id: 65552
date: 5/26/2006 7:45
refid: 06DUSHANBE986
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE394
header:
VZCZCXRO8660
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0986 1460745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260745Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7641
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1578
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1633
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1563
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1657
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1625
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1653
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1448
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1177
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0963
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8902
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000986
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KIRF, KISM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: A RESOLUTION
TO THE SYNAGOGUE’S PROBLEMS?
REF: DUSHANBE 394
1. Local Tajik news sources have
reported that Alexsandr
Mashkevich, president of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC)
and Kazakh oligarch, agreed to fund the construction of a new
synagogue in the center of Dushanbe.
The existing synagogue has
already been partly demolished along with other buildings in the
surrounding area to make way for a green-zone and park area near
the new presidential palace (reftel).
News reports say that
Mashkevich met with Tajikistan’s President Rahmonov during his
visit to Kazakhstan in early May.
The two discussed
opportunities for business and humanitarian cooperation. The
report quotes Mashkevich declaring the synagogue’s problems have
been solved «once and for all» and that Rahmonov promised the
EAJC a plot of land in the center of Dushanbe to build a new
synagogue that will be convenient for the elderly in the
congregation.
2. DCM and PolOff met with the
synagogue’s Rabbi Abdurahmonov
May 24 to ask about the latest developments. Abdurahmonov said
he never had discussions with the EAJC or heard from them about
funding for a new synagogue. He
had met with some
representatives from other organizations who claim to be close
to Mashkevich, but did not receive news from them about
potential funding either. The
Rabbi is still hopeful about
potential donors in Israel. Post
has followed up with the
president’s press office and the MFA, neither of which could
confirm the meeting with Mashkevich.
One assistant originally
said the meeting did not occur.
3. Abdurahmonov said the Bukharan
Rabbi of Central Asia David
Gurevich was recently in Dushanbe and had meetings with local
government officials to negotiate the synagogue’s future.
Gurevich told Abdurahmonov government officials agreed to allow
the synagogue to remain where it is located now, if the
community would renovate the building’s facade to match the
area’s architecture. (NOTE: Gurevich has frequently come to
Dushanbe and had discussions with government officials that have
led nowhere.) Abdurahmonov was
optimistic that thanks to
Gurevich the synagogue’s problems will be solved, even though he
could not produce anything in writing from the government saying
they would not tear down the synagogue.
4. COMMENT: The synagogue’s leadership is extremely
optimistic
that things are on track, but they recognize that their fate
depends on government officials and outside funding. Although
they believe that Gurevich has finally solved their problems,
with no official documents from the government, the reasons for
optimism are not completely convincing.
The reality is that
half of the synagogue has already been demolished. Although
various possible donors pop up every once in a while, none has
followed through with cold hard cash.
Embassy sources report
that Mashkevich is very active behinds the scenes in business
deals and with the Jewish community in Kazakhstan, which may
explain why the Presidency was reluctant to confirm a meeting.
Given the lack of communication with the synagogue in Dushanbe,
Mashkevich’s motives and plans are unclear. The Embassy will
continue to engage with the Jewish community and the government.
There seems to be a willingness
on both sides to resolve this.
In the end, we suspect it will be resolved, if there is enough
outside funding available to placate all sides. END COMMENT.
SIGNATURE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 65806
date: 5/30/2006 10:01
refid: 06DUSHANBE995
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE620|06DUSHANBE696|06DUSHANBE995
header:
VZCZCXRO0865
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0995/01 1501001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301001Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7657
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1644
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1178
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0964
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8918
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000995
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/ACE, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, DRL, S/P
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: LAYING THE
FOUNDATION FOR BETTER ELECTIONS
REF: A) ARMBRUSTER-MCKANE 05-26-06 EMAIL
B) MCKANE-ARMBRUSTER 05-27-06 EMAIL,
C) DUSHANBE 0620 D) DUSHANBE 0696
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Although we can predict six months before
Tajikistan’s presidential election that it will not fully meet
international standards, we have the opportunity to ensure that
the election is conducted significantly better than any previous
election in Tajikistan’s short independent history. To put U.S.
resources into this election is not to fund a «bad election.»
Rather, it is to have faith in the power of transformational
diplomacy. Transformational
diplomacy is a long-term process —
it does not happen overnight, or in one election. We should not
allow our natural desire for perfection to impede the
possibility of real progress in the November election. Thus, we
renew our request for $300,000 in election funds, as previously
foreseen in our jointly agreed presidential election strategy.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C) In Refs A, C, and D, Post
requested $300,000, as
foreseen in the previously agreed USAID-EUR/ACE-Embassy Dushanbe
presidential election strategy.
Ref B responded EUR/ACE would
review the request and stated, «We aren’t interested in simply
help[ing] the Tajiks make a bad election look better from the
technical perspective. We should
be interested in real changes
to the way Tajiks do business, primarily in the pre-election
period.»
INTENSIVE WORK UNDER WAY TO IMPROVE THE ELECTION
3. (SBU) The Tajik Government has
already committed to an
historically large number of changes in how this election will
be conducted, including in the pre-election period. This is
thanks to intensive work with the government by the
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), fully
supported from the beginning by the United Nations Tajikistan
Office for Peace-building (UNTOP), and more recently by the OSCE.
4. (SBU) IFES, in conjunction
with the Central Commission for
Elections and Referenda and the President’s Strategic Research
Center, has used the OSCE Election Observers’ report from the
February 2005 parliamentary election to create a matrix of the
shortcomings in that previous election, and has also drawn from
Tajikistan’s election laws and the CIS election-standards
document (Ref C). The Government
of Tajikistan has bought into
the entire matrix, and has undertaken to fix each identified
problem, including making provision for civil society local
election observers.
5. (C) Realistically, there is no
time before the early
November presidential election to revise the Law on Presidential
Elections and to put it out for national discussion and
international analysis. However,
President Rahmonov has agreed
to issue a presidential decree mandating the changes. This is
already a significant step forward.
EQUAL MEDIA ACCESS
6. (C) Although we continue to
press at every opportunity,
extracting a promise to guarantee equal air time on state
broadcast media for all parties and candidates is more
problematic. While there may be
improvements in this area that
at least meet the current law, they will unlikely meet our
standards. However, the Avesta
Internet News Agency, one of the
two most important independent Internet news sources in
Tajikistan, has begun to publish an independent newspaper in
Russian, «Commentaries and Facts.» It was launched this Spring
with a small grant from the British Embassy. To continue
publishing until the end of this calendar year, including
through the presidential election period, the Avesta founder and
editor has asked Embassy Dushanbe for $30,000, and has
guaranteed his paper will provide equal access for all parties
and candidates. We would like our
requested $300,000 for
election activities to include this grant. The Central
Commission for Elections and Referenda has also identified the
need for televised debates as a step toward meeting
international standards and has requested funding from donors.
Up to $30,000 of our request would also be used to sponsor
debates or produce election-related talk shows.
THE PARTIES
DUSHANBE 00000995 002 OF 002
7. (C) In fact, equal media
access, including on state
broadcast media, for all parties and candidates, will not make
much difference in the outcome of this election. The three
miniscule «democratic» parties — the Democratic Party of
Tajikistan, the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, and the
Socialist Party of Tajikistan — consistently poll in the single
digits in reliable but unpublished public opinion polls and are
based largely on personalities, not distinctive party platforms.
Further, they have already made
clear that they have no
intention of putting forward a joint candidate. The Islamic
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan polls in the mid to high teens,
and has already announced it will nominate a candidate. The
Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) is barely distinguishable
from the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT),
although it gets its back up once in a while and criticizes the
PDPT on one specific issue or another.
If the CPT nominates a
candidate, it would be only for symbolic purposes. The two new
pocket parties — the Party of Economic Reform and the Agrarian
Party — may well nominate candidates, but we would not be overly
shocked if those candidates threw their support to President
Rahmonov just before the election.
8. (C) The bottom line is that
the PDPT will nominate President
Rahmonov, and he will win the election.
Further, although we
will work intensively with Rahmonov and his closest advisers to
ask him to prevent it, some of the district election commission
results may be falsified. If so,
that would be more by
ex-Soviet force of habit than from need.
President Rahmonov can
legitimately win this election with a walloping 75% or more. He
doesn’t need Ministry of Security minions over-fulfilling the
plan to give him 95%, and we will tell him so.
9. (U) UNTOP has also invited all
political parties to take
part in the election reform process and in moving forward the
recommendations in the matrix.
UNTOP’s initiative has generally
met with enthusiasm from the parties, and will help to further
institutionalize good governance and transparency.
THE LONG-TERM POWER OF TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY
10. (C) We can predict six months
before the presidential
election that it will not fully meet international standards.
But we have the opportunity to ensure that the election is
conducted significantly better than any previous election in
Tajikistan’s short independent history.
We belie targeted U.S.
funds could prove the power of transformational diplomacy. By
setting new standards for the conduct of this election, we will
have laid the foundation for future elections, when we can press
for even more fundamental changes.
Transformational diplomacy
is a long-term process — it does not happen overnight, or in one
election. We should not allow our
natural desire for perfection
to impede the possibility of real progress in the November
presidential election in Tajikistan.
Having the United States
in a lead role in election reform will bolster our long-term
goals, and out credibility with the people of Tajikistan.
11. (C) We renew our request for
$300,000 in additional funds
to support the election process in Tajikistan.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 66011
date: 5/31/2006 11:07
refid: 06DUSHANBE1013
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2794
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1013/01 1511107
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311107Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7684
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0040
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1654
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1629
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1634
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1579
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1575
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1566
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0051
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1449
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1391
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1601
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1646
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1180
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0966
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8950
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001013
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, E, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS
NSC FOR MILLARD, MERKEL
MANILA PLEASE PASS TO ADB-AMB. SPELTZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/31/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, ECON, EINV, ENRG, UZ, RS, TI
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON TAJIK-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, UZBEKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Although they met ostensibly for Presidential
Adviser Rahmatulloyev to give a read-out of the Putin-Rahmonov
meeting in Sochi, Rahmatulloyev, clearly authorized by President
Rahmonov, spent much of the 90-minute meeting laying out
Tajikistan’s exasperation with Russia and Uzbekistan. He said,
«We reject 19th-century great games.» The Ambassador reiterated
his invitation for President Rahmonov to cut the ribbon June 28
at Embassy Dushanbe’s New Embassy Compound, and delivered orally
Washington’s reply to President Rahmonov’s request for bilateral
debt relief. END SUMMARY
2. (C) The Ambassador, at his
request, met with Presidential
Foreign Policy Adviser Erkin Rahmatulloyev on May 30 for a
read-out of President Rahmonov’s May 27 meeting with Russian
President Putin in Sochi. During
the pre-substance banter, the
Ambassador noted it had been quite a while since they had met,
because the U.S.-Tajik relationship has been on an even keel.
The Ambassador assured Rahmatulloyev he had no new problems to
raise. Rahmatulloyev responded
quite seriously, «But we have a
big problem, and I’ll tell you about it.»
3. (C) The Ambassador observed
the press accounts of the
Rahmonov-Putin meeting had seemed mundane, even restrained.
However, the Ambassador said, he knew from three recent
encounters with President Rahmonov in as many weeks that
Rahmonov was quite irritated with aspects of the Tajik-Russian
relationship. Rahmatulloyev said,
«That’s the problem I want to
tell you about.»
4. (C) Rahmatulloyev said the
Sochi meeting had been
«constructive,» even «very constructive.» However, two years
after Oleg Deripaska’s RusAl had signed agreements to build the
Rogun dam and hydroelectric station and to upgrade the Tajik
Aluminum Plant (TadAZ) as well as to consider a new aluminum
plant, the only project RusAl has concretely begun is
construction of the new Hyatt Hotel in Dushanbe. On the other
had, current problems at Sangtuda-1 dam and hydroenegy station
with Russian energy monopoly RAO UES are simply the kinds of
glitches to be expected on any project of that size, and
President Rahmonov is satisfied with RAO UES and its chairman
Anatoliy Chubais. (C)OMMENT: As we wee it, not all glitches
are technical. The Russian
government was repoertedly planning
to fund 100 percent of Sangtuda-1, but now RAO UES is working
with the World Bank to secure international funding. END
COMMENT.)
DUSHANBE 00001013 002 OF 004
THAT DAMN DAM
5. (C) Rahmonov is especially
exasperated with RusAl because
the Rogun project was envisioned to provide reliable power to
Tajikistan and enough to export to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
RusAl, however, seems to see Rogun as its private domain to
supply just enough power for its supposed aluminum interests in
Tajikistan, primarily TadAZ.
6. (C) RusAl insists that
Tajikistan accept a lower, concrete
dam at Rogun, rather than the planned higher earth-fill dam,
like the successful one already in place at Nurek.
Rahmatulloyev noted that Tajik and international seismologists
worry that a concrete dam would be prone to structural failure
in earthquake-prone Tajikistan, whereas Nurek has withstood
significant seismic activity for over 20 years. RusAl
commissioned the German consulting firm Lahmeyer to study the
project, and Lahmeyer recommended the lower, concrete dam.
Rahmatulloyev noted RusAl «paid the piper and picked the
tune.»
He added even Lahmeyer has since admitted that a concrete dam
does not make sense for the project, but that’s what it was paid
to recommend. Rahmatulloyev added
an earth-fill dam would begin
to clear a profit in five to seven years, whereas a concrete dam
would take three times as long to become profitable. He said
President Rahmonov has ordered an independent study by the World
Bank of the two alternatives — concrete or earth-fill — with the
longer-term view of attracting an international consortium to
build Rogun.
TAJIKISTAN, AN UZBEK OBLAST?
7. (C) With Rogun a potential
plus for the region and
potentially profitable for Russia, why aren’t the trucks rolling
into Tajikistan with construction equipment and supplies? In a
word, according to Rahmatulloyev, Uzbekistan. He alleged that
President Karimov, in his most recent meeting with Putin in
Sochi, warned Putin he would do everything in his power to
prevent Tajikistan from «holding the key» to energy and water
in
the region. Karimov supposedly
vowed to prevent any goods and
supplies related to Rogun’s construction from passing through
Uzbekistan to reach Tajikistan.
Rahmatulloyev commented, «That
is another reason why the U.S.-funded Pyanzh Bridge is so
vitally important. It will
provide an alternative to get
construction supplies and equipment into Tajikistan.» According
to Rahmatulloyev, President Rahmonov believes Russia, in its
myopic quest to maximize Uzbekistan’s turn to Moscow, will do
anything to satisfy Karimov, including accept Karimov’s
conditions on Tajik hydropower.
Rahmatulloyev said, «We
believee this new relationship is at our expense.» He urged the
Ambassador to make this situation known in Washington so that
the United States could consider playing a role to broker a
solution. The Ambassador promised
to pass the message, but
noted, given current geopolitics, there is little we can do at
this time with Uzbekistan and even with Russia.
8. (C) In response to a question,
Rahmatulloyev acknowledged
Tajikistan has suspicions, though no concrete evidence,
Uzbekistan could have staged the May 12 Tajik-Kyrgyz border
posts attack that killed several Tajik border guards. Why?
Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in
January and must by June 1 accede to the EEC’s requirements for
member states of visa-free transit, demined borders, and the
free transit of goods. In
Rahmatulloyev’s view, Uzbekistan has
no intention of implementing those provisions with Tajikistan
DUSHANBE 00001013 003 OF 004
(or any other Uzbek neighbor), and a «well-timed terrorist
attack» could give Karimov the excuse to wiggle out of his
commitments.
9. (C) Even if this turns out not
to be true, Rahmatulloyev
pointed out, Uzbekistan still harbors and supports former Tajik
coup-plotter Colonel Khudoberdiyev and his 1,400 armed men — all
of whom receive official Uzbek support, identity documents, and
protection. Rahmatulloyev said
President Rahmonov had laid out
the situation in great detail for President Putin, who did not
respond. Rahmatulloyev asked
heatedly, «How can we talk about
regional cooperation and security with this impossible person
[Karimov]? Why does his National
Security Service run these
[Khudoberdiyev] camps against us?»
He answered himself
sarcastically, «Karimov sees Tajikistan as a future Uzbek
oblast!»
«WE DON»T WANT RUSSIA’S 19TH-CENTURY GREAT GAME»
10. (C) The Ambassador asked
about press reports Putin in Sochi
had promised Rahmonov new material assistance for the Tajik
Border Guards (TBG).
Rahmatulloyev responded, «Putin
‘promised,’ but he’s promised before.
We’ll see.» He recounted
that last year Putin, in Rahmonov’s presence, had ordered the
Russian Border Force during its final pull-out from the
Tajik-Afghan border to leave behind eight helicopters for the
TBG. «But it was never
implemented. In the end, the Russians
left two of their oldest helicopters that aren’t airworthy for
mountain flying,» Rahmatulloyev said with evident disgust. He
added, «And now Russia continues to portray us as incapable of
controlling our borders.»
11. (C) Rahmatulloyev said
Rahmonov was highly irritated Russia
had tried to scuttle Central Asian participation in the recent
U.S.-organized international counter-narcotics conference in
Dushanbe. The Ambassador agreed
Russia’s attempt to undercut
the conference had no logic, given the impact of Afghan
narcotics on Russia itself.
Rahmatulloyev said the Tajik side
had been advised in advance Putin would raise this issue in
Sochi, «but he was wise enough to have avoided it.»
Rahmatulloyev characterized Russian and Uzbek attitudes as
«19th-century great-game playing.» He emphasized Tajikistan
wants pragmatic relations, «not games,» with key players.
12. (C) The Ambassador responded
we understand it is difficult
for Tajikistan, but see President Rahmonov’s «open-door foreign
policy» as a success. He
reiterated U.S. policy has remained
consistent — adamant support for Tajikistan’s independence and
sovereignty. He added, «No
one wants to see Tajikistan as a
‘Russian oblast.'»
INVITATION FOR RAHMONOV TO CUT THE NEC RIBBON
13. (C) The Ambassador noted the
Embassy had sent a
diplomatic-note request and that he himself had personally asked
Rahmonov to cut the ribbon for the Embassy Dushanbe NEC on June
28. He added we would understand
if Rahmonov decided «political
constraints» would make that too difficult for him.
Rahmatulloyev remembered Rahmonov had promised three years ago
to participate in the ribbon-cutting ceremony if the United
States ever completed its new Embassy.
He undertook to remind
Rahmonov of that promise.
U.S. DEBT RELIEF FOR TAJIKISTAN
DUSHANBE 00001013 004 OF 004
14. (C) As agreed by e-mail with
SCA/CEN, the Ambassador
delivered an oral response to President Rahmonov’s letter to
President Bush requesting forgiveness of Tajikistan $18 million
bilateral debt. Rahmatulloyev
quipped, «I used to think Soviet
bureaucracy was ‘the best’ in the world.
I now see yours is
even ‘better’!»
15. (C) COMMENT: We know that even the most senior officials
like Rahmatulloyev check in with President Rahmonov for marching
orders before they meet with the Ambassador. We have known
Rahmonov is increasingly irritated with Russia, and it is clear
he authorized Rahmatulloyev to tell us at least some of what is
on his mind, if not all that transpired in Sochi. The stormy
Tajik-Russian relationship is on rough waves right now, in part
because of the Moscow-Tashkent love-fest — or at least
short-term convergence of interests.
By contrast, the
U.S.-Tajikistan relationship is an even-keeled voyage of
promises kept by both sides, for the most part. On-going reform
by the Tajik government and responsive U.S. humanitarian,
development, and security assistance has resulted in the kind of
open relationship of trust that allows the Ambassador to spend a
frank and cordial 90 minutes with one of Rahmonov’s most senior
advisers. It is clear Tajikistan
values its no-drama,
no-surprises relationship with the United States. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 66130
date: 5/31/2006 23:05
refid: 06TOKYO2992
origin: Embassy Tokyo
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3727
OO RUEHCN RUEHDBU RUEHGH
DE RUEHKO #2992/01 1512305
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 312305Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2699
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0376
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0110
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0011
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2561
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0151
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0596
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1063
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8034
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8741
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0065
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0029
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002992
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2026
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KZ, KG, UZ, TI, TX, JA
SUBJECT: A/S BOUCHER’S MAY 30 MEETING WITH EUROPEAN DDG
YAGI ON CENTRAL ASIA
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary.
MOFA DDG for Europe Takeshi Yagi told
visiting SCA A/S Richard Boucher that Japan will hold its
second round of Foreign Ministerial-level talks with Central
Asian nations on Monday, June 5.
Tokyo hopes the Central
Asian countries will adopt an Action Plan that will include
inter-regional cooperation and other areas covered in a
diagram that he passed to the Assistant Secretary.
Attendance at the meeting is still undecided and Yagi pointed
out that a Russian official said that the talks were an
«unuseful» rival to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO). Afghanistan’s Foreign
Minister will also attend the
meeting and Tokyo will stress the importance of its
integration through regional projects such as the
construction of a highway from Tajikistan to Afghanistan.
DDG Yagi said that Japanese Foreign Minister Aso told Uzbeki
Deputy Prime Minister Azimov during his Tokyo visit in May
that the Japanese government wants more efforts towards
democratization and respect for human rights. The Japanese
government slashed ODA to Uzbekistan dramatically last year
to the two million USD level.
Japan hopes that Uzbekistan
will better resist efforts to be pushed further into the
Russian camp. DDG Yagi noted that
Japan, the U.S. and the EU
are limited in their Central Asian participation compared to
Russia and called for close coordination of Western efforts.
End summary.
Japan-Central Asia Foreign Ministerial Talks
———————————————
2. (C) During a May 30 meeting, MOFA DDG for Europe
Takeshi
Yagi briefed visiting SCA A/S Richard Boucher on plans for
Japan’s second Foreign Ministerial level consultations with
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kygyzstan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan on June 5 in Tokyo.
These consultations started
two years ago after then Foreign Minister Yuriko Kawaguchi’s
trip to Kazakhstan in August 2004 resulted in the group’s
first meeting. Although Tokyo
wanted to meet last summer,
the Japanese Diet elections intervened and required MOFA to
postpone the meeting, DDG Yagi explained. This year Japan
has also invited Afghanistan, and Afghan Foreign Minister
Rangeen Spanta has indicated he will attend. Japan hopes the
group can adopt a five-point Action Plan, which would include
greater intra-regional cooperation.
DDG Yagi provided A/S
Boucher with a diagram outline of the Action Plan.
3. (c) Attendance is still undecided, noted DDG
Yagi.
Turkmenistan had initially indicated it would send its
Foreign Minister but notified Tokyo on May 30 that it would
not send anyone — a move anticipated by MOFA. Kazakhstan
has designated its Deputy Foreign Minister as a «Special
Envoy» to the meeting. The
Uzbek and Tajik governments have
promised attendance by their Foreign Ministers, but one can
never be sure of who will attend until the day of the
meetings, DDG Yagi said.
Russian unease with Japan’s approach to Central Asia
——————————————— ——-
4. (C) Upon hearing from A/S Boucher of Moscow’s
attempts
to dissuade Central Asian countries from attending a recent
U.S.- Central Asia meeting on narcotics in Dushanbe, DDG Yagi
opined that the Russians may also be trying to interfere with
Japan’s upcoming talks. A Russian
official told DDG Yagi
that the SCO has produced actual cooperation in the region
and called approaches by other countries to establish
separate mechanisms «unuseful.» A/S Boucher encouraged Japan
to continue to pursue stronger ties with Central Asia, noting
the SCO has not produced much substantively and the
development of alternatives to Russia and China is good.
While the U.S. does not seek to cut out Russia or China, the
recent ability of Kazakhstan to renegotiate with Gazprom
demonstrates that Central Asian countries need options to
ensure their fair treatment.
Afghanistan
————
5. (C) DDG Yagi agreed with A/S Boucher on the
importance
TOKYO 00002992 002 OF 002
of involving Afghanistan in regional integration efforts. At
next week,s conference, Tokyo will stress Afghanistan’s role
in the region and highlight the importance of projects such
as the construction of the highway from Tajikistan to
Afghanistan and the building of the Afghan ring road. Japan
will also encourage the gas pipeline project from
Turkmenistan to Pakistan, even though its development is a
long shot, DDG Yagi said. A/S
Boucher expressed appreciation
for Japan’s support in Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean.
Uzbekistan Woes
—————
6. (C) Responding to A/S
Boucher’s observation that Prime
Minister Karimov is closing off contacts and options with the
West to move closer to Moscow, DDG Yagi said that during
Deputy Prime Minister Asimov’s Tokyo visit in May, Foreign
Minister Aso told him that Japan wants Uzbekistan’s
government to make greater efforts toward democratization and
respect for human rights. Japan
slashed its 10 million USD
development assistance program back to 2 million USD last
year, including no ODA loans. The
Uzbek government suspects
that Tokyo is linking its ODA program to greater respect for
human rights. DDG Yagi said that although
the Japanese
government does not want to drive the Uzbekis into the
Russian corner, it wants to send them a message.
Western cooperation key
————————
7. (C) DDG Yagi said that Japan has limited
influence in
Central Asia compared to Russia.
Therefore, it is important
for the U.S., Japan and the EU to coordinate efforts. With
joint efforts we can achieve good results in Central Asia and
counter Russian influence, he stated.
8. (U) Participants:
United States
————-
SCA A/S Richard Boucher
Joseph Donovan, Deputy Chief of Mission
Ann Kambara, Embassy notetaker
Joel Ehrendreich, Embassy Poloff
Japan
——
Takeshi Yagi, Deputy Director General for Europe, MOFA
Fumio Iwai, Director, Second Middle Eastern Division, MOFA
9. (U) A/S Boucher cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 66416
date: 6/2/2006 11:46
refid: 06DUSHANBE1027
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE835|06DUSHANBE978|06STATE85450
header:
VZCZCXRO5990
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1027/01 1531146
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7706
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
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RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1666
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1572
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8973
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001027
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EMBASSY MANILA: PLEASE PASS TO ADB AMBASSADOR SPELTZ
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ENRG, ECON, EAID, AF, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN’S POWER POLITICS: DEPUTY PM GHULOMOV REMAINS
COMMITTED TO US ROLE IN ENERGY SECTOR
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0835 B) STATE
85450 C) DUSHANBE 0978
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (SBU) Tajikistan is the most attractive country in
Central
Asia for hydro power investment, according to Deputy Prime
Minister Ghulomov, and he intends to demonstrate that to
investors and suppliers alike at the «Energy Without Borders»
conference in Istanbul June 12-14.
In a 45-minute meeting with
PolOff June 1, he stated clearly his personal goal for the U.S.
Trade and Development Agency (TDA) sponsored meeting: attract
investment in Tajikistan’s numerous potential hydropower
stations and transmission lines projects. He noted that his
overview presentation will highlight existing cooperation
agreements with Afghanistan, demonstrating how Tajikistan can
play a central role in regional infrastructure integration.
2. (SBU) Ghulomov was pleased to learn that a $800,000
TDA
grant to AES to study transmission lines to Afghanistan was one
of the key deliverables of the conference (ref B). He
tentatively agreed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding for
all participating countries in Istanbul, but requested time to
review the agreement.
3. (C) Ghulomov dismissed AES’ worries that RAO UES
may be
creeping on the U.S. firm’s plan to export excess Tajik
electricity. At the beginning of
the meeting, a concerned Oumed
Latipov of AES asked for a few moments to clarify a conversation
he had with a RAO UES representative in Dushanbe. RAO
reportedly is working with the Tajik authorities to sell summer
excess electricity to Uzbekistan, potentially reducing the
amount of electricity available for AES to sell. (NOTE: Were
this true, it would also mean RAO would have removed the major
hurdle to donor funding for Sangtuda-I.
The World Bank and
other international financial institutions (IFIs) have said they
will only fund hydropower stations producing for export, in
direct conflict to President Rahmonov’s declaration that
Sangtuda-I must be used for domestic consumption. Exporting
summer power may be RAO’s way to get IFI funding for the
additional $250 million to finish the $550 million project. END
NOTE.)
4. (C) Ghulomov rolled his eyes and replied,
«We signed an
agreement with you. We will honor
that agreement. Why do you
have doubts?» referring to the May 24 MOU signed establishing a
Tajik government-AES joint venture to build transmission lines
to the Afghan border (ref C). He
reminded Latipov that
President Rahmonov had given AES the right to manage the joint
venture for 12 years, a clear indication of his trust. He noted
that the AES transmission line project would not be in operation
until late 2007, and until then, Tajikistan needed to sell its
1.5 billion kW hours to someone.
Selling summer excess in 2006
and 2007 in no way threatened the agreement with AES. He did
urge AES to accelerate its project.
(COMMENT: A bit ironic,
considering the May 24 MOU had been with the Tajik authorities
since January 31. END COMMENT.)
After Latipov left, Ghulomov
reiterated to PolOff that the Tajik government stood by its
agreement.
5. (C) COMMENT:
Enthusiastic and committed to the Istanbul
conference, Ghulomov will not attend the June 15 Shanghai
Cooperation Organization meeting in Shanghai (where President
Rahmonov will likely ink a $320 million agreement for Chinese
development of transmission lines, telecommunications networks
and road and tunnel construction) in order to attend the U.S.-
sponsored meeting in Turkey. His
challenge will be convincing
DUSHANBE 00001027 002 OF 002
donors and investors that Tajikistan is ready to do business by
Western standards and willing to move at a Western pace. END
COMMENT
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 66984
date: 6/7/2006 7:15
refid: 06DUSHANBE1067
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO0315
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1067/01 1580715
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070715Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7758
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1664
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1670
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1576
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1589
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1644
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1190
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0974
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1401
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9025
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001067
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/SE, EB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, ENRG, EINV, EAID, TI, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH EMBASSY WANTS BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN
TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Turkey supports U.S. efforts to develop
Tajikistan’s
energy sector and other infrastructure projects, but Turkish
Embassy Chargi d’ Affaires Askin Cakmak suggested that for those
projects to succeed, donor countries need to send the Tajik
government a strong message to improve the investment climate.
Cakmak requested a June 6 meeting with PolOff to discuss U.S.
policy and areas where Turkey and the United States might
cooperate in Tajikistan. The
upcoming U.S.-sponsored «Energy
Without Borders» conference in Istanbul could stimulate
international interest in Tajikistan’s energy projects, but he
cautioned that without a transparent business environment, most
investors would not commit.
«If there are no guarantees for
investors, it is meaningless to invest,» he stated.
2. (C) Cakmak highlighted the frustration Turkish
construction
businesses experienced in Tajikistan.
Bribes were high,
inspections frequent, tax exemptions for imported equipment not
honored and investments not guaranteed.
Even Oyak, the company
that successfully — and profitably — repaved a long stretch of
road along the Afghan border, was tired of working in
Tajikistan, and would not seek more projects here. Enka, the
Turkish company building the Dushanbe Hyatt for Russian Hotels
(a sister company to Russian Aluminum giant RusAl), had
experienced significant problems importing construction
equipment, despite existing tax and customs exemptions for
foreign investors. The Tajik
government, he said, is «keen to
attract foreign investment, but they do nothing to protect
investors.» Tajik partners,
required by law for foreign
investors, often take advantage of this situation.
3. (C) No Turkish companies plan to develop any of
Tajikistan’s hydropower projects, because the Tajik government
could not guarantee financing.
However, they may be willing to
subcontract on some projects backed by international partners.
Cakmak suggested Turkish firms would be interested in working
with U.S. partners on infrastructure projects in the region.
Turkey currently has about $20 million in direct investments, in
hotels and a business center. A
$75 million textile project is
also in the works.
4. (C) Turkish Airlines’ attempts to get more
flights to
Dushanbe further highlighted the Tajik’s «small mindedness»
and
the difficulties for successful international businesses in
Tajikistan. Since February, when
Turkish Airlines inaugurated a
weekly flight between Dushanbe and Istanbul (much to the delight
of the international community), Turkish Airlines has flown at
100 percent capacity. «You can’t get a seat for a month,»
Cakmak
said of the unexpectedly profitable flight. Turkish Airlines
requested additional days, and offered Tajikistan State Airlines
(TSA) additional routes, but the Tajiks refused on both
accounts. «TSA cannot support more than one flight a week to
Europe,» said Cakmak, noting TSA had recently consolidated its
weekly Dushanbe-Munich and Dushanbe-Istanbul flights into a
weekly Dushanbe-Istanbul-Munich-Istanbul-Dushanbe milk run.
«We’d give them the right to fly to Istanbul every day, but
because we are profitable and they are not, they refuse.»
5. (C) Cakmak reported Turkey grants only small
amounts of
technical assistance and humanitarian aid, but agreed that as a
secular Islamic democracy, Turkey could be an example to
Tajikistan. He suggested Turkey
should identify areas where
they could provide Tajiks with training, possibly in civil
society support. The U.S.
regional priorities — particularly
security and economic development — match Turkey’s. As he
noted, «We are in cooperation, not in competition here.» He
closed the meeting by reiterating his opening comment:
International donors at the Istanbul conference must insist on a
DUSHANBE 00001067 002 OF 002
better business environment.
6. (SBU) COMMENT:
Considering that Turkish companies operate
with relative success and ease in Tajikistan, Cakmak’s sharp
comments about Tajikistan’s poor business environment came as a
surprising indictment. If
Tajikistan plays its cards right, it
could attract much investment from Turkey, which would make it
even more attractive to players outside the region. However, if
Turkish companies decide the climate is too corrupt for them to
operate, Tajikistan has little chance of truly developing its
economy. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 67325
date: 6/9/2006 5:59
refid: 06TOKYO3193
origin: Embassy Tokyo
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3025
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKO #3193/01 1600559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090559Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3053
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 0378
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0112
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2714
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0153
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0599
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0635
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1894
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8050
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 8887
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0187
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003193
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO E/SHINER.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PTER, PGOV, SNAR, AF, KZ, KG, UZ, TI, TX,
RS, CH, JA
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTERS RELEASE «ACTION PLAN» AT CENTRAL
ASIA PLUS JAPAN DIALOGUE
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (C) Summary. The June 5
«Central Asia Plus Japan»
dialogue in Tokyo produced an «Action Plan» with specific
initiatives for regional cooperation in the areas of
counterterrorism, counternarcotics, anti-personnel landmine
clearance, poverty alleviation, health care, the environment,
disaster prevention, energy cooperation, trade and
transportation. The group
supported Japan’s bid for a
permanent UN SC seat and called for universalization of the
IAEA Additional Protocol.
Afghanistan attended for the first
time, while Turkmenistan backed out after first accepting its
invitation. MOFA contacts
acknowledged that the meeting was
timed to draw attention away from the late-June
China-Russia-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization
meeting. Separately, Ambassador
for Counterterrorism
Yamamoto told the DCM on June 6 that Japan plans to expand
its counterterrorism activities to South and Central Asia
over the next few years, and reiterated his desire to
coordinate with the United States on this initiative. End
Summary.
2. (C) On June 8, MOFA Central Asia and Caucasus Division
Director Hideki Uyama briefed Embassy Tokyo Political
Officers on the June 5 «Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue»
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. This
was the second such
meeting, a legacy of former Foreign Minister Kawaguchi’s
August 2004 initiative that stressed Japan’s region-based
policy for Central Asia. Uyama
described the Foreign
Ministers’ meetings as the venue for developing a framework
for Japan’s cooperation with the region, while the separate
Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOM) regularly reviewed progress
of the action plans.
Counter to China and Russia
—————————
3. (C) Uyama acknowledged that the timing of the meeting,
coming less than two weeks before the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) was to meet in Shanghai, was chosen to
counter Chinese and Russian influence on the Central Asia
countries. Similarly, Foreign
Minister Aso’s speech on
Japan’s policy toward Central Asia, given June 1 at the Japan
National Press Club, was timed to deflect influence away from
China and Russia, Uyama stated.
(Note: The full text of
Aso’s speech can be found at
www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/speech0606.html. End Note.)
4. (C) Japan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were all
represented at the Foreign Minister level, while Kazakhstan
sent Vice-Minister Abdrakhmanov.
According to Uyama,
Turkmenistan had indicated it would send its Foreign
Minister, but later reneged and did not attend, citing a
desire to «remain neutral» on regional issues. Uyama joked
that Turkmenistan thinks that any cooperation with other
Central Asian nations is bad.
This meeting marked the first
time Afghanistan had been invited, as an observer. FM Rangin
Dadfar Spanta represented Afghanistan.
Japan has come to
appreciate the U.S.’ inclusion of Afghanistan in the regional
organization, Uyama said, for two reasons: it is an
important country in the fight against terrorism and it is a
valuable southern option for commerce and for transportation
routes.
Action Plan
————
5. (C) The ministers produced a new «Action Plan» based on
the five «pillars» for cooperation: political dialogue,
intra-regional cooperation, business promotion, intellectual
dialogue, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges. Uyama
pointed to nine initiatives for intra-regional cooperation as
the highlight of the Action Plan.
Japan confirmed its intent
to support intra-regional cooperation in the fields of
counterterrorism and counternarcotics, clearance of
anti-personnel landmines, poverty alleviation, health and
TOKYO 00003193 002 OF 002
medical care, environment, disaster prevention, energy/water
cooperation, trade and investment, and transportation
(particularly through Afghanistan).
6. (C) The groups’ effort to
counter terrorism, Uyama
shared, was placed near the beginning of the Action Plan
because it the most important regional goal. Although Japan
would be hard-pressed to provide security training to the
countries, Uyama thought it could offer capacity building
measures. Regarding the clearance
of anti-personnel mines,
Uzbekistan was determined to deal with the problem itself and
declined Japan’s offer of help.
Tajikistan appeared more
interested and, Uyama said, Japan would be ready to help, if
Tajikstan requested it. He
underscored his hope to work
together with the United States to make these projects more
effective. (Note: Full text of
the Action Plan is available
at www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/dialogue/action0 606.html.)
Support for Japan’s UN Bid
—————————
7. (C) Participants unanimously agreed to support Japan’s bid
for a permanent UN Security Council seat. They called for
overall reform of the UN, agreed to cooperate in on the 2010
NPT Review Conference, agreed on the need to universalize the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional
Protocols, and reconfirmed the importance of Central Asian
countries intensifying efforts toward democratization,
promotion of market economies, eradication of terrorism and
poverty, and the protection of human rights.
Call for U.S.-Japan CT Cooperation in the Region
——————————————— —
8. (C) In a separate meeting,
Ambassador for
Counterterrorism Tadamichi Yamamoto told the DCM on June 6
that Japan is planning to expand its counterterrorism efforts
beyond Southeast Asia to South and Central Asia over the next
few years. Yamamoto admitted that
Japan does not yet have a
budget in place to accomplish the expansion but reiterated
his desire to coordinate with the United States on this
initiative. The action plan
signed by Foreign Minister Aso
is consistent with Yamamoto’s goal and paves the way for
greater cooperation on all fronts, including
counterterrorism.
SCHIEFFER
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 69318
date: 6/26/2006 5:53
refid: 06DUSHANBE1174
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE541
header:
VZCZCXRO9992
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1174/01 1770553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260553Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7904
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1688
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1672
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1652
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1657
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1606
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1590
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1584
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1465
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1409
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1198
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1615
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1662
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0982
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9185
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001174
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KIRF, KISL, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: HELSINKI COMMISSION COUNSEL’S FIRST VISIT
REF: DUSHANBE 541
&n
