id: 73307
date: 8/1/2006 12:12
refid: 06DUSHANBE1464
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO6970
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHDBU #1464/01 2131212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011212Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8260
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1741
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RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1664
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1263
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1712
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9579
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001464
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/CARC, PM, S/P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, GG, RS, TI
SUBJECT: OLD-GUARD TAJIK MINISTER OF DEFENSE OBSESSES ON NATO,
GEORGIA
DUSHANBE 00001464 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, Embassy
Dushanbe, State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador endured a three-hour-plus
one-on-one lunch August 1 with Tajikistan’s Minister of Defense
Sherali Khairulloyev. Apart from
the general conversation, the
minister apologized for previous mil-mil relations that didn’t
meet expectations; harped repeatedly on NATO, Georgia, and
Saakashvili; and asserted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
must become a military bloc to face down NATO. By the end of
the alcohol-sodden lunch, the minister was slurring and unsteady
on his feet. We suspect President
Rahmonov ordered the minister
to host this farewell lunch.
While it was rather unusual in
many respects, we believe it helped place another brick in the
wall of U.S.-Tajikistan military relations. END SUMMARY
2. (C) Defense Minister
Khairulloyev apologized several times
for «misunderstandings and missed opportunities» in the past
in
U.S.-Tajik military relations. He
asserted repeatedly that he
expects an increasingly smooth and productive relationship. He
said he has come to understand Tajikistan must have a number of
equal partners, not just one [Russia], if it is to propser.
3. (C) Minister Khairulloyev
returned several times to NATO and
Georgia. He repeatedly asked,
«Why does NATO want a country
like Georgia? Even the Warsaw
Pact didn’t subsume losers!» He
asked if NATO will improve Georgia’s «hopeless» economy. He
asked why the United States «indulges the adolescent»
President
Saakashvili. The only possibly
explanation, he asserted, is to
«stick your finger in Moscow’s eye.» He added, «When Stalin
created the Georgian Socialist Republic, he threw in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia because Georgians on their own were a `fly
speck.’ Without Abhkazia and
South Ossetia,» he alleged,
«Georgia has no hope of existing.»
4. (C) Khairulloyev volunteered
that the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) has to develop to become a military bloc
«with one-third of the world’s population» to face down NATO.
The Ambassador asked why Russia and the former Soviet republics
view NATO as an enemy.
Khairulloyev hoisted himself up and
declared, «When the Warsaw Bloc disintergrated, of course a new
bloc emerged for world domination.
That’s the historical
dialectic. It’s now time to
confront NATO.»
COLOR
5. (C) This lunch took place in
Minister Khairulloyev’s private
dining room off his recently renovated private office. He
emphasized that he seldom receives guests in his private office
and, especially, that only one other ambassador had ever dined
in his private dining room — former Russian Ambassador Maksim
Peshkov.
6. (C) The Ambassador lost track
of the toasts after the tenth.
His shot-glass held vodka. The minister’s high-ball glass was
kept filled with un-cut Scotch.
Late into the lunch, the
minister was slurring badly and was not walking a straight line.
Nevertheless, as the Ambassador
kept attempting a gracious
retreat, the Minister insisted on showing him «secret rooms»
in
the ministry. Each «secret
room» was merely another public
conference room with a large fresh flower display and — again
and again — another round of toasts set out.
COMMENT
6. (C) This bizarre event was
curious, because U.S.-Tajik
military relations have incrementally been improving, especially
with the National Guard, but also with the Russia-centric
Ministry of Defense. Khairulloyev
continues to make clear he
DUSHANBE 00001464 002.2 OF 002
serves at the pleasure of President Rahmonov and may be replaced
after the November presidential election. Although this
drunk-fest is how many old-guard former Soviets do mutual
business, it was most unusual for an American guest. It was, to
a degree, a mark of respect. We
would not be surprised if
President Rahmonov had ordered Khairulloyev to «do something for
the departing Ambassador,» and we rather wonder if this may have
been a sort of valedictory by an old-guard security minister who
suspects his days of service are numbered. Whatever, we were
pleased to have drunk Khairulloyev well under the table. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 73317
date: 8/1/2006 13:05
refid: 06DUSHANBE1465
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO7014
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1465 2131305
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011305Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8262
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9581
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1688
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1735
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1743
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1694
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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1629
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1470
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1265
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1666
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1714
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1023
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001465
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: U.S. EMBASSY PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO EARTHQUAKE
VICTIMS
1. Two earthquakes, ranging from
5.0 to 6.0 on the Richter
scale, struck southern Tajikistan’s Qumsangir district July 29.
The earthquakes affected over 1,600 households and nearly 9,000
people. Officially, three deaths
were reported, all of them
children. The media reported
approximately 20 people injured
and hundreds left homeless. The
entire village of Zamini Nav
comprised of 167 homes was completely destroyed. Up to 400
mud-brick homes in the region were leveled. In addition, power
lines running through the region are also down and roads
suffered heavy damage.
2. PolOff received a phone call
from Counterpart Humanitarian
Assistance Program (CHAP) July 30 informing of the disaster and
the Ministry of Emergency Situations’ requests for Embassy
assistance. Post immediately
agreed to distribute over $24,000
worth of relief items corresponding to CHAP’s needs assessment.
Relief items, including medical supplies, blankets, water jugs,
clothing and other household items, were dispatched through CHAP
to the region for distribution to those in need. Earlier this
year, EUR/ACE provided Post with ten containers filled with
medical equipment for disaster relief to be used for quick
dispersal in such emergency situations.
3. Thus far, the Ministry of
Emergency Situations, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.S. Embassy
are the only donors to provide equipment such as tents, bedding,
medical supplies and thirty tons of food. The Tajik government
sent in medical teams and 170 servicemen to assist with the
relief effort. EmbOffs attended a
donors meeting convened by
Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov July 31 to garner international
humanitarian assistance.
President Rahmonov asked the Deputy
Prime Minister himself to a spearhead a commission of various
Ministries to immediately assist the injured and homeless.
Scorching weather, consistently above 40 degrees centigrade,
lack of drinking water and power, and the high probability of
diseases spreading are priority concerns.
4. COMMENT: Post will continue to cooperate with the
government and other international organizations to provide
assistance as needed. Post
greatly thanks EUR/ACE for the
foresight and supplies provisioned earlier this year. Without
the Department’s shipment of medical equipment, the Embassy
would not have been able to act so quickly to help the Tajik
people. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 73452
date: 8/2/2006 11:27
refid: 06DUSHANBE1469
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06Dushanbe1434|06Tashkent1486
header:
VZCZCXRO8081
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1469/01 2141127
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 021127Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8266
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1024
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1266
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1668
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1716
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0066
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9585
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001469
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG, TI, AF, IR
SUBJECT: THREE «IRAN-FREE» STEPS TO BRING TAJIKISTAN AND
AFGHANISTAN
CLOSER
REF: A) Dushanbe 1434 B) Tashkent
1486
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) The «Persian Language Summit» in
Dushanbe July 26
highlighted the cultural and linguistic ties between
Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Iran, but also provided an
opportunity for the three presidents to declare publicly their
economic and energy ties (Reftel A).
At the close of the press
conference, the Afghan and Iranian leaders expressed their moral
support for President Rahmonov’s favorite mega-project,
Dhasti-Jhum, the proposed 4000 KW hydropower project on the
Pyanj River between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
2. (C) While enthusiasm comes at no cost, the mere
mention of
Dhasti-jhum in this tri-lateral context shows the Tajiks’
determination to find support for this project and others on the
Afghan-Tajik border. Whether Iran
(or Russia) helps them
realize their hydropower plans will depend largely on whether
other countries step up to the plate first. The recent $600
million concessional credit agreement with China clearly
demonstrates that Tajikistan remains open to any and all
investors, particularly in the infrastructure and energy
sectors.
3. (C) Despite the Tajik political hype, outside
experts
confirm Dhasti-Jhum has enormous potential for power and
irrigation: up to 4000 MW electricity for Tajikistan,
Afghanistan and South Asia; new agricultural areas with
increased irrigation; and better managed flood plains. But it
will take more than political will to make these benefits real.
Dhasti-Jhum, the largest of thirteen potential projects on the
Pyanj, can only be developed as a public-private partnership on
a cost recovery basis — not through donations.
4. (C) We may have a real opportunity here to
practice
transformational diplomacy. Just
as the U.S.-funded
construction of the bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj between Afghanistan
and Tajikistan has become a concrete symbol for U.S. commitment
to promote South and Central Asian integration, so would
increased engagement in Pyanj River water and energy issues
demonstrate that Tajikistan and Afghanistan can further
strengthen their ties directly, without the involvement of Iran.
5. (C) The United States could play a leadership
role, through
diplomacy and development, by supporting the following three
steps:
— Formulating and funding a feasibility study of a hydropower
station at Dhasti-Jhum. The
Tajiks have long shopped around the
idea of Dhasti-Jhum, but their plans are largely based on Soviet
studies. Recent U.S. experts
visiting the site concluded the
project does indeed have merit and looked much more promising
than they had expected after reviewing the old Soviet papers.
Nothing would convince Tajikistan of our commitment to regional
stability and Tajik hydropower more than helping them flesh out
the details of this project. We
cannot provide $600 million in
low interest loans — but we could afford to help with the
initial studies on their flagship project.
— Supporting a Bilateral Tajik-Afghan Committee for Energy
issues. The Afghans and Tajiks
have already met on energy
issues in April, December 2005 and May 2006 (in Istanbul), and
signed various memoranda for joint cooperative agreement in the
energy sector. (By contrast, Ref
B reports a bumpier energy
DUSHANBE 00001469 002 OF 002
relationship between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.) We should
encourage Tajik and Afghan authorities to establish a
functioning working body that will discuss power issues and make
agreements that stick.
— Activating the Bi-national Commission on the Joint
Development of Water Resources, as per the 1958 treaty between
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
This bilateral commission
would be the first step in resolving water management issues.
A working level delegation from the Afghan Ministry of Water
will visit Dushanbe August 2-9, thanks to the coordinated
efforts of Embassies Dushanbe and Kabul.
This visit should
start an ongoing Tajik-Afghan dialogue about water issues and
shared resources, and may lead to activation of the Commission.
6. (C) The United States has already been actively
developing
regional energy networks, through the U.S. Trade and Development
Agency’s June Istanbul conference «Energy Without Borders» and
USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program. But more can
be done. The three steps above
represent concrete and
confidence-building actions. Only
by high-profile engagement on
issues important to the Tajik and Afghan governments can the
United States prove itself as an alternative-and less demanding
partner-than Iran.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 73471
date: 8/2/2006 12:33
refid: 06DUSHANBE1470
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8180
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1470/01 2141233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 021233Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8268
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1739
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1688
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1026
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1268
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1474
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1670
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1718
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9587
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001470
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S POLITICAL PARTIES CONSIDER BOYCOTTING ELECTION
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
The three main opposition political parties
are considering boycotting Tajikistan’s presidential election as
a statement of protest. Knowing
Rahmonov will win handily and
worried legitimate opposition candidates may not even have a
chance to run, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), the
Social-Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) and the Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) have all told EmbOffs
they may boycott the election. In
a series of meetings with
EmbOffs July 27-28, deputy chairmen from the three parties
discussed how each party will gear up for the election, or not
take action, in the absence of their chairmen. The Chairman of
the IRPT is still seriously ill, the Chairman of the SDPT is in
Switzerland seeking treatment for a stroke and the DPT’s
Iskandarov remains in detention; although he may be called to
Moscow as a witness in his kidnapping trial. END SUMMARY.
IRPT’S NURI INCREASINGLY ILL
2. (C) Said Abdullo Nuri, Chairman of IRPT, returned
to
Dushanbe July 26 from Germany, where he was undergoing treatment
for cancer. According to Muhiddin
Kabiri, Deputy Chairman of
the IRPT, Nuri’s health is deteriorating rapidly. The party’s
presidium is seriously concerned and has relocated its
headquarters to Nuri’s home and asked Kabiri to cancel a trip
abroad.
3. (C) Kabiri had planned to meet with political
parties in
the UAE and Turkey to seek financial and political support.
When asked about the IRPT’s relations with Iran, Kabiri noted
that the during President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Tajikistan July
25-27, the IRPT did not meet with anyone from the visiting
delegation. Kabiri observed that
as Iran’s relations with the
government of Tajikistan improve, the IRPT’s relationship with
Iran has waned. Kabiri stressed
sincere regret at not being
able to meet with the Iranians.
(NOTE: During the Tajik civil
war, the Iranians and Afghans backed the IRPT, but Iran has
since ceased assistance to the party.
END NOTE.)
4. (C) In a recent poll by a
local media outlet, Kabiri was
voted as the chief rival to Rahmonov in the presidential
election. However, Kabiri remains
insistent he will not run,
and instead predicts that his party will nominate a more
conservative candidate. IRPT
make-up is about 80%
conservatives— those adhering to more traditional Islamic
values and customs and 20% liberals— those, who like Kabiri,
are moderate and do not strictly follow rules such as wearing a
beard or praying five times a day.
Despite the distinction
between conservatives and liberals, he insists that the IRPT
remains united. (COMMENT: The
decision to run a conservative
candidate may be driven by Rahmonov’s expressed desire to see a
more conservative Muslim lead the IRPT.
With a conservative
leading the IRPT, Rahmonov has better leverage potentially to
label the IRPT as an extremist religious group to his political
advantage. END COMMENT.)
5. (C) Despite criticisms that the IRPT is aligned
with the
government, Kabiri emphatically stated, «In any case, we would
not support the candidacy of Rahmonov.» If the IRPT is unable
to register a candidate due to corrupt bureaucratic practices
and technicalities, the party would either boycott the election
or declare a neutral position.
DPT’S ISKANDAROV STILL IN TAJIK DETENTION, BUT MAY RETURN TO
MOSCOW
6. (C) DPT Deputy Chairman, Rahmatullo Valiev,
informed PolOff
that a Moscow regional court in Russia has stated that
DUSHANBE 00001470 002 OF 002
Iskandarov should come back to Moscow as a witness in his own
kidnapping trial. Iskandarov’s
relatives opened a criminal case
in Russia’s Karalova city charging that Russian law enforcement
authorities kidnapped Iskandarov and illegally extradited him to
Tajikistan. According to Valiev,
the Karalova court agreed with
the General Prosecutor’s office that Iskandarov’s return to
Tajikistan was not illegal, but the Moscow regional court,
overriding the decision, said Iskandarov should be called back
to Moscow to testify and start an investigation. On July 31 the
Karalova city court rejected the higher court’s decision and
refused to call Iskandarov back to Russia to testify.
Iskandarov’s lawyer will once again appeal to the higher Moscow
regional court. Iskandarov
alleged that he was illegally
kidnapped to Tajikistan while in Moscow to stand trial for a
variety of crimes for which he has been sentenced to 23 years in
prison. (COMMENT: It is unlikely that President Rahmonov would
allow Iskandarov to return to Moscow prior to the election. END
COMMENT)
7. (C) Valiev, as in every meeting with U.S.
officials,
expressed great dissatisfaction in the election process and
blamed the U.S. Embassy as well as the OSCE, UN, IFES and other
international organizations for being complacent and not acting
to improve Tajikistan’s flawed election process. He also
accused those organizations of working too closely with the
government. (COMMENT: The U.S. Embassy and IFES have taken an
inclusive approach towards reforming the election process and
elections legislation. At every
step of the way, they have
included political parties as well as the Central Committee for
Election and Referenda. END
COMMENT.)
SDPT’S ZOYIROV SEEKING TREATMENT IN SWITZERLAND
8. (C) Rahmatullo Zoyirov, the Chairman of the SDPT,
is
currently in Switzerland undergoing medical exams and seeking
treatment for his recent stroke.
It is unclear when he will
return to Dushanbe, but Deputy Chairman Amniyat Abdunazarov said
that Zoyirov’s health is improving.
9. (C) The SDPT, a party of intelligentsia led by
the
country’s premier lawyer and a drafter of the constitution,
stands firmly behind its position that Rahmonov is an illegal
president and he cannot constitutionally run in the presidential
election. The SDPT knows well
that any candidate it puts forth
will not be registered. The party
is considering boycotting the
election to make a statement. By
participating in the election,
it believes it would legitimize Rahmonov as president.
9. (C) COMMENT:
The political parties are realistically
resigned to the fact that Rahmonov will win the presidential
election. They also know that
they will most likely not be able
to register legitimate candidates in the race. With the
exception of the IRPT, the parties have based their platform on
decrying the president and the unfair process rather than
building a platform of ideological opinions, concrete changes
and services to appeal to the people.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 73729
date: 8/4/2006 11:51
refid: 06DUSHANBE1498
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE304
header:
VZCZCXRO0609
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1498 2161151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 041151Z AUG 06
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1672
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1720
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9620
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001498
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/4/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: RADIO SILENCE CONTINUES FOR BBC IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: DUSHANBE 304
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, CdA, U.S. Embassy, Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (SBU) Tajikistan’s State Radio and Television
Committee
(SRTC) announced August 2 it refused to give BBC a license to
broadcast in Tajiki/ Farsi on FM radio.
Margaret Belof, the
British DCM, told PolOff August 3 the committee based its
refusal on two grounds: the BBC is still not properly registered
with the Ministry of Justice, and no agreement exists between
the Tajik and British governments on television and radio
broadcasting.
2. (SBU) The Tajik government stopped BBC broadcasts
in
January due to registration problems (reftel). The MOJ
reregistered BBC June 26, but BBC needs to obtain a new
broadcasting license from the SRTC.
Belof did not go into the
details of the registration issue, stating only that, «We think
they are wrong-all the papers are in order and BBC is now
legally registered.»
3. (C) First Deputy Head of SRTC
Abdurakhmon Abdumannonov told
media sources, «According to the Tajik media law (passed in
November 2005), no foreign radio station has the right to
broadcast on the territory of Tajikistan without the
corresponding intergovernmental or interstate agreement.» Belof
observed that Great Britain has no intergovernmental
broadcasting agreements with any other country in the world, nor
do other counties usually make these kinds of agreements. «Only
Russia has this agreement with Tajikistan,» she noted, and the
conditions of the Russian agreement would be impossible for BBC
to accept.
4. (C) Belof commented that Tajik authorities still
did not
understand that BBC is not a state-owned branch of the British
government, but an independent news service. The British
Embassy is drafting a memorandum of understanding, explaining
the special status of the BBC.
(COMMENT: The BBC’s decision to
push for a MOU seems only one step away from an official
agreement with the Tajik government, and may be a very
legalistic way around the law. END COMMENT.) Belof suggested
that if working level BBC representatives could not reach an
agreement with the Tajik government, the Director of BBC World
Service would travel to Tajikistan to continue talks. The BBC is
still broadcasting on shortwave radio.
5. (SBU) COMMENT: Tajikistan doesn’t make it easy for any
radio or TV stations to broadcast.
The dual requirements of
registration and licensing have dramatically slowed several
U.S.-funded community radio and television projects. As a
result, most Tajik audiences are stuck watching Tajik state
television or listening to state radio, if not watching Russian
stations on satellite. However,
the situation with BBC suggests
Tajik authorities are increasingly fearful of any outside or
independent broadcasts, and will use all means, often disguised
as any reason possible bureaucratic formalities, to control
content on the airwaves. At a
time when the United States is
pressing Tajikistan for freer media for opposition candidates
leading up the November Presidential election, it seems unlikely
the environment is going to improve.
END COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 74034
date: 8/8/2006 9:36
refid: 06DUSHANBE1512
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE1512|06KABUL1629
header:
VZCZCXRO3620
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1512/01 2200936
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080936Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8318
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1743
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1736
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1697
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1706
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1750
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9647
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001512
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ETRD, BEXP, AF, TJ
SUBJECT: BUILD MORE BRIDGES! AFGHAN BUSINESSMEN VISIT DUSHANBE
REF: KABUL 1629
DUSHANBE 00001512 001.2 OF 002
1. «You can select your
friends, but not your neighbors,» said
Sharif Saidov, Tajikistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Chairman (TCCI). «If your
neighbor is calm, then you are
calmer.» The August 3 visit
of Afghan businessmen to Dushanbe
underscored the calm on both sides of the border and the
potential for greatly expanded commercial relations. Four
businessmen and two officials from the Department of Foreign
Affairs in Kunduz, accompanied by the U.S. PRT officer and FSN
in Kunduz, came north to reciprocate an April 6 visit made by a
Tajik business delegation and EmbOffs (Reftel). Following on
the heels of the July 27 bilateral summit in Dushanbe, Afghans
and Tajiks participants repeated the comments of Presidents
Rahmonov and Karzai about the bonds of language and culture that
connect their countries, and how trade relations could improve
the prosperity and security of both countries.
2. «We are not maximizing our
potential,» noted Saidov, after
welcoming his Afghan «brothers» to their
«motherland.»
Statistics show Tajik-Afghan trade consists mainly of small
numbers of shuttle traders crossing the border with consumer
goods. In an hour-long meeting,
he proposed more joint
roundtables and exhibitions to stimulate bilateral trade.
Saidov noted that the Tajik parliament had passed a law in 1998
making foreign investment and international trade easier, and
that if Tajikistan developed its hydropower potential, it would
have plenty of electricity to export to Afghanistan. «Tajikistan
has some of the same reconstruction challenges as Afghanistan,»
he observed, describing the declining cotton harvest and
struggling agricultural economy.
«Consider the TCCI your point
of contact in Dushanbe,» he offered, handing the visitors an
English-language list of Tajik companies interested in doing
business with the Kunduz representatives. The Afghan Deputy
Trade Attachi noted that several of the companies on the TCCI
list were already active in Afghanistan, and the Tajik-Afghan
business council had 75 small businesses in Dushanbe.
3. The Afghan delegation echoed
Saidov’s comments about peace
leading to economic growth and the need to improve trade. «In
1984, we exported raisins to the Tajik Consumer Union,»
remembered the Head of the Kunduz Chamber of Commerce.» Years
of war had cut the commercial ties, and the economic base
fueling them. «Our goals are now the same: cross border
trade.»
He and Saidov agreed the U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhniy Pyanj,
due to open in Summer 2007, would dramatically increase the
potential for large scale trade and commerce, but even more
bridges were needed to connect other parts of Afghanistan and
Tajikistan.
4. In a meeting hosted by the
Dushanbe Construction
Association, the lively discussion focused on the practical
aspects of cross-border commerce.
«Can anyone get me 5000 tons
of diesel?» asked a Kunduz plastics producer. «What kind of
banks can we use for transactions? Will a letter of credit
suffice?» asked another businessman. Given the demand for
reconstruction in Afghanistan, the groups acknowledged the
possibility of construction contracts, «not just one bulldozer,
but a sustained supply of steel, cement and equipment.»
5. However, corruption and
bureaucracy on both sides of the
border posed barriers. Afghans
and Tajiks also cited the lack
of a trucking network as slowing trade-each individual driver
and truck owner negotiated his own price. Both countries have
to import most raw materials, adding to costs. Tajiks noted the
lack of insurance for vehicles operating in Afghanistan, and
Afghans complained how hard it is to get a Tajik visas. In
practice, such restrictions can mean goods have to be off-loaded
from Tajik trucks and re-loaded onto Afghan trucks, or vice
versa, costing the traders time and money. (COMMENT:
International donors have been telling the Tajik government for
years the restrictive, and somewhat arbitrary visa regime
impedes business. END COMMENT.)
6. After lunch, a visit to a
small metal construction workshop
left the Afghans observing that they already produced similar
products in Kunduz, thus eliminating any interest in imports.
(NOTE: During the April 6 visit
in Kunduz, the Tajiks similarly
DUSHANBE 00001512 002.2 OF 002
responded to visits to a flour factory and cotton processing
facility, both of which exist at the same level of capacity and
quality in Dushanbe. END NOTE.)
The groups parted by
reaffirming their potential, and a few businessmen exchanged
contact information with their Tajik counterparts.
7. The visit was a day trip. The Afghans departed Kunduz in
the early morning, crossed the temporary bridge at the U.S.
construction site, and arrived in Dushanbe three hours later.
After five hours of meetings, they headed back the same route.
The Afghan delegation included: Haji Abdul Rasul, Chief of
Kunduz Chamber of Commerce and head of Faiaz Ltd (exports and
imports carpet and other goods from Turkey); Mir Agha, head of
Amiri CC (building construction materials imports); Ahmadshah,
Chief of Turk Slayman Ltd, (vehicles and vehicle parts imports
and exports); and Akhtar Mohammad, Nisar Plastic; as well as
Abdul Ghafar Sadid and Said Zamarudin from the Department of
Foreign Affairs in Kunduz. The
Construction Association was
represented by several Dushanbe constructions firms, including
Sangreza Ltd, whose owner, Saobiddin Zayniddinov, participated
in the April 6 trip to Kunduz and has been particularly eager to
help set up trade in construction materials and aggregates.
8. COMMENT: It was a small step, but it was forward
motion.
This day-long visit not only provided an opportunity for
cross-border networking, but also highlighted how much goodwill
and desire exists on both sides to help each other develop
economically. The Afghan Embassy
retains two commercial
attaches in Dushanbe, and both have enthusiastically embraced
U.S. efforts to promote Afghan-Tajik relations. Embassy
Dushanbe looks forward to continued cooperation with PRT Kunduz,
as well as the possibility of working with other PRTs looking to
expand local ties with Tajikistan.
END COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 74227
date: 8/9/2006 13:22
refid: 06DUSHANBE1523
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE1465
header:
VZCZCXRO5261
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1523 2211322
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091322Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8326
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1741
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1699
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1708
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1639
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1748
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1752
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1490
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1477
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1271
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1721
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1029
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9662
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001523
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/ACE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S EARTHQUAKE RELIEF STATUS REPORT
REF: DUSHANBE 1465
1. More than a week after two
earthquakes shook Tajikistan’s
Qumsangir District in Khatlon province on the southern border
with Afghanistan July 29 (reftel), the Tajik government and
donors continue to help displaced residents. Under the
leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Ghulomov, the Tajik
government established the National Emergency Commission to
coordinate donor assistance, assess damage, and plan for
reconstruction. Although the
Tajik government has not yet
officially declared the region a disaster area, President
Rahmonov has made several calls to international organizations
and wealthy Tajiks to provide assistance.
2. The damage to five settlements
in the district is
approximately $22 million, according to the latest data provided
by the United Nations Disaster Risk Management Project. The
death toll has remained low at three people, but the earthquakes
displaced more than 15,000 people, a higher number than
estimated in the days immediately following the earthquake.
Over 700 homes have been completely destroyed and over 1,200
partially damaged, many of them mud-brick structures common to
Tajikistan’s impoverished southern region.
3. Although the central
government, NGOs, and international
missions acted quickly to provide assistance such as temporary
shelter, food, medical aid, and clothing to victims, the
government has called for additional assistance. Health and
disease prevention concerns authorities, as the earthquakes
destroyed all health service structures according to the UN
report. Sanitation conditions are
poor, access to clean water
is rare and there is a prevalence of malaria in the region. The
government has requested soap, cleaning disinfectants,
additional water containers, assistance in monitoring and
preventing waterborne diseases, and help in surveillance and
preventing malaria including distribution of mosquito nets. The
Ministry of Emergency Services reported the food supply
requirements have not been met and also asked for additional
kitchen supplies.
4. The government has provided
1,200 tons of cement for
reconstruction of homes and promised co-financing to those
involved in rebuilding projects.
An international NGO will
assist in training people how to build homes according to safe
building standards for an earthquake zone. As a temporary
solution, the government requested an additional 2000 tents for
the homeless.
5. Through the NGO CHAP, the
Embassy provided $24,000 worth of
emergency relief assistance in the form of clothing, sleeping
bags, water containers, and medical supplies immediately after
the earthquakes occurred. CHAP
has verified that our relief
supplies were properly transported and distributed to victims.
Although the earthquakes are responsible for many gaps in
services, the problems the people of southern Tajikistan face
now reflect pre-existing conditions, including the country’s
impoverished status, lack of adequate health facilities and poor
water supply system. Post remains
involved in coordination
activities with the government and international community to
ensure that assistance provided will meet the immediate short
term need as well as longer term development goals.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 74231
date: 8/9/2006 13:28
refid: 06DUSHANBE1524
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1470
header:
VZCZCXRO5290
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1524 2211328
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091328Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8327
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9663
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1700
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1749
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1753
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1702
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1640
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1709
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1478
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1722
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1272
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1030
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001524
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
NSC FOR MERKEL, MILLARD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/9/2016
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, KISL, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S IRPT CHAIRMAN SAID ABDULLO NURI PASSES AWAY
REF: DUSHANBE 1470
CLASSIFIED BY: THUSHEK, CHARGE D’AFFAIRES, STATE, STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (U) The Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance
Party, Said
Abdullo Nuri passed away August 9 at approximately 16:30. Nuri
had been suffering from stomach cancer and his death was not
unexpected. He had received
periodic treatments in Iran and
Germany for over a year and returned to Dushanbe July 26. The
IRPT suspected he was approaching his final days and relocated
their headquarters to his home (reftel).
2. (C) COMMENT:
Nuri’s successor is not clear and sources say
that President Rahmonov would prefer the IRPT appoint a more
conservative chairman. A more
conservative Islamic leader would
likely allow Rahmonov to label the IRPT as an extremist group,
potentially alienating the party from the mainstream public and
paving the way for him to consolidate power further. Post will
follow developments in the IRPT closely in the coming days. END
COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 74442
date: 8/11/2006 6:33
refid: 06DUSHANBE1545
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE1545|06DUSHANBE326
header:
VZCZCXRO7634
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1545/01 2230633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 110633Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8344
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1752
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1754
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1703
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1744
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1701
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1710
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1641
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1031
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1274
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1479
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1673
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1723
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 0068
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9700
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001545
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG, EFIN, TI, AF, IR
SUBJECT: WIIL ROGUN EVER GET BUILT? TAJIKISTAN AND RUSAL ENGAGE IN
WAR OF WORDS
REF: DUSHANBE 326
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Hushek, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY:
Is RusAl on the verge of abandoning Rogun, or
merely posturing to hasten its acquisition of Tajik state-owned
aluminum smelter TadAZ? In the
past week, Tajik and regional
news agencies have published several articles on Rogun and other
Russian-Tajik investments, questioning the partnership and
trading accusations from both sides.
Privately, ministers and
others close to President Rahmonov have hinted about Tajik
displeasure with RusAl and its slow start at the Rogun
construction site, with some suggesting Tajikistan will need to
look elsewhere for partners.
Avesta news agency published a
blistering interview in which RusAl’s Dushanbe representative
accused Tajik authorities of muddying the waters with the World
Bank, purposefully misinterpreting the words of President Putin,
and begging for financial assistance from the Russian
Government, even though «the times of the State Planning
Committee of the USSR ended long ago.» Fighting words, indeed.
The Tajiks pushed Rogun negotiations to the Intergovernmental
Commission on Russian-Tajik Cooperation, scheduled for
September, as Rogun becomes an important part of the bilateral
relationship. END SUMMARY.
ROGUN
2. (U) At the heart of the growing controversy lies
Rogun
power station, a 3600 MW hydropower project on the Vakhsh River.
Started in the 1980s, the
government abandoned the project when
the Soviet Union collapsed, having already invested over $800
million in construction of several tunnels and support
facilities. Tajikistan estimates
another $2.2 billion is needed
to complete the project. If
finished, Rogun could produce 13.1
billion kW/hour of electricity, almost doubling Tajikistan’s
current 17.1 kW/h billion per year.
3. (U) The Russian aluminum giant RusAl wants to
develop Rogun
as a power source for aluminum production in Tajikistan.
TadAZ, the Tajik state-owned smelter, consumes an annual 6.7
billion kW/h, 40% of Tajikistan’s total electricity production.
During Russian President Putin’s October 2004 visit to Dushanbe,
part of the economic package included RusAl building a second
aluminum smelter in Tajikistan, in exchange for RusAl’s getting
controlling interest in Rogun.
4. (C) Uzbekistan has been particularly opposed to
the Rogun
project, on the grounds that the reservoir will impede water
supplies necessary for irrigating Uzbekistan’s cotton fields.
Tajikistan consistently claims the Rogun dam will better
regulate water to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, improve regional
irrigation and even help solve the problems of the Aral Sea. In
the last six months, RusAl head Oleg Deripaska is rumored to be
spending time in Tashkent, trying to woo the Uzbek leadership
into supporting the project.
IRRESPONSIBLE BUREAUCRATS!
5. (U) «Tajik bureaucrats, (I cannot say all of
them), hand
out irresponsible interviews during the negotiation process.»
In an August 1 interview with Avesta news agency, Konstantine
Zagrebleniy, head of RusAl’s Dushanbe office, accused the Tajik
government of bureaucratic delays, of misquoting Putin, and
predetermining the dimensions and scale of the project before
the feasibility study is finished.
In an attempt to clarify
DUSHANBE 00001545 002 OF 003
RusAl’s position and defend it against Tajik officials’
insinuations that RusAl had delayed construction, Zagrebleniy
suggested that Tajik authorities were to blame for the delays,
and laid down the challenge that Rogun could not be built
without RusAl.
WHY ALL THE FUSS?
6. (C) RusAl and the Tajik government have yet to
finalize an
agreement on the structure, financing and ownership of the
project. Several outstanding
issues remain:
— Ownership: RusAl and Tajikistan have not yet finalized
the
terms of the partnership. Tajik
authorities claim they have
already put at least $800 million into the project, and want 50
percent ownership of a joint venture.
RusAl may try to low-ball
the value of existing structures as a way to minimize Tajik
shares in Rogun. A Dushanbe World
Bank analyst suggested RusAl
valued the existing infrastructure at only $100 million.
Zagrebleniy told Avesta, «While the Tajik side says they already
have a project~ we consider that there is practically no
project. Half the documentation
is simply missing and it does
not exist physically.»
— The feasibility study: Rogun commissioned the German firm
Lahmeyer to conduct the technical survey of the project and
revise Soviet-era plans, including the type and size of the dam.
Although Lahmeyer will not
complete its study until later in
August, Tajik officials, including the Energy Minister Yerov and
Presidential Center for Strategic Research Director Suhrob
Sharipov, have told PolOff that «Lahmeyer will conclude whatever
RusAl wants, since RusAl is paying the bill.» Fearful that the
Lahmeyer study will disadvantage Tajikistan, the Tajik
authorities have insisted that the World Bank play the role of
independent arbiter.
— The dam: Perhaps the biggest sticking point in the
project
is the dam’s dimensions. The original Soviet plans call for a
330-meter rock and earth dam, which would be the world’s
tallest, while RusAl has proposed a shorter 285-meter cement
dam. The Tajiks point to the
30-year old rock and earth dam at
Nurek, noting how well it has held up despite hundreds of small
earthquakes, and complain that a cement dam will be too
expensive to build and maintain.
If the construction price
rises significantly, their stake in the project will be smaller.
A smaller dam will also provide
less power output.
— Financing: Although RusAl’s leadership claims Rogun
cannot
be built without them, the $2.2 billion investment is too big
for RusAl alone. The
international financial institutions’
current interest in Tajik hydropower is based on production of
electricity for export, while RusAl has clearly stated it
intends to use Rogun’s output for domestic aluminum production.
Deputy Foreign Minister Yatimov told PolOff August 1 he thought
the Russian government would step in and help finance the
project, as it had promised to do for the Sangtuda-I hydropower
station, a 670 MW project being built by Russia state utility
RAO UES. However, Zagrebleniy
stated that the Tajiks cannot
expect additional financing from the Russian Federation’s
Stabilization fund. «The
times of Gosplan, the USSR State
Planning Committee, are long past,» he was quoted. «President
Putin’s words on state participation should not be interpreted
as a promise to finance the project from the Russian budget.»
(NOTE: RAO UES is now looking for
additional funding for
Sangtuda-I, despite the pledge from the Russian Federation. END
NOTE.)
SO WILL IT BE BUILT?
DUSHANBE 00001545 003 OF 003
7. (C) Tajik officials have quietly suggested other
investors
would be welcome in Rogun. Yerov
told PolOff July 16 that Rogun
should be built by the «international consortium» of donors,
investors and private companies formed in Dushanbe in January —
not by RusAl alone. (NOTE: RusAl
was one of the signatories to
the Consortium Agreement, as were AES, RAO UES, the governments
of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as well as the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. END NOTE.) Sharipov
suggested to PolOff July 28
that although RusAl already invested in some infrastructure
improvements to the site, investments from China, Pakistan and
Kazakhstan could force Russia out of the project. Without such
pressure, Russia and RusAl might drag out the negotiations,
causing «delay after delay.» «Russia should have a
post-imperial
responsibility to Tajikistan,» he opined. Sharipov, Yerov and
his First Deputy Pulat Mukhiddinov have all individually
predicted that RusAl will use the Lahmeyer study as an excuse to
pull out of Rogun, citing the costs as too high to make aluminum
profitably.
8. (C) COMMENT:
Regardless of the outcome of the Lahmeyer
study, building Rogun will cost at least $2 billion. Without
guaranteed cost recovery from exports, it is doubtful an
international financial institution will want to make that large
an investment, particularly with a partner so closely tied to
the Kremlin like RusAl. RusAl
wants Rogun for aluminum
production, not electricity exports, and without a second
smelter or full control of TadAZ, it may not need or want Rogun
at all.
9. (C) COMMENT CON’T: Our best guess: Unless high
voltage
transmission lines can reliably export Tajik electricity to
Pakistan or Kazakhstan, Rogun will be too big a gamble for any
single investor, and with RusAl in the driver’s seat, too
complicated for a consortium. END
COMMENT.
HUSHEK
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 74472
date: 8/11/2006 10:04
refid: 06DUSHANBE1549
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE1524|