Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 111878
date: 6/13/2007 9:46
refid: 07DUSHANBE886
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 07DUSHANBE786
header:
VZCZCXRO3706
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0886/01 1640946
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 130946Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0162
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2127
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2177
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 DUSHANBE 000886
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: SETTING THE SCENE FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND’S JUNE
19 VISIT TO TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Executive Summary. Embassy
Dushanbe welcomes you on your
first trip to Tajikistan. This
will be an important step in
forging personal relationships with key Tajik leaders. We enjoy
friendly relations with this small but strategic country on the
Afghan border. In addition to DoD
and CENTCOM military and
security-related programs, we view economic and democratic
development as integral components to ensuring long-term
regional stability.
2. (C) Five months after the presidential election secured
President Rahmon a third seven-year term, Tajikistan seems to
have stalled on the road of reform.
Throughout 2006, Rahmon
assured international visitors and his public alike that «after
the election,» new blood and new ideas would take Tajikistan to
a new era of economic prosperity and open civil society. You
will find a Tajikistan that has set aside the promises of the
November 2006 election, and a government that is less worried
about international perceptions and more confident in tightening
its control over society and the economy. President Rahmon’s
ministers and advisors continue to argue for the need for
stability before democracy, and economics before politics.
3. (C) Despite these trends, Tajikistan is an extremely
important country worthy of your time and investment as CENTCOM
Commander. Tajikistan has
significant opportunities to prosper,
which if seized, will provide additional economic and strategic
options. However, Tajikistan also
faces significant
transnational threats that could affect regional and
international stability. Of
primary significance to both
Tajikistan and the United States is the future of Afghanistan.
4. (C) The key theme that you can emphasize, both in your
bilateral meetings and in the press opportunity, is that
Tajikistan’s long-term security and economic prosperity are
closely linked to its progress in advancing democracy, the rule
of law, and respect for human rights.
This message is
counter-intuitive to President Rahmon and many of his advisors,
and strong and consistent messages from high-ranking U.S.
interlocutors will play an important role in slowing (or
reversing) Tajikistan’s slipping toward authoritarianism and
corruption.
Background — Reform
————————
5. (C) Negative trends. Instead
of steering his country towards
much needed reform and growth, we see a number of worrying
tendencies in Rahmon’s leadership and government. Tighter
government control, a smaller, less competent inner circle,
little political will to go beyond rhetoric and increasing signs
of public restiveness are a few of the negative trends we see.
Increased unconditional economic assistance from China and Iran
undermine the importance of creating a business climate that
attracts private investors, and the pernicious
little-brother-big-brother relationship with Russia works
against the U.S. (and European) programs on rule of law and good
governance. Without sufficient
incentives to correct these
growing tendencies, Tajikistan will risk becoming a less stable,
less prosperous country mired in poverty, unemployment and clan
politics.
6. (C) Political reform. The
Tajik government is still not sold
on the benefits of democratic reform or political openness. It
looks at Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and its own civil war,
and questions what good could come out of allowing more
political expression and the development of political parties.
They may not like Uzbekistan, but the Tajiks admire the
«stability» Karimov’s regime has wrought and count on the
international community to give Tajikistan leeway as long as it
remains better than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan — the bad
examples in the region. We must
convince the Tajik government
that creating democratic institutions and practices — such as a
reformed judiciary that promotes rule of law, a parliament that
is educated and engaged in legislating, rather than serving as a
rubber stamp, and a freer media to inform its citizenry — are
steps that will actually be in the government’s interest, and
not threaten President Rahmon’s authority.
7. (C) Economic reform. Economic reform is more palatable, and
the government has taken a few small steps towards improving the
DUSHANBE 00000886 002 OF 006
investment climate, such as a new law on inspections that could
cut the number of inspections in half, a new Committee on
Investments and State Property and an Agency to Fight Corruption
and Economic Crimes aimed at rooting out corruption on all
levels. How these new initiatives
are implemented will
demonstrate how serious Tajikistan is about linking itself to
the global economy. Thus far, progress is slim.
8. (C) The Tajik response. Government officials will likely
try to parry any discussion of better governance and democratic
reform with a request for U.S. investment in the economy and
infrastructure. Given the steady
flow of state-funded
investment from China, Iran and Russia in hydropower,
transmission lines, telecom, roads and tunnels, the Tajiks will
be looking for the same kind of engagement from the United
States — and will be less interested in hearing that they
should improve their business climate to attract private
companies.
Economics
————
9. (C) Economics before politics.
During your short visit, you
may be pleasantly surprised by the veneer of Dushanbe’s active
consumer economy, which hides the underbelly of massive
corruption and industrial decay.
The government, including the
recently renamed Foreign Minister Zarifi and President Rahmon
(going back to their Tajik roots), insists on talking «economics
before politics.» However,
they turn a deaf ear when we insist
that only reforming their business climate will attract Western
investors, and are insulted by the suggestion that corruption
scares off businesses. They point
to over $800 million in
no-strings-attached Chinese loans they have received for
infrastructure projects, and tell us to bring American companies
to Tajikistan.
10. (C) The investment climate. Although there is some
enthusiasm for U.S. investment and requests to send American
companies to Tajikistan, there are few substantial examples of
what the Tajiks are doing to create an attractive environment or
recruit international businesses beyond vague talks of «fighting
corruption» and a «law on foreign investments» that has
yet
truly to protect the few international firms that run into
problems. Cross-border trade
faces customs challenges, visa
issues, and political mistrust.
Courts do not always uphold
contracts or the rule of law.
Investors bristle at the hassle
of Tajik corruption; repeated demands for money from low and
mid-level officials across the government dissuade
entrepreneurs. Small businesses
flourish outside the official
economy trading agricultural and consumer goods, avoiding taxes
and customs fees.
Regional Integration
———————-
11. (C) The Uzbek problem.
Although the Tajik government shares
our enthusiasm for regional integration, deep down, they may not
share the same fundamental vision.
Tajik officials define
«region» differently, and cannot talk about regional issues
without including Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan causes Tajikistan
serious problems with electricity and gas, customs, imports,
exports, visas, landmines, water sharing and even locusts.
12. (C) Energy as an export. As part of the emphasis on regional
integration, the United States is pushing for Tajik hydropower
to be exported to Pakistan and Afghanistan. A major issue is
who will pay for the electricity once it is produced. To that
end, the United States is working in Afghanistan and Tajikistan
to develop the regulatory environment.
We are also currently
facilitating the negotiation of a power purchasing agreement
between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and are encouraging U.S.
private sector participation in the development of hydropower
and related infrastructure.
13. (C) New bridge to Afghanistan.
Tajik officials and
businesspeople are very excited about the opening of the
U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj, of which DoD was the prime
financier, designer and implementer.
The bridge will allow the
Tajiks more opportunity to bypass Uzbekistan and look to South
Asia as a commercial destination and partner. The bridge should
open in August with Afghan President Karzai, Tajik President
Rahmon, and a high-level U.S. delegation attending. We are
hoping that Secretary Rice will also attend although her
schedule is not yet confirmed. The Tajik Foreign Minister
floated the idea of a high-profile commercial convoy crossing
DUSHANBE 00000886 003 OF 006
the bridge carrying export goods from Tajikistan to Afghanistan
and Pakistan as part of the opening ceremony. Security issues
in Afghanistan may prevent the convoy from traveling south at
the official opening, but it’s a vision that supports our
concept of regional economic integration.
Security and Military Structures
———————————
14. (C) Balancing Russia and
others. Rahmon has not changed
his «open door» policy of working with all countries, yet
Tajikistan is still primarily influenced by Russia and this
factor significantly colors its security perceptions. The
presence of the 201st Russian Military Base effectively supports
the existence of the Rahmon regime. Russia also maintains a
relatively constant stream of black propaganda against U.S.-led
initiatives and activities in Tajikistan and Central Asia. There
was considerable Russian pressure on cabinet appointments during
the December 2006 government reshuffle.
The presence of Russian
Border Advisors, while greatly decreased, still leaves
Tajikistan with an overseer, who does not necessarily always
have the Tajiks’ best interests in mind.
Tajikistan also deftly
balances China, Iran (see Dushanbe 786 and IIR 6 947 0016) and
India, as well as membership in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).
15. (C) Tajikistan’s Armed
Forces. The Tajik Armed Forces
consist of numerous power structures which, in the absence of an
over-arching security strategy, regularly scrap for roles,
missions and very limited resources.
President Rahmon clearly
has a hierarchy of favorites within his security establishment,
with the National Guard falling out on top and the Ministry of
Defense (MoD) generally getting the leftovers. The Main
Department for Border Forces, recently reorganized under the
State Committee for National Security, falls in the middle of
this spectrum.
16. (C) Ministry of Defense. Adrift in roles and missions
ranging from counter-terrorism to homeland defense, often
specifically focused on the proverbial Uzbek threat, the
Ministry of Defense is the weak link in U.S.-Tajik military
relations. As a fighting force, the Tajik Land Forces are
extremely limited in capability, their Air Force virtually
non-existent. General-Colonel
(U.S. 3-star equivalent) Sherali
Khairolloyev has just completed his twelfth year as the Tajik
Minister of Defense. A repeated
message from Khairolloyev
dwells on his preference for receiving material goods (called
`technical assistance’), vice training and reform-oriented
support. We try to dispel this
notion as often as possible.
In the past six months he has focused on improving his officer
corps starting with the military educational system, requesting
assistance for the high-school and college-level military
educational institutions, a goal we are seeking funding to
support as it will enable us reach the incoming generation of
younger officers. The Minister and his entrenched mindset are
the main obstacles to improved military relations between the
U.S. and Tajikistan.
17. (C) National Guard. The
National Guard fulfills multiple
roles, ranging from counter-terrorism to homeland defense, yet
it is primarily designed to protect the Rahmon regime and
respond to him personally. Essentially, they are President
Rahmon’s own Praetorian Guard and they clearly receive the
priority of fill and perks within the Tajik defense
establishment. The Commander,
General-Major (U.S. 1-star
equivalent) Rajabali Rahmoniliev is a young, comparatively
progressive thinker, and hailing from the President’s hometown
of Danghara, can be considered one of Rahmon’s staunchest allies
outside of his own family. The National Guard is arguably the
most competent conventional/limited special operations capable
force in Tajikistan. The National
Guard has successfully
completed three iterations of SOCCENT JCET counter terrorism
training, with a fourth JCET to begin in August 2007.
18. (C) Border Forces. The Main
Department for Border Forces,
reorganized under the State Committee for National Security in
the December 2006 post-election reshuffle, is commanded by a
young MoD-bred officer, General-Major (U.S. 1-star equivalent)
Sherali Mirzoev. The
reorganization has yielded some
retrenchment in U.S.-funded border-related programs, although
these are probably due more to the State Committee on National
Security oversight of the Border Forces than to Mirzoev’s
personality. Ostensibly done to
consolidate and improve border
control, the Tajiks probably viewed this as a «normal» return
to
the former Soviet model of Border Guards as a wing of the
DUSHANBE 00000886 004 OF 006
intelligence and security service, a step most post-Soviet
countries have made. Given the
numerous
cross-border/transnational ills that plague Tajikistan’s
borders, this arm of the Tajik power structures should be one of
the most focused. Yet the lack of
a comprehensive border
management strategy still hinders the effective utilization of
embassy and international assistance.
State Department
International Narcotics Law Enforcement(INL)-funded programs
including the construction of a Border Forces Academy and border
outpost refurbishments continue to be at risk because of the
Border Force’s lack of transparency and direction. Likewise,
the Border Guards initially rejected joint training with Afghan
Border Guards at an INL-funded training facility, but responded
to international concern expressed by donors at the
Ambassadorial level, and joint training will go forward.
Theater Security Cooperation
——————————-
19. (S//NF) U.S.-Tajik Defense Cooperation. Tajikistan, by
reason of geography, occupies a strategic location in the Global
War on Terrorism. By reason of
history, Tajikistan is
viscerally concerned with stability in Afghanistan, which
directly affects Tajikistan militarily, economically and in
terms of population movements.
Tajikistan was an early
supporter of OEF operations, even offering a base at Kulyob, a
fact which the President may mention.
The most direct route
from Manas Air Base to Afghanistan is over Tajikistan (as it was
from K2 base in Uzbekistan).
Tajikistan has been extremely
permissive, granting blanket overflight clearances and divert
and refueling options, although the latter two are rarely used.
(Note: the French Air Force maintains a small detachment at
Dushanbe Airport, which supports ISAF operations with cargo and
close air support.) Tajikistan
also has LNOs in CENTCOM’s
Coalition Village, and offered forces to Afghanistan, which was
turned down due to the no-neighbors policy and a suspicion that
they were probably offering more than they could support.
Although the Tajik President did not respond positively to 2006
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s probes on basing here, citing
SIPDIS
his need to get along with all his neighbors, nevertheless,
Tajikistan is proud of their contributions to the war on
terrorism.
20. (U//FOUO) CENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation. Tajikistan
cooperates with the U.S. military through the CENTCOM annual
military-to-military (MTM) contact program. A fairly robust
series of information exchanges (14 in 2006, 16 thus far in
2007), numerous Marshall Center events and participation in
multi-lateral exercises and 4 SOCCENT JCETs are all aimed at
improving Tajik military capabilities, defense reform and
extending governance to the far eastern mountainous regions of
Tajikistan. The Ministry of
Defense, National Guard, Main
Department of Border Forces, and the Committee for Emergency
Situations all participate in our military cooperation events.
Through the State Partnership Program and annual MTM program,
Tajikistan has an excellent relationship with the Virginia
National Guard mostly focusing on NCO/Officer technical skills
and professional development, with some disaster response events
sponsored by the State Department EXBS program. ARCENT and
CENTAF also provide expertise for events focusing on search and
rescue in the mountains, logistics and other military
capabilities. Tajikistan marginally participates in NATO and
EUCOM exchanges, but has participated in Marshall Center
programs since 1993. Tajikistan has also recently been approved
for participation in the Global Peacekeeping Operations
Initiative, funded at $1.5 million, provided conditions are met.
21. (U//FOUO) CENTCOM also provided $5 million in counter
narcotics funding for the construction or renovation of 3 border
crossing stations, projects just getting underway on the
Tajik-Afghan border. State INL
funding has been used to
build/renovate several other border post facilities. CENTCOM
counter narcotics funding is also being used in a multi-year
program to provide an integrated communications system which
will link the Border Forces from the border to their regional
and national HQ, and provide interagency communications between
the Border Guards, the MOD, and the Drug Control Agency. The
embassy appreciates CENTCOM support in the important areas of
border security and counter-narcotics, primarily focused on the
Afghanistan border.
22. (U//FOUO) U.S. Security Assistance.
Current security
assistance programs focus on improving capability of the
Tajikistan armed forces in the areas of tactical and strategic
communications, emergency response, English language, and in
building a future leadership with Western principles. FMF/IMET
DUSHANBE 00000886 005 OF 006
funding levels for FY07 are $250K/$343K, DoS requested for FY08
$675/$565K, and DoD requested for FY 09 $600K/$700K.
Proposed Talking Points
————————
23. (U//FUOU) During your bilateral meetings with the President
and Defense officials, Embassy Dushanbe recommends Commander,
USCENTCOM, emphasize the below-listed talking points. Note that
in general, the Tajiks do not absorb subtle messages well, so
some level of bluntness is recommended.
—(U//FOUO) We consider security to be not just an issue of
military capability; rather we believe that democratic and
economic development are essential for long-term stability.
This is why DOD sponsors «non-military» training on topics
such
as fighting corruption. Regarding
economic development,
supporting growth of small and medium enterprises and reducing
barriers to investment, such as corruption, will render
significant long term benefits for Tajikistan.
—(U//FOUO) Likewise, the United States values adherence to
human rights obligations — religious expression, media freedom,
minority rights, civil society and education as much as it
values military security. A
strong military is composed of a
well-educated corps of professionals who are trusted to make
decisions appropriate to their authorities and who are guided by
a duty to protect the interests of the people they serve.
—(U//FOUO) Global War on Terrorism — We appreciate Tajikistan’s
continuing support to the United States in the Global War on
Terrorism. The generous SOFA,
blanket overflight clearance and
emergency divert agreement granted to DoD are a significant
gesture of support, save valuable time and resources and
significantly support the development of a stable Afghanistan.
—(U//FOUO) As you prepare for the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) Summit in August in Bishkek, we urge you to
work to further those common goals on Afghanistan, and also
ensure the SCO and its participants recognize the important role
Manas Air Base, in particular, and our efforts in Afghanistan in
general, play in promoting broad-based stability and prosperity
in the region.
—(U//FOUO)) Afghanistan remains a subject of great concern for
both our countries. The entire
world has an interest in
bringing stability to Afghanistan, and we welcome Tajikistan’s
positive contribution to this effort.
We welcome more joint
initiatives with Afghanistan and continue to look for ways to
integrate Tajikistan and Afghanistan economically. We welcome
the positive role Tajikistan can play in building Afghanistan’s
capacity.
—(C/REL Tajikistan) We noted
with concern your recent joint
statement with the Iranian government that you would support its
efforts to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Iran’s
participation as an SCO observer nation is
already problematic. While it
continues to defy the
international community and the UN Security Council by refusing
to stop its weapons-related enrichment and reprocessing
activities, Iran may try to use the SCO as a platform to seek
support for its activities.
—(U//FOUO) Greater military
proficiency and ultimately better
regional security cooperation is best achieved through training
and exercises. The USG appreciates positive steps to improve
cooperation with the armed forces of Tajikistan, but further
progress is essential. USCENTCOM
builds capabilities. We do
not provide equipment without training, and in fact we are more
interested in providing training than equipment. The units that
we train must be real, operational units, with defined roles,
missions and responsibilities. A
well-trained soldier can learn
to use any sort of equipment in different operations.
—(U//FOUO)) We are pleased with the counter-terrorism training
being conducted with SOCCENT and special operations forces of
the National Guard and the Border Forces. We would like to see
more responsiveness from the Ministry of Defense and more
accountability, access and transparency with the Main Department
of Border Forces. A possible area
of significant cooperation
with the Ministry of Defense is the offer for Tajikistan to join
the Global Peacekeeping Initiative, if conditions are accepted.
Proposed Speaking Points for Press Opportunity
——————————————— —
DUSHANBE 00000886 006 OF 006
24. (U) The Tajik media is largely self-censoring and as such
will probably not ask difficult or stumping questions. This is
an excellent opportunity to relay the below messages on behalf
of the Country Team, as well as engage a generally
neutral-friendly audience, who gains most of its information
from the Russian media.
—(U) The United States considers security to be not just an
issue of military capability; rather we believe that democratic
and economic development and the respect for human rights are
essential for long-term stability.
This is why DOD training
includes some «non-military» topics such as fighting
corruption.
—(U) We consider Central Asians themselves at the center of our
approach to this part of the world, and we reject any notions
that Central Asia is merely an arena for outside powers to
compete for influence. Tajikistan
is not the object of
America’s geopolitical struggles with anyone. We aim to support
your goal of an independent nation whose citizens have the
opportunity to realize their destiny.
This is why we are
funding and constructing a $35 million dollar bridge along with
associated Border Control and Customs facilities, to facilitate
legal traffic between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
—(U) Tajikistan is an extremely important country to the United
States for several reasons:
—Americans take particular interest in helping emerging nations
such as Tajikistan achieve their own goals of independence.
—Tajikistan faces significant transnational threats that are
important to regional and international stability. Of primary
significance to both Tajikistan and the United States is the
future of Afghanistan.
—It is in U.S. interests to join Tajikistan and its regional
partners in combating these threats and further supporting
Tajikistan’s development and strategic options.
25. (U) POC: Lieutenant Colonel
Dan Green, USA, Defense and
Army Attache, USDAO Dushanbe, Voice: (992)(37) 229-2701, Cell:
(992) (93) 570-7030, classified email: HYPERLINK
«BLOCKED::mailto:[email protected]»[email protected] or
[email protected] and unclass email: [email protected].
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 112070
date: 6/14/2007 14:27
refid: 07DUSHANBE894
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2162
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2141
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0160
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1962
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1225
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000894
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
TREASURY PASS TO JEFF BAKER; STATE FOR SCA/CEN; STATE FOR EUR/ACE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR, EFIN, ECON, EAID, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: DONOR DISAGREEMENT ON TAJIK COTTON SECTOR
DUSHANBE 00000894 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Summary.
Fissures within the donor community
threaten to derail efforts to resolve Tajikistan’s $400 million
cotton debt. The Asian
Development Bank favors a donor bailout
of the cotton sector, in order to save industry investors and
prevent a potentially fatal breakdown of the nascent banking
system. The World Bank believes
that upwards of 80% of the debt
should be written off by investors who knew what they were
getting into, and allow farmers and the government to pay off
the remainder of the debt following a series of agricultural
reforms. The Tajik government is
largely beholden to the
powerful investors (including some close relatives and
associates of President Rahmon) who control the debt, but donors
may be able to push the Tajik government into accepting a
debt-write off by finding ways to fund future harvests. We
should not subsidize wealthy local investors who have done
little to improve the situation and done much to keep
Tajikistan’s farmers in poverty, and who may be inflating their
debt holdings to squeeze more out of donors. End Summary.
2. (SBU) Director General Juan
Miranda of the Asian Development
Bank surprised donors at the June 2 Development Forum meeting in
Dushanbe by backing out of a plan to create an independent Tajik
mechanism to take on the $400 million cotton debt. He instead
proposed to bring in an international accounting firm to handle
the debt as an authoritative arbiter.
[Comment: Having a
respected international company handle the debt makes sense
since the Asian Development Bank is interested in putting
significant funds into a bailout.
End comment.] Asian
Development Bank proposed financing a bailout of up to $100
million, which they would split with the World Bank. World Bank
officials in Dushanbe chafed at this idea, preferring to punish
powerful Tajik investors, whom they calculate have made $1.2
billion from Tajik cotton exports over the last 10 years, while
Tajikistan’s farmers grew more impoverished. The World Bank
believes the Tajik banking sector can withstand the fallout of
any investor bankruptcies, despite the fact that many of the top
cotton investors are intricately involved in Tajikistan’s banks.
3. (SBU) Both donor banks remain
committed to agricultural
reform, with the World Bank recently agreeing to a $15 million
agricultural development project, following on the Asian
Development Bank’s $12 million program.
Both projects include
funds to help create an independent debt resolution mechanism,
but do not provide loan funds to actually pay off the debt. All
donors agree that the farmers’ debt should be taken out of the
hands of investors in order to free farmers from their control.
4. (SBU) Without debt relief for
farmers, the roadmap on
agricultural reforms which the government signed in March will
not succeed. The roadmap commits
the government to put through
a series of measures over the next three years, most importantly
preventing local governments from bullying farmers and allowing
them to buy inputs independently, plant the crop of their
choice, and sell to whomever they like.
Additionally, the
government and donors will enhance seed stock, improve market
information, build processing capacity, and ease farmers’ access
to credit. With U.S. technical
assistance, the government is
working on land code reform that would allow buying, selling and
mortgaging of land use rights.
These reform measures will put
the agricultural sector — and individual farmers — on the path
to profitability.
5. (SBU) Getting farmers access
to agricultural credit is vital
to the roadmap’s success.
According to the agricultural policy
unit at the Ministry of Agriculture, farmers need $80 — $100
million each year to fund the harvest.
In order to improve
farmer access to credit, the United States is planning to work
with local banks to provide credit guarantees for their
agricultural loans. The European
Bank for Reconstruction and
Development is also funding agricultural loan projects.
Increased funding for these programs would allow local banks to
increase their lending to the sector.
DUSHANBE 00000894 002.2 OF 002
6. (SBU) Comment: The local
consultant for the Asian
Development Bank believes that the Tajik government will not go
through with essential agricultural reforms if the donors do not
bail out the investors. With tens
of millions of donor funds
conditioned on the government implementing specific reform
measures spelled out in the roadmap, the government should
understand that failure to introduce reforms will only hurt the
Tajik agricultural sector more.
What the government will
actually do, and how it will balance the clear need for reform
with the financial interests of powerful investors from Rahmon’s
inner circle, remains unclear.
7. (SBU) Over the past year, as donors got closer to
agreeing
on a debt resolution program and investors began anticipating a
big payoff, the size of the cotton debt ballooned from $300
million to $400 million, according to National Bank figures.
However, after spending over a year studying the debt on a
farm-by-farm basis, the World Bank basically gave up trying to
determine the actual size of the debt, since farmers themselves
hold scanty documentation of debts and only investors have
records of what is owed them. The
World Bank feels no need to
pay off a made-up debt and neither should we. Reforming the
agricultural sector and pushing the government to fight off
powerful investors and write off the debt is the best solution
for Tajikistan’s farmers. End
Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 112412
date: 6/18/2007 9:36
refid: 07ASHGABAT599
origin: Embassy Ashgabat
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07STATE84289
header:
VZCZCXRO8021
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHAH #0599 1690936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180936Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8875
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2611
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 0072
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE 2902
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 0067
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 5031
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 0062
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0447
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-2/REA/NMJIC-J2//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J5/RUE//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASHGABAT 000599
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (NICOLAIDIS)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: EAIR, PARM, PREL, MNUC, KN, SY, AM, KZ, KG, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN RESPONSE TO SYRIAN OVERFLIGHT
REQUEST: «WE WILL DENY SUCH A REQUEST IF WE RECEIVE ONE»
REF: STATE 84289
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i. Jennifer L. Brush for reasons 1.
4 (B), (C) and (D).
In response to reftel demarche, Turkmenistan’s Foreign
Affairs Deputy Chairman Rashit Meredov told Charge the
Government of Turkmenistan would deny any such request, if it
received one. Meredov said he had
no news on this request,
would look into it and inform Charge if such a request were
made. Charge reminded Meredov
Turkmenistan also had the
option of allowing the aircraft to land and be inspected, but
Meredov said the government’s decision would be to deny the
request, period.
BRUSH
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 112424
date: 6/18/2007 10:20
refid: 07ANKARA1545
origin: Embassy Ankara
classification: SECRET
destination: 07STATE84289
header:
VZCZCXRO8070
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHAK #1545 1691020
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181020Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2629
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 1941
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 0015
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0340
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK IMMEDIATE 0364
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1649
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 0767
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN IMMEDIATE 1291
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T ANKARA 001545
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2032
TAGS: EAIR, PARM, PREL, MNUC, TU, KN, SY, AM, KZ, TI, TX, UZ
SUBJECT: TURKEY REVIEWING REQUEST TO DENY OVERFLIGHT
CLEARANCE TO SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES FLIGHT
REF: STATE 84289
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carl Siebentritt, reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Per reftel request, we met with MFA Aviation
Department Head Hamit Olcay and South Asia Department Head
Murat Yoruk on June 18 to request that Turkey deny overflight
clearance to reftel Syrian Arab Airlines aircraft, in
accordance with UNSCR 1718. Olcay
checked with the MFA
flight clearance department to determine whether or not the
flight originating in Syria that was to have landed in North
Korea on June 18 had requested permission to overfly Turkey.
According to Olcay’s sources — assuming the flight did take
off as scheduled — it did not/not request permission to
overfly Turkey on its way to North Korea. Olcay pledged to
monitor incoming overflight requests to watch for this
aircraft, but deferred to Yoruk for a political determination
on what, if any, action Turkey would take should the aircraft
request overflight permission.
2. (S) Yoruk noted that, as with past US requests, it is
difficult for the Turkish government to deny overflight
clearance absent detailed information that a specific flight
is in fact carrying illicit cargo.
He pledged to review our
request with the Arms Control and Disarmament Department and
to discuss it with his superiors, but stated that any
additional information on the possible cargo and the presumed
final destination, if not Syria, would also be helpful. Post
welcomes any additional information on this flight that can
be shared with the Turkish government.
Visit Ankara’s Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/
WILSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 112462
date: 6/18/2007 13:54
refid: 07DUSHANBE924
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8300
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0924/01 1691354
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181354Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0488
INFO USOFFICE ALMATY 1869
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0479
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0837
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0812
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2258
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 000924
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, DS/IP/SCA, DS/SPC/SO, DS/DSS, CA/OCS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2017
TAGS: ASEC, AMED, CASC, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSAULTED AND MEDEVACED
REF: RSO SPOT REPORT 06/17/2007
CLASSIFIED BY: SETH GREEN, RSO, DUSHANBE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (d)
1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:
On June 17 at 0115 hours, three temporary
duty military personnel and one private American citizen were
severely beaten outside a local night club. Members of the team
estimated the assault lasted for twenty minutes and around
thirty attackers participated.
They subsequently received
treatment at the Embassy Medical Unit and were medically
evacuated on a military flight at 2130 hours that evening. A
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official requested orally (not in
writing) that the Embassy waive the victims’ immunity status in
order to facilitate the investigation and possibly prosecute the
Americans for assaulting Tajik nationals. The Embassy expects
to receive an official note from the Ministry this week, which
may or may not include a request for an immunity waiver. The
Embassy has already initiated dialogue with officials to improve
responses to such incidents consistent with Vienna Convention
protections and the Status of Forces Agreement. END SUMMARY.
2. (S/NF) On June 16, around 2300 hours, one Army
warrant
officer from a U.S. Central Command Planning Team, two Marines
making up a Marine Special Operations Command advance team for a
Joint Combined Exchange Training, and a private American citizen
visited a local nightclub called Port Said, which is frequented
by westerners including American diplomats. According to one
Marine, they shared between the four of them and two guests a
single bottle of vodka and a large box of juice. On June 17, at
approximately 0030 hours, the group left Port Said and drove to
another nightclub called Simin, arriving at approximately 0100
hours. None of the Americans
noticed anything suspicious at the
club or any large crowd in the front.
3. (SBU) According to the Americans interviewed, one
Marine
and the Army warrant officer went upstairs while the remaining
Marine and private American remained downstairs. None claimed
to be involved in any altercation at Port Said or at Simin. At
approximately 0115 they decided to leave Simin because the club
was slow. In the small entryway
leading into the club, a large
crowd of locals had gathered.
Details from the interviews with
the three American military personnel and their health status
follow:
4. (SBU) The Army Officer remembered coming down the
stairs
and «everything went black.»
According to one Marine, five or
six locals assaulted him from behind as he entered the small
entryway. The Army Officer had a
broken nose, concussion, and
bruised ribs. He had numerous
cuts and bruises across his face.
His significant facial wounds are
consistent with an assault
from behind and going face first into the ground. His clothing
was covered in blood.
5. (SBU) The senior Marine remembers ordering a beer
at the
bar. Before he was able to drink
it, the private American
approached him and signaled the group was ready to leave. As he
exited through the small lobby, a large crowd of men were there
lining each wall. Someone struck
him on the left side of the
head and several men began punching and kicking him. The men
then dragged him outside continuing to beat him until he fell
down a series of stairs leading from the club entrance. Men
continued to beat him until an unidentified female arrived and
began screaming at the attackers to stop. He then made his way
back to their vehicle where their local driver was waiting. The
senior Marine had a severe concussion, but no broken bones. He
had numerous cuts and bruises across his face and was barely
conscious. His clothing was
covered in blood.
6. (SBU) The junior Marine remembered going upstairs
with the
Army warrant officer, and after approximately ten minutes, they
decided to leave because the club was slow. He was behind the
others when the beating started in the entryway. A group of
five to six attackers punched, kicked, and dragged him outside.
At one point, he managed to evade his attackers and sprint a few
meters away where he observed the Army warrant officer on the
ground, apparently unconscious and local men continuing to
assault him. He returned to the
area to assist the warrant
officer and the group attacked him again, repeatedly kicked him
in the head. On a couple of
occasions, he was able to briefly
escape but his attackers chased him down and continued to beat
him. During the attack, he
recalled hearing sirens and on one
occasion when he had briefly made distance between himself and
his attackers, he saw five or six uniformed officers from the
DUSHANBE 00000924 002 OF 005
Ministry of Interior observing the fight, but making no effort
to intervene. At some point, the
attackers dispersed and he was
able to retrieve the barely-conscious Army warrant officer, who
was in a gutter spitting up blood, and bring him to their
vehicle. The junior Marine was
the most lucid in recalling
details afterwards. He had a
broken nose and cheek bone, and a
number of cuts and bruises on his face.
His clothing was
ripped, but he appeared to have significantly less blood loss
than the others.
7. (SBU) Following the attack, the four had managed to
make
their way back to their Embassy vehicle when uniformed officers
from the Ministry of Interior surrounded the vehicle. The local
national driver attempted to depart the scene but the Ministry
of Interior policemen blocked their way.
The policemen removed
the driver from inside the vehicle and began to remove the
Americans as well. The junior
Marine explained in both English
and Russian that they were American military associated with the
Embassy, and used the word «diplomat» a number of times. The
junior Marine explained that they were going to the Embassy for
medical treatment. The Ministry
of Interior policemen forcibly
removed the Americans from the diplomatic vehicle, took the
keys, and put the wounded Americans in a local ambulance. A
Ministry of Interior policeman put the local national driver in
the back seat of the diplomatic vehicle and drove that vehicle
to the police station.
8. (C/NF) The Army warrant officer first called the
Defense
Attache at 0143 hours and said that there were policemen trying
to force them from the car. The
line went dead. The Defense
Attache immediately called back and the Army warrant officer
stated that he had just been put into an ambulance and didn’t
know where he was being taken. He outlined all the Americans who
were with him. The Defense
Attached spoke to the driver who
stated they were being taken to the Karabulo hospital. The Army
warrant officer was very incoherent during both phone calls.
The Defense Attache immediately notified the RSO and the Medical
Officer. The RSO also contacted
the Medical Officer, and the
two met the Defense Attache at the Karabulo Hospital. The RSO
observed only the three official Americans present and learned
that the private American had left the hospital on his own by
taxi and was heading home. The
Medical Officer determined that
the medical facility was not safe for treatment and recommended
they transfer to the Embassy Medical Unit for treatment. At
this time, officials from the Ministry of Interior arrived and
the RSO met with them off to the side to arrange for the safe
evacuation of Embassy personnel.
9. (C/NF) At 0230 hours, the Medical Officer and
Defense
Attache, along with members of the local guard force Mobile
Patrol, transported the three men to the Embassy while the RSO
met with the Ministry of Interior policemen who had arrived at
the hospital. According to the
Army Officer and junior Marine,
both Ministry of Interior policemen were on the scene when they
were attacked, and were directing the police who had removed
them from the diplomatic vehicle.
The senior Ministry of
Interior official identified himself as Subhon MIRALIEV, Deputy
Chief of the Ministry of Interior in the Sino-1 district, and
protested the removal of the American to the Embassy. He stated
that the Americans began the fight with local men at the club.
According to witnesses, he stated, an African-American male
began arguments inside the disco club with one of the local men
and decided to talk outside. Once
outside, the American hit the
local man with a bottle of beer and a fight ensued involving
20-30 local men. He stated that
they had a few local men in
custody and that he wanted to take the Americans to the police
station to identify them. He
further demanded that the men be
given blood alcohol testing at another Ministry of Interior
facility immediately. The RSO
stated that his immediate concern
was for their health and safety, and that they would be treated
by the Embassy Medical Officer, who would perform all
appropriate tests. RSO stated
that if the police identified
suspects, once the Americans were treated he would request
permission from for them to participate in identifying the
suspects. According to the mobile
patrolman who was
translating, MIRALIEV switched to Tajik and ordered his men not
to allow the Americans to leave.
The RSO insisted that the
Americans were protected people under the Vienna Convention and
they could not be detained by Tajik authorities. The RSO then
ordered the Embassy security guards to assist the Embassy
Medical Officer and Defense Attache in moving the Americans into
their vehicle.
10. (C/NF) RSO dispatched Embassy security investigators
with
a mobile patrol to the original crime scene to see if
DUSHANBE 00000924 003 OF 005
investigators were still there and interview any witnesses. The
club was deserted, there was no crime scene established, and
broken glass and bottles remained outside. The mobile patrol
recovered a military watch belonging to one of the injured
Americans in one of the ditches.
11. (C/NF) After the RSO left the
scene, Embassy mobile patrol
guard overheard an interview between MIRALIEV and one local
Tajik who was brought into the hospital having been involved in
the fight. The local had
difficulty speaking because of an
injured jaw, but stated that he had been in an argument with a
large African-American male and they had stepped outside. He
stated the next thing he knew, his brother was taking him to the
hospital. RSO Note: The senior Marine and the private American
are both African-American. The
private American is the taller
and broader of the two. End Note.
12. (SBU) At 0238 hours, the
injured Americans along with the
Medical Officer and Defense Attache arrived at the Embassy and
treatment began. RSO arrived at
the Embassy at 0244 hours and
began debriefing the injured Americans to varying degrees,
depending on their consciousness and Medical Officer’s guidance.
The RSO contacted the Consul to
notify him of the injured
private American and dispatched an Embassy security investigator
to go with him to assist. All three had facial lacerations which
the Medical Officer repaired, two had concussions, and all three
had facial contusions: one severe, one moderate, and one mild.
The in-country CAT scan of two more seriously injured Americans
revealed multiple skull fractures and brain contusions.
13. (C/NF) At 0315, the RSO
attempted to contact the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, but the duty officer informed Embassy
security investigators that there was nobody available to
respond. The RSO then contacted
the DCM to brief him on the
situation and request guidance.
The DCM attempted to contact
the Foreign Ministry but was unable to reach anyone. At 0340
the Embassy security investigator arrived at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and spoke with the duty officer who said the
Ministry had nobody available until 0800 that morning.
14. (C/NF) At 0635, Embassy
security investigators interviewed
the local national driver who had been detained by the Ministry
of Interior following the incident.
According to the driver, he
observed approximately thirty Tajik males involved in the
assault. They separated the four
Americans and a group of six
to seven were hitting and kicking them for approximately ten to
fifteen minutes. He stated that
when the Ministry of Interior
policemen arrived, people began to disperse. The driver tried
to get all the Americans together in the car, but the policemen
did not allow them to leave. The
policemen took the Americans
out of the vehicle, ordered him in the back, and drove the
vehicle to the police station.
15. (C/NF) At 1106 hours, the DCM and RSO met with
representatives from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. According to the
Ministry of Interior
representative, the police received a call at 0130 hours about
an incident at Simin. A group of
policemen left to respond.
According to multiple witnesses’ statements including wait staff
and club security, an American was sliding down a railing from
the top floor when his leg hit the head of a local patron. A
fight started and «several injured people are at the hospital»
with various injuries he categorized as medium to light.
According to multiple witnesses, an American started the
fighting. The Ministry of
Interior requested that the Embassy
produce the injured Americans for an independent medical
examination by Ministry of Health officials, interviews by a
Ministry of Interior investigator, and records indicating their
blood alcohol content. The
Ministry of Interior also requested
copies of the Americans identification and a copy of the Status
of Forces Agreement.
16. (SBU) RSO Note.
The Tajik criminal code rates injuries as
minor, light, medium, and severe in order to determine the
criminal charge levied. The
reason the Ministry of Interior is
frustrated by RSO actions to remove the Americans from the local
hospital is because doctors do not make this determination, but
rather an «independent group of experts from the Ministry of
Health». According to the
Ministry of Interior investigator,
medical doctors are not qualified to make such a determination.
End Note.
17. (C/NF) The RSO reviewed his
notes from the incident with
the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
representatives, indicating there were significant variations in
DUSHANBE 00000924 004 OF 005
the story the injured Americans told about the event and those
of the witnesses the Ministry of Interior interviewed. The RSO
also expressed concern about the Ministry of Interior’s presence
at the incident and their failure to intervene on behalf of the
Americans until after the attackers left. The RSO explained
that the reason the Americans were hesitant to go to the
ambulances was because they had witnessed the police standing by
passively while they were being assaulted and did not believe
the police were trying to help.
The RSO further expressed
concern that the police physically detained and removed the
Americans from the vehicle after they identified themselves as
diplomats and were seated inside a diplomatic vehicle. Further,
the RSO expressed concern about the removal from the diplomatic
vehicle and
