id: 79704
date: 9/26/2006 11:19
refid: 06DUSHANBE1758
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE1758
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001758
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL
PLEASE PASS TO DOJ
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, SNAR, AF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK BORDER POSTS STILL SUFFER FROM LAST YEAR’S FLOODING
AND LACK OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
DUSHANBE 00001758 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) Embassy Officers visited four border posts in
the
Moscovsky region bordering Afghanistan and saw how last year’s
severe flooding destroyed the units’ buildings, seriously
hindering the border guards’ ability to protect the Tajik border
from illicit activity. In
addition to flood damage and years
of wear and tear, the departing Russian border troops stripped
the posts of critical equipment and supplies. In the winter, as
in many rural areas of Tajikistan, electricity is scarce, only
available one to two hours per day.
Generators at the border
posts are nothing more than Soviet-style hunks of metal, too
inefficient to run given the price of fuel. Minefields
installed by Russian troops remain active and pose a real threat
to unsuspecting visitors and civilians. EmbOffs, guided by
Colonel Kamolov, the State Border Protection Committee engineer
responsible for designing architectural plans for construction
of new buildings, surveyed the border posts. Post will
recommend that outposts number 8 and 7 described below receive
priority consideration for renovation/reconstruction using
existing INL funding. The rest
should be funded using DoD
Counter-narcotics FY06 supplemental funding.
RIBHOZ, FISHFARM, #8
2. (SBU) In early 2005, floods from the Pyanj River
ripped
through the outpost and split it into two, destroying training
facilities. The water left a bed
of rocks about 500 yards wide
in the middle of the post. The
post evacuated staff and moved
ammunition, but have since returned to the same location.
Border guards report that Afghans crossed the border and
periodically looted the facilities after the 2005 flood up until
July 2006. Ribhoz currently has
no functioning communications
system, however, through U.S. government funding, Post will be
installing Harris radio communications system at the outpost.
3. (U) The Pyanj is known to flood frequently and
each year
the river’s destruction takes its toll in property and lives.
The Asian Development Bank is working with the government on an
embankment reinforcement project in Moscovsky to prevent future
flooding, but work is not yet complete.
4. (SBU) The State Border Protection Committee intends
to move
the post’s location one to two kilometers further away from the
river. Ribhoz is the name of
border post number 8 in Moscovsky
District, so named because of the area’s former abundance of
fish farms. Fish farming used to
be profitable, but the
supplies have since depleted and many large dried-out man-made
lakes remain. It is in one of
these lakes that the State Border
Protection Committee intends to relocate the border post site.
SAYOD, HUNTER, #7
5. (SBU) The effects of the Pyanj floods is most
striking at
Sayod, number 7 of the Moscovsky posts.
Little remains of the
post, established at least twenty years ago. Prior to the
flooding, Sayod had 12 buildings, now there are only four. The
floods cause land erosion, which claimed 8 of the buildings,
including warehouses and offices.
Although the water flow has
been diverted, land continues to erode away and threatens what’s
left of Sayod’s property. The
State Border Protection Committee
wants to build a new post on nearby higher ground with a better
view of the Afghan border and safe from the Pyanj.
6. (SBU) Sayod has a minimal communications system
comprised
of only Motorola radios. The
post’s commander reported the
soldiers received Halal meals from U.S. assistance, but that
many fell ill after eating what they commonly believe to be
expired MREs. He claimed a doctor
lab-tested them and deemed
DUSHANBE 00001758 002.2 OF 002
them unacceptable to eat.
(Note: The border guards do not
have
a qualified lab technician to conduct tests and provided no
evidence supporting their finding.
Post is working to train and
set up a proper forensics lab in Tajikistan.)
JAIROLI, PORCUPINE, #6 AND MUHOJOROBAD, LAND OF REFUGEES, #5
7. (SBU) The Jairoli #6 post and Muhojorobad #5 post
face
problems common to border posts throughout Tajikistan. Each
post houses approximately 50 soldiers, but their dilapidated
buildings and poor facilities make living conditions difficult.
Jairoli is at least 25 years old and Muhojorobad’s construction
dates to the 1940s or 1950s. Both
Jairoli and Muhojorobad could
benefit from a water well and water pump. Tajikistan’s rural
water supply system has deteriorated since the Soviet times.
Currently, Jairoli gets its water supply through a rudimentary
pipe and water wheel operating on a stream that runs through the
post’s compound.
8. (SBU) Both posts need
significant renovation. Areas of
importance include establishing bathroom and shower facilities,
constructing new roofs, renovating warehouses and repairing
crumbling internal walls. Both
posts currently have Motorola
radios and also utilize an old ineffective cable telephone line.
Building officers’ quarters would
boost morale at the posts.
Currently officers live and work in their offices. With
officers’ quarters they could bring their families to live with
them at post. That way, they
would be able to remain on site
longer throughout the year.
9. (SBU) State Border Protection Committee guides told
EmbOffs
Jairoli and Muhojorobad also received Halal meals, but we did
not see any uniforms, boots, sleeping bags or other U.S.
assistance.
10. (SBU) COMMENT:
Post will reexamine and increase end-use
monitoring of border guard assistance and devise an improved
plan to directly provide INL assistance to the border posts
instead of routing it through the central government where
bureaucracy and corruption can delay essential assistance.
Post’s Senior Law Enforcement Advisor has visited the site for
follow-on assessments and will bring direct assistance during
future site visits instead of relying on the State Border
Protection Committee which has responded slowly to needs. In
addition, post will consider providing food assistance in the
forms of staples locally purchased instead of U.S. military
Halal meals which Tajik soldiers do not favor.
11. (SBU) The devastation caused by flooding at the
posts on
the Afghan border shows the destructive potential of the river.
In addition, the country’s inadequate water delivery system is
extremely evident at these border outposts. Water issues have a
tremendous effect on the environment, health and economy. Here
in Tajikistan, we also see the important role that water plays
in security issues. The border
posts need to be repaired or
relocated with potential flooding hazards in mind if Tajikistan
wants to continue to be successful in protecting its borders.
END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 79834
date: 9/27/2006 10:22
refid: 06DUSHANBE1765
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE1718|06DUSHANBE1726|06DUSHANBE1765
header:
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RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0100
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001765
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECIN, ECON, EFIN, ENRG, TBIO, TI
SUBJECT: CHINESE DRAGON STEPS GENTLY IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: DUSHANBE 1718; DUSHANBE 1726
DUSHANBE 00001765 001.2 OF 002
1. SUMMARY: Chinese Ambassador to Tajikistan Li Huilai
laid
out the founding principles of friendship between Tajikistan and
China, including economic, security, and cultural relations, at
an academic conference hosted by the Tajik Center for Strategic
Research in Dushanbe on September 26.
Academics and
policymakers spent the day discussing the future potential of
China-Tajik relations. Beyond the
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), China seeks to develop its status as a
bilateral partner in Tajikistan’s overall development. END
SUMMARY.
2. Li’s remarks followed a
standard Chinese script. He said
that the Tajik-Chinese relationship is based foremost on trust,
and noted the significance of the upcoming signing of a document
on cooperation and friendship.
China’s goals, he asserted, are
to help the Tajik government «uphold its independence and
enhance social stability.»
Li enumerated the economic and
security related agreements signed between the two countries
during the recent meeting in Dushanbe of the leaders of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (reftels). Li emphasized that
China is not interested in domestic Tajik affairs or internal
politics. He stated that each
country has its own path of
development, and that China would respect the model that
Tajikistan has chosen for itself.
3. Although trade between the two
countries is very small, Li
noted that it is growing quickly.
Last year, trade equaled $157
million between the two countries, whereas this year trade
should break the $200 million threshold.
Umarov, a speaker from
the Tajik Center for Strategic Research, lamented that this
trade is basically one-sided, with Tajikistan importing consumer
products from China. Umarov
called on China to seek out Tajik
goods to import from the textiles, food, mining, and other
spheres. He noted, however, that
low-cost goods from China
allow Tajik consumers to purchase more goods than otherwise
available from Russia, Turkey, or elsewhere. He also noted that
cheap transport costs from China make their goods more desirable
to Tajik consumers. For example,
cargo on a truck through the
Pamir mountains costs $90 per cubic meter, versus $260 per cubic
meter on a cargo plane. Chinese
assistance with Tajik road
improvement projects could make goods from China even more
attractive.
4. China is also extending its
friendship to Tajikistan in the
cultural and educational spheres.
According to Li, China gave
30 student scholarships to Tajik students to study in China this
year — twice as many as last year.
In September, the first six
Chinese students came to Tajikistan to study. China has opened
its training institutes to various Tajik specialists, and has
already trained 100 specialists in China. The Tajik Department
of Health sent doctors to China to study medicine. The Tajik
Minister of Education will soon travel to China to sign an
agreement on further strengthening cooperation in education.
5. In the cultural realm, Li
noted that China will send several
national artists and performers to Tajikistan for concerts. On
September 27, the National Museum of Tajikistan will open an
exhibit on Chinese instruments.
The Chinese Embassy will
sponsor a Chinese movie week by the end of the year, and China
is working on a Chinese Cultural Center in Tajikistan. In
addition, China would like to make 2007 the «Year of China» in
Tajikistan, and will seek to name 2008 the «Year of
Tajikistan»
in China.
6. Tajik academics at the
conference responded positively to
the Chinese Ambassador’s comments and to China’s involvement in
Tajikistan through the SCO. Many
speakers called for further
investment and cooperation beyond the stated projects, and see
China as an able partner to help Tajikistan develop its
struggling economy.
7. COMMENT: The push from China for increased
«mutual
understanding» may provide very little to bridge the cultural
chasm between the two countries.
On the other hand, the
increased attractiveness of Chinese consumer goods, the
provision of quick and well-targeted assistance projects, and
expanded security cooperation will ensure that China plays an
increasingly important role in Tajikistan, both within the
DUSHANBE 00001765 002.2 OF 002
multilateral confines of the SCO and directly as a bilateral
partner. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 79838
date: 9/27/2006 10:27
refid: 06DUSHANBE1766
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE1766
header:
VZCZCXRO1667
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1766/01 2701027
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001766
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
SCA FOR FEIGENBAUM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, OEXC, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: KABIRI’S IRPT TAKES A «TIME OUT»
DUSHANBE 00001766 001.2 OF 003
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:
During an hour-long introductory call with
the Ambassador September 26, Islamic Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan (IRPT) leader Muhiddin Kabiri described his party’s
reasoning for not participating in the upcoming presidential
elections. Kabiri said the party
would use the next three years
to increase party strength and «build trust from domestic
society and the international community» in preparation for the
2009 parliamentary elections — «the government will no longer be
able to play the Islamic fear card against us then.» Kabiri
made a plea for increased educational exchanges and help
improving the level of English among the party’s young people —
«otherwise they go to Russia.»
End Summary.
===============
Internal and External Factors Behind the «Time Out» Decision
===============
2. (SBU) Kabiri listed several domestic reasons for
the
party’s September 25 decision not to participate in the
presidential elections. First,
there is no proper legal basis
for the elections. Perhaps more
importantly, Rahmonov’s forces
have created a political environment where society believes
there is no real alternative to him.
The «monopolist» press has
already been conducting a pro-Rahmonov campaign for two or three
years; it is impossible to conduct a campaign in a matter of
months. «You could battle
Rahmonov as a person, as a politician
— but not his administrative resources.» Kabiri described a
belief that exists both in Tajikistan and sometimes abroad that
the active political participation of an Islamic party is
ironically a threat to democratization — the ruling party argues
that should the IRPT gain power, it will set Tajikistan on the
same course as Afghanistan under the Taliban, or at least be
«bad for the investment environment.» The IRPT has found it
difficult to get out its message that it is not extremist, but
rather stands for fair government that reflects the common
«values of civilization and humanity» and not just Islamic
values.
3. (SBU) Kabiri also described challenges posed by the
external environment. When the
U.S. began its fight against the
Taliban in Afghanistan, the party took a difficult decision — to
support the U.S. battle against terrorism even against
«believing Muslims.»
The party’s support of the U.S. position
had cost it some of its electorate.
The war in Iraq compounded
this problem, as had Western reaction to the election of Hamas
in Palestine. «Our people
say that when an Islamic party was
democratically elected, it created a rift with the West, and
caused problems not just for the government, but for the people
of Palestine.» Kabiri’s
media statements that his party decided
not to participate in the election so as «not to create a
confrontational situation» grow in part from this perception.
4. (SBU) «There will not be a true contest,»
Kabiri predicted.
When we participate in elections,
he added, we want to
participate in a true competition.
To participate at this
juncture would «play with the feelings of the electorate.»
==============
Election Conduct and Next Steps
==============
5. (SBU) Kabiri said his party would like to observe
the
voting process, and would like to have one of its members
participate in the Election Commission (Note: Parliament
Speaker and Dushanbe Mayor Ubaidulloyev had told Ambassador
earlier that day that only parties fielding a candidate would be
allowed to observe the elections at polling places. The Mayor
is probably incorrect. The
Central Committee on Elections and
DUSHANBE 00001766 002.2 OF 003
Referenda already having approved IRPT representatives at
polling stations even prior to its decision not to field a
candidate. The CCER’s Deputy Chairman Muhibulloh Dodojonov has
already told international organizations that the government has
changed the decree to permit all political parties to send in
observers regardless of whether or not they have fielded a
candidate.) Kabiri said he
doubted the presidential election
would be substantially better than the last parliamentary
elections. Following the
election, which Kabiri described as a
«Time Out» for his party, the IPRT will focus its efforts on
«building up trust in society» and «strengthening the
party» for
participation in parliamentary elections three years hence. He
said the environment then would be different — «they will no
longer be able to play the fear-of-Islamists card against us.»
The IPRT would not be substantially changing its strategies or
tactics, «but every generation has its own view.»
===============
Separating the IRPT from Extremists
===============
6. (SBU) Kabiri pointed out the difference between
what he
called «extremist» groups such as the IMU, which use violence
to
achieve political goals, and «radical» groups such at Hizb Ut
-Tahrir (HT), which do not.
«I’m not a supporter of HT,» he
said, «but we shouldn’t be imprisoning people for having radical
ideas if they’re not acting on them with violence.» When you
put young people in jail for 8-10 years because of political
ideology, they’re already «lost» and more disposed to become
extremists, even terrorists. The official position of the IRPT
is that HT’s ideas are utopian and against the national interest
of an independent and sovereign Tajikistan.
==============
Request for More Exchanges
==============
7. (SBU) As in every official meeting the Ambassador
has had
since her arrival, Kabiri asked for more educational exchange
opportunities for Tajik students, especially those from the
IRPT. Many of his staff have been
to the United States. «They
always return with a greater appreciation for the U.S. because
of the respect they see for Muslims there.» He lamented that so
far no IRPT members had been selected for educational exchange
programs, «although I know the selection is fair and
transparent, and you cannot establish some kind of IRPT quota.»
(Note: Vohidkhon Qisiddinov, Head of Administration for the IRPT
was selected for USAID’s Community Connections exchange program
in the United States October 6-25.)
He thought perhaps the
level of English language was not sufficient to compete
successfully, «so many of our students go to Russia.» Kabiri
himself, who regularly travels abroad, including several visits
to lecture at Columbia University, has again been invited for a
three week trip this fall to the United States. «It’s tough for
a political leader to be away for such a long time, and it’s
also a political question — some of our members think I already
spend too much time in the West.»
8. (SBU) Comment:
While sharing the view of other opposition
parties who have opted out of the election (septel) that there
will not be a level playing field for candidates, Kabiri clearly
believes that the political dynamic in the country will evolve
over time to permit more electoral freedom. Although Rahmonov’s
People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan will hold onto power,
the tools it has used to do so thus far (fear of instability,
assertions that an Islamic party would send Tajikistan back to
the dark ages) will be increasingly less effective as time goes
by and the devastating civil war recedes from the political
DUSHANBE 00001766 003.2 OF 003
consciousness.
9. (SBU) We are struck by the constant request for
more
educational exchanges in the United States — including from some
less expected sources such as the leader of the Islamic party
and Parliament Speaker, largely believed to be in Moscow’s
pocket. It is clear to us that
the emerging political
generation, no longer overwhelmed by memories of the dark days
of the 1990s, is looking for a touchstone — if not in the United
States, they’ll find it in Russia or Iran. To truly promote
democratic political development in the only country in Central
Asia to have a legal Islamic party, we need to dramatically
increase our exchanges, and find new ways to boost the level of
English language throughout the country — Peace Corps could play
a positive role in this regard.
End Comment.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 79939
date: 9/28/2006 2:53
refid: 06DUSHANBE1773
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
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RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0033
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0097
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001773
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: SIX WEEKS OUT: NO STRONG CANDIDATE WILL CHALLENGE RAHMONOV
REF: Dushanbe 1766
1. (U) Tajikistan’s opposition political party
congresses have
taken a stance not to participate in the election. Short of
boycotting the election, the Islamic Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan (IRPT), the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(SDPT) and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) each decided
not to nominate a candidate to run against President Rahmonov in
the November election. In
addition the parties will not throw
their support behind any candidate.
2. (U) The SDPT and the DPT declared the election
«irrelevant»
and spoke out against the unconstitutional nature of Rahmonov’s
presidency. They will not
consider the results of the November
election legitimate. The parties
as a whole are refusing to
participate in the election, but will allow members to vote for
whomever they choose. The DPT and
SDPT, spearheaded by the
country’s preeminent constitutional lawyer Rahmatullo Zoyirov
who helped draft the constitution, do not recognize the 2003
constitutional referendum that permitted Rahmonov to run for two
additional seven-year terms. Both
parties publicly stated that
they foresee the election will not be free or fair.
3. (U) The IRPT congress on similar lines voted
unanimously
not to nominate a candidate, not to publicly support any
candidate and also not to boycott the election. In addition,
the party rationalized that it needs to work on its image. It
does not want the people to view it as an opposition party that
is a destabilizing force, a reputation stemming from the Civil
War that ended nearly ten years ago.
The Ambassador met with
IPRT Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri September 26 to discuss this
decision further. (reftel).
4. (U) The IRPT’s Chief of Information, Saifullozoda
remarked
the decision was «in the spirit of the late Nuri.» Saifullozoda
suggested that just as a decision to remain silent is inherent
in free speech, the IRPT’s decision to not to field a candidate
is consistent with the practice of democracy.
5. (U) Rahmonov officially accepted the People’s
Democratic
Party of Tajikistan’s nomination to run for a new term September
23. He was unanimously supported
by the party’s delegates.
The Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) also nominated Ismoil
Talbakov, a parliament member.
6. (SBU) COMMENT:
The SDPT, DPT and IRPT’s decisions not to
run a candidate do not come as a surprise. All three know that
no candidate they field could possibly beat Rahmonov. In the
SDPT and DPT’s case, taking a stance and not participating is
the loudest political message they could send and a more shrewd
move than attempting to field a candidate. Although the IRPT
took a similar stance, it distanced itself slightly from the
SDPT and DPT, not wanting to be lumped in the category of
«opposition» political parties. If the IRPT ran Kabiri, he and
IRPT members would have faced harassment from the government.
If the IRPT supported Rahmonov, it would create more tension and
possibly a public party split.
7. (SBU) The OSCE has said that it will send 100 short
term
observers for the election with the caveat that if no credible
opposition candidates emerge, it would consider rescinding the
decision. With the SDPT, DPT and
IRPT out, no true opposition
candidate is eligible to run.
Narziev’s Socialist Party of
Tajikistan, although considered opposition is not eligible to
run since the party is not officially registered. We will see
if the OSCE considers the pocket party and pro-governmental
party candidates to be credible.
END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 80144
date: 9/29/2006 11:23
refid: 06DUSHANBE1803
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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DE RUEHDBU #1803/01 2721123
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0141
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001803
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, EAID, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BOUCHER’S VISIT TO DUSHANBE
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey Ann Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Dushanbe, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (U) Embassy Dushanbe welcomes Assistant Secretary
Boucher
back to Tajikistan. This visit
will be a good opportunity for
you to build upon your May meetings in Dushanbe and give an
extra push for better conduct one month before the presidential
election.
2. (C) The U.S.-Tajikistan bilateral relationship
remains
positive overall, but we have seen some troubling signs
particularly in the democratic development arena. Your visit
exactly one month ahead of the November 6 presidential election
is prime time to highlight problems with a one-sided election,
the downward trend in treatment of non-governmental
organizations, and problems in the business environment.
Tajikistan remains a strong cooperative partner on issues of
border security and the war against terror and we hope to use
this success to leverage improvements in other areas. (See
suggested talking points, paras 7, 10, 13, 15, 19.)
NOVEMBER 6 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
3. (SBU) The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy,
Human
Rights and Labor recently granted the International Foundation
for Election Systems an additional $300,000. Through the
efforts of this foundation, the Embassy, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations
Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding, the Central Commission for
Elections and Referenda has taken significant steps forward
changing election protocols to more closely approach
international standards, issuing uniform manuals and training
polling station workers.
4. (C) Despite small technical steps forward, the
political
playing field is wildly unbalanced.
The «opposition» political
parties— the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Social
Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the Islamic Renaissance Party
of Tajikistan— are not fielding or supporting candidates for
the election. The Democratic
Party of Tajikistan and Social
Democratic Party of Tajikistan publicly criticize Rahmonov and
his government, calling his presidency illegal and
unconstitutional, and refuse to recognize the November 6
election. The rest of the parties
are pocket parties —
pro-governmental parties who put forth candidates for the effect
of pluralism — or are too weak to have a serious impact.
Central Asia’s only Islamic political party, the Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, is in a vulnerable position
after the recent death of its leader, Said Abdullo Nuri. A
government smear campaign over the years since the civil war has
led much of the public to believe that the Islamic Renaissance
Party of Tajikistan could become a violent force of instability.
Knowing that the Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan will
not win in the election and not wanting to further the
opposition stereotype, Muhiddin Kabiri, the present chairman,
has said that his party will take a hiatus to revamp its image
and build its base in preparation for parliamentary elections in
three years.
5. (SBU) The Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human
Rights (ODIHR) plans on sending in long term observers and 100
short term observers for the election.
Its observation
mission’s report could be a map
for future election
improvements. We expect the
parallel Commonwealth of
Independent States observer team will not provide as useful a
critique of the election process.
We must remember that in a
country like Tajikistan, democratic progress can be slow and the
international community needs to remain vigilant and engaged.
6. (C) Controversial laws have also been sidelined
until after
the election. History shows that
leaders tend to tighten the
reigns after they consolidate power, and it is possible Rahmonov
may gain the confidence to adopt more authoritarian policies
after his expected landslide victory.
7. (C) Suggested talking points:
— As a popular leader, you have
a real opportunity to conduct
a fair election-you don’t need to falsify results. We
appreciate you and other senior government leaders making public
DUSHANBE 00001803 002 OF 004
statements calling for a fair election.
This message needs to
be delivered to the local levels.
— We hope that all candidates will have greater access to the
media and equal exposure.
— We are concerned about continuing harassment of journalists
leading up the election and a recent order from your government
asking internet service providers to shut down all websites
critical of the government.
A DOWNWARD TREND FOR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AND THE NON GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION CLIMATE
8. (C) Although Tajikistan does have a vibrant civil
society,
we remain concerned about an apparent trend against
foreign-sponsored non governmental organizations. The most
recent victim is Mercy Corps where an expat had to leave
following a «poison pen» letter and pressure from the Ministry
of Justice. The Mercy Corps
problem falls into a pattern of
certain ministries pressuring or harassing U.S.-funded non
governmental organizations, including National Democratic
Institute, International Research and Exchanges Board, Internews
and the American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian
Law Initiative.
9. (C) We would like to increase U.S.- Tajik
exchanges
exponentially. Tajik government
officials and religious and
civil society leaders regularly and eagerly call for
opportunities to send their young people to the United States.
However, we are disappointed that Embassy and U.S. non
governmental organization exchange programs have faced
obstacles. The president has
reportedly put a moratorium on all
official travel abroad leading up to election and the
International Research and Exchanges Board has recently been
informed they are not permitted to begin recruiting for Muskie
or U-GRAD educational exchange programs until after January
2007.
10. (C) Suggested talking points:
— The climate for international non governmental organizations
continues to concern us. Non
governmental organizations are
still harassed by certain ministries and refused registration.
— The National Democratic Institute remains unregistered and
Internews has not been able to reregister. We hope that you
will register them so that their employees can continue to carry
out good work for the people of Tajikistan.
— The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has told the International
Research and Exchange Board to delay recruitment until next
year. We know the emphasis you
place on education and ask you
to support our efforts to send students to the United States,
not postpone them.
BUSINESS CLIMATE: BUYER BEWARE
11. (C) Tajikistan officials regularly and publicly
state they
want foreign investors to bring money to Tajikistan to develop
their energy, textiles, and other industries. However, a recent
survey showed that 85% of Tajiks think corruption is the main
factor hindering economic growth, while Transparency
International ranks Tajikistan as one of the most corrupt
countries in the world. Officials
point to their transparent
laws on investment but the government regularly sidesteps these
rules at every level. Tajiks pay
bribes for jobs, education,
and services. Foreign and
domestic investors face the
uncertainty of a non-working judicial sector that cannot back up
contracts. Our economic
assistance programs and others
including the World Bank can help.
At a certain level the
Tajiks recognize this and have been cooperating.
12. (SBU) Your discussions on this issue will provide a
suitable opening to address the case of Gerald Metals whose
contract dispute with Tajik aluminum giant TadAZ remains bogged
down in legal proceedings. A
similar case against TadAZ by
Norsk Hydro led to the largest ever political risk insurance
settlement, making large investors more shy than ever about
investing in Tajikistan. Failure
to resolve the Gerald Metals
case would further deteriorate Tajikistan’s investment
DUSHANBE 00001803 003 OF 004
reputation.
13. (C) Suggested talking points:
— The U.S.-funded Pyanj bridge project is evidence of our
support for economic development and regional integration. The
bridge is set for completion in June 2007, and will help develop
commercial ties between Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
— Through a variety of assistance projects, including the
transmission line feasibility study, programs for small and
medium businesses, and banking sector projects, we are
supporting Tajik economic development.
— However, Tajikistan needs to
do better to rid itself of the
Soviet legacy of corruption. In
order to attract Western
investment, especially in Tajikistan’s energy sector, the
government needs to increase transparency, introduce regulatory
reform and respect for rule-of-law and sanctity of contracts.
— Gerald Metals: What are the
prospects for resolution?
BORDER SECURITY: A CORNERSTONE OF ASSISTANCE
14. (C)
Border security and counter-narcotics continue to be
cornerstones in our bilateral relationship. The Tajiks
appreciate our assistance and are more than willing partners in
law enforcement and border security.
We regularly facilitate
training for Tajik military and uniformed personnel and
exchanges to the United States and the Marshall Center. We
continue to renovate and equip outposts along the Afghan border.
We have a Harris radio team that
will help install a new
communications system, allowing the border guards to be more
effective. This new
communications system is the first of its
kind in the region and will link all security ministries
facilities and headquarters with state of the art
interconnectivity.
15. (SBU) Suggested talking points:
— Congratulation on your excellent drug interdiction rates. We
will need to continue to support these efforts as the amount of
opium Afghanistan produces and exports increases. Tajikistan
bears an important task in a dangerous neighborhood.
THE ENERGY OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
16. (C) At the September 15-16
Shanghai Cooperation
Organization meeting here in Dushanbe, China claims to have kept
the discussions well within what we consider positive
parameters, focusing on economic cooperation first and foremost,
although China and Tajikistan also completed their first joint
military exercises in the Tajik mountains. China announced a
host of cultural and educational initiatives aimed at building
trust here. Public comment — and
we have not heard otherwise
— from Russia and Tajikistan underlines that countries in the
region will try to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
mainly for economic purposes.
17. (C) There has been rampant speculation about the
make-up
and direction of the proposed «Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Energy Club», which may become an important mechanism, but would
only be one of many fora discussing regional energy issues.
With a cold winter of energy shortages approaching, Tajikistan
is laser-focused on negotiating with Uzbekistan on natural gas
imports to keep some electricity running in Tajikistan to heat
the countryside. Tajikistan hopes
the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization can help them leverage Uzbekistan on energy issues
in the future; the Uzbek side has shown no interest in helping
its neighbor, however. In the
long-term, Tajikistan may try to
develop its latent coal, oil, and natural gas resources. Also,
the new United States Agency for International Development
Regional Energy Market Assistance Program (REMAP) is designed to
help the region form a functioning energy market. In the
short-term, rationing and stockpiling for the winter has already
begun.
18. (C) Overall, Tajikistan has taken a healthy
approach to
China. We agree with the
International Monetary Fund and others
that the $637 million Chinese loan for Tajik infrastructure
projects will bring positive economic development and increased
DUSHANBE 00001803 004 OF 004
trade and investment opportunities.
Partnering with China
reduces Tajikistan’s reliance on Uzbekistan and Russia for its
overall needs, while also reducing our own leverage here. China
possesses the advantage of tremendous resources combined with
rapid implementation. With ink
still wet on the investment loan
agreements, the Chinese have begun work on road and energy
projects. By contrast, Tajiks
increasingly view the U.S. as
slow-moving, and are frustrated with our lack of public
financial support for new energy projects. The Minister of
Energy recently complained that U.S. company AES is behind
schedule in completing its feasibility study of a north-south
transmission line. With
hydropower, the Tajiks are looking to
whoever can construct dams fastest.
Russian giant RusAl has
staked its claim on Rogun but continues to drag its feet on
agreement of financial and technical terms with Tajikistan. The
Tajiks will also bring up the Dhasti-Jhum dam project, which has
huge potential. Rahmonov will
likely ask for our assistance in
developing this project, perhaps funding a feasibility study.
19. (C) Suggested talking points:
— The U.S. supports Tajikistan’s
plans for development of its
extensive hydropower resources, and we will provide whatever
technical and coordination support we can. U.S. company AES
remains interested in investing in the hydropower sector.
— The U.S. appreciates Tajikistan’s
support for regional
energy development projects that will help its neighbor,
Afghanistan, such as the transmission lines to be constructed
next year.
— We look forward to the
upcoming regional energy conference
in Dushanbe at the end of October as a means to discuss future
energy cooperation.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 81042
date: 10/7/2006 8:08
refid: 06DUSHANBE1840
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1840
header:
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OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1840/01 2800808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 070808Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8760
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1856
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1849
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1807
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0201
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001840
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/7/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, EAID, EINV, ENRG, TI
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER LOOKS SOUTH FOR OPPORTUNITY AND NERVOUSLY
AT GEORGIA
CLASSIFIED BY: TJACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:
In a 45-minute meeting with Assistant
Secretary Richard Boucher October 6,
Foreign Minister Talbak
SIPDIS
Nazarov remarked that the United States and Tajikistan have a
positive bilateral relationship because they have built an
atmosphere of trust. He thanked
Boucher for the U.S. security
and economic assistance but urged increased U.S. engagement in
Afghanistan, where the deteriorating situation poses a direct
threat to Tajikistan. The short
and long-term electricity
supply remains a top concern. END
SUMMARY.
AFGHANISTAN
2. (C) Nazarov expressed a fear that the
«exacerbated»
situation in southern Afghanistan could move north, posing a
direct threat to Tajikistan’s border and stability. «The
illicit drug flow is more than enough already,» he quipped.
Tajikistan did not want to seriously criticize the Afghan
government, but encouraged the United States to step up its
engagement. Nazarov noted that
recent announcement that NATO
will increase troop numbers was a good sign. Afghanistan is a
big country that needs more forces, he advised. Nazarov
applauded efforts to train Afghan police to help fight the
Taliban, but noted the Afghan border guards also needed
assistance.
3. (C) Boucher agreed that expanding government
operations and
increasing the Afghan police and armed forces would lead to
greater stability, but Afghanistan also needed significant
infrastructure to achieve real peace.
The fundamental issue, he
said, was to strengthen government in Afghanistan’s border areas.
4. (SBU) Nazarov noted that bilateral relations
between
Dushanbe and Kabul were good, and getting stronger, as the two
countries signed more agreements and increase operational
cooperation, particularly on drugs.
The U.S.- funded bridge at
Nizhniy Pyanj, slated to open Summer 2007, will provide further
opportunities for cooperation, and trade.
ENERGY
5. (SBU) Because Tajikistan has no gas or oil, Nazarov
noted
that securing electricity for the winter was a top priority. He
lamented the inadequate transmission network that cut off
northern Tajikistan from the south.
Tajikistan had recently
reached an agreement with Kyrgyzstan to purchase electricity,
but because transmission lines go through Uzbekistan, Tashkent
scuttled the deal, and then suggested the Tajiks purchase Uzbek
electricity, and three times the cost.
The Chinese project to
build South-North high voltage transmission lines through the
Varzob Gorge will eliminate this problem by connecting directly
to Kyrgyzstan’s network, but those lines will not be ready for
at two years.
6. (C) Nazarov hinted that Uzbekistan had also
played a role
in the changing relations between the Tajik government and
RusAl’s Oleg Deripaska over the Rogun hydropower station. «I
don’t want to blame the Uzbeks, but when Deripaska came back
from Tashkent, he came a different person» and no longer
accepted the long-standing design for a 335 meter earth-and-rock
dam. The recently published
Lahmayer technical study on Rogun
had not entirely settled the issue of height and of a cement
versus earth dam. The World Bank
will be weighing in with an
independent assessment.
7. (SBU) Nazarov said the upcoming Central Asia and
South Asia
Electricity Trade conference in Dushanbe October 26-28, would
provide another opportunity for regional countries to work out
trade agreements for electricity, particularly for Afghanistan.
He noted that Tajikistan had a good record of exporting to those
places in Afghanistan that had transmission lines. «Even in the
winter, when we don’t have enough electricity, we still export
to Afghanistan.»
INVESTMENT CLIMATE AND CORRUPTION
DUSHANBE 00001840 002 OF 002
8. (C) Boucher observed that the investment climate
and
widespread corruption meant Tajikistan remained a risk for
investors. He noted that the
unresolved case of Gerald Metals
with the state aluminum plant «TadAZ» stood out as an example
of
what could happen in Tajikistan, and urged the Tajik government
to help resolve the case soon.
Nazarov called the former TadAZ
director a criminal, and remarked that the director was being
also prosecuted in London.
Nazarov reported that Tajikistan
signed the anti-corruption convention in New York during the UN
general Assembly meetings in September.
New domestic
legislation also addresses corruption.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
9. (C) In response to Boucher’s question about the
November 6
presidential election, Nazarov laughed and said, «I only know
what I read.» He said he was
surprised the Islamic Renaissance
Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) has declined to put up a candidate,
but reported that a friend of his in the party has said they did
not want to «waste their time.» The Islamists would save their
efforts and strength for the future.
Nazarov noted that some
parties worked quietly to build their base, while others
quarreled among themselves.
10. (SBU) Nazarov reported that President Rahmonov had
given
firm instructions that all candidates should have access to
state media services, and ministers and local officials were not
to interfere in the election process.
Observers from any
country would be allowed on November 6.
11. (SBU) Boucher asked whether there were any plans to
investigate or punish cases where fraud did occur. «I honestly
don’t know,» said the foreign minister. «You can ask the
president.» Boucher states
that the election was a chance to
get the procedures and processes right.
12. (SBU) Boucher also asked about registration and
licensing
of media outlets and radio stations, including U.S.-funded
community radio stations through the non-governmental
organization Internews. Nazarov
switched to the subject of BBC,
and reported he had personally spoken with the head of the state
agency on radio, and it seemed likely the BBC would be licensed
soon.
GEORGIA AND RUSSIA
13. (C) Mentioning with concern the situation between
Russia
and Georgia, Nazarov observed, «Whenever a big country and a
small country come into conflict, the small country suffers
first.» Boucher said his
message during upcoming consultations
in Moscow was that U.S. and Russian goals and interests in the
region are the same. Competition
only harmed countries in the
region, including Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
14. (SBU) COMMENT:
Nazarov was relaxed and open, but
non-committal on the elections, preferring to pass that to the
President himself. END COMMENT.
JACOBSON
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 81043
date: 10/7/2006 8:24
refid: 06DUSHANBE1841
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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DE RUEHDBU #1841/01 2800824
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O P 070824Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1858
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1851
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1809
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1748
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1818
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0203
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001841
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/7/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, EAID., EINV, ENRG, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENT TELLS BOUCHER ELECTION SHOULD MEET
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
CLASSIFIED BY: TJACOBSON, AMBASSADOR, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
In a two-hour meeting with Assistant
Secretary Richard Boucher October 6, Tajikistan’s President
SIPDIS
Emomali Rahmonov stressed the positive bilateral relationship
with the United States. Stating
he wanted to deepen contacts at
every level, Rahmonov thanked the United States particu
