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id: 51813
date: 2/6/2006 4:54
refid: 06DUSHANBE239
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000239
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, R, EUR, SA, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/6/2016
TAGS: PREL, PROP, KDEM, KPAO, RS, ZK
SUBJECT: THE CIS NEEDS A CNN RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SERVICE
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) This message is Central
Asia specific, but it is
relevant to the other countries of the former Soviet Union,
including Russia, as the other U.S. ambassadors to CIS countries
agreed during a January 4 meeting in the Department with U/S
Burns.
2. (C) Russia is increasingly
flexing its political and
economic muscles in the region.
In principle, there is nothing
wrong with this, but it is doing so as a way to carve out a
«sphere of influence» — a concept that the United States
rejects. A World Bank study
released on January 31 warned that
two blocs are forming in Europe-Eurasia — a relatively rich and
traditionally liberal bloc identified with Western values, and a
poorer, authoritarian bloc in the former Soviet Union led by
Russia.
3. (C) It has become clear that
Russia’s goal is to limit the
influence and presence of the West in «Russia’s bloc» to the
fullest extent possible. The
unrelenting Kremlin attack on U.S.
democracy NGOs over the past 18 months, asserting they are U.S.
intelligence-agency tools working to overthrow existing
governments in order to encircle, isolate, and weaken Russia,
has been especially harmful.
Russia’s promise, yet to be
delivered, of massive investments in Central Asia gives these
governments less reason to pursue economic reform to meet
international standards. And so,
both our political and
economic agendas for this region are increasingly challenged.
4. (C) In Central Asia, 90
percent and more of the population
rely on television and, to a slightly lesser extent, radio for
news, information, and general world-view. Even poor villages
bristle with satellite dishes.
What is available to these
populations is state-controlled broadcast media and, most
popular of all, Russian television broadcasts. Russian
television is now state-controlled, and the Russian press is
increasingly state-influenced.
Because of this, it is
increasingly hard to get the U.S. message to the general public
in Central Asia. What the people
know about the United States
and its policies is largely what the Kremlin wants them to know
— and that is not to the benefit of the United States.
5. (C) Traditional U.S. public
diplomacy will always have a
role to play, but it relies increasingly on Internet-based
products. Internet is still not
broadly used in Central Asia,
especially at home, and users who do access our sites are a
specialized, self-selecting audience likely to be already
well-disposed toward the United States.
Speakers, artists, and
other special programs are one-off events. They are almost
always extremely well-received and make a momentary splash, but
they reach a miniscule portion of the population.
6. (C) RFE/RL radio broadcasts
reach at very best 15 percent of
the population, VOA radio much less, and VOA TV programs, where
they are rebroadcast (not in Tajikistan), reach even fewer. In
theory, the United States could mount a major new broadcast
effort, but considering priorities and budget limitations we
acknowledge that is most unlikely.
Further, the generally
literate adult populations of Central Asia lived under the
Soviet media regime, and the younger part of the population has
grown up with rigidly controlled, and head-bangingly boring,
state broadcasts. All want
something independent from
government, including from the U.S. government.
7. (C) We need to think outside
the box. One way to achieve
this would be through a Russian-language service of CNN
International. CNN already has
language services — e.g.,
Arabic, Turkish, Spanish — and in theory could initiate a
Russian service. The demographics
would seem to be promising,
with an increasingly wealthy Russia, and also Kazakhstan. In
fact, EUR DAS Bryza is aware of a generally progressive (for the
region) broadcasting corporation in Kazakhstan that might
welcome a joint venture with CNN that could broadcast direct by
DUSHANBE 00000239 002 OF 002
satellite throughout the CIS.
8. (C) CNN Russian service would
be beneficial for the entire
CIS, not the least Russia, especially as Moscow moves toward the
2008 presidential election, and beyond.
The World Bank report
emphasizes that the emergence of two blocs in Europe-Eurasia is
not yet necessarily a given. We
should do everything possible
to ensure that we do not drift into an ideological Cold War-II.
9. (C) If the Department decides
it is worthwhile to pursue a
CNN Russian option, the point of contact is CNN International
Managing Director Chris Cramer (404-827-3491). We would suggest
that the best contact from the Department to initiate this
discussion would perhaps be U/S Hughes or U/S Burns.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51881
date: 2/6/2006 12:36
refid: 06DUSHANBE246
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000246
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, EUR/PPD, DRL, SA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, PROP, KDEM, KPAO, TI
SUBJECT: ROUNDTABLE WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR AND LOCAL MEDIA
DUSHANBE 00000246 001.2 OF 002
1. The Ambassador and PAO met on
February 3 with 15 local
editors and other prominent journalists for a 90-minute informal
but on-the-record roundtable.
————
U.S. PATRIOT ACT
————
2. The journalists covered a
variety of topics, starting with
the State of the Union address and the President’s comments on
the Patriot Act. The Ambassador
explained that the Act was a
response to the events of September 11, 2001, and gave
law-enforcement agencies in the U.S. more leeway to track down
terrorists. He added that
historically during wartime, the U.S.
has experienced some abridgement of civil liberties, but the
issue has always been vigorously debated in our democratic
society.
———
U.S. NGOS
———
3. The journalists asked about
the status of foreign NGOs
working in the United States. The
Ambassador pointed out that
although there is certainly no restriction on foreign NGOs in
the United States (with the exception of the limits on providing
money to political parties), most international NGOs work in
developing countries. The
Ambassador stated that media reports
of U.S. NGOs being linked to intelligence agencies with the goal
of overthrowing governments in the region is nothing more than
intentionally harmful «black propaganda.»
————————-
EXTREMISM VS. TERRORISM: THE HT
EXAMPLE
—————————
4. The journalists were very
interested in the definition of a
terrorist versus extremist organization, and wondered why
extremists like Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) are allowed to operate in
the United States. The Ambassador
explained that unless the
group is violent or espouses violence, its members are entitled
to their rights under the U.S. Constitution, including the
freedom of speech and of assembly.
There is never, however, the
right to hurt other people or destroy property. The Ambassador
acknowledged that HT is an extremist organization that bears
close observation, but it is not a terrorist organization
because there is no proof that it has ever employed violence.
————————
THE DANISH CARTOON CONTROVERSY
———————-
5. The journalists asked about
the «Danish cartoons,» noting
their lack of sensitivity to Islam.
A lively discussion ensued
as to when it becomes like shouting «fire» in a crowded
theater
and goes beyond freedom of speech.
The journalists bemoaned the
lack of sensitivity to Islam in Western culture.
6. After these more philosophical
topics, the journalists moved
to the tougher questions: U.S.
policy on Iran and Hamas. The
Ambassador hewed closely to the Department’s Echo Chamber
talking points.
—————————————
DNI SAYS CENTRAL ASIA TO COLLAPSE INTO CHAOS?
—————————————
7. A journalist asked the
Ambassador to comment on DNI
Negroponte’s statement that Central Asia is in danger of
collapsing into chaos. The
Ambassador said he could not comment
DUSHANBE 00000246 002.2 OF 002
because he had not yet seen the original statement and did not
know if the DNI had been correctly quoted. (COMMENT:
We have
now seen the statement and expect it will elicit much media
discussion in coming days. END
COMMENT.)
8. The journalists unanimously
concurred that an informal
roundtable at the Ambassador’s residence was better than a
formal press conference, and that it should occur on an
occasional basis. Post fully
concurs and will make this a
regular part of our public diplomacy outreach.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 51986
date: 2/7/2006 4:07
refid: 06DUSHANBE250
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 06CEP20020206027174|06DUSHANBE151
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—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000250
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/CACEN, SA, DRL
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/7/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, TI
SUBJECT: DPT ACTING LEADER:
«WE DON’T FEEL YOUR SUPPORT»
REF: A) DUSHANBE 0151 B)
CEP20020206027174
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) The Ambassador and PolOff
met for an hour on February 6
with Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan
(DPT), Rahmatullo Valiyev. The
imprisoned Mahmadruzi Iskandarov
is still the DPT’s titular head.
The meeting was within the
context of a DPT effort, as evidenced by its February 6 press
release, to engage foreign embassies and international
organizations to press for Iskandarov’s release. In fact,
Valiyev had little to say on this account and, instead, made a
long and sometimes emotional plea for more overt U.S. support
for his party.
2. (C) Valiyev opened by noting
Russian Ambassador Ramazan
Abdulatipov has already endorsed President Rahmonov for
re-election this year and commented, properly, that this is
interference in Tajikistan’s internal affairs (refs). He
accused the U.S. Embassy of «going silent» on support for
democracy and independent media — «We don’t feel your support»
—
and made a veiled request for U.S. financial support for his
party, because its membership base is urban intelligentsia «who
are poor.» Although
independent polls show the DPT with only
about 1.5% support in the Tajik electorate, Valiyev argued that
his party’s real support is at least 60%, «because the one
million Tajiks who have gone to Russia to work have done so
because they hate Rahmonov.»
(COMMENT: His glaring fallacy is
that they are all, therefore, DPT supporters. END COMMENT.)
3. (C) The Ambassador explained
that the United States supports
the democratic process, not specific parties and personalities.
He noted his widely publicized December speech to youth
activists calling for greater democracy and independent media,
and reminded Valiyev that U.S. NGOs continue to work to build
civil society in Tajikistan, which is the long-term foundation
for true democracy. The
Ambassador further noted that he and
his colleagues continue to work intensively through quiet
diplomacy to keep Tajikistan from going further down the wrong
path, but he acknowledge this is frustrating for Tajikistan’s
democratic forces because it is not visible cannot be
publicized. The Ambassador noted
it would be as inappropriate
for him or the U.S. Embassy to endorse the DPT as Abdulatipov’s
open support for Rahmonov.
4. (C) Valiyev criticized the
International Monetary Fund for
forgiving Tajikistan’s $99 million debt under the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries mandate, and he said the United States
should «stop giving Rahmonov money.» The Ambassador explained
that U.S. assistance funds programs, not the government and
individuals, and is for activities in the interest of the nation
and people of Tajikistan, like border security and
counter-narcotics. Valiyev
acquiesced but disagreed with the
strategy, because his view is the sooner Rahmonov is «cut
off,»
the sooner the DPT can come to power.
(COMMENT: According to
independent polls, without the President’s Peoples Democratic
Party in the mix, the Communist Party and the Islamic
Renaissance Party would rise to the top of the lists at this
time. END COMMENT.)
5. (C) Valiyev criticized U.S.
exchange programs for sending
Tajik government officials, who are predominantly from the
President’s party, to the United States.
The Ambassador
explained that exchange participants are chosen not for their
political party allegiance, but for their expertise and
likelihood of rising to more important positions in the future.
DUSHANBE 00000250 002 OF 002
He emphasized that we find many reform-minded younger officials
whom we want to encourage.
6. (C) Valiyev reminded us that
he had sent Secretary Rice a
letter shortly after her October 13 visit to Dushanbe, asking
her to intervene for Iskandarov at the European Court of
Justice. He asked, in the name of
his party presidium, if she
had yet done so. The Ambassador
assured Valiyev that the
Secretary surely had read his letter, but that it would be
SIPDIS
inappropriate for her to intervene in a court action on behalf
of an individual.
7. (C) Valiyev pressed that only
the United States can bring
democracy to Tajikistan — neither Russia, China, nor Iran will
do so. The Ambassador assured
Valiyev that working to enlarge
the democratic space in Tajikistan is one of his highest
priorities.
8. (C) COMMENT: The three so-called democratic parties in
Tajikistan have miniscule support, in part because they are to
varying degrees personality-based, and also because they do not
have a critical mass of party workers to build broader support.
Also, none at this time has a savvy and charismatic politician
as a leader. That said, should
such a leader improbably emerge,
Rahmonov would certainly quash him, as he did Iskandarov. While
we must acknowledge that Rahmonov’s action against Iskandarov
was politically motivated, we also should not forget in a more
unguarded moment in the past Valiyev admitted to the Ambassador
that Iskandarov had surely been corrupt when he was Chairman of
TojikGaz — «He’s a rich man!
How do you think he got his
money?» — one of the charges on which he was eventually
convicted. We continue to believe
that the Tajik people would
naturally gravitate toward a populist democratic leader, should
one ever emerge. However, at this
time, no such leader exists.
Our long-term task is to remain committed to building civil
society in Tajikistan. There is
no reason democracy cannot
blossom here, but it will not happen in the short term. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 52191
date: 2/8/2006 12:18
refid: 06DUSHANBE268
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000268
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM, PREL, PINR, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: NDI REGISTRATION: YOUR DOG’S TAIL IS CROOKED
REF: A) DUSHANBE
1. (SBU) Tajik folk wisdom has it
that even if all your papers
are in order, inspectors will find something wrong — your dog’s
tail is crooked — for example.
After many promises that
re-registration for National Democratic Institute (NDI)
personnel was solved, it turns out to be unsolved. DCM spent an
hour and a half at the «OVIR» registration office, with many
cell phone calls to the MFA, to no avail. OVIR’s English
equivalent is printed at the entrance.
The bronze plaque reads:
Departament of Viza and Registration of Foreing Citizens,»
(sic).
2. (SBU) The normally two-minute
process dragged on and on as
the OVIR Chief Inspector found excuse after excuse for not
re-registering NDI Program Director Nurul Rakhimbekov, a CIS
citizen who must keep a current registration on file. First,
the inspector simply said «no, come back in the afternoon.»
Then, she needed the NDI landlord’s passport. We dispatched a
driver and 30 minutes later complied.
(We learned later that
the landlord has already been summoned to the Prosecutor’s
Office for questioning.) Then she
complained that Rakhimbekov
could not be registered as an individual since he works for an
NGO. DCM took exception to all of
these technicalities and said
the Ambassador has an understanding with the Deputy Foreign
Minister that Rakhimbekov will be registered as an individual,
then local Director Gegham Sargsyan will be registered, also as
an individual, and then we can fight about NDI’s registration as
an NGO.
3. (SBU) Two cell phone calls
with the MFA bought us some time,
but no decision before lunchtime, when we were escorted out. At
that point, the final word was that Rakhimbekov is still legal
until February 15, and so he should not re-register until then.
Throughout the process we kept many other applicants waiting,
and there were groups of other seemingly unoccupied men giving
us malevolent glares.
4. (SBU) In the afternoon, DCM
again discussed the issue with
MFA North American Chief Nasriddinov, who said he would inform
the Minister of the latest developments.
5. (SBU) At about 4:30 DCM called
Nasredinov again. He said
the Minister would probably call the Ambassador in on Thursday.
First to discuss a security incident in Washington, then to
assure the Ambassador, once again, that the NDI issue is
«solved.» Regarding the
security incident, the Tajiks are
looking for a diplomatic note from the State Department about
how to proceed in a case in which their driver was allegedly
assaulted.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: The NGO problem is a long way from being
solved. In fact, according to the
American Councils’ Director,
the Prosecutor’s Office has given the green light to
investigators to initiate investigations at any NGO office. The
fine line between investigation and harassment is not always
recognized in Tajikistan and this signal to lower level
officials is likely to be interpreted as open season on NGOs,
particularly American NGOs. Even
dogs with straight tails are
likely in for a rough period.
7. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 52194
date: 2/8/2006 12:27
refid: 06DUSHANBE269
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 000269
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM, PREL, PINR, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: NDI REGISTRATION: YOUR DOG’S TAIL IS CROOKED
REF: A) DUSHANBE
1. (SBU) Tajik folk wisdom has it
that even if all your papers
are in order, inspectors will find something wrong — your dog’s
tail is crooked — for example.
After many promises that
re-registration for National Democratic Institute (NDI)
personnel was solved, it turns out to be unsolved. DCM spent an
hour and a half at the «OVIR» registration office, with many
cell phone calls to the MFA, to no avail. OVIR’s English
equivalent is printed at the entrance.
The bronze plaque reads:
Departament of Viza and Registration of Foreing Citizens,»
(sic).
2. (SBU) The normally two-minute
process dragged on and on as
the OVIR Chief Inspector found excuse after excuse for not
re-registering NDI Program Director Nurul Rakhimbekov, a CIS
citizen who must keep a current registration on file. First,
the inspector simply said «no, come back in the afternoon.»
Then, she needed the NDI landlord’s passport. We dispatched a
driver and 30 minutes later complied.
(We learned later that
the landlord has already been summoned to the Prosecutor’s
Office for questioning.) Then she
complained that Rakhimbekov
could not be registered as an individual since he works for an
NGO. DCM took exception to all of
these technicalities and said
the Ambassador has an understanding with the Deputy Foreign
Minister that Rakhimbekov will be registered as an individual,
then local Director Gegham Sargsyan will be registered, also as
an individual, and then we can fight about NDI’s registration as
an NGO.
3. (SBU) Two cell phone calls
with the MFA bought us some time,
but no decision before lunchtime, when we were escorted out. At
that point, the final word was that Rakhimbekov is still legal
until February 15, and so he should not re-register until then.
Throughout the process we kept many other applicants waiting,
and there were groups of other seemingly unoccupied men giving
us malevolent glares.
4. (SBU) In the afternoon, DCM again
discussed the issue with
MFA North American Chief Nasriddinov, who said he would inform
the Minister of the latest developments.
5. (SBU) At about 4:30 DCM called
Nasredinov again. He said
the Minister would probably call the Ambassador in on Thursday.
First to discuss a security incident in Washington, then to
assure the Ambassador, once again, that the NDI issue is
«solved.» Regarding the
security incident, the Tajiks are
looking for a diplomatic note from the State Department about
how to proceed in a case in which their driver was allegedly
assaulted.
6. (SBU) COMMENT: The NGO problem is a long way from being
solved. In fact, according to the
American Councils’ Director,
the Prosecutor’s Office has given the green light to
investigators to initiate investigations at any NGO office. The
fine line between investigation and harassment is not always
recognized in Tajikistan and this signal to lower level
officials is likely to be interpreted as open season on NGOs,
particularly American NGOs. Even
dogs with straight tails are
likely in for a rough period.
7. (U) Kabul minimize considered.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 52450
date: 2/10/2006 5:31
refid: 06DUSHANBE272
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1367
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1311
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1266
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RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0738
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 7769
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000272
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR, E, EB, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, ECON, EINV, ENRG, SNAR, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: MURKY
BUSINESS AND GEO-POLITICS
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: In two meetings with U.S. businessmen on
February 9, a reliable CEO passed along the rumor that the
largest cell-phone and Internet company in Tajikistan,
Babilon-T, is founded on drug money and may sooner or later be
bought by Moscow’s Sistema-MTS. A
less reliable U.S.
interlocutor asserted that Tajikistan knows that Russia/RusAl is
jerking it around with the promise to build Rogun Dam and
Hydroelectric Station. He says
Tajikistan is wide open to U.S.
leadership to build Rogun. END
SUMMARY.
POTENTIAL MONEY LAUNDERING?
2. (SBU) The Ambassador met on
February 9 with long-standing
friend of the Embassy, Richard Seney (please protect), President
and CEO of Alexandria-based MTC Corporation, which is the parent
company of Indigo Cellular in Tajikistan, a joint venture with
the Aga Khan Group. Seney is a
credible interlocutor. MTC is
also heavily invested in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central
Asia.
3. (C) Seney reported an
«explosion» of cell-phone use in
Tajikistan, with his company registering an increase during the
past five months from 5M minutes to 25M minutes. His
explanation: «The cell-phone
culture is catching on.» He said
his company feels secure because its largest volume of business
is in Khujand and surrounding Sogdh Oblast, where it is
autonomous from the Indigo leadership in Dushanbe, where it
could be subject to political whim.
Even so, Seney remains a
tad uneasy because his major partner in Sogdh is Governor Qosim
Qosimov’s brother, and the Qosimov’s dominant position in Sogdh
is subject to Dushanbe’s political winds.
4. (C) Seney reported that the
biggest cell-phone company in
Tajikistan is Babilon-T (NOTE:
The Embassy’s Internet provider.
END NOTE). Babilon-T’s real ownership remains shrouded
in
mystery. The minority shareholder
is believed to be «security
agencies» in Tajikistan. The
majority owners are extremely
closely held, but rumored to be big drug money. According to
Seney, there is clear evidence that Babilon-T’s business
leadership is positioning the company to sell it, by ineptly
driving up the number of users, which is not the true value of a
cellular company — minute-usage is the true value. Sistema-MTS
from Moscow has long been in talks with Babilon-T, but has not
yet reached an agreement, although in the end is expected to
conclude the deal, because Tajikistan is the only place in
Central Asia (apart from Kazakhstan)
where Sistema does not
have a footprint. Seney agreed
with the Ambassador that a sale
of Babilon-T, if the rumors are true, would be tantamount to
major drug money laundering.
«TAJIKISTAN KNOWS RUSSIA IS JERKING IT AROUND ON HYDRO»
5. (SBU) The Ambassador met on
February 9 with EurasiaLink’s
(also Superior Engineering-American Hydro) Rudolph Rubiner
(please protect), who has a TDA-funded feasibility study on the
table with the Ministry of Energy for the Varzob and Karakum
Cascades hydroelectric projects.
6. (C) We do not consider Rubiner
a fully credible
interlocutor, and so report the following for what it is worth.
DUSHANBE 00000272 002 OF 002
7. (C) Rubiner first presented
himself as already having the
contract to build the Varzob and Karakum projects. When
challenged on this, he became defensive and agitated, and then
suggested what he really has is agreement-in-principle for EBRD
to finance the project and, thus, will surely win the final
contract because he is so close to the Energy Minister.
8. (C) A former Soviet citizen at
ease operating in this
environment, Rubiner has been spending a lot of «quality time»
with Energy Minister Nurmahmadov at his dacha’s sauna and in
other social settings. Rubiner
claims that Nurmahmadov, and
thus President Rahmonov, are convinced that Russia/RusAl will
never build Rogun Dam and Hydro-electric station, even though
Russia keeps telling the West, «Hands off Rogun.» They are
especially dyspeptic that RusAl’s Deripaska is now playing
footsie with the Uzbeks, including with First Daughter Gulnora
Karimova.
9. (C) According to Rubiner, the
top-level Tajik view is that
Putin threw in the promise on Rogun, via RusAl, at the October
14, 2004, summit in Dushanbe as a honey-trap to ensure that
Moscow would get permanent status for its military base in
Tajikistan and to build political capital. (NOTE:
It is worth
remembering that Deripaska’s appearance at the October 14 summit
was a surprise for all, even for most in the Russian delegation,
as suggested by «Kommersant» articles and then-Russian
Ambassador Maksim Peshkov. END
NOTE.) According to Rubiner,
all the hoopla that RusAl keeps slinging around in Tajikistan —
pop-star concerts, billboards, relatively minor philanthropy —
may be little more than eyewash to keep the Tajiks dangling for
geo-political purposes.
10. (C) Rubiner asserted that
Nurmahmadov and other senior
Tajiks are desperate for U.S. leadership in the International
Financial Institutions to take the lead on Rogun. «If you do
that, Tajikistan will do anything you want,» Rubiner insisted
Nurmahmadov said. Rubiner pressed
the Ambassador to spend the
evening in Nurmahmadov’s sauna.
The Ambassador countered that
he would be pleased to meet Nurmahmadov at any time in the
Energy Minister’s office.
11. (C) When asked if the
business climate in Tajikistan has
changed in the five years he has been involved here, Rubiner
hesitated, then responded, «There’s more money, but it’s still
Communist, or authoritarian — same thing. The President and his
team control everything. It’s all
insider dealing. A deputy
minister of energy just got the main factory for repairing city
transformers, so he can profit from all the government
contracts.»
12. (C) COMMENT: This alleged Tajik understanding about
Russia’s intentions, or non-intentions, about Rogun does not
indicate what they think about Deripaska’s interest in the TadAZ
aluminum plant, which is supposedly linked to the Rogun project.
We know that the main
business-political contact for Deripaska
is Orien Bank’s Chairman, First Brother-in-Law Hasan Sadullayev,
but we know almost nothing about their business dealings. We
occasionally hear rumors that the top Tajiks know that Deripaska
is playing games with TadAZ, and that they are ever more leery
of him since he allegedly accepted Uzbek President Karimov’s
complaint that TadAZ is polluting Uzbekistan. Whatever the
truth, foreign businesses need a rather strong stomach to
operate successfully here, or need a strong backbone of
international transparency and rectitude, like Seney’s MTC. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 52503
date: 2/10/2006 12:35
refid: 06DUSHANBE275
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
VZCZCXRO2708
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0275/01 0411235
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INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1401
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1281
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1369
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1313
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1268
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1164
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000275
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, G
EMBASSY TASHKENT FOR EVELYNN PUTNAM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EIND, ETRD, SENV, RS, TI
SUBJECT: TADAZ CLAIMS POLLUTION HAS DECREASED
DUSHANBE 00000275 001.2 OF 002
1. (U) SUMMARY:
Central Asia’s Regional Environment, Science,
Technology and Health Officer (REO) and PolOff visited the
Tajikistan Aluminum (TadAZ) plant in Tursun-Zoda near the
Uzbekistan border February 9.
Uzbekistan blames the Tajik
government for allowing TadAZ to pollute the environment, which
affects Uzbek towns just across the border. TadAZ officials
claimed air and water pollution from the plant has decreased
tremendously and painted a rosy picture of an ideal company
town. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) Rustam Latifov, current deputy chairman of
the State
Committee for Environmental Protection (SCEP), explained one
reason for the friction between the Uzbek and Tajik governments
on pollution issues is each country has different methodology,
standards and statistics for measuring pollution. Latifov added
that the Uzbeks pollute more than the Tajiks. According to
Tajik standards, the TadAZ pollution levels are acceptable.
3. (U) TadAZ has its own Department for
Environmental
Protection, headed by Nurali Kadirov.
TadAZ lab tests of the
water and air quality show pollution declining since the
nineties. A possible reason for
the decline is that in 1992 and
1997 TadAZ installed $16 million worth of pollution prevention
technology from Norway. According
to TadAZ environmental
officials, a TadAZ scientist patented a process he developed to
recycle aluminum waste into other products. Last year TadAZ
produced 380,000 tons of aluminum and also 15,000 tons of
aluminum waste. TadAZ officials
would not give PolOffs copies
of their assessment, explaining that the document had sensitive
commercial information as well.
Their assessment was derived
from the work of three laboratories in Tajikistan. The SCEP has
a laboratory in Dushanbe and TadAZ has two laboratories equipped
with Soviet-era equipment-one at their plant facilities and one
in a suburb of Tursun-Zoda.
4. (U) Most of TadAZ’s newer equipment and
technology comes
from Russia, although the original equipment is early 1970s
French. TadAZ officials mentioned
that RusAl is considering
modernizing the plant. When asked
about RusAl’s relationship
with the plant, TadAZ officials would not comment. They said
their role as environmental monitors prevented them from knowing
whom their clients or suppliers are and said TadAZ processes raw
materials brought from an intermediary who also sells their
products. (Note: Although they
did not come out and directly
say it, the intermediary is a Russian company.)
5. (U) TadAZ is the largest employer in the city and
like
other large Soviet company towns, continues to provide services
to its workers. In 2000, TadAZ
built a hospital where employees
and their families can seek free medical treatment. City
residents can also go to the hospital for a negotiated, but
nominal fee. In addition, TadAZ
has also set up a «green zone»
where they planted trees. TadAZ
officials noted that not only
does the park benefit the community; the plant life is also used
as an indicator of pollution.
«If the trees are alive and well,
then there is no pollution problem.»
6. (U) Factory workers, according to Kadirov, can
earn up to
$300/month depending on how much they produce. EmbOffs were
permitted to walk right up to the machines and aluminum
production sites. Few safety
measures were seen. All employees
wore helmets, but none had on masks to prevent inhaling the
metallic dust and chemical fumes swirling around the plant.
7. (U) The meeting with TadAZ was originally
scheduled just
between EmbOffs and TadAZ officials.
The day before, Latifov
requested to participate, and during the meetings answered most
of EmbOffs’ questions. Latifov
often sided with the TadAZ
DUSHANBE 00000275 002.2 OF 002
Department on Environmental Protection’s responses on
environmental issues. Their
common stance was an inherent
conflict of interest exists between businesses and the
environment, and businesses naturally act in their own interest.
In a private comment, Latifov
sounded surprised by the notion
gaining currency in U.S. environmental circles that the cost of
a product should include its environmental effects.
8. (SBU) COMMENT:
The state-owned TadAZ provides Tajikistan,
along with cotton, significant export earnings and plays a
critical role in the weak economy.
Officials are unlikely to be
overly concerned with environmental impact, particularly if it
occurs on the other side of the border.
SCEP is in no position
to act as a watchdog, particularly given the fact that much of
TadAZ’s aluminum is likely controlled by the giant RusAl. The
question of TadAZ pollution is also geopolitical. RusAl’s
Deripaska, seeking investment in Uzbekistan, seems to have
bought, at least in part, the Uzbek complaints about TadAZ
pollution, much to Tajik officials’ annoyance. Given the
quality of the lab and equipment that EmbOffs saw, as well the
fact that TadAZ’s labs are company-owned, TadAZ’s results are
questionable and its evaluation of its environmental impact
cannot be taken at face value.
9. (SBU) BIO NOTE: Latifov, a former deputy chairman
at the
State Committee for Environmental Protection, was recently
dismissed and most likely will be promoted to a post in a new
regional water commission. His
brother, Oumed Latifov, is AES
Director for Energy Development in Central and South Asia. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
