id: 75873
date: 8/23/2006 12:15
refid: 06DUSHANBE1599
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06Dushanbe1587
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001599
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA FOR DEUTSCH; NSC FOR MERKEL;
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/23/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ENRG, KDEM, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RAHMATULLOYEV MEETS DAS
FEIGENBAUM
REF: Dushanbe 1587
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Advisor on Foreign Policy Erkin
Rahmatulloyev waxed philosophical on Central Asia’s history and
role in U.S. policy and the challenges facing his country, but
agreed with Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum that the
U.S. and Tajik governments share the same priorities and
concerns about regional integration and stability. Democracy,
he added, will not happen in Tajikistan overnight, and the Tajik
government fears instability. But
there are indications that
the Tajik mentality is changing step by step. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) In an 80 minute meeting
August 21, Rahmatulloyev told
DAS Feigenbaum he was very pleased with the current bilateral
relationship, particularly because during the 1990s the United
States had given only «episodic» attention to Tajikistan and
its
neighbors. Now, the relationship
reached across many sectors
and cooperation was clearly growing stronger. DAS Feigenbaum
agreed but offered a slightly different characterization of
early U.S. policy in the region, noting it had not been
«episodic» since the US had maintained a consistent interest
in
the region since 1991. But it
might have seemed one-dimensional
— for example, focused mainly on opening new embassies and
denuclearization in the early 1990s, and later on responding to
the Global War on Terror. Many
observers in the 1990s had
argued that U.S. policy was simply a function of geo-strategic
competition with Russia and China, reducing Central Asian states
to the objects of their struggle.
Feigenbaum noted we have now
reached a new moment where the United States is pursuing a
genuinely multi-dimensional relationship with Tajikistan and its
neighbors and where the Central Asian countries themselves are
at the center of our regional policy.
DEMOCRACY TAKES TIME
3. (C) Rahmatulloyev observed
that the U.S. vision for the
region almost mirrored the Tajik government’s priorities,
although he suspected that the United States sometimes feels
that democracy and human rights were not shared priorities in
the region. Unlike neighboring
countries, «We don’t have that
allergy» to democracy, he joked.
However, he cautioned that the
«mentality» of the Tajik population was not ready for a
dramatic
democratic transition that could lead to «undesirable
consequences.» «One
reason for the Civil War was that political
demonstrators tore down a Lenin statue before the population was
ready for such a change. This led directly to confrontation.»
Five years later, he noted the government changed the name of
Lenin district to Sughd district, with nary a complaint from the
public.
4. (C) It was all about gradual
timing of new ideas, he opined.
«For a long time we lived in a society of single-mindedness, but
now we are used to multiple opinions.
We cannot come to this in
a day.» Feigenbaum noted that democracy was by no means a
uniquely American idea and many countries had developed their
own democratic traditions. He
said Washington would like to see
Tajikistan develop more democratic processes but in a manner
that would be unique, not a carbon-copy of the United States.
He noted the great deal of interest in Tajikistan’s November
presidential election.
DUSHANBE 00001599 002 OF 004
ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY
5. (C) Rahmatulloyev noted that
neighboring countries were not
always pleased Tajikistan allowed an Islamic-based political
party to operate legally.
Rahmatulloyev called the existence of
the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) a compromise between
Islamic and secular movements, noting that it has reduced the
basis for fundamentalism in the country.
He also suggested that
the IRPT’s legal status should demonstrate to neighboring
countries that not all Islam js radical and political.
6. (C) Rahmatulloyev doubted that
acting Party Chairman
Muhiddin Kabiri would run for president in November, noting that
his candidacy could reduce his political prestige. (Reftel A)
«It would be catastrophic for him if the party nominates him!»
said Rahmatulloyev. There is no
alternative to President
Rahmonov, and any opposition candidate will receive such a small
percentage of the vote, he will seem politically insignificant
and fade away. «Look at Usmonov!» he said, referring to the
last
candidate who opposed Rahmonov.
«He got two percent of the
vote, and now he’s gone.» When the Peace Agreement was signed in
1998, added Rahmatulloyev, the opposition received 30 percent of
government positions, representing its approximate share of
support among the population.
Now, Rahmatulloyev estimated the
support for any opposition to President Rahmonov to be much
lower.
NEXT STEPS
7. (C) In response to DAS Feigenbaum’s question about what else
or new the United States could do in the region, Rahmatulloyev
suggested stimulating regional development. Referring to the
UNDP’s recently published Human Development Report,
Rahmatulloyev noted that Central Asian countries would
experience a 50 percent growth in GDP just by reducing tariffs
and trade barriers.
«Tajikistan supports this policy.» He
called the U.S.-funded Bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj a regional, not
bilateral project, for the transport connections it would
facilitate. «When we
proposed building that bridge, you were
still friends with Uzbekistan, and the Uzbeks urged us to
refuse, because there was already a bridge across the Pyanj.
Now look how important our bridge is.» The United States’
presence in the region is a catalyst for development, he said.
8. (C) The United States’ role
should be to facilitate regional
integration, Rahmatulloyev said, helping Central Asia
diplomatically and economically.
He gave the example of
Tajikistan’s excess summer electricity, noting that until 1996,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan swapped excess power. The Uzbeks
abandoned the agreement for political reasons, and chose instead
to expend resources on domestically produced power at «three
times the price of Tajik electricity. It overturned economic
logic.» DAS Feigenbaum noted
the region’s interdependence, and
regretted the political obstacles to realizing the integration
opportunities. The United States,
he said, wants to be a
facilitator, a convener in helping to realize precisely these
opportunities.
DUSHANBE 00001599 003 OF 004
9. (C) Rahmatulloyev reported he was writing a book that
addressed Tajikistan’s traditional problems and new challenges.
Traditional issues included hydropower and water sharing,
transport and communication links, regional relations-«issues we
inherited» from the Soviets.
New problems meant radical Islam,
narcotrafficking, and terrorism.
«U.S. policy must take into
account these realities,» he advised. DAS Feigenbaum repeated
that we shared many of the same concerns. He noted that we
would like to see more U.S. businesses opening in Tajikistan,
but the current investment climate remained risky for many.
Enhanced economic rule of law could help to attract more private
investors at this exciting time.
Ultimately, an American
Chamber of Commerce would help demonstrate that Tajikistan had
assimilated international commercial practices.
«THE BEST BUREAUCRACY IN THE WORLD»
10. (C) Rahmatulloyev complained that U.S. bureaucracy — «the
best bureaucracy in the world» — led to long gaps between
agreements and implementation. He
noted the Chinese supported
three major infrastructure projects, signing the official
agreements in June. Within ten
days, they had sent machinery
and the projects had started.
«As the United States intensifies
its economic ties, it would be beneficial if it could move
faster,» he subtly counseled, particularly in energy, where
Afghanistan and Pakistan have a growing demand for electricity.
ONE LAST THING~ ABOUT THAT DEBT RELIEF
11. (C) Rahmatulloyev observed that since independence, the
United States had given Tajikistan almost one billion dollars in
assistance. «We are most
grateful,’ he said. «But I have a
little question.» He noted
that Tajikistan had requested
several times the United States to forgive the $17 million in
debt for food purchases, and added that President Rahmonov had
asked about this issue. Other
highly-indebted poor countries
received debt write-offs, the IMF forgave almost $100 million in
Tajikistan debt, and Pakistan has also forgiven $30 million.
«We don’t understand, but we attribute this to your U.S.
bureaucracy.» DAS Feigenbaum
pledged to look into the matter.
COMMENT:
12. (C) Rahmatulloyev had a very analytical bird’s eye view of
regional policy, and a realistic perspective on the U.S role in
the region. However, his
complaints about U.S. bureaucracy
reflect what many in the Tajik government think: the U.S. is all
talk, and slow action.
Particularly on infrastructure projects,
like Sangtuda-I hydropower station, the south-north highway and
transmission lines, the Russians and Chinese have, in Tajik
eyes, moved quickly to deliver on promises. Rahmatulloyev did
not acknowledge that often the Tajik bureaucracy holds up
movement on projects, such as the Ministry of Energy’s
month-long period to consider the AES contract for a feasibility
DUSHANBE 00001599 004 OF 004
study on transmission lines to Afghanistan. He, like many in
the Tajik leadership, welcomes the idea of more U.S. investment
and involvement in the region, but may not entirely understand
to what extent that would entail transparency and enhanced rule
of law. END COMMENT.
13. (U) DAS Feigenbaum cleared this cable.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 75880
date: 8/23/2006 12:44
refid: 06DUSHANBE1600
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9804
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001600
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN; OES
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SENV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: WARM TEMPERATURES RAISE LAKE SAREZ’S WATER
LEVEL
REF: Dushanbe 1465
1. Two recent earthquakes that
damaged thousands of homes in
southern Tajikistan offered a bracing reminder that this
mountainous country remains seismically very active (Reftel).
In 1911, a strong earthquake rocked Tajikistan’s Pamir
mountains, triggering a massive landslide that created the Usoi
Dam along the Murghob River and Lake Sarez. The Usoi Dam is the
largest naturally-formed dam in the world, holding in Lake
Sarez’s 17 cubic kilometers of water.
If the dam were to break,
or an earthquake or landslide were to spill water over the dam,
the result could be catastrophic flooding not only in
Tajikistan, but also into Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Afghanistan downstream. PolOff
and Regional Environment
Officer met with the Ministry of Emergency Situation’s Special
Agency on Lake Sarez’s Director Amin Husainov August 17 to
review the status of Lake Sarez.
2. Director Husainov stated the
situation remains very
dangerous and that the Tajik government treats the problem very
seriously. The Agency briefs the
government daily on the lake’s
water levels and any new or extraordinary activity. The
Government pays close attention, because an earthquake of the
magnitude that created the lake occurs in the area every 80 to
120 years. Given that the
earthquake that created the lake
occurred 95 years ago, it is believed a similar earthquake could
happen at any time. In addition,
most lakes created by such
events are temporary and eventually disappear. The lake’s water
level has risen substantially.
For the past ten years, the
water level rose an average of ten centimeters annually, but a
greater volume of snow melt from the Pamirs caused the Lake to
rise a whopping 2.62 meters last year.
3. Experts have come to conflicting
conclusions about the Usoi
Dam’s stability. Some predict it
is vulnerable to large
earthquakes and will eventually break; others claim the dam is
quite sturdy and Lake Sarez will remain a permanent geographical
fixture in Tajikistan’s landscape.
Most experts agree that
although the dam might not instantly burst, in the event of a
landslide or earthquake, large scale flooding would occur. The
Tajik government created the Lake Sarez Risk Mitigation Project
(LSRMP) with a $4.3 million budget jointly financed by the Tajik
government and the donor community (including USAID) to assess
the risks, develop early warning systems, and prepare local
communities for a possible disaster.
The World Bank and Swiss
government are the largest contributors to LSRMP. An early
warning system was finished in 2004.
The system should notify
officials in Dushanbe and residents in the affected area within
one minute of any irregular activity at the Usoi Dam or a change
in Lake Sarez’s water level. Select
residents in each village
of the potentially flooded areas received emergency training and
are equipped with communications radios.
4. The Uzbek government has
expressed interest in developing an
early warning system for its territory, but has not made any
significant efforts to cooperate with Tajik authorities.
Studies predict that if the Usoi Dam were to break completely,
flood waters could spread as far as a 20-km width along the
Uzbek plains and could be as high as twelve meters when it
reached Uzbekistan. The water
would flood from the Pamirs down
through the Bartang, Pyanj, and Amu Darya Rivers all the way to
the Aral Sea. Over two million
people in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, as well as the settlements and cities along
the rivers, could be affected by flooding. Such possible
flooding poses not only an immediate danger to people’s lives,
but has longer term economic implications for agriculture and
economic development.
5. COMMENT: Lake Sarez is a natural wonder that could
become a
natural disaster with one good quake.
The Tajik authorities
monitor the situation as best they can, but aside from early
warning measures, already in place, and hopefully functional,
there is little any government could do to prevent this
disaster. Because the most damage
would be in Uzbekistan,
Tashkent and Dushanbe would be well advised to cooperate on
early warning systems. END
COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 76319
date: 8/28/2006 7:37
refid: 06DUSHANBE1608
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001608
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK GOVERNMENT SETS LOOSE THOUSANDS OF PRISONERS
1. (U) Tajikistan’s parliament adopted an amnesty
law August
17 that would free 4,000 prisoners and reduce the terms of
11,000. All women above the age
of 55, children under the age
of 18, first time offenders, along with other designated groups
will be eligible for amnesty.
Families will be given the
opportunity to petition to free imprisoned relatives and the
penitentiary system will nominate a list of names for
consideration to President Rahmonov’s office.
2. (U) Previous amnesty laws aimed to contribute to
the peace
process after the Tajik civil war when the government granted
amnesty to many opposition fighters.
In 2001, another amnesty
law was passed which freed 20,000 prisoners. This year’s
amnesty law was passed out of the goodness of the
parliamentarians’ hearts in order to celebrate the 15th
anniversary of Tajikistan’s independence. Coincidentally, it
also comes right before the November presidential election.
During past amnesties, some political parties have petitioned
for the release of member they consider imprisoned for political
reasons, but the government denied their requests.
3. (SBU) Embassy sources tell PolOff that despite the
amnesty,
prison officials keep a tight leash on the penitentiary system
ahead of the November presidential election. One international
mission that had frequent access to prisons in order to
implement assistance programs, has been experiencing resistance
from Ministry of Justice.
4. (SBU) COMMENT:
It is doubtful any prisoners affiliated
with opposition political parties will be released. This
gesture of goodwill from the government also will not hurt
President Rahmonov’s popularity right before the election,
although he has no declared competition and will win the popular
vote. END COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 76361
date: 8/28/2006 12:30
refid: 06DUSHANBE1613
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1587|06DUSHANBE1599|06DUSHANBE960
header:
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001613
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MERKEL;
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/28/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TEN WEEKS TO ELECTIONS, TAJIKISTAN MOVING SLOWLY TO
IMPLEMENT CHANGES
REF: A) DUSHANBE 960 B) DUSHANBE 1599 C) DUSHANBE 1587
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ten weeks out from the November Presidential
election, Tajik authorities are moving very slowly to implement
improvements to the electoral process.
After a significant step
forward in May, when Tajik authorities presented donors with a
the first government plans to address previously election
inadequacies, the Central Committee on Elections and Referenda
(CCER) has largely been working behind the scenes with NGOs and
donors. IFES, the UN and OSCE are
pushing the CCER to issue a
decree on the conduct of the election, but the ball rests with
the CCER, which may not have much power without a distinct
directive from the President’s office.
Top advisors to the
president acknowledge the importance of holding a more
transparent election, but seem more concerned with checking
boxes on a checklist for international approval than
strengthening the actual process.
They do not seem to
understand the structural changes to make an election more fair
and transparent, including media access and an election campaign
free from pressure or government intimidation. The election
support funds Post requested in May have yet to make their way
to Tajikistan, and few other donors plan to invest in an
election where the result is a foregone conclusion. Post still
believes it is in our and Tajikistan’s interest to train
officials and an electorate in proper election procedures, in
preparation for a day when the race is truly open. END SUMMARY.
VERY SMALL STEPS
2. (C) Since a May 17 meeting
presented international donors
with a very concrete set of actions to improve the election
process (Reftel A), movement on election issues has been slow
and almost entirely behind-the-scenes.
United Nations
Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP) held a July 27
roundtable with the President’s Center for Strategic Research
(CSR), the CCER and political parties to discuss a possible
decree to be issued by the CCER prior to the elections. The
decree would offer district-level election commissions specific
guidance to implement better practices on election day. The
decree belongs to the list of changes identified by CCER, IFES
and CSR, in response to Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) criticisms of the February 2005
Parliamentary elections. After
the July 27 meeting, UNTOP told
other donors the ball was «firmly in the CCER’s court» to
release a statement on the election. In late August/early
September, the CCER expects to send to parliament a decree to
institute changes in the election procedure after conferring
with the political parties.
3. (SBU) In early August, OSCE
gave the Tajik authorities an
assessment on the Law on the Election of the President, which
the Tajik Parliament amended in January.
The assessment
criticized the law for restricting campaign free speech and
imposing overly strict requirements for candidates. The OSCE
assessment recommended a number of new amendments to the
election law, to provide non-partisan domestic observers; an
independent, pluralistic election administration; fair
allocation of state resources to candidates; and improved
process of verifying signatures to nominate a candidate.
CHAIRMAN BOLTUYEV
DUSHANBE 00001613 002 OF 004
4. (C) CCER Chairman Boltuyev had difficulty
articulating the
changes his agency had already implemented, or the general CCER
goals for the November election.
In an August 18 meeting with
Deputy Assistant Secretary Feigenbaum and PolOff, he stressed
the CCER’s independence and the autonomy of the individual
district election commissions, separate from the Presidentially
appointed local government. He
noted Parliament would convene
August 31 to set the official date for the Presidential election
— most likely November 6. When
DAS Feigenbaum repeated the
question about the changes CCER hoped to make, Boltuyev only
mentioned attempts to eliminate «family» voting, where the
male
head of the family filled out ballots for multiple registered
voters. Boltuyev hinted that the
CCER would issue procedural
guidance to local level election officials, but offered no
comments on the action plan developed with IFES and CRS.
5. (C) Boltuyev faulted the OSCE for issuing their
report on
the February 2005 election «six months later» and not
identifying the specific polling stations where violations
occurred. «They should have come to us that night, so we could
immediately correct the mistake.»
He also criticized the OSCE’s
assessment, noting «the CCER cannot just change the law.»
(NOTE:
He’s correct. END NOTE.) Despite
several leading queries,
Boltuyev did not mention his work with IFES, which has been a
driving force behind the matrix of changes to be implemented
before the election. He made no
mention of scheduled
poll-worker trainings or voter education, as the CCER previously
proposed to donors.
6. (C) In a series of unrelated comments, Boltoyev
thanked the
United States for its support, went into details about the
mechanics of getting 3 million registered voters on the voting
rolls and to the ballot box and emphasized the close working
relationship with UNTOP. He
rejected the offer of additional
material support or funding, even when the offer was restated so
as to be clear that there could be funding to help with the
balloting. His deputy Dodjonov,
sitting next to him, quickly
interjected that the CCER could indeed use assistance with some
publications, including 40,000 copies of the election laws and
constitutions. Boltuyev
emphasized the need for observers, and
closed the conversation by asking «Why would we violate
(international standards)?»
7. (C) An NGO director and UNTOP head Ambassador
Sotirov told
PolOff in later conversations that Boltuyev was drunk on the job
with increasing frequency.
Sotirov noted that Boltuyev often
called him for drinking binges.
«I give my liver for
democracy!» he smiled, in order to maintain the working
relationship with the CCER. The
NGO head reported that the CCER
tried to maneuver events so that Boltuyev gave prepared remarks,
and then left the floor and the work to Dodojonov and other
department heads. The NGO head
noted that after Boltoyev’s wife
passed away, he became an alcoholic and Dodojonov runs the CCER
with Boltoyev only as its chairman by name. The NGO head also
commented that CCER has tried to keep its activities with the
NGO and political parties very quiet, until they can formally
announce the decree.
WE WANT CLEAN ELECTIONS
DUSHANBE 00001613 003 OF 004
8. (C) CSR head Suhrob Sharipov
told PolOff August 19 the
government wanted to have a «clean» election-and President
Rahmonov himself had told his administration that the balloting
was supposed to follow international standards. «We must do
away with family voting, and make sure that every local election
official understands that the President wants them to follow the
rules.» Sharipov
acknowledged that in a culture where
connections were everything, no local official wanted his
district to be the one that delivers less support to the
President. «The President
has gotten a good chuckle out of the
Americans telling him he doesn’t need 99 percent of the vote,»
said, Sharipov, possibly referring to Presidential Advisor on
Economics Davlatov’s meeting with former-DAS John Gastright in
Washington in April.
9. (C) Sharipov predicted Islamic
Renaissance Party acting
chairman Muhiddin Kabiri would run against Rahmonov (Reftel C).
When pressed about access to the media and state television for
any opposition candidates, Sharipov appeared thoughtful, but
somewhat unconvinced it was a necessary step. «The President is
really popular,» he noted.
«He has done so much for this
country. We know he’s going to win.» Like Boltuyev, Sharipov
was reticent about collaboration between his Center and IFES on
election reform
COMMENT:
10. (C) Although the CCER may have cooperated with international
organizations, it is clear that it has limited authority. In
Tajikistan, particularly with the presidential election, top
government officials are still in firm control.
11. (C) Sharipov and Bolutyev’s comments suggest the Tajik
authorities are very interested in appearing to make changes to
win international favor, but may not entirely understand why
certain reforms have been recommended.
In Tajikistan’s
unsophisticated democracy, focus is still on rectifying
culturally-based violations like family voting, or absentee
voting, rather than understanding and undertaking structural
changes needed such as creating more independence from
government pressure and a fair campaign season.
12. (C) Sharipov’s throughts echoed a later statement
by
Presidential Advisor Rahmatulloyev (Reftel B) on the danger of
political irrelevance for any opposition candidate, in light of
Rahmonov’s overwhelming popularity.
For Sharipov and Boltuyev,
a clean election seems to be a hoop to jump through for an
international audience, not something that could benefit their
own institutions.
13. (C) The clock is ticking, but reform is slow and
underfunded. Funding from Post’s
May request for election
support has yet to be hit the ground (Reftel A) and few other
donors, aside from UNTOP and OSCE, plan to invest in the
election. Although the result may be a foregone conclusion.
Post still believes it is in the U.S. and Tajikistan’s interest
to help the CCER train its poll workers and the electorate, in
DUSHANBE 00001613 004 OF 004
anticipation for a day when Tajikistan’s political field is
truly open. END COMMENT.
14. (U) DAS Feigenbaum did not
clear this cable.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 76517
date: 8/29/2006 12:48
refid: 06DUSHANBE1620
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1593|06DUSHANBE1599|06DUSHANBE1620
header:
VZCZCXRO0113
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1620/01 2411248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 291248Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8453
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1759
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0086
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9847
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001620
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA FOR DEUTSCH; NSC FOR MERKEL; E FOR HENGEL AND DUNCAN; EMBASSY MANILA
PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG
SUBJECT: REGIONAL INTEGRATION: TAJIK ENERGY MINISTER SAYS «DON’T
WORRY ABOUT SOCHI!
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1593 B) DUSHANBE 1599
DUSHANBE 00001620 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) A rumored Russian-led hydropower consortium
will not
threaten a U.S. company’s plans to export Tajik electricity to
Afghanistan. Energy Minister
Asadullo Yerov told PolOff August
28 that the «informal discussions» at the August 15-17
Eurasian
Economic Community (EurasEC) meeting in Sochi, Russia were
largely to pressure Uzbekistan to cooperate with regional
countries on energy issues.
«We made it clear that we had
already signed an agreement with AES to export electricity to
Afghanistan-any EurasEC arrangement would not affect that at
all.» He emphasized that
Tajikistan no longer wanted to lose
billions of kilowatt hours of excess electricity every summer,
and if Uzbekistan would not buy the surplus, as it had in the
Soviet period, the Tajiks needed to sell it elsewhere.
2. (C) Yerov hinted that most of the discussions at
Sochi,
regarding energy and customs unions, attempted to force
Uzbekistan to cooperate with the other EurasEC members. «As
former Soviet republics, we have a history of cooperation on
energy issues,» he observed, but he downplayed recent internet
reports about Russia organizing a common energy market. (NOTE:
In addition to Russian and Central Asian media coverage, an
August 25 article on the Asian Times website suggested the
energy part of the EurasEC meeting had been kept confidential,
but was designed to compete with the U.S. regional integration
strategy. In earlier meetings
with EmbOffs, Foreign Minister
Nazarov and Presidential Advisor on Foreign Policy Rahmatulloyev
carefully dismissed the questions about energy policy talks at
Sochi (reftels). END NOTE.)
3. (C) Yerov reported that his ministry had signed
the final
documents for AES to commence its feasibility study to construct
220 kV lines to the Tajik-Afghan border, and told PolOff he had
designated first Deputy Minister Pulat Mukhidinnov as the point
of contact for the project. Yerov
noted the Asian Development
Bank was currently hosting a delegation in Dushanbe, including
Energy Specialist Xavier Humbert, which was looking at financing
the AES transmission lines project.
COMMENT:
4. (C) Compared to Nazarov and Rahmatulloyev, Yerov
directly
addressed U.S. concerns about Russian intentions in the energy
sector and acknowledged Tajikistan’s commitments to AES and to
Afghanistan. He made the same
statements in June, when RAO UES
proposed selling excess electricity to Uzbekistan, suggesting
that as Tajikistan tries to balance the increased interest (and
pressure) in its energy sector, it also understands the
importance of honoring its agreements.
Tajik officials also
perceive Uzbekistan as an unreliable partner and recognize their
interest in looking for alternative outlets for Tajik energy and
other goods.
5. (C) Excess electricity is one of Tajikistan’s few
resources
and fewer bargaining chips with its neighbors. Most Tajik
officials-particularly Yerov and energy czar Deputy Prime
Minister Ghulomov — talk enthusiastically about exporting to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the
United States wants to keep
Tajikistan engaged and looking towards South Asia, we will want
to make sure that when the transmission lines to the Afghan
border are completed in 2008, there is a viable electricity
network to hook into. Otherwise,
Tajikistan will have to look
elsewhere to sell its summer electricity, and its old Soviet
DUSHANBE 00001620 002.2 OF 002
trading partners might look appealing again. END COMMENT.HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 76518
date: 8/29/2006 12:48
refid: 06DUSHANBE1621
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET//NOFORN
destination: 06DUSHANBE986
header:
VZCZCXRO0115
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DE RUEHDBU #1621/01 2411248
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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1500
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1761
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1310
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1065
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9849
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001621
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/CI, DS/IP/SCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, KIRF, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: UNKNOWN ASSAILANT SETS SYNAGOGUE ON FIRE
REF: DUSHANBE 986
DUSHANBE 00001621 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: THUSHEK, CHARGE D’AFFAIRES, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
SECRET/NOFORN
SIPDIS
1. (C) SUMMARY:
An unknown assailant set Dushanbe’s synagogue
on fire August 18 by throwing a Molotov cocktail through a first
floor window. Fortunately, a
neighbor sounded the alarm and the
fire was put out before it was able to spread and engulf the
entire building. Dushanbe’s Fire
Department has officially
acknowledged that the fire was deliberate and will investigate.
In the days leading up to the fire, a series of strangers
visiting the synagogue and a break-in at the rabbi’s residence
indicate the fire may have been well-planned and orchestrated by
an undeclared group. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) According to Rabbi Mikhail Abdurahmonov, on
Friday,
August 18 at 10:00 pm, an unknown person or possibly a group of
people walked up to Dushanbe’s only synagogue, snuck behind a
protective wall and threw a Molotov cocktail (a bottle with fuel
and packed with paper lit on fire) through a window into a small
prayer room. The bottle broke the
window, completely burned the
curtains, charred a large section of the prayer room’s wall and
damaged a table and chair.
Fortunately, a vigilant neighbor,
alarmed by his dog’s barking, alerted synagogue officials and
authorities. The fire department
put out the fire and stopped
it from spreading. Synagogue
members had finished Friday night
prayers earlier in the evening at approximately 9:00 pm and left
the room vacant. Friday night is
the beginning of the Jewish
Sabbath and prayers are always held after sunset. No one was
hurt.
3. (C) Police and fire department officials
investigated the
fire the same night and returned three days later to assess the
damages. They have officially
concluded the fire was a
deliberate act and not an accident, but have no leads on who is
responsible for the fire.
According to the congregation’s
rabbi, officials also told him not to tell anyone about the
fire, explaining that nothing should ruin the government’s
Independence Day celebrations, planned for September 8-9. No
media reported the news and post may never have known about the
incident, had an American citizen not visited the synagogue
August 17.
4. (C) Police promised to investigate the fire, but
have no
leads yet. Several days prior to
the incident, police went
door-to-door in the neighborhood occupied by several Jewish
residents, and told them to beware of suspicious packages lying
around. They warned that some
people may try to cause problems
leading up to Tajik Independence Day, September 9.
Specifically, they instructed Rabbi Abdurahmonov to refuse entry
to any strangers into the synagogue, even if they claim to be
Jewish.
EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRE
5. (C) Several days prior to the fire, someone broke
into
Abdurahmonov’s residence, locked his dog up in a small room and
broke a window. Nothing was
stolen from his house. The rabbi
said the break-in was designed to intimidate him.
6. (C) Rabbi Adburahmonov informed EmbOffs of a
series of
visitors to the synagogue in the weeks before the fire. The
first suspicious visitor was a Tajik male who asked detailed
questions about the building’s layout and prayer times. He
DUSHANBE 00001621 002.2 OF 003
attempted to take photographs of the synagogue, but when
confronted by synagogue staff, he claimed to be a journalist.
When asked for his documents, he ran away.
7. (C) The second visit involved two Tajik men and
one male
who the rabbi presumed to be «a foreigner.» The staff, noticing
the third male had a darker complexion than the average Tajik,
asked where he was from. The two
men replied jokingly that he
was from Lebanon. The third male
did not speak during the
visit, so his origins could not be determined. They were
interested in the layout of the synagogue, times of prayer, and
entered the small prayer room that was later the site of the
fire asking about it.
8. (C) A third visit was by a stranger asking for
Gourevitch’s
phone number. Gourevitch is a
rabbi based in Tashkent who has
been attempting to assist the Dushanbe synagogue resolve its
forced relocation problem with the government (reftel). In a
small town where the rabbi knows everyone in the Jewish
community, and strangers rarely visit the synagogue, suspicious
visitors stick out.
9. (C) Concerned about future attacks, members of
the
synagogue community now guard the building on a 24-hour basis.
In Abdurahmonov’s years at the synagogue, this is the first act
of vandalism that he can recall.
10. (C) COMMENT:
Up to this point, Tajikistan’s population
overall has not overtly displayed feelings or acts of
anti-Semitism. Conspiracy
theories from locals include a
response to the events between Israel and Lebanon and an action
by the GOTI in order to more quickly move the synagogue out of
the neighborhood where the new Presidential Palace is being
built (REFTEL).
11. (C) It is doubtful the fire is related to the
land dispute
between the government and the synagogue, as the issue has been
going on for years. Knowing that
the international community
keeps a watchful eye on the synagogue, government officials
would not want to risk an international religious freedom
incident prior to Tajikistan’s Independence Day or the November
presidential election.
12. (C) the series of visits prior to the fire by
strange men
indicate an organized group may have conducted pre-operational
surveillance of the site and planned the fire. The motivation
for setting the synagogue on fire is unclear. Typically, if the
act were politically motivated, for example to protest Israel’s
attacks in Lebanon, the perpetrator would have issued a public
statement, or made his goals clear.
13. (S/NF) The GOTI’s response to
this event is equally
puzzling. The Ministry of
Security (MB) would normally
investigate acts of terrorism, political violence, or any
possible threat in the lead-up to Independence Day. Not wanting
to publicize such an event before Independence Day is in line
with the Tajik way of doing business, but this does not explain
the MB’s failure to investigate this case. It is possible that
a low-level Fire Department official made the decision
independently believing it to be consistent with the GOTI’s
desire to keep events such as this out of the public eye.
14. (C) Although a week has passed without additional
incidents, the activity leading up to the fire shows a pattern
consistent with a terrorist operational cycle: pre-operational
surveillance, planning, rehearsal, attack, and escape. This one
incident shows that the small Jewish community in Tajikistan may
need to be more vigilant in case these same individuals are
DUSHANBE 00001621 003.2 OF 003
planning to carry out additional attacks. Likewise, the Embassy
will remain vigilant concerning the overall security climate and
our own safety in Tajikistan.
END COMMENT.HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 76599
date: 8/30/2006 5:19
refid: 06DUSHANBE1623
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1623
header:
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1313
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1068
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9854
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001623
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, TI, RS
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: SDPT
CHAIRMAN RETURNS FROM MEDICAL TREATMENT IN
MOSCOW AND MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS
CLASSIFIED BY: THUSHEK, CHARGE D’AFFAIRES, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
The Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan’s
(SDPT) Chairman, Rahmatullo Zoyirov met with PolOff August 28
after returning from treatment in Moscow and Switzerland
following his stroke. Zoyirov
appeared healthy and
reinvigorated, and discussed the upcoming presidential election
as well as conversations in Moscow with Tajik labor migrants and
Russian authorities on their role in the election. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Rahmatullo Zoyirov, Chairman of the SDPT,
spent three
weeks in Switzerland and Moscow seeking treatment after
temporarily losing his speech and some movement in his body from
a micro-stroke in July. Zoyirov
told Embassy sources that while
he was in Moscow, doctors tested his blood and found a high
level of toxins, indicating that he was poisoned. However,
doctors refuse to issue statements supporting the evidence.
Zoyirov strongly suspects the government poisoned him in order
to eliminate political opposition.
He now says that he is
healthy and has regained full speaking skills and control of
motor movements. Doctors say he
may have suffered some brain
injuries as a result of the stroke and he still cannot see
clearly. He said he was thankful
for the opportunity to check
his health, the first time in twenty years. During Zoyirov’s
meeting with PolOff he appeared in fine health and spoke with
his usual assuredness and energy.
TAJIK POLITICS IN RUSSIA
3. (C) While in Moscow, Zoyirov met with Russian
government
officials. Although he declined
to name them, he did say they
are very close to Putin.
According to Zoyirov, he only
initiated one meeting and was invited by officials to other
meetings. He was not entirely
forthcoming with the nature or
content of his discussions, but observed Russia may be «shopping
around» for political leaders in Tajikistan to support besides
Rahmonov. Officials made it clear
to Zoyirov that he was not
«their type of candidate.»
(COMMENT: This leads one to
believe
that Zoyirov may have gone to Moscow to ask for political
support. END COMMENT.) He
mentioned that Russia was courting
several people in the government who are «two-faced» and eager
to take over power from Rahmonov, including Prime Minister Oqil
Oqilov. Zoyirov expressed concern
about Tajikistan’s stability
after the election and fears an assassination may occur or some
other tumultuous event such as a steep economic decline.
4. (C) Zoyirov also met with Tajik immigrants in
Moscow to
rally their support for him.
However, he was unable to get any
assurances of support from the migrants he met. Tajik labor
migrants number anywhere from 600,000 to one million. Although
their numbers are large, few plan to vote in the presidential
election. The Tajik embassy in
Moscow will set up polling
stations in key cities throughout Russia. However, since most
migrants are unregistered, many will not go to vote out of fear
of being detained by Russian authorities. During past
elections, Tajik embassy personnel have been ordered to go out
to the street and collect votes from migrants in order to meet a
certain quota set by Dushanbe.
BACK TO THE DUSHANBE GRIND
5. (C) Zoyirov planned to meet with Islamic
Renaissance Party
of Tajikistan (IRPT) Chairman Muhiddin Kabiri to discuss the
IRPT’s plan for the election. He
suggested that if Kabiri wins
his party’s nomination to run against Rahmonov, the party may
split because some factions may strongly support other
DUSHANBE 00001623 002 OF 002
candidates and refuse to support Kabiri.
He said that in order
for the IRPT to remain united, it may have to refrain from
nominating any candidate.
6. (C) Regarding his own party’s participation in
the
election, Zoyirov stated that he will run in the election if
Rahmonov does not run, or the SDPT will boycott the election if
Rahmonov runs. (COMMENT: Of
course Rahmonov will run! We will
see what Zoyirov decides. END
COMMENT.) The SDPT has always
maintained that Rahmonov’s presidency is constitutionally
illegal and will make it their campaign platform to educate
Tajik citizens about this perceived injustice. They plan to
closely monitor the election and point out violations during the
process. Zoyirov said he was
ready to be back in Dushanbe and
to start working, but strongly doubted Tajikistan would change
for the better after the election.
7. (C) COMMENT:
As one of the most preeminent lawyers in
Tajikistan, Zoyirov has always enjoyed great credibility. His
meetings with Russian authorities likely did occur, however, it
is uncertain at what level Zoyirov would have access. Russian
authorities may be misleading Zoyirov in an attempt to rile his
opposition fervor. Zoyirov may
have initiated a meeting with
Kabiri in an attempt to gain IRPT support for his own agenda.
END COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 76608
date: 8/30/2006 7:11
refid: 06DUSHANBE1625
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE1314|06DUSHANBE626
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