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id: 44788
date: 11/9/2005 10:57
refid: 05DUSHANBE1793
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 05DUSHANBE1729|05DUSHANBE1762|05DUSHANBE1766
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001793
SIPDIS
NSC FOR MERKEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/9/2015
TAGS: PREL, ECON, PGOV, EAID, KDEM, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: EU SWIMMING IN THE SAME MOLASSES IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: A) DUSHANBE 1729 B)
DUSHANBE 1762 C) DUSHANBE 1766
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) In a meeting with the European Commission,
Muzaffar
Isakov, Director of the Aid Coordination Unit of the President
of Tajikistan, suggested that while EC experts and consultants
would continue to receive visas for Tajikistan, international
NGO workers were less welcome.
Barbara Plinkert, Chargi d’
affaires for the European Commission briefed Poloff November 6
about her meeting to discuss EC-financed NGO problems obtaining
and renewing visas, and a new $7 fee for invitation letters from
the MFA’s Consular Department.
Isakov suggested the Europeans
shift their support from humanitarian assistance to economic
development. (The same message we
heard from Foreign Minister
Nazarov reported reftel B.)
Isakov was pleased with the
technical assistance on certain issues, but saw little need for
continued civil society projects.
He also asked Plinkert to
provide more information, possibly quarterly reports, about the
organizations and projects they were funding.
2. (C) Plinkert reminded Isakov that all personnel
working on
EC-financed projects are entitled to visas under an assistance
agreement signed in 1994. Article
10 specifically stipulates
that «The Government shall grant personnel taking part in
services contracts financed by the (European) Community, and
members of the their family, as defined in Article 9, multiple
entry visas and appropriate visa extensions to be issued in the
republic of Tajikistan.»
3. (C) In a November 3 letter signed by Adrian van
der Meer,
Head of Delegation, the Europeans firmly reminded the Tajiks of
the conditions. «Up to now
the Delegation of the European
Commission to Tajikistan has assisted the Government in applying
for visa (sic) for international experts and consultants. With
the new fees imposed and delays experienced, this arrangement
appears no longer practicable. In
order to avoid further
misunderstandings I would request that, in future, the
Government take full responsibility for the issuance of visa in
compliance with Article 10.»
4. (C) Plinkert suggested that since the EC and USG
fund
similar projects, and often partner with the same NGOs, the
missions in Tajikistan coordinate their approach to the growing
visa difficulties. She accepted
Poloff’s invitation to an NGO
roundtable later in the month, possibly with Tajik officials, to
better understand the changing climate and develop a strategy to
work with the Tajiks to ensure established projects can continue.
5. (C) COMMENT: In an unusually
coordinated effort, the Tajiks
are sending a strong message to the donor community: we want
your money, but not your NGOs. As
the goalposts continue to
shift, post will work with other donors and NGOs to comply with
the system so as to continue the critical democracy and civil
society work.
6. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Post has also heard rumors that the
Head of the Consular Department, Bakhrom Kholnozarov, believed
to be a Rahmonov relative, has been profiting greatly from his
position from additional fees and bribes (Reftel c). This is
the first we’ve heard of a new fee for invitation letters, but
the motives may be less anti-NGO and more old-fashioned
corruption. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 44797
date: 11/9/2005 11:35
refid: 05DUSHANBE1796
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001796
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/9/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: NDI FENDS OFF RAID BY INTERIOR MINISTRY
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Hoagland, Ambassador, US Embassy
Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) During a National Democratic Institute (NDI)
training
program for Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)
members, three plainclothes militia members tried to break up
the event, calling it an «unauthorized religious gathering.»
According to NDI program directors Gegham Sargsyan and Nurul
Rakhimbekov, the police showed their Ministry of Interior
identification and then said NDI had failed to register the
October 28 event with the MOI.
(NOTE: An April 14 MFA Circular
Note instructs NGOs to notify the MFA of meetings of more than
10 participants, but we are unaware of any requirement to
register any event with the MOI.
END NOTE.) After a heated
30-minute discussion, the police left, but continued to observe
participants entering and exiting from the street.
2. (C) Sargsyan and Rakhimbekov admitted they had
not notified
the MFA about the training program, but lamented they were stuck
between a rock and a hard place due to their legal limbo. If
they notified the government of their event, they ran the risk
of having the government ban any event, due to their lack of
registration.
3. (SBU) However, they commented they had recently
conducted
the same party-building training programs for the ruling
Peoples’ Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) with great
success. Despite their
unregistered status, they enjoy good
relations with the PDPT, which has sought out NDI help to train
women and regional party members.
NDI was even been invited by
the Ministry of Justice-the same ministry that has yet to
register NDI-to help Justice Minister Hamidov lead a training
program in honor of Constitution Day November 6.
4. (C) COMMENT:
It is hard to say whether the actions of the
militia targeted NDI or the bearded IRPT members entering the
meeting; however, in light of recent government attempts to
control mosques and prevent girls from wearing the hijab in
public schools, we lean towards the notion this was directed at
the IRPT. NDI’s legal limbo seems
to make it harder for them to
conduct activities beyond those that help build the capacity of
the ruling party. Post advised
NDI to behave as if it were a
registered NGO.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 44805
date: 11/9/2005 12:24
refid: 05DUSHANBE1798
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001798
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, PHUM, TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: FREEDOM
HOUSE IN STRATEGIC RETREAT
1. (SBU) Primarily due to the ending of its DRL grant,
Freedom
House is shifting its Tajikistan efforts to a local NGO. Robert
Freedman, Washington-based Program Director, told the Ambassador
November 9 that Freedom House did not want its Tajik partners
and human rights defenders to feel abandoned. In order to
maintain a presence, and build on the NGO’s successes, local
staff had founded and registered a new NGO, Freedom, to work
with the human rights community.
Although DRL funding has
expired, Freedman said potential donors, especially the
Institute for Humane Studies, are interested in funding a Tajik
think tank to allow journalists and scholars to look at domestic
problems and find domestic solutions.
2. (SBU) Freedman observed that Tajikistan provided a
great
deal of «political space» in which human rights workers and
others met freely and discuss sensitive issues without fear of
arrest or repercussions from the government. «This would never
happen in Uzbekistan,» he emphasized. He gave the example of a
Tajik student who participated in a Freedom House training
program, and then published an op-ed piece about her positive
experience. He did caution that
freedom of expression might be
constrained in the period leading to the November 2006
Presidential elections.
3. (SBU) COMMENT: For a director whose NGO has been
specifically targeted by the Tajik government, Freedman was
surprisingly positive about the human rights atmosphere in
Tajikistan. However, as pleased
as we are that things are not
as bad as in Uzbekistan, the situation for NGOs in Tajikistan is
far from good. We support the
notion of establishing a think
tank in Dushanbe, particularly one focused on economic or legal
rights, which would fill a need for more focused intellectual
debate. END COMMENT.
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 44886
date: 11/10/2005 6:00
refid: 05DUSHANBE1802
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination: 05STATE201459
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
UNCLAS DUSHANBE 001802
SIPDIS
STATE FOR PM/WRA (KATHERINE BAKER), EUR/CACEN, SA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MASS, PREL, TI
SUBJECT: DEMARCH DELIVERED:
DESTRUCTION OF STATE BORDER PROTECTION
COMMITTEE-HELD MANPADS
REF: STATE 201459
1. Post delivered reftel demarche
on MANPAD destruction on
November 9 to General Saidamir Zuhurov, Chairman of the State
Border Protection Committee (Tajik Border Guards).
2. On the first point, Zuhurov
said Tajikistan is working well
with OSCE on the destruction of small arms, light weapons, and
ammunition.
3. On the second point, Zuhurov
stated that he knew of only
five or six MANPADs that existed and believed they had already
been destroyed. He will confirm
whether they have been
destroyed or not, and if not, he has no problem with OSCE
destroying them. He will provide
us with confirmation by
November 20.
4. On the third point, taking
steps to make arrangements with
OSCE, Zuhurov stated that the Government of Tajikistan is
cooperating fully with OSCE and will also cooperate on MANPAD
destruction.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 44916
date: 11/10/2005 11:02
refid: 05DUSHANBE1805
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001805
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015
TAGS: KDEM, PREL, PGOV, TI
SUBJECT: TIPS FROM THE MFA ON HOW TO FIGHT THE WAR OVER NGO’S IN
TAJIKISTAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Armbruster, DCM, Dushanbe, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) DCM had a long talk with MFA North America
Chief
Ismatullo Nasredinov on November 10 on the growing pressure on
U.S. and other Western NGO’s. The
DCM said Tajikistan appeared
to be taking a step backwards by not providing registration,
visas, or other support for NGO’s like the Rotary Club and CADA,
two of the latest targets for harassment. Further, Tajikistan
cannot expect international businesses to establish in
Tajikistan if NGO’s are under pressure.
Nor can the Embassy
advocate more foreign investment if the mission is tied up with
defending beleaguered NGO’s.
Nasredinov, a young official just
back from the United States, offered a number of helpful
observations.
2. (C) Nasredinov suggested that
the Ambassador approach the
Foreign Minister about hosting a roundtable discussion on NGO
activity in Tajikistan. Since one
of DCM’s talking points was
to suggest a roundtable for November 29-30, DCM readily agreed
that Nasredinov had hit on a good idea.
Nasredinov said the
roundtable would not resolve all problems, but if mid to high
level officials from MFA, Justice, and Security attend, there is
a good chance of making progress.
Nasredinov also suggested
that NGO’s go on an information offensive and raise their
profiles. He said some NGO’s such
as Save the Children and IFES
are well known for their good work.
Others «simply register and
never do any work or promotion.»
When DCM raised the Rotary
Club for example, an organization that is apparently being
denied registration, Nasredinov said most Tajik bureaucrats do
not even know that Rotary is a service organization providing
community projects and business promotion worldwide. Nasredinov
said Tajik officials are only getting one side of the argument
(from the Russian propaganda machine) but if presented with both
the negative and positive assessments they could analyze the
conflicting reports and hopefully come to the right conclusion.
As it is now, officials are only hearing the negative side.
3. (C) Nasredinov was quite
impressed with his first-ever trip
to the United States. He was not
aware of the power of business
and political lobbies prior to the trip, nor did he expect to
hear so many different opinions on foreign policy from his
interlocutors. The political
debate that he was exposed to was
clearly eye opening and extremely useful in shaping his views on
American democracy. Nasredinov
was impressed with the dynamism
of the interagency process and the competition for ideas.
American border control procedures in Buffalo, New York were
also useful in shaping his thinking on Tajikistan’s border
operations.
4. (C) COMMENT:
Nasredinov is not a power broker in
Tajikistan, but he is clearly not on the path to becoming part
of the «old guard.» He
is savvy enough to understand what can
and cannot get done in the U.S.-Tajik relationship and he is
willing to offer ways forward.
However, it is clear that his
trip revealed to him just how backward his colleagues can be,
particularly on the issue of civil society. Post will have to
be careful not to expose Nasredinov as too much of a reformer,
and hope that he can rise to a level of influence within the
government soon. END COMMENT.
5. (C) AMBASSADOR’S COMMENT: We have argued that this
government is neither monolithic nor dumb. We need to listen
carefully to our mid-level contacts, while recognizing that they
have very little influence at this time.
We had already planned
to begin working on a major information and public relations
offensive, and will soon put this into play. We will soon
submit a cable outlining what we think is happening in the
country and steps that Embassy Dushanbe and the U.S. Government
can take in response. While we
will inevitably be reactive, we
also want to take the high road and search for those strategies
that will best promote the goal of transformational diplomacy.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
NNNN
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 45022
date: 11/14/2005 6:21
refid: 05DUSHANBE1812
origin: Embassy Dushanbe
classification: SECRET
destination: 05DUSHANBE1805
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
—————— header ends —————-
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001812
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, EUR, SA, DRL, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
ALMATY PASS TO USIAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PROP, ECON, EAID, KDEM, KPAO, RS, TI
SUBJECT: DESPITE RUSSIAN PRESSURE, THE UNITED STATES CAN PROMOTE ITS
POLICY GOALS IN TAJIKISTAN
REF: A. A) DUSHANBE 1805
B. B) DUSHANBE 1762
C. C) DUSHANBE 1646
D. D) DUSHANBE 1352
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy
Dushanbe.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Although we now de-emphasize its previous
Cold-War primacy in U.S. foreign policy, Russia still requires
clear-eyed scrutiny for the havoc it can play with the
President’s democracy agenda and larger goals for
transformational diplomacy in the former Soviet republics. We
believe Russia is exerting consistent and strong pressure on
Tajikistan to reduce the U.S. and Western role and presence.
Although Tajikistan’s «open-door» foreign policy seeks to
balance competing foreign pressures for its own best interests,
Moscow’s pressure is beginning to take a toll. To promote
democracy and economic and political reform in Tajikistan, we
need to develop new ways to overcome negative Russian actions
and influence. END SUMMARY.
WHY IS RUSSIA FOCUSING ON TAJIKISTAN?
2. (S) Russia is paying special
attention to Tajikistan because
of its military base and other strategic interests, including
the Nurek Space Tracking Center.
Moscow is determined to do
everything possible to prevent a «color revolution» in
Tajikistan that could threaten its perceived strategic
interests. Working from the
«siloviki» zero-sum-game worldview
of current geo-politics, some in Moscow seem to believe that the
United States wants additional and permanent U.S. military bases
in Central Asia and sees Tajikistan as a prime candidate,
especially after the U.S. loss of Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan.
3. (S) Despite the fact that
Tajiks are war-weary and
opposition-leary, and President Rahmonov is still genuinely
popular, Moscow truly fears a «color revolution» in
Tajikistan.
Elsewhere, «color revolutions» have tended to bring
Western-oriented leaders to power, although in Tajikistan no
Saakashvili or Yushchenko is waiting in the wings. A «color
revolution» in Tajikistan, the «siloviki» fear, would
open the
door for a U.S. military base, or even more devastating to
Moscow, for Dushanbe to kick out the Russians and give the
Russian military base to the United States. The nightmare of
the «siloviki» is that the United States would then have a
string of bases from Afghanistan, through Tajikistan, and into
Kyrgyzstan to weaken Russia and dominate Central Asia, which
Russia persists in calling its «sphere of influence.»
4. (S) This may sound like easily
dismissed fringe paranoia,
but the «siloviki» do not play by our rules of fact-based
logic.
It is worth recalling that Moscow
and the Russian Embassy in
Dushanbe consistently put out the irrational rumor in 2004 that
the United States had secretly convinced Tajikistan to demand
that the Russian Border Force leave the Tajikistan-Afghanistan
border which Russia had controlled back to the 19th century.
WHAT IS RUSSIA DOING?
5. (C) Because Russia is
militarily weak, it uses other means
to assert its authority in Tajikistan.
After years of
inconclusive negotiation, Russia and Tajikistan rapidly reached
agreement in 2004 (following Tbilisi’s Rose Revolution) to
forgive Tajikistan’s bilateral debt and to establish the legal
basis for the Russian military base in perpetuity.
6. (C) The symbolic culmination
was President Putin’s October
16, 2004, visit to Tajikistan. To
set the hook in Rahmonov’s
jaw, Putin also announced major investments, variously described
as $1.2 billion to over $3 billion, in Rahmonov’s pet interests
— hydropower (primarily Sangtuda-1 and secondarily Rogun) and
the old Soviet aluminum tolling industry. Until then, no
nation, especially in the West, took Rahmonov’s pleas seriously
to invest in these Soviet-era behemoths, although it is now
evident that they had some economic merit, especially for South
Asia.
7. (C) Since Russia made its
commitment-in-principle, Iran has
expressed interest in creating the financial consortium for
Sangtuda-2, and China has said it will invest in the Nurek
Hydroelectric Station. These
potential investments, especially
Russia’s, could be seen as economically positive for Tajikistan
and the region, or at least politically benign — except that
Russia appears recently to be working to exclude Western
participation in them (septel).
8. (C) Through the second half of
2004 and 2005, Russia has
mounted a campaign to prevent «color revolutions» in the CIS.
In overt media propaganda and in private and covert
communications with governments like Tajikistan’s, Moscow has
asserted that U.S. democracy NGOs — specifically, National
Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute,
Freedom House, and Internews — are U.S. covert tools whose job
is to prepare the local populations to overthrow «legal
governments» in the CIS.
More recently, the goal of Russian
pressure seems to be to limit the presence of not just U.S.
democracy NGOs but all Western elements present in Tajikistan.
9. (C) On the ground in
Tajikistan, the Russian position seems
to be hardening. The previous
Russian Ambassador, Maksim
Peshkov, was reasonable, amiable, and accessible. He worked the
diplomatic circuit and was always available for reasonably
frank, even if inconclusive, discussions with the U.S. and other
Western ambassadors.
10. (C) Since the arrival in
early summer of the high-level
political appointee, Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov, the Russian
Embassy has become a closed bastion.
The U.S. Embassy’s
previous access to different sections of the Russian Embassy has
nearly dried up, and Abdulatipov very seldom appears in public.
He continues to accept diplomatic invitations, but almost
invariably at the last minute pleads an unexpected visitor from
Moscow or that he is indisposed.
The rare times that he is seen
in public — e.g., at important countries’ national days — he
ostentatiously huddles in a corner with the most senior Tajik
officials present.
11. (C) At the same time, we and
other Western embassies hear
that Russian Embassy officers have unlimited free access at any
time to Tajik Government offices, sometimes even barging in
without appointments. This is
especially telling because all
other embassies are required to submit diplomatic notes, to
which the responses are often long delayed, for appointments to
conduct even the most mundane mid-level daily business.
12. (S) Most important, the
Russian intelligence services
thoroughly dominate Tajikistan’s Ministry of Security. Ministry
of Security views often take precedence in the Presidential
Apparat and key ministries like Justice that is responsible for
registering foreign NGOs and Tajik media outlets and political
parties.
BUT RAHMONOV IS NOT A SIMPLE PAWN
13. (C) Tajikistan describes its
foreign policy as «open door,»
and balances its relations with the United States, Russia,
China, Iran, and the European Union seeking what is best from
each for its own national interests.
During the last six
months, President Rahmonov has repeatedly let us know he is
«satisfied» with the U.S.-Tajik relationship. He is especially
pleased with the security relationship — primarily U.S. funding
and training to increase Tajik capabilities for border control,
counter-narcotics, and counterterrorism.
14. (C) Even on the contentious
issue of U.S. democracy NGOs,
Rahmonov has appeared to split the baby — refusing legal
registration for National Democratic Institute and Freedom
House, but allowing them, nonetheless, to operate most of their
programs. Another positive sign
is that he has just approved
for the national school curriculum a civic-education textbook
that has been a long-term project of the International
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).
For some reason, IFES
is the only U.S. democracy NGO that escaped Tajik scrutiny and
operates unfettered.
INCREMENTALLY CLOSING IN ON WESTERN NGO’S AND OTHERS
15. (C) More recently, though, we
detect an incremental
hardening of the Tajik position.
Although no new Tajik anti-NGO
legislation is pending like in Kazakhstan and Russia, the Tajik
Government is consistently working to gain greater control over
all NGOs, not just democracy ones.
16. (C) The Tajik Government
argues that during the 1992-97
Civil War and in its aftermath, Western NGOs flooded into
Tajikistan without limit or supervision.
Dushanbe now wants to
find out who is actually in Tajikistan and what they are doing.
For any country concerned about security, this is reasonable.
But we also believe it is a Ministry of Security response to
Russian prodding to prevent a «color revolution» and limit
Western influence.
17. (C) Further, Tajikistan has
recently been floating a new
policy position, including during Secretary of State Rice’s
October visit and more recently with the European Union. The
Tajik Government suggests it is time for foreign assistance
delivered via NGOs to cease and be replaced by direct foreign
investment in infrastructure projects (like the hydroelectric
stations and roads) and business «joint ventures.»
18. (C) Foreign Minister Nazarov
has told us that this is, so
far, a Tajik Government «desire, not a policy» (reftel B).
Tajikistan argues that NGOs are both expensive, because of their
high overhead to support foreign advisers, and sometimes
ineffective. This, Tajikistan
says, is an unacceptable waste of
foreign assistance. While this
argument has some merit, it
suggests a worrisome trend, and will scare off the very
international investors they are trying to attract.
INCREASING VISA DELAYS — MALEVOLENCE OR JUST INCOMPETENCE?
19. (C) Even more worrisome,
obtaining Tajik visas is becoming
more difficult — not just for U.S. NGO staff, but also for
European NGO workers, foreign business people, and even staffs
of international financial institutions.
Being an «inscrutable
Eastern country,» Tajikistan never likes to say
«no.» It just
drags things out until reasonable but impatient people give up.
There is a credible view in the Western diplomatic community
that these new visa problems are a result of Russian prodding to
limit Western influence in Tajikistan.
It is worth noting the
Ministry of Security vets all visa applications.
20. (C) However, another
explanation is possible — corruption
and incompetence. The previous
reasonably professional chief of
the Foreign Ministry’s Consular Office was replaced this past
summer by a Rahmonov relative (reftel D), and that’s when the
new problems started. It could be
that he has the job to assure
loyalty to a new restrictive visa policy. However, the Rahmonov
«cousins, nephews, and in-laws» have a reputation for gaining
lucrative positions, few with any real qualifications, and then
going wild with unrestrained corruption.
That could be
happening with visas. The most
famous example this year was a
son-in-law appointed as Chief of Border Control at Dushanbe
International Airport. Flagrantly
incompetent and corrupt, he
lasted only a few months before he was quietly «reassigned to
another position.»
BOOST THE ECONOMY TO PREVENT A «COLOR REVOLUTION»
21. (C) Russia’s anti-U.S. stance
in Tajikistan and Dushanbe’s
incremental moves against U.S. and other Western NGOs may be
coincidental. However, we know
Russia agitates for countries
like Tajikistan to curtail, if not expel, U.S. NGOs. More
indirectly, Russia does not deliver «foreign assistance» via
Russian NGOs in Tajikistan.
Moscow’s promises of massive direct
investment in hydropower and aluminum may have emboldened
Rahmonov to begin to draw the line against NGO-provided Western
foreign assistance.
22. (C) We know Rahmonov
understands clearly that one of the
key trip-wires for «color revolutions» is chronic economic
stagnation. While he has been
reasonably open to economic
reform that would eventually create the conditions for Western
economic investment, he may now be impatient with how long that
process takes and that it comes with no tangible promises of
investment. He may believe that
to survive, he has to give
Tajikistan concrete economic improvement and growth, and do it
fast.
23. (C) From the West, Rahmonov
receives painful and
long-drawn-out economic restructuring and seemingly endless and
inconclusive feasibility studies.
From Russia (and Iran and
perhaps China), he receives promises of large-scale investment
that could potentially lift the entire economy. He has no
extensive experience in the West and no deep understanding of
the complexities and realities of the global economy. He wants
Tajik economic growth, and he wants it now. If he has to take a
little extra political baggage from Moscow, that’s a price he
may be willing to pay. At the
same time, we do not believe that
he will abandon Western-style economic restructuring and reform.
He wants to hedge his bets.
WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO?
24. (C) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: Our short-term focus will be to
protect the interests of U.S. NGOs as deliverers of
developmental assistance. A
mid-level Foreign Ministry official
recently told us that the Tajik Government generally does not
understand what U.S. NGOs really do and simply listens to Russia
on these matters (reftel A).
(COMMENT: This may not be as
absurd as it seems. All written
communication with any part of
the government must be conducted by diplomatic note, and the
Ministry of Security screens all diplomatic notes. We suspect
the Ministry of Security does not pass forward diplomatic notes
with which it does not agree. END
COMMENT.) Embassy Dushanbe
plans to arrange information roundtables to bring together
senior government officials and major U.S. developmental NGOs.
We will also start a public diplomacy campaign of press releases
focusing each week on one U.S. NGO and its achievements for
Tajikistan. Print media reach a
miniscule percentage of the
population; but we know that the Ministry of Security and
Presidential Apparat carefully study each and every U.S. Embassy
press release, and that’s what counts.
25. (C) SUPPORT FOR TAJIK
HYDROPOWER IN GREATER CENTRAL ASIA:
In brief, the U.S. Government needs to make clear to the
Government of Tajikistan, in international fora and in public,
that the United States supports the development of Tajikistan’s
hydroelectric potential for export to Afghanistan and Pakistan
to create new Central-South Asian links.
See septel.
26. (C) ENGAGEMENT: We cannot and should not attempt to
compete with the constant back and forth of Russian and Tajik
officials between Moscow and Dushanbe — and even less should we
attempt to emulate their drinking bouts.
However, building on
Secretary Rice’s successful October 13 visit, we would
SIPDIS
definitely benefit from more frequent and — this is important —
longer senior U.S. visits.
Rahmonov does indeed listen, but he
needs to have U.S. interlocutors willing to spend more than a
few hours in Tajikistan every six months or so. He especially
needs interlocutors who do not focus on the relatively stable
security side of the bilateral relationship but who can tackle
the harder parts of the relationship, including economic
development.
27. (SBU) U.S. ASSISTANCE
REVIEW: We do not want to appear
like iconoclasts seeking to reinvent the wheel of U.S.
assistance for Tajikistan. But we
do suggest for consideration
two possibilities:
28. (C) (A) For democracy NGOs,
we need to consider whether
current partners’ approaches have been overtaken by events. For
example, if Internews can no longer be effective with its
current programs because Tajikistan is using its licensing
regulations to strangle the broadcast of non-government
information (reftel C), we need to consider whether a refocus on
training journalists and helping «independent» media outlets
to
become financially independent might be a better way to meet our
media goals. Any NGO will likely
find successes to justify its
current programs, but we may need a review council with
political-level participation to determine whether current
assistance is promoting U.S. core policy goals — or if we are on
self-defeating autopilot.
29. (C) (B) It may be useful to
convene an off-cycle senior
assistance review with both U.S. and Tajik participants who are
decision makers, not just at the technical level. We need to
listen as well as to preach. What
does Tajikistan want? How
can we make what Tajikistan wants support core U.S. policy
objectives? We believe that if we
make this effort, and
especially if we can jointly reach consensus, there will be less
pressure on U.S. development NGOs.
This, in turn, will provide
a wider space for the United States to promote its core policy
goals and objectives.
30. (C) COMMENT: Tajikistan has brought this latest crossroads
on itself. There is the requisite
political stability for
Tajikistan to continue on its modest path of democratic,
economic, and political reform.
However, thanks to Russian
pressure, Tajikistan is embarking on a potentially
confrontational approach that will slow development and
encourage the Tajikistan Government’s worst instincts. Now is
the time to encourage Tajikistan to stay on track. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
