorities Block Unsanctioned Pilgrimages
——————————————— —
3. (C) Ehmetjan Hesen (protect), a member of the XUAR PPCC
standing committee and the Xinjiang Islamic Association
standing committee, told Poloff December 3 that the head of
Xinjiang’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission recently
stated that Xinjiang authorities want «zero» unsanctioned
pilgrimages. Hesen heard from the
Commission’s chairman that
Saudi Arabia asked China to bar Chinese citizens from making
pilgrimages via third countries, because they «run into
trouble when they are not supervised» and can become «a
burden on Saudi Arabia.»
However, Majed A. Alshammary
(protect), the Saudi Consul in Beijing, recently told Poloff
that China asked Saudi Arabia not to allow embassies and
consulates in countries outside of China to grant Hajj visas
to Chinese citizens. Though China
cannot directly control
pilgrimages by citizens located in third countries,
Alshammary said Chinese officials would definitely stop any
would-be pilgrims seeking to depart China by means other than
a government-organized tour. They
«would not allow the Hajj
pilgrim to board the plane,» Alshammary said.
4. (C) In Kashgar, Pakistani businessman Mohammed Shafiq
(protect) told Poloff that authorities deny border-crossing
cards to Uighur (but not Han) residents of Xinjiang to
prevent overland Hajj journeys via Islamabad. The
border-crossing card resembles a passport and allows its
bearer to stay outside China for up to one month over the
course of a «season» running from May to December. On
December 1, Alshammary told Poloff, China began blocking
Chinese Muslims from departing the country in order to
prevent pilgrimages via third countries.
In Kashgar and
Urumqi, Poloff observed elements of an official propaganda
campaign against the «scattered Hajj,» a term describing
pilgrimage tours not arranged by the Chinese Government.
Uighur and Chinese slogans painted prominently on walls in
residential neighborhoods warn people not to participate in
«illegal» Hajj journeys, stating that pilgrims «must take
the
path of the organized Hajj» and that the «scattered Hajj is
an illegal religious activity.»
. . . And Limit Participation in Official Pilgrimages
——————————————— ———
5. (C) Hesen said the IAC each year divides the total number
of spots available on government-arranged Hajj journeys among
China’s provinces. Xinjiang
officials then allocate
Xinjiang’s total allotment among its prefectures and
counties. Once prefectures and
counties learn their
allotments, local Islamic Associations and Ethnic and
Religious Affairs Commissions (a Xinjiang Government organ
similar to Religious Affairs Bureaus in other provinces)
approve and arrange for local citizens to join the tour.
Local government officials who are Muslim accompany Hajj
BEIJING 00007550 002 OF 002
pilgrims to Saudi Arabia and have responsibility for ensuring
that they return to China. Hesen
estimated that only
one-third of applicants from Kashgar were approved to go on
Hajj in 2007 and acknowledged that government-arranged
pilgrimages fail to meet demand in Kashgar. Though the 2007
national total of participants in the official tour has risen
by about 1,000 persons since 2006, according to statistics
published in official media, the number of participants from
Xinjiang actually went down from 3,108 in 2006 to 2,706 in
2007.
6. (C) Hesen told Poloff that individuals cannot join the
government-arranged Hajj trip unless they pass a health
check, fall between 50 and 70 years of age and pay a RMB
22,000 (USD 2,930) Hajj fee from their personal funds. The
Hajj fee cannot be borrowed and the applicant must have no
outstanding debts. Such age
restrictions, which reportedly
exist elsewhere in China, contradict State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA) regulations stating that Hajj
applicants must be 18 years of age or older (reftel). Hesen
conceded that the age requirement might anger young Muslims
who would otherwise qualify to travel on government-arranged
pilgrimages.
RANDT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 135306
date: 12/21/2007 6:02
refid: 07BEIJING7591
origin: Embassy Beijing
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07BEIJING7550
header:
VZCZCXRO7360
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #7591/01 3550602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210602Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4173
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 6646
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0610
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 007591
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2032
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, KIRF, TI, PK, MY, SA, CH
SUBJECT: SURPRISINGLY SMALL INCREASE IN CHINESE HAJJ
PILGRIMS, SAUDIS FRUSTRATED
REF: A. FBIS/OSC CPP20071119968182
B. FBIS/OSC SAP20060916037002
C. BEIJING 7550
Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).
1. (C) Summary: Saudi Arabian Consul Majed Alshammary
(protect) told Poloff December 13 that Saudi Arabia would
admit 20,000 Chinese Hajj pilgrims annually if China
permitted it, although China has stated it will allow 10,700
Hajj pilgrims in 2007. Alshammary
said he is surprised that
China did not authorize a larger increase in the number of
Hajj pilgrims for 2007, given Saudi Arabia’s requests for
«help» in deflecting criticism within the Muslim world
following the 2006 refusal (at China’s request) to grant Hajj
visas to large numbers of Chinese Hajj pilgrims in Islamabad.
Alshammary said he is frustrated
with China’s failure to
allow significant numbers of Chinese Muslims to participate
in the Umrah and with China’s rejection of King Abdullah’s
offer to sponsor poor Chinese pilgrims on Hajj. China began
blocking Muslims from traveling to third countries around
December 1, Alshammary said, but sympathetic Saudi consular
officials sometimes issue Hajj visas to Chinese Muslims in
third countries. End Summary.
Saudi Consul «Surprised» China Has Not Authorized Larger
Increase in Hajj Pilgrims, Despite Saudi Requests
——————————————— ————-
2. (C) Saudi Arabian Consul Majed A. Alshammary (protect)
told Poloff December 13 that his country would permit 20,000
Chinese Muslims to make the annual Hajj pilgrimage, although
Chinese official media has stated that China will allow
10,700 pilgrims in 2007, up from 9,700 in 2006 (ref A). Each
year Saudi Arabia’s Hajj Ministry grants visas on a worldwide
basis to 0.1 percent of each country’s estimated Muslim
population. Alshammary said Saudi
Arabia «respects China’s
official statistic» of 20 million when allocating Hajj visas,
even though he believes there are at least 45 to 50 million
Muslims in China.
3. (C) Alshammary said he is «surprised» that China has not
authorized a larger increase in the number of official Hajj
pilgrims, following the 2006 incident in which the Saudi
Embassy in Islamabad denied Hajj visas to large numbers of
Chinese Muslims traveling overland from China. The Saudi
Embassy in Islamabad initially refused to grant visas to
2,500 pilgrims because China had asked Saudi Arabia not to
issue Hajj visas to Chinese citizens outside of China,
Alshammary said, although the Saudi Embassy later granted
visas to about 1,000 (ref B).
Alshammary told Poloff that
Saudi Arabia has been criticized in the Muslim world because
«Mecca is Allah’s place, not Saudi Arabia’s.» Other Muslims
have said that Saudi Arabia had no right to deny visas to
Chinese Muslims gathered in Islamabad.
The Islamabad
incident was so «embarrassing,» Alshammary said, that Saudi
Arabia asked China to help deflect criticism by boosting the
number of Chinese pilgrims allowed on the Hajj. Alshammary
said he had expected that China would offer around 15,000
places in 2007.
Saudi Consul Frustrated With China’s Response to Umrah
Initiative, King’s Offer
——————————————— —————
4. (C) Alshammary said he has been frustrated with China’s
tepid response to initiatives that would have extended
pilgrimage opportunities to more Chinese Muslims. The
Islamic Association of China asked Saudi Arabia to facilitate
travel by Chinese Muslims to participate in the Umrah,
Alshammary said, and yet China only approved 32 people for
the Umrah pilgrimage during all of 2007.
Saudi’s King
Abdullah offered to pay «out of his own account» for sixty
poor Chinese Muslims to participate in the 2007 Hajj.
However, Chinese officials delayed their response for weeks
and eventually rejected the King’s offer, suggesting that the
Saudi Embassy should have allowed more processing time. «I
could not believe it,» Alshammary said, noting that «every
other country» warmly welcomes and even requests the King’s
support for poor Muslims.
Alshammary later used the Hajj
spots ceded by China to assist poor Muslims from Mongolia.
5. (C) Alshammary said China on December 1 began blocking
Chinese Muslims from leaving China.
«This is a fact,»
Alshammary emphasized, adding that he would gladly approve a
BEIJING 00007591 002 OF 002
Hajj visa for any Chinese Muslim who walked into his office,
but that Chinese authorities «would not allow (the applicant)
to board the plane» departing China. He said the explicit
reason for the prohibition is not clear, but suggested that
the reason is likely Hajj-related.
Nevertheless, Alshammary
stated, Saudi consular officials in third countries like
Indonesia and Malaysia continue to approve Hajj visas for
some Chinese Muslims. Despite
Saudi Arabia’s agreement not
to issue Hajj visas to Chinese citizens outside of China (ref
C), Alshammary said no Saudi consul in a third country wants
to tell «a couple hundred crying Chinese Muslims» that they
cannot have visas to perform the Hajj.
Good Deal for Pilgrims Who Travel
———————————
6. (C) For Chinese Muslims who secure spots on Hajj
pilgrimages arranged by the Chinese government, Alshammary
said the RMB 20,000-30,000 (USD 2,660-3,000) price is «quite
reasonable.» Many Chinese
Muslims, he said, would be willing
to pay as much as RMB 60,000-70,000 (USD 8,000-9,330) to
attend Hajj. As additional proof
that the price is not
excessive, Alshammary said that some Chinese Muslims have
offered him bribes as high as USD 1,000 to arrange passage to
Mecca. Alshammary said he thinks
that 50,000 or more Chinese
Muslims would travel to Mecca each year if China did not
restrict the numbers.
RANDT
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 135558
date: 12/26/2007 11:24
refid: 07DUSHANBE1772
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHDBU #1772/01 3601124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261124Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0055
INFO RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0001
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0001
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0001
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0001
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0007
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001772
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: 5000 Tajiks Made the
Hajj; It Wasn’t Cheap
1. (SBU) Summary: This year, approximately 5000 Tajiks made the
Hajj, accompanied by 100 interpreters, doctors, and expediters.
Countries must apply to the Saudi authorities for spaces at the
Hajj, and Tajik authorities initially underestimated the number of
applicants they would have, creating bureaucratic confusion. While
the Hajj is supposed to be a deeply meaningful religious experience,
the process in Tajikistan has not escaped the endemic corruption
that dominates the country. End
summary.
2. (U) Over the past few weeks, we have spoken to a variety of
individuals about the Hajj, including mid-level employees of the
Ministry of Culture’s Department of Religious Affairs; an inspector
at the State Agency to Fight Corruption and Economic Crimes;
opposition party members; a government-employed guide; and imams and
worshipers at local mosques. Each
described a flawed, corrupted
process that takes away from the religious meaning of the event.
Government Control Means Plenty of Chances for Big Money
2. (U) The Tajik government regulates who can go on the Hajj, and it
strictly controls all aspects of the three week trip. The Ministry
of Culture’s Department of Religious Affairs collects applications
and all fees, and makes all flight and hotel arrangements. The
Department chooses participants based on a set of factors; those who
are under 18 are excluded, and preferences are given to those who
have not yet made the trip. Most
who apply are allowed to go.
3. (U) From 1991 to 2000, Tajiks were able to travel to Saudi Arabia
by any means they wished. Since
2000, however, the Tajik Government
gradually restricted Hajj travel, banning private arrangements and
prohibiting private tour companies from participating. While the
Government’s stated aim was to prevent unscrupulous companies from
bilking Tajik pilgrims, taking control of the Hajj was consistent
with the Government’s overall effort to exert greater control over
religious practice.
4. (U) A corruption investigator described the many potential
avenues for collecting bribes or kickbacks in the process. First,
ensuring that you are on the list of approved hajjis involves paying
off the local representative of the Department of Religious Affairs.
Tajik Air is the exclusive
carrier for the hajjis, and there is
always potential to inflate the price of charter tickets, as well as
to skim off some of the cash actually paid for the tickets. There
are kickbacks for the hotels, as well as for the sacrificial animal
that each Hajji is supposed to receive in Saudi Arabia.
Deputy Minister of Culture Shows How It’s Done
5. (U) In 2006, two newspaper articles criticized Murodullo
Davlatov, the Deputy Minister of Culture for Religious Affairs, and
his associates for allegedly defrauding Tajikistan’s 3500 pilgrims
of more than $1 million. The
newspapers asserted that the pilgrims
each paid $100 for a sheep to be slaughtered; but Davlatov had
arranged for the slaughter of only 100 sheep, pocketing $340,000.
The articles also accused government officials of charging Hajjis
higher rates for hotels than the hotels actually charged, pocketing
the difference. There were also
accusations that Davlatov and Tajik
Air conspired to inflate the cost of the flight to Saudi Arabia.
Davlatov and Tajik Air officials then split the illicit profits.
One newspaper published a letter from a Saudi citizen to President
Rahmon complaining about the corrupt officials who led the Hajj
QRahmon complaining about the corrupt officials who led the Hajj
delegation.
6. (U) Hundreds of Tajiks try to find ways around the government
restrictions. In 2006, some
Tajiks from Ghaffurov and Isfara
Districts bought Kyrgyz passports and traveled from Kyrgyzstan by
bus. Several of them were stopped
and detained by Uzbek border
guards, who quickly determined that they were not Kyrgyz.
2007 — More People, More Opportunities
8. (U) According to Department of Religious Affairs employees,
Davlatov’s role in the Hajj diminished this year in light of past
accusations. This does not mean,
however, that the process has been
cleaned up. The employees
described how the Government of
Tajikistan initially applied to the Saudis for 4000 spaces, after
the Department of Religious Affairs estimated that few people could
afford the $2700 cost of the trip.
The regional and district
offices of the Department of Religious Affairs failed to inform the
head office in Dushanbe in a timely manner about the actual number
of applicants. By the time the
late October deadline for
applications rolled around, more than 5500 Tajiks had applied to go
on the Hajj and paid their $2700.
9. (U) Tajikistan requested 1500 additional places when government
officials realized they had underestimated the number of hajjis, but
the Saudis only granted 1000.
This presented yet another
opportunity for enterprising government officials — accepting bribes
from hopeful hajjis to ensure that they were among the chosen 1000.
One Department employee told us that just before the hajjis departed
this year, representatives of the Ministry of Economics and Trade
informally told the Department of Religious Affairs to return the
$120 fee for sacrificing a sheep to each hajji. The Department has
thus far not complied.
You’ve Got The Job — As Long As you Play By the Rules
10. (U) There are also kickbacks in choosing the 82 interpreters and
guides for the hajjis. Each Tajik
escort will be paid more than
$1000 for three weeks’ work, which is several times the average
salary in Tajikistan. One of
those chosen to be an interpreter said
to us that many of the interpreters and guides will share their
$1,000 with the employees of the Department of Religious Affairs if
they want to be included in the hajj campaign of 2008.
11. (U) Comment: The Department of Religious Affairs is as corrupt
as any other part of the Tajik government. Its dishonesty and
mismanagement of the Hajj gives religious activists a sensitive
issue around which to build opposition to the present regime.
Compounding the unhappiness over the Hajj process is the
Government’s inadequate response to the corruption — our contact
with the Anti-Corruption Agency told us that investigators have
found numerous irregularities, but no criminal reports have been
filed, highlighting the Anti-Corruption Agency’s weakness and lack
of purpose. Lack of competence is
one of the reasons why the
Department of Religious Affairs failed to conduct an adequate public
information campaign. Another
could be that Davlatov wanted to
ensure disorder to keep the number of hajjis low and to create
conditions fostering kick-backs.
In general, the administration of
the Hajj in Tajikistan shows a government which cannot deal
positively with religious practice, and which tends to exacerbate
the problems (i.e., extremism) it aims to resolve. End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 135595
date: 12/26/2007 16:35
refid: 07USUNNEWYORK1210
origin: USUN New York
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06USUNNEWYORK2279
header:
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUCNDT #1210/01 3601635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261635Z DEC 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3427
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 2270
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0058
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0230
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0024
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0001
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1734
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0201
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0405
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1969
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0106
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001210
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2017
TAGS: AF, BG, CE, IN, KG, KZ, NP, PHUM, PK, PREL, TI, TX,
UNGA, UZ
SUBJECT: UN: 62ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION: SOUTH ASIA WRAP
REF: 06 USUN 2279
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS FOR REASON
1.4 (B & D)
SUMMARY:
1. (U) Joe Melrose served as the Senior Area Advisor
for
the 62nd UN General Assembly for South and Central Asia. The
following is his summary of the UNGA as it pertained to South
and Central Asia. The South and
Central Asian states did not
provide the drama of some other regions or even of the last
UNGA.
THE GENERAL DEBATE
2. (U) The first two weeks were
occupied by speeches
providing general statements of the individual member states’
orientation toward the General Assembly often delivered by
Heads of State or Government or the Foreign Minister. Notable
participants from South and Central Asia included Presidents
Karzai of Afghanistan and the new President of Turkmenistan
Gurbouguly Berdimuhamedow making his first visit to the UNGA
and the first visit by a Turkmenistan Head of State in a
number of years. His predecessor
Saparmurat Nyazov passed
away during the last week of last year’s General Assembly
ELECTION TO THE UNSC
3. (U) The elections for the non-permanent Security Council
seats proceeded smoothly and without the drama of last year.
The two contests for seats were resolved with the withdrawal
of the other candidates in favor of Costa Rica and Croatia
after only several ballots — a far cry from the protracted
process of last year to select a GRULAC state.
ELECTIONS FOR THE CAT AND IAAC
4. (SBU) The re-election of
American candidate Felice Gaer
to the Committee Against Torture (CAT) went well with our
candidiate receiving the highest number of votes. The
election for the newly created Independent Audit Advisory
Committee (IAAC) saw American candidate Comptroller General
of the U.S. David M. Walker defeat the Spanish nominee for
the WEOG seat with 99 votes. SCA
countries were strongly
supportive of our candidate with eleven declaring their
support early and one more at the end. Only Uzbekistan
claimed to be awaiting instructions the day of the vote.
Given the results, when compared to our vote tally sheets, it