Переведено с использщованием AI
id: 54747
date: 3/1/2006 10:14
refid: 06DUSHANBE403
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO3029
OO RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0403 0601014
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 011014Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6843
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY 0086
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7962
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000403
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EB
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, EINV, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK PRESIDENT’S OFFICE UNDERTAKES TO ANSWER U/S SHINER’S
LETTER ADVOCATING RESOLUTION OF THE GERALD METALS COMMERCIAL DISPUTE
REF: WALTERS-HOAGLAND E-MAIL DTD 02-28-06
1. (U) Sensitive but
unclassified. Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) During a March 1 meeting
with Presidential Foreign
Policy Adviser Erkin Rahmatulloyev, the Ambassador asked when
Under Secretary Shiner can expect a reply to her December 2005
letter to President Rahmonov advocating resolution of the Gerald
Metals commercial dispute with the Tajik Aluminum Plant (TadAZ).
To our surprise, Rahmatulloyev
stood up, went to his in-box,
and fished out a thick file.
Enunciating precisely, as he does
when dealing with a serious issue, he said he has been
personally involved with this case, even though trade and
commercial issues are not his portfolio, since the Shiner letter
was delivered to the President’s office December 19.
3. (SBU) Initially, Rahmatulloyev
said that the issue has
unfortunately acquired an «unnecessary emphasis» in the
bilateral relationship, and that a «commercial-economic»
dispute
should not become political.
Without notes, he reviewed the
recent judicial history of the dispute and noted that Gerald
Metals has not yet exercised its right to appeal the most recent
decision by the Higher Economic Court of Tajikistan, implying
that the ball is currently in Gerald Metals’ court. He noted
the Tajik government’s touch of heartburn at «hints» in
letters
from U.S. senators about the case that Tajikistan’s judicial
system is biased.
4. (SBU) Rahmatulloyev passed a
thick file of recent court
documents on the case to the Ambassador and asked him to study
them closely, because the Higher Economic Court had made its
most recent decision «in accordance with our law as it now
exists.» He then added,
«It is our view that both sides should
come to a compromise. The
President’s sincere desire is to have
a fair settlement. We are ready
for further contact on this
issue.»
5. (SBU) Rahmatulloyev admitted
that TadAZ’s management has
seen «upheaval in recent years,» and, without elaborating,
that
there had previously been «lots of illegal interference in its
affairs.»
6. (SBU) Focusing on the point
that President Rahmonov wants a
«fair settlement,» the Ambassador recommended that
Rahmatulloyev
request a letter from Rahmonov stating that sentiment to Under
Secretary Shiner. He suggested it
would be wise to have such a
SIPDIS
letter in Washington before Minister of Industry Saidov meets
senior officials in the Commerce Department March 22.
Rahmatulloyev agreed with this approach and said he would do his
best to follow through.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 54923
date: 3/2/2006 5:15
refid: 06DUSHANBE408
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE151
header:
VZCZCXRO4585
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0408/01 0610515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 020515Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6848
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1419
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1460
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1449
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1400
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1346
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1416
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1374
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1311
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1219
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1453
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1501
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0793
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7967
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000408
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KISL, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: IRPT LEADER
CLOSELY WATCHED
REF: DUSHANBE 151
CLASSIFIED BY: RICHARD HOAGLAND, AMBASSADOR, DUSHANBE,
TAJIKISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Muhiddin Kabiri, First Deputy Chairman of the
Islamic
Renaissance Party (IRPT) will travel to the United States March
8 to deliver a speech at Columbia University on the state of
religion and politics in Tajikistan after the wave of «color
revolutions» in other post-Soviet countries. Kabiri told PolOff
February 27 the government disapproved of his trip to the United
States.
2. (C) When Kabiri notified Tajikistan’s
Parliamentary Speaker
of his impending absence, the Speaker questioned why Kabiri had
to attend the lecture in New York.
Despite Kabiri’s insistence
that he would go with or without the Speaker’s permission, the
Speaker insisted he himself would consult with the President’s
Office about Kabiri’s trip.
Austria’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs also invited Kabiri to speak in Vienna in March, and the
Speaker instructed Kabiri to attend Austria’s conference instead
of the lecture at Columbia University.
According to Kabiri, the
Tajik government suspects the United States is inviting
perceived opposition leaders, like himself, to come and engage
in discussions about possibly stirring up a «color revolution»
in Tajikistan. The President’s
Office ultimately consented to
Kabiri’s travel, but when he returns from the United States he
will have to submit financial records and a report of his trip’s
activities.
3. (C) During a recent Parliament session, Kabiri
brought up
the problem of BBC’s registration and advocated for more varied
media sources. Fellow
parliamentarians chastised him for even
bringing up the issue and dismissed it simply as BBC’s failure
to follow Tajik laws, the standard government line. In public
and private, government officials have accused Kabiri of being
an «agent of influence» for the West. Because of this
reputation, Kabiri says he has periodically made comments
criticizing U.S. foreign policy in the media to fend off
critics’ attacks. In meetings
with EmbOffs he often mentions
how he is always trying to stay out of jail, and out of trouble
with the government. He has also
mentioned how he sees the IRPT
as a «loyal» opposition party.
4. (C) Kabiri told PolOff the Russian Ambassador
Abdulatipov’s
public statements supporting Rahmonov for re-election offended
him (reftel). Mostly, he was
disappointed that his fellow
parliamentarians did not react.
He posited that if a
representative of the United States made such a comment, it
would be seen as interference and many would be outraged.
Kabiri explained this attitude reflects a broader outlook in
Parliament. According to him,
most Tajik officials view
Tajikistan as a protectorate of Russia with Rahmonov as a puppet
leader and Abdulatipov the General Governor of Tajikistan.
Recently, one parliamentarian was overheard commenting, «If
Rahmonov can’t solve this problem for me, I will go to Putin.»
5. (C) COMMENT:
The government’s attempts at marginalizing
the IRPT’s Kabiri as an «Agent of the West» seem a bit ironic,
and out of step with global politics.
Instead, the government
may fear the IRPT’s genuine popularity-Kabiri is one of the few
politicians outside the President’s party with a true base of
support. In the months leading to
the Presidential election,
the government may step up it efforts to discredit and
marginalize Kabiri. To counter
this, and save his image, he may
feel the need to increase his public comments against the West.
However, he is still a moderate Islamic leader who understands
DUSHANBE 00000408 002 OF 002
Western democratic values. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 54986
date: 3/2/2006 11:25
refid: 06DUSHANBE410
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE390
header:
VZCZCXRO4932
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0410 0611125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021125Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6851
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1451
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1418
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1462
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1421
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1376
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1348
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1402
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1002
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0795
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1221
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7970
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 000410
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, INL, PM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK BORDER UPDATE
REF: DUSHANBE 390
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (SBU) This begins a series of
cables summarizing
Tajikistan’s border security developments and activities of
Embassy Dushanbe’s Border Law Enforcement Working Group (BLEWG).
Led by the DCM, with
participation from the Senior Law
Enforcement Advisor (SLEA), the EXBS advisor, the Defense
Attachi’s Office (DAO), Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC),
Pol/Econ, Pol/Mil and others, the BLEWG is an interagency
working established in 2005 to coordinate all aspects of USG
border security assistance. This
cable covers activities for
February 2006.
2. (SBU) At the February 16
meeting of the Border Interagency
Group (BIG), donor agencies formed a Canine Working group to
better coordinate assistance with donors and government
ministries and avoid duplication of efforts. Currently, the
Ministry of Interior (MOI), Drug Control Agency (DCA), and
Border Guards all have drug-detecting programs, but there has
been no coordination or decision at the government level about
who would run or fund dog centers, provide veterinary care or
training. SLEA will work with UN
Office of Drug Control
(UNODC) and other major donors to standardize the dog programs.
Donors also agreed to from a training committee to coordinate
all law enforcement training.
3. (U) Ambassador Hoagland and Russian Ambassador
Abdulatipov
attended the graduation of Ministry of Interior trainees
February 17. A Swedish-Russian
contractor conducted the
U.S.-funded training at a MOI new criminal intelligence center
in Dushanbe
4. (C) At a private reception in his honor February
20,
General Zuhurov, Chairman of the State Border Protection
Committee, highlighted the United States’ close relationship
with Tajikistan and Russia’s waning influence with the Border
Guards. The dynamics of the private reception indicated that for
all the press attention on Russian assistance and cooperation,
the Border guards consider the United States a true ally
(reftel).
5. (SBU) General Zuhurov told
SLEA his trip to the United
States, tentatively scheduled for March, has been postponed
until June. Presidential Advisor
Rahmatulloyev confirmed to the
Ambassador the President’s Office preferred Zuhurov travel in
June, after the May Counternarcotics Conference.
6. (SBU) Planning continues for
the May CENTCOM/Marshall Center
sponsored Counternarcotics Conference, which the Tajiks continue
to enthusiastically support.
7. (SBU) SLEA reports helicopter and truck deliveries
of the
$3.2 million of food, fuel and uniforms continue at a slow, but
steady pace to border posts (zastavas) along the Tajik-Afghan
border in Moscovskiy district.
The Border Guards took
possession of eight U.S.-funded ambulances to operate at each of
the eight border posts identified for U.S. assistance.
8. (SBU) SLEA and EmbOff completed an assessment Khurmanjo
border post February 19. This
pilot renovation project will
serve as a model for future and is scheduled to begin
construction in late spring.
9. (U) Drug interdictions for February (as reported
by the
Tajik Press): 160 kg of heroin,
raw opium and cannabis in four
raids by the DCA, Border Guards and Ministry of Interior.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 55305
date: 3/4/2006 6:47
refid: 06DUSHANBE419
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06DUSHANBE301|06DUSHANBE326|06DUSHANBE63
header:
VZCZCXRO7901
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0419/01 0630647
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 040647Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6866
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1453
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1419
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1464
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1423
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1378
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1350
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1404
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1004
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0797
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1223
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7985
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000419
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SNAR, ECON, EINV, EAID, ENRG, TI, CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO TAJIKISTAN: «WHY NOT COOPERATE IN
CENTRAL ASIA?»
REF: A) DUSHANBE 63 B) DUSHANBE
301 C) DUSHANBE 326
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Chinese Ambassador to Tajikistan Li Huilai
said China shared many of the United States’ priorities in
Tajikistan, including economic growth, counter-terrorism and
border stability. In a very frank
and open 90-minute meeting
with Ambassador Hoagland, Li suggested there was room for
Chinese-U.S. security and economic cooperation in Tajikistan.
END SUMMARY.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND HYDROPOWER
2. (C) China plans to invest in
roads, hydropower stations
(HPS), and modernizing the telecommunication sector in
Tajikistan. The China Development
Bank had offered the other
countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) a total
of $900 million at low interest rates, and Tajikistan intended
to apply for some of that assistance.
However, they have not
yet finalized negotiations on any particular projects. Li noted
with some frustration that, unlike the Uzbeks, who negotiated
very quickly, the Tajiks were «more nuanced» and invoked the
Tajik Civil War and their need for stability during
negotiations. However, a
delegation from the Chinese
Development Bank would arrive in Dushanbe soon and he was
confident they would reach an agreement.
3. (C) Li acknowledge the Chinese
were interested in Shurob HPS
or Rogun, but said no feasibility studies had been conducted for
any hydropower projects, including the Varzob cascade.
(COMMENT: This contradicts
comments the Deputy Energy Minister
Silantiev and the Chinese Trade Attachi made to PolOff (Reftels
A and B). END COMMENT.) He noted
that Chinese investment in
Shurob would depend on the plans for Rogun-if the dam built at
Rogun was too high, it would not make a HPS at Shorub worth the
investment.
4. (C) China would consider
working with American companies on
its infrastructure projects, according to Li. (COMMENT:
This
also contradicts the Chinese Trade Attachi’s comments to PolOff
that only Chinese firms would be eligible to participate in
Chinese investment projects (Reftel B).
END COMMENT.) Li
indicated an international consortium could be useful. «Where
are we going to export that power?» he asked, if the
international community was not in agreement. He specifically
said U.S. companies would be welcome to build transmission
lines. Li agreed that Dost-I-Zhum
hydropower station would only
be viable if the Tajik government proved successful with
Sangtuda I and II, and Rogun (reftel C).
«WHY NOT COOPERATE IN CENTRAL ASIA?»
5. (C) Agreeing with the
Ambassador, that the large powers
needed to coordinate their message and efforts in Tajikistan, Li
noted China’s enormous trade surplus over the past five years
meant real benefits for the Chinese and other countries China
helped. He listened with interest
as the Ambassador explained
areas where U.S. consultants have highlighted investment
opportunities in Tajikistan, such as mining, energy,
agriculture, transport and telecom.
BORDER ISSUES
6. (C) Li observed the Chinese
border was the quietest portion
of the Tajik border last year, with no incidents. Within two
years, he estimated that the demarcation process would be
complete and the border region would remain peaceful and stable.
The border post at Kalma was currently
only open from May to
October, although the Tajiks had repeatedly asked China to keep
the border crossing open year-round.
Li noted that to do that,
DUSHANBE 00000419 002 OF 002
they would need better infrastructure and housing built at a
lower elevation for border guards and customs workers.
7. (C) The Tajik-Afghan border
concerned China, particularly
after the departure of the Russian Border Guards. Narcotics
made their way to China either through Burma or from Afghanistan
through Central Asia; they had noticed a rise in traffic along
the latter «northern» route recently. Li remarked that in a
meeting with General Zuhurov of the Tajik Border Guards, Li had
noted the lack of professionalism and training of the current
leadership of the Border Guards.
China has donated vehicles
and uniforms to equip Tajik border forces.
8. (C) The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization was considering
establishing a counternarcotics center in Central Asia, and
planned to invite Afghanistan to participate. «Without
Afghanistan there would be no point,» he noted.
COUNTERTERRORISM: ROOM FOR MORE
COOPERATION
9. (C) Li expressed China’s
concern over the terrorist group,
the Eastern Turkistan Organization, and noted that his Embassy
receives monthly threat reports.
He highlighted the death of a
Chinese diplomat and the death of 12 businessmen last year in
Kyrgyzstan as evidence that China also faces terrorism on
regular basis. Li characterized
his embassy’s relationship with
Tajikistan’s Ministry of Security (MoS) as «at the beginning
stages, «needing better cooperation. «There is very little
information sharing. We don’t
know if it’s because they don’t
have information, or will not share.» Li attributed the
situation to a lack of experience in the MoS. «Tajikistan is a
young republic,» he said.
The Ministry of Security is not very
professional, he opined, staffed with «family and friends» of
the powerful.
SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION
10. (C) Li noted the coming year would bring China and
Tajikistan closer. President
Rahmonov planned to visit Beijing.
The SCO would convene a meeting
in Dushanbe as well. Li
parried the Ambassador’s suggestion that the SCO could help
motivate Uzbekistan to open its borders to its neighbors by
proposing that Uzbekistan’s recent accession to the Eurasia
Economic community would provide better leverage.
11. (C) Li summed up China’s
policy for Tajikistan as reform,
development, and stability. In
closing, he mentioned an article
he had read, stating the CIA anticipated two more color
revolutions in former Soviet Republics.
«I hate to be
immodest,» he smiled, «But will one be in Tajikistan? Belarus?
Uzbekistan?» The Ambassador
put in context for Li DNI
Negroponte’s recent testimony to Congress. Tongue-in-cheek, he
told Li that Tajikistan is not on the «color revolution»
schedule for this year.
12. (C) COMMENT: Li’s openness to share information comes in
marked contrast to the meeting with the Trade Attachi, who was
extremely reticent about Chinese investment and priorities in
Tajikistan. Quite possibly, Li
feels freer to speak openly and
has the authority to reveal policy and priorities that others on
his team do not. Li’s openness to
collaboration of U.S. and
Chinese companies in building Tajikistan’s hydropower
infrastructure, if accurate, is encouraging. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 55358
date: 3/6/2006 8:00
refid: 06BRUSSELS731
origin: Embassy Brussels
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000731
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, GG, AM, AJ, TX, KZ, TI, KG, USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND ENERGY SECURITY WITH EU OFFICIALS
Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary: In U.S.-EU COEST Troika consultations on
Caucasus and Central Asia on February 23, EUR DAS Matt Bryza
discussed with EU officials how to change the dynamic of
discussions on South Ossetia.
Echoing an EU Presidency
statement on February 21, EU representatives agreed that the
international community should explore the idea of a new
forum besides the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to negotiate
a political settlement for South Ossetia. EU officials
acknowledged that Russian intransigence is
an impediment in negotiations but said that Georgian rhetoric
and behavior should also be moderated.
EU Special
Representative (EUSR) for Caucasus Talvitie said that it is
also important to say that the JCC still has a function in
implementing previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1
and 2 of Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan:
de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic
rehabilitation. All agreed that
discussions on
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) should continue despite the missed
opportunities at the Feb.10-11 summit at Rambouillet. The
Austrian Presidency said it would like to help the cause of
Armenian/Turkish relations during its tenure. EUSR believes
that the South Caucasus has a European future and it would be
valuable to try to convince officials in Moscow of this. On
Central Asia, the Austrian Presidency said it will have a
series of events focused on Central Asia starting in April in
Astana. On Kazakhstan, the
European Commission highlighted
three goals: 1) Support democratic
reforms; 2) Assist in WTO accession; 3) Engage on energy. On
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, EU has not been able to
effectively address its priorities of democratization and
poverty alleviation because of its limited representation.
However, all agreed that promotion of moderate Islam in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be key to EU/US interests in
the region. There are no
improvements in EU relations
with Uzbekistan. Regarding
Turkmenistan, the EU pushed the
idea of having human rights consultations in Ashgabat and
promoting a constructive energy dialogue to promote European
energy security. End Summary.
Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia
—————————-
2. (C) DAS Bryza acknowledged the Austrian EU Presidency,s
February 21 statement on South Ossetia, which noted that the
JCC should be judged according to the results it achieved,
and that the international community should look at other
avenues for negotiation. Bryza
suggested that one
possibility could be a
forthcoming OSCE Donors’ Conference for South Ossetia, which
would be attended by the EU and OSCE and member states from
these organizations, and which could build momentum towards a
new and potentially more successful negotiation process.
Commission staff expressed caution, and Talvitie, while
acknowledging
the JCC’s limitations, stressed that it is important for us
to say that the JCC still has a function: implementing
previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1 and 2 of
Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan:
de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic
rehabilitation.
3. (C) Talvitie urged a cautious approach on negotiations,
wondering whether we should first acknowledge Russia,s
preference to discuss de-militarization of South Ossetia
before moving on status discussions.
Talvitie nevertheless
stressed it should be made clear to the Russians that we do
want to discuss status soon. DAS
Bryza acknowledged this
reality but expressed concern that the Georgians need to see
soon that there is a «light at the end of the tunnel» before
they get discouraged and therefore emboldened. The Russians
need to understand that our leverage over the Georgians faces
real limits, and Georgians may resort to force if they feel
they lack support in the international community to press
Russia to cooperate in advancing a peaceful, negotiated
settlement. Thus, the status quo
that Russia seems to seek
may not actually exist. DAS Bryza
expressed appreciation at
the February 21 EU statement on South Ossetia noting we might
build on it to changeing the
dynamic of negotiations over
the conflict. Bryza lamented that
Russia had taken several
provocative steps in recent days with respect to the South
Ossetia conflict, including: walking back its agreement to
attend a JCC session in Vienna if the Georgian parliament
moderated its resolution calling for the withdrawal of
Russia,s peacekeeping operation, (which the Georgian
Parliament did in fact do); falsely dubbing a meeting in
Moscow with the Ossetians a JCC (even though Amb. Kenyaikin
assured Bryza this would be only an informal, preparatory
meeting for a later JCC), and then claiming Georgia and the
OSCE refused to attend the «JCC;» canceling Georgian Prime
Minister Noghaideli,s meeting with Russian PM Fradkov,
(which the Russians pledged to hold if the Georgian
Parliament moderated its resolution); and reportedly
conducting military over flights of Georgian territory. EU
interlocutors agreed such Russian behavior appeared designed
to be provocative, and recognized that the Georgian side had
indeed moderated its behavior in recent weeks, as requested
by Moscow.
Armenia/Azerbaijan
——————
4. (C) Representing the incoming Finnish Presidency, Petteri
Vuoromaki urged the continued work of OSCE
co-chairs on N-K negotiations and believed that we needed to
«rein in» both parties because the rhetoric is getting too
aggressive. He expressed concern
that Azerbaijan may soon
become bellicose on N-K as it begins to fortify its army from
its oil windfall. EUSR Talvitie
conveyed that one high-level
Azeri official expressed to him the desire for additional
peace negotiations since the Rambouillet talks failed to make
any progress. The Austrian
Presidency believed that we could
see a Russian effort «to deliver» a solution for N-K by this
summer’s G-8 summit in order to portray itself as a
peacemaking nation while continuing to forestall negotiations
on South Ossetia.
5. (C) DAS Bryza said that Rambouillet was not a complete
failure, that Azerbaijani President Aliyev had made a
significant offer, that the ball was now in the Armenian
court, and that Moscow had a chance to deliver Yerevan. DAS
Bryza expressed hope that Turkey would agree to open its
border with Armenia should Armenia withdraw from territories
it currently occupies in Azerbaijan as part of a broader deal
on NK. The Austrian Presidency
said that it is interested
in advancing Turkish/Armenian relations during its tenure and
would work to achieve this end.
6. (C) EUSR Talvitie said that we needed to approach
democratization of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an
«evolutionary» mindset.
He welcomed the U.S. statement
following Azerbaijani elections in early November. He
believes transformation can happen there but that we will
have to be patient. In a humorous
aside, EUSR said that when
he goes to Baku and Yerevan to speak to their respective
Parliaments, he gets standing ovations when he proclaims that
the «EU is for evolution, not for revolution!» However, he
receives a standing ovation in Tbilisi when he propounds in
Parliament that «the EU is for revolution, not for
evolution!» However, he
believes that it is worthwhile to
convince a tough crowd in Europe that the South Caucasus has
a European identity and future; he thought this was common
ground for the EU and US to work together. Expressing
optimism about President Aliyev, Talvitie said that Aliyev
will need time to simultaneously shed the «dead-wood» from
his father’s entourage while building his
own political base. The EC said
it will be opening offices
in Azerbaijan in 2007.
Kazakhstan
———-
7. (C) The Commission said its goals for Kazakhstan are
threefold: 1) Support democratic reforms; 2) Assist in WTO
accession; 3) Engage on energy.
The EC believes that
market-driven energy climate in Kazakhstan is important and
it will work to achieve this; it supports the idea of
multiple sources of energy through multiple pipelines. DAS
Bryza said that Kazakhstan is emerging as the key partner in
the region and that the EU/US should work with Kazakhstan,s
new Deputy Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, to help him move
reforms forward. All agreed that
Kazakhstan’s bid for the
2009 OSCE Chairman-in-Office is problematic, but we should
not rule out future bids.
Tajikistan
———-
8. (C) The Commission pointed out that Tajikistan is the most
important and biggest recipient of the Commission’s aid in
Central Asia. However, given the
EU’s limited representation
in Dushanbe, efforts to channel this aid to effective use for
poverty alleviation are hamstrung.
The EC expressed concern
about President Rahmonov’s systematic repression of political
candidates and the Tajik Parliament’s consideration of an NGO
law that would require continued re-registration of foreign
NGOs represented in
the country; the EC considers this proposal misguided and
would seriously impede their NGO operations.
9. (C) All parties agreed on the importance of helping
Tajikistan Bolster its traditions of tolerant faith and
scientific learning to counter foreign missionaries,
attempts to import extremist interpretations of Islam.
DAS
Bryza conveyed that this is an important area for EU/US
cooperation and that together we can help remind Tajiks of
the importance of their indigenous history and their
deeply-held, moderate Islamic roots.
The Austrian Presidency
believed that, together, the EU and US should convey to
Rahmonov that having a moderate Islamic political party in
his government is a positive sign.
DAS Bryza concurred and
said that the USG has been trying to send this message but
Rahmonov’s
mistrust of political opposition is hindering progress on
this front.
Kyrgyzstan
———-
10. (C) EU officials expressed worry about Kyrgyzstan
trending «from bad to worse.»
Political discussions between
the EU and the Kyrgyz government have been disappointing,
Council officials said, and the economy is not only slowing,
but contracting. The Commission
made reference to a
cooperation agreement that was signed on February 3 between
Turkish Cypriots and Kyrgyzstan; the EC believes that Moscow
might have encouraged this deal to be signed as a way to
drive a wedge between Brussels and
Bishkek. Further enshrouding this
situation was when the EU
asked the Kyrgyz government for the substance of the
agreement, the Kyrgyz declined saying the agreement is
confidential. Furthermore, the EC
thought it was odd that
SIPDIS
the Turkish Prime Minister recently received the Kyrgyz
Foreign Minister. DAS Bryza
believed that the pull from
Moscow is strong right now in
Bishkek (as it is in Dushanbe)
and therefore we have to work extra hard to advance
democratization in these two countries.
We have a
real interest in seeing Kyrgyzstan succeed — therefore, we
have to promote democracy.
Stability comes
legitimacy, which derives from democracy. EU officials
agreed with DAS Bryza that the GOK risked prompting a
resurgence of civil unrest if it failed to advance democratic
and constitutional reform and fight corruption. Civil
society (fortunately) remained vibrant in Kyrgyzstan, and
expected President Bakiyev to deliver on his promises to
provide justice and prosperity.
Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan
———————
11. (C) The Austrian Presidency conveyed that there have been
no improvements in the EU’s relationship with Tashkent.
There is little incentive for the EU to cooperate with
Uzbekistan as the Karimov government says it wants to be able
to choose which EU NGOs can operate in the country; if the EU
does not allow this, the Commission said, the government has
said it will make life extremely difficult
for NGOs there. Citing no
improvement in US-Uzbek relations,
DAS Bryza said the U.S. aimed to sustain its current — albeit
modest — level of engagement with Uzbekistan. The U.S. had
made a conscious decision to criticize the GOU,s
indiscriminate use of force in Andijan, in full recognition
that this would likely cost us access to the air base at
Karshi Khanabad. Karimov was uncomfortable in the
position he is in right now being wholly dependent on Beijing
and Moscow. Perhaps he would come
to his senses and realize
the only way to end the descending spiral of
repression-extremism-repression-extremism was to embrace
reform rather than repression. In
the long run, the United
States and the people of Uzbekistan would hopefully be able
to work together to help the people of Uzbekistan embrace the
moderate traditions of Classical Islam that were born a
millennium ago in what is today Uzbekistan. This was perhaps
the most effective way to counter the extremist threat that
Hizb-U-Tahir poses to Uzbekistan.
12. (C) On Turkmenistan, DAS Bryza called on the EU/US to
explore whether a trans-Caspian gas pipeline might bolster
European energy security. DAS
Bryza explained that Niyazov
was indicating interest in a Trans-Caspian Pipeline to
provide him some leverage in dealing with Gazprom, thereby
allowing him to negotiate a gas sales price that Gazprom
could no longer dictate and which was closer to prices in the
European market. The Austrian
Presidency shared these
opinions but also pushed to have
human rights conversations with Turkmen officials in Ashgabat
(where, they said, a lot of government officials actually
show up for these meetings). DAS
Bryza agreed, recounting
how he told President Niyazov in January that securing the
participation of U.S. companies and/or export finance
organizations like OPIC in a trans-Caspian pipeline would
require progress on democracy and human rights.
Energy Security
—————
13. (C) DAS Bryza discussed the broader issue of European
energy security with EU officials.
The U.S. sought to
enhance European energy security because the more secure
Europe is, the more secure the U.S. will be, and because U.S.
interests are served when markets function well. While we do
not want confrontation with Russia’s gas monopoly Gazprom, we
share an interest with our European friends in Europe
diversifying Europe,s gas supplies away from Gazprom. We
could do so by relying on market mechanisms. Our goal is to
accelerate upstream investment by private companies in gas
production in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Iraq, which in
turn will provide Europe confidence that it can negotiate
more firmly with Gazprom on pricing without locking itself
into long-term deals that increase its dependence on a singly
supplier of gas. But convincing
upstream producers to
accelerate their investments would require Europeans to
provide requisite regulatory reforms and pipeline
infrastructure to receive Central Asian gas. Turkmenistan
figures prominently in this strategy, since its gas reserves
are the largest currently in play for delivery to Europe via
either the Gazprom network or a new corridor running across
the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, then through Georgia and
Turkey to Greece and Italy,
and/or to Romania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Austria. As such a
«Southern Corridor» emerges,
the large split between Central Asian and European gas prices
would gradually diminish, thereby eliminating the enormous
rents that fuel organized crime and lack of energy sector
reform along pipeline routes.
Moreover, as Gazprom lost the
ability to force Central Asian countries to sell it cheap
gas, it would need to reform itself internally to attract
foreign investors required to develop gas fields in Russia.
This was the only way to channel Gazprom toward more
market-based and therefore, constructive behavior. EU
officials took on board this message.
They agreed on the
need to eliminate the price differentials between gas bought
in Central Asia and Europe and agreed commercial competition
was the best and perhaps only way to channel Gazprom toward
reform rather than acquisition of European energy assets.
EUSR said that the EU will play an important role in
advancing energy security in its dialogue with Turkey. The
EU said a green paper on European energy security would be
forthcoming in the spring.
14. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.
McKinley
.
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 55377
date: 3/6/2006 10:48
refid: 06DUSHANBE442
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO8855
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0442 0651048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 061048Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6892
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1425
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1466
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1455
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1406
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1355
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1421
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1380
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1314
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1225
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1006
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1456
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 1504
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0799
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8014
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000442
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK STUDENTS DEMAND APOLOGY FROM EMBASSY OVER 2004 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT
REF: 05 DUSHANBE 2014
1. (U) Students from Tajikistan’s Technological
University
published an open letter March 2 criticizing by name an Embassy
Public Affairs Section FSN for distributing the State
Department’s 2004 Human Rights Report on Tajikistan. The
students charge the report with being slanderous and inaccurate.
They said the report does not
give enough attention to positive
steps Tajikistan has made towards improving human rights. They
fear the publication and distribution of such «black
information» undermines Tajikistan’s international reputation.
Claiming the employee offended the Tajik people’s dignity, and
motivated by patriotism, the students demanded an apology from
the Embassy employee to the students and the Tajik government.
Two newspapers have published this open letter so far.
2. (U) During a human rights roundtable at Tajik
Technological
University December 12, EmbOffs distributed Russian-language
copies of last year’s Human Rights Report on Tajikistan and
engaged students in a two-hour conversation (ref). Prior to
December 12, the government purposely tried to block EmbOffs
from holding the roundtable. Post
originally approached the
Russian-government-sponsored Russian-Tajik Slavonic University
to host a discussion on human rights.
When the Russian Embassy
vetoed that plan, Post asked Tajik Technological University, but
was refused by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the
Embassy hand-delivered a diplomatic note to the president’s
adviser, the government finally relented at the last minute and
allowed EmbOffs to speak with students at the Technological
University.
3. (SBU) COMMENT:
Given the government’s original disproval
of the human rights discussion with students, post suspects the
government had a hand in the open letter, although it was
attributed to the students. The
letter is an attempt to
discredit the Human Rights Report-the 2005 version slated for a
March 8 release. Post will send
the media a response letter
from the Ambassador. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 55383
date: 3/6/2006 11:23
refid: 06DUSHANBE443
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 06DUSHANBE239
header:
VZCZCXRO8900
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0443/01 0651123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061123Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6893
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1426
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1467
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1456
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1407
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1356
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1422
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1381
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1315
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1226
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1457
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1505
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1007
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0800
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8015
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000443
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, EUR/PPD, R, P, S/P, EUR
NSC FOR MLLARD, MERKEL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PROP, EINV, SNAR, SOCI, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: DISTORTED
VIEWS FROM THE EDUCATED STREET
REF: DUSHANBE 0239
DUSHANBE 00000443 001.2 OF 002
1. SUMMARY: Distorted views of U.S. policy and goals
originate, in large part, in the Russian mass media, which
dominate Tajikistan’s information space.
Reputable and
independent international broadcasts in Russian, perhaps from a
CNN Russian Service, would help to alleviate this problem. END
SUMMARY.
2. In December, Dushanbe
newspapers published an attack on
ABA/CEELI’s law and rights program for high school students,
alleging that it was part of a «color revolution» plot to
undermine authority and turn students against their parents.
The Ambassador responded with a letter to the editor setting the
record straight. That letter
prompted an op-ed from a local
lawyer and occasional journalist, Dmitriy Juravlev, attacking
U.S. foreign policy on democracy and on other issues. It was
clear Juravlev was not recycling government talking points, but
was making a reasonably good-faith effort to understand U.S.
policy in a badly distorted information environment. In his
reply to Juravlev, the Ambassador invited him to meet and
discuss his ideas.
3. Juravlev and the Ambassador
met March 2 for 90 minutes. In
his early 30s, Juravlev was graduated from the Tajik Pedagogical
University and the Russian Legal Academy in Moscow. He worked
for two and a half years in the Tajik presidential apparat
covering human rights, disarmament, and foreign policy issues.
He left when a new boss came in and is currently the assistant
manager of the Tajik Nitrogen Plant in Yovon, Khatlon Oblast.
4. Juravlev is no dummy. We report his views as an example of
what U.S. public diplomacy is up against on the reasonably
well-educated street. His
questions and views included the
following:
— Why is the United States really involved in a remote country
like Tajikistan? What is your
real motive?
— Other countries like Russia and Iran are investing in
Tajikistan. Why does the United
States refuse to invest?
— Didn’t you invade Iraq and aren’t you preparing to invade
Iran so that you can control their oil and deny access to it by
China and India so that their economies won’t grow and threaten
U.S. global dominance?
— Your military has occupied Afghanistan for four years, but
heroin production continues to burgeon.
Aren’t you really
colluding with the Afghan government to poison Russia with
heroin to weaken Moscow?
— Why are you building the [Pyanzh River] bridge and promoting
road-building and other infrastructure projects? Don’t you
really have military goals in mind?
5. The Ambassador responded
candidly and at length to each
question, explaining U.S. views and goals. At the end, Juravlev
replied, «I know all that.
I’ve read all your speeches and
interviews,» implying that a U.S. official’s views are
unreliable simply because they are official.
6. COMMENT: By Tajik standards, Juravlev is well-educated,
well-spoken, and not ill-informed, considering the information
to which he has access. In
post-Soviet Tajikistan, people like
him gain their understanding of the world largely from Russian
broadcast and print media. Each
of Juravlev’s allegations has
appeared in Russian media here.
While we will add Juravlev to
DUSHANBE 00000443 002.2 OF 002
our distribution list and invite him to appropriate programs,
there are thousands and thousands more Juravlevs that we can’t
reach in person. This would seem
to argue for the kind of
independent Russian-language broadcasting proposed reftel, «The
CIS Needs a CNN Russian Language Service.» END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 55499
date: 3/7/2006 3:46
refid: 06DUSHANBE447
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 05DUSHANBE2014
header:
VZCZCXRO0062
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0447 0660346
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 070346Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6900
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 1432
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1428
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0310
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0057
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1469
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1458
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0533
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0802
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1409
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1358
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8778 PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1383
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1317
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0539
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0034
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1228
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1459
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1507
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1009
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0029
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8022
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000447
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIK STUDENTS DEMAND APOLOGY FROM EMBASSY OVER 2004 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT
REF: 05 DUSHANBE 2014
1. Students from Tajikistan’s
Technological University
published an open letter March 2 criticizing by name an Embassy
Public Affairs Section FSN for distributing the State
Department’s 2004 Human Rights Report on Tajikistan. The
students charge the report with being slanderous and inaccurate.
They said the report does not
give enough attention to positive
steps Tajikistan has made towards improving human rights. They
fear the publication and distribution of such «black
information» undermines Tajikistan’s international reputation.
Claiming the employee offended the Tajik people’s dignity, and
motivated by patriotism, the students demanded an apology from
the Embassy employee to the students and the Tajik government.
Two newspapers have published this open letter so far.
2. During a human rights
roundtable at Tajik Technological
University December 12, EmbOffs distributed Russian-language
copies of last year’s Human Rights Report on Tajikistan and
engaged students in a two-hour conversation (ref). Prior to
December 12, the government purposely tried to block EmbOffs
from holding the roundtable. Post
originally approached the
Russian-government-sponsored Russian-Tajik Slavonic University
to host a discussion on human rights.
When the Russian Embassy
vetoed that plan, Post asked Tajik Technological University, but
was refused by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the
Embassy hand-delivered a diplomatic note to the president’s
adviser, the government finally relented at the last minute and
allowed EmbOffs to speak with students at the Technological
University.
3. COMMENT: Given the government’s original disproval of
the
human rights discussion with students, post suspects the
government had a hand in the open letter, although it was
attributed to the students. The
letter is an attempt to
discredit the Human Rights Report-the 2005 version is slated for
a March 8 release. Post will
send the media a response letter
from the Ambassador. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 55880
date: 3/9/2006 10:24
refid: 06DUSHANBE464
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination: 06DUSHANBE464
header:
VZCZCXRO3235
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0464/01 0681024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091024Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6925
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1459
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1424
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1470
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1429
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1384
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1359
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1410
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1010
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0803
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1229
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 8047
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000464
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN; TDA FOR SCOTT GREENIP AND DAN STEIN; COMMERCE FOR
PHILIP DE
LEON AND DANICA STARKS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, EINV, CH, TI
SUBJECT: U.S. GETS BUSY SIGNAL FROM TAJIK TELECOM
DUSHANBE 00000464 001.2 OF 002
1. SUMMARY: Despite the striking success of Indigo, a
U.S.-Tajik cellular service joint venture, China has taken the
lead in developing Tajikistan’s telecom sector. Meetings with
Tajikistan’s key telecom decision makers highlighted the growing
role of China and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the lack of real regulation and the pitfalls
of letting the government control international connectivity.
The United States can play an important role in providing
technical guidance and assistance, but may end up taking a back
seat to other investors in the infrastructure projects. END
SUMMARY.
CHINA TAKING LEAD IN TELECOM
2. «Things have changed a
lot in
